Political History
Lesotho's modern history began when it gained full independence from
Great Britain on October 4, 1966. The Kingdom of Lesotho was
established as a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament
consisting of a Senate and an elected National Assembly. In the first
elections taking place in 1970, the ruling party, the Basotho National
Party (BNP), appeared to be behind its rival the Basotholand Congress
Party (BCP) in early election results. Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan
consequently nullified the elections, suspended the constitution,
declared a national state of emergency, and dissolved the Parliament.
In 1973, a rubber-stamp Interim National Assembly was established by
the ruling BNP to serve as a political instrument. Increasingly, Jonathan
began to feel the pressure from South Africa which threatened to close
land borders and pursue more direct action if the BNP government did
not cease its support of the African National Congress (ANC). South
Africa's apartheid regime believed that Lesotho was providing a safe
haven and training grounds for the ANC, the black-led party which
supported the overthrow of the South African government. Having
geographically been placed in a position to rely on South Africa,
Lesotho was particularly fearful of South Africa's apartheid regime. As
violence and internal disorder plagued Lesotho, the military took over in
1986.
A Military Council decree issued in January 1986, transferred state
executive and legislative powers to the King who was to act upon the
advice issued by the Military Council, a self-appointed group of leaders
of the Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF). The new military
government chaired by Justin Lekhanya ruled Lesotho in coordination
with King Moshoeshoe II and a civilian cabinet appointed by the King.
In 1990, King Moshoeshoe II was removed and exiled by Lekhanya.
The Council of Ministers was purged. Lekhanya established the
National Constituent Assembly to formulate a new constitution
returning the country to democratic, civilian rule by June 1992. This
transition was prevented when Lekhanya was ousted in 1991 by junior
army officers that installed Phisoane Ramaema as Chairman of the
Military Council. King Letsie III, son of Moshoeshoe II, was installed as
king. Although he did abdicate in favor of his father, Moshoeshoe's
death in a car accident, re-installed King Letsie. In 1993, a new
constitution was enacted leaving the King without any executive
authority and preventing him from engaging in political affairs. The BCP
ascended to power with a landslide victory in multiparty elections in
which they gained every seat in the 65-member National Assembly. In
August 1994, King Letsie III, taking advantage of discontent in the
military, staged a coup. Although he suspended the government, the
BCP government was restored due to domestic and international
pressure. The government faced little opposition until 1997 when
internal fighting caused a split in the government in which Dr. Mokhehle
abandoned the party and formed the Lesotho Congress for Democracy
(LCD). Although Mokhehle remained the Prime Minister, he took
two-thirds of Parliament with him, leaving the BCP in the opposition.
The BCP refused to accept their new opposition status, leading to new
multiparty elections in May 1998. In these elections, the LCD won 79
out of 80 seats in the new Parliament. Mokhehle's Deputy Prime
Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili became the new Prime Minister. Although
international observers found the elections to be free and fair, the
opposition disputed that claim because of the overwhelming majority
won by the LCD.
Oposition-led protests continued throughout the country. At the request
of the government, a Southern African Development Community
(SADC) task force initiated Operation Boleas, consisting of South
African and Botswanan troops which entered Lesotho on September
22, 1998 to put down an army mutiny and restore the democratically
elected government. The SADC task force withdrew leaving a small
task force to provide training to the LDF. The Interim Political Authority
was established in order to review the electoral structure in the country.
NDI's Civil-Military Involvement in Lesotho
Post-election violence in 1998 culminated in a coup attempt by the
military, highlighting lingering problems in Lesotho's transition to
democracy. Following the restoration of order, the government began to
demobilize, de-politicize, and establish stronger civilian control of its
armed forces.
In March 1999, NDI invited Principal Secretary of the Ministry of
Defense Matsepo Ramakoae to an NDI/Partnership for Democratic
Governance and Security-sponsored conference in Manila in which
Asian political, civic, and military leaders discussed the region's
successful transitions from military to democratic societies. In July,
NDI invited Secretary Ramakoae and Major Mahao to Costa Rica and
El Salvador. During this visit, the Lesotho delegation explored various
models of civil-military relations with several high-level officials
representing government, defense, and civil society. In El Salvador, the
discussions primarily focused on integrating demobilized soldiers into
the civilian economy and society at large. In Costa Rica, the delegation
met with former President and Nobel Prize Winner Oscar Arias who
offered the use of his name and organization to raise international
awareness and acquire funds for retraining troops if Lesotho
demonstrated the political will to dissolve its military. Since Lesotho
faces no external enemies and its only neighbor, South Africa, has
actually helped to protect the nation's democracy, the Costa Ricans
suggested that Lesotho demilitarize. Moreover, the Costa Ricans
recommended that Lesotho could reallocate its scarse resources in
services or education rather than the military. Arias believed that
Lesotho would receive worldwide acclamation if it chose to become the
first African nation to completely demilitarize.
Following her visit to Central America, Secretary Ramakoae went to
Washington where she met with officials at USAID, the Departments of
State and Defense, and Congress. Secretary Ramakoae said she
would encourage her Prime Minister to take steps to undergo a 50
percent demobilization following the El Salvador model since this was
more feasible than the Costa Rica model. Ramakoe and Major Mahao
intended to begin a national dialogue on the role of the military upon
their return to Lesotho.
Follow-ups were designed to:
Inform the leadership of Lesotho's government of practical alternatives to its current military structure that emphasize demilitarization and civilian oversight of the military; and,
Stimulate further debate, and eventually create military reform initiatives.
In November 1999, NDI conducted a study mission for Prime Minister
Mosisili and Foreign Minister Thabane. The Government of Lesotho
also sponsored the participation of Colonel Thuso Motanyane, Major
Tsepo Mokuena, Chief of Protocol Teboho Kitleli, and Ministry of
Defense Public Relations Officer Moliehi Khabele. The delegation met
with the same experts and leaders from the July study mission, with
notable additions of Costa Rican President Rodriguez and El
Salvadoran President Flores. While the Costa Rican and El Salvadoran
experts emphasized many of the same points and lessons shared with
Principal Secretary Ramakoae, great attention was given to the Prime
Minister's strong interest in effective demobilization programs.
In El Salvador, the delegation met with numerous top leaders in the
military, government, and civil society, including the vice minister of
defense, the president of the congressional defense committee, and
the undersecretary of defense. The delegation also met with several
retired officers that played important roles in negotiations that ended
the civil war and in the ensuing demobilization programs. Many of these
retired officers now work as NGO and political consultants in El
Salvador's civil society.
In Costa Rica, the delegation met with several high level government,
public safety, and civil society representatives, including the vice
minister of public security and interior, the president of the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal, and the minister of foreign affairs. During this visit,
Costa Rican President Rodriguez emphasized the need for Lesotho to
redirect its budget towards health and education rather than spending
so much on the military. The meeting with Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias
was particularly noteworthy. Arias painted a bleak picture of Africa in
which investments in the military, and too often wars, have come at the
expense of investing in education, health, and social development. The
former Costa Rican president highlighted the domino effect in Africa
that could occur as a result of Lesotho's demilitarization. He also
argued that, "a lack of defense is the greatest defense," and that the
resulting moral authority and a strong regional agreement will be more
than adequate for Lesotho. Arias pledged the use of his name and his
organization in the event that Lesotho chose to demilitarize.
Prime Minister Mosisili expressed great admiration for the maturity and
sophistication of the leaders of Costa Rica and El Salvador, both in the
security services and in politics. He suggested on a number of
occasions that representatives from Costa Rica and El Salvador visit
Lesotho to help share their countries' models and political and security
reforms, particularly broadening the discussion and understanding
among the public, opposition, and elected officials. To date, no
follow-up has been scheduled.
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