Political History
Nicaragua's history from 1909-1933 was dominated by U.S.
interference in Nicaraguan political affairs. During this time, the U.S.
often sent marines to back leaders loyal to the United States. Any
Nicaraguan who was publicly critical of U.S. involvement or intervention
was promptly removed from Nicaraguan politics.
The emergence of Somoza Garcia, chief director of the U.S.-backed
National Guard, put an end to the long line of unstable governments.
Garcia ruled Nicaragua, directly or indirectly, from 1936 until his
assassination in 1956. He derived strength from three main sources:
the military support of the National Guard, support from the United
States, and ownership or control of substantial portions of the
Nicaraguan economy. By investing in different sectors of the economy,
Somoza created an oligarchy consisting mainly of his friends and
family. With support from the U.S. and the National Guard, Somoza
was able to control the opposition and force the rubber-stamp
Constituent Assembly to elect him to consecutive presidential terms.
Following WWII, however, opposition to Garcia began to grow. He
responded by installing different leaders in his place so that he could
rule indirectly. In order to thwart any labor opposition, the government
placated socialist opponents by promoting liberal labor policies and in
some cases paying bribes. Garcia warded off opposition from the
Conservative Party by granting them one-third of the congressional
delegates and limited representation in the cabinet and courts. He also
included clauses in the new 1950 constitution guaranteeing
"commercial liberty" which allowed him to win back the support of the
traditional elite who managed the economy. Having made numerous
enemies, Garcia was assassinated in 1956 and succeeded by his son,
Luis Somoza Debayle. From 1956-1974, Luis Somoza Debayle and his
brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle ruled the country. From 1957-1963,
Luis provided citizens with some freedoms and raised hopes for
political liberalization, while his brother, Anastasio, headed the feared
National Guard.
In 1967, Anastasio was elected president amidst an oppressive
campaign against opponents. His oppressive measures, inability to
deal with natural emergencies such as the 1972 earthquake, and
growing amount of wealth, drew increasing criticism from the Roman
Catholic Church and political opponents. Through political repression,
however, Anastasio was reelected President in 1974. At about this
time, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was
consolidating its power. A guerrilla movement enjoying support from
peasants and students groups, the FSLN was poised to topple the
government. Increased oppression by the government and the United
States' displeasure with Anastasio increased the popularity of the
FSLN. In 1979, Anastasio resigned and went into exile; he was later
assassinated.
Having inherited a nation devastated by a Civil War which left 50,000
Nicaraguans dead, 120,000 exiled, and 600,000 homeless, the new
FSLN government was faced with the daunting task of rebuilding the
nation. The new government sought foreign assistance in order to
rebuild the Nicaraguan economy and renegotiate foreign debt. In
addition, it nationalized Somoza's family-owned properties. The
Sandinistas developed mass organizations which represented popular
interest groups. Most importantly, the FSLN reversed the previous
government's pattern of repression and torture. The government,
however, established new political institutions to consolidate their
control. On August 22, 1979, the FSLN ruling junta proclaimed the
Fundamental Statute of the Republic of Nicaragua which abolished the
constitution, presidency, Congress, and all courts. Important decisions
were made by a nine-member Joint National Directorate and then
transferred to the junta for its approval. In addition, the new government
created a consultative corporatist representative assembly, which
though it was not a rubber stamp assembly, did answer to the junta
and was composed primarily of members of the FSLN.
Internal opposition to the FSLN began to grow, largely in part to U.S.
efforts. Upon assuming office, President Reagan launched a campaign
to isolate the Sandinistas. Convinced that the FSLN government,
assisted by Cuba and the Soviet Union, was a communist threat to
Central America, the Reagan administration mobilized and unified the
Nicaraguan opposition. Largely consisting of minority ethnic groups and
disgruntled members of the former National Guard, the Contras as the
opposition became known, were funded by the U.S. to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government. Operating out of Honduras, the Contras, began
to cause damage to the Nicaraguan economy. In addition, the Roman
Catholic Church and La Prensa, one of the leading newspapers, began
to voice opposition to the government. Although the government held a
presidential election in 1984 at the opposition's request, FSLN
candidate Daniel Ortega won the election amidst opposition cries that
the election was not fair.
Continued U.S. assistance to the Contras caused the Ortega regime to
crack down on civil liberties. This act led to increased opposition, which
in turn, hurt the government. International trends, however, weakened
the resolve of both the Sandinistas and Contras to keep fighting. Costa
Rican President Oscar Arias's called upon governments and guerrillas
in the region to take steps to end the fighting. Arias's plan was
successful as government and guerrilla leaders around the region,
including Nicaragua, stopped seeking foreign assistance and granted
amnesty to political prisoners. In addition, the Iran-Contra scandal
slowed down U.S. assistance to the Contras and the collapse of the
Soviet Union eroded the main base of support for the Sandinistas.
President Ortega called presidential elections for 1990.
In the 1990 presidential elections, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of the
National Opposition Union, a coalition of fourteen parties, carried 55
percent of the popular vote against Daniel Ortega's 41 percent. Having
promised to end the unpopular military draft, bring about democratic
reconciliation, and promote economic growth, Chamorro earned a
stunning victory. During her presidency, Chamorro attempted to keep
peace among the various factions, even appointing Sandinistas to her
government. Chamorro reduced the military and privatized many
state-owned enterprises. She even set up a judicial board to review
property claims which were causing turmoil throughout the country. In
the first peaceful transition of power in Nicaraguan history, Arnoldo
Lacayo Aleman of the newly-formed Liberal Alliance was elected
president in the 1996 elections. President Aleman has been focusing
on ending unemployment and poverty and sustaining economic growth.
NDI's Civil-Military Programs in Nicaragua
NDI's involvement in Nicaragua represents one of its most successful
civil-military relations programs throughout the world. The success was
due to the willingness of both Nicaraguan military and civilian
representatives to make concessions and cooperate with one another.
Upon President Chamorro's assumption of power, civilian and military
officials had heated disagreements about the status of civil-military
relations, institutions, and structures. Although Chamorro's UNO was in
power, General Humberto Ortega, brother of former President Daniel
Ortega, remained the commander-in-chief of the Sandinista Popular
Army (the name given to Nicaragua's "national army"). As a
consequence, the army still owed allegiance to the Sandinista Party.
General Ortega opposed any attempt to tamper with the military
structure and vowed to stay on as commander-in-chief until 1997.
Meanwhile, many civilians, emboldened by the emergence of
democracy, proposed that the military be eliminated all together and
replaced by a national police. Anxious to make democracy work and
alleviate the alienation of the Sandinistas, President Chamorro did not
ask General Ortega to step down.
Amidst this backdrop, in 1992, Nicaraguan political leaders asked NDI
to help decrease tensions and changes the country's legacy of
misguided militarism, rigid societal divisions and narrow understanding
of the respective roles of military and civilian sectors in a democratic
society. NDI responded by initiating a three-year NED-funded program
to help strengthen civilian oversight of the military, to promote
communication between civilian and military leaders, and to train
civilians in security affairs. Members of NDI's first civil-military relations
assessment team went to Managua in 1992 and met individually with
various political and military leaders to encourage them to meet
together publicly to reach a consensus on basic principles.
The first such forum was held in April 1993. The attendees to this
forum, who appeared together publicly for the first time, included
General Humberto Ortega, Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo,
Sandinista congressional leader Sergio Ramirez, President of the
National Assembly Luis Humberto Guzman, and Vice President Virgilio
Godoy. In this forum, Ortega pledged publicly-for the first time-to
support a change in the name of the army. Prior to this forum, the
Nicaraguan army, and in particular, Gen. Ortega, publicly and
adamantly opposed all efforts to change the politically-charged name of
the armed forces. In addition, Ortega also stated that he would leave
the army in accordance with any new military law passed by the
National Assembly. NDI's April 1993 report on civil-military relations in
Nicaragua made strong recommendations regarding the creation of a
civilian-led ministry of defense and prompted Ortega's first public
acceptance of the need for the ministry. The April 1993 and subsequent
forums were important because they provided a neutral setting and
relayed the experiences of other countries to both civilian and military
leaders. Moreover, the positive response given by the media, civil
society, and the public encouraged civilian and military officials to
continue joint seminars and workshops for the enhancement of
civil-military relations. Most importantly, NDI workshops and seminars
generated unprecedented openness from the military.
Following Ortega's two groundbreaking announcements, the Minister of
the Presidency and President of the National Assembly requested
NDI's assistance in drafting military reform legislation. NDI experts
provided technical advice about possible provisions and reforms, as well
as comparative legislation from other countries.
In NDI's April 1994 seminar, more than 250 Nicaraguans participated in
workshops on the creation of a ministry of defense. Presentations were
made regarding the structure of other countries' ministries and the
challenges they faced establishing civilian control of the armed forces.
During this seminar, Minister of the Presidency Lacayo and Gen.
Ortega unexpectedly announced their agreement on military reform
legislation called the Military Code of Organization, Jurisdiction and
Military Social Security-Military Code. Most importantly, these two
individuals resolved the two most outstanding issues: Ortega's
retirement and the renaming of the army. Due to its groundbreaking
achievements, this seminar made headlines across the Nicaraguan
media. Following the seminar, the executive branch sent a reform
package to the National Assembly. After some modification, the
Military Code was passed by Assembly on August 21, 1994. As
specified by the new law, Ortega retired from military service on
February 21, 1995 and the Nicaraguan army was renamed the "Army of
Nicaragua."
Nicaraguans from various walks of life expressed gratitude to NDI for its
critical assistance in implementing military reforms in Nicaragua.
Former President of the National Assembly Luis Humberto Guzman
specifically pointed to NDI's role in providing positive reinforcement to
General Ortega regarding his decision to retire. A group of NDI
international experts, specifically retired military officials and
ex-Ministers of Defense, discussed with Ortega the positive and
historic role he could play for both Nicaragua and the military institution
itself by retiring and helping to establish a democratic system of
civil-military relations in the country. Most importantly, the experts
explained to Ortega that he could still have a productive life in
retirement.
Another strategic focus of NDI's Nicaraguan programs was to provide
information on mechanisms, institutions, and practices necessary to
increase the ability of civilians to develop security policy and to
promote a nonpolitical role for the armed forces. NDI's seminars had
educational and training components. Activities included an eight-day
course in September 1995 taught by experts from five countries which
covered technical issues and provided participants with thousands of
pages of resource materials and comparative legislation. Nicaraguan
military officials conceded that the NDI seminars were allowing civilians
to become more well-rehearsed in security and intelligence affairs.
In addition to familiarizing Nicaraguan civilians with security affairs, NDI
also focused on supporting the development of civilian institutions. NDI
played a key role in advancing the creation of the country's first
civilian-led ministry of defense. First, the Institute prompted the army to
agree publicly to the creation of a civilian-led ministry of defense.
Second, the program increased awareness about the issue among
Nicaraguan political and military leaders and the public at large. Third,
NDI trained a core group of civilians to design and create a ministry of
defense.
NDI also trained and enhanced the image of the Defense Commission
of the National Assembly. When NDI's delegation first visited Managua
in 1992, the Sandinista and UNO legislators of the Commission refused
to meet together, barely allowing it to function. By the time NDI's April
1994 program took place, however, the Defense Commission was not
only conducting weekly meetings with all members participating, but
organizing seminars on defense issues and actively taking part in the
civil-military debate. In 1996, the Commission had five major security
affairs-related legislative projects on its schedule, ranging from a new
police law to reforms on military justice and civil defense. Having shed
its role as merely a "rubber-stamp" assembly, the Assembly's Defense
Commission began to make improvements on security-related
legislation that it received from the executive branch. The army, in turn,
responded positively to the Commission's efforts to introduce military
reform. In 1995, for example, Gen. Cuadra organized for the first time in
history a public briefing for the Commission about the defense budget
and the army's structure, as well as took members on a tour of the
military installations in Managua. Whereas, previously, the army would
only approach the Presidency with regards to future military legislation,
it now began to approach the Defense Commission. This response from
the military encouraged the Assembly to consider the Army's needs
when allocating money for defense.
Finally, NDI sought to provide sustainability to the new dialogue and
training by empowering Nicaraguan civilians to promote communication
and civilian oversight. To this end, NDI was integral in the development
of the Nicaraguan Center for Strategic Studies (CEEN), Nicaragua's
first multi-partisan nongovernmental organization dedicated to
familiarizing civilians with security affairs and promoting better relations
between the armed forces, the government, and civil society. The
CEEN is in a position to play an important role in Nicaragua
civil-military relations for a number of reasons. First, CEEN has been
well-regarded as a local resource and forum for discussions on
civil-military relations. Second, through NDI, CEEN has access to
international security affairs experts and resource materials that can
help Nicaraguan policymakers as they work to strengthen civil-military
relations. Third, current and former members of the CEEN-as well as
CEEN program participants-have been in high level positions in the
newly established ministry of defense and in the National Assembly.
NDI's extensive involvement in Nicaragua continued from June 15-21
1997 when it sponsored the visit of a delegation of Nicaraguans and
Hondurans to study the Argentine national security policymaking
process and system of civilian oversight of the military. The delegates
represented an unprecedented ideological, political, and institutional
mix. The Hondurans were included since they were interested in
improving civil-military relations in Honduras based on NDI's success in
Argentina and Nicaragua. Before the delegation's visit to Argentina, the
Argentines were briefed about the state of evolving civil-military relations
in Nicaragua. Once in Buenos Aires, the delegation met with defense
policymakers, representatives of the ministry of defense, members of
congress, academic experts and former political leaders and ministry
officials who were involved in the reform of the Argentine ministry of
defense following its transfer to civilian control in 1983.
Although the mission's primary focus was on issues relating to the new
ministry of defense, NDI hoped the mixed composition of the delegation
would help to build channels of communication and consensus about
basic structures and powers before the ministry of defense legislation
is presented in the Assembly. The Defense Commission, by virtue of
receiving defense management legislation from the Presidency, plays a
key role in submitting revised security-related legislation to the National
Assembly. The inclusion of delegates from outside of the ministry
reinforces the concept that well-developed and coordinated national
security policymaking reflects the input of various state institutions and
political viewpoints.
To build on the results of the Argentina study mission, NDI sent a small
team to Managua to analyze the current state of civil-military relations
and to develop broad policy recommendations for Nicaraguan political
leaders. The team met with political and military leaders, the national
police, representatives of nongovernmental organizations and
government officials to gather a wide variety of views about the state of
civil-military relations in Nicaragua. In addition, the team provided the
participants of the Argentina study mission with follow-up advice. One
expert from Argentina gave presentations about Argentina's national
defense policymaking process to approximately 50 military officers of
the rank of captain and major at the military academy in Managua and
to the Defense Commission of the National Assembly.
The NDI team found that there have been substantial advances since
1995, especially in terms of the professionalism of the army and its
separation from the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN).
Moreover, the Nicaraguans had created a civilian-led ministry of
defense and initiated positive constitutional reforms regarding defense.
The delegation noted, however, that there were still substantial legal
and structural shortcomings and the ministry of defense lacked defined
functions and a role in national defense. Based on the team's
observations, NDI developed policy recommendations that were
communicated to Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense officials. Nicaraguan
ministry officials and members of the National Assembly believed that
NDI's recommendations provided significant input for the subsequent
legislation and the further development of the ministry.
In December 1997, the Nicaraguan vice minister of defense asked NDI
to provide additional information about defense ministry functions in
other countries. Once this information was provided by NDI, it was
implemented in a preliminary law defining the proposed ministry of
defense's roles and subsequently submitted to the National Assembly.
In addition, NDI also helped the Ministry re-establish contact with the
Argentine security affairs think tank, SER en el 2000, which gave
policy-makers additional information about defense ministry functions.
The visit to Argentina allowed Nicaraguan civilian policymakers to not
only learn about civilian oversight of security affairs but to be given
concrete examples of relevant legislation from other countries. The
Buenos Aires visit reinforced the importance of coordination and
collaboration among the various sectors-civil society, government,
congress, and the army-that form civil-military relations. Institutional,
political, and personal ties among the delegates were also
strengthened by the visit.
There was evidence of a decreased tension among the policymakers as
a result of the Buenos Aires and subsequent workshops and seminars.
Sandinistas and UNO members often dined and took photographs
together. The headline of an article in the widely-read La Prensa
declared "distinguished figures of the controversial Nicaraguan political
life who, in one moment opposed [to each other], are now united within
the current process of democratization."
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