Overview
From December 3-5 2001, NDI held a workshop in Peru on the "Role of the Legislature in Providing Democratic Oversight of the Peruvian Security Sector." The two-day event was held in the Congress, and was attended by legislators, military officials, and members of civil society. The program generated a great deal of enthusiasm and was favorably covered in the Peruvian press.
Political Context
The establishment of a transition government under President Valentin Paniagua in 2000 signaled the end of an era of direct military involvement in Peruvian politics. With the collapse of the Fujimori government and revelations of gross corruption engineered by Intelligence Chief Vladamir Montesinos, the military's infrastructure of political power that had dominated the post-independence period began to crumble. New elections in 2001 leading to a turnover in both the executive and congress, broad public dissatisfaction with the security services, and recognition by the military of the precariousness of it's situation, presented Peru's civilian leaders with a historic opportunity to establish genuine democratic civilian oversight of the armed forces and enact long overdue military reforms.
In October 2000, Congress passed a law dismantling the National Intelligence Service (SIN) and replacing it with the National Intelligence Council (CNI). Though the CNI today is a fifth of the size of its predecessor, it not only coordinates the intelligence activities of the various military and other intelligence agencies, but also engages in its own intelligence gathering activities. While the new law marginally increases the oversight of the Congress, it does not provide an adequate framework for enacting substantive change. For example, the law still does not give Congress budgetary oversight of security activities. Similarly, the director of the intelligence agency is not required to give information to the Congress. Rather, s/he communicates with the Congress via the executive. Perhaps the greatest weakness lies in the fact that Peru currently has no intelligence law that defines or restricts the powers of intelligence agencies. No laws exist which regulate the type of information that can be collected, the manner by which it can be collected, and the ways in which intelligence can be used. Finally, there is no legislation outlining citizen rights with respect to intelligence gathering.
Since Alejandro Toledo's election to president in 2001, reform of the military, police and intelligence agencies has primarily been undertaken by the executive branch through the formation of commissions charged with outlining plans for restructuring each of these bodies. The Comisión de Reestructuración de las Fuerzas Armadas (Commission for the restructuring of the Armed Forces), for instance, has been charged with writing "una propuesta integral de reforma" for the military. The Congress's role to date has been minor, largely due to a lack of technical expertise and the absence of a core group of legislative members committed to developing a clear defense and security reform strategy.
Budgetary problems have lead Toledo to promise reductions in the budget in many areas. In the area of defense, Toledo has already promised a 50% reduction in the military budget. However plans for achieving such a sizeable cut have not been forthcoming. Original plans included the forced retirement of thousands of military officials. It was later recognized that the pension payments for these officials would nearly offset the budgetary gains from such retirement.
In addition to budget reductions, the Toledo government is also making attempts to increase transparency and accountability. Currently civilian officials have no means of independently confirming military expenditure - the number of soldiers, for instance, is reported only by the military itself, and the numbers offered vary widely. Finally the military procurement process is neither clear nor transparent and has been rife with corruption. The Toledo government has set up a commission to restructure the Office de la Contraloria General de la República (CGO), the primary agency responsible for auditing the state budget.
Workshop Description
In response to requests made by Peruvian policy-makers, NDI conducted a workshop on "The Role of the Legislature in Providing Democratic Oversight of the Peruvian Security Sector."
The first day examined the broader context for reform. Juan Rial explored the legal and judicial framework within which various institutions in the security sector act. Drawing upon the reform experiences of other Latin American countries, Dr. Rial suggested strategies for reform. In Dr. Rial's presentation and the extensive questions and answer period that followed, a wide range of topics was covered from military education to intelligence reform to military courts.
The second day of the workshop focused on intelligence oversight. Jaime Garetta examined the legal and judicial frameworks within which Latin American intelligence agencies operate, and using comparative Latin American reform experiences, extrapolated successful strategies and identified lessons for potential reformers. Col. William Spracher (ret.) examined the role of the U.S. Congress, particularly the role of committees, in providing intelligence oversight in the United States. Both presenters described mechanisms for intelligence oversight used in other democracies, including: hearings, independent commissions and reporting agencies, fiscal and budgetary oversight, and state secret laws. They also examined strategies for taking advantage of the current political environment to institute much needed intelligence reform.
In the future, NDI hopes to continue working with the congressional representatives strengthening their capacity to direct, manage and oversee the various branches of the armed forces.
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