Presented by The Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
Speakers:
- Les Campbell, NDI senior associate and regional director for the Middle East and North Africa
- Marina Ottaway, senior scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
Description: Some call it the Islamist winter while others talk of revolution betrayed. Neither claim portrays accurately what is happening in Arab countries in the throes of popular uprisings and rapid political change. The rise of Islamist parties in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings took most by surprise, including in some cases the Islamist parties themselves, which were more successful than they dared to hope. Coupled with the disarray of the secular opposition, the success of Islamist parties augurs poorly for democracy, because a strong, competitive opposition is the only guarantee against the emergence of a new authoritarianism.
Date & Time: Wednesday, February 27, 2013 12:00 – 1:00 p.m.
Location: 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Woodrow Wilson Center (located in the Ronald Reagan Building), 5th floor conference room, Washington, D.C.
Event Summary:
The event focused on the recent electoral victories by Islamists in the MENA region, as well as what this entails for opposition parties and movements in the region. Additionally, the event marked the publication of a paper by Woodrow Wilson Center Senior Scholar Marina Ottoway entitled The Resistible Rise of Islamist Parties. The event was moderated by Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center Middle East Program, and Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director for NDI, and Marina Ottoway were the speakers.
Marina Ottoway - began the event by noting that Islamists and/or Salafist political parties have benefitted from the Arab Spring, enjoying electoral wins in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. She noted that only in Egypt did Islamists and Salafists win an outright majority, while in the other two countries they won pluralities. Turning to the main question of the event, whether this trend was irresistible or merely a temporary aberration, she noted that secular parties in many of these countries are (a) ineffective at winning elections and (b) not strongly committed to liberal or democratic values. This in turn presents a larger problem in that political scenes that do not have a functioning opposition of some form cannot ensure either accountability or democracy.
Ottoway then gave a brief summary of the political situation in each of the three countries:
· Morocco – Ottoway contended that in Morocco, where the Islamist Party of Justice and Development won a plurality in elections and is now in power, there was no real chance of domination of the political system by the Islamists. This is because there is a countervailing force in opposition to the Islamists in the form of the Palace or Monarchy. She noted that the 2011 Constitution only “allows” the King to give expanded powers to the government, meaning that he is not required to relinquish any control. However, there remains an unknown factor in the Islamist Justice and Charity movement, which is officially banned from politics and is considerably larger than the PJD. With the death of its longtime leader Sheikh Yassine, there has been subsequent reorganization and the possibility that the movement could enter politics.
· Tunisia – Ottoway noted that in Tunisia there is a much greater chance for Islamist domination, as the secular spectrum is in ‘total disorganization.’ Furthermore, many secular parties are compromised by ties to the former regime, which hurts their legitimacy amongst voters. She noted three possible sources of opposition to Islamists:
o Trade unions – particularly the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) which has a large base, is well organized, and could provide a pool of voters for leftist parties.
o Secular/Centrist coalitions – particularly Nida Tunis (Call of Tunis) which is headed by a longtime veteran of Tunisian government Beji Caid Sebsi. She noted that these coalitions are often formed (and broken) without much definitive activity.
o Salafists – who thus far have engaged only in street action and whose electoral capabilities or desires remain unclear.
· Egypt – Ottoway said that the situation was probably at its worst in Egypt, where Islamists and Salafists won a large majority in elections. She added that the Egyptian opposition was particularly disorganized and ineffectual for five reasons:
o An inability to deliver messages in a politically savvy manner, especially messages that capture the sense of discontent in the region. She gave as an example a statement by the leader of the secular Wafd Party in Egypt following the elections that the Islamists had won because of the “illiteracy” of voters.
o An inability to solve problems or improve conditions. o Disconnects between opposition parties and secular labor organizations. She pointed to an example in the Draft Constitution of Egypt which outlawed the right to strike, and would have been a good connection point for parties opposed to the Draft.
o An inability to develop an effective message on Women’s issues. She pointed out that the current message, which contends that Islamists will be repressive towards women, only resonates with secular women, and not with those already in the Islamist movement.
o An inability or lack of desire to address the “nuts and bolts” of campaigning, including starting branch offices, and connecting with voters.
Marina Ottoway concluded by noting that these issues, which are true to varying extents for all opposition groups in the three countries discussed can be addressed, and the lack of effective opposition to Islamists corrected.
Leslie Campbell – began by agreeing with Dr. Ottoway’s assessment of the current situation and added that street politics as the only antidote to Islamists was an inherent danger to democracy in the three countries. He added that Islamists themselves face a further challenges, especially in Egypt, where they face difficulties in governing effectively. This was due to:
o A disconnect with the economic elite. Islamists may have been successful in connecting with poorer voters, a large factor in their electoral victories, but they have no or little connection to the elite which are necessary to govern effectively.
o A lack of experience in governing. This was due to the exclusion of Islamists by former regimes, especially the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Campbell further noted that this rendered Islamists vulnerable to manipulation, especially by Mubarak regime remnants. He noted that this was evident in many Brotherhood/FJP responses to security situations, and new laws such as the draft NGO law. This presents a further danger in that there may be a second wave of “purer” less moderate Islamists that win in the next elections.
Campbell also noted that political parties can have oppositional strength in the region, citing examples from Morocco, Yemen, and Jordan. He also drew a parallel to Bosnia in the 1990s, in which multi-ethnic groups were seen as outmatched electorally by nationalist groups. Nonetheless, after a transition period, multi-ethnic parties went on to win in 1998 showing that message development and continued party participation leads to gains.
Turning to Egypt, Campbell said that by excluding NDI and other similar NGOs from operating in the country, Egyptian political parties were missing the international connections, opportunities for training, and new ideas, and that this will make the path to successful parties difficult. He noted that before NDI was shut down in Egypt, they trained over 10,000 party members. Analyzing why secular parties have been unsuccessful so far, Campbell pointed to three main reasons:
o An unwillingness to do hard work in terms of campaigning. This was linked to elitism in that many party leaders did not want to engage people or neighborhoods that they considered unsavory.
o A sense that the international community will ‘come to the rescue’ by pressuring the Islamists in power to include secular groups and ‘carve up the pie’ or enter into power-sharing agreements. This sense leads to a lack of motivation to try and win by more strenuous and costly campaigning methods.
o A fear of investing resources in elections whose results may be cancelled. This was especially pertinent in light of the recent history of elections in Egypt.
In addressing the issue Campbell concluded that the international community should continue to try and engage secular Egyptian political parties when possible. He added that the international community should also make it clear that they will pressure the Islamists to abide by democratic practices, but not force them to share power with secular groups.
Audience Questions – Questions from the audience have been organized thematically.
o Addressing the Egyptian economy – why have Islamists not joined with moderates or technocrats in order to fix pressing economic issues?
o Ottoway – felt that this was largely an issue of trust. She pointed to the example of the Egyptian IMF loan, in there was a lack of trust between negotiators (mostly technocratic); the Government (Islamists); and Party leaders (Islamists).
o Campbell – answered that this was partially imaginative thinking, that economic problems could be solved without outside help, exacerbated by self-imposed isolation. Pointing to an example where President Morsi characterized subsidy reform as an end to subsides for embassy vehicles and yachts he noted that Islamists cannot find enough political space domestically to accept international support.
o Where did Salafist parties come from, and are rumors of Gulf (Qatari or Saudi) support for Salafists true?
o Ottoway – Salafists were always there in Egypt, they were just not involved in politics. They became politically active following the revolution. She was skeptical of official government support for Salafist groups, but that private funding was harder to track and possibly prevalent.
o Campbell – noted that anecdotally, from his visits to Salafist party headquarters, it is clear that they are well funded and receiving funds from external actors. Whether these are states or private citizens or corporations is unclear.
A copy of Marin Ottoway’s paper, The Resistible Rise of the Islamists, can be found here.
