By Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor, Iran Election Bulletin
Dear Reader,
As reformists began uniting behind former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi this week, with several prominent reformist parties officially endorsing his candidacy, rival Mehdi Karroubi remained steadfast in his plans to contest the June 12 presidential elections. With Karroubi cast in the role of spoiler, the reformists are leaving the door open for a potential coalition of pragmatic conservatives to capture votes from the center-left and prevent the divided reformists from securing an election victory.
It is still anybody’s guess as to whether the “pragmatics” will settle on a candidate – or who that candidate might ultimately be. Both Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Mohsen Rezai, two of the three leaders of the pragmatic conservative coalition, have moved to announce their candidacies, only to make sharp reversals. Ali Akbar Velayati, the third leader of the coalition, previously stated that he had no plans to run. With President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s candidacy still undeclared, although expected, conservatives have no official candidate with less than two weeks before candidate registration opens.
Amid the political disunity – among reformists and conservatives alike – National Nuclear Day highlighted the one issue that does unite Iranians. While Iran’s nuclear program has not been a major campaign issue, declared and potential candidates have uniformly reiterated their support for the Islamic republic’s enrichment program. So while the next president of Iran might make a shift in economic policy or the level of social liberties, Iran’s nuclear position is likely to remain unchanged.
This edition of the Iran Election Bulletin features articles by Geneive Abdo on how the nuclear issue is factoring into domestic politics and by Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji on what reformists should learn from past electoral defeats. Gazelle Javantash adds her reflections on the election from a recent trip across Iran.
I hope you enjoy reading this edition and welcome you to
email me [3] with any questions or comments you may have.
Sincerely,
Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor
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Published on April 24, 2009
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By Geneive Abdo
Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation
In Iran’s dynamic political landscape, few issues unite conservative and reformist leaders, and even fewer topics inspire broad-based public enthusiasm. But Iran’s nuclear program has proven to unify a country that is habitually – some might say, congenitally – divided.
As part of National Nuclear Day celebrations, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurated on April 9 the nation’s new manufacturing plant to produce nuclear fuel near Isfahan. He boasted that new, more advanced machines had been tested for enriching uranium – in defiance of worldwide alarm that Iran is developing a nuclear bomb. Echoing Ahmadinejad’s proud claims, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization was more specific, saying enrichment capacity was up to 7,000 centrifuges – a increase of 1,000 from February.
Other presidential contenders from across the political spectrum, determined not to be upstaged by Ahmadinejad, championed the apparent advancement in nuclear technology and vowed that Iran would not surrender to worldwide pressure to suspend uranium enrichment. Speaker of the parliament Ali Larijani – himself a former nuclear negotiator and a rival to Ahmadinejad – joined the national grandstanding about Iran’s right to a nuclear program, vowing that parliament would play a major role in Iran’s future nuclear negotiations with Europe and the United States to safeguard the nation’s “inalienable nuclear rights.”
Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a reformist contender for president, also addressed the nuclear issue during his first campaign press conference, saying that Iran “can’t hold back in continuing nuclear advancement.” While at times Mousavi has said that nuclear technology should be used for peaceful purposes, he clearly reiterated in an interview in the Financial Times on April 13 that “no one in Iran would accept suspension [of uranium enrichment].”
The most important words in his statement were “no one.” Contrary to the perception that only Iran’s hard-liners aspire to become a nuclear power, Iran’s leaders, ranging from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to former reformist president Mohammed Khatami, support the country’s right to a nuclear program.
Iran’s nuclear program began under Mohammed Reza Shah in 1974, with the support of the United States, under the belief that oil was a resource that would eventually be exhausted. The current international consensus that Iran does not need nuclear energy because it is the world’s fourth largest oil producer emerged only after 1979.
Since the 1979 revolution, there has been a stark contrast between Iran’s perception of itself and how the international community views the Islamic republic – particularly in regard to the nuclear issue. While a major world power in oil production, Iran has had trouble for years meeting its own domestic energy needs, in part because of growing population, inefficient distribution networks and a shortage of oil refining capacity that forces it to import petroleum products even as it exports large amounts of crude. Much of the world views Iran as a menacing power on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon, but Iran’s leaders worry that their country is undeveloped economically and technologically and needs to demonstrate its advances in nuclear technology. After inspecting the construction of supersonic wind tunnels at the aerodynamic research center at Imam Hossein Military Academy on April 14, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reflected this concern, saying that “in spite of the fast pace of scientific progress in the country, there is a long way to go before we can achieve an appropriate position and make up for the backwardness we have suffered.”
The official position of the Iranian government is that it is enriching uranium for peaceful purposes. Yet, there is a prevailing view in the country that nuclear technology should not only be developed for alternative sources of energy, but also to develop nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence in the region, which is also home to nuclear-armed Israel, Iran’s staunch enemy. In addition, Iran feels threatened by the United States’ military presence in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Enriching uranium can produce fuel for a nuclear power plant, or if purified, can provide material for an atomic bomb.
Although International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors have never found solid evidence linking Iran’s uranium enrichment to weapons development, Iran has refused to be transparent about its program and this has raised international concern. The IAEA has repeatedly found that Iran has failed to report details of its nuclear facilities. In 2003, succumbing to international pressure, Iran temporarily suspended its enrichment program and signed an Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) giving the IAEA greater access to its nuclear sites. Under the NPT, signatories have the “inalienable right” to produce fuel for civilian purposes.
For Iranians, advanced nuclear technology is a matter of national pride and Iran’s sovereign rights, which Iranians believe were denied them for many decades, first under British and Soviet influence and later by the United States in 1953 through a CIA-backed overthrow of an elected government that returned the Shah to power. Further, Iran’s leadership and the public firmly believe that a double-standard exists in the international community: although countries such as Israel and Pakistan are advanced nuclear powers, Iran, by virtue of being an Islamic republic, should be forbidden from having a nuclear program. During an April 4 conversation with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Ayatollah Khamenei blasted what he called continuous worldwide “propaganda” against Iran’s nuclear program and portrayed Iran as an underdog. “The arrogant powers’ opposition is again indicative of the fact that the achievements made by the Islamic republic in developing nuclear technology are an important step towards strengthening the righteous front in the world,” he said.
The more worldwide condemnation Iran receives the more the country’s leaders believe they are justified in developing a nuclear program. This position gives them rare support within Iranian society, which often is at odds with the leadership over social issues.
Some Western governments believe that Iran’s political leaders, in fact, might exaggerate its progress in nuclear technology to have greater influence in the Middle East and to boost its negotiating position with Western governments. Following Ahmadinejad’s inauguration of the fuel manufacturing plant in Isfahan, Kayhan newspaper highlighted the international attention Iran’s nuclear program was receiving on French television as well as in the German, Japanese and British media.
Despite optimism in Washington and in European capitals that the election of a reformist president on June 12 might bring a change in Iran’s nuclear policy, overwhelming evidence points to the contrary. Not only is there little or no difference in the positions among reformers and conservatives on this issue, but Supreme Leader Khamenei remains as committed as ever to advancing Iran’s nuclear program.
Even if the U.S. government engages in talks with Iran – in the coming weeks or after Iran’s presidential election – it is unlikely the Islamic republic will change what has been a consistent stance for many decades.
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Published on April 24, 2009
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By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford
Since 2004, reformists have fared poorly in executive and legislative elections in Iran. The common orthodoxy in Iranian studies suggests that these repeated electoral failures are a product of institutional barriers to entry posed by unelected elements of the regime. Primarily citing the 2004 majles election, analysts have argued that the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, the appointed body that approves candidates for elections, disproportionately targets reformists during the candidate vetting process, which prevents them from competing effectively in national elections.
While heavy vetting has undeniably taken a toll on reformist efforts in the past, widespread societal backlash—including student protests, calls for boycotts and the casting of spoilt ballots—has dissuaded the Ministry of Interior and the Guardian Council from conducting mass disqualifications to the same degree since 2004. Indeed, three notable reformists were allowed to participate in the 2005 presidential race (Mostafa Moin, Mehdi Karroubi and Mohsen Mehralizadeh) and it seems at least two reformists, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, will compete in the upcoming June 2009 poll. It is highly unlikely that the Guardian Council will disqualify Mousavi or Karroubi. Doing so would deprive the June election of its legitimacy, indicate that the reformists pose a formidable threat to conservatives and perhaps even stir public unrest.
As notable reformists have competed in national elections since 2004, citing Guardian Council vetting does not accurately account for their failure to secure substantive votes. This is not to suggest that other external factors—such as persistent media attacks, forced newspaper closures, and imprisonment of intellectuals—do not disadvantage the movement. Rather, it suggests the roots of the reformists’ persistent electoral shortcomings lie within the internal machinations of the movement itself.
Two internal vulnerabilities continue to hinder the reformists’ efforts to remain politically viable. Their past failures are primarily a product of internal dissent and disorganization coupled with an incoherent platform. If the reform movement hopes to succeed in the June poll, it must strive to resolve these issues rather than lament its past misfortunes.
From 1997 to 2005, Mohammad Khatami was undoubtedly the flag bearer of the reform movement. His tenure as president prevented the explicit emergence of internal discord in the movement. Though some members in the rank and file became disillusioned with the pace of reform, Khatami maintained unity among the leadership. However, following his departure from the political limelight in 2005, no single reformist successfully assumed leadership of the movement, producing internal dissent as various personalities vied for Khatami’s position. As the leadership began to splinter, so did the reformist base. Without a focal point for reformist voters to unite behind, their votes have often been diluted among several candidates, none of whom is able to win a majority.
Many believed that Khatami’s candidacy in this year’s election would help restore order in the movement. However, Karroubi’s and Mousavi’s subsequent nomination announcements dispelled these hopes. Recognizing the importance of presenting a united front, Khatami later withdrew his candidacy in favor of consolidating support behind Mousavii—the candidate most reformist leaders believe has the best chance of winning. While most other reformists, such as Abdollah Nouri and Mohammad-Reza Aref, have either refrained from announcing their candidacy or withdrawn from the race, Karroubi insists that he will compete in the 2009 election.
Unlike the division in conservative ranks that emerged in early 2008 as a response to growing opposition to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s policies, reformist disunity has largely been a product of a few individuals vying to increase their personal political power. Karroubi has been one of the most divisive personalities in the movement, establishing his own distinct party, National Trust Party, which was a failed platform for his 2005 presidential bid. Despite his poor performance in 2005 and his inability to recruit substantive candidates for his parliamentary list in 2008, Karroubi is once again vying for the presidency, and in so doing, prolonging reformist disunity.
Members of Iran’s various reformist organizations have recognized this weakness and are reorienting their campaign strategy to unite the divided voter base. The most influential reformist factions, including Executives of Construction, Association of Combatant Clerics, Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO) and the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), have already endorsed Mousavi and are calling for Karroubi’s withdrawal. Even Khatami has openly called for Karroubi’s withdrawal from the race, but these efforts have proven futile. Karroubi’s presence on the ballot will surely divide the reformist base and dilute the vote margins, potentially depriving Mousavi of a majority that could give him a first round victory, or a place in a possible second round run-off.
Even if the reformists are able to overcome internal dissent and present a unified front, they still need to articulate more concrete and realistic solutions to Iran's current problems. The slow pace of reform during Khatami’s eight years in office, despite lofty rhetoric, resulted in widespread apathy and disillusionment with the movement. A reformist victory in June depends on Karroubi’s or Mousavi’s ability to persuade the electorate that their agenda is comprised of realistic goals that can be achieved within the current political context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This would help secure support from the established reformist base—including Iran’s diverse ethnic minority groups, women and youth—and moreover expand their base, attracting moderate-leaning voters more concerned with economic growth than social issues.
In the past few weeks Mousavi and Karroubi have begun articulating specific policies on the campaign trail to re-energize the middle-class reformist base—primarily targeting women and youth. Mousavi has proposed the full privatization of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation (IRIB) and the dismantling of the “moral police” as part of his attempts to expand social freedoms to alleviate urban middle-class grievances. Karroubi has also focused on the expansion of civil liberties as part of his three-pronged campaign agenda, promising the “revival and institutionalization of citizenship rights” by revising the 1989 constitution. Neither candidate, however, has directly addressed the needs of the peripheral ethno-linguistic minority groups that comprise roughly 51 percent of Iran’s total population—a voting bloc that has traditionally supported reformists.
While these policies are an improvement from the candidates’ previous reliance on rhetoric to secure votes, the proposals have already come under scrutiny by conservatives and moderates alike for being too drastic under the current political system. Reformists are once again overstepping the realm of possibility with their campaign promises, the opponents say. This time however, it is unlikely that these promises will resonate with the electorate, who may instead vote for the pragmatic conservative coalition—headed by Mohsen Rezai, Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—who they perceive will implement actual change, albeit to a much lesser degree.
The present realities are such that Iran’s population—roughly 10 million of whom live below the poverty line—is largely concerned with the threat of unemployment and starvation. To become competitive, reformists must successfully address these basic needs by emphasizing structural development in the economic and political sectors, and moderating their attention on social liberties.
Neither Karroubi nor Mousavi have proposed specific policies to create jobs and stimulate positive economic growth. The policies they have thus far proposed will not be sufficient to attract votes from other social groups, such as the rural or urban poor and the bazar—swing voters who have cast ballots according to economic interests in the past. Karroubi continues to expound a populist message. When he stood for election in 2005 he offered $50 handouts and he has once again promised to offer shares to the public in Iran’s state oil and gas industry if he is elected. However, this populist approach has lost its broad appeal among the urban and rural poor as a result of Ahmadinejad's redistribution policies that have contributed to sky-rocketing inflation.
In contrast, Mousavi disagrees with giving “alms” to the public, an indication of his opposition to Ahmadinejad and Karroubi’s populist economic policies. But his recent comments on the campaign trail cast a shadow of doubt on his economic expertise, which may raise concerns among his more moderate fiscally-oriented supporters. Although an alleged proponent of privatization, Mousavi recently stated that the government should increase not only regulation but also pursue a protectionist policy on imports and increase its involvement in major industries that are at risk of failing—policies that seemingly contradict free-market principles.
In sum, if the various reformist factions fail to learn from their mistakes and address their internal vulnerabilities, it is unlikely that Mousavi or Karroubi will secure the presidency this June. And even if the reformists address these past failures, unite their base and begin articulating more realistic and appropriate policies, the final outcome still depends on what the pragmatic conservative coalition, which could pull voters from the center-left, does in the coming weeks.
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Published on April 24, 2009
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By Gazelle Javantash
During a recent visit to Iran for the Nowrouz (Iranian new year) holiday, I had the opportunity to sit with family, students, workers and other average Iranians. While Nowrouz is not usually a time when politics becomes the center of conversation, this year was different. As I traveled across Iran, people were buzzing about the upcoming presidential election, the state of the economy and the shocking withdrawal of former president Mohammad Khatami from the presidential race just three days before the New Year holiday.
Students and young people felt that Khatami had been the main hope for Iranian youth. They were shocked that Khatami withdrew in favor of lesser known Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who since the end of his tenure as prime minister in 1989 has not been involved on the national political stage. The overwhelmingly young Iranian population – 75% of Iranians are under 30 years old – have no memory of Mousavi. Youth complained that Khatami should have stayed in the race just a bit longer to make sure that his message and platform were heard. Many remember the social freedoms and the reformist agenda that Khatami pursued during his presidency. One young woman said, “I have no idea who [Mousavi] is…we just don’t understand why Khatami left so early. His platform and point of view did not get heard by enough people so that it could have an impact on the general conversation around the election.”
Iranians I spoke with saw Khatami’s departure as a sign of politics as usual, that the veiled threats of assassination and the restrictions on his campaigning were a move by those in power who opposed his candidacy. Many doubted that Khatami would have won if he had stayed in the race. One gentleman agreed with Khatami’s withdrawal: “He did the right thing—they would have kept him from running in one way or another.”
Regardless of who is running, the economy remains the single most important issue for Iranians. Traditionally, foreign policy and ideology have differentiated presidential candidates. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, once famously said that the Iranian Revolution was not about “the price of melons.” However, the price of melons and other basic goods are exactly what are on Iranians’ minds as they head toward the June polls. Iranians fear that the economy, plagued with unemployment and inflation, is going to get much worse. They pointed to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s announcement of “Year of Revision to the Pattern of Consumption” as the theme for the new Iranian year; the previous year had been the “Year of Innovation and Prosperity.” Khamenei spoke of a “waste of personal and public resources” and “unbridled consumption of the country’s resources” as ills to be addressed by the whole of society. Iranians have interpreted this to mean that their social welfare and services will be cut and they will have to learn to “conserve.” Currently, Iran regularly experiences rolling blackouts and water shortages; this summer is likely to be much worse because of a lack of rainfall during the fall and winter seasons.
While current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is highly unpopular among many upper-middle class Iranians not only because of his economic policies, but also because his fiery ideological rhetoric has reduced Iran’s standing in the international community, he still has a solid base of support among poorer and rural Iranians. During a rest stop in central Iran, a bus driver pointed to patrons wearing Basiji scarves at the next table and said, “When you ask who is supporting Ahmadinejad, don’t just consider North Tehran. Take a look at the people in the villages and towns, where he is bringing them free cooking oil and rice and other subsidies. They are not always seen, but their voices are heard in the election. These are the people who vote for him.”
No matter who is elected – reformist, pragmatic conservative or hard-line conservative – Iranians want security and economic prosperity for their families. As one bazaar merchant summed up, “All I want is for my future to be secure and not to worry from one day to the next if I can provide for my family. If one of these guys can do that, then I will vote for him. I hope that one of them can, but right now, I’m just not sure.”
The author is an Iranian-American who resides in New York. She recently led a delegation of graduate students from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs who spent two weeks traveling throughout Iran. The opinions expressed reflect those of the author, and not necessarily those of the National Democratic Institute or The Century Foundation.
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Published on April 24, 2009
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“There are no restrictions and no law on the nomination and assessment of women candidates.”
– Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaye, Guardian Council spokesman, quoted by Mehr News Agency, April 11
Reversing previous statements by the Guardian Council, the appointed body that approves candidates for elections, Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaye, council spokesman, said that the Guardian Council is open to receiving nominations of women for the presidential polls. Previous spokesman Gholamhossein Elham had stated that the Iranian constitution only allowed men to compete for the presidency. Among women who are expected to submit their nominations are former members of parliament Raf’at Bayat and Azam Taleqani, as well as Ma’soumeh Ebtekar, who served as Iran’s first female vice president under Mohammad Khatami. In his April 11 statement, Kadkhodaye also said that the Guardian Council does not make decisions based upon the gender of potential candidates. However, the Council has previously rejected on Islamic grounds the candidacies of all women nominated to run for president.
“The Iranian President’s senior advisor has formally resigned. Analysts believe that this has been done in order for him to get ready to become Ahmadinejad’s campaign manager.”
– Headline in the leftist Sarmayeh newspaper, April 14
Although the reasons for the resignation of Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi have not been confirmed, speculation is that he will assume the post of campaign manager for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election campaign. In a letter published by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Samareh Hashemi said that he was resigning to “have an opportunity to serve in other areas.” Samareh Hashemi had served as a senior advisor to the president and as deputy interior minister for political affairs. He also has ties to Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, the hard-line cleric who is Ahmadinejad’s spiritual advisor, as well as to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Under Iranian law, the president’s advisors or other senior members of his administration must resign from their offices before engaging in election campaigning.
“Election supervision committee ‘illegal’”
– Headline on the Iranian-run English language Press TV website, April 15
The Interior Ministry rejected a proposal raised by reformist candidates Mehdi Karoubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi to establish a Committee to Safeguard Election Votes, comprised of representatives of all presidential candidates, saying that it “has no doubt that the elections will be free and fair.” The proposal came as a result of candidates’ concerns regarding potential election manipulation based upon past allegations of vote tampering, counting fraud and other election violations, as well as the recent move to staff the elections board with representatives from outside the Ministry of Interior. Under Iranian law, candidate agents are permitted to observe voting and counting procedures at polling stations. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, each political group was allowed two observers at every polling station, and the Ministry of Interior had 45,000 election observers under its supervision. Independent domestic or international monitoring of elections is not permitted.
“Ahmadinejad to run as independent hopeful”
– Headline on Press TV website, April 15
“There is a lot of different and controversial information about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s campaign”
– Headline on reformist Aftab website, April 14
Similar to 2005, Ahmadinejad’s advisors indicate that he will run as an independent in the upcoming elections; he has not officially declared his candidacy but is expected to run. Rumors are that Ahmadinejad will not establish a formal campaign or campaign headquarters as a means of demonstrating his frugality in tough economic times. Instead, he is expected to rely upon a network of supporters to establish local campaign branches, many of whom began planning campaign activities last month.
“There should be no arguments or different opinions in the case of supporting Mir-Hossein Mousavi for president.”
– Kargozaran (Executives of Construction) party spokesman quoted by the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), April 17
While reformist rivals Karroubi and Mousavi continue to vie for the presidency, reformist parties have begun lining up behind Mousavi. The Executives of Construction party, founded by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the Militant Clerics Society, founded by Karroubi; Islamic Iran Participation Party, formerly led by Mohammad Reza Khatami the brother of the former president; and the Association of Combatant Clerics, led by former President Mohammad Khatami, all officially declared that they would support Mousavi in the election. In addition, the Coordination Council of the Reformist Party, which includes more than 20 reformist parties and groups under its umbrella, also announced its backing for Mousavi. The parties have emphasized that Mousavi is the more qualified candidate based upon his tenure as prime minister. The Coordination Council added that “we believe that the characteristics, records, capabilities and the ideas of Mir-Hossein Mousavi can settle the current deficiencies in the management of the country.” Breaking with the trend, however, the Islamic Council of Teachers refuted the apparent unified support among reformists for Mousavi, saying that his two decade absence from the political scene has alienated him from young reformers.
“Mohsen Rezai announces candidacy in presidential election”
– Headline on the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) website, April 22
“Rezaei has not yet made any decision regarding his candidacy and will issue a statement in the coming days about this issue.”
– from an Expediency Council statement quoted by ISNA, April 23
Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, appeared at last to be officially announcing his candidacy as an independent in the presidential elections. However, just a day later reports were that he was still on the fence. Speculation is that he may still lead a pragmatic conservative coalition, but no official word has come from that faction. In other candidate news, Abdoallah Nouri, who had been considering a bid for the presidency from the reformist camp, announced that he would not run.
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Published on April 24, 2009
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The leading candidates to emerge in the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
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In his successful 2005 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad took a populist approach, with emphasis on his own simple life. He is a self-described “principlist”, that is, one whose politics are based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He is known for promising to “put the petroleum income on people’s tables,” referring to distribution of Iran’s oil profits among the poor. Since 2008, he has pushed to remove subsidies from the state budget, which he believes have bloated the system, in exchange for cash distributions to the public.
Ahmadinejad has been the only presidential candidate to characterize relations with the United States and the United Nations as being one-sided and against Muslims. He has defended Iran’s nuclear program and has accused the West of trying to limit Iran’s industrial and technological developments. He supports fighting terrorism in order to improve foreign relations and has called for greater ties with Iran's neighbors by ending visa requirements between states in the region.
He has been known to crackdown against women’s attire and activity, homosexuals and minority religious sects. Freedom of expression has been limited in order to further national security.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a senior cleric from Qom, is Ahmadinejad’s ideological mentor and spiritual guide.
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Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but supports the Supreme Leader. He calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was an advisor to Khomeini and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, before he resigned in the belief that non-elected conservative factions were interfering in society. Karroubi considers himself a pragmatic reformist. In his first term as speaker of parliament, he was among the maktabi or “radical” faction of the majlis who contested the policies of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as foreign investment and market reforms. Karroubi sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy.
Karroubi differs from Ahmadinejad over almost all domestic issues, especially the management of the economy and the nuclear issue. He embraces all classes within society – students, workers, professionals and the clergy – while operating within the general framework of the constitution of the Iranian Republic. He has stated that he believes that many articles of the constitution pertaining to rights of the people have not been implemented. Karroubi has also stated that he will appoint women as ministers and presidential aides if he wins the June presidential election – a move that would break the barrier women have faced in holding ministerial posts.
During his campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Karroubi vowed to pay 500,000 rials ($50 dollars) monthly to every Iranian above 18. Since his campaign was announced for the 2009 election, Karroubi has said he will offer shares in Iran’s state oil and gas industry to the public.
Karroubi’s campaign slogan is “Change”, hoping to “bring about change in Iran’s Executive Body”.
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Mousavi has vowed to follow former president Mohammad Khatami’s path not only to pursue democratic reforms, but also to stay true to the country’s Islamic values and the revolution. Mousavi, a former conservative, does not believe in Western-style economic and political reforms. However, he does believe in press and individual freedoms and intends to establish a special dialogue to increase social cohesion. Mousavi believes the society’s mindset must be transformed in order to increase women’s participation in social life. While praising the technological and nuclear advancements, he criticizes current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s planning and budgeting. He further believes Iran needs to improve human resources and management. He is widely lauded by Iranians for his management of the economy as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war. Many believe he can attract principlists and reformers.
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Published on March 27, 2009
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|
Right-Wing Principlists |
|
|
EXPECTED |
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mohammad Jahromi |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mostafa PourMohammadi |
|
Moderate Conservatives |
|
|
CONSIDERING |
Mohsen Rezai |
|
CONSIDERING |
Gholamali Haddad-Adel |
|
CONSIDERING |
Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mohammad Nahavandian |
|
CONSIDERING |
Hassan Rowhani |
|
NOT RUNNING |
Ali Akbar Velayati |
|
NOT RUNNING |
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf |
|
Reformists |
|
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mehdi Karroubi |
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mir-Hossein Mousavi |
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NOT RUNNING |
Abdollah Nouri |
|
NOT RUNNING |
Mohammad-Reza Aref |
|
NOT RUNNING |
Mohammad Khatami |
|
NOT RUNNING |
Mohamad-Ali Najafi |
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Updated on April 24, 2009
Links:
[1] http://www.ndi.org/node/15428
[2] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org
[3] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org