By Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor, Iran Election Bulletin
Dear Reader,
The National Democratic Institute, in partnership with the Century Foundation, is pleased to introduce a new bi-weekly publication: the Iran Election Bulletin. At a time of increasing international debate on the future of relations with Iran, the Bulletin will provide analysis and information on the domestic political debate in Iran as the Republic prepares for presidential elections in June.
The Bulletin will include articles and analysis on Iranian domestic and electoral politics and review hot topics appearing in the Iranian media. “Voices from Iran” will include articles and first-person accounts written by Iranians, either currently living in Iran or recently expatriated, who provide their unique perspective on politics and elections.
This first edition seeks to set the pre-election scene as different factions jockey for position. Future editions will include an exploration of the various power centers within Iran; the major political parties; election administration; campaigning and electioneering; voting and public attitudes toward the elections; and issues that are figuring prominently in political rhetoric and public debate.
I hope you enjoy reading the Iran Election Bulletin, and welcome your feedback, comments and questions as we launch this new publication.
Sincerely,
Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor
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Published on Feb. 26, 2009
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By Geneive Abdo
Middle East analyst, The Century Foundation
Four months before the Iranian presidential election, competing candidates and factions are already entering the race with great drama and fanfare. Unlike other recent elections, when Iranian voters were apathetic, thinking their vote could make little difference, the upcoming June 12 election is generating widespread public interest and debate. For many Iranians, the election will serve as a referendum on the tenure of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the policies of his conservative administration.
This election is also critical for Iran’s relations with the West. Recent overtures by U.S. President Barack Obama have made Iran’s leadership and the electorate optimistic that, even if diplomatic relations are not fully restored, at least the relationship with the United States will be less icy. Obama’s promise to talk to Iran without pre-conditions has left the political establishment aware that the selection of the next president will help shape the immediate future of U.S./Iranian relations.
With the stakes so high, familiar as well as new faces are entering the contest. There is no official campaign season in Iran, so contenders tend to announce their candidacies haphazardly, often months apart. Some potential candidates sat on the sidelines, waiting to see if Ahmadinejad would run for a second term. In late January, Ahmadinejad entered the race, signaling that he felt he had the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
At times, Khamenei has vacillated in his support for Ahmadinejad. He has openly criticized the dire state of the economy, which Ahmadinejd pledged to improve during his 2005 presidential campaign. Yet, despite harsh criticism from fellow conservatives and reformers alike, Khamenei has given Ahmadinejad the go ahead. Now, Ahmadinejad’s bid for another term is prompting his rivals, among them Iran’s struggling reformers, to put forth their strongest contenders.
No one is better placed to compete against Ahmadinejad than Seyyed Mohammed Khatami. There were months of speculation whether Khatami, the two-term former president, would risk another campaign. When he left office in 2005, Khatami’s initial popularity had declined significantly. Iranians believed he never delivered on the grand promises he made, including creating a free press, establishing the rule of law, and bringing Iran out of world isolation. But after four years of Ahmadinejad, the Iranian electorate is more pragmatic. Many have lowered their expectations of fundamental change in the political system and are willing to accept Khatami, despite the limitations his presidency might face. On February 8, Khatami finally announced that he would run to serve the desires of his supporters, positioning himself as the reluctant leader and champion of the reformists. His candidacy is already invigorating the political system, which is precisely the goal of Iran’s Supreme Leader.
Khamenei needs Khatami now just as he needed him in 1997. Khatami’s participation lends respectability to the election by offering a competitive and compelling race. He also is a reminder to the West that Iran’s political system is not monolithic, but rather consists of competing political and theological structures. After four years of an Ahmadinejad presidency, which reaffirmed the stereotype of Iran as an extremist, anti-American, anti-Israeli state, Khamenei knows he needs to present Iran’s gentler face.
While the Iranian regime wants to convince the world – and its own citizens – that its elections are free and fair, it would be a stretch to characterize them as such. The electoral process does not begin with the candidates’ announcements nor does it end at the ballot box. Whether a candidate throws his hat into the ring and whether he actually wins largely depends upon Ayatollah Khamenei and the Council of Guardians, a body of six clerics and six jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardians will review the candidates who have nominated themselves to run for president and then approve a final slate of contenders. By law, the Guardians are required to state specific criteria for any candidate disqualifications, but more often than not ambiguous reasons are given, such as “lack of dedication to the Islamic republic.” Supreme Leader Khamenei has great influence over the decisions of the Guardian Council. Khatami previously stated that he would not run unless he had a guarantee that the Guardian Council would approve his candidacy; his declared candidacy indicates he has received the go ahead from Khamenei.
Now that it appears Khamenei and the Guardians have assured Khatami he will be placed on the final slate of candidates, the question is whether he will be allowed to win. Reformists inside Iran are predicting that he will need a large voter turnout – 70 or 80 percent of the electorate – to win if the election is fair. They think Khatami could beat Ahmadinejad by a margin of 2:1. But there are still no guarantees for Khatami that the regime will honor the election results.
In recent years, there have been complaints that the polls were manipulated, including charges the outcome was rigged at the voting booths. In 2005, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, who ran against Ahmadinejad, complained that pro-Ahmadinejad Basij paramilitaries manipulated the vote count to ensure his victory. Further, high-ranking commanders in the armed forces have used their influence to endorse candidates – a step that contravenes legal requirements that the state remain neutral. This election season is no different. On January 26th, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Maj. General Hassan Firouzabadi gave a speech endorsing Ahmadinejad.
Mehdi Karoubi, a reformist and former speaker of parliament who declared his presidential candidacy in October 2008, has warned that he plans to make public any electoral irregularities, and he issued an angry response to the Supreme Commander’s statements. In a letter he wrote to him, Karoubi charged him with assuming the title of “Supreme Commander who intervenes in elections.” Clearly the underdog, Karoubi is not only overshadowed by reformist rival Khatami but he is also not on the best terms with Khamenei. Karoubi’s decision to raise the issue of election manipulation, however, could put the Guardian Council on notice. In previous elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many experienced candidates. In some parliamentary elections, thousands have been banned from running for office, and in the 2005 presidential election many women were prevented from running.
Such an electoral process makes becoming and staying a candidate tricky business. Khatami has already demonstrated a bit of realpolitik as he navigates his candidacy. In a February 3speech, he departed from his usual calls for democracy and reform and instead gave full support to the Islamic system, showing uncharacteristic deference to Khamenei. “The person who comes to power should know that this is an Islamic republic. He should comply with the (Islamic) system … and in this system there is a Supreme Leader … He (the president) should preserve the importance and successes of the Supreme Leader … and also pay attention to the things that disturb the Leader.” Khatami also emphasized that the future direction of Iran must be charted according to the constitution, in a move designed to reassure the political establishment that should he be re-elected, the risks he tried to take when he was president would not be tried again. In 2000, during one of the many tense moments of his presidency, Khatami, frustrated by his limited power, suggested that the constitution be revised to give the presidency more authority. Shortly thereafter, the conservative establishment forced him to retract his statements.
Working in Khatami’s favor now is a sense in Iran that he would be better suited to engage President Obama than Ahmadinejad. If Iran hopes that this is the moment to change the relationship, Khatami is their best representative. Not only is he an intellectual, like Obama, but he is viewed by the United States and Europe as a man suited for diplomacy and dialogue. During his last presidency, Western governments courted Khatami, and he was respected inside Iran for attempting to integrate Iran into the international community. But precisely because of his popularity abroad, which his conservative foes are using against him, Khatami will walk a fine line on the campaign trail between appealing to his younger supporters, who want to end Iran’s isolation, and hardliners, who believe that dialogue with the United States undermines the power of the regime.
While relations with the United States will be an issue during the campaign, domestic issues, particularly the economy, will likely figure more prominently in the political debate. During the 2005 campaign, Ahmadinejad promised to help Iran’s economy, reduce high levels of unemployment and improve the lives of the downtrodden. In August, the government pledged a major economic plan to ensure that low income families pay fewer taxes while gaining greater government benefits, but the middle class is suffering and plummeting global oil prices do not work in Ahmadinejad’s favor. He is likely to rely on voters in the rural provinces, much as he did in 2005, to be the base of his re-election. In a February 18th speech in Yazd, he noted that he has “come to know the detailed aspects and challenges of the people living in the small and isolated provinces” through his 52 trips to the provinces.
Playing to the rural electorate may help bolster his populist credentials, but corruption charges threaten to undermine Ahmadinejad’s candidacy. His presidency has been plagued with such charges and a recent startling revelation could provide a fatal blow. In February, Iran’s National Audit Office revealed that more than $1 billion in surplus oil income from 2006-2007 failed to be deposited in the state treasury. Pressure on Ahmadinejad to explain the missing money is mounting, and during the week of February 16th parliament bitterly criticized him and his government.
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Published on Feb. 25, 2009
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By Masih Alinejad
At a recent soccer match between South Korea and Iran, the young women of Tehran, who have been deprived of attending sporting events at stadiums, were finally able to join the audience and applaud their favorite teams. However, the persistent struggle of women in the capital to win the right to attend sporting events has no meaning for the women of small towns and distant villages. Rural women are deprived of basic wages and rights, and they view the struggle of women in the capital with sarcasm, saying that those whose bellies are full have the luxury to fight to attend a sporting event.
In Iran’s election atmosphere, the competition between reformists and conservatives is somewhat akin to the disconnect between women in the capital and in the villages. The issues that concern reformists have absolutely no meaning for conservatives, and the reformists’ efforts toward political freedoms seem nonsensical to conservatives, who accuse reformists of being “pro-Western” and “well fed.”
Since former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announced his candidacy for the upcoming presidential election, he has been under attack in the conservative media, Friday mosque sermons, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA). Although Khatami has frequently mentioned Iran’s economic crisis in his speeches, conservatives believe his and his supporters’ primary goals are to create political openness, revive civil liberties, deescalate international crises, and strengthen Iran’s foreign relations. To counter Khatami’s platform, conservatives are using all official platforms under their control to reintroduce Khatami and his partisans as “women with full bellies” who have forgotten the people’s struggle to subsist and who pursue frivolous freedoms at the expense of serious daily concerns.
Hamid Rassaei, a pro-Ahmadinejad representative in the ICA, has tried to draw a stark contrast between the current and the former presidents. Referring to a personal recollection of one of Khatami’s deputies during his presidency, Rassaei exclaimed that people should know that Khatami’s eyes were red from staying up late to watch soccer matches, while Ahmadinejad’s eyes were red from sleeplessness and working hard to further serve the people. During rallies for the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, demonstrators held pictures of Ahmadinejad and shouted, “We do not need an American President… Ahmadi, Ahmadi, we support you”, implying that Khatami is a creature of the United States.
Kayhan, a conservative newspaper supervised by the office of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has also attacked reformists, comparing their destiny to that of Pakistan’s Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in December 2007. Kayhan’s articles call up memories of an assassination attempt closer to home – that of Saeid Hajarian, a Khatami deputy, who was severely paralized by an attack by an extremist youth in Tehran – and strike fear in reformists about an extremist revival. Therefore, the reformists are anxiously asking: What message are the conservatives trying to send with the comparison of Khatami to Bhutto?
Although no one has formally stepped in from the conservatives, attacks against reformists are serious and organized. Iranian conservative groups are not readily willing to surrender their power, and are already planning to persuade Iran’s public, particularly the poor, that pro-Western reformists are pursuing freedoms that are contrary to Islam. References to Khatami shaking hands with a woman on a trip to Italy are prevalent. Conservatives are already establishing the grounds to prove to society’s more traditional sectors that Khatami can endanger Islamic values as much as seating men and women in the same stadium.
In addition to Khatami, former ICA Speaker and leader of Iran's reformist National Confidence Party Mehdi Karroubi has indicated his intention to run for president. Karroubi’s reputation as a defender of student rights and civil-society activists has draw the support of the majority of political prisoners and human rights activists, including Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi. There are also rumors that Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war, will run; some of his supporters have established a campaign for him.
Karroubi, who ran against Ahmadinejad in the previous elections, has taken a strong stand against electoral fraud. He has written to Ayatollah Khamenei, accusing the Ayatollah’s son of interfering directly in the election process, and to the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Army with allegations of the military’s interference in elections. Karroubi has also written numerous letters to the head of the Guardian Council Ayatollah Jannati, accusing him of illegally disqualifying presidential nominees. These letters, which have been publically released, have increased support for reformists in general and Karroubi, in particular. A group of Iranian media activists and party members have supported Karroubi by establishing a newspaper and writing numerous editorials. The group believes that Karroubi—who has been able to form a political party, start a newspaper, and establish the first private satellite television network in Iran—is the only centrist, reformist executive able to compete against Khatami.
Note: This articles was translated from Farsi. The opinions expressed reflect those of the author, and not necessarily those of the National Democratic Institute or The Century Foundation.
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Published on Feb. 25, 2009
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By an Anonymous Journalist
In Iran, the president’s term is four years, and he can be reelected for a consecutive four-year term. Out of six presidents in Iran, three – Ali Khamenei, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Seyed Mohammad Khatami – held power for eight years; Abolhassan Banisadr was impeached by the parliament, and Mohammad-Ali Radjaei was killed in a terrorist attack. Considering this history, presidents have a significant chance for reelection to a second term. However, the coming June presidential election, which takes place in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s first term, is gearing up to be more competitive and sensitive as compared to similar past elections.
According to his counselors, the current president will be nominated a second time in June 2009. Seyed Mohammad Khatami, the former Iranian President (1997-2005), and Mehdi Karoubi, the former Speaker of the House, have announced their nominations on behalf of the reformist camp. While the rumors of Mirhossein Mousavi’s nomination, Iranian Prime Minister during the first decade of the revolution (Iran-Iraq war era), have increased, there have been no nominations from the conservative camps yet. Conventional political wisdom is that with the candidacy of Khatami, who based on public opinion polls has a much higher chance of defeating Ahmadinejad compared to other nominees, the conservatives, regardless of their criticisms of Ahmadinejad, will support him to prevent a transfer of power to the reformists. However, as the election nears, conservative unity, in the face of the failings of the current administration and a potential for Ahmadinejad to lose, might dissolve, and they might urge others from within the conservative camp to compete against him.
There are already rumors of a project to bypass Ahmadinejad in which conservatives are actively attracting support from within their coalition for an alternative nominee. Proposed names include Ali Akbar Velayati, the former Foreign Minister of Iran, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran’s Mayor and a 2005 presidential nominee, or perhaps a dark-horse nominee who will be unexpectedly announced later. Although some of the president’s supporting parties deny the existence of a project called “bypassing Ahmadinejad,” others do not deny it, implicitly stating that the conservative nominee might be both a more acceptable and more powerful individual—even preferably a mullah.
This is the first time that the Iranian president is facing such a fragile and challenging situation in a second-term election in his own party. Although Khatami faced criticisms in his second term election by his own friends, there was not a single competing reformist among all nine nominees. In contrast, even during his presidency, Ahmadinejad’s conservative supporters do not hesitate to criticize him. No other presidential nominee has faced such a strong rival after his first term. Even Mirhossein Mousavi, whose supporters include conservatives, has a better chance of attracting votes from villagers and the lower classes of society, the very segments of the electorate that Ahmadinejad has relied upon. In addition, some former ministers and supporters of the current president have stated their intentions to compete for the presidential office.
In addition to internal conservative rivalries, another element which promises a hotter election in Iran is the tension between reformists and conservatives in the framework of an election duel between Khatami and Ahmadinejad. Once the conservatives felt Khatami’s candidacy was serious – even before he officially announced his nomination on February 6th – they began to claim that his presence is somehow a political measuring against Ahmadinejad – an indicator of the people’s tendency toward reform or conservatism. Ahmadinejad’s administration has intensely criticized “The Construction Era” of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, “The Reform Era” of Khatami’s presidency and the last 16 years of technocrats’ and reformists’ demonstrations. Therefore, they consider the coming election an indicator of the people’s final interest toward development (Rafsanjani), though Rafsanjani is among the silent supporters of Khatami; democracy (Khatami) and justice (Ahmadinejad). They have set the stage for a final and decisive battle – a political Armageddon.
In this political Armageddon, the health of the election, avoiding any corruption and confidence in the results will be vital. In the last election, both Rafsanjani and Karoubi criticized the election and its vote-counting process. Reformists are concerned about the partiality of an election in which the president’s supporters are the only ones managing the election. They believe that if the election takes place in a healthy manner, Khatami’s victory is guaranteed. Proponents of both reformist candidates – Khatami and Karoubi – believe that support from military entities, including the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards, and other power centers in Iran prop up Ahmadinejad. They are confident that the reformists’ power to mobilize voters will result in a change in the balance of power in Iran.
To ascertain this election’s importance and the potential for either the conservatives or reformists to win, we should examine the legacies of Ahmadinejad. The livelihood of the people has been challenged; inflation has increased; because of the international sanctions, foreign investment has declined; and even unprecedented oil price increases have not been able to save the economic situation. The international financial meltdown has reached Iranian economic shores and even tougher situations are bound to happen. In foreign relations, some taboos have been broken, as Ahmadinejad is the first among his Iranian predecessors to have announced his willingness to engage in debate with his American counterpart and the first since the revolution to send a letter congratulating an incoming US president. However, his calls for the destruction of Israel and his denial of the Holocaust have practically left foreign politics in a dead-end situation.
Critics have also appraised Ahmadinejad’s nuclear approaches as unsuccessful. They believe despite the Iranian consensus regarding the right to peaceful nuclear technology, the president’s policies and conduct have seriously aided the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council. The issuance of four separate resolutions against Iran and the installation of more international sanctions have demonstrated how Ahmadinejad has failed to build trust with the West. Contrary to initial announcements that the primary diplomatic activities of the Ahmadinejad administration would create friendly relationships with Iran’s neighbors, the relations between Iran and the region’s Arab nations and the Persian Gulf coast have not been without tension. Restrictions on freedom of the press, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations, university students and women have also intensified during these four years.
To counter criticisms, Ahmadinejad and his cabinet have made an unprecedented number of trips to the provinces and made never-ending promises to the people of these regions. His claim to populist policies is among the ways the president may try to attract votes. In addition, support from the leader of the Islamic Republic may bolster Ahmadinejad, and there is speculation that the core of Iran’s power pyramid agrees with the extension of Ahmadinejad’s term. Having said that, the leader of Islamic Republic of Iran has never implicitly supported a specific candidate in any election, and some of the more traditional conservatives believe that the Supreme Leader actually seeks a more powerful administration compared to the current administration.
Although the reformists have not announced any specific plan, they all emphasize an agenda that includes creating a stabilized economy; renovating the economic regime; reviving the office of management and planning, which was dissolved by Ahmadinejad; deescalating foreign relations policies and building trust; and hiring experienced managers and experts who were pushed aside during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. On the contrary, Ahmadinejad emphasizes that he will end governmental subsidies and give the people cash hand outs – policies which experts have warned will have negative economic effects. As a result, the presidential election in Iran is shaping up to be a political Armageddon and a duel among the official blocks of the Islamic Republic’s conservative and managerial doctrines.
Note: The names of the authors of the Voices from Iran series have been redacted at the authors’ request. The articles are translated from Farsi. The opinions expressed reflect those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the National Democratic Institute or The Century Foundation.
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Published on Feb. 26, 2009
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By Geneive Abdo
Middle East analyst, The Century Foundation
When the U.S. government included Iran in the “axis of evil,” it was easy for the Iranian regime to rally the masses in anti-America fury. But after 30 years of staged rallies in Tehran filled with “Death to America” chants, the conciliatory messages from President Barack Obama have taken Iran’s clerics and political elites aback. Even though the regime is adamantly anti-American, many Iranians are not. Candidates running for president are particularly stumped as to whether they should appeal to their constituents or the country’s leaders, such as Khamenei, who remains steadfast in his anti-American stance.
Considering the delicate nature of the U.S./Iran relationship, it is likely Iranians will see a role reversal as presidential campaigning gets underway. Khatami could very well be the one who will express caution in quickly accepting Obama’s gesture for dialogue and Ahmadinejad who seems more willing to extend an unclenched fist. Khatami will want to assure his conservative foes that he will approach any possible US-Iran dialogue only after consulting all factions. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, will want to send a signal to young voters and other moderates who oppose his candidacy that he will not obstruct US engagement on ideological grounds.
Ahmadinejad signaled as much on February 10th during a speech he gave at a huge rally in Tehran’s Freedom Square: “The new administration has announced that they would bring change and that they want to hold dialogue,” Ahmadinejad said. “The change must be fundamental and not a mere tactical move. The Iranian nation is ready to hold talks, but talks in a climate of fairness with mutual respect.”
Other more pragmatic conservatives however took a harder line. Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament and former nuclear negotiator, dismissed Obama’s repeated pleasantries. He warned on February 2nd that the United States should not just shout slogans but untangle the knots of negotiations “by unfreezing Iranian assets and releasing Iranian prisoners held in Iraq.” He vigorously dismissed the notion that the issue of negotiations with the United States would influence the outcome of the Iranian presidential election – the very denial of which means that it could. Larijani, a pragmatic conservative, has shifted his tone from just two moths ago when he, along with his brother Mohammad Javad Larijani a long-time diplomat, said it was time for talks with the United States.
Some Iranian cynics inside and outside Iran are comparing Obama to Khatami, but for surprising reasons. Like Khatami when he was president, Obama might think he can ring in change, but the Washington political establishment could stop him, they say. One Iranian cartoonist, who rose to fame during Khatami’s presidency but who now lives in Canada, drew a cartoon that has become popular on blogs and other publications. It features Khatami and Obama. While a smiling Obama says “Yes we can,” a frustrated Khatami says, “No we can’t.”
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Published on Feb. 25, 2009
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The leading candidates to emerge in the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
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In his successful 2005 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad took a populist approach, with emphasis on his own simple life. He is a self-described “principlist”, that is, one whose politics are based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He is known for promising to “put the petroleum income on people’s tables,” referring to distribution of Iran’s oil profits among the poor. Since 2008, he has pushed to remove subsidies from the state budget, which he believes have bloated the system, in exchange for cash distributions to the public.
Ahmadinejad has been the only presidential candidate to characterize relations with the United States and the United Nations as being one-sided and against Muslims. He has defended Iran’s nuclear program and has accused the West of trying to limit Iran’s industrial and technological developments. He supports fighting terrorism in order to improve foreign relations and has called for greater ties with Iran's neighbors by ending visa requirements between states in the region.
He has been known to crackdown against women’s attire and activity, homosexuals and minority religious sects. Freedom of expression has been limited in order to further national security.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a senior cleric from Qom, is Ahmadinejad’s ideological mentor and spiritual guide.
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Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but supports the Supreme Leader. He calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was an advisor to Khomeini and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, before he resigned in the belief that non-elected conservative factions were interfering in society. Karroubi considers himself a pragmatic reformist. In his first term as speaker of parliament, he was among the maktabi or “radical” faction of the majlis who contested the policies of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as foreign investment and market reforms. Karroubi sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy.
Karroubi differs from Ahmadinejad over almost all domestic issues, especially the management of the economy and the nuclear issue. He embraces all classes within society – students, workers, professionals and the clergy – while operating within the general framework of the constitution of the Iranian Republic. He has stated that he believes that many articles of the constitution pertaining to rights of the people have not been implemented. Karroubi has also stated that he will appoint women as ministers and presidential aides if he wins the June presidential election – a move that would break the barrier women have faced in holding ministerial posts.
During his campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Karroubi vowed to pay 500,000 rials ($50 dollars) monthly to every Iranian above 18. Since his campaign was announced for the 2009 election, Karroubi has said he will offer shares in Iran’s state oil and gas industry to the public.
Karroubi’s campaign slogan is “Change”, hoping to “bring about change in Iran’s Executive Body”.
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Mousavi has vowed to follow former president Mohammad Khatami’s path not only to pursue democratic reforms, but also to stay true to the country’s Islamic values and the revolution. Mousavi, a former conservative, does not believe in Western-style economic and political reforms. However, he does believe in press and individual freedoms and intends to establish a special dialogue to increase social cohesion. Mousavi believes the society’s mindset must be transformed in order to increase women’s participation in social life. While praising the technological and nuclear advancements, he criticizes current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s planning and budgeting. He further believes Iran needs to improve human resources and management. He is widely lauded by Iranians for his management of the economy as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war. Many believe he can attract principlists and reformers.
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Published on March 27, 2009
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Right-Wing Principlists |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad Jahromi |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mostafa PourMohammadi |
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Moderate Conservatives |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf |
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CONSIDERING |
Mohsen Rezai |
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CONSIDERING |
Gholamali Haddad-Adel |
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CONSIDERING |
Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri |
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CONSIDERING |
Mohammad Nahavandian |
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NOT RUNNING |
Ali Akbar Velayati |
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Reformists |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad Khatami |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad-Reza Aref |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mehdi Karroubi |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mir-Hossein Mousavi |
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CONSIDERING |
Hassan Rowhani |
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CONSIDERING |
Mohamad-Ali Najafi |
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Published on Feb. 26, 2009
Links:
[1] http://www.ndi.org/node/15437