By Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor, Iran Election Bulletin
Dear Reader,
In the final days before the June 12 Iranian presidential election, the level of debate among candidates and their supporters has been unprecedented. The candidates faced off in nationally televised debates that saw heated exchanges on the economy, foreign policy and the overall direction of the country that crossed many of Iran’s political redlines. And thousands of supporters of the two main contenders – incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi – took to the streets in Tehran.
On the eve of the election, the excitement among the electorate is evident, with many projecting a record voter turnout. However, underlying the excitement, particularly among reformists, is the fear that forces behind the scenes are organizing to manipulate or influence the outcome of the election.
This edition of the Iran Election Bulletin examines one of the groups that has been accused of manipulating past elections – the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the basij militia that fall under its purview. Alleged to have had a hand in determining the outcome of the 2005 presidential election, the role the IRGC should play in this year’s election is being hotly debated among Iran’s political and military elite. The Bulletin looks at how the debate, as well as the divisions within the IRGC and basij, may impact their ability to influence this election.
I hope you enjoy this edition and welcome you to email me [2] with any comments.
Sincerely,
Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor
–
Published on June 11, 2009
—
By Geneive Abdo
Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation
Now that Iran’s presidential election has effectively boiled down to a close race between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and reformist challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a struggle has emerged over whether a powerful outside force – the country’s militias, who primarily support Ahmadinejad – should be allowed to endorse a candidate and oversee the balloting on election day.
The debate intensified on May 4, when the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Ali Jafari, announced that the basij, a paramilitary group under the control of the IRGC, should not remain on the sidelines of electoral politics. He said the militia, estimated to have 12 million members, was free to play an active role in the presidential campaign because it is not technically part of the “official” armed forces.
The basij militia emerged onto the electoral scene in 2005 when Ahmadinejad – himself a former basij and member of the IRGC during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war – first ran for president. They mobilized thousands to vote for him and were accused of stuffing ballot boxes and intimidating voters. Their efforts are believed to be responsible for Ahmadinejad’s surprise victory over former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Now, it seems history is being repeated in this election. In addition to Jafari’s statement, the representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei within the IRGC claimed in some publications that Khamenei, in a hand-written note, privately endorsed Ahmadinejad. Khamenei, who directly controls the IRGC, has stated publicly that he will not endorse a candidate in the June 12 poll; however, it is a long tradition in Iranian politics for each side to claim the “secret” sympathies of the leader.
Not only have IRGC commanders made public statements in support of Ahmadinejad, but IRGC publications, such as Sobh-e Sadegh, have attacked reformist ideas while voicing approval of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The website Ansar News, which is the IRGC’s Internet mouthpiece, published an article stating that Khamenei credited Ahmadinejad’s administration with having numerous advantages.
The IRGC has also staged rallies for Ahmadinejad. Women basij gathered in late May in the 12,000-seat Azadi stadium in Tehran to hear Ahmadinejad speak. In the end, the president did not attend because he was meeting the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the event was interpreted as the most clear-cut evidence to date of organized IRGC support for Ahmadinejad.
The apparent campaign by the militias to boost Ahmadinejad’s candidacy has prompted outrage among Iran’s reformers, who have long-standing complaints about the increasing role of the military in Iranian life and politics. Not only has the IRGC come to play a vital role in Iran’s political involvement in Iraq, but at home, in its role as Iran’s morality police, the basij has been vital in enforcing Ahmadinejad’s conservative social policies. These include strict enforcement of the law requiring all women to wear headscarves and a ban on public interaction between couples who are not related by blood or marriage.
Mehdi Karroubi, a reformist presidential contender, has led the battle against the basij. In early May, as he registered to become a candidate, he said: “We are here to hold a free election without intervention of the basij, without intervention of the armed forces and without intervention of rogue forces.” Karroubi is adamant that the basij be forbidden from intervening because he blames them for losing in the first round to Ahmadinejad during the 2005 election. At the time, Karroubi said sarcastically that there had been a “divine intervention” in the race – a reference to the basij.
Some conservatives, even those in the military, agree with the reformers. Brigadier General Seyyed Masoud Jazayeri, the deputy head of Iran’s Armed Forces Headquarters, said the basij should not be used as a campaign tool. “We hear that certain individuals and political organizations are attempting to abuse the name of the basij for their own personal and political ends. … This is against the standing orders of the Volunteers Resistance Force of Basij,” he said, according to the state-owned English-language network PressTV.
Some conservatives argue that the military’s intervention in Iranian politics is against the revolutionary ideals of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic republic in 1979. Khomeini established the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution from internal threats after the fall of the Shah. In 1988, he established basij forces on university campuses across Iran to ensure that students, long known for political dissent, would remain loyal to the republic.
Since then, the basij have served as an ideological police force, with varying degrees of influence depending upon who holds the Iranian presidency. Each year, Iran commemorates “Basij Week” to remind Iranians that the country is in a perpetual state of war against its enemies. Many argue, however, that Khomeini had never intended for either the basij or the IRGC to play a direct role in elections.
Under Khamenei’s leadership, the powers of the IRGC and basij have increased. In 1998, Khamenei gave his approval to a bill passed in parliament that called for a substantial increase in the numbers of basijis on college campuses to discourage political unrest. Last year during parliamentary elections, Khamenei appointed Alireza Afshar, a former IRGC commander and spokesman for the armed forces, to oversee the polls. And now, the basij are members of local election boards and, according to press reports, are coordinating their election activities with Ahmadinejad’s campaign staff.
Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s main reformist rival and a veteran of Iranian politics, has adopted a different strategy from that of Karroubi. Rather than fight what seems to be the inevitable, Mousavi’s campaign is attempting to co-opt the basij to his side. On May 14, former Revolutionary Guard Commander Alireza Rashid, who is campaigning for Mousavi, announced that the presidential candidate welcomed the involvement of the basij in the election.
Still, this has not entirely immunized Mousavi from criticism and attack. Basirat website, which is affiliated with the IRGC’s political bureau, published a commentary in which it accused Mousavi of being a leader from a different, bygone era who “had been hurled into today’s political world.” The article said the reformists were so desperate to find a candidate, after former president Mohammad Khatami withdrew from the race, that they brought back Mousavi, who had been on the sidelines of Iranian politics for the last 20 years.
Despite this heated debate, it seems unlikely that either angry reformers or wary conservatives can prevent the basij and IRGC from increasing their direct involvement in the 2009 presidential election. But public opposition could still limit the degree of their intervention and potential attempts to tamper with the election results. Historically, Iran’s clerical leadership has put great emphasis on presenting national elections as free and fair – whatever the actual facts on the ground. In the past, public unease has forced Khamenei and other senior clerics to declare vote tampering “un-Islamic.” A similar stance this time, whether in public or behind the scenes, could go a long way toward reducing the real impact of the basij and their masters in the IRGC.
–
Published on June 11, 2009
—
By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford
Since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, the same factionalism that has increasingly divided conservative ranks has also created rifts in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the basij militias under its control. The divisions have intensified in the run-up to the hotly contested 2009 presidential election, particularly as the less hard-line elements of the IRGC and basij have abandoned support for incumbent Ahmadinejad and realigned behind presidential contenders Mohsen Rezai and Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
The IRGC proved integral in the conservative effort – particularly from 2003 to 2005 – to resist former president Mohammad Khatami’s reform agenda, oust the reformists from power during the 2004 parliamentary and later 2005 presidential elections and ultimately consolidate conservative political power. However, much as competition among the formerly united conservatives has intensified, Ahmadinejad’s controversial tenure has caused disunity within the IRGC and basij. The President’s confrontational foreign policy stance, which has increasingly isolated Iran, coupled with his economic mismanagement have proven the most significant factors in creating disunity. Two distinct groupings – hardliners and pragmatists – have emerged within IRGC and basij elements.
The hardliners form Ahmadinejad’s hardcore, though increasingly marginalized, constituency. They share his view that the Islamic Republic is engaged in an eternal fight against the “foreign enemy,” oftentimes portrayed as the West and Israel. Although hardliners in both the IRGC and basij support Ahmadinejad vehemently, their allegiance is more to the revolutionary and religious ideals Ahmadinejad espouses than to the president himself. He has won their support thus far because he most closely represents their anti-capitalist, anti-Western attitudes and adherence to a modest lifestyle as led by the Prophet Mohammad and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces Seyyed Hassan Firouzabadi recently stated in Raja News, “Ahmadinejad’s phenomenon” is that he “has revived Imam (Khomeini’s) discourse and differed from traditional politicians.”
The very actions and rhetoric that have endeared Ahmadinejad to the hardliners have put him at odds with the pragmatists. The IRGC is not only a security force, but also a corporate entity, and the pragmatists believe they can best maximize the profitability of their investments when Iran enjoys domestic and regional stability – conditions they claim Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric constantly undermines. In addition to significant stagflation produced by Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement, Iran’s increasing international isolation has limited much needed foreign direct investment and restricted international trade. Although the IRGC has profited in the last four years from, for example, preferential construction contracts and the operation of illegal jetties in the South, the pragmatists believe they have not realized their full revenue potential.
Although the pragmatists have withdrawn their support from Ahmadinejad, they have not unified behind any one of his three rivals, Karroubi, Mousavi or Rezai. Many of the less hard-line principlist commanders have expressed support for Rezai because their mutual opposition to both Ahmadinejad and the reform movement leaves Rezai as the only suitable candidate. Pragmatists among IRGC and basij elements also support Rezai because they believe his technocratic approach is best suited to revitalize Iran’s ailing economy and foster better international relations, while still upholding conservative principles. Ayatollah Movahedi Kermani, the former representative of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the IRGC, recently endorsed Rezai as a “capable, principlist, positive and innovative manager.”
More moderate pragmatists within the IRGC and basij support Mousavi as a centrist candidate with one foot in both the reformist and conservative camps. Last week Mihan Blog – published by Tehran University students – circulated an open letter from 59 former IRGC commanders endorsing Mousavi. However, in contrast to Rezai, Mousavi’s support is concentrated more among basijis than the IRGC – perhaps due to his own background in the basij. In a recent speech to a group of basijis at the University of Shiraz, Mousavi repeatedly declared his admiration for the basij and promised to support its expansion once elected president, stating, “I myself am a basiji and still have not put away my uniform!”
Several basij elements in Tehran and Khorramshahr, among other large cities, led by former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rashid, have established offices in support of Mousavi’s election campaign. Moreover, an Iranian blogger Naeim Karimi, reported that at a rally held on the anniversary of Khorramshahr’s liberation, war veterans, family members of soldiers martyred in the Iran-Iraq war and current basij members showed their support for Mousavi by honoring him with the trademark Palestinian resistance scarf that has also been adopted by the IRGC and basij.
The role the IRGC and basij will play in the elections – both in administering the elections and supporting the candidates – is still being debated. The militias, who reformists accuse of rigging the 2005 elections in Ahmadinejad’s favor, could once again influence the outcome of the June 12 polls through behind the scenes manipulations. However, the division between hardliners and pragmatists may decrease the potential for systematic interference on the national-level and, moreover, reduce Ahmadinejad’s share of the vote as compared to the 2005 presidential election. With at most 1.5 million IRGC and basij out of roughly 46 million eligible voters, their impact – at least as voters – on the final election outcome is unlikely to be decisive.
–
Published on June 11, 2009
—
“Many of the officials in the Rafsanjani government and many of your officials started work with nothing and ended up billionaires…How many of my ministers have become billionaires in the last four years?”
– President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during a presidential debate with reformist challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi
“Mr. Ahmadinejad provides a collection of data that are certainly wrong. Either he is provided ‘wrong’ information, or he himself intentionally provides wrong information.”
– Reformist candidate Mehdi Karroubi during a presidential debate with incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
The 2009 presidential debates in Iran, which, according to Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, were watched by 70 million people in Iran and across the globe, were unprecedented in the level of attacks levied by the candidates against their rivals. Ahmadinejad accused his current competitors, as well as former president Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, of extreme corruption and nepotism. He further alleged that Rafsanjani, Khatami and Mousavi comprised an elite cabal that was actively working behind the scenes to undermine his administration. His attacks even extended to Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of Mousavi, who has become something of an icon for women during this election, accusing her of not sitting for her entrance exams to obtain her academic degrees. Rahnavard struck back by threatening to sue the president if he did not apologize for his remarks.
Ahmadinejad also countered criticism of his economic management, which has become a primary election issue. He claimed that inflation was at 14 percent and on a trajectory to fall to 10 percent by the end of his term, that unemployment had decreased during his term and that pension funds had soared. Both Mousavi and Karroubi took issue with his statistics, citing, among other data, a report released by the Central Bank of Iran that put inflation at 25 percent. Karroubi, in not so veiled remarks, went so far as to accuse the president of lying to the people about the true state of the economy. The president responded in a speech on June 10 in Tehran by accusing his rivals of using biased information derived from Zionist forces.
Despite the political mudslinging during and following the contentious debates, Ahmadinejad appears not to have soured on debates as a whole. According to PressTV, he has said that if re-elected, he would invite U.S. President Barack Obama to participate in a debate.
“Tens of millions of people in the country and outside watched as he [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] lied and violated laws against religion, morality and fairness, and as he had targeted the achievements of our Islamic system.”
– Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in an open letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, June 9
In response to the allegations levied against him by Ahmadinejad during the debates, Rafsanjani – who ran against Ahmadinejad in 2005 – published an open letter to the Supreme Leader criticizing the president and calling upon him to recant his statements. In the letter, Rafsanjani accuses the president of undermining the revolution and of speaking against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Ahmadinejad had claimed that his administration was the only one since the revolution to have worked in support of the nation, appearing to implicitly criticized Khamenei who served as president from 1981 to 1989.
Rafsanjani also sought to counter the president’s allegations that he is working in concert with current presidential candidates to undermine Ahmadinejad. He reiterated that none of the candidates had sought his counsel, nor had he officially endorsed any of the competitors. However, in a shift from his public neutrality during the election, Rafsanjani did explicitly indicate his opposition to the Ahmadinejad administration, stating that “the continuation of the present state of affairs is not in the interest of the political system and the country.”
He ended his letter by calling upon the Supreme Leader to ensure that the elections are conducted freely and fairly, reflecting the concern among many reformists that the elections may be manipulated behind the scenes in favor of Ahmadinejad.
Mesbah Yazdi’s Decree to Rig Votes
–headline in Rooz, June 9
“Observers and polling officers are entrusted with the vote of the people, which they must safeguard.”
- statement released by the Guardian Council on June 9
According to several sources, Ministry of Interior employees published an open letter highlighting serious concerns that preparations for vote manipulation were being made. In the letter they reference a fatwa – which based upon the description of the cleric appears to have been delivered by Mesbah Yazdi, a hard-line cleric and spiritual advisor to Ahmadinejad – declaring that Iranians have an obligation to defend the revolution and appearing to sanction electoral fraud in support of Ahmadinejad. Ministry employees further indicate that as many as 2.6 million extra unaccounted for ballots have been printed and that the number of electoral stamps – used to certify counting results – produced is twice the number of polling stations.
In response to ongoing concerns that the elections will be rigged, the regime, which has a strong interest in portraying the elections as free and fair, is allowing for additional monitoring of election day procedures. In addition to the Guardian Council Election Monitoring Committees, the General Inspection Office, which falls under the judiciary, and candidate representatives will also observe the polls. Candidate representatives, according to the head of the election administration office, will be allowed to monitor all phases of election day, including voting and ballot counting.
–
Published on June 11, 2009
—
In the history of the Islamic Republic, no incumbent has ever lost in a presidential election. The 2009 election may make history with over 46.2 million eligible voters and record high voter turnout anticipated.
The polling stations will be open Friday, June 12, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. The Interior Minister Sadeq Mahsouli announced, however, that if the polling stations are busy, the hours allocated to vote could be extended. There are 45,713 voting centers, including 3,200 in Tehran and vicinity alone. There are an additional 162 polling stations for Iranians living outside the country, including 32 in the United States.
Every polling station will have at least six people administering the election including a chief, a deputy, three secretaries and a member assigned by the governor. These administrators will ensure voters are eligible to vote and that election procedures are followed. To cast a ballot, voters must be over 18 years of age, be mentally sane and provide national identification cards that certify the voter is an Iranian citizen. Once the voter’s ballot is cast and sealed, the election administration stamps the voter’s identity card to eliminate the possibility of voting twice.
The elections will be monitored by the Central Supervisory Committee, established by the Guardian Council and made up of two members of the Guardian Council and five individuals chosen by consensus by the council. They will monitor their local supervisory boards appointed at the local district level. The Guardian Council, in addition to monitoring the election, reviews candidate nominations and approves the final slate of candidates.
The candidates can personally or collectively introduce supervising representative(s) at the polling stations. Candidate representatives can be present at all polling stations for the balloting, counting and transfer process. Those monitors can report any violations to the Supervisory Committee in writing.
The Judiciary also gave Iran's General Inspection Organization, a government oversight body, the authorization to observe the election, despite opposition by incumbent Ahmadinejad.
Once a polling station is closed, the counting process begins. Polling station officials first count the ballot stubs, followed by the ballots. Ballots will be considered null and void with the verification of the local district Supervisory Board if the ballot is illegible, contains names other than the approved candidates, lacks election seals or is a nonstandard ballot. If the number of stubs and ballots are equal, then the actual vote count begins. If there are more votes than ballots, then the difference is randomly selected from the ballot box and the votes cancelled, then the ballots are counted. In cases where there are more stubs than ballots, the discrepancy is reported and the votes are counted.
Once the votes are counted and results tallied, the official results are certified, and all ballots are returned to the ballot box, which is then sealed and officially transferred to the Executive Committee. Results will be announced within 24 hours.
–
Published on June 11, 2009
—
The candidates certified by the Guardian Council for the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
In his successful 2005 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad took a populist approach, with emphasis on his own simple life. He is a self-described “principlist”, that is, one whose politics are based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He is known for promising to “put the petroleum income on people’s tables,” referring to distribution of Iran’s oil profits among the poor. Since 2008, he has pushed to remove subsidies from the state budget, which he believes have bloated the system, in exchange for cash distributions to the public.
Ahmadinejad has been the only presidential candidate to characterize relations with the United States and the United Nations as being one-sided and against Muslims. He has defended Iran’s nuclear program and has accused the West of trying to limit Iran’s industrial and technological developments. He supports fighting terrorism in order to improve foreign relations and has called for greater ties with Iran's neighbors by ending visa requirements between states in the region.
He has been known to crack down against women’s attire and activity, homosexuals and minority religious sects. Freedom of expression has been limited in order to further national security.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a senior cleric from Qom, is Ahmadinejad’s ideological mentor and spiritual guide.
Followers of Imam Line and Leadership Front (FILLF) | April 24, 2009
Society of Benefactors of the Islamic Revolution | April 24, 2009
Followers of Islamic Revolution Society | April 25, 2009
Islamic Coalition Party (member of FILLF) | April 26, 2009
Islamic Society of Workers | April 26, 2009
Islamic Revolution Caucus | April 26, 2009
Islamic Society of Engineers | Expected
200 of 290 members of the Iranian parliament
–
Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but supports the Supreme Leader. He calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was an advisor to Khomeini and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, before he resigned in the belief that non-elected conservative factions were interfering in society. Karroubi considers himself a pragmatic reformist. In his first term as speaker of parliament, he was among the maktabi or “radical” faction of the majlis who contested the policies of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as foreign investment and market reforms. Karroubi sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy.
Karroubi differs from Ahmadinejad over almost all domestic issues, especially the management of the economy and the nuclear issue. He embraces all classes within society – students, workers, professionals and the clergy – while operating within the general framework of the constitution of the Iranian Republic. He has stated that he believes that many articles of the constitution pertaining to rights of the people have not been implemented. Karroubi has also stated that he will appoint women as ministers and presidential aides if he wins the June presidential election – a move that would break the barrier women have faced in holding ministerial posts.
During his campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Karroubi vowed to pay 500,000 rials ($50 dollars) monthly to every Iranian above 18. Since his campaign was announced for the 2009 election, Karroubi has said he will offer shares in Iran’s state oil and gas industry to the public.
Karroubi’s campaign slogan is “Change,” hoping to “bring about change in Iran’s Executive Body.”
National Trust (Etemad-e Melli)
(Karroubi is the chairman of Etemad-e Melli)
–
Mousavi has vowed to follow former president Mohammad Khatami’s path not only to pursue democratic reforms, but also to stay true to the country’s Islamic values and the revolution. Mousavi, a former conservative, does not believe in Western-style economic and political reforms. However, he does believe in press and individual freedoms and intends to establish a special dialogue to increase social cohesion. Mousavi believes the society’s mindset must be transformed in order to increase women’s participation in social life. While praising Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s technological and nuclear advancements, he criticizes the current president’s planning and budgeting. He further believes Iran needs to improve human resources and management.
He is widely lauded by Iranians for his management of the economy as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war. Many believe he can attract principlists and reformers.
Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO) | April 10, 2009
Militant Clerics Society | April 11, 2009
Association of Combatant Clerics | April 12, 2009
Solidarity (Hambastegi) | April 15, 2009
Executives of Construction | April 17, 2009
Islamic Iran Participation Party | April 18, 2009
Coordination Council of the Reformist Party | April 18, 2009
–
Rezai leads a coalition of pragmatic conservatives, along with Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf and Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Supreme Leader. He has been a clear critic of Ahmadinejad, stating that the current president has brought Iran into the “path of destruction.”
His campaign has focused on seven core issues he considers “major threats” to Iran, including unemployment, inflation, poverty, social ills such as drug use, the loss of happiness and peace in society, the weakening of moral values in politics and government, and divisions within the government, ethnic groups and between Shi’a and Sunnis.
He has stated his concern over polarized elections and a self-centered executive branch. His campaign includes the pledge to create an effective coalition government of conservatives and reformists as a major aspect of his reform plan.
Rezai was the chief commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps for 16 years and is currently the secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. He previously ran for president in 2005, but withdrew his candidacy two days prior to the election.
Development and Justice Party of Islamic Iran | April 15, 2009
The Front of Unity of Islamic Iran | April 27, 2009
–
Updated on June 11, 2009
Links:
[1] http://www.ndi.org/node/15547
[2] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org