Overview

Since the collapse of its last national government and administration in 1991, Somalia has been characterized by political anarchy, economic destitution, and general insecurity. While two distinct and relatively stable self-administered regional entities have emerged-'Somaliland' in the northwest and 'Puntland' in the northeast-most of Somalia, until recently, was splintered among clan- and sub-clan-affiliated warlords. While various attempts have been made to reconcile the warring clans and warlords in the rest of Somalia, including both the U.S.-led operation in 1992 and the United Nations (UN) operation in 1993, all such efforts have failed to disarm the factions and bring stability to the country. Recent events, however, have revived international interest in Somalia, as efforts to reconstitute a durable governing framework have been challenged by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and regional conflict.

Somalia's fledgling Transitional Federal Government was borne of a peace and reconciliation process facilitated by the country's regional neighbors-through a regional body, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-and with the support of international donors. The Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya succeeded in developing the Transitional Charter, forming a Transitional Federal Parliament led by a Speaker, electing a president, and forming and endorsing an executive branch headed by a prime minister. Broadly based, inclusive, and representative, the TFG may be the country's best hope for the restoration of order and stability. Still, the TFG continues to face many challenges: it has failed to exercise control over wide swaths of the country or provide security; it has struggled to establish local administrative capacity; and divisions regarding the location of the interim governing institutions and the presence of foreign peacekeepers threatened to undermine the body.

Ultimately, a January 2006 compromise signed in Yemen-the Aden Declaration-led to the relocation of the new government institutions to Baidoa. Shortly thereafter, the TFP convened its first legislative session on Somali soil. Still, the TFG has remained unable to garner a popular governing mandate largely due to its limited security capacity. In fact, with the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a Mogadishu-based Islamic political movement, the TFG saw control confined to its immediate surroundings in Baidoa.

In June 2006 this group forcibly expelled the warlords who had divided and ruled Mogadishu-Somalia's traditional capital-for more than a decade. The UIC then quickly went about establishing its own alternative governing structures, including its own quasi-legislative body, the Islamic Council (Shura) headed by hardliner Hassan Dahir Aweys, and an executive committee chaired by the more-moderate Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Despite the efforts of regional bodies including the Arab League and IGAD to encourage reconciliation and an agreement of mutual recognition, relations between the UIC and TFG began to deteriorate over the latter half of 2006. Meanwhile, the Islamic Council continued to consolidate its political and military base, while its more-radical elements began to impose Shari'a law throughout the country.

Ethiopia, fearing the rise of a militant Islamist movement on its sensitive southeastern border, sent troops into Somalia to back the transitional government. The UIC, for its part, then used the presence of troops from predominantly-Christian Ethiopia to galvanize and militarize its movement, declaring holy war (jihad) and reaching out to Islamist supporters worldwide. In addition to moral and financial support, the Islamists, according to a November 2006 UN report, also received outside military assistance; Eritrea was reported to have backed the UIC, a development that threatened to turn Somalia into a proxy war for regional rivals.

On December 6, 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1725, which called for the cessation of hostilities between the UIC and TFG, authorized the deployment of an IGAD/African Union stabilization force for Somalia, and partially lifted its 1992 arms embargo in order to allow the peacekeepers to enter the country. In spite of this development, UIC-affiliated militias continued their military advance across southern Somalia and attacks on TFG and Ethiopian positions outside Baidoa.

In a surprising reversal, government and Ethiopian troops routed the Islamist forces in a late December march from Baidoa. A widely-feared regional conflict has not materialized and the TFG entered Mogadishu for the first time. With untested institutions, little experience, and few resources, however, the TFIs continue to face daunting challenges as they confront their new role in Somalia's changing political context.

NDI Activities

To address these needs, with the support of the Government of Norway and the National Endowment for Democracy, NDI is working with Somalia's transitional administration to develop its central leadership and decision-making structures. NDI's Somalia program seeks to better enable TFG leaders to carry out their duties by providing targeted training-through workshops and seminars-for many of the specific skills and competencies integral to democratic governance.

The specific program objectives are to: (1) strengthen the institutional capacity of the TFG's core executive branch structures, particularly regarding their staffing and functions; (2) assist newly installed executive and selected legislative branch officials, as well as elected members of parliament, to better understand and differentiate their respective roles and responsibilities as leaders and decision-makers in the development of democratic state institutions; and (3) foster constructive working relationships among members of the TFG's Council of Ministers, as well as between the executive and legislative branches.

Curriculum Development

Building on its current activities in the region and its extensive experience in supporting newly transitioning democracies in other countries, the Institute is providing assistance in an incremental fashion in close coordination with relevant TFG officials. At the outset, NDI conducted a comprehensive needs assessment of the transitional institutions, mechanisms and processes.

Based on this assessment, the Institute crafted a customized training curriculum to assist the TFG, with particular emphasis on the executive branch. Since the ministers are also members of parliament (MPs), the curriculum is tailored to help these individuals differentiate their roles and responsibilities between the executive and legislative branches of government. Other illustrative training topics could include: the basics of democracy and principles and practices of good governance; roles and responsibilities of branches of government; internal consensus-building and negotiation; openness, transparency and accountability; policy design, coordination and review; instituting anti-corruption mechanisms; inter-ministerial communication and coordination; executive-legislative relations; establishing bi-lateral linkages with ministerial counterparts; strengthening women's participation in executive and legislative decision-making; the use of technology to enhance organizational efficiency; and effective management and leadership strategies. Drawing on its network of contacts, the Institute deploys specialists to serve as trainers, recruited on the basis of each major area of the core curriculum agreed to in partnership with the transitional government.

Targeted Training and Capacity-Building Activities

NDI is also conducting a series of targeted capacity-building workshops and related technical assistance to support the emerging Council of Ministers Secretariat, Office of the Prime Minister, the Office of the President, and key staff members therein. Additional targeted trainings may be devoted to supporting elected members of parliament, as well as in strengthening the voice and role of women in executive decision-making and in parliament. NDI draws upon a pool of experts from primarily other African countries, as well as from Europe and the United States to conduct training.

Given the unique challenges Somalia faces, while still in a perpetual state of insecurity, NDI will also offers training on conflict and security sector management. Such training focuses on security as an area of competence for newly installed officials. Disarmament and demobilization of clan-based factions has been a major challenge for the new government, bringing security into central focus. By highlighting some of the key issues in this early phase of the transition, and by drawing on some of the lessons learned from other similar settings in Africa and elsewhere, NDI is helping give the new government a head start in addressing some of the difficult obstacles it faces.

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