



**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**NDI ELECTIONS ADVISORY MISSION
TO THE REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI**

December 13-19, 1992

INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION REPORT

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is the report of a five-member elections advisory team sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) that visited the Republic of Burundi from December 13-19, 1992. The NDI mission was arranged in response to requests from the government and political parties to provide assistance and practical advice to the country's leaders as they seek to establish a democratic election framework following years of single-party rule.

The NDI team comprised: Tessy Bakary, a professor of political science at the University of Laval in Quebec, Canada; Matyas Eorsi, a member of parliament from Hungary; Patrick Griffin, president of Griffin & Johnson, a government relations consulting firm based in Washington, DC; NDI Program Officer Peter Silverman; and NDI Program Assistant Jason Keiles. [See Appendix I.]

The team met with President Major Pierre Buyoya, Prime Minister Adrien Sibomana, the minister of interior, the minister of justice, the secretary of state and international cooperation, the president of the Constitutional Court, members of both the Technical Commission and the National Consultative Commission on Democracy, the director of the Center for the Promotion of Human Rights and leaders of all eight accredited political parties. [See Appendix II.] During the consultations, the team focused on key issues relating to the development of an electoral law and the administration of free and fair elections envisioned for 1993.

There are several significant and, in some respects, unique challenges to the democratization process in Burundi. Government officials assert that they are committed to bringing national unity and reconciliation to Burundi through multiparty democracy, but they are also attempting to closely regulate the process in an effort to avoid setbacks in the transition and the kind of political instability that has affected some of Burundi's neighbors. Opposition parties believe that the government's approach has marginalized them from meaningful participation in the transition process.

Before elections are held, electoral and communal codes must be approved by the president of the republic. These codes are currently being drafted by the newly formed 12-member Technical Commission. According to government officials, this process should be completed by the end of January, although opposition party leaders do not believe this timetable is reasonable.

The 1992 Constitution approved by referendum last March determined the election systems for the presidential, legislative and communal elections. Nonetheless, the drafting of the electoral and communal codes remains an extremely important element in developing the legal and administrative frameworks for the election process. The government and opposition parties agree that the draft codes should be presented to the people of Burundi for input before being approved by the president, although the precise review process has not yet been determined.

This report is intended to help Burundian leaders consider some of the key issues relating to their country's election process. Based on the team's experience dealing with similar issues elsewhere, alternative approaches are suggested for resolving several particularly contentious issues. The team hopes that this report contributes to an informed debate of the issues among the people of Burundi.

II. BACKGROUND

Following Burundi's independence from Belgium in 1962, conflict between the ethnic minority Tutsi (comprising approximately 14 percent of the population) and the majority Hutu (85 percent) polarized the country and resulted in the early consolidation of power by the Tutsi. The assassination of a Hutu prime minister in 1965 and the appointment of a Tutsi prime minister following a Hutu victory in legislative elections shortly thereafter led to an aborted coup by the Hutu-dominated gendarmerie in October 1965.

The violent suppression that followed essentially removed the Hutu from Burundi's political life for more than two decades. In consolidating their power during the 1960s and 1970s, Tutsi leaders removed the Hutu from the armed forces and politics, often through purges and violence directed against Hutu citizens. Throughout this period, the Tutsi-dominated armed forces played a prominent role in Burundian political life. The Union Pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), the governing political party since independence, became the sole legal political party in 1966.

Major Pierre Buyoya assumed power in an army-led coup in 1987, following which he introduced a series of reforms to promote national unity and ethnic reconciliation. President Buyoya's rapprochement with the Hutu in the late 1980s led to increased calls by the ethnic majority for greater political participation. Ethnic violence, however, erupted in August 1988. The Tutsi-dominated army was accused of massacring Hutu citizens and creating tens of thousands of refugees, reigniting both international and domestic criticism of the government.

In the face of growing pressure, President Buyoya initiated a series of political reforms. A National Commission of Inquiry and National Unity, comprised equally of Hutu and Tutsi members, was appointed in October 1988 to investigate inter-ethnic violence, address the issue of ethnic inequality and make recommendations for national reconciliation. The commission drafted the Charter of National Unity, which called for national reconciliation and guaranteed equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion, region, sex or other such differentiations. The government also organized a national dialogue among Burundians on the issue of unity; some in the opposition considered the dialogue stifled and inadequate. The people of Burundi approved the charter in a February 1991 national referendum.

In 1988, President Buyoya also established a new government and restored the post of prime minister by appointing a Hutu, Adrien Sibomana. The president also placed an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi on the Council of Ministers. A multi-ethnic Constitutional Commission was appointed in March 1991 to study the issue of democratization in Burundi,

promote a national discussion on the issue and prepare a new constitution. A draft constitution was disseminated nationwide for discussion in September 1991. Six months later, the new constitution, which established a multiparty political system, was approved overwhelmingly in another national referendum. The Charter of National Unity and the 1992 Constitution are now the fundamental laws of Burundi.

As with the Charter of National Unity, the 1992 Constitution drafting process is criticized by many in the opposition. The absence of a legal opposition, they claim, prevented a formal challenge to the government's draft. Opposition parties contend that these documents, having been drafted under the one-party system, do not accommodate the new multiparty environment. They object, in particular, to the sweeping powers of the executive relative to the National Assembly and the judiciary. They also believe the process for amending the constitution is too difficult, requiring concurrent support by the president and the approval of four-fifths of the legislature. In addition, opposition parties find fault with the traditional local governance system prescribed in the constitution, which calls for indirect elections and restricts formal party competition at the communal level. They fear that local politics have been co-opted by one-party rule to allow for broad representation at the local level under this system.

Articles 184 and 185 of the 1992 Constitution place all executive and legislative power exclusively with the head of state until a new president and National Assembly are elected. According to the constitution, the president is elected by direct universal suffrage for a maximum of two five-year terms. If a candidate does not receive a majority of valid votes cast in the first round, a runoff is held between the leading two candidates within 15 days.

Members of the National Assembly are elected by universal suffrage for five-year terms. These elections are based on a system of proportional representation using closed party lists. Parties are awarded seats proportional to their vote in each electoral district -- presumably the country's 16 provinces. However, a party must win at least 5 percent of the vote nationwide to qualify for seats, while independent candidates must gain at least 40 percent of the valid votes cast in their constituency to be elected to the National Assembly.

Local elections are based on the traditional local governance system of *ubushingantahe* for the Communal Assembly, Communal Council and communal administrator. Voters in each census district (*colline* or hillside) will select approximately four or five *bashingantahe* to represent the district in the Communal Assembly, which will in turn elect the communal administrator (there are approximately 2,600 *collines* and 114 communes in Burundi). Residents of each district will also select one delegate to the Communal Council from among their representatives to the Communal Assembly. The constitution describes this system as "outside the competition of political parties," meaning a proscription against formal political party activity at the local level (Article 178).

The Political Parties Law was promulgated in April 1992, which along with the 1992 Constitution, allowed for the formation of political parties. President Buyoya resigned as head of the ruling party, UPRONA. The party was delinked officially from the government and registered as an independent party in May. While the NDI team acknowledges assurances from

the government and party leadership that UPRONA is no longer the governing party, UPRONA continues to maintain close informal ties with the government and, for the purpose of this report, will be distinguished from the newer, opposition parties.

Eight political parties are currently registered to compete in the legislative and presidential elections. A potential ninth party was denied accreditation by the minister of interior during the team's visit. The team was told by the minister of interior that the rejected party's dossier failed to satisfy the laws requiring the party to uphold the constitution and Charter of National Unity. According to the Political Parties Law, this decision can be appealed to the administrative chamber of the Supreme Court. [See *Participation in the Electoral Process* below.]

The opposition parties have repeatedly called for a national conference and the creation of a transition government in order to establish the election framework and govern until elections. The government, on the other hand, maintains that these demands are unconstitutional and unnecessary obstacles to continued reform. On October 20, the leaders of five opposition parties drafted a 30-point memorandum that called for, among other things: powersharing in a transition government that would be negotiated directly between the parties and the government; a code of conduct for civil servants and political parties; neutrality in the judicial system; an assessment of UPRONA property holdings; and freer access to public communication resources.

President Buyoya created two national commissions which he viewed as an effort to address the concerns of the opposition parties and to provide them with a more significant role in collaborating with the government on the election framework. The National Commission for the Preparation of Elections was established in October to prepare a new electoral code, revise the current communal law and devise plans for the administration of the upcoming elections, including an election calendar. The commission (comprised of representatives designated by the accredited political parties, state and local institutions, the armed forces, the Church, civic groups, associations and labor unions) was mandated to prepare a report making recommendations to the president. Opposition parties criticized the commission on the grounds that it lacked formal power and did not represent a meaningful concession by the government toward greater powersharing. In addition, they were concerned that their representatives would be outnumbered on the commission.

A 28-member National Consultative Commission on Democracy ("Consultative Commission") was created in November to provide a forum for increased dialogue between the government and the political parties on key democratization and election-related issues. These issues include the mode of collaboration between the government and the parties, political party conduct, the election calendar, party financing, access to the media and other matters. According to the presidential decree, this commission shall also make recommendations to the president. The commission, chaired by the minister of justice, comprises a vice chairman, five government ministers and one representative from their staffs, and two leaders from each of the eight accredited parties.

Just before the team's visit, President Buyoya dissolved the National Commission for the Preparation of Elections following a boycott by opposition parties, which objected to the participation of the secretary general of the Central Union of Burundi (CSB). They argued that the CSB was not an officially registered union and therefore should not be represented. Government officials, meanwhile, criticized members of the opposition parties, who supposedly asked for per diem and transportation allowances for participating on the commission. The commission chair, unable to break the impasse, asked President Buyoya to intervene.

After dissolving the National Commission for the Preparation of Elections, President Buyoya created the Technical Commission to draft a new electoral code and communal law. This 12-member commission, chaired by the vice president of the Supreme Court, comprises judges and magistrates; political parties are not formally represented. It is designed to be purely technical in nature and had only recently initiated its work at the time of the NDI team's visit. Members of the commission spoke of completing their work by the end of January. The draft electoral code and communal law are expected to provide the legal and administrative structures for the conduct of elections that have not already been determined by the constitution. However, the specific scope of this commission's work has not been clearly defined by the opposition parties or the government.

III. ELECTION ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Before the NDI team's visit, the crux of debate between the government and the opposition parties concerned issues of process, specifically relating to the participation of the parties in developing the election framework. A lack of immediate consensus on broader questions, such as the creation of a transition government or the composition of the national commissions, has often prevented the dialogue from focusing on issues regarding the drafting of an electoral code and the administration of the elections. The team's consultations with Burundian leaders emphasized these election issues in order to assess areas of possible agreement and compromise.

The NDI team expressed deep concern about an apparent lack of agreement between the government and opposition parties on fundamental issues. The conflicting positions are further exacerbated by a high level of distrust between the parties and the government. The team believes that, in such an environment, it is important that the election framework reflect a general consensus among all political entities and not be drawn along partisan lines.

UPRONA's 30-year reign accords a particular responsibility on the government to ensure an administratively sound process, free of any perception of partisanship. Given that Burundi's constitution places executive power exclusively in the head of state throughout the transition, the president bears a considerable burden to ensure a meaningful and successful transition. At the same time, the goal of all parties should be the consolidation of democracy in Burundi and not just the attainment of political power.

While the 1992 Constitution outlines important aspects of the election system, many critical elements remain to be determined in completing the framework for the elections. As the only existing body for realizing a formal dialogue between the government and the political parties, the Consultative Commission represents a potentially significant vehicle for achieving consensus on important issues. However, while the opposition parties regard this commission as perhaps the only remaining opportunity to participate in establishing the election framework, they are skeptical given its mandate that assigns a purely advisory role to the commission with no formal decision-making power.

In this context, the prospects for consensus might be enhanced if there were a commitment to accept the recommendations of the Consultative Commission, thereby giving it a more significant and formal role. Such a political gesture would neither undermine the spirit of the constitution nor reduce the legally guaranteed powers of the head of state.

As far as the electoral and communal codes are concerned, the government and all of the parties agree that the draft codes should be offered to the people of Burundi for input before being presented to the president for formal approval. The government and the Technical Commission have also indicated that suggestions from any source, including the political parties, are welcome throughout the drafting process. Additionally, all eight political parties with whom the team met believed that it would be useful for the multi-sector Consultative Commission to discuss the draft codes. This deliberation could go a long way in enhancing the parties' confidence in the process. At the same time, however, the opposition parties would have to begin identifying specific issues that they would want to see addressed in the election law.

The team believes that *confidence* in the election system and the *perception* of fairness can be as important as the content of the election law itself. Burundians, therefore, should not be concerned only with the soundness of the election code and communal law but with seeking ways to promote trust in the overall process as well. Where there is a lack of trust, additional safeguards -- an extra layer of transparency -- should be considered. It is with the above ideas in mind that this report highlights several issues for attention and makes recommendations, based on the experiences of team members, for consideration by the leaders of Burundi.

Election Administration

Elections in Burundi have traditionally been administered by the ministry of interior under the direction of the director general of administration and territorial security. A National Election Commission was created under the ministry of interior to organize and administer the 1992 referenda. Chaired by the director general, the commission comprised primarily civil servants and technicians named by the president. Committees established by the ministry of interior at the commune level administered the elections locally.

Many opposition parties expressed concern about the equitable conduct of multiparty elections if they are to be administered by the ministry of interior and appointed local officials without a role for the parties. Some propose creating an election commission with political party

representation, while others have suggested alternative models. Regardless, opposition parties believe strongly that the administration of elections must account for the new multiparty context.

In countries that have experienced periodic changes in government from one political party to another, a certain level of confidence in the objectivity of those administering the election process is likely to prevail. However, in a country that is in a democratic transition such as Burundi, the administering body must not only be impartial but must be perceived to be acting in such a manner. Where the administering body is seen as partisan, the credibility of the elections may be questioned and the transition process undermined. Thus, while the referenda apparently were fairly administered, additional safeguards may be needed to promote confidence in the upcoming multiparty elections.

There are basically two different models for election administration: 1) elections administered on a nonpartisan basis, where political parties do not formally participate on the administering authority; and 2) elections administered on a partisan basis with the formal participation of the political parties. The first case includes elections administered by an independent election commission or, as in the case of many francophone countries, by civil servants. While in this approach parties can not play a formal role in administering the elections, they may still serve an important function by monitoring the process -- from the pre-election period to the post-election announcement of results.

Some opposition parties suggested establishing an election commission whose members would be nominated by the political parties. In such a case, the commission, not the ministry of interior, would be in charge of administering the elections. While this method helps to ensure the representation of different interests on the commission, the proliferation of parties that often occurs in a transition can make the size of the commission unwieldy. In addition, under this scenario, the commission may be comprised of individuals who lack the technical skills and expertise to contribute substantively. Thus, giving political parties a formal role in administering the process can add credibility and transparency to the process, but often at the cost of efficiency.

Another option involves creating an independent election commission that does not involve formal party participation. Political parties could instead, by consensus, select individuals to serve on the commission who have relevant expertise and a reputation for independence and integrity. However, the establishment of this type of independent administering authority would likely require significant legal and administrative changes and the creation of another permanent bureaucracy.

Perhaps a more practical short-term solution in Burundi would be to assign the responsibility for administering the elections to the ministry of interior while adding safeguards to enhance confidence in the process. One mechanism that has been used elsewhere involves the creation of an election advisory council that derives at least half of its membership from the opposition parties. This council would provide an important forum for debating issues regarding the implementation of the election law and would review the practices of those administering the elections. The council would also offer suggestions regarding modifications in practices or

personnel and propose changes designed to promote a more equitable and transparent election process. If established in Burundi, the council should be accorded direct access to the minister of interior and other senior government officials, and should conduct its deliberations in public. The inclusion of party representatives in an officially sanctioned advisory council would undoubtedly increase confidence in the election process. Furthermore, the creation of such a council could be achieved at this late juncture without the constitutional or bureaucratic changes that may be required to establish an independent election commission.

In some respects, the basis for such a council already exists in the Consultative Commission. However, the team's impressions are that this commission lacks the formal mandate to perform such a role. At present, the commission's purely advisory capacity undermines its credibility among many parties as representing a significant body whose decisions are accepted by the authorities. Additionally, the participation of the minister of interior on the commission may complicate the perception of its independence on issues regarding election administration.

Timing of Elections

The government and opposition parties disagree on the timing of elections and the appropriate sequence for the presidential, legislative and local elections. The government prefers the timetable that anticipates elections beginning in March 1993, although officials on several occasions cited this date simply as a reference point and appeared willing to briefly delay the schedule if necessary. The opposition parties believe the March date would not provide sufficient time to adequately prepare and compete effectively in the elections, given that some parties were not accredited until last fall.

Before elections can be held, electoral and communal codes must be accepted, an authority to administer the elections appointed, local administrators trained, voters registered (or some alternative mechanism for identifying voters approved), candidates nominated, ballots and other paraphernalia prepared and distributed, and a campaign period administered. As the first multiparty elections in more than 25 years, their conduct in a free and fair manner is critical to building public confidence in the government's commitment to overseeing a meaningful democratic transition. Even if unintentional, a poorly administered process or a noncompetitive election could impede the transition process and undermine Burundi's position internationally.

The team understands the government's desire to proceed expeditiously with the elections and minimize the duration of the transition period. However, such a schedule should not be followed at the expense of making the necessary preparations to help ensure a successful process. Based on the team's experience in other countries, it is critical that the election calendar reflect a consensus decision reached among all the competing parties.

Burundi's leaders offered differing positions on scheduling the three elections, with some opposition parties and government officials suggesting three separate election days for the local, legislative and presidential elections. Since the local elections are indirect and will likely use

a different balloting system, separating them from the other two elections may prevent voter confusion.

Some leaders underscored how important it is for the electorate to recognize the significant role of a legislature in a democratic system. They are concerned that conducting the presidential and legislative elections on the same day will cause the presidential contest to overshadow the elections to the National Assembly. The team agrees that this phenomenon often occurs in transition elections where the electorate is less familiar with the institutions of democratic governance. On the other hand, in a highly polarized political environment, the time between elections can be particularly tense and can place additional strains on the process. Burundians should also take into account logistical and financial realities in determining whether to combine elections or schedule them on different days, allowing for the possibility of additional rounds in the elections.

Whatever the decision, agreement from the outset on a realistic timetable for the three elections will be crucial to a smooth-running process. It will allow proper time for the parties and electorate to adequately prepare, and for the government and administering authority to solicit and allocate the appropriate resources.

Electoral System

While the legislative elections will be based on a proportional representation system using party lists, the number of legislators who will be elected to the National Assembly and the formula to allocate seats both among and within Burundi's electoral constituencies remain uncertain. Some Burundians suggested allotting equal representation among the provinces, while others favored allocating seats among the constituencies proportional to their population. If the latter option is selected, a determination will have to be made about the efficacy of the census figures and whether seats will be allocated based on these figures, the number of registered voters in each constituency or the number of valid votes cast.

The team was told that a census was conducted by the ministry of interior for the 1992 referenda using figures that were collected during a period beginning in 1990. This census arranged the population figures by province, commune and *colline*. Some opposition parties questioned the credibility of these numbers -- fearing they reflected politics more than demographics -- and did not want them used to determine delimitation and other issues. They have called for an independent or multipartisan authority to conduct a new census for the upcoming elections.

In proportional representation systems, the precise formula for counting votes can play an important role in determining the election outcome because it dictates how party vote totals will be translated into seats in the legislature. Two approaches are most frequently used.

The *largest-remainder* system favors smaller parties. In this system, the vote received by each party is divided by an electoral quota (a quota, in its simplest form, is derived by dividing the total number of valid votes cast in a constituency by the number of seats to be

allocated), with a seat awarded to a party for each bloc of votes equal to the quota it receives. The party's remaining votes that comprise less than the full quota needed to achieve a seat constitute a remainder. Parties that are not awarded any seats (they receive fewer votes than the quota needed to win even one seat) have their vote total also counted as a remainder. Seats unallocated because no party meets the designated quota are allocated in sequence to the parties with the largest remainders. Thus, a party can win a seat in a constituency, even if its share of the vote is less than a full quota, when its vote total is more than the remainder of the larger parties that have already been allocated seats.

The *d'Hondt system* (highest-average system), one of the simplest methods for allocating seats, favors the larger parties. In a series of consecutive rounds, each party's vote total is divided by a sequence of numbers (1,2,3... or 1,3,5...etc) and the resulting quotients are listed. Comparing all of the quotients, seats are then allocated to the parties with the largest quotients in descending order until all of the seats have been distributed.

There are variations of these models that can affect the overall allocation of seats. Those selecting a system must keep in mind those who will ultimately interpret the rules -- the voters, the parties and the election officials -- and strive for simplicity as well as fairness. A system that is too complicated may be inadvertently as inequitable as one that is deliberately biased if the resulting confusion overshadows an otherwise fair process.

Voter Registration

For the 1992 referenda, voter registration was conducted at the communal level by local committees appointed by the ministry of interior, presumably in cooperation with the communal administrator. A potential registrant presented a national identification card and received a voter registration card that was required for voting on election day. The registry contained the voter's name, the order in which the voter was registered, and his/her *colline*, name, age, sex and voter registration card number. The law provided for challenging the voter lists through the competent Residential Tribunal, but it is not clear how the lists were made public for review. The final voter rolls were stored at the communal level, with copies forwarded to the provincial governor, the president of the National Election Commission and the minister of interior.

The government estimates that there are approximately 2.6 million eligible voters in Burundi, based primarily on the number of voters who participated in the 1992 referenda. While some government officials appear comfortable using previous voter lists as a basis for the upcoming elections, most opposition parties are calling for a new voter registration process. They believe that the ministry of interior and local administrators who organized the registration process under the one-party system were partisan and therefore an independent or multiparty commission should conduct a new process. They also believe that new registration is necessary to account for previously displaced individuals and those who have since come of age, thereby enhancing participation in the elections. A new process will also help ensure that the appropriate quantity of voting paraphernalia is allocated to each polling place.

An alternative to undertaking an entirely new voter registration process would be to provide for a formal review of the existing voter lists by the electorate and the parties. An adequate period of time would be set aside to allow lists to be examined for accuracy and to enable new or displaced potential voters to register. A system would have to be developed for voters to challenge the lists and to appropriately amend the registries. These abbreviated procedures can enhance confidence in the voter lists, while perhaps expending less money and time than would be spent undertaking an entirely new registration process.

Concerns were raised with the team about parties using forged national identification cards to illegally obtain voter cards. To the extent that parties are worried about multiple voting, a review of the voter rolls for accuracy will help prevent irregularities and counter the perception that they can easily take place. However, the government and parties may wish to address the issue of utilizing voter cards in general and whether additional or alternative means, such as the use of a national identification card and indelible ink, should be adopted to ensure the integrity of the voting.

Participation in the Electoral Process

The constitution and the Law on Political Parties define the conditions under which a political party can be accredited. According to Article 55 of the constitution, political parties are required to uphold the constitution and the Charter of National Unity and to adhere to the following principles:

the respect, safeguard and consolidation of national unity; the protection and promotion of the fundamental rights of the human being; the promotion of a state of law based on the respect and defense of democracy; the defense of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty; the prohibition of intolerance, ethnicity, regionalism, xenophobia and recourse to violence in all forms.

Additionally, parties are forbidden to form on the basis of ethnicity, region, religion or sex, and are required to have ethnically and regionally balanced leadership committees and to present candidates that are representative of the population at large.

The team recognizes that no serious problems emerged previously as a result of these provisions -- all eight parties that applied for accreditation were approved. However, at the conclusion of the team's visit, a group called the Movement for Peace and Democracy (MPD) was refused accreditation by the minister of interior because, according to the minister, the group's dossier failed to uphold the constitution and the Charter of National Unity. The team was told that, for example, the MPD's platform called for a restructuring of the armed forces to allow for multi-regional and multi-ethnic representation, which apparently conflicts with the Charter for National Unity by stipulating specific ethnic representation. The minister of interior assured the team that the group will be accorded every legal opportunity to appeal the decision with the Supreme Court and to reapply for accreditation.

The team is concerned by the MPD's rejection. The MPD claims that it was not afforded the same opportunity to discuss its dossier with the minister of interior that was granted to other parties, and it was not provided with a formal statement explaining its rejection. This lack of communication may have hampered the MPD's ability to modify its dossier in order to comply with regulations and gain the accreditation it seeks.

International human rights standards require extending the principle of freedom of association as broadly as possible. Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society for the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

The team has not considered this issue in detail, but believes that the government has generally complied with these standards in accrediting political parties. However, the team notes that too many proscriptions against political parties may limit the choices available to the electorate. While the government must certainly exercise discretion in dealing with this issue, the team believes that restricting party participation can be counterproductive and even impede efforts at achieving national reconciliation and unity. The team therefore would recommend that the government promote within the regulations the highest participation of Burundians in the political process. In this context, the authorities should render assistance to applicants where appropriate so as not to hinder their participation in the process, particularly for administrative reasons.

Election Campaign

The election campaign is a critical period in a democratic election process. A campaign provides competing political parties and candidates an opportunity to communicate their messages through the media, public rallies and other political activities. Their ability to function freely and equitably during a campaign is a primary factor in determining the fairness of the election process.

The political environment in Burundi has been tense and polarized. It is not unusual in transition situations for tensions among parties and their supporters to be exacerbated during a highly-charged election campaign. It is important, however, that the pressures of competition not threaten the fundamental objectives of the election process in Burundi -- the peaceful resolution of different political views and national reconciliation.

Political parties repeatedly stressed the need for a code of conduct to help create an environment of trust and accountability in Burundi. Additionally, the presidential decree creating the Consultative Commission listed as a priority the establishment of a code of conduct. International experience has shown that, while it does not always impose broad legal obligations, a code of conduct ratified by the political parties helps significantly to create a more peaceful and constructive climate, and to enhance trust among the parties and electorate alike in the fairness of the election process.

The team is pleased that the parties have begun to address this issue. Codes of conduct differ around the world. In some cases, such as in Namibia, a code was drafted under the sponsorship of the United Nations and signed by the parties. In Pakistan, the Electoral Commission prescribed a code of conduct for the parties. [See Appendix III for the codes from these two countries.]

The Law on Political Parties provides for government funding of the parties' campaigns. However, the opposition parties are waiting for funding from the government that they claim should be forthcoming. Before funds can be distributed, however, the government and parties must consider such questions as the timing and method for allocating the funding; the limitations on the use of funds and the system of accountability; and the government services that would be available for party use. The expeditious and equitable resolution of these issues will increase confidence in the fairness of the election process.

Article 18 of the Law on Political Parties guarantees political parties equal access to the state media. A new press law places final responsibility for press freedom, media access and other media questions with the National Communications Council, which can overturn decisions made by the minister of communication on such matters. The 18-member presidentially appointed council, which was declared neutral and independent, also acts as arbiter in disputes between the government, parties, newspapers and other bodies concerning media issues. Parties are not represented on the council.

The minister of communication told the team that national television and radio conduct a two-hour broadcast on weekends in French, Kirundi and Swahili during which the political parties can communicate their messages -- with each party allotted 15 minutes. The minister pointed out that the government is providing this media access despite the fact that a campaign period has not formally commenced.

Parties and journalists criticize the press law for imposing too much government scrutiny on media issues. Opposition parties also fault the sanctions imposed on media that criticize the head of state, or that undermine national unity or confidence in the government. The parties believe these restrictions hamper their ability to effectively present political issues, particularly during the campaign when, for example, the president might be a candidate or government policy may be the focus of opposition criticism.

The NDI team would recommend a liberal interpretation of the press law in order to enhance public discourse during the campaign. At the same time, the political parties should engage in substantive debate that offers clear choices to the electorate. In addition, the government could allow a multipartisan commission to consider media access issues. Such a commission would make formal recommendations to the National Communications Council before the latter handed down any decision.

Ballots and Ballot Boxes

For the 1992 constitutional referendum, the law called for providing at least one polling station with four voting booths for each commune -- with additional stations to be added as necessary. Each booth contained two ballot boxes, one black box representing the "no" vote for ballots opposing the draft constitution and a white box for "yes" ballots favoring passage of the draft constitution. Polling officials provided a stamped ballot that the voter placed in one of the two ballot boxes reflecting his/her choice.

The parties are considering a variety of balloting methods for the upcoming multiparty elections. Many Burundians envision the use of multiple ballots and ballot boxes for either or both the legislative and presidential elections. While this type of system functioned satisfactorily for the referenda that considered only two choices, it may present certain administrative and logistical problems in the more complex multiparty elections.

A multiple balloting system raises concerns relative to maintaining the secrecy and integrity of the vote. When using multiple ballots, the voter selects among different ballots corresponding to each of the candidates or political parties competing in the presidential or legislative elections respectively. The voter can select either from ballots offered by a polling official before entering the polling booth or can choose among stacks of ballots once inside the booth. The latter method increases the possibility of tampering, as ballots can be sabotaged or removed. In either case, the voter must be provided a stamped envelope in which to place the selected ballot before depositing it in the ballot box. This step is critical to deter ballot stuffing and ensure ballot secrecy. Obviously, a procedure must be established to control the distribution of envelopes. Multiple ballot boxes also present many of the same risks as multiple ballots and can be very unwieldy.

Single ballots, which normally include the names and symbols of all competing candidates or parties, tend to be less cumbersome and more effective in ensuring ballot integrity. Some Burundians expressed concern that, given the high illiteracy rate and general lack of voting experience among the electorate, single ballots may be too difficult for voters to decipher. Many countries have cleared similar hurdles through a variety of methods, including placing pictures or party symbols on the ballots. In the latter case, voters would mark their choice on the ballot by identifying the corresponding picture or symbol, or both. In Namibia, ballots for the 1989 legislative elections contained only party symbols, without the party lists. In Guatemala, the ballots for the 1990 presidential elections exhibited party symbols and the candidates' names and pictures, while the ballots for the 1990 presidential elections in Nicaragua did not include the candidates' pictures. [See Appendix IV for sample ballots.]

In determining the most appropriate balloting methods to adopt, Burundians should weigh practical administrative and financial considerations, as well as the need to ensure the honesty of the balloting and the ease with which the people of Burundi can exercise their right to choose.

Ensuring the Integrity of the Process

Even where there is an adequate electoral law, effective monitoring is essential to ensure a successful election process. Domestic monitors, comprising representatives from the political parties and nonpartisan civic organizations, can play a unique and valuable role in promoting confidence in the process and acceptance of the election results.

Some parties expect to place representatives in polling stations around the country to observe the election proceedings. Many of Burundi's nascent parties, however, may be too small or possess too few resources to organize a nationwide observer effort on their own. To overcome this obstacle, several parties might coordinate their respective pollwatchers to allow for greater coverage. With at least eight political parties, it may not be necessary for each party to locate observers at every polling site. If political party representatives are not included as polling officials in Burundi, they should be afforded access to all aspects of the balloting and vote counting process as observers, with their complaints formally registered by the polling officials.

The civic organizations in Burundi, such as the human rights groups and the Church, also have an important role to play in supporting the democratic election process. These groups can organize their own nonpartisan pollwatching effort that can complement party pollwatching activities. Civic education programs could be organized to inform voters about the process for registering to vote and the mechanics of voting; the appearance of the ballots; procedures for marking the ballots; the identity of polling officials and observers; and other issues. Civic groups can also play a role in objectively reporting on the conduct of parties and their supporters during the campaign and on election day.

Major irregularities that can affect the outcome of the elections normally take place during the vote counting. To increase public confidence during this important stage, parties or civic groups should develop a mechanism to verify the official results and to detect any irregularities. A parallel vote tabulation, during which the parties or other groups collect the tally sheets obtained by their representatives nationwide to tabulate the results independent of the official count, is an effective device that has been used successfully in countries around the world to certify election results. The civic groups ought to assume the responsibility to act in a nonpartisan manner. Moreover, they, along with the political parties, should provide evidence with documentation of any electoral irregularities.

In Burundi, the government has welcomed the presence of international observers as a demonstration of its commitment to credible elections. Opposition parties hope that international observers will help guarantee the fairness of the process. Depending on the circumstances, international observers enhance confidence and encourage participation in the election process, deter fraud and report objectively on the elections to the international community. However, the team strongly believes that international observers will make the most meaningful contribution to the election process only if there is also a strong domestic monitoring effort.

IV. CONCLUSION

The government and the people of Burundi have taken important and courageous steps toward establishing a multiparty democracy. However, the political climate in Burundi remains polarized. It is crucial that meaningful and sincere dialogue take place among the government, political parties and other sectors of Burundian society on key issues regarding the election framework in order to achieve the broadest consensus on the rules that will govern the process.

It is the shared responsibility of all Burundians to create an atmosphere of confidence in the nation's democratic transition. The current situation requires acts of good faith to be exhibited on all sides. The team recognizes that the government and political parties have raised legitimate concerns. Many have correctly stated that they have taken steps to address the apprehensions of the others. However, threats of sanction or nonparticipation enforced by any side will, over time, increase public cynicism and call into question the credibility of the transition process in Burundi.

An unprecedented opportunity now exists for the leaders of Burundi to work together to move their country forward. In this spirit of cooperation, they should not hesitate to enlist local groups, such as civic organizations, and the international community to assist in this important and difficult undertaking. While the people of Burundi will ultimately determine the success or failure of their democratic transition, they deserve the respect and support of the international community in this historic endeavor.

APPENDICES



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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■ FAX (202) 939-3166
■ Telex 5106015068 NDIIA

APPENDIX I

DELEGATION BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Tessy Bakary is a professor of Political Science at the University of Laval in Quebec, Canada. He has been a leading member of GERDDES Afrique, a regional non-partisan democratic development organization based in Benin. Dr. Bakary has also written many works on development and democratization in Africa. He is a specialist on elections in Africa and has recently participated in a civic education workshop in Togo with NDI. Dr. Bakary has also worked with NDI on an election observer training program in the Congo, Ivory Coast, and Niger.

Matyas Eorsi, MP was a founder of the Alliance of Free Democrats in Hungary. In 1989, he participated in the National Triangle Negotiations on behalf of the Opposition Round Table, where the rules of the political transition were discussed and agreed. That same year, he served as a member of the National Election Commission. Dr. Eorsi has been a member of the Hungarian Parliament since 1990 and has served on the Constitutional and Legislation and the European Community Affairs Committees. Most recently Dr. Eorsi participated in an NDI survey mission to the Republic of Georgia.

Patrick Griffin is President of Griffin, Johnson & Associates, a government relations consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. He formerly served as Senior Vice President and Managing Director for the Government Relations Division of Burson-Marsteller, one of the leading public relations and communications firms in the United States. Prior to that, Mr. Griffin was Secretary for the Democrats in the U.S. Senate where he served as the only Democratic elected officer of the Senate. In addition, he served as the senior floor assistant to the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Byrd. During his career in the Senate, Mr. Griffin carried out duties as professional staff on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee and the Senate Budget Committee. He also served as a domestic policy advisor at the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Mr. Griffin participated in NDI's election observer delegation to Pakistan in 1990.

Jason Keiles is a program assistant at NDI, where he has worked on democratic development programs in Southeast Asia and East Africa. Mr. Keiles was formerly an intern at the Atlantic Council, a public policy center, where he worked on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation project.

Peter Silverman is a program officer and has been at NDI since September 1989. He has contributed to democratic development programs in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and East Africa. Mr. Silverman has also participated in international observer delegations to the national elections in Chile (December 1989), Guatemala (November 1990) and Haiti (December 1990).



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APPENDIX II

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Sunday, December 13

12:30pm Briefing at residence of U.S. Ambassador Perry

Monday, December 14

9:00am Ralliement pour la Démocratie et pour le Développement Economique et Social
RADDES
Joseph Nzeyimana, President

10:30am Parti Liberal
Andre Nzeyimara, Vice President

3:00pm Union pour le Progrès National
UPRONA
Nicolas Mayugi, President

6:00pm Meeting with diplomatic community at residence of U.S. Ambassador Perry
Ambassador of Belgium - Pierre Colot
Ambassador of France - Marcel Caussee
Ambassador of the United States - Cynthia Perry
Charge d'Affaires of Germany - Heike Peitsch
Delegate to the European Community - High Johnstone

Tuesday, December 15

9:00am La Parti du Peuple
Shadrock Niyonkuru, President

2:30pm Secretary of State for Cooperation
Charles Itangishaka

4:00pm Prime Minister of the Republic of Burundi
Adrien Sibomana

6:00pm Technical Commission
Térence Sinunguruza, President

8:00pm Le Front pour le Démocratie au Burundi
FRODEBU
Melchoir Ndadaye, President

Wednesday, December 16

7:45am Le Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais
RPB
Ernest Kabushemeye, President

9:00am Minister of Justice and Chairman, National Consultation Commission
Sébeastien Ntahuga

10:30am Minister of Communication
Alphonse Kadege

3:00pm Minister of the Interior
Francois Ngeze

6:00pm ANNADES
Jean Kabura, President

7:30pm FRODEBU
Melchoir Ndadaye, President

Thursday, December 17

7:45am Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple
PRP
Francois Mbesherubusa, President

9:00am Director of the Center for the Promotion of Human Rights
Marguerite Bukuru

10:00am Constitutional Court
Gérard Niyungeko, President

2:30pm Mouvement pour la Paix et la Démocratie
MPD
Nkeshimana Amédée

6:00pm Technical Commission

Friday, December 18

- 3:00pm Press Forum
- 6:00pm President of the Republic of Burundi
Pierre Buyoya
- 7:00pm Reception hosted by the Minister of Interior

Saturday, December 19

- 7:30am Briefing with diplomatic community at residence of U.S. Ambassador Perry
- Delegation departs

CODE OF CONDUCT

FOR POLITICAL PARTIES DURING PRESENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN

On Tuesday 12 September 1989 nine Namibian political parties signed an agreement among themselves. It establishes a Code of Conduct which they have pledged to respect during the coming electoral campaign. They have also agreed to issue directives to their members and supporters to observe this Code, and to take other necessary steps to ensure that its terms are respected. They, and I, have also agreed to publicise this Code throughout Namibia by all the various means at our disposal.

I have been deeply impressed by the attitudes of restraint, constructiveness and flexibility shown by the parties in concluding this agreement. It is an important and historic achievement on the long road that has led to the prospect, soon to be realized, of free and fair elections for an independent Namibia. It is also a significant step towards national reconciliation.

Martti Ahtisaari, Special Representative of the Secretary-General










An essential part of free and fair elections is freedom of political campaigning. Everyone has the right to put forward their political principles and ideas, without threat or fear, to every other person, without exception. But freedom of political campaigning also carries responsibilities, including the duty to accept every other person's freedom to campaign.

The Namibian political parties whose names are subscribed to this document, meeting together in Windhoek under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 12 September 1989, have agreed as follows:

- ▶ 1. Intimidation, in any form, is unacceptable and will be expressly forbidden by the parties in directives to their members and supporters.
- ▶ 2. Party leaders will instruct their members and supporters that no weapon of any kind, including any traditional weapon, may be brought to any political rally, meeting, march or other demonstration.
- ▶ 3. Parties will notify UNTAG-CIVPOL as well as SWAPOL in advance of their planned meetings and other rallies.
- ▶ 4. All practical steps will be taken by parties to avoid holding rallies, meetings, marches or demonstrations close to one another at the same time. Party leaders undertake to co-operate in applying this principle in good faith and in a reasonable spirit should any coincidence of time or venue arise.
- ▶ 5. Speakers at political rallies will at all times avoid using language which threatens or incites violence in any form against any other person or group of persons. Parties will not issue pamphlets, newsletters or posters, whether officially or anonymously, which contain inflammatory language or material.
- ▶ 6. All parties will consistently emphasize, both to their supporters and also to voters in general, that there will be a secret ballot, and that consequently no one will know how any individual may have voted.
- ▶ 7. Party members and supporters will not disrupt other parties rallies, meetings, marches or demonstrations.
- ▶ 8. Party members and supporters will not seek to obstruct other persons from attending the political rallies of other parties.
- ▶ 9. Party members and supporters will not plagiarize symbols of other parties, or steal, disfigure or destroy political or campaign materials of other parties.
- ▶ 10. Party leaders will use their good offices to seek to ensure reasonable freedom of access by all political parties to all potential voters, whether they be at farms, on state-owned properties, in villages, or at secondary reception centres. They will also seek to ensure that such potential voters wishing to participate in related political activities have freedom to do so. This may, where necessary, take place outside working hours.
- ▶ 11. Parties will establish effective lines of communication to one another at headquarters, regional and district levels, and will appoint liaison personnel who will be constantly on call to deal with any problems that may arise.

- ▶ 12. Parties will meet on a fortnightly basis under the chairmanship of UNTAG regional directors or centre heads to discuss all matters of concern relating to the election campaign. A standing committee of party leaders at headquarters will meet on a fortnightly basis under the chairmanship of the Special Representative or his Deputy to deal with such matters on a nation-wide basis. An observer from the Office of the AG will be invited to attend the meeting of the standing committee. Emergency meetings will be convened as and when necessary.
- ▶ 13. All allegations of intimidation and other unlawful conduct in the election campaign will be brought to the attention of the nearest UNTAG-CIVPOL and SWAPOL stations or patrols.
- ▶ 14. Party leaders will issue directives to their members and supporters to observe this Code of Conduct, and take all other necessary steps to ensure compliance.
- ▶ 15. It is stated in the Settlement Proposal that: "The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect." Party leaders undertake to honour the outcome of free and fair elections so certified by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- ▶ 16. The Special Representative and party leaders undertake to publicise this Code of Conduct throughout Namibia by all means at their disposal.

The Namibian political parties whose names are subscribed below accept and endorse this Code of Conduct as binding upon them. They agree that alleged violations will be brought to and considered by the Standing Committee referred to in paragraph 12 above.

NAME OF PARTY	NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE	SIGNATURE
Action Christian National	J.M. de Wet	
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance	F.J. Kozonguzi	
Federal Convention of Namibia	H. Diergaardt	
Namibia Christian Democratic Party	W. Adam	
Namibia National Front	I. Uirab	
National Patriotic Front of Namibia	E. van Zijl	
South West Africa People's Organization	H.G. Geingob	
SWAPO-Democrats	for A. Shipanga	
United Democratic Front	Justus Garoeb	

In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,


Martti Ahtisaari

UNTAG Headquarters,
Windhoek, 12 September 1989



UNTAG

APPENDIX III

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE POLITICAL PARTIES 1990 PAKISTAN ELECTIONS











There is no denying the fact that the Election Commission and the Government are required to make effective arrangements for maintaining law and order during the elections. Main responsibility in this behalf, however, develops upon the political parties who play a major role in the electioneering campaign. The Election Commission, therefore, thought it more appropriate to remind the political parties of their legal and moral obligations to maintain peaceful conditions in the country on this occasion. With this end in view, the Commission prescribed a twelve-point "Code of Conduct for the Political Parties" and supplied copies thereof to them, besides its publication in the national press. The Code of Conduct is reproduced below for ready reference:

1. The political parties shall not propagate any opinion, or action in any manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity, or security of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the armed forces of Pakistan, as provided under Article 63 of the Constitution.
2. The political parties, their candidates, agents or workers shall not obstruct or break up meetings organized by the rival parties and candidates, nor interrupt speeches or prevent distribution of handbills, leaflets and pasting of posters of other parties and candidates.
3. The political parties shall avoid criticism of other political parties, their leaders and candidates having no bearing on their public activities. Criticism and comments shall be confined to policies and programs of other parties. Speeches and slogans shall be dignified and based on principles of morality, decorum and decency.
4. The political parties shall refrain from speeches calculated to arouse parochial feelings and controversy or conflicts between sects, communities and linguistic groups.
5. Public leaders and all other participants in political activity shall act with a sense of responsibility and dignity befitting their status. While propagating their own views and programs, they shall not interfere with the freedom of others to do the same as that would be the negation of democracy.
6. Appeals to violence or resort to violence during meetings, processions, or during polling hours should be strictly avoided.
7. Carriage of lethal weapons shall not be allowed in public meetings and official regulations in this regard shall be strictly observed. Use of crackers and other explosives at public meetings shall not be allowed.

8. The political parties and their candidates shall extend cooperation to the officers on election duty in order to ensure peaceful and orderly polling and complete freedom for the voters to exercise their franchise without being subjected to any annoyance or obstruction.
9. The political parties and their candidates shall scrupulously avoid all activities which are "corrupt practices" and offenses under the election law, such as the bribing of voters, intimidation of voters, impersonation of voters, canvassing within 400 yards of a polling station, holding public meetings during the period of 48 hours ending with the hour fixed for the close of the poll.
10. The political parties, their candidates, agents or workers shall not indulge in offering gifts or gratifications or inducing another to stand or not to stand as a candidate or to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature.
11. The political parties and their candidates should not procure the support or assistance of any civil servant to promote or hinder the election of a candidate,
12. The political parties and their candidates shall dissuade their workers or sympathizers from destroying any ballot paper or any official mark on the ballot paper.

APPENDIX IV

(Namibia, 1989)

<p>AKSIE CHRISTELIK NASIONAAL</p>	<p>ACN</p>		
<p>CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ACTION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE</p>	<p>CDA</p>		
<p>D.T.A. VAN NAMIBIË</p>	<p>DTA</p>		
<p>FEDERAL CONVENTION OF NAMIBIA</p>	<p>FCN</p>		
<p>NAMIBIA NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY</p>	<p>NNDP</p>		
<p>NAMIBIA NATIONAL FRONT</p>	<p>NNF</p>		
<p>NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF NAMIBIA</p>	<p>NPF</p>		
<p>SWAPO-DEMOCRATS</p>	<p>SWAPO-D</p>		
<p>SWAPO OF NAMIBIA</p>	<p>SWAPO</p>		
<p>UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF NAMIBIA</p>	<p>UDF</p>		

APPENDIX IV





































TRIBUNAL SUPREMO ELECTORAL

"ELECCIONES DE PRESIDENTE Y VICEPRESIDENTE 1990"

"DEBE MARCARSE UN SOLO CUADRO CON UNA "X", UN CIRCULO U OTRO SIGNO. CUALQUIER SEÑAL QUE ABARQUE OTROS CUADROS O CUALQUIER APUNTE O MODIFICACION ANULARA EL VOTO".

GUATEMALA, C. A.



<p>Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)</p>   <p>Aivaró Arzú Irigoyen</p>  <p>Fraternal Vila Baloret</p>	<p>Coalición: Partido Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) y Partido Frente de Avance Nacional (FAN)</p>  <p>Luis Ernesto Sosa Avila</p>   <p>David Arturo Eshenasy</p>	<p>Coalición: Partido Socialista Democrático (PSD) y Partido Alianza Popular Cinco (AP-5)</p>  <p>René De León Schlatter</p>  <p>ALIANZA POPULAR</p>  <p>Aracely Conde de Paiz</p>	<p>Partido Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN)</p>   <p>Jorge Carpio Nicolite</p>  <p>Manuel Aysu Córdón</p>
<p>Partido Revolucionario (PR)</p>  <p>José Ángel Lee Duarte</p>   <p>Carlos Gallardo Flores</p>	<p>Partido Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS)</p>  <p>Jorge Serrano Elias</p>   <p>Gustavo Espina Salguero</p>	<p>Partido Frente Unido de la Revolución (FUR)</p>  <p>Leonel Hernández Cardona</p>   <p>Raúl Horacio Montenegro</p>	<p>Partido Movimiento Emergente de Concordia (MEC)</p>  <p>Benedito Lucas García</p>   <p>Héctor Guerra Pedrosa</p>
<p>Partido Democrático de Cooperación Nacional (PDCN)</p>  <p>José Fernández González</p>   <p>José Puitzeya Pacheco</p>	<p>Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)</p>  <p>Fernando Leal Estevez</p>   <p>Kurt Martin Meyer Rodas</p>	<p>Partido Demócrata</p>  <p>Jorge Reyna Castillo</p>   <p>Carlos Torres Herrera</p>	<p>Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)</p>  <p>Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo</p>   <p>Marco A. Villamar Contreras</p>

APPENDIX IV

BOLETA ELECTORAL PARA PRESIDENTE Y VICEPRESIDENTE
 CONSEJO SUPREMO ELECTORAL
 REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA



MUESTRA^{9A}

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
 UNO UNION NACIONAL OPOSITORA	 PSOC PARTIDO SOCIAL CONSERVATISMO	 PLIUN PARTIDO LIBERAL DE UNIDAD NACIONAL	 PRT PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE LOS TRABAJADORES	 FSLN FRENTE SANDINISTA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL	 MAP-ML PARTIDO MARXISTA LENINISTA	 PSC PARTIDO SOCIAL CRISTIANO	 PUCA PARTIDO UNIONISTA CENTRO AMERICANO	 PCDN PARTIDO CONSERVADOR DEMOCRATA DE NICARAGUA	 MUR MOVIMIENTO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA
PRESIDENTE VIOLETA BARRIOS DE CHAMORRO	PRESIDENTE FERNANDO AGUERO ROCHA	PRESIDENTE RODOLFO ROBELO HERRERA	PRESIDENTE BONIFACIO MARTIR MIRANDA BENGOCHEA	PRESIDENTE DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA	PRESIDENTE ISIDRO IGNACIO TELLEZ TORUJO	PRESIDENTE ERICK RAMIREZ BENAVENTE	PRESIDENTE BLANCA ROJAS ECHAVERRY	PRESIDENTE EDUARDO MOLINA PALACIOS	PRESIDENTE MOISES HASSAN MORALES
VICEPRESIDENTE VIRGILO GODOY REYES	VICEPRESIDENTE WILLIAM ESTRADA VELEZ	VICEPRESIDENTE LOMBARDO MARTINEZ CABEZAS	VICEPRESIDENTE JUAN CARLOS LEITON VALLE	VICEPRESIDENTE SERGIO RAMIREZ MERCADO	VICEPRESIDENTE CARLOS DOMINGO CUADRA CUADRA	VICEPRESIDENTE RINA CORDOBA DE TABOADA	VICEPRESIDENTE DANIEL URCUYO CASTRILLO	VICEPRESIDENTE HUGO TORREZ CRUZ	VICEPRESIDENTE FRANCISCO SAMPER BLANCO