AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OCTOBER 11, 1992 ELECTION IN CAMEROON

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International Observer Delegation to the Presidential Election in Cameroon

October 11, 1992

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Acknowledgments

This report is based on the work of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in Cameroon since September 1991, when NDI sponsored an international team of election experts to evaluate Cameroon's electoral code and democratization process. For the presidential election in October 1992, NDI organized an international observer effort that included 13 delegates and six staff members. The delegation comprised nationals from Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Hungary, Mexico and the United States. Before the election, NDI also conducted an extensive training program for more than 175 political party pollwatchers. NDI carried out its training program and observer delegation in Cameroon in cooperation with the Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in Africa (GERDDES - Afrique), a regional nonpartisan democratic development organization.

This report was prepared under the auspices of NDI after consultations with members of the international delegation. While these deliberations indicate a consensus for the conclusions described herein, NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the report.

NDI Senior Program Officer Edward McMahon has managed the Institute's programs in Cameroon since 1991. He organized the

October election observer delegation and was the senior NDI staff member present for the election. McMahon and NDI Program Assistant Timothy McCoy are the principal authors of this study. James Tierney, co-leader of the international observer delegation, contributed markedly to the report, which also draws on observations written by other members of the election delegation.

NDI Senior Program Officer Eric Bjornlund was the principal editor of this report and contributed to the development of the argument presented herein. NDI Senior Associate for Electoral Processes Larry Garber also edited the report and drafted significant sections. NDI President Kenneth Wollack and Public Information Director Sue Grabowski contributed significantly to the editing of the report, and Aaron Rosenbaum also provided his editing eloquence to this project, for which NDI is extremely grateful. Eliza Burnham translated the report into French.

Finally, NDI acknowledges the support of the United States Agency for International Development, which made possible the election observation program and the publication of this report.

Preface

The democratic revolution that swept across the globe during the past decade changed the lives of millions and altered the course of history. The prospect of democracy, political freedom, and economic development has fired imaginations around the world.

The experiences of the past decade also demonstrate that the development and consolidation of a democratic political culture and representative political institutions are extremely complicated and delicate tasks. Adopting a common understanding of the "rules of the game" and finding the proper equilibrium among different branches of government and sectors of society are never easy. Issues such as relations between the legislature and the executive remain lively topics of debate even in long-standing democracies. Indeed, because democracy by definition calls for an organic and flexible approach to governance, these issues can never be fully resolved.

Since each democratic system is a reflection of the society within which it exists, no two systems are exactly alike. Nonetheless, for countries to belong to the growing international community of democracies, they must share certain basic values. These include a belief in the sovereignty of the people as expressed from time to time through the ballot box, freedom of political association, respect for human rights, and tolerance of dissenting viewpoints.

In some countries, governments have attempted to introduce the trappings of democracy without embracing its spirit. This situation does not necessarily suggest that an incumbent government in a formerly authoritarian regime is incapable of implementing a democratic transition, winning an election and then governing under the new democratic dispensation. It does mean, however, that such a government carries with it a special responsibility to ensure that elections are legitimate and accepted by the population. In particular, the separation between government and the ruling party must be respected. This is not easy in a situation involving a long period of single-party rule, but it is critical if the country is going to increase political freedom and tolerance and commit itself to political institutions that promote and protect political competition and civil rights.

The October 11, 1992 presidential election was an important test of Cameroon's commitment to its transition to a multiparty democratic system. Unfortunately, the political forces competing in the election did not agree upon or respect the rules of the game. Most of the responsibility for this environment lies with the government. Every ruling party, of course, strives to win elections. But the Cameroonian government, for which President Paul Biya bears ultimate responsibility, took unusually extreme and illegitimate actions to ensure the president's victory. This led inexorably to the conclusion that the election was flawed to the point where its legitimacy and validity are called into question.

NDI evaluated the election process in Cameroon using the same objective standards that it has employed in observing more than 40 elections throughout the world. NDI hopes that this report will contribute to a better understanding, within Cameroon and around the world, of what occurred during this electoral process.

This report is important not just for Cameroon. Recent elections in countries undergoing democratic transitions indicate a growing sophistication on the part of ruling elites who call elections in an effort to create a democratic façade for their regimes. Such elites in many countries have shown themselves to be unprepared to accept the possibility of alternance of power, which is implicit in open, competitive elections.

Cameroon is not the only country where authoritarian impulses complicate a democratic transition. NDI hopes that this report will

further increase understanding of the emerging international consensus about the standards that define open and meaningful elections.

Executive Summary

This report evaluates the October 11 election in Cameroon, the country's first multiparty contest for president. This election was an extremely important test for the transition process in Cameroon. For the election, NDI organized an international observer delegation that included 13 delegates from nine countries and six staff members. On election day, the NDI observer delegation visited polling sites in nine of Cameroon's 10 provinces.

This report finds serious fault with the electoral process in Cameroon. It is important to emphasize that the delegation cannot determine the rightful winner of the election. The information available to the delegation – and the failure of the authorities to provide polling-place-by-polling-place results – simply does not make it possible to determine which candidate received the most votes or which candidate would have been the winner in a fair election.

Notwithstanding the serious flaws described in this report, the delegation found some aspects of the electoral process encouraging. These included the strong sense of civic duty exhibited by the Cameroonian people on election day and the dedication of the many election officials and political party representatives who, under difficult circumstances, sought to conduct an open and fair election.

Nonetheless, widespread irregularities during the pre-election period, on election day and in the tabulation of results seriously call into question, for any fair observer, the validity of the outcome. Cameroon's election system seemed designed to fail. While several parties bear responsibility for election irregularities, the overwhelming weight of responsibility for this failed process lies with the government of Cameroon and President Paul Biya.

The evidence supporting this conclusion includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- The election was scheduled hastily by President Biya, before the adoption of an election code. Once enacted, the code provided for a 30-day campaign period, an impossibility given the date already set for the election.
- The election system provided civil administration officials responsible to President Biya – including the minister of territorial administration, senior divisional officers and divisional officers – with excessive discretion in matters of voter registration and ballot tabulation. Many officials abused this latitude to further the political interests of the incumbent president.
- The tabulation of votes was conducted under the authority of the minister of territorial administration, whose partisan support for President Biya was unmistakable. In violation of the electoral code, the Ministry of Territorial Administration originally decided to prohibit political party representatives from obtaining tally sheets of election results at the polling sites. While this decision was ultimately reversed, the electoral code did not provide an opportunity for party representatives to monitor the transfer of tally sheets to the divisional supervisory commissions.
- The National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes, which was appointed only days before the election, failed to inspire public confidence in the integrity of the tabulation process. The composition of the commission did not represent ethnic, regional or political balance.
- The early election date, and the failure to reopen the registration process, needlessly restricted voter registration. The early election in effect disenfranchised the many Cameroonians who had boycotted the March 1 legislative elections.

- Little control was exercised over the distribution of voter registration cards, thus creating an opportunity for multiple and underage voting. Handfuls of cards were repeatedly offered to the observers as proof of a lively market in voter card trafficking. Observers witnessed the distribution of these cards by opposition parties as well as by supporters of President Biya.
- Voter registries were generally not published before election day, which meant that parties or voters could not review the lists to ensure their accuracy. In several instances, officials refused to allow individuals to vote whose names appeared on the voter roll and whose voter cards had been stamped during the March legislative elections, which demonstrated that the same individuals had been permitted to vote at that time.
- Biased news coverage and the partisan use of the government-controlled television and radio in favor of the incumbent president marred the election campaign. For example, the television news broadcast on October 7 provided the government and its campaign 142 minutes of coverage, while only 12 minutes were allotted to the opposition.
- On election day, rules regarding voter eligibility were not uniformly applied. Throughout the country, the names of eligible voters were improperly crossed off the register.
- Polling sites were arbitrarily moved in some areas —including Yaoundé, Maroua, Douala, Garoua and Ebolowa — before election day, which created confusion and reduced voter turnout in specific regions.
- Political party pollwatchers were prevented from entering polling sites and, in one case, were barred from entering the entire territory surrounding the town of Rey Bouba in Mayo-Rey Division, which was controlled by a traditional leader who supported President Biya.
- Fictitious polling places, *i.e.*, polling places that did not exist on the official list distributed before the election, reported overwhelming vote totals in favor of President Biya, contrasting dramatically with the results from other polling sites in the same area. In Foumbot in the Noun Division in the West Province, for example, 10 polling places that did not appear on the official list of polling places were reportedly cited in a compilation of

results forwarded by the senior divisional officer to the divisional supervisory commission. The results from these polling places generally provided overwhelming, and similar, vote totals in favor of President Biya, while the remainder of the area voted largely in favor of another candidate.

- Statistically anomalous results were reported from several polling sites. One particularly egregious example involved a cluster of polling sites from the Mvila Division in the Ebolowa area that reported a 100 percent turnout of 5,856 voters and 100 percent support for President Biya. Similar, although slightly less extreme, examples were recorded in neighboring polling places.
- Without authorization in the electoral code, the Ministry of Territorial Administration released unofficial partial results several days after the election. The release included subjective analysis as to why President Biya would emerge the final victor.
- The authorities failed to publish polling-site-by-polling-site results that precluded the possibility of a credible, independent review of the overall election results.

The chief justice of the Supreme Court underscored the seriousness of the irregularities when he referred to them while announcing the official results. The minister of justice also cited problems in an interview with a Cameroonian newspaper.

The people of Cameroon are the ultimate judge of their electoral process. NDI has urged all sides to join in peaceful dialogue and to reach agreement on a course of action that will resolve the impasse. Included in this report are a number of recommendations that Cameroonians may find useful as they seek to lay the foundation for meaningful elections in the future. It is time for reflection, dialogue and negotiation among all Cameroonians.


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Province boundary
Province capital
Road
Railroad
0 50 100 Miles
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NIGER
NIGER
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
N'DJAMENA
Kousseri
Maiduguri
Gama
CHAD
FAR-NORTH
Maroua
Yagoua
Bongor
Kaélé
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
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Chapter 1

Introduction

A. October 11, 1992 Election

On October 11, 1992, Cameroon held its first competitive, multiparty presidential election, in which six candidates ultimately took part. On October 23, the Supreme Court declared incumbent President Paul Biya the winner with 39.9 percent of the vote. The official results provided Social Democratic Front (SDF) candidate John Fru Ndi with 35.9 percent and National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP) candidate Bello Bouba Maigari with 19.2 percent. Concerns about fraud, however, called into question the veracity of the official results.

Cameroon legalized the formation of new political parties in December 1990. The country held multiparty parliamentary elections in March 1992, but one major party and a few smaller opposition parties boycotted those elections. Nonetheless, the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), lost its overall majority in parliament, although it was able to form a coalition to

maintain its political dominance. The relatively large showing for the opposition surprised those who had anticipated widespread fraud and a large margin of victory for the CPDM in the parliamentary elections.

In August 1992, the president called for a presidential election in October. In September, the National Assembly adopted a new electoral code. Given the significance of the election and requests by several parties, NDI decided to organize an international observer delegation for the election.

B. NDI Activities

1991 Programs

NDI organized its first program in Cameroon in September 1991. Responding to an invitation from the prime minister of Cameroon, and with the concurrence of opposition parties, NDI sent a team of international experts to assess the democratic transition already underway. The team was led by Keba Mbaye of Senegal, a former judge on the International Court of Justice and former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Senegal. Other team members were François Frison-Roche, Director of Democracy Without Borders, France; Esteban Caballero, Director of the Center for Democratic Studies, Paraguay; Gail Schaffer, Secretary of State for New York, USA; and Edward McMahon, then-NDI Program Coordinator.

The delegation reviewed legal and political questions central to the democratization process, including the drafting of a new electoral code, media access, and constitutional issues, such as decentralization, guarantees of political freedoms and the separation of powers. The mission sought to help break the political impasse that had developed between the government and the opposition regarding the implementation of a multiparty system in Cameroon.

In November 1991, Cameroonian representatives from both the ruling party and the opposition attended an NDI-sponsored seminar in Cotonou, Benin on election monitoring by civic groups and political parties. This project, co-sponsored with GERDDES-Afrique, shared information about international standards and norms for democratic elections.

1992 Programs

Shortly before the March 1 parliamentary elections, the government of Cameroon invited NDI to send trainers and election observers to the country. Given the short lead time, the boycott by some opposition parties and other factors, NDI declined the request. The Institute remained prepared, however, to explore the possibility of supporting a program to train Cameroonian election observers and to organize an international observer mission for future elections. Local elections were envisioned for October.

On August 25, President Biya announced that a presidential election would be held on October 11. In letters dated September 16 and September 25 addressed to the prime minister and president of Cameroon, respectively, NDI explained its intention to conduct an election monitoring training seminar for political party and civic organization representatives and to send an international delegation to observe the elections. The Cameroon embassy in Washington, D.C. agreed to facilitate the issuance of visas for delegation members.

From October 2 to 4, NDI sponsored an election monitoring seminar in Yaoundé in collaboration with GERDDES-Afrique. More than 170 Cameroon political activists and civic leaders attended the conference and discussed in detail aspects of organizing domestic election observer operations. The seminar sought to "train trainers," who then would share what they had learned with their organizations or political parties before the election. The training faculty consisted of Taofiki Aminou and Moustapha Osseni from GERDDES-Benin, Mariana Drenska from the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights, and Edward McMahon from NDI.

The seminar used small, interactive sessions designed to maximize the exchange of information and experiences. Plenary and workshop sessions addressed the organization of domestic election observation operations, pre-election day activities and preparations, observation on election day, including monitoring the vote counting process, and methods of evaluating the transparency and legitimacy of the election.

Participants at the seminar were drawn from most political parties, although representation was weighted toward the five largest political parties: the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), the Union of Cameroonian Peoples (UPC), the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the National Union for Democracy and

Progress (NUDP) and the Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU). Representatives from several civic organizations also attended. This broad participation was unusual for Cameroon, especially one week before a presidential election and especially given so sensitive a topic. Initial suspicion by some attendees was soon replaced by a cooperative and productive atmosphere.

In all, approximately 1,000 party and civic leaders participated in the seminar in Yaoundé and follow-on training sessions conducted by the international faculty in Douala, Bamenda and Garoua from October 5 to 8. This figure does not include individuals who were subsequently trained by seminar participants or others who were exposed indirectly to the program. For example, the NUDP, just after the seminar's conclusion, devoted its allotted national radio and television air time to sharing information discussed in the seminar. Widespread coverage from both the opposition and government media cast the seminar in favorable terms.

Election Observer Delegation

For the election, NDI organized an international delegation of election experts, political leaders and democratic activists from Africa, Europe and North America. Delegation members, apart from those who conducted the training sessions, were scheduled to arrive in Cameroon in the week before the election.

The delegation, however, confronted a serious problem when several of its members were denied entry visas. Until October 5, Cameroonian authorities had issued visas to members of the NDI delegation, both at embassies overseas and upon arrival at the Douala International Airport. But early in the week of October 5, a Senegalese and a British member of the delegation were refused visas, without warning or explanation, at the Cameroon embassies in Dakar and London. On October 7, an American and two Beninese members of the NDI delegation who arrived in Cameroon without visas were barred entry. These incidents occurred even though issuing airport visas was a common practice and other delegation members without visas had been permitted to freely enter the country.

NDI representatives contacted government authorities to protest the situation and to request that additional delegation members be allowed to enter the country. In the course of its investigation, NDI obtained a copy of a telex dated October 2, sent by Secretary of State

for Internal Security Jean Fochive to Cameroon embassies and immigration authorities. (See Appendix I.) The telex ordered visa refusals to individuals seeking entry into Cameroon to observe the presidential election without an invitation from the government.

On October 8, representatives of NDI and the U.S. embassy met with Cameroon foreign ministry officials to protest the visa refusals. On October 9, the final two delegation members arrived in Douala without visas and were permitted to enter the country. The Cameroon government never explained or apologized for its refusal to allow entry to five members of the NDI delegation.

The government-controlled *Cameroon Tribune* enthusiastically welcomed the arrival of the NDI observer delegation. In a front-page article, the paper claimed that the presence of the observers was proof that the election would be free and fair. Opposition party officials also generally applauded the presence of international observers, although some opposition leaders initially voiced concerns that the mission would serve merely to legitimize a fundamentally flawed process.

Absent the members denied entry into the country, the NDI delegation ultimately included 13 international observers, supplemented by six NDI staff members. Delegates came from nine countries: Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Hungary, Mexico and the United States. Canadian Senator B.A. Graham and James Tierney, former Attorney General of Maine, co-led the delegation. Graham was a veteran of NDI observer missions to Paraguay, Bulgaria and Namibia. Tierney had participated in NDI's international delegation to the 1991 legislative election in Bulgaria.

From October 7 to 9, the international delegation attended a series of briefings in Yaoundé with representatives of the government, Supreme Court and political parties, election officials, journalists, academics and diplomats. After these briefings, observer teams were deployed to nine of the country's 10 provinces. (See Appendix II.) Before the election, each team met with local election officials, representatives of political parties and civic organizations, as well as prospective voters.

On election day, each team visited 20 to 30 polling sites to assess the voting process. The observers interviewed voters and other individuals. In addition to monitoring at the polling-place level, the

observers followed the vote counting process at the polling-place, subdivisional and divisional levels well into the next day. (See Appendix III for several team reports.)

The delegation re-assembled in Yaoundé on October 12 to compare their observations on election day and to prepare a preliminary statement. On October 14, three days after the election, the delegation issued a preliminary post-election statement that highlighted major problems in the electoral process. (See Appendix IV.) The delegation, however, withheld a final assessment of the process, pending release of the final results and an evaluation of election-related complaints filed by various political parties.

The *Cameroon Tribune* on October 15 seriously misrepresented the preliminary statement of the NDI delegation. The day after the report was issued, the paper carried a story entitled "NDI Delegation 'Globally Satisfied'." The story inaccurately reported that the NDI statement had endorsed the electoral process. This characterization prompted NDI delegation co-chair James Tierney, who had remained in Cameroon, to declare in a public statement that the article was "seriously distorted" and to request that the preliminary statement be published in its entirety. (See Appendix V.) The *Cameroon Tribune* subsequently complied with Tierney's request.

NDI Post-Election Activities

Due to the closeness of the electoral contest, the slow counting of the ballots, and the serious allegations of fraud and manipulation presented by opposition parties, Tierney and NDI staff member Lisa Herren remained in Cameroon for 11 days after the election. During the period between the release of the delegation's preliminary assessment and the announcement of the official results, Tierney and Herren met with political party representatives, election officials, traditional chiefs and media representatives. They made daily visits to the body charged with the final tabulation of votes, the National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes (NCFCV), and attended the Supreme Court session that announced the official results. They also investigated specific complaints presented by representatives of several political parties.

In addition, the NDI representatives obtained additional information about election-day events, primarily through interviews, observation of legal proceedings, and monitoring of the media. On

October 23, the Supreme Court announced the official results that declared incumbent President Paul Biya the winner.

Due to escalating tensions after the official announcement of results and election-related unrest in the North-West Province, NDI and the delegation leaders decided to issue an interim report reviewing further the electoral process. They believed that a definitive statement would clarify, for the people of Cameroon and the international community, the delegation's assessment of the election.

On October 28, delegation co-leaders Graham and Tierney and then-NDI President J. Brian Atwood held a press conference at NDI headquarters in Washington, D.C. to announce the delegation's findings and to release the interim report, which substantially forms the executive summary of this report. The interim report strongly criticized the electoral process in Cameroon. (See Appendix VI.)

In response, Minister of Communication Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni held a press conference on October 30 in which he labelled the interim report a "legal blunder" and an "intellectual scandal." (See Appendix VII.) In Washington on November 12, a government delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Francis Nkwain met with Atwood and NDI staff members. Arguing that NDI had uncritically accepted the position of the SDF opposition party, the government delegation contended that the NDI report was unfair and inaccurate. NDI countered that the report expressed the judgments of an independent, impartial and multinational group of election experts, political leaders and democratic activists. NDI also emphasized that the delegation did not seek to support the position of any party.

Chapter 2

Background

A. Geography and Demographics

The Republic of Cameroon is located in the western part of the African continent on the Gulf of Guinea. It is situated about midway between Senegal and South Africa. Cameroon covers 475,439 square kilometers — an area somewhat smaller than France. The capital city is Yaoundé, and other major cities are Douala (the most populous city and the nation's business center), Bafoussam, Nkongsamba, Garoua and Bamenda.

Cameroon possesses a varied topography. Coastal plain and equatorial rain forests dominate the south; in the center, a transitional plateau reaches to 1,372 meters above sea level; in the west, forested mountains soar to 4,100 meters; and in the north, a low, rolling savanna gradually slopes toward a desert basin and marshlands surrounding Lake Chad.

Cameroon's population was approximately 12 million in 1990. This population is concentrated in the Center, West, and Far North

Provinces. Sixty percent of the population lives in rural areas. The people of Cameroon reflect the country's position at the geographical and ethnic crossroads of Africa; more than 200 tribes and clans are found in Cameroon and at least that many languages and dialects are spoken. To bridge these divisions, English and French, the languages of Cameroon's colonial administrators, are designated the official languages. Approximately 53 percent of Cameroonians identify themselves as Christian, 25 percent as adherents of traditional African beliefs, and 22 percent as Muslim.

Ethnic distinctions continue to be important in the country's political and economic life. The Beti ethnic group controls the government sector, while Bamilekes tend to dominate the economy. Tribal leaders are officially recognized for the important role they play in community affairs, especially in rural areas.

B. Economic Conditions

Cameroon enjoyed sustained economic growth from independence in 1960 until 1985. In the 1970s and early 1980s, economic growth averaged about 8 percent each year, and the World Bank ranked Cameroon as a lower middle-income country.

Since the colonial period, Cameroon has relied heavily on its agricultural sector, which employs 70 percent of the work force. Cameroon is one of the few African countries that is self-sufficient in food. Cereals, fruits, tubers and livestock form the core of the domestically produced food supply. Cotton, coffee and cocoa are Cameroon's chief agricultural exports.

In 1977, Cameroon began exploiting offshore oil fields. Petroleum soon became the country's most important source of foreign exchange. Average output ranged between 7 and 9 million barrels per year. As oil prices soared in the late 1970s, Cameroon's economy surged ahead.

This positive economic picture darkened considerably beginning in the mid 1980s. World prices for Cameroon's major exports – oil, coffee and cocoa – collapsed, and the country's foreign exchange earnings declined sharply. GDP, once growing at 8 percent per year, headed into a tailspin and declined by more than 6 percent in fiscal year 1989-90.

As the situation worsened, the government appealed for assistance to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Loans were approved, and public sector debt was re-scheduled. Progress was noted, with the Cameroonian government taking steps to privatize state enterprises and streamline laws on foreign investment. In spite of these moves, the government was criticized for moving too slowly to address Cameroon's economic crisis, and opposition to the government escalated.

C. Cameroon's Path to Independence

Two European colonial powers, France and Britain, administered different parts of Cameroon until independence. These two powers gained control of Cameroon during World War I when they seized the territory from its first colonial administrator, Germany. In 1919, Britain and France agreed to divide Cameroon, of which the larger, eastern area was transferred to French possession. In 1946, British and French mandates over the territory were converted into trusteeships by the United Nations.

By the mid-1950s, the Union of Cameroonian Peoples (UPC), a banned political organization, was waging guerrilla warfare against French administration, with the goal of total Cameroonian independence and reunification of the British and French territories. According to the terms of a 1956 French law, which provided for local governance in most French African colonies, French Cameroon became an autonomous state within the French community in 1957. In 1958, a Muslim northerner, Ahmadou Ahidjo, became prime minister in the nascent Cameroonian government and formed his own party, the Cameroonian Union (CU).

In December 1958, the U.N. voted to end the French trusteeship, and on January 1, 1960, the former French possession achieved full independence as the Republic of Cameroon. In May 1960, the national legislature elected Ahmadou Ahidjo president of Cameroon by a majority vote. One year later, Britain held a plebiscite in its trusteeship. Northern sections of the British Cameroons voted to join Nigeria. The southern areas, however, opted to attach themselves to French-speaking Cameroon, and on October 1, 1961, the new Federal Republic of Cameroon was born.

D. Political Life After Independence — The Ahidjo Period

Ahidjo had embarked upon a course of cooperation with the French authorities during the colonial period. This move effectively weakened the UPC and even enticed some of its members into Ahidjo's ranks. Following independence and reunification, President Ahidjo quickly moved to consolidate his own position and create a state structure with strong central powers.

Ahidjo's government came to rely upon repression and co-optation as methods of promoting the president's vision of national unity. From 1960 to 1962, political life in the newly independent nation centered around two political parties, President Ahidjo's Cameroonian Union in east Cameroon, and the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in the west. These two parties formed a governing coalition in 1961. In 1962, however, leaders of the main opposition parties were arrested after they criticized Ahidjo's increasingly authoritarian rule.

Ahidjo was re-elected in 1965. On September 8, 1966, Cameroon became a de facto one-party state as the CU absorbed the KNDP and several other opposition parties to form the Cameroonian National Union (CNU). In 1971, the government finally crushed a rebellion led by the UPC, the only remaining significant opposition party. Many of the party's leaders were exiled to France.

Political power was further consolidated in the hands of the president in 1972, when Cameroonians approved a constitutional amendment that converted Cameroon into a unitary state and abolished the office of vice president. On May 20, 1972, the United Republic of Cameroon was proclaimed. Ahidjo was re-elected in 1975, and, following constitutional revisions, appointed Paul Biya prime minister. By using repression and Cameroon's continuing economic success, President Ahidjo stifled any overt challenges to his system of governance.

Ahidjo was re-elected to a fifth five-year term in 1980. On November 4, 1982, President Ahidjo surprised the Cameroonian people by announcing his resignation, reportedly due to health considerations. Ahidjo designated Biya his successor. Ahidjo remained politically powerful, as he retained the post of president of the CNU.

E. Biya's Presidency

On becoming president in 1982, Biya immediately set out to reshape Cameroon's political landscape. Entering the presidency with little constituency of his own, Biya, a francophone southern Christian, filled government positions with technocrats and gradually removed supporters of the former president. Bello Bouba Maigari, a northern Muslim, was named prime minister. Cameroon was still reaping the benefits of a healthy economy, and the presence of a new administration heightened expectations for a more open, less-centralized governing environment.

Biya's presidency, however, was shaken in August 1983 by the discovery of a coup plot instigated by Ahidjo supporters. In response, Biya dismissed the prime minister and the minister of the armed forces, also a northern Muslim. Later in August 1983, Ahidjo resigned as president of the CNU, bitterly criticizing Biya's administration. Biya was subsequently elected president of the ruling party and, in January 1984, was elected president of Cameroon.

President Biya faced the most serious threat to his leadership in 1984. In February, trials were held arising from the 1983 coup plot. Ahidjo, who had fled into exile, and two of his close advisors were tried and sentenced to death; these sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment. On April 6, 1984, rebel elements in the elite presidential guard, apparently sensing that Biya was consolidating his position, launched a coup attempt. Hundreds lost their lives in the ensuing three days of fighting before the attempt was crushed.

Reacting to the coup attempt, Biya changed the military hierarchy and the CNU Central Committee and reshuffled his cabinet, purging most northerners from the military and political system. Press censorship was strengthened. Trials of those implicated in the coup plot led to death sentences for 51 defendants. Many more were imprisoned.

At a national conference in March 1985, the CNU renamed itself the Cameroonian People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). This change was seen as yet another move by Biya to distance his administration from that of his predecessor. Extensive reorganization of the ruling party followed. Still, Biya rejected any notion of a multiparty system.

A presidential election, originally planned for January 1989, was moved up to coincide with the legislative elections of April 1988.

President Biya was re-elected with reportedly more than 98 percent of the votes cast. Popular dissatisfaction with the government increased, however, as the Cameroonian economy suffered through its worst crisis since independence. Previously suppressed opposition forces re-emerged, along with a renewed focus on ethnic and linguistic differences. Amnesty International and other international organizations raised human rights concerns. The government's responses, such as the February 1989 creation of a special police unit and the appointment of hardliners to key security positions, appeared to signal that dissent would not be tolerated.

F. Movement Toward Political Reform

In 1989, Yondo Black, a Cameroonian lawyer, attempted to create a political party, for which he was arrested in February 1990. In response to Black's detention, the legal community organized large-scale protests. These demonstrations reflected the dramatic political changes underway in Eastern Europe and the rest of Africa as well as the pent-up desire for greater political freedoms among a wide segment of the Cameroonian population.

In a June 1990 speech, President Biya reacted to this political ferment by announcing a new political era. He presented a series of reforms, including revisions to the law on political associations and the reinforcement of press freedom, that foreshadowed the revival of a multiparty system.

A law permitting the formation of political parties was enacted in December 1990. Entirely new political parties, and those that existed before the advent of single-party rule, were soon registered. Other elements of the political reform program included liberalization of the media and the holding of municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections.

In early 1991, several opposition parties formed a coalition, the National Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties (NCCOP). These parties agreed to coordinate their opposition strategies in reaction to perceived attempts by President Biya to control the democratization process and to ensure a leading role for his party in a post-electoral period.

In May 1991, the coalition initiated "Operation Ghost Town," which called for a general strike from Monday to Friday every week until the government would agree to accept a national conference to

guide the democratic transition. The strike led to considerable violence and several hundred deaths. While failing to have much effect in the capital of Yaoundé, Operation Ghost Town paralyzed Douala, where public transport, shops, bars, markets and taxi services were all seriously affected.

By mid-July the strike had faltered, becoming increasingly restricted to the West, North-West, South-West and Littoral provinces. In retrospect, the strike contributed to greater political polarization within the country and a worsening of economic conditions. Ironically, the strike's eventual failure served to re-channel demands for political change to the electoral arena.

On October 30, 1991, President Biya convened a tripartite meeting in Yaoundé with representatives from the government and ruling party, civic organizations and part of the opposition. The meeting was designed to discuss the framework for a new electoral code. The talks were initially delayed due to opposition demands to review the constitution. When the government rejected this demand, representatives of the NCCOP withdrew from the tripartite meeting.

In mid-November, the government and remaining opposition parties signed an agreement in which some opposition parties pledged to suspend Operation Ghost Town. The government, for its part, established a 10-member committee to examine constitutional reform, agreed not to ban opposition meetings and released all prisoners arrested during anti-government demonstrations. Some NCCOP parties, including the SDF and MP, insisted on additional concessions from the government, including acceptance of a national conference. They declared the agreement between the government and other opposition parties invalid and vowed to continue their campaign of civil disobedience.

G. The 1992 Parliamentary Elections

On October 11, 1991, President Biya scheduled parliamentary elections for February 1992. In the face of widespread demands for a later election date, the schedule was pushed back slightly, from February 16 to March 1. The date was changed primarily to allow parties more time to organize for the election. On February 7, President Biya announced that he was making available 500 million CFA (about $2 million USD) to parties fielding candidates in the parliamentary elections. Most parties eventually agreed to take part in

in the election, although the SDF and several smaller parties, citing a lack of proper conditions for fair elections, refused to participate.

The election results deprived the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement of its legislative majority. Many different factors contributed to this result, including ethnic and regional allegiances and popular concern over economic and political policies of the government. At the same time, the significant vote in favor of the CPDM demonstrated the government's ability to mobilize its supporters. Of 180 parliamentary seats, the CPDM won 88, the NUDP, 68, the UPC, 18, and the Movement for the Defense of the Republic (MDR), six. The CPDM formed a coalition with the MDR, a small, northern-based party, and gained a working majority. Given the results of the parliamentary elections, the SDF was criticized in the media for having handed the election to the CPDM "on a plate."

By most accounts, the conduct of the parliamentary elections process was relatively smooth. Many who had anticipated widespread fraud were surprised that the results produced significant opposition representation. In the months that followed, however, the National Assembly of Cameroon, even with opposition representation, remained hamstrung by the legacy of authoritarian rule and the resulting concentration of power in the executive branch.

Chapter 3

The Framework for Elections

According to the constitution of Cameroon, the country was required to hold a presidential election by mid-1993. In late August 1992, President Biya announced that a presidential election would take place on October 11.

Although receiving only seven weeks notice, all important political parties agreed to participate in the election. Many, however, expressed serious concerns about the rules under which the election would be held and the impartiality of the election administration authorities. The National Assembly hurriedly enacted a new electoral code in an extraordinary session on September 17, 1992.

A. The 1991 NDI Delegation and Controversy over the Electoral Code

As Cameroon began its transition to a multiparty system in 1991, controversy developed over the design of the election system and the

electoral code. The resulting polarization provided the backdrop for the 1991 NDI delegation visit to Cameroon.

After a series of meetings throughout Cameroon where information was gathered from virtually all political parties, the delegation recommended adoption of a new electoral code that stressed the principles of accountability, transparency and neutrality in election administration. Specifically, the delegation suggested that the code extend the franchise as broadly as possible, provide for adequate review of voter lists, reduce candidate barriers, lengthen the electoral campaign period, educate the public on its rights and responsibilities in a democracy, welcome and facilitate the presence of international observers and afford all parties access to the broadcast media.

The report was well received across the political spectrum. Representatives from a number of political parties and civic organizations commended the report for having identified central elements that needed to be addressed in order to advance democracy in Cameroon. The report was used as a key reference document during subsequent multiparty negotiations designed to lay the groundwork for elections, including the Yaoundé tripartite meeting discussed in Chapter 2. However, not all recommendations included in the report were adopted in the period preceding the October election.

The report noted that "perhaps the most important factor in promoting a free and fair electoral environment is the establishment of a system for administering the elections that will command the confidence of all the participants in the process. . . ." Accordingly, the report recommended one of two alternatives: the election should be administered either by "a multiparty national commission that includes significant representation of the opposition parties" or by "an independent national commission made up of individuals who are recognized as being politically neutral."

The government of Cameroon did not adopt either recommendation. To the contrary, President Biya and his government retained control over the appointment of every election official, issued every electoral decree (some of which were issued and withdrawn only to be reissued again), established all vote counting procedures, staffed every electoral bureaucracy and strictly controlled governmental release of partial results — for which no provision existed in the electoral code — until the official announcement of the final results on

October 23. Opposition parties had little or no input into any of these actions.

B. The Electoral Code

On December 16, 1991, the Republic of Cameroon enacted an electoral code that governed the parliamentary elections held in March 1992. This statute placed the administrative responsibility for organizing and conducting elections within the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT). On September 17, 1992, the National Assembly adopted a new electoral code designed to govern the presidential election. The new law again placed administrative control within MINAT.

The electoral code of September 17, 1992 is divided into the following sections: Qualifications of Electors (who can vote), Eligibility and Incompatibilities (who can be a candidate), Electoral Commissions (multiparty commissions overseeing different stages of the electoral process), Register of Electors (voter eligibility requirements), Preparing the Poll (pre-electoral preparations), The Poll (election-day operations, including vote counting) and Electoral Disputes (election complaint resolution). (See Appendix VIII for excerpts.)

C. Administration of the Election

Like the ministries of interior in other francophone African countries, MINAT had chief administrative responsibility for this election. The Cameroon electoral code and its implementing decrees assigned to MINAT responsibility for administering the electoral process, up to the vote counting process at the divisional and national levels. MINAT acted as the chief law enforcement body, and its responsibilities also included management of the civil service and the state administrative system.

The French-based model of public administration emphasizes the role of the state, especially centralized government structures. This system differs from the anglophone political tradition, in which independent multipartisan or quasi-governmental commissions form an integral part of the system of checks and balances in the administration of elections. In theory, under the French public administration model, the ministry represents the state and is thus politically neutral.

Many countries have developed healthy democratic systems based upon the francophone model. Authorities must, however, ensure public trust and confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral process. These sentiments were difficult to achieve in Cameroon during the key pre-electoral period, given the polarized political environment and the fact that the country was holding its first genuinely competitive presidential election.

The hastily drafted electoral code contained several statutory provisions designed to safeguard the process. For example, it provided for the creation of multiparty commissions to tabulate votes at the divisional level (divisional supervisory commissions). One of the real weaknesses of the electoral code, however, was that it did not allow opposition parties to be present at the critical subdivisional level where polling place results were initially transmitted. It was at this level that divisional officers supposedly verified the results before sending them to senior divisional officers who, in turn, transferred the results to divisional supervisory commissions.

In the Cameroon system, electoral authorities possess especially broad discretionary powers as evidenced by government-appointed officials at the subdivisional level (divisional officers) who both implemented and interpreted voting procedures. Under the electoral code, divisional officers bore responsibility for preparing and maintaining voting lists, establishing procedures for voter registration, and determining both the number and the locations of voting places. While the electoral code mandated a maximum of 600 registered voters at each polling place, divisional officers had virtually unfettered discretion in administering this provision. In addition, divisional officers in some areas were appointed only a few weeks – in some cases, only a few days – before the election.

MINAT did not provide any detailed training to divisional officers to prepare them for their electoral duties. They were simply directed to follow the ministry's shifting guidelines. The ministry never instructed the divisional officers, as they carried out their statutory duties, to cooperate with or listen to political parties that were participating in the election. MINAT did not instruct the officials to make any effort to inform local voters or parties as to the proposed location of voting places. Nor did the ministry require or instruct the officials to post voter lists in a public place before

election day. Too often, election officials were left without guidance or assistance as they made decisions of extraordinary significance.

Election officials underscored the problems created by the late appointment of responsible authorities. In Douala, for example, the divisional supervisory commission issued a statement complaining that, because of its tardy formation, it was not involved in pre-electoral operations such as publishing the voter register and issuing voter cards. Similarly, in Maroua, the president of the divisional supervisory commission did not learn the names of his commission's members until two days before the election. This particular commission held its first meeting one day after the election and began its work of counting votes on the same day. In Douala's Third District, a heavily populated opposition stronghold that had witnessed substantial immigration, the official in charge of supervising the election was appointed only 10 days before the election. (See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the appointment of the National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes.)

Every MINAT divisional and senior divisional officer had to be personally approved or appointed by the president, who was, of course, contesting the election. In the polarized environment that characterized Cameroon in the weeks before the election, the president's role naming these officials triggered suspicion about the motive for late appointments, administrative changes, lack of consultation with opposition parties at the local level and failure to publicize the location of polling places. Opposition parties complained vociferously that government officials were using their discretion in a conscious and illegitimate attempt to undercut the opposition's electoral strength.

D. Pre-Election Issues Relating to the Electoral Process

Considerable debate emerged about a number of important issues regarding the electoral code and its implementation. This section reviews and considers the significance of the concerns raised.

Registration of Voters

Before the 1992 legislative elections, little attention was paid to the process of voter registration. This unfamiliarity on the part of many Cameroonians led to confusion and frustration when voter

registration became a critical factor in the 1992 elections. In fact, voter registration was the most contentious issue in the period before the October presidential election.

The electoral code of December 1991 established a limited period within which individual Cameroonians were allowed to register. Between January 1 and April 30, 1992, any Cameroonian 20 years of age or older could present him/herself with his/her national identity card to a local divisional officer. Assuming the applicant was not excluded for a valid reason, such as a felony conviction, the individual would then be registered to vote, have his/her name entered upon the voting rolls and be given a blue voter registration card that would contain essential information such as name, address and date of birth.

In practice, however, the card was not issued immediately; rather voters were told to return to the subdivisional office before the March 1 parliamentary elections to collect their cards. Each card contained a number corresponding to the number adjacent to the voter's name on the voter roll. Individuals were listed on the rolls by number, not alphabetically by last name.

Before the March 1 elections, several opposition parties announced that they would boycott the parliamentary elections. As a result, many supporters of these parties failed to return to the subdivisional office to pick up their cards. Some collected their cards but did not vote. Still others registered between March 1 and the April 30 cut-off date; some in this category picked up their cards while many did not. Many simply did not register to vote.

The December 1991 electoral code stated that no one could register to vote after April 30 and before January 1, 1993, unless they were civil servants who had retired or been transferred, or military personnel who had moved. The new electoral code, adopted on September 17, 1992, did not change the registration deadlines. In this context, scheduling an early election without reopening the voter rolls effectively barred a significant number of potential voters from registering.

According to government statistics, about 4.2 million of Cameroon's estimated 12 million citizens were registered to vote before the 1992 election. Some have estimated the number of those eligible, but unable to register, at about 1.2 million although it is difficult to assess the reliability of such an estimate.

Early Presidential Election

Under the constitution of Cameroon, the incumbent's term was not scheduled to end until April 1993, five years after President Biya's election in April 1988. Nevertheless, in July and August, a well-organized parade of representatives from different parts of Cameroonian society petitioned President Biya – often in highly publicized meetings with the president at his residence – to call an early presidential election. Petitioners expressed their support for the president and his policy of democratization.

President Biya announced the October 11 election date on August 25, before the adoption of the electoral code. Biya's opponents viewed the decision to call an early election as a shrewd political move designed to maximize his chances of re-election. They noted that an election during the rainy season would discourage participation, and they accepted the premise that a lower voter turnout would favor the president. An early election would also shorten the time for the opposition to unite behind a single candidate. Finally, holding an election before the new year, when electoral rolls would be re-opened, would prevent the registration of opposition supporters who had failed to register previously.

The calling of an early election also raised important legal questions. First, Article 7 of the constitution stated that a presidential election could be called "no less than 20, nor more than 50" days before the expiration of the incumbent president's term. Calling an election in October 1992, when the president's term did not expire until April 1993, appeared to violate this constitutional provision.

The government, however, asserted that calling an early election triggered the constitution's vacancy provisions. The constitution required that in the case of a "vacancy" in the presidency, an election must take place no less than 20 days and no more than 40 days from the date of the vacancy. Vacancy, however, is clearly defined as the death or the resignation of the president or a permanent inability of the president to attend to his duties, as determined by the Supreme Court. President Biya did not resign. Rather, he continued to exercise the powers of the presidency through election day, and thus this provision appears inapplicable.

A second legal issue involved Section 51 of the new electoral code, which stipulated that an election could not take place sooner than 30 days after the date of the publication of the decree announcing

the election. This requirement, however, was not followed, since the election occurred on October 11, only 24 days after the adoption of the new electoral code.

Single versus Two-Round Electoral System

In the period leading up to the election, the choice of a first-past-the-post electoral system was controversial. The government championed a single-round presidential electoral system, in which the candidate winning the plurality of votes is declared the winner.

Many opposition leaders called for a two-round system. Under this system, which is common in francophone Africa and elsewhere, if no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote, the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes compete in a second and decisive round. While opposition parties might field separate candidates in the first round, they would be able to unite behind a single candidate in a run-off.

The government argued that the single-round system was less complicated, less expensive and less logistically demanding than a two-round system. The government also noted that this system is used by a number of democracies.

After considerable debate in the press and within the National Assembly, the leader of the UPC in the Assembly and an original proponent of the two-round system, Augustin Frederic Kodock, withdrew his support for the two-round system. Kodock's decision to support the government position effectively ended parliamentary opposition to the government's proposed first-past-the-post system. The parliament then moved to incorporate the single-round system into the electoral code. After the election, Kodock was appointed minister of state.

Eligibility of Presidential Candidates

During the pre-election period, a controversy arose over a proposed residency requirement for presidential candidates. An early government proposal would have required a candidate to be a resident of Cameroon for the three years preceding the election. Opposition leaders argued that the government was attempting to use the law to disqualify unwanted candidates, and, indeed, a three-year residency requirement would have disqualified the NUDP's Bello Bouba. After opposition criticism and parliamentary debate, the residency requirement was reduced to one year. This stipulation rendered ineligible

one potential presidential candidate, Hogbe Nlend, a professor at the University of Bordeaux in France. Nonetheless, the residency requirement did not appear to restrict unreasonably the choices available to the electorate.

Deposit Requirements

Under Section 56 of the electoral code, prospective presidential candidates were required to deposit 1,500,000 CFA (approximately $US 6,000) in order to qualify to run. This electoral code provision had sparked intense debate when the originally proposed deposit of 200,000 CFA (approximately $US 800) was increased more than seven-fold. Smaller parties argued futilely that the amount was excessive and would further limit possible competition for the presidency.

Availability of Tally Sheets

Debate also arose about providing polling-place results to party representatives. Section 92 of the electoral code stipulated that signed copies of polling-place tally sheets be given to each party's polling-place representatives. Just before the election, however, MINAT adopted a new rule that violated this requirement. The ministry ordered that polling-place officials make only two copies of the tally sheet and that the officials retain these copies for themselves.

Opposition party leaders harshly criticized the new procedure as a clear violation of the electoral code. They argued that all participating parties needed copies of signed polling-place tally sheets to monitor effectively the ballot counting and tabulation processes.

Participants in NDI's pre-election seminar in Yaoundé raised and debated the tally sheet issue. On October 7, a new ministerial order announced that, in conformity with the law, all party representatives present at a given polling place would receive copies of the tally sheet. On election day, however, some polling-place officials were unaware of the new order and resisted opposition efforts to obtain signed copies of tally sheets.

"Administrative Reforms": Changes in Administrative Units

In the pre-election period, MINAT authorities, presumably with the approval of the president, made substantial changes in the administrative structure of the country. Opposition parties questioned

the ministry's motives and charged that the changes led to confusion and disenfranchisement of voters.

Cameroon is divided for administrative purposes into 10 provinces, which are in turn divided into divisions and subdivisions. A governor, appointed by the president, presides over each province. A senior divisional officer, also appointed by the president, oversees government functions at the divisional level, and a divisional officer presides at the subdivisional level. Consistent with Cameroon's status as a unitary state and its French colonial heritage, MINAT in Yaoundé determines these administrative divisions, and provincial and divisional officials are answerable to the central government through MINAT.

Before the election was called, Cameroon's 10 provinces comprised 49 divisions and 182 subdivisions. After the president's announcement of the October 11 election date, the minister of territorial administration created seven additional divisions. Of the seven, five were established just one month before the election, for which the president appointed new senior divisional and divisional officers. The final two new divisions were created only days before the election, so close to election day that no new senior divisional or divisional officers were appointed.

The minister of territorial administration stated that the new divisions were created in response to many years of complaints that the previous divisional structure had become unwieldy due to massive shifts in the population. According to the minister, these "administrative reforms" would improve election administration and speed ballot tabulation.

Up to and including election day, many old and new divisional officers increased the number of polling places and changed their locations. These officials appear to have made little if any effort to publish these changes or to coordinate the voter lists with the new polling places.

Opposition parties strongly criticized the government's decision to reconfigure Cameroon's administrative map. They saw in the timing and substance of the reforms a deliberate attempt by the government to exacerbate confusion among voters. Many voters were understandably confused about the registration process, about where they should pick up their registration cards, about what documents they needed to cast ballots and about where they should go to vote.

Moreover, after the March parliamentary elections, opposition parties had warned that the government was preparing to implement boundary changes before the next election to benefit the ruling party. Opposition leaders pointed out that the changes made and the resulting confusion generally occurred in areas where opposition support was strongest. They believed that the creation of new divisions would make it easier to establish ostensibly new polling places, which did not really exist, for the purpose of delivering non-existent votes to a newly appointed senior divisional officer. The existence of fictitious polling places was the subject of considerable debate in the closing days of the election campaign.

After the presidential election, MINAT asserted that it was mere coincidence that many of these changes occurred in areas of opposition political strength. The ministry did not explain why it undertook these actions without communicating with opposition parties or voters. Nor did it satisfactorily explain why the changes were made so late in the process.

MINAT representatives also said that the opposition could not complain, as it had fared very well in the areas where the reforms had been instituted. In a first-past-the-post presidential election, however, any actions that unfairly or fraudulently add to a candidate's vote total will affect the overall national result.

Chapter 4

Electoral Campaign

A. The Political Parties and Candidates

Initially eight political parties presented candidates for the presidential election. Two candidates withdrew, and by election day, six men remained as candidates for the office of president of the republic. Despite much discussion about the need for unity, the opposition failed to coalesce behind a single candidate.

The three most important presidential candidates were President Paul Biya, SDF leader John Fru Ndi and NUDP leader Bello Bouba Maigari. The other three candidates combined – Adamou Ndam Njoya, Jean-Jacques Ekindi and Hygin Rene Philippe Williams Emah Ottou – captured less than 5 percent of the national vote.

The Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM)

The candidate of the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement was the incumbent president, Paul Biya.

President Biya drew his core support from the "grand south" region, which consists of his native South Province, East Province and Center Province, where the capital, Yaoundé, with its large number of government employees, is located. The CPDM also carried the Far-North Province. Biya ran as the true proponent of democracy and change and as the only candidate possessing a coherent program of development.

A member of the Beti ethnic group, Paul Biya entered government service in 1962, after receiving a university education in France. Named prime minister in 1975, Biya saw his years of service under President Ahidjo rewarded in 1982 when Ahidjo, upon his resignation, nominated Biya to be his successor. Biya became president of the ruling party in 1983. Announcing his presidential candidacy on August 25, 1992, Biya became the first Cameroonian president to run in a multiparty presidential election.

Social Democratic Front (SDF)

Seizing upon the arrest of Yondo Black in February 1990, John Fru Ndi decided to form his own political party, the Social Democratic Front. An anglophone bookstore owner from the north-western town of Bamenda, Fru Ndi organized a rally on May 26, 1990, to inaugurate the SDF. Security forces reacted violently to the rally, and six persons were killed. This event catapulted Fru Ndi to national prominence and established the "Bookseller from Bamenda" as a fiery populist symbol of resistance to years of single-party rule.

The SDF took the lead in organizing the Operation Ghost Town campaign. Then, citing concerns about the lack of safeguards in the electoral process, the SDF boycotted the March 1992 legislative elections.

Despite the boycott, Fru Ndi left little doubt that he would be a candidate for the presidency. Popular in the anglophone North-West Province, the SDF candidate worked to establish a nationwide constituency by campaigning throughout most of the country. In spite of the fact that he does not speak French, Fru Ndi was able to capitalize on francophone dissatisfaction with the status quo.

National Union of Democracy and Progress (NUDP)

Led by Bello Bouba Maigari, a former prime minister under President Biya, the National Union for Democracy and Progress

positioned itself as the "moderate" opposition party. The NUDP was strongest in the Muslim, northern regions of the country. It participated in the March legislative elections and emerged as the second largest party in the National Assembly.

A native of Bénoué Division in the North Province, Bello Bouba Maigari was no stranger to Cameroonian politics. Having served as Biya's first prime minister, Bello Bouba was dismissed from office in 1983 and fled into exile following the 1984 coup attempt. He spent six years in Nigeria.

With the advent of a multiparty system, Bello Bouba returned to Cameroon and was seen by many, especially in the north, as the heir to Ahmadou Ahidjo. In January 1992, following tensions in the leadership of the NUDP, Bello Bouba replaced Samuel Eboua as the party's chairman. This development left the NUDP with a solid northern basis and led to criticisms that the party's support was too regional. Nevertheless, capitalizing on a protest vote and widespread boycotts, the NUDP captured 68 seats in the legislative elections.

For the October presidential election, Bello Bouba presented himself as a moderate candidate possessing crucial government experience. The NUDP candidate attracted support in the north, around Douala and in most of the francophone Muslim community.

Other Parties

The Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) candidate was Adamou Ndam Njoya, a highly respected former minister of education and UNESCO official. Most of the party's support came from the West Province.

The Progressive Movement (MP) was a coalition of small opposition parties. Its candidate was a former high-ranking official in the ruling party, Jean-Jacques Ekindi. Ekindi was one of the most inflammatory and virulent opponents of the CPDM and was an effective campaigner.

The Regrouping of Patriotic Forces (RPF) presented its leader, Hygin Rene Philippe Williams Emah Ottou, as a candidate for president. A pharmacist, Emah Ottou previously served as secretary-general of the UPC. He frequently advocated fielding a single opposition candidate.

Two other parties, the Democratic Movement of Progress (MDP) and the National Progressive Party (NPP), presented candidates who

actively campaigned for the presidency. Both of these candidates, however, withdrew from the race before election day.

The MDP candidate, Samuel Eboua, had been replaced by Bello Bouba as leader of the NUDP in January 1992. On February 24, 1992, Eboua formed the MDP and later announced his desire to run for president. In an effort to spur a unified opposition, though, he later withdrew from the contest and pledged his support to John Fru Ndi.

The NPP was a minor party formed before the presidential election. Its candidate, Antar Gassagay, withdrew on the eve of the election and endorsed Biya.

B. Campaign Environment and Campaign Themes

Election campaigning officially began on September 26. The 15-day campaign period was generally peaceful, and NDI observers noted that many Cameroonians actively and enthusiastically participated in campaigning and campaign-related events.

Candidates engaged in a hectic schedule of public meetings and rallies. They also tried, with varying success, to communicate their message through the media. While most of the candidates drew upon traditional geographical bases of support, all campaigned throughout the country in order to portray themselves as truly national candidates, capable of attracting broad electoral support.

On the campaign trail, candidates were met by singing, cheering supporters dressed in traditional garments emblazoned with party logos and slogans. Local party officials generally led off rallies by voicing their support for the visiting candidate, often promising to deliver "100 percent" of the vote.

President Biya campaigned as the only candidate with the ability to lift Cameroon out of its current economic and financial crisis and as the sole candidate to enjoy international recognition. Biya portrayed himself simultaneously as the agent of stability and democratic change in Cameroon.

During the campaign, Biya, who spent most of the campaign period in the capital, relied on traditional support from the South, Center and East Provinces, home to large numbers of people from the Beti ethnic group. Beyond these areas, the Biya candidacy attracted considerable support in the north and some support in the Douala area in Littoral Province.

Opposition campaigning focused on the broad themes of democracy, change and development. While all parties stressed these issues, there was little emphasis on any particular set of policies or course of action. Not surprisingly, opposition leaders tended to concentrate their rhetoric on the incumbent president. They argued that Biya's defeat would be the best means of ensuring the country's political and economic development.

The end of the electoral campaign witnessed large rallies in major population centers. On October 10, the day before the election, the CPDM, SDF and NUDP parties held public meetings in Yaoundé that were attended by thousands. The streets of Yaoundé were filled with supporters of all three parties who were singing campaign songs and distributing campaign literature. Scattered violence was associated with these rallies, and reports of one death at the SDF meeting were widely carried in the international media.

During the pre-election period, NDI representatives received complaints about the conduct of the campaign. Both opposition and ruling party representatives voiced concerns, with each side accusing the other of taking steps to influence unfairly the outcome of the impending election.

C. Media Access and News Coverage

The government of Cameroon controls the one television and radio network (CRTV) that broadcasts inside the country. Radio is the most significant mass medium of communication. In 1989, there were an estimated 1.9 million radio receivers in Cameroon. Television has a more limited impact, with 250,000 sets estimated in 1989. Nonetheless, television plays an especially influential role in elite sectors of society.

There is one daily newspaper in Cameroon, the government-controlled *Cameroon Tribune*. *La Nouvelle Expression*, *Le Messager* and *Challenge Hebdo* are weekly newspapers critical of the ruling party, with an estimated combined total circulation (mid-1992) of 100,000.

On September 24, the minister of communications issued an order governing political party access to the government-controlled media in addition to rules concerning producing, scheduling and broadcasting campaign programs. From September 26 through October 10, each candidate was allocated a share of 120 minutes of

daily air time on the radio, between 8:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. On CRTV, the candidates divided a daily total of 60 minutes of air time, from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. The time was divided evenly among candidates, based on the number of candidates in the race on a given day. By campaign's end, the six candidates were each allowed nine minutes air time on state television's *Expression Directe* program. All candidates took advantage of this time to present videotaped campaign material.

This distribution of air time was not without problems. The opposition complained that the broadcast of *Expression Directe* frequently appeared only late in the evening; the program rarely appeared during the originally scheduled 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. time slot. According to the opposition, the late broadcasts and correspondingly diminished audience reduced the program's effectiveness as a vehicle for communicating different points of view.

On October 2, CRTV denied air time for a videotaped segment prepared for *Expression Directe* by the campaign of candidate Jean-Jacques Ekindi. Authorities stated that they rejected the Ekindi segment because it contained "vociferous attacks" against the CPDM and "insulting and defamatory words against Paul Biya." They maintained that their action was consistent with the rules governing party access to state media. After review, though, the National Communication Board overruled the CRTV decision, and Ekindi's tape was shown on October 7. Nevertheless, Ekindi's broadcasts for October 9 and 10 were banned without notice or explanation. The opposition cited the Ekindi incident as evidence that the government was not committed to the principle of equal access to the state-controlled broadcast media.

As part of its evaluation of television news coverage, NDI timed the amount of coverage accorded to candidates from different political parties on October 7. On that day, the government received 142 minutes of news coverage, as opposed to 12 minutes for the entire opposition. Similarly, U.S. embassy personnel documented that, for the first week of the campaign, September 26 to October 3, the ruling party received 346 minutes of coverage. During the same period, all opposition parties combined received coverage totaling 124.5 minutes.

Responding to criticisms in the delegation's preliminary post-election statement, ruling party representatives attempted to justify the large imbalance in media coverage by arguing that the television had

merely covered the "business of the Cameroonian government" and that most of the government's actions in the week before the election dealt with the preparations for election day. At the same time, Minister of Communication Kontchou acknowledged that media coverage of the activities of President Biya was more intense than opposition coverage; he reasoned that the CPDM engaged in more campaign activities.

Critics claim that Kontchou's assertion is questionable on empirical grounds, as the imbalance in the media far outweighed any proportional difference in the degree of campaign activities of the different candidates. Moreover, even if the time afforded the candidates on the *Expression Directe* program is considered, the imbalances remain striking. On October 7, for example, total air time for President Biya would have been computed at 151 minutes as compared to 57 minutes for the five opposition candidates who were then in the race.

There were also serious problems with the print media. Although it included coverage of the activities of opposition candidates, the *Cameroon Tribune* voiced enthusiastic and uncritical support for President Biya. During the weeks leading up to the election, the government suspended the operations of *La Nouvelle Expression*, *Challenge Hebdo* and *Le Messager*.

D. Campaign Intimidation

Both ruling and opposition party members complained about campaign intimidation. In Garoua, violence between members of the SDF and NUDP was reported during the campaign period, and Ekindi's campaign entourage was reportedly attacked. This incident was followed shortly by another, in which Ekindi supporters reportedly attacked CPDM sympathizers. In another incident, on the evening before the election, a group of CPDM supporters allegedly assaulted SDF supporters at Mbalmayo Park and Wada intersection in Yaoundé.

Individuals reporting intimidation sometimes implicated government security personnel. In one incident on October 6, security forces reportedly searched the Garoua home of a NUDP official, which prompted an angry crowd to gather and almost sparked a violent confrontation.

Government officials complained on several occasions about acts of violence and intimidation committed by opposition militants against CPDM supporters. One incident, reported in the *Cameroon Tribune*, involved the ransacking of the Douala home of CPDM central committee member Françoise Foning and the burning of her car.

Government officials also accused certain clergy members of making attacks on the ruling party that were so virulent that they amounted to intimidation. These officials complained that some clergy members used selected Bible verses (from Job, Ch. 4, Verses 1-10 and I Peter, Ch. 5, Verses 8-11) to warn of the "evils" of the ruling party. These verses contain unflattering references to the lion, President Biya's de facto campaign symbol.

E. Misuse of Government Resources in the Campaign

Opposition leaders complained about the excessive involvement of government ministers in the campaign, which further undermined confidence in the impartiality of the election administration. The deputy foreign minister, for example, was placed in charge of President Biya's re-election campaign in the North-West Province. Likewise, in Dja and Lobo Division of the South Province, the minister of defense directed the president's campaign. Perhaps most seriously, the secretary of state for internal security, who headed Cameroon's security apparatus, was appointed to organize Biya's campaign in Noun Division of the West Province. Placing such important government officials in prominent campaign roles contributed to the sense that the government would use all its resources to assist the Biya campaign.

A week after the election, on October 19, the governor of East Province, George Achu Mofor, resigned. In his letter of resignation to President Biya, Mofor cited reasons "relating to the management of the democratic process especially the last two elections and because of the flagrant violation of human rights in Cameroon." He thanked the president for not personally exercising "undue influence" on him in the execution of his duties as governor, but he added that "I cannot say this of all members of government."

Mofor, the half-brother of the prime minister, also alleged that at a meeting on September 28 the minister of territorial administration had ordered the provincial governors to "do everything fair and foul

to ensure at least a 60 percent victory of the CPDM party candidate in our provinces." Mofor added that "To assist us in this task, a six-page document issued by the CDU party on techniques of electoral fraud was distributed to us." Mofor warned of a "bloody confrontation between the forces at my disposal and citizens who are convinced that they have been deprived of their rights" if he were to impose the tough, repressive security measures expected by the national authorities. (See Appendix IX.)

Chapter 5

Election Day

A. Balloting Process

In order to vote in the October 11, 1992 election, eligible voters reported to the polling places indicated on their voter registration cards. Officials had designated a total of 13,100 polling places around the country, each established to serve no more than 600 voters. Polling places were located in schools, private homes, political party headquarters and public centers. In some instances, more than one polling place was located in the same building.

Each polling place was staffed by a president, appointed by the senior divisional officer, a secretary, and a representative from each political party presenting a candidate in the election. Polling places were scheduled to open at 8 a.m. Observers noted that many failed to open on time, due to a host of problems ranging from insufficient numbers of ballot papers for some candidates to late arrivals of polling-place presidents and party representatives. In Ebolowa and Douala, observers reported that some polling places had not opened

at 12 noon. Most polling places, though, appeared to be functioning within one or two hours of the scheduled opening.

Upon entering a polling place, a voter was required to present to the polling-place president his/her voter registration card or, failing this, another means of identification "in keeping with established rules and customs." (MINAT Order No. 0391 of 9/22/92). In practice, this imprecise authority afforded polling-place officials wide discretion in determining who could vote. The voter's name would then be checked against the voter list for that polling place. If the voter's name and number appeared on the list, that person could then proceed to vote.

The election was held using a multiple ballot system, whereby voters were given a separate ballot paper for each of the six presidential candidates. After picking up the six ballots and an official envelope, the voter was then directed to a voting booth, usually a cardboard or cloth screen, set up to ensure privacy. The voter indicated his/her choice by placing the ballot of the chosen candidate in the envelope. The voter then discarded the remaining ballots in waste containers placed in the voting booths by the polling place commission. After depositing the envelope into the ballot box, the voter's thumb was marked with indelible ink and pressed onto the voter's registration card to indicate that the person had voted.

During election day, the balloting was generally peaceful and orderly. Nonetheless, some incidents of violence and voter frustration were reported around the country. Many of these incidents were apparently provoked by a shortage of ballot papers or questions related to voter registration lists. In Maroua and Douala, *Radio Cameroon* reported attacks on vehicles belonging to divisional officers. Attacks on supporters of various parties were widely reported, although rarely confirmed.

B. Problems with Voter Lists and Voter Access

Before the election, the public was accorded only sporadic access to the voter lists. In only a few places did authorities publish voter lists before election day so that parties and voters could review the lists to ensure their accuracy. Consequently, considerable confusion ensued on election day, amid suspicion that authorities had deliberately failed to publish or correct, or had even tampered with, the lists for partisan purposes.

While the delegation was unable to determine their exact extent, problems with inaccurate voter lists appeared widespread, especially in the most populous areas of Cameroon. Individuals who had voted in March 1992 complained that they had returned to their polling places only to find that other names had been typed beside their numbers and that, in some cases, those people had already voted. Observers noted many voters who simply did not know where they were supposed to vote and who were left to wander around in search of their polling places.

Lists appeared to be incomplete. In the Third District of Douala, where the official in charge of the election had been appointed only 10 days before election day, delegation members observed some voter lists that were numbered from 206 upward and others from 507 upward without any indication of any previous pages. In Maroua, a polling-place president, when questioned about the voter list, showed observers a voter registration roster that listed 414 voters, whereas the list he had shown them earlier in the day contained 214 names.

Delegation members noted the application of unequal standards to voter eligibility. In Yaoundé, for example, three successive polling-place presidents gave three different answers as to voter eligibility documentation. One stated that both a voter registration card and a national identity document were necessary. A second required only a voter registration card, while the third accepted a national ID document alone as long as the voter's name appeared on the registration list.

Divisional officers and polling-place presidents, all of whom were appointed by senior divisional officers, exercised considerable discretion regarding who could and could not vote on election day. These decisions often seemed arbitrary and resulted in a lack of uniformity on how regulations were interpreted.

Delegation members witnessed officials disallowing potential voters whose names appeared on the electoral list. They also saw instances where names of eligible voters appeared to be improperly crossed off the register. In Yaoundé, the president of one polling place declined to allow some people to vote without offering any satisfactory reason or rationale. Some of these disenfranchised voters showed their voter cards to observers. These cards had been stamped during the March legislative elections, which demonstrated that the same individuals had been permitted to vote at that time. Observers

witnessed this problem in Bokle, near Garoua, where 138 would-be voters stated that their names had been crossed off the register, and in Buea in the South-West Province. On October 11, *Radio Cameroon* also cited this problem in Douala in Littoral Province.

Observers also called into question the government's uneven adherence to the maximum of 600 voters per polling place, as stipulated in the electoral code. For example, at the College Iptec in Yaoundé, observers noted that the voter list contained 1,050 names. Observers at some polling places encountered long lines throughout the day.

C. Problems with Voter Registration Cards

Little control was exercised over the official distribution of voter registration cards, thus creating an opportunity for multiple voting and underage voting. Handfuls of cards were repeatedly offered to the observers as proof of a lively market in voter card trafficking. Observers witnessed the distribution of these cards by opposition parties as well as by supporters of President Biya. In Maroua, a recently arrived divisional officer signed voter registration cards that were back-dated to appear to have been issued during the legally permitted registration period earlier in the year; by some accounts, there were 6,000 such illegitimate cards in that area.

Opposition supporters charged that people claiming to belong to the CPDM received voter cards immediately before the election, although the delegation could not verify these claims. At the same time, other examples were cited of opposition parties benefitting from fraudulent voter cards, especially in the Douala region.

Observers in Douala and Yaoundé also saw voters who appeared far younger than the required minimum age of 20. When questioned by delegation members, several of these individuals admitted that they were younger than the voting age. They did not explain how their names were enrolled on the voter lists or how they obtained voter cards.

It proved impossible to determine the extent of the problem caused by fraudulent voter registration cards. Nonetheless, the situation clearly contributed to an atmosphere in which all parties could question the legitimacy of the process and each other's intent to play by the rules.

D. Fictitious Polling Places

One party, the CDU, presented apparent evidence of fictitious polling places, for which results were inserted into tabulation sheets sent by divisional officers to senior divisional officers for transmission to divisional supervisory commissions. In Foumbot in the Noun Division of the West Province, the CDU representative on the divisional commission reported that the official results forwarded to divisional authorities included results for polling places that did not appear on the official polling-place list. Official lists for the area recorded 55 polling places. The tally sheet for Foumbot, which was provided by the CDU representative on the divisional commission, showed 10 polling places that did not exist on the official list: Mairie B, Projet Riz B, Marché A, PTT B, Marché B, Ecole Publique Koupare B, Ecole Publique Njindoun B, Ecole Publique Gbetnsouen B, Ecole Publique Massett B and Cebec Mbantou B.

The results from nine of these 10 polling places provided overwhelming, and similar, vote totals in favor of President Biya, whereas the remainder of the area voted largely in favor of another candidate. Official results recorded candidate Biya only once receiving more than 400 votes in the 55 polling places officially listed. By contrast, in eight of the 10 polling places that did not appear on official lists, President Biya surpassed the 400-vote mark.

E. Access of Party Representatives to Polling Places

Due to the regional support of many of Cameroon's political parties, not all of the parties were able to place representatives in all of the polling places. However, numerous party representatives reported being barred from polling places where they were attempting to perform their election-day duties. In addition, some polling places were actually located in local CPDM headquarters or in homes of notables affiliated with the CPDM.

For example, in Rey Bouba, a town in Mayo-Rey Division in the North Province, many opposition party representatives were denied access to polling places. The traditional leader in Rey Bouba was an open supporter of the ruling party. When NUDP polling-place representatives attempted to enter into territory controlled by this leader, armed guards refused them admittance. The local divisional officer confirmed the problem. NDI observers were also barred from entering this area. Similar problems were reported in other regions

of the country, including the city of Ebolowa, which is located in President Biya's home province.

In several cases, it was unclear whether certain individuals inside polling places actually represented the party they claimed to represent, as their actions cast doubt on their party affiliation. In one instance, a representative in the presence of international observers claimed affiliation with one opposition party, only to say a few minutes later that he represented another party. In another place in Mvila Division in the South Province, observers interviewed individuals who claimed to represent opposition parties, but the results from that particular polling place indicated a 100 percent vote total for Biya. Polling-place presidents may have been attempting to provide the appearance of multiparty representation when in fact these polling places were entirely in the hands of the ruling party.

Placing political party representatives in polling places represents one of the critical checks on biased administration and fraud at the polling-place level. It was impossible to determine how many polling places operated in the absence of representatives from more than one party. Nor was it possible to explain the reason why polling places operated without opposition representatives; both intimidation and a lack of party organization seemed to contribute to the problem. Regardless, the fact that opposition party representatives were not present in many polling places contributed to the lack of confidence in the balloting and counting process.

Chapter 6

Ballot Counting

A. Ballot Counting at the Local Level

Polling places were scheduled to close at 6 p.m. In a number of instances, however, places that had opened late were allowed to continue operating to accommodate those still in line. In Kumba in the South-West Province, for example, officials reported that polling places remained open until 10 p.m.

Once a polling place closed, the president of the polling site proceeded with the counting process. In the presence of polling-place commission members, including party representatives, the ballot box was opened, emptied and displayed to onlookers to show that no ballots remained inside. Next, an official counted the total number of envelopes that had been in the box. A pre-designated party representative then removed each ballot paper from its envelope and handed the ballot to another party representative who read the vote aloud. In the counts witnessed by NDI observers, officials kept informal tabulations on blackboards, with each vote marked off in a

slow but dramatic process that was closely followed by everyone present.

Once all of the votes were counted, the polling-place president was authorized to announce publicly the results for that polling place. He or she prepared a report of the polling-place results, and duplicates were prepared for each party representative. The original was signed by all commission members and forwarded to the divisional officer.

B. Ballot Tabulation

Tabulation of votes at the subdivisional and divisional levels was conducted under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration. While MINAT backed down from its initial attempt to prohibit political party representatives from obtaining tally sheets of election results at the polling sites, the electoral code did not provide an opportunity for party representatives to monitor the transfer of tally sheets from the divisional officer, through the senior divisional officer, to the divisional supervisory commissions.

According to the electoral code, the divisional officer tabulated the polling-place results for the subdivision and forwarded them to the senior divisional officer. The senior divisional officer was then charged with delivering the results to the divisional supervisory commission, which, in turn, sent them to the National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes (NCFCV).

The September 1992 electoral code created the NCFCV, which was charged with overseeing the counting of results and resolving disputes reported by lower commissions. The composition of the 19-member Commission was not finalized until October 9. Later, the government said that the creation of the NCFCV was deliberately tardy in order to avoid intimidation of its members. The government failed to cite the source of this alleged potential intimidation, and it is unclear why the government was more concerned about this matter than about the consequences of a delay in the appointment of the commission.

The NCFCV comprised a chairman, who was a judge appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, two judicial officers appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, 10 representatives of the administration appointed by MINAT, and one representative of each

political party or candidate. Meetings of the commission were held at the Supreme Court.

The NCFCV did not have an ethnic, regional or political balance. The government appointed 13 of the NCFCV's 19 members, and 11 of those 13 were drawn from ethnic groups in the Center and South Provinces, strongholds of President Biya. These circumstances served to make the NCFCV a target of opposition party criticisms and further exacerbated an already polarized environment.

Section 30 of the electoral code charged the commission with responsibility for verifying the poll results at each polling place on the basis of the official reports and appended documents forwarded by the divisional supervisory commission. The NCFCV was charged with finalizing election results no later than 10 days after the end of voting. A report was then to be transferred to the registry of the Supreme Court, which would proclaim the results of the election. Copies of this report would be made available to MINAT and to each candidate.

The NCFCV held its first meeting on October 12, the day after the election. At that time, the commission decided to delay the beginning of its work until October 14, due to the lack of tally sheets from divisional supervisory commissions.

On October 13 and 14, respectively, the NUDP and SDF filed separate requests with the Supreme Court to have the election annulled, based on alleged irregularities in the conduct of the campaign and election. The SDF withdrew its petition the same day it was filed on the grounds that the Supreme Court was not the proper authority for addressing a political issue. The SDF also maintained that the Court was subordinated to the Biya government by virtue of the constitution. On the night of October 14, the Supreme Court, after deliberating for approximately 30 minutes, refused to consider the NUDP request on the grounds that the party had submitted photocopies, not the required originals, of documents supporting its case.

These legal actions forced the NCFCV to suspend its work for an additional day, until October 15. The commission then reconvened and readied the final results for announcement by the Supreme Court on October 23. On October 18, however, the SDF charged publicly that the commission was attempting "to falsify the

results of the elections in favor of the CPDM candidate" and withdrew its representative.

C. The National Tabulation Process

While the actual counting process at polling places generally proceeded smoothly, the transmission of results from polling places through the divisional levels to the national level seemed open to question. Before results reached the NCFCV, they were reported by senior divisional officers to MINAT, usually by telephone or fax. This step had no basis in the electoral code.

MINAT, before the election, had established an in-house committee to aggregate and, in the words of committee members, "verify" results arriving from senior divisional officers. NDI observers visiting MINAT headquarters watched as committee members, many wearing CPDM campaign paraphernalia and assembled in a room dominated by a huge campaign poster of President Biya, waited for results. As results arrived, members of the committee meticulously prepared, by hand, charts listing results by area and by candidate.

MINAT officials did not make clear the means it used to verify results submitted by senior divisional officers, nor the means senior divisional officers used to verify results forwarded to them by divisional officers. Nevertheless, MINAT's role was considerably greater in the vote counting process than indicated in the electoral code or than outlined by the minister of territorial administration in his response to NDI's interim report. Although the Supreme Court alone had jurisdiction to proclaim official results, MINAT began releasing unofficial partial results on the evening of October 12 and continued to update running totals at occasional intervals thereafter. (See Appendix X.)

The partial results released by MINAT on October 12 were based on a count of about 20 percent of the vote. In addition to providing the partial vote count, the MINAT communique included analysis seemingly designed to prepare the country for a Biya victory. The communique stated:

> . . . [T]he results of the vote count gathered as of now show candidate Biya's lead over the other two candidates, Fru Ndi and Bello Bouba. This lead could well be maintained given the CPDM's presence across the country,

which should enable it to command a large share of the vote in the areas traditionally supportive of other political parties; whereas the reverse is not true for these parties in areas with strong support for the CPDM.

The government stated that transparency was assured because MINAT representatives were not present at all stages of the counting process, such as during the deliberations of the divisional supervisory commissions. But MINAT was, of course, in charge of administrative preparations for the election, and divisional officers played a crucial role in receiving, tabulating and transmitting polling-place results.

After the election, the government implied that subdivisional commissions had existed and included political party representatives. No such commissions were designated in the electoral code. Furthermore, the delegation witnessed political party representatives being denied a meaningful opportunity to observe the work of the divisional officers. In Maroua, where observers noted that party representatives were allowed to participate at the subdivisional level, they were only permitted to do so after lodging strong protests and essentially refusing to leave the offices of the divisional officer.

It was difficult to assess the ballot tabulation process from the subdivisional level to the divisional level. Divisional officers forwarded subdivisional results to their superiors, the senior divisional officers, who then transmitted them to divisional supervisory commissions, where political party representatives were present. The morning after the election one delegation member visited the senior divisional officer in Yaoundé at his desk who had yet to receive the first returns. The forms he seemed prepared to use to tabulate votes contained space only for votes for candidate Biya. When questioned about this anomaly, the official indicated that his secretary was, at that moment, in the process of typing additions to the forms to make room for the names of opposition candidates. He went on to say that the forms on his desk were left over from previous legislative elections, although the observer clearly saw the word "presidential" at the top of the forms.

In any event, the compilation of tally sheets and tabulation of results was slow, exacerbating opposition suspicions. Moreover, it was unfortunate that there was no statutory provision for party representatives to monitor the tabulation of results at the subdivisional

level or the transferral of tally sheets between the subdivision and divisional supervisory commission.

D. Discrepancies Between the Official and the SDF Counts

The SDF organized and conducted a parallel vote tabulation. SDF activists transmitted individual polling-place results to an SDF office in Yaoundé, where the results were tabulated by computer.

On October 21, 1992, the SDF published its tabulation, which it labelled as the "final results" for the October 11 presidential election. On the basis of these figures, John Fru Ndi declared himself the "legitimate president of Cameroon." Two days later, the Cameroon Supreme Court, meeting in accordance with Cameroonian law, announced the official final results (see Appendix XI) and certified the re-election of President Biya. (See Chapter 7.)

The tabulation of the SDF differed markedly from the official NCFCV tabulation as announced by the Supreme Court. There were also significant discrepancies between two different sets of results labelled as "final" that were both provided by the SDF. The SDF has not explained the discrepancies between its two different tabulations, released October 21 and 28.

NDI carefully reviewed the official results and the two SDF parallel tabulations. In an attempt to assess the discrepancies, NDI requested in writing from both the SDF and the government a breakdown of results by polling place for approximately 10 percent of Cameroon's 13,100 polling places. The acting chief justice, who headed the NCFCV, responded on November 25 that, for "practical reasons," the government was unable to furnish the requested information. The SDF said that it would provide the information, but it did not do so. These circumstances made it impossible for NDI to make even a cursory judgment about the accuracy of either tabulation.

Nonetheless, information received by NDI demonstrated considerable differences between government and SDF results in no fewer than 21 of Cameroon's 56 divisions in eight of the country's 10 provinces. The first set of SDF results gave candidate John Fru Ndi 1,177,209 votes to 1,125,103 for candidate Biya, a "winning" margin of 52,106 votes for Fru Ndi. Official results, on the other hand, indicated that 1,185,466 valid votes were cast for Biya, as opposed

to 1,066,602 for Fru Ndi, a "winning" margin of 118,864 votes for the incumbent.

But the second set of SDF "final" results, released on October 28, 1992, were much closer to the official results than the first SDF tabulation. (See Appendix XII.) They were at significant odds with the government's results in only nine divisions (Diamaré, Logone and Chari, Wouri, Fako, Manyu, Meme, Ndian, Donga Mantung and Noun). In 12 divisions where SDF and government figures had previously differed, SDF's October 28 figures were in agreement with the government's results. Candidate Biya was now shown to have received 1,119,126 votes, a reduction of 5,977 votes from earlier figures. Candidate Fru Ndi received 1,169,355 votes in the October 28 results, a reduction of 7,854 votes. The margin of "victory" for Fru Ndi was updated to stand at 50,229 votes.

In at least one case, the SDF recorded a vote loss for candidate Biya – in Donga Mantung Division of the North-West Province. The October 21 SDF figures for Donga Mantung had shown Biya receiving 15,471 votes. "Final results" for October 28 provided by the SDF showed Biya garnering only 6,003 votes.

E. Implausible Results and Evidence of Fraud

In the official tabulations, there are examples of implausible and anomalous results from individual polling places. NDI did obtain polling-site results in a few cases. For example, in Mendong Subdivision of Mvila Division in the South Province, figures recorded not only that all 100 percent of the 5,856 registered voters actually voted, but that every ballot was cast in favor of President Biya. Similar, albeit somewhat less extreme, results were recorded in neighboring polling places. (See Appendix III.)

In its response to NDI's interim report, the government stated that the turnout figure for all of Mvila Division was 93 percent, rather than 100 percent. The NDI figures cited, however, were not for the whole division, but for a cluster of polling places within one of the division's subdivisions. The figures indicated that for the 10 specified polling places in Mendong Subdivision the turnout was indeed 100 percent. The government further questioned why NDI has not focused on results in opposition strongholds. In fact, NDI has not received any similar information from results in opposition-friendly areas.

Chapter 7

Announcement of Election Results and Aftermath

On October 23, the chief justice of the Supreme Court announced the official results of the October 11 presidential election. He declared incumbent President Paul Biya the winner with 39.9 percent of the vote. The official results put SDF candidate John Fru Ndi at 35.9 percent and NUDP candidate Bello Bouba Maigari with 19.2 percent. Turnout was announced as 71.9 percent of registered voters. The SDF, though, claimed fraud and refused to accept the results.

At the same time, the chief justice issued a frank statement that explicitly acknowledged serious claims of irregularities in the process. He argued that the court could not rule on these claims because it had no complaints before it upon which it could assert jurisdiction. The Supreme Court had earlier thrown out the NUDP petition requesting that the election be annulled. Although the court dismissed the case

on a technicality, it nevertheless stated that the NUDP had failed to submit sufficient proof of its allegations and, in any case, the irregularities alleged by the NUDP were not, in the court's opinion, of a magnitude to affect the election's outcome.

The Court's October 23 statement cited the following areas as having been subjects of concern:

- the inability of many otherwise eligible voters to register;
- questionable actions by polling-place and divisional supervisory commissions;
- refusal to permit party representatives to enter polling places;
- the absence or delays in the arrival of voting materials;
- a widespread absence of controls over voter registration cards; and
- denial of the franchise to eligible voters.

After the announcement of the results, protest demonstrations and riots erupted in the western part of the country. On October 27, the government declared a state of emergency, and in November, according to Amnesty International, there were mass arrests of opposition supporters. Fru Ndi was held under house arrest for several months.

In response to election-related problems and post-election abuses, the U.S. suspended a reported $14 million in foreign aid to Cameroon. On November 14, the U.S. State Department spokesman reported that after the election the government of Cameroon "resorted to intimidation to consolidate its position." The State Department urged the government to immediately lift the state of emergency "as a signal that reconciliation, not punishment, now tops its agenda."

Chapter 8

Reflections and Recommendations

The October 11, 1992 Cameroonian presidential election presented a predicament that international observers dread confronting: serious pre-election problems compounded by election results that, according to all parties, indicated a very close election. The observers' quandary was further complicated by the fact that some losing parties refused to accept the results announced by the Supreme Court and by the possibility of violence in the aftermath of the announced results.

NDI observer delegations are no strangers to such difficult settings. In the Philippines and Panama, NDI delegations denounced the government for attempting to manipulate the election results and deny opposition candidates their victory. In other countries – Paraguay, Romania and Pakistan – NDI delegations have declined to condemn elections outright, despite often significant irregularities; the margin of victory was simply too large for NDI delegations to conclude that the

irregularities affected the overall outcome. Nonetheless, in these instances, the delegations prepared thorough reports recounting the problems and attributing responsibility where appropriate.

In contrast to Cameroon, the observers in Paraguay, Romania and Pakistan possessed considerably more tools with which to evaluate the overall fairness of the elections. But the sudden scheduling of the Cameroonian elections prevented an extended observer presence, the dispatch of pre-election fact-finding missions, the establishment of relations with an effective nonpartisan monitoring group or the implementation of a mechanism for verifying the election results. Moreover, the inability of the government and political parties to produce polling-place results precluded even a rudimentary post-election statistical analysis.

Without these tools, NDI observers in Cameroon had to rely almost exclusively on impressions gleaned from traveling around the country before, on and after election day. These impressions, obviously, cannot provide a basis for determining who won the election. These impressions, however, together with the specific information adduced in this report, convinced the delegation that the election could not be viewed as reflecting the will of the Cameroonian people.

No single piece of evidence provided the basis for this conclusion. Rather, the determination was based on the cumulative weight of the evidence. The most critical factor, however, was the government's failure to establish an electoral process that earned the confidence of the population.

The government was urged to establish an independent election commission. Instead, reliance was placed on the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which controlled the entire Cameroonian civil administration and which did not have the confidence of many segments of Cameroonian society. In this context, the considerable discretion of local election administrators in implementing the process severely undermined ostensibly neutral administrative laws and regulations.

The government was urged to provide political parties with an active role in monitoring the process. Instead, government officials obstructed the efforts of party representatives to receive tally sheets and, in some regions, to obtain mere access to the polling sites.

The National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes was established to tabulate the results. But the late appointment of the

board and the fact that most of its members were viewed as Biya supporters undermined this potentially effective confidence-building measure. And rather than relying on the Commission, MINAT decided to make partial results public and even offered commentary on their political implications.

NDI recognizes that questioning the legitimacy of an election process may have profound implications for the citizens of Cameroon and for the international community. On the other hand, failure to criticize a flawed election would have frustrated the development of democratic values and institutions. The credibility of international election monitoring also suffers when observers refuse to criticize a defective process.

In view of the circumstances, NDI must reflect on whether the Institute should have accepted the responsibility of observing the Cameroon election. In addition to the short lead time and the inability to rely on the tools mentioned above, several other factors might have justified a decision not to observe. Few of the recommendations included in the 1991 NDI report for improving confidence in the electoral process had been implemented during the year. Moreover, as evidenced by the visa denials, the government was divided over whether to welcome observers. And there was deep polarization within the country, which made probable an election whose results would not be accepted by the losing parties.

Notwithstanding these considerations, NDI decided to organize an international observer delegation. Having been engaged in Cameroon programs for more than a year, NDI understood the country's political dynamics and the 1991 report had established benchmarks for evaluating the 1992 elections. Moreover, organizing an observer delegation was seen as an effective means for encouraging an election process that, despite the flaws, could contribute to the development of meaningful multiparty democracy in the country. Finally, a successful election in Cameroon would reinforce the momentum toward liberalization and democratization in other West African countries.

NDI also was confident that established relationships with the contesting parties would ensure that the observer delegation received the information required to evaluate effectively the election. In this regard, NDI sought to enhance the capabilities of the political parties in monitoring the election by organizing a series of workshops

throughout the country during the week before election day. The workshops signified the political parties' willingness to participate in multiparty forums, although the goodwill generated by the workshops quickly dissipated after the election.

In retrospect, NDI believes that the observer mission served important purposes. The presence of observers in the country at the time of the election may have provided the population with a greater sense of confidence. This assurance was reflected in active campaigning and the large turnout in many regions. The observers' presence on election day and the decision to maintain an on-site presence in Cameroon, in the person of the delegation co-leader, until final results were announced also may have deterred more conspicuous forms of fraud. Ironically, it is the lack of obvious manipulation of the election results that has made the evaluation of this election so difficult. Perhaps most important, the observers' presence ensured that a credible report was presented to the Cameroonian people and the international community about the conduct of the elections.

NDI remains prepared to work in Cameroon, particularly to encourage the initiation of a dialogue among political parties regarding further reform of the electoral process. With this in mind, and based on the delegation's observations and NDI experiences elsewhere, the following recommendations are offered for consideration:

- The establishment of an independent election commission would contribute considerably to promoting public confidence in future Cameroonian elections. If such a step proves administratively impractical or politically impossible, then the involvement of MINAT in the election process should be severely reduced. MINAT, for example, should be prohibited from creating new election divisions in the period preceding the election, from establishing new election regulations without consulting the electoral contestants and from releasing election results and commenting upon them.
- The voter registration process should be redesigned to ensure maximum enfranchisement of potential voters. Elections should not be called to preclude participation by those who failed to register previously. Also, voter lists should be displayed in a

timely and public manner, thus enabling prospective voters and political parties to verify their accuracy.

- State-controlled television and radio must provide fair and responsible coverage of all parties contesting the election. An official independent review board might be charged with monitoring the campaign coverage as well as the refusal by the media to broadcast political party messages during the free time provided. In addition, journalists operating in all media should be encouraged to develop professional standards.
- The role of political parties in monitoring all aspects of the electoral process should be respected. Before an election, parties should have access to the voter registries and lists of polling sites. On election day party representatives should have access to all polling places and counting centers.
- The counting of ballots must be transparent in all phases. Parties must have access to the polling sites while the count is underway and must be authorized to receive copies of tally sheets upon the conclusion of the count. The procedures for transmitting results from the polling site to the authority responsible for releasing the results – *i.e.*, the election commission, a special counting board or the Supreme Court – must be unambiguous. Both aggregate and polling-place results should be released to permit independent verification.
- The development of a democratic culture must be nurtured. This will require the active involvement of political party and civic organization leaders. They must emphasize tolerance and compromise, and they must learn to accept election results.

In the end, the manipulated electoral process has failed the people of Cameroon. A democratic political system requires political leaders to contest elections fairly and to work within the political system whether they win or lose. Political leaders in Cameroon must re-dedicate themselves to these principles and find the means to overcome the present impasse. Without such an effort, Cameroon is likely to regress into authoritarian rule, which will threaten the country's internal stability and international standing.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

October 2 Telex from Jean Fochive, Secretary of State for Internal Security

Editor note: The following is an English translation of the original text of the telex copied below.

1920 - -02/10/92-

-D G S N -YAOUNDE-

-C S P S N C -YAOUNDE- -EVERYBODY-

(DECODING)

03401/3P/AC/DGSN/CAB 01/10/92

RESPECTFULLY REQUEST xx DENY VISAS TO ANY PERSON CLAIMING TO BE OBSERVER TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITHOUT INVITATION FROM OUR GOVERNMENT xx STOP./-

-FOCHIVE-

1920 - - 02/ 0/92 -

- D G S N -YAOUNDE-

Special Rapport

- C S P S N C - YAOUNDE - - TOUS LE MONDE -

(DECHIFFREMENT)

03401/3P/AC/DGSN/CAB 01/10/92

HONNEUR VOUS DEMANDER xx REFUSER VISAS ENTRE TOUTES PERSONNES SE RECLAMANT TITRE OBSERVATEUR ELECTION PRESIDENTIELLE SANS MEME INVITATION NOTRE GOUVERNEMENT xx ET FIN./-

- FOCHIVE -

Appendix II

Deployment List

International Observer Delegation
Cameroon Presidential Election

October 7-14, 1992

BAFOUSSAM *(West Province)*	Edouard Bustin (Belgium) Anna Wang (NDI)
BAMENDA *(North-West Province)*	Taofiki Aminou (Benin) Robert Wood (NDI)
DOUALA *(Littoral Province)*	Saidou Agbantou (Benin) Mariana Drenska (Bulgaria) Moustapha Osseni (Benin)
BUEA *(South-West Province)*	Luis Xavier Garrido (Mexico)
EBOLOWA *(South Province)*	Lisa Herren (NDI) Aristide Sokambi (Central African Republic)
GAROUA *(North Province)*	Hubert Oulaye (Côte d'Ivoire)
MAROUA *(Far-North Province)*	Ivan Horvath (Hungary) Robert Nicolas (USA)
NGAOUNDERE *(Adamaoua Province)*	Romain DjeDje (Côte d'Ivoire)
YAOUNDE *(Center Province)*	B.A. Graham (Canada) James Tierney (USA) Christopher Fomunyoh (NDI) Timothy McCoy (NDI) Edward McMahon (NDI)

Appendix III

Excerpts from Selected Team Reports

Ebolowa Region - South Province

Prepared by Lisa Herren

Aristide Sokambi, GERDDES member from Central African Republic, served as the principal NDI observer in Ebolowa. He was joined by Lisa Herren of NDI. Aristide has been actively involved in the opposition in Central African Republic, and attended the NDI training seminar in Benin. Ebolowa was his first election observation mission. Aristide arrived in Ebolowa on Friday afternoon and conducted meetings on his own. Lisa joined him Saturday morning. The following report is taken from the notes of Lisa Herren.

Saturday, 10 October 1992

We contacted the divisional officer, the senior divisional officer and the governor. We attempted to meet with the mayor but were told that he had to attend a meeting. That meeting turned out to be the local CPDM rally. The mayor is the CPDM manager for the Mvila Division.

1. Against a background of Biya posters, we were greeted with open arms at the office of the divisional officer. Local volunteers were counting ballots and stuffing ballot boxes with materials needed for each polling place. We learned that the materials would be picked up by the president of each polling place and transported to their polling site. We were told that 2,000 CFA were being provided to polling-place presidents for expenses in addition to 3,000 CFA for gasoline to facilitate transportation to remote areas.
2. Our next meeting was with the senior divisional officer. We asked for verification of the rules of registration and whether registration cards were still being distributed. This question led to an examination of Articles 47 and 49 of the electoral code, which indicated that electoral cards could not be issued legally from 10 days preceding the election.

3. We then paid a courtesy call to the governor, who welcomed us with champagne and peanuts on his porch overlooking the town. Most of the discussion revolved around everything but the details of our mission. We merely stated our intention to observe and the importance of the democratic process, for which he declared his full support. He stated that receiving us into his home demonstrated his wish for a truly fair election. During the meeting, a security officer arrived to accompany the governor to the CPDM rally. Earlier, the governor had stated his desire not to make an appearance at the rally in the interest of non-partisanship. We preceded the officer in leaving, so we could not ascertain whether the governor stayed true to his word and avoided the manifestation.
4. Aristide contacted a NUDP militant in the Muslim section of the town on Friday. Upon meeting with our contact Saturday, we were presented with an electoral card dated Oct. 9, signed by the divisional officer, which we were told had been obtained by a NUDP man claiming to be a CPDM supporter. Our NUDP contact said that the cards were being made available to CPDM supporters; i.e., those possessing party cards or uniforms. We made a copy of the card in Aristide's possession.
5. Upon departing from our hotel after lunch, we were approached by a commandant who addressed us by name. He directly asked us where we intended to visit on election day so that he could advance for us and let them know we were coming. The non-confrontational exchange yielded little information for him, and we were not questioned again during our stay in Ebolowa.
6. We identified several polling places and chose several where there had been SDF complaints of irregularities. Several concerns arose throughout our discussions with opposition members:
   - confusion about the location of polling sites, even on the eve of the election;
   - polling sites in private homes;
   - availability of electoral cards until the day before the election;
   - voting booths placed by windows; and

- political party (CPDM) posters on administrative buildings, inside and outside polling places.

Sunday, 11 October 1992

Election day proceeded in a calm manner, and we were glad to see an absence of any true unrest. Only one incident in a village on the outskirts of Ebolowa caused some concern. The SDF chairman for Ebolowa was chased out of the polling place by the voting crowd and was slightly roughed up. We arrived on the scene just as the incident was taking place and saw him being harassed and forced into his car. However, while the crowd was not amenable to the opposition, the SDF chairman was able to leave one SDF representative in that polling place.

The following are some of the more frequent/grave irregularities that we observed:

1. There seemed to be no standardized procedure for polling-place presidents to solve problems. In several cases, we found two voters with the same electoral card number. In one polling place, located at the Ecole Publique, the second voter was told he could not vote because a woman with the same number had already voted. In another polling site, the second voter was allowed to vote and a notation was made that it was a duplicate.
2. Few polling sites opened on time, due either to lack of materials, absence of the president or party representatives, etc.
3. There was a shortage of ballots in some polling places; in one case, the president of the site was asking voters not to wrinkle their ballots so that they could be pulled out of the trash and reused.
4. Few voters knew the location of the polling sites, including the presidents themselves.
5. We observed confusion over the dating of ballots. In some areas, officials were stamping the ballots with the date, in others, they were not. Concern arose as to whether one set of ballots would be declared void.
6. In rural villages, we were greeted by chants of "100 percent" amid waving pictures of Biya. When asked if all parties were represented, the answer was always in the affirmative, yet the opposition had received no votes. Our NUDP contact verified

that there were no NUDP representatives in the particular area that we had visited.

7. Some polling places were full of CPDM representatives without any opposition representation.
8. There was confusion in polling places over the required identification needed to vote. The law is unclear as to what must be presented. In most cases national identity cards were not obligatory.

Monday 12 October 1992

We spent most of the morning waiting for the results to be tabulated at the office of the senior divisional officer. The senior divisional officer gave us all of the results that he claimed to have tabulated, including a few rural areas. However, Ebolowa, four rural districts, and several urban bureaus were supposedly missing.

Repeated visits yielded no further information except one. Earlier in the morning, the senior divisional officer had given some numbers on the results of two rural areas. However, a man on the commission later told us that the results from those two areas specifically had not been received. Aristide interpreted this faux pas as a hint that the senior divisional officer was tampering with the numbers. His reasoning was this:

- the opposition did not have representatives in the rural areas so were unable to attest to the validity of the results;
- the rural villages were almost 100 percent Biya, as we can attest from the villages we visited; and
- cheating could be accomplished easily by boosting the number of registered voters in the rural villages; this is a tremendous concern and is a potential area of fraudulent activity.

By 14:00 we were told that the results from the rural regions had not yet been received. We therefore found our way to the SDF chairman's home, which had been turned into a hideout/fortress. We noticed one unconcealed weapon, and each of the approximately 20 people seemed extremely worried and tense. We met with the leader of the SDF, who gave the numbers that had been collected by his representatives. The SDF representative's numbers compare with the results given to us by the senior divisional officer (see below).

(N.B. The following chart is a sample of election returns for some subdivisions and districts in the South Province. These results were gathered by NDI observers during the course of their stay in that province.)

	Ebolowa	Biwang-Bane	Mendong	Ngoule-makong
Biya	30,724	4,084	5,856	5,368
Fru Ndi	2,804	4	0	0
Bello	523	0	0	0
Njoya	214	0	0	0
Ekindi	19	7	0	0
Ottou	16	0	0	0
Registered Voters	48,090	4,145	5,856	5,382
Actual Voters	34,611	4,096	5,856	5,368
Null	116	1	0	0

When we left Ebolowa at 15:00, Bamileke shop owners were closing their stores in response to threats by the local Beti population. The military had been called in to keep the peace. Evidently, there was concern by ruling party supporters that a small percentage had voted for the opposition. By SDF figures, SDF garnered 8 percent of the vote while other opposition parties claimed 2 percent, totalling 10 percent for the opposition.

A goodbye call to the governor left us with a sense that something was abrew. He was noticeably worried and displayed none of the relaxed ease with which he had received us previously.

We never obtained the final results from the senior divisional officer as they were not available by 15:00. We departed with the idea that approximately 10 percent had voted for the opposition and that further unrest would soon follow.

Maroua Region - Far-North Province

Prepared by Robert Nicolas

Initial Contacts Upon Arrival in Maroua

Upon arrival in Maroua, the team contacted the local authorities and was assured that all was ready for a smooth election:

- The polling-place presidents and their commissions had all been designated, allowing for representative party participation. However, few, if any, commissions had yet met.
- The divisional supervisory commission headed by the president of the *tribunal de grande instance* had been appointed the day before (October 8; he should have been appointed in time to supervise the entire electoral campaign);
- All of the ballots had been received in more than adequate amounts and were ready for distribution;
- The list of voters had not been published but was reported to have been updated and ready for distribution (Article 48 appears to require that changes in the list be published at least four days before voting);
- The list of polling places had been posted in front of the office of the divisional officer on Monday, October 5, 1992 (less than the eight days required by law).
- It must be noted that the local authorities and political parties expected the team and extended their complete cooperation.

Voter Registration Lists

No explanation was given for not publishing the list as required by law, other than it was customary not to publish it. In addition, the senior divisional officer and the divisional officer added that the lists, along with the ballots and their envelopes, the ballot boxes, the tally sheets, pens for the staff, and food for meals for the polling-place staff all would be ready for distribution/pick up on Saturday by the presidents of the polling-place commissions. Also at this time, the lists would be available for the first time to potential voters in their respective regions.

The divisional officer added that anyone who wanted to see the list at the his office could have done so since last April. He stated that a few changes had been made in the list to register the people

whom the law allowed a later (than April) registration. Failure to publish the list could have been considered an oversight under normal circumstances. However, in this instance, when the Diamaré region changed from 261 polling precincts to 361, this issue became more serious. This increase in the number of precincts constituted a complete reorganization of the voting infrastructure.

In order to ensure a more orderly voting process, the local authorities decided to limit all precincts to about 300 registered voters. In order to do so, all precincts over 300 voters were reorganized in two or more precincts. The result was that a large number of voters had voting cards with a precinct number that differed from the official records. At times, the new precinct was next door or nearby, but in many instances it was in a more distant region. The team tested this issue in one case where, using a car, it took 15 minutes to find one of the five precincts added to what was originally precinct #217.

The voters were not informed that these changes had been made. They would proceed to the precinct designated on their card and find that their name was not on the list and would be denied the right to vote. No other information would be given. Several of the parties were rapidly informing their pollwatchers that voters should be told to check several other polling places in the immediate neighborhood to attempt to find their name. In addition, no list of the new numbers of the divided or newly-formed precincts was made available. For example:

1) Precinct #217 was now #217 (now numbered #120), #218 and #216 and possibly two others. The team found three of them, in the same neighborhood, about 1 km apart. However, the staff of one precinct could not provide the information about the precinct split or the new numbers, thereby making it difficult for a voter to find his or her designated polling place. There may have been others.
2) Precinct #212 was split into #280 and #281. These were right next to each other, in different classrooms, in the school where #212 had been located during the legislative elections. We could not find the "new" #212, which was still listed on the list of precincts in addition to #281. We could not clarify whether there had been an old #281, which voters had been registered in it, or where they had voted.

There was one additional point of confusion observed in all of the polling places visited by the team. All of the lists were in numerical order (the individual number given to each card for that precinct). They were not in alphabetical order. Many voters arrived with what appeared to be valid cards. When their number was verified, another name would be on the list pertaining to that number. In many instances the voters were sent away, unable to vote. In others, where the president of the precinct was more patient, he would actually look up the name, and if it were found on the list the voter would be allowed to vote; the discrepancy would be noted on the list and on his card. In other instances, the voter would be told to wait until the crowd had diminished and a search would be made for his/her name if that voter had been aggressive enough to demand such a search.

Copies of Registered Voter Lists

It must be noted that in all of the precincts visited in Maroua, only one copy of the list existed, which slowed the process considerably, since all of the polling places were experiencing massive problems with the list. By contrast, all of the polling places visited outside of Maroua had two copies of their lists.

Both the NUDP and SDF complained of "parallel" voter lists, one which had been modified by private secretaries in the homes of government officials to allow the "reported thousands" of newly minted registered card holders to vote at secretly designated precincts. The official version of the list, however, was kept at the office of the divisional officer. The team was provided with a copy of a doctored list for precinct #217. However, the possibility of proving this allegation was not possible within the time spent in Maroua.

Fraudulent Cards

NUDP and SDF accused the ruling party of colluding with the local government authorities to provide false cards in the province. They gave estimates ranging from 1,000 to 200,000. The CPDM local campaign manager made similar allegations and accused NUDP and SDF of providing such cards. However, he did not offer any numbers. It was not possible for the team to verify these allegations.

Both the NUDP and SDF local campaign managers proffered that they had sent large numbers of their members to pose as CPDM members, and they were promptly given voter registration cards.

They also reported that many young men in Maroua came to NUDP and SDF to sell voter registration cards that had been issued to them, with various sums of money, by CPDM officials in the days preceding the vote. The NUDP and SDF showed the team large stacks of such cards which they alleged to have purchased locally. Many of the cards shown to the team were for precinct #217. These same people claimed to have many others.

One of the fraudulent cards provided to the team was numbered 930/530 for polling place #217, Djoudoudou V, issued to Wardam Weweme, domiciled in Djoudoudou, born in 1960 in Roua, issued on 15/4/92 and signed by Mr. Mvondo. When the team visited polling place #217 (its new number was now #120), the name on the voter registration list by the number 930/530 was Mama Sali, born in 1965; her profession was listed as housekeeper.

Other types of card-related irregularities included cards bearing the signature of the current divisional officer, Mvondo Jean-Gérard, signed in April. He arrived in Maroua three weeks before the vote.

In addition, cards that were signed by the current divisional officer and reportedly were provided validly to civil servants who had recently moved to the area bore the title of housewife, doctor, mechanic. These titles do not appear to be those of public servants. The numbers of this category of cards was reported to be between 300 and 6,000. These numbers could not be verified.

It must also be noted that voter registration cards in the Maroua area were signed by at least six different officials. The explanation given to the team for this variance was that at various times, in the absence of the divisional officer, several local officials were given authority to sign these cards.

By mid-day, in many of the polling places, the confusion over the cards was so great that decisions were being made haphazardly by polling-place commissions or their presidents. In some instances they were allowing voters who had cards and were not on the lists to vote, but the officials kept their cards and/or kept a separate list of such voters; in other precincts any discrepancy resulted in the voter being denied the right to vote. Some precincts claimed to have the divisional officer's authority to change the regulations.

The result of this situation was that many voters intending to vote were not able to do so or simply gave up and went home. This is clearly and admittedly speculative. However, in some of the

precincts where there were a lot of problems with the lists, the voter participation was lower than in other precincts that appeared to have had a smoother operation.

The Scene at the Subdivisional Office

The day designated for pick up of polling-place supplies and equipment (Saturday, October 11) was marked by general chaos at the office of the divisional officer. This situation was to have been expected because the divisional officer did not begin to organize the division of the supplies and equipment to the 361 precincts until the morning of the 10th, about two hours before the precinct presidents were due to pick them up. The major concern here was that it allowed for very loose control over the ballots. This scene was repeated the next day, on the 11th, because there were still about 12 precincts that had not received their complete set of ballots.

The team was able to observe people who identified themselves verbally as presidents of precincts or party representatives of a precinct commission, helping themselves to stacks of ballots. One man was observed with three 1000-ballot stacks of NUDP ballots and claimed he was saving them for several precincts that had not received adequate numbers of NUDP ballots. Several presidents were complaining that other ballots were still missing, such as SDF or CDU.

Despite the warnings by the representatives of the NUDP and SDF about the "problems" they expected from the voter registration lists, none could actually be observed until the voting started (see description above).

Visit to Kaélé on October 10

The team visited the town of Kaélé for a few hours on October 10. In addition to meeting with the divisional officer briefly, the team met with representatives of NUDP, CPDM, SDF and MDR. They all complained about the issuance of fraudulent voter registration cards. NUDP and SDF complained of various pressures used by the CPDM and local authorities to force local traditional chiefs to ensure that their people would vote for Biya.

NUDP claimed to have documented evidence of non-existent polling places and fraudulent voter registration lists. They stated that in the Tchabeyel and Bibemire (Kaélé II bis) polling places, large numbers of fraudulent cards had been distributed with corresponding

names on the lists of these two precincts. They claimed to have made a formal written complaint to the divisional officer and the president of the local tribunal. These same NUDP representatives also claimed to have documented evidence of false polling places in the subdivision of Gilidis where the official list indicated 75 polling places while the NUDP representatives in the area claimed to have found only 65. Again, NUDP claimed to have made a formal complaint to the proper authorities.

The local CPDM representatives accused the NUDP of importing Chadians to increase the size of the crowds at its political rallies. During the team's visit in Kaélé, the CPDM held a public meeting in front of the office of the senior divisional officer followed by a procession through the town. Most of the local officials attended this political gathering, using their official vehicles.

The SDF representative also complained of fictitious polling places, particularly in the region of Gilidis (or Kidigis) in the Bizil Canton. He also complained of the issuance of fraudulent cards, with a gift of 1,000 CFA, which were provided to anyone claiming to be a member of CPDM. One such card shown to the team was numbered 331 for the polling place of Tchebeyel, Ecole Principal #71. It was dated April 8, 1992 and had been provided to an SDF party member posing as an CPDM militant in early October.

October 10 Disturbance at the Maroua Subdivisional Office

The team was advised by SDF and NUDP officials at about 22:00 that there was a disturbance in front of the subdivisional office. Upon visiting the area, at a safe distance, the team found that a hostile crowd of about 100, mostly young men, were waving sticks and clubs in the air. Upon speaking to some of the calmer members of the crowd, the team was able to find out that the cause of the incident was the lack of adequate numbers of ballots for NUDP in at least 65 of the Maroua precincts. This information was confirmed by someone who presented himself as a NUDP precinct supervisor and shortly thereafter by the governor in a meeting called at the request of the team. Local representatives/campaign directors of SDF and NUDP also confirmed the information.

It must be noted that NUDP said that only NUDP ballots were missing and the governor said that it was both NUDP and CPDM. The governor's explanation for the problem was failure of the clerks

in the subdivisional office to adequately to count the ballots divided among all of the precincts, as they were instructed to do. Assuming that this explanation is true, one wonders why only the ballots of one or two of the parties were insufficient when the local authorities, by their own admission, said that they had received adequate numbers of ballots for all of the parties.

Nevertheless, the situation was rectified when the governor requested and obtained supplemental ballots from the surrounding towns that evening for about one half of the missing precincts and promised that a military flight would bring additional ballots by 06:30 the next day (day of voting). He also added that the same military flight had attempted to leave Yaoundé on the 10th to bring the additional ballots, but due to bad weather over Ngaoundéré they had been obliged to turn back.

This incident did nothing to alleviate the already tense atmosphere. In addition, the divisional officer reported that the next day a large number of polling-place presidents found an excuse to turn down their appointments; replacements had to be found very quickly. This further added to the general atmosphere of disorganization and confusion.

Allegation of Chadian Voters

One of the NUDP regional precinct supervisors (he presented himself as such) was riding in his car with a young man who was being restrained by two NUDP militants. In answer to the team's question, the NUDP supervisor informed the team that they had captured one of the many Chadian voters brought by the CPDM. Upon questioning the young man, he gave his name as David Georges. He carried no identification except for a voter registration card which had only the name of Boubacar. The young man claimed to be from Mora. He would answer no other questions. When I asked the NUDP supervisor how he knew that this young man was Chadian, he responded that he knew what a Chadian looked like. He did not appear to have been harmed physically, but he was not being allowed to escape. He was not tied, but when they let him out of the car to speak to me the two NUDP militants held him by the arm. The young man appeared less than 20 years old.

Precinct Observation Visits by the Team

The team visited the following polling places on election day:

MAROUA

#281. This precinct had been #212 for the legislative elections. The team randomly selected several of the voters waiting in line and interviewed them. None of them were aware that the precincts had been reorganized and all of the cards spot-checked by the team indicated precinct #212.

At this precinct, the team was able to witness two voters who presented voter cards signed by the current divisional officer but dated in February and April. Both of these voters' names appeared on the list. Their names were:

1) Mr. Abdouraman, card #614, dated February 23, 1992. This voter, when interviewed by one of the observers, claimed that he had obtained this card from his chief two days before the legislative elections. He said that he had voted in the legislative elections, as stamped on his card. He claimed to be with the NUDP;
2) Mr. Asia Wortournou, card #622. The team did not have an opportunity to interview this voter.

This precinct was generally disorganized, and its president rearranged the room twice in the presence of the team in an attempt to respond to a protest by CPDM representatives and to improve the flow of voters through the room.

This precinct, like all of the others visited, had three policemen sleeping at a distance of about 30 meters from the polling place. Their weapons, if they had any, were not visible.

#280. This precinct was the expansion of #212. It was not ready to open until 09:40 because officials had not been able to receive all of their ballots until that time. The president of this precinct's commission was much more experienced and immediately seated the staff and observers for optimum traffic flow. He even devised a smoother system to handle the many problems with the list that quickly began to crop up soon after he opened the voting process.

#241. At about 10:30 this precinct had not opened because officials could not find the ballot box containing their supplies and equipment. The president was at the subdivisional office trying to locate it. About 70 people were patiently waiting to vote. Like many

of the other ballot boxes, the one for this precinct had the #160 written in red stencil, still visible under the new #241. 241 was the new number for the precinct. Whenever we asked the precinct staff what these changes represented, they either knew nothing about them or responded that the numbers had changed and were unable to provide any further explanation on this issue.

The team returned to this precinct at about 11:59 and found that about 50 people had voted. In answer to our questions, the precinct staff responded that about 15 voters had come to vote with voting card numbers that appeared on the voter registration list but whose names did not appear on the list. They were not allowed to vote. The voter registration list showed that there were 396 registered voters on the list.

#240. The president of this precinct was by himself. The place was well organized and ready for voters (08:45). However, there was no one there. The president did not know why there were no voters. He added that he had been president during the previous election at the same school. The team later ran into this president at another precinct location (School Cetic I). He explained that his precinct location had been changed, and that he had not been informed. He had not met the other members of his commission prior to that morning. He claimed not to be a member of any political party. He was a teacher. He had a new voter registration list that contained 414 voters as opposed to the list he showed the team at 08:45 that had only 214 registered voters. This new list had discrepancies for at least 50 percent of the voters who presented their cards.

#340, Enia II. This precinct was formerly #240. The former precinct was now divided into four polling places, all in different classrooms of the same school. These four precincts had major problems with confusion of names and numbers on the lists of voters. The team spoke to two voters who had gone to all four classrooms and still could not find their names on any lists. In this precinct, the president asked all of the people who had cards but whose numbers did not correspond to the names on the list to come back later, when it would be less crowded. In addition, the SDF and NUDP claimed that with this "surprise" multiplication of precincts, they had to scramble to find additional observers to cover all of these polling

places; in some areas they had not been able to do so until late in the day.

The white trash bag (used for discarded ballots) that had been observed in the voting booth of the other precincts earlier was not available. The president explained that a lot of people were "confusing the trash bag for the ballot box," so he decided with the rest of the commission to dispose of it and let the voters take away the unused ballots.

#242, Enia I. This precinct was formerly #192. By 11:30 about 100 people had voted. According to the president of the commission, more than 90 percent of those who had voted had some discrepancy between the names and the numbers on their cards. The president took the time to find the names on the lists for those whose cards' numbers did not correspond to the name on the list.

#243, Enia III. This precinct was formerly #41. They were having a lot of problems with their list. Many of the voters had various precinct numbers written on their cards, but their names were not on the list.

DOGBA (Small village outside of Maroua on the road to Meri)

#45, Quartier Moundou. This precinct was formerly #33. According to the president of the precinct, a neighboring village now had precinct #33. Here only NUDP, SDF and CPDM had representatives present. No explanation was provided for the lack of representation of the other parties. There were two copies of the voter registration list, which contained 364 registered voters. At the bottom of the list, 40 names had been written by hand to allow voting by people who had what the precinct president considered valid voter registration cards but whose names did not appear on the list. There were no indications of the party affiliation of these 40 voters.

#46. The second precinct for the village of Dogba also had two copies of the voter registration list (344 registered voters). At 14:30, when the team visited this village, more than 75 percent of the voters had already cast their ballots. Here, also, only CPDM, NUDP and SDF had representatives. However, unlike precinct #45 in the same village, any voter whose name did not appear on the list was not allowed to vote.

TIERE (Small village, on the road to Meri)

#59, Tiere 3. The number was formerly #44. This precinct had 405 registered voters, and by early afternoon more than 75 percent of the voters had already cast their ballots. Again, only NUDP, CPDM and SDF had representatives. According to the precinct president only one voter with a voter registration card had not been allowed to vote because his name did not appear on the list.

MERI (Large Town)

#1. This precinct number and location had also changed, and its president learned of the change early on voting day. It was previously #2. Here, too, no explanation was provided for the change in number and building location. There were 398 registered voters, and more than 80 percent had voted by 15:30. According to the president, only about 10 voters had been turned away because their names were not on the registration list. CPDM, NUDP, CDU and SDF were represented in this precinct.

#2. 431 registered voters appeared on the list at this precinct, and the same four parties had representatives at the table. However, this list had 11 names handwritten at the end. According to the president, these names were on the list when it was provided by the subdivisional office. According to the president, fewer than 10 people were not allowed to vote due to discrepancies; either their name was not on the list or the number on their card differed from the number on the list.

The team met briefly with the divisional officer who provided the following information. For the legislative elections, there were 53 precincts in the subdivision; and for the current election, the number had increased to 69, each to contain no more than 600 voters. For the legislative elections, there were 22,959 registered voters; 17,200 had voted and 15,000 were considered valid. He did not explain why 2,200 were not considered valid. There are now 25,000 registered voters. He allowed voters to register until June 1992. He felt that he had to be more flexible due to the difficulties in communicating with the many isolated villages in the region.

MORA (Large Town)

In a brief discussion with the divisional officer, he informed the team of the following: 41,229 voters were registered for the

legislative elections in 119 precincts; 44,860 voters were registered for the presidential election in 135 precincts.

He estimated that close to 50 percent of the voters had problems at their respective precincts due to discrepancies in the voter registration lists and differences between the information on the voter registration cards and the lists provided to the precincts. He added that most of the voters who experienced such problems were not allowed to vote.

#2. This precinct had 484 voters and at 09:00 more than 80 percent had voted. According to the president, about 20 people had been turned away because their names were not on the list at this precinct.

#3. At this precinct at 17:40, about 60 percent of the registered voters had voted. The president said that at least 40 people had been refused the right to vote because their names were not on the voter registration list.

#5. This precinct experienced no particular problems. The president estimated that fewer than five people were turned away because their names did not appear on the list. There were 281 registered voters on their list, and more than 80 percent had voted at 17:55.

#4. This precinct started the day with the wrong voter registration list, but the problem was corrected before 09:00. By 17:45, 250 of their 326 registered voters had voted. The president estimated that no more than 10 people were not allowed to vote because their names did not appear on the list.

Vote Counting

The team observed vote counting in the following Maroua precincts:

#218, Wardum Weweme. The vote count was witnessed by a large number of local residents and appeared to have proceeded normally. When the team arrived, the count was almost finished, and the various party representatives were completing their copies of the official minutes (*process verbal*). The results were as follows: 351 registered voters; only 219 actually voted; nine annulled; nine voted for CPDM; 190 for NUDP; one vote for MP; six votes for SDF; CDU received four; and zero for RFP.

#217. The new number for this precinct was #120. The vote count was witnessed by an orderly crowd of local residents. The team arrived when the minutes were being completed by the various members of the precinct commission. The results were as follows: 366 registered voters; 187 votes for NUDP; 11 for CPDM; one for CDU; zero for RFP; and zero for MP.

#340, Enia II. The vote count was witnessed by an orderly crowd of local residents. The team arrived when the minutes were being completed by the various members of the precinct commission. The president of this polling-place commission had kept nine voter registration cards. They belonged to the voters whose names did not appear on the list but who were allowed to vote and had valid cards. None of these cards had been signed by the current divisional officer. This problem had been noted in the minutes, and he was submitting the cards with the minutes. The results were as follows: 428 registered voters; 225 actually voted; 183 votes for NUDP; 24 for CPDM; seven for SDF; 10 for CDU; and one for RFP.

#242, Enia I. The team arrived when the vote count and the minutes had been completed. The president of this polling-place commission noted that a large number of voters were turned away because their names did not appear on his list. The results were as follows: 423 registered voters; 204 actually voted; NUDP received 189 votes; CPDM five; SDF five; CDU two; MP two; and RFP one.

Garoua Region - North Province

Prepared by Hubert Oulaye (Translated from French by the editors)

The NDI observation mission in this region was conducted by Hubert Oulaye, who was charged with observing several polling places in the city of Garoua. Following observations in Garoua itself, polling places would be visited in surrounding areas, in the neighboring division of Mayo-Rey, the town of Poli, and in Faro Division.

The day before election day, I met with the senior divisional officer of Bénoué Division and presented him with letters of accreditation for conducting the observation mission. The senior divisional officer, after taking note of the accreditation letters, assured me that he would take the necessary measures to inform local administrators of my presence in areas I would be visiting.

The senior divisional officer, in responding to my questions, also informed me that he had just signed the decree designating members of the divisional commission. He indicated that he had been informed of two incidents that had taken place a few days earlier: 1) police had searched the home of a NUDP official in Garoua and; 2) a young supporter of the CPDM in Gonna village had died following a confrontation with NUDP supporters. Finally, the senior divisional officer was unable to provide me with a list of polling places and referred me to divisional officers for this information.

Also on the day before elections, I met with local officials of political parties, notably the SDF and CPDM. A NUDP official was unable to be present at the meeting. The SDF official stressed that the voter list had not been published while the divisional officer had illicitly distributed voter cards to CPDM supporters. This SDF official offered to show photocopies of voter cards that had been given to certain SDF supporters who had made themselves appear as CPDM supporters. NUDP officials confirmed, by telephone, the same voter card fraud.

CPDM officials, for their part, noted the death of one of their supporters in Gonna village. They also indicated that CPDM supporters had been intimidated by NUDP supporters.

Garoua, Sunday, October 11, 1992

At 7:45 a.m. I visited the divisional officer in Garoua. He informed me that everything was in order. Ballot boxes and election materials (ballots, ink pads, rubber stamps, nine copies of the tally sheets, sacks for discarded ballots, etc.) had been delivered the day before to presidents of polling places located outside of Garoua.

Nevertheless, even as the meeting with the divisional officer was taking place, the first incidents were reported by polling-place party representatives; there were not enough opposition candidate ballots in several polling places in Garoua. Words were exchanged between several party representatives and the divisional officer.

I left the divisional officer around 8:15 a.m. to begin visiting polling places. During election day, I visited 26 polling places, including the following:

- City of Garoua — 10 polling places
- Countryside around Garoua — 11 polling places
- City of Tcholliré (Mayo-Rey Division) — 02 polling places

- Countryside around Rey Bouba 02 polling places
- Countryside around Poli 01 polling place

It should be noted that in order to reach Tcholliré, the home territory of the traditional chief (*lamido*) of Rey Bouba, we had to cover nearly 180 km. It is for this reason that I was unable to observe a larger number of polling places. However, the decision to visit Rey Bouba was motivated by the fact that this region is, in reality, controlled by a powerful traditional chief who is a CPDM supporter and who had refused to allow campaign meetings of the NUDP. It was decided that irregularities would more than likely be discovered in this region. On this point we were correct.

It also should be noted that I was unable to reach the town of Poli because of the extremely poor condition of the road and the lateness of the day.

City of Garoua

- There were not enough ballots in most polling places. Example: Lainde A Polling Place, around 8:30 a.m., 631 registered to vote. Ballots were present in the following quantities: RFP, 82; MP, 100; CDU, 155; NUDP, 232; CPDM, 347; SDF, 477
- Voters could not find their polling places;
- Voters sometimes found under their registration number another name or found their names listed under another number; and
- Some voters were refused their right to vote due to an erroneous interpretation by divisional officers and polling-place presidents of the decree from the Ministry of Territorial Administration. In this case, a voter registered to vote and carrying a national identity card could not vote because he did not possess a voter registration card. This was in violation of Article 10 of Decree (revised) No. 0391 of September 22, 1992.

Countryside around Garoua

Bukle Polling Place: 443 registered voters

- There were no ballots for the CDU candidate;
- Ballots were still present for candidates who had previously withdrawn from the race, i.e., Samuel Eboua and Antar Gassagay; and

- More seriously, 138 voters whose voter cards carried the numbers 202 to 340 could not find their names on the voter list. Curiously, the list included numbers 341-443. Obviously, these names had been voluntarily omitted; several of the affected voters testified that they had voted in this polling place during the legislative elections.

Sangrepool Polling Place: 292 registered voters

- Ballots were missing; and
- Ballots were still present for withdrawn candidates Samuel Eboua and Antar Gassagay.

Sangerigode Polling Place: 332 registered voters

- Insufficient number of ballots;
- Insufficient supply of tally sheets; and
- Registered voters had not received their voter cards.

N'gaounbara Polling Place: 672 registered voters

- Some voters had received new voter cards but could not find their names on the voter list; and
- Registered voters who had not received voter cards were not allowed to vote.

N'gong "C" Polling Place: 509 registered voters

- No representatives were present from the SDF, RFP and MP; and
- There were not enough tally sheets.

N'gong "A" Polling Place: 513 registered voters

- No organizational problems observed.

N'gong "B" Polling Place: 550 registered voters

- No representatives were present from the RFP and MP; and
- The polling-place president stated that the divisional officer had asked all polling-place presidents not to give tally sheets to party representatives except in cases where party representatives insisted on having them.

N'gong "D" Polling Place: 395 registered voters

- Two voter lists were furnished to the polling-place president, who did not know which one to use.

Quona "B" Polling Place: 356 registered voters

- No representatives were present from the CDU, RFP and MP; and
- 30 voters were in possession of voter cards, but could not find their names on the voter list; affected voters had voted in this polling place during the legislative elections.

Gonna "A" Polling Place: 308 registered voters

- The only parties represented were the SDF, NUDP and CPDM.

Tcholliré 1 Polling Place: 499 registered voters

- The only parties represented were the NUDP and CPDM;
- There were not enough tally sheets; and
- The polling place was located in the local CPDM headquarters.

Tcholliré 3 Polling Place: 494 registered voters

- Some voters had voter cards but could not find their names on the voter list; and
- An insufficient supply of ballots was present. The senior divisional officer, in noting the size and distances involved in his division, had requested that in case of shortages missing ballots should be replaced by those already discarded in the voting booths.

Maradi Polling Place (Rey Bouba): 225 registered voters

- A CPDM campaign poster was posted on the front of the polling place;
- There were no political party representatives (certainly prevented from being present – this polling place was located in territory controlled by the traditional chief (*lamido*) of Rey Bouba.); and
- A strange fact – during the visit to this polling place, a vehicle arrived to drop off a ballot box. Questioned, the polling-place president, visibly angered, indicated that this ballot box had come from a neighboring polling place, Larki, where voting had already ended. It was 4:30 p.m. When asked if the vote counting had already taken place at Larki, the president responded that the divisional officer had demanded that all vote counting take place in Rey Bouba.

Panon Pape Polling Place

- I arrived at this polling place as vote counting was taking place at 5:15 p.m. Nothing to report.

Pinchouba Polling Place

- I also arrived here as vote counting was taking place. Nothing to report.

Just as I was ready to return to Garoua, two persons arrived to report that the senior divisional officer at Poli had prohibited NUDP party representatives from being present in polling places. He had, in turn, accepted CPDM party representatives. I could not go to Poli to confirm this report as it was already 6 p.m. and the road was bad.

Douala Region - Littoral Province

Prepared by Mariana Drenska and Moustapha Osseni (Translated from French by the editors)

We conducted an election observer training seminar in Yaoundé from October 2 to 4, 1992. In this seminar, where there were nearly 200 participants from all political parties (at least from those having a presidential candidate) and several nonpartisan civic organizations, we had promised to assist seminar participants in continuing the training in areas outside of Yaoundé. Therefore, it was with this in mind that we arrived in Douala on Tuesday, October 6, 1992 and stayed until Monday, October 12, 1992.

We also took advantage of our time in Douala to observe the conduct of the October 11 presidential election. In this mission we were joined by Saidou Agbantou on October 8.

On our arrival in Douala, we went to the American Consulate to arrange for transportation on election day. We would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank the American Consul, Michelle Sisson, Vice-Consul Christopher Lamora, the Secretary of the Consulate, and the consulate drivers, who impressed us with their generosity and warmth. We will, ladies and gentlemen of the consulate, always remember your kindness.

In the course of our stay in Douala we met with the governor of Littoral Province; the senior divisional officer of Wouri Division; representatives of the CPDM, SDF, NUDP and MP; representatives

of the National League of Human Rights (LINAH); and the four divisional officers for Douala.

While the provincial governor, Kounga Edima, and the senior divisional officer, Richard Mota, had given us a general idea of election organization, we set out to find problems that were of concern to political parties, and we tried to find solutions based on the various legal codes relating to the conduct of the elections.

Only LINAH accepted our invitation to train several of its members. This training session took place in the study of Mr. Mbok, national president of LINAH, on Saturday, October 10, 1992 from 11 a.m. until 2 p.m.

The different points of concern raised by the political parties are summarized below.

1. Polling-Place Lists
   a. They had not been published, as required by law, at least eight days before the election.
   b. Certain problems were associated with polling-place lists:
      i. There were more lists present for the presidential election than for the legislative elections.
      ii. Polling places were not numbered sequentially.
      iii. The same number was given to more than one polling place.
      iv. Polling-place locations were indicated geographically, but addresses were not provided.
2. Contradictions existed between Article 92 of the Electoral Code and Article 31 of the Ministry of Territorial Administration Decree No. 0391 of September 22, 1992.
   a. Except for Mme. Foning from the CPDM, who could not believe that Paul Biya could make such a decision with the agreement of his legal advisers, the other political parties agreed that, from a legal point of view, the Electoral Code supersedes the Ministerial Decree.

      (N.B. A new ministerial decree, No. 0466 of October 6, 1992, re-established order at the level of Article 31. Also, Article 92 of the Electoral Code was kept. We brought this information to the attention of the political parties.)

3. Contradiction existed between Article 92 of the Electoral Code and Article 35 of the Ministry of Territorial Administration Decree No. 0391 of September 22, 1992. See above.
4. Article 87 of the Electoral Code stipulated that "in case of public disorder" ballot boxes are to be transferred to the divisional level for counting:
   a. Political parties worried about the vagueness given to the term "public disorder," fearing that this could be a source of fraud.
5. Creation of new administrative divisions five days before the election:
   a. The plan had been in existence for several years, according to the CPDM, and would have no impact on the elections.
   b. The governor called it a policy decision.
   c. Other political parties called the move confusing as the measure was accompanied by new appointments of officials, even in existing administrative divisions.
6. Article 36 of Decree No. 0391, which stipulates that ballots already counted are to be burned:
   a. For the ruling party, this was not a problem.
   b. For opposition parties this was a source of possible fraud. They argued that if tally sheets are altered after the counting has been completed, there would be no way to undertake a count of verification.
7. Failure to re-open voter registration and keep voter lists secret:
   a. According to the administrative authorities and representatives of the CPDM, this was a fair decision.
   b. According to the opposition, this decision was unfair. They argued that because the presidential election had been announced, it was necessary to re-open voter registration.
   c. Also, party representatives should be registered on the voter list of the polling place where they would be representing their parties. Since the voter list was unknown, it was impossible to make a list of party representatives.
   d. Opposition representatives also alleged that voter lists had been re-opened for CPDM supporters and cited an October 7, 1992 article in the journal *La Detente*.

8. Who should sign accreditation for party observers?
   a. For CPDM representatives, it would be the party, a position also held by the governor.
   b. Several opposition representatives held that the divisional officer should sign accreditation, while others felt the parties were responsible for this action.

Election-Day Observations

1. Some polling places listed on the polling-place list could not be found.
2. Voter cards were used that did not indicate a polling place.
3. Voters who had voted in the legislative elections, when attempting to vote during the presidential election, found other names in place of their own.
4. Divisional supervisory commission only began its work at 12 p.m. on Monday, October 12, 1992.
5. Estimated 65 percent voter turnout observed by 4 p.m.
6. Polling places were generally open around one hour after the scheduled opening.
7. We confirmed that, in several rare cases, there was a lack of ballots for certain opposition candidates.
8. Forces of order were not present.

Appendix IV

Preliminary Post-Election Statement

International Observer Delegation
Cameroon Presidential Election

Yaoundé, Cameroon
October 14, 1992

We are pleased to offer a statement on behalf of the international observer delegation sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which has observed elections throughout the world since 1985. This delegation, consisting of 13 members from nine countries, witnessed Cameroon's first multiparty presidential election on October 11. It was organized in cooperation with the Study Group for Research on Democracy and Economic Development in Africa (GERDDES-Afrique), a nonpartisan regional democratic development organization.

In September 1991, at the invitation of the Cameroonian government, NDI organized a delegation of international election experts that independently and impartially assessed the country's democratic transition. The delegation's report was widely disseminated in Cameroon and addressed issues relevant to the subsequent legislative and presidential elections.

Prior to the presidential elections, NDI and GERDDES conducted an election monitoring training seminar in Yaoundé on October 2-4 for approximately 175 participants from both the ruling and opposition political parties as well as civic organizations. The Yaoundé seminar was designed to train participants in election monitoring techniques. During the week prior to the election, the trainers conducted additional seminars throughout Cameroon. Seminar participants also shared information gained at the seminar within their organizations and publicly prior to the October 11 vote.

By election day, observers were present in nine of Cameroon's 10 provinces. In five provinces, delegation observers had been present for approximately one week. In these areas, meetings were held before the election with local and regional officials and members

of political parties and civic organizations to assess preparations for the election.

Cameroonians are to be congratulated for embarking upon the transition to multiparty democracy, of which the October 11 presidential election represents a significant event. Since the legalization of political parties in December 1990, the country has grappled with a series of complex issues associated with the democratic transition.

At this date, three days after the election, our views about the election can only be preliminary, as the vote tabulation process is still underway. A full report will be sent to the government, political party leaders and the media within six weeks. NDI hopes to receive additional information on the post-election day process as it prepares its report. With that understanding, the delegation offers the following initial assessments.

There were many positive aspects about the October 11 presidential election, the first multiparty presidential election in the nation's history. One president of a polling place put it best. He told us on the day of the vote that these were the first presidential elections to have real meaning in the 20 years he had presided over his polling place.

Voting was generally peaceful and orderly. Furthermore, before the election the authorities took the important step of authorizing signed copies of polling-place reports for each political party polling-place representative, a vital means of increasing confidence in the results. The secrecy of the ballot, a fundamental element of a legitimate electoral exercise, appears to have been respected throughout the country.

There were, however, a number of serious problems regarding the conduct of the election process. Given the ongoing vote counting process, we are unable to assess the extent to which these problems may affect the final results. We hope that a detailed breakdown of the complete results, based upon certified polling-place reports, will be made public and widely disseminated by the proper authorities as quickly as possible, in order to help ensure public confidence in the process.

Several pre-election day issues must be noted. A significant number of voters were not registered, due to the electoral code that stipulates that in most cases voters cannot register for elections in a

calendar year after April 30. We recognize that the authorities were within their legal right not to have re-opened the electoral registers. In the spirit of democracy, however, which encourages the greatest amount of popular participation in the political process, the delegation regrets that voter registers were not re-opened to accommodate the fact that an early presidential election was called. Further, the lack of readily available public access to voter registers led to considerable confusion at a large number of polling stations.

The imbalance of media coverage of the candidates was clearly evident For example, the delegation notes that apart from the *Expression Directe* political party campaign broadcasts, television air time heavily favored the ruling party. As an illustration, on October 7 coverage during the evening news and political news segments totalled approximately 142 minutes for the ruling party candidate and 12 minutes for all opposition candidates.

Less than a week before the election, the government implemented "administrative reform" measures. Although the stated purpose was to further decentralize government functions, the immediate effect was to create confusion in voters' minds about electoral operations and polling-place sites.

On election day, the delegation witnessed a number of serious problems. It should be emphasized that the delegation cannot at this point evaluate the extent to which these problems may affect the final vote count. The problems include: a lack of posted information about polling-place sites eight days prior to the vote, as required by Section 78 of the electoral code; loose controls over voter registration cards; an insufficient supply of ballots at some local polling stations; and the absence on registration lists of the names of individuals holding voter cards. There was also substantial evidence of the existence of voting cards of doubtful validity. In addition, election procedures lacked uniformity, with individual polling-place presidents making decisions about what documentation was necessary for individuals to vote. Some of these problems undoubtedly resulted from the actions of overzealous officials at the local level, administrative confusion, lack of experience, and inadequate knowledge of electoral procedures.

It is always a privilege to be a guest in another country. We were impressed by the thousands of people who demonstrated their commitment and dedication to democratic principles. While we deeply regret that several members of the delegation were denied

visas into the country, we are sincerely grateful for the open and generous manner in which we were received by the Cameroonian people. We also wish to thank the Cameroon government for having provided accreditation to permit observers to circulate freely in carrying out their duties for the election of October 11.

The delegation wishes to acknowledge its profound respect for the way in which the Cameroonian people fulfilled their civic duty on October 11. This land is blessed with tremendous human and physical resources. We are confident that Cameroon will continue to build a democracy, through which the country's considerable potential will be fully realized.

Appendix V

Statement of James E. Tierney Delegation Co-Leader Clarifying Post-Election Press Coverage

Yaoundé, Cameroon
October 15, 1992

The co-leader of the international observer team to last Sunday's presidential election, James E. Tierney of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), today stated that the front page headlines in both editions of the *Cameroon Tribune* of October 15 "seriously distorted" the real meaning of the "Preliminary Post Election Statement" issued October 14 by the entire observer team.

"The NDI statement repeatedly characterized last Sunday's election as having a 'number of serious problems,'" said Tierney, a former Attorney General of the State of Maine (U.S.). "It is important for the people of Cameroon to know that NDI is continuing to gather data on the ongoing process as we prepare for our final more detailed report."

"The headlines in both editions of the *Cameroon Tribune* state that the NDI delegation was 'satisfied' with the conduct of the presidential election. That is not true. The article in the French language edition also implies that the NDI delegation formed opinions as to the accuracy of the voting results that have been released up to this time. That is also not true. NDI has yet to formulate any conclusions as to the vote counting procedures or the results and will not do so until the issuance of the final report."

"I ask the Cameroonian media to print the entire text of the NDI statement, a copy of which is attached, without editing so that the people of Cameroon will be able to read for themselves the preliminary results of our observation efforts."

Appendix VI

Interim Report
International Delegation to the Presidential Elections in Cameroon

October 28, 1992

This interim report, issued by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), evaluates the October 11 election in Cameroon, the country's first multiparty contest for president. The significance of the October 11 election cannot be overestimated. The polling was designed to further Cameroon's transition to a multiparty democracy. Moreover, under the Cameroon constitution, the president of the country exercises unusually strong powers.

This report is based on NDI's work in Cameroon since September 1991, when an NDI-sponsored international team of election experts undertook, at the request of the country's major political parties, an evaluation of the Cameroonian electoral law. NDI's effort in Cameroon also included an extensive training program for more than 175 political party pollwatchers and a 13-member international observer delegation for the October 11 election. The delegation included nationals of Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Hungary, Mexico, and the United States. NDI's training program and observer delegation in Cameroon were carried out in cooperation with GERDDES-Afrique, a regional nonpartisan democratic development organization.

On election day, the NDI observer delegation visited polling sites in nine of Cameroon's 10 provinces. On October 14, three days after the election, the delegation issued a preliminary statement, which highlighted problems in the electoral process. However, the delegation withheld a final assessment of the process, pending release of the final results and an evaluation of the election-related complaints filed by various political parties.

Due to the close nature of the contest, the slow counting of the ballots, and the serious allegations of fraud and manipulation presented by opposition parties, delegation co-leader and former Maine Attorney General James Tierney remained in Cameroon for 11

days after the election. On October 23, the Supreme Court announced the official results, in which incumbent President Paul Biya was declared the winner of the October 11 election. During the period between the release of the delegation's preliminary assessment and the announcement of the official results, Mr. Tierney met with representatives of the political parties and the election commission and other knowledgeable Cameroonians. Mr. Tierney also sought to investigate specific complaints presented by representatives of several political parties.

NDI notes several positive features of the election. In particular, these include a strong sense of civic duty on the part of the Cameroonian people on election day, and the dedication of the many election officials and political party representatives who, under difficult circumstances, sought to conduct an open and fair election.

Nevertheless, NDI concludes that widespread irregularities during the pre-election period, on election day and in the tabulation of results must seriously call into question, by any fair observer, the validity of the outcome. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that this election system was designed to fail.

While several parties were responsible for election irregularities, the overwhelming weight of responsibility for this failed process lies with the government and President Biya.

The evidence supporting this conclusion includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- The election was scheduled hastily by President Biya, before the adoption of an election law. Once enacted, the law provided for a 30-day period prior to the polling – a period that proved impossible given the date already set for the election.
- The election system provided civil administration officials responsible to President Biya – including the Minister of Territorial Administration, divisional officers and sub-divisional officers – with excessive discretion in matters of voter registration and ballot tabulation, which many officials abused to further the political interests of the incumbent president.

  Tabulation of votes was conducted under the authority of the Minister of Territorial Administration, whose partisan support for President Biya was unmistakable. In violation of the electoral law, the Ministry of Territorial Administration had

originally decided to prohibit political party representatives from obtaining tally sheets of election results at the polling sites. While this decision was ultimately reversed, the electoral law did not provide an opportunity for party representatives to monitor the transfer of tally sheets to the divisional supervisory election commissions.

NDI has received direct testimony to the effect that, prior to the election, high level government officials were told that their performance would be rated on the number of votes President Biya garnered in their respective areas. They were given a goal of 60 percent and told that this figure should be achieved by whatever means was necessary.

- The National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes, which was appointed only days before the election, failed to inspire public confidence in the integrity of the tabulation process. The commission did not represent a geographic, ethnic, regional or political balance.
- Voter registration was needlessly restricted, as the registration process was not reopened following the announcement of the election date. This decision, in effect, disenfranchised the many Cameroonians who had boycotted the March 11 legislative elections.
- Little control was exercised over the distribution of voter registration cards, thus creating an opportunity for multiple voting and underage voting. Handfuls of cards were repeatedly offered to the observers as proof of a lively market in voter card trafficking. In Maroua, a recently arrived subdivisional officer signed what, by some accounts, were 6,000 voter registration cards that were back-dated to appear to have been issued during the legally permitted registration period earlier in the year. Observers witnessed the distribution of these cards by opposition parties as well as supporters of President Biya.

  In addition, voter registries were not published before election day, precluding the possibility that parties or voters could review the lists to ensure their accuracy. The NDI delegation observed or received complaints regarding numerous examples of voters whose names had been on the electoral list but who were not allowed to vote. In a number of provinces, would-be voters showed observers voter cards that had been stamped at the time

of the March legislative elections to demonstrate that they had been permitted to vote at that time.

- The election campaign was marred by the extremely partisan use of the government-controlled television and radio in favor of the incumbent president. The observer delegation's preliminary statement made reference to this biased news coverage. The statement cited the television news broadcast on October 7 in which the government received 142 minutes of coverage, while only 12 minutes were allotted to the opposition.
- On election day, rules regarding voter eligibility were not uniformly applied. Throughout the country, the names of eligible voters were improperly crossed off the register.
- Polling sites were arbitrarily moved in some areas prior to election day in an apparent effort to sow confusion and reduce voter turnout in specific regions. Observers documented this problem in Yaoundé, Maroua, Douala, Garoua and Ebolowa.
- Political party pollwatchers were prevented from entering polling sites and, in one case, were barred from entering the entire territory of Rey Bouba in the district of Mayo-Rey, which was controlled by a traditional leader, who supported Biya. The observer delegation noted other highly partisan acts by polling site officials in Yaoundé and Maroua.
- "Ghost" precincts, i.e., precincts that did not exist on the official list distributed by the election commission prior to the election, reported overwhelming vote totals in favor of President Biya, contrasting dramatically with the results from other polling sites in the area. In Foumbot in the Noun Division in the West Province, for example, 10 polling places that did not exist on the official list of polling places were cited in a compilation of results forwarded by the subdivisional officer to the divisional supervisory commission. The results from these polling places provided overwhelming, and similar, vote totals in favor of President Biya, while the remainder of the area voted largely in favor of another candidate.
- Statistically anomalous results were reported from several polling sites – one particularly egregious example involved a polling site from the Mvila Division in the Ebolowa area, which reported 100 percent turnout of 5,856 voters and 100 percent support for

President Biya. Similar, although slightly less extreme, examples were recorded in neighboring polling places.

- Undue delays in the release of the official results provided the opportunity for wholesale manipulation, while the failure to publish polling-site-by-polling-site results precludes the possibility of a credible, independent review of the overall election results.

NDI has an obligation to evaluate the election process in Cameroon using the same objective standards that it has employed in observing more than 40 elections throughout the world. In the case of Cameroon, the seriousness of the irregularities has been underscored by the chief justice of the Supreme Court when he announced the official results, and by the minister of justice in an interview with a Cameroonian newspaper.

In conclusion, NDI urges all Cameroonian political parties to pursue a peaceful resolution to the problems confronting the country. The divisions that have emerged as a result of the presidential election should not be allowed to reverse the progress that has occurred in Cameroon during the past two years.

NDI recognizes that the people of Cameroon are the ultimate judges of their electoral process. This interim report is a reflection of a growing consensus in Cameroon. NDI hopes that the views expressed herein will contribute to a better understanding of what occurred during this electoral process both inside Cameroon and around the world.

NDI urges all sides to come together in peaceful dialogue and to reach agreement on a course of action that will resolve the current impasse. A violent reaction by any of the parties or the government will tend to influence negatively the views of the international community toward the perpetrators. It is time for reflection, dialogue and negotiation among all Cameroonians.

Appendix VII

Cameroon Government Critique of NDI Interim Report

At an October 30, 1992 press conference, Cameroon government spokesman and Minister of Communication Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, responded to the NDI interim report on Cameroon's October 11 presidential election. Below are the editor's summaries of Kontchou's point-by-point criticisms of the report.

1. Television Coverage Was Biased

NDI noted that government-controlled media gave disproportionate coverage to the ruling party during the campaign. The report cited the example of the television news broadcast on October 7, in which the government received 142 minutes of coverage, while only 12 minutes were allotted to the opposition. Kontchou challenged the figures offered by NDI, noting that each night during the campaign, one hour of television time was shared equally among the candidates for the *Expression Directe* program. For example, on the night of October 7, the six opposition candidates received more than the 12 minutes of television time described in the NDI report.

2. Election Was Hastily Scheduled

NDI highlighted the fact that the election was called before a new electoral code was passed, and that the presidential decree that set the election date contravened a provision of the code requiring that the announcement be made no less than 30 days before the balloting. Kontchou cited Article 7 of the Cameroon Constitution, which establishes that the presidential election is to be held "no less than twenty, nor more than fifty" days from the date the president's mandate expires. The section also provides that in the event of a "vacancy" in the presidency, the election is to be held "no less than twenty, nor more than forty days" from the date of the vacancy. Kontchou asserted that these provisions of the constitution supersede the 30-day requirement in the electoral code. Kontchou went on to suggest that because President Biya called early elections, the vacancy provisions of the constitution could apply.

3. Minat Controlled Election Process

The NDI report charged that officials of the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) had excessive discretion in matters of voter registration and ballot tabulation, which many officials abused to further the political interests of the incumbent president. In particular, NDI reported that it "received direct testimony" that government officials had been instructed to ensure that Biya garnered 60 percent of the vote "by whatever means necessary."

Kontchou responded to these charges by saying that opposition party representatives were present at all stages of the voting process, while "senior divisional officers or the Ministry of Territorial Administration (had) nothing to do in all of this." He challenged the claim that government officials had been instructed to deliver a 60 percent vote, noting that the official who resigned from the government after making the charge "has joined the SDF." Kontchou wondered aloud, "How can we take such partisan statements seriously?" He added that the charge must have been false, since the government won less than 60 percent of the vote nationwide.

4. National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes Was Not Representative

NDI reported that the National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes, which is responsible for tallying overall results, was appointed "only days before the election" and did not represent a "geographic, ethnic, national or political balance." The government spokesman explained, in response to this, that the commission members were named at the last minute so that they would face less partisan pressure to manipulate the results. Kontchou said that the commission represented ethnic balance, with participants drawn from all corners of the country. Candidates' representatives also sat on the commission, Kontchou added.

5. Closed Voter Rolls Disenfranchised Opposition Members

NDI noted that the decision to call an early election in October, without altering the annual January-April voter registration period, served to disenfranchise many eligible voters, especially SDF supporters who boycotted the March 1 legislative campaign and elections. Kontchou replied that the electoral code established the voter registration period as running from January through April of

each year. Registration outside this period is allowed only in certain limited circumstances. According to Kontchou, reopening registration to others in October would have been against the law.

6. Fake Voting Cards Were Widely Distributed

The interim report noted that numerous fake voter cards were in circulation on election day. The government contributed to this confusion by not publishing voter lists before election day, "precluding the possibility that parties or voters could review the lists to ensure their accuracy." Kontchou explained the procedures used to guard against multiple voting. As each voter cast his ballot, his voter registration card was stamped with the date and his thumbprint. Candidate representatives at each polling place had the opportunity to object if they thought anyone was voting twice.

7. Some Registered Voters' Names Were Dropped From Rolls

Many registered voters found their names had been "improperly crossed off the register," the October 28 report noted. Kontchou retorted that the Supreme Court had already ruled against a petition raised on these grounds by the opposition National Union for Democracy and Progress.

8. Polling Places Were Moved Arbitrarily

NDI reported that "polling sites were arbitrarily moved in some areas prior to election day in an apparent effort to sow confusion and reduce voter turnout in specific regions." The problem was documented by NDI observers in Yaoundé, Maroua, Douala, Garoua and Ebolowa. Kontchou replied that there was a logical explanation for moving each polling place. He cited the example of a polling place that had previously been in a traditional chief's house, but was moved to a new school. While he acknowledged that it might have taken some time for voters to find the new polling places, "in reality," he said, "this was not a problem."

Kontchou also took issue with the NDI assertion that the Cameroonian government had switched polling places to sow confusion and reduce turnout. Two of the cities cited by NDI (Yaoundé and Ebolowa) are areas of ruling party strength. Why, Kontchou asked, would the government want to sow confusion in its own strongholds?

9. Party Representatives Were Kept From Polling Places

The interim report issued by NDI stated that "Political party pollwatchers were prevented from entering polling sites and, in one case, were barred from entering the entire territory of Rey Bouba." The Cameroonian government responded to this allegation by flatly stating, "this is false." Kontchou maintained that "one cannot say (that) anywhere in the republic . . . representatives of political parties were chased away from polling stations."

10. Fictitious Polling Places Benefitted the Ruling Party

NDI stated in the interim report that "'ghost precincts' – i.e., precincts that did not exist on the official list distributed by the election commission prior to the election – reported overwhelming vote totals in favor of President Biya, contrasting dramatically with the results from other polling sites in the area." The report gives the example of 10 polling places in Noun Division of the West Province, "which did not exist on the official list of polling stations" but "provided overwhelming, and similar, vote totals in favor of President Biya."

Kontchou countered this claim by saying that NDI failed to provide the name of a single fictitious polling place that could be independently verified. He charged NDI with using a double standard: when Biya won in a district, it must have been fraud; when the opposition won, it was normal.

11. Ruling Party Strongholds Reported Abnormal Results

NDI wrote in the October 28 report that statistically anomalous results were reported from several polling sites – one example involved a polling site from Mvila Division in the Ebolowa area, which reported a 100 percent turnout of 5,856 voters and 100 percent turnout for President Biya. The government pointed out that in the North-West Province and other strongholds of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), similarly anomalous results were recorded. "The NDI does not take any pains to mention those polling places where the SDF had 100 percent scores," he said. Kontchou added, sarcastically, "Only those which favored President Biya are mentioned because they are abnormal and scandalous, whereas where the SDF won is admirable and historic!"

12. Undue Delays in Release of Election Results

NDI noted that "undue delays in the release of the official results provided the opportunity for wholesale manipulation, while the failure to publish polling-site-by-polling-site results precludes the possibility of a credible, independent review of the overall election results."

Kontchou replied that, according to the electoral code, the national vote counting commission has up to 10 days after voting day to complete its work, and the Supreme Court up to five days to announce the results. The vote counting commission finished the tally on day 10, and the Supreme Court declared the winner two days later. Thus, "the Court proclaimed the results a few days earlier than the time allowed it by law," Kontchou added.

Appendix VIII

Selections from the Cameroonian Electoral Code Relevant to the October 11, 1992 Presidential Election

Editor's Note: These selections are drawn from official documents. As such, all capitalization, punctuation, and numbering and labeling of the parts, chapters, sections and the like are offered here exactly as they appear in the electoral code.

Part I
General Provisions

Section 1:

(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected for a term of 5 (five) years by universal suffrage and by direct and secret ballot.

(2) He shall be eligible for re-election.

(3) He shall be elected by a single round majority ballot. Voting shall be for a single candidate and shall take place not later than 20 (twenty) days and not more than 50 (fifty) days before the expiry of the term of office of the incumbent President.

(4) The candidate who obtains the majority of the votes cast shall be declared elected.

Part II
Qualifications of Electors
Chapter 1. Right to Vote

Section 2:

Every person of Cameroonian nationality or any naturalized Cameroonian, of either sex, who has reached the age of 20 years and is not under any of the disqualifications laid down by this law, shall be entitled to be an elector.

Part III
Eligibility and Incompatibilities

Section 8:

(1) Candidates for the office of President of the Republic must be in full possession of their civic and political rights and must have attained the age 35 (thirty-five) years by the date of election.

(2) They shall be Cameroonian citizens by birth and show proof of having resided in Cameroon for an uninterrupted period of at least 12 (twelve) months and of having their names entered in the register of electors on the date of election.

Part IV
Electoral Commissions

Section 10:

Joint electoral commissions shall be set up and charged with preparing electoral activities, organizing and supervising electoral operations, polling operations and the final counting of votes.

Chapter II: Local Polling Commissions

Section 15:

(1) Every polling station shall have a local Polling Commission consisting of the following members:

Chairman: a representative of the Administration, appointed by the Senior Divisional Officer;

Members: a representative of each candidate.

Section 23:

(1) The Commission shall make a report on all polling operations. Such report shall be signed by the members of the Commission. If one or more members of the Commission can neither read nor write English or French mention shall be made thereof in the report and their fingerprints affixed thereto.

(2) A copy of each report and appended documents shall be immediately forwarded by the Subdivisional Officer or, where applicable, the District Head to the Divisional Supervisory

Commission which shall in turn forward it to the National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes through the fastest means possible.

Chapter III: Divisional Supervisory Commissions

Section 24:

(1) A Divisional Supervisory Joint Commission shall be set up in each division. It shall be charged with the proper conduct and impartiality of elections.

(2) To this end, it shall:

- supervise operations for drawing up, preserving and revising registers of electors;
- examine all protests or claims relating to registers of electors or registration cards;
- supervise the distribution of registration cards;
- authorize, after examination, the corrections made necessary by the protests or claims against the decisions of the administrative authority relating to the registers of electors and registration cards;
- examine protests and disputes concerning the comportment of candidates or their agents during the election period;
- centralize and check returning operations done by local polling commissions and documents relating thereof. In case of a simple irregularity, it may request immediate regularization by members of the Local Polling Commission.

Section 25:

(1) The Divisional Supervisory Commission shall comprise the following:

Chairman: The Presiding Judge of the High Court and, in his simple or unavoidable absence, a judicial officer appointed by the President of the Court of Appeal having jurisdiction.

Members: three representatives of the administration appointed by the Senior Divisional Officer.

— one representative appointed by each candidate.

(2) A defaulting representative may, by simple notification to the Chairman of the Supervisory Commission, be replaced by the candidate who appointed him.

Chapter IV: The National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes

Section 29:

(1) A National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes comprising the following is hereby set up:

Chairman: A judge appointed by the President of the Supreme Court;

Members: two judicial officers appointed by the President of the Supreme Court;

— ten representatives of the administration appointed by the minister in charge of territorial administration;

— one representative of each political party or candidate appointed by the political party or the candidate.

(2) The list of members of the commission shall be permanently kept at the Registry of the Supreme Court.

(3) The composition of the National Commission for the Final Counting of Votes shall be fixed by an order of the minister in charge of territorial.

Section 30:

(1) The final counting of votes shall take place in public at the seat of the Supreme Court on the basis of the reports and appended documents forwarded by the Chairmen of the Divisional Supervisory Commissions.

(2) Each candidate shall be entitled to attend the proceedings of the Commission for the Final Counting of Votes and may submit any comments.

Part V
Register of Electors

Section 37:

The annual revision of registers of electors shall commence on 1 January of each year.

Section 45:

On the thirtieth day of April of each year, the Subdivisional Officer or the District Head shall forward to the Senior Divisional Officer a list of the amendments and close the register(s) of electors for his administrative unit.

Part VII
Preparing the Poll
Chapter One: Convening the Electors

Section 51:

Not less than 30 (thirty) days shall elapse between the date of publication of the decree and the day of election. Polling shall take place on a day declared a public holiday and shall last a single day.

Chapter II: Nomination of Candidates

Section 52:

Any candidate wishing to stand for presidential elections shall declare his candidature through a declaration bearing his authenticated signature.

Section 56:

Candidates shall pay a deposit fixed at 1,500,000 (one million five hundred thousand) CFA francs into the Public Treasury.

Section 58:

No less than 20 (twenty) days to the opening of the poll, and at the request of the President of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Territorial Administration shall ensure the publication of the lists of candidates.

Chapter III: Campaigning

Section 64:

There shall be printed for every candidate a number of ballot papers equivalent to the number of electors registered, increased by a quarter.

Section 65:

The election campaign shall open on the fifteenth day preceding the election and close at midnight on the eve of the day of election.

Part VIII
The Poll
Chapter 1: Polling Stations

Section 77:

There shall be one polling station for a maximum of six hundred electors.

Section 78:

The list of polling stations shall be posted up in the chief town of divisions, subdivisions and districts at least eight days before the day of election.

Chapter II: Conduct of the Poll
I. Voting

Section 79:

Any Person whose name appears on the register of electors shall be entitled to record his vote.

Section 80:

No person shall be allowed to vote unless his name appears on a register of electors.

Section 81:

(1) On entering the polling station, the elector, after having been identified by the polling commission in accordance with the established rules, shall show his voter's card.

(2) Every elector shall, after taking his envelope enter the polling-booth, put his ballot paper in the envelope and, after satisfying the commission that he holds a single envelope, place such envelope in the ballot-box.

Chapter III: Counting of the Votes

Section 86:

The checking of the envelopes and the counting of votes shall take place in each polling station immediately after the actual termination of voting, in the presence of voters who so desire provided the hall can contain them without obstructing the counting operation.

Section 88:

Envelopes shall be checked and opened by members of Local Polling Commission and, in the case contemplated in Section 16, by scrutineers appointed from among electors whose names appear on the register of electors of the area and who can read and write.

Section 89:

(1) The procedure for counting the votes cast shall be as follows:

(a) the ballot-box shall be opened and the number of envelopes contained therein checked;

(b) one of the scrutineers shall take the ballot paper out of the envelope, unfold it and hand it to another scrutineer who shall call out the name; the name appearing on the ballot paper shall be recorded by at least two scrutineers on specially prepared counting sheets. Where an envelope contains several ballot papers, such ballot papers shall be invalid if they are different; they shall count as one vote if they are identical.

Section 90:

Immediately after termination of the counting, the results obtained in each polling station shall be proclaimed.

Section 92:

The result of the poll shall be forthwith entered in the report. Such report, which shall be made in as many copies as there are members present plus two, shall thereafter be closed and signed by all members. The original shall be forwarded immediately to the Chairman of the Divisional Supervisory Commission. A copy thereof shall be kept in the archives of the Subdivisional or District Office. One copy shall be given to the representative of each candidate.

Part IX
Electoral Disputes

Section 93:

The Supreme Court may admit a claim lodged by any eligible person, a political party or a candidate requesting that the elections be canceled.

Section 95:

In any case, the Supreme Court must take a decision not later than 72 (seventy-two) hours following the termination of voting.

Part X
Proclamation of Results

Section 98:

At the end of the voting, the Supreme Court shall, at a solemn session, proclaim the results of the election on the basis of the report of the National Commission for the Final Counting of votes.

The Supreme Court shall, not later than fifteen days following the termination of the voting, proclaim elected the candidate who has obtained the highest number of the votes cast.

Appendix IX

Resignation Letter of George Achu Mofor, Governor of East Province

George Achu Mofor
Governor of East Province
Republic of Cameroon
19th October 1992

H.E. The President of The
Republic of Cameroon
Yaoundé

Your Excellency,

EXERCISE OF MY DUTIES

I have the honour to draw your very high attention to the following facts which make it very difficult, if not impossible for me to continue to perform my duties as Governor of East Province, a responsibility you entrusted to me some eighteen months ago (March 1991).

1) You remember that last year, I forwarded to you a copy of a letter addressed to the Minister of Territorial Administration who, for reasons other than administrative, was doing everything possible to jeopardise the normal exercise of my duties. A copy of another letter sent to the Secretary of State for Defence in connection with the deplorable conduct of the Legion Commander of the Gendarmerie whom you transfered two months ago, bore ample testimony to the harm which my boss did to my authority.

2) Ever since, I have been subjected to pressure of all types; notably from my boss, who has not missed any opportunity to draw my attention to my alleged affiliations with the opposition. That his attitude towards me is not due to any breach of duty on my part, but on purely political considerations, is evidenced by the excellent report he made on me last year (19.5/20). For this reason, you advised me during your visit here in September last year that I should continue

to do my work objectively and not to listen to what people say. I wish to seize this opportunity to express my gratitude for this advice and the confidence bestowed on me during this period and the fact that you have not personally exercised any undue influence on me. I cannot say this of all members of government, some of whom have done so directly or otherwise.

3) In spite of the above, I have been the subject of systematic blackmail to force me to change my attitude to serve all my subjects impartially, without fear or favour, or based on political, ethnic or religious considerations as some people want.

4) As a nationalist, a patriot, and an avowed democrat, I adhered totally, on your accession to power, to your policy of stringency, moral rectitude and democratisation of our society and expressed this in a memorandum sent to you in 1990 in which I took a clear stand for democracy, followed by concrete proposals on democratic and constitutional reforms, some of which have been adopted.

5) The "last straw that has broken the camel's back" is the organisation and conduct of the last presidential elections of 11/10/92. I feel very concerned about the fact that there is overwhelming evidence of foul play and fraud in the said elections through legislation, regulation, registration of voters, unequitable treatment of candidates and voters, the conduct of the polls and the verification of the results. This has been reported by members of the public, foreign observers, etc. My attention has been drawn to some of the irregularities in my province. But Governors were not directly involved in the conduct of the elections. It was therefore very difficult if not impossible to change the course of events. Let me draw your attention to the fact that I did not find it in accordance with my conscience to implement the instructions of the Minister of Territorial Administration given during the last extra ordinary Governor's Conference of 28 September 1992. By these we were instructed to do everything fair and foul to ensure at least a 60% victory for the CPDM party candidate in our provinces. This subjected us, as he insisted, to "an obligation de resultat." Furthermore, we were to be appraised thereafter on this basis. To assist us in this task a six page document issued by the UDC party on *Techniques of Electoral Fraud* was distributed to us. As another example of blackmail and influence, he issued to us a second

document entitled *MAJORITE PRESIDENTIELLE* by which the prison staff about 5,000 strong, was requested to support your candidature to show gratitude for the recent regulation you adopted relating to better working conditions for them, and that in case of your victory the disciplinary measures taken against some of them during the last strike would be reviewed.

We have been instructed to execute the exceptional security measures taken by government to ensure that all citizens accept the results and to severely repress any acts of violence resulting from discontent following their declaration. I do not think I would be in a position to enforce such orders that could lead to bloody confrontations between the forces at my disposal and citizens who are convinced that they have been deprived of their rights.

Taking into account the above facts and considerations, I feel strongly that it is not in accordance with my conscience, my duty to the people of this province in particular and of Cameroon as a whole, who are aspiring to a real democratic society where Human Rights and the Rule of Law are respected, to continue to serve your government in this capacity.

This said, I therefore tender my resignation as Governor of East Province.

Yours faithfully,

George Achu Mofor
Senior Administrative Officer
Officer of the Cameroon Order of Valour

Appendix X

MINAT Communique of October 12, 1992

Ministry of
Territorial Administration

Republic of Cameroon
Peace-Work-Fatherland

General Secretariat

To: the Director General of Cameroonian Radio and Television

Statement by the Minister of Territorial Administration:

In light of the partisan and deliberately distorted information disseminated by certain elements of the press, I feel it is necessary to state clearly where we stand on the results of the October 11 Presidential Election received thus far:

As of today the total number of votes cast for all provinces is 694,801.

The break-down of votes is as follows:

1) Candidate Paul Biya, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM): 471,045 votes.
2) Candidate John Fru Ndi, Social Democratic Front (SDF): 246, 592 votes;
3) Candidate Bello Bouba Maigari, National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP): 144,742 votes.

Certain comments are in order for these figures to be meaningful:

1) At the present moment, Mr. Paul Biya leads in the number of votes cast; as of now he has received more than half the vote.
2) Mr. Biya is followed by candidates John Fru Ndi and Bello Bouba Maigari respectively, in terms of number of votes; the remaining 1% of the vote is shared by all of the other candidates.
3) M. John Fru Ndi's lead is unquestionable in the West, North-West, South-West and Littoral provinces, where he has received a large share of the vote.

However, outside of these four provinces he received few votes in the Center, South, Far-North, East and North provinces.

4) M. Bello Bouba received a fair share of CDU votes because he won a clear majority of votes in the divisions of Nyong and Kellé and Maritime-Sanaga. In addition to the support he received from the Hogbe Nlend faction of the UPC, the areas in which he enjoys strong support are the Far-North, the North and Adamaoua, where he shares the vote with the CPDM.

5) The CPDM candidate is the only one of the candidates running who received votes in all of the provinces, even though the vote count in the areas which generally support him, namely the Center, South and East provinces, is not yet complete.

In conclusion, the results of the vote gathered as of now show M. Biya's lead over the other two candidates, Mr. Fru Ndi and Mr. Bello Bouba.

This lead could well be maintained given the CPDM's significant presence across the country, which should enable it to command a large share of the vote in the areas traditionally supportive of other political parties; whereas the reverse is not true for these parties in areas with strong support for the CPDM.

Yaoundé, October 12, 1992
The Minister of Territorial
Administration,

Gilbert Andze Tsoungui

Appendix XI

Government Final Results

(released October 23, 1992)

DIVISION	*CPDM* Paul Biya	*SDF* John Fru Ndi	*NUDP* Bello Bouba Maigari	*CDU* Adamou Ndam Njoya	*MP* Jean Jacques Ekindi	*RFP* Emah Ottou
Djérem	4472	1042	10489	407	224	131
Faro-Et-Deo	2732	248	7755	119	79	55
Mayo-Banyo	2948	2436	11944	445	84	71
Mbere	14175	803	15459	342	383	179
Vina	7583	3246	32557	942	485	275
Haute-Sanaga	24999	1429	4296	139	100	66
Lékié	89770	1338	997	195	51	60
Mbam (2 Divisions)	36904	13154	8125	1096	652	404
Mefou (2 Divisions)	69112	885	954	52	54	52
Mfoundi	109651	81866	17188	3065	325	394
Nyong-et-Kellé	9070	3988	19046	392	220	157
Nyong-et-Mfoumou	36774	742	314	58	9	16
Nyong-et-Soo	32438	3446	1140	138	41	44
Boumbe-et-Ngoko	8528	1172	7137	407	224	183
Haut-Nyong	37570	2193	4839	910	322	238
Kadey	22569	1253	6336	582	251	127
Lom-et-Djérem	24432	4357	11027	724	340	193
Diamaré	29244	4148	62687	2044	2043	1002
Logone-et-Chari	39630	1351	29760	300	428	151
Mayo-Danay	34548	5684	25271	2434	2146	1452
Mayo-Kani	33312	1857	19594	1304	1348	829
Mayo-Sava	26888	1386	17786	484	603	289
Mayo-Tsanaga	38512	3575	25087	2001	3335	1703
Mungo	6972	87438	3015	2536	625	326
Nkam	4879	5897	825	308	294	72
Sanaga Maritime	8778	10412	24019	624	294	205
Wouri	36467	166027	29782	6615	2304	356

DIVISION	*CPDM* Paul Biya	*SDF* John Fru Ndi	*NUDP* Bello Bouba Maigari	*CDU* Adamou Ndam Njoya	*MP* Jean Jacques Ekindi	*RFP* Emah Ottou
Bénoué	31824	4089	60416	1378	1249	526
Faro	7271	430	6139	310	157	144
Mayo-Louti	24674	1858	36680	1194	1437	785
Mayo-Rey	30935	573	8152	304	244	137
Boyo	1819	21447	947	416	44	24
Bui	2729	51887	1811	558	82	55
Donga-Mantung	15777	44609	2719	276	77	71
Mentchum	2205	25628	785	206	64	38
Mezam	3541	76387	2214	865	133	70
Momo	3486	41753	1123	180	32	20
Ngohk-Entunjia	2791	29150	647	329	35	37
Bamboutos	2131	56488	994	1185	301	110
Haut-Nkam	2220	36666	574	866	170	78
Menoua	3856	59027	1344	1750	418	276
Mifi	5292	81606	1300	2854	622	336
Nde	1965	20467	690	972	271	101
Noun	30605	9067	2785	60657	228	185
Dja-et-Lobo	74718	8	5	0	1	1
Mvila	51613	2711	527	214	19	16
Océan	37469	4074	1792	295	66	52
Vallée du Ntem	19495	81	52	93	6	3
Fako	6113	44177	7743	1343	238	151
Kupe et Managouba	7638	5497	5433	229	75	59
Manyu	12680	23662	13150	1664	159	128
Meme	3055	7826	7514	329	81	48
Ndian	4607	6039	6941	281	72	64
TOTAL	*1185466*	*1006580*	*568959*	*107411*	*23545*	*12555*

Appendix XII

SDF Final Results

(released October 28, 1992)

Province Division	*SDF* John Fru Ndi	*CPDM* Paul Biya	*NUDP* Bouba Bello Maigari	*CDU* Adamou Ndam Njoya	*MP* Jean Jacques Ekindi	*RFP* Emah Ottou
ADAMAOUA	*7795*	*31910*	*78204*	*2255*	*1235*	*711*
Djérem	1042	4472	10489	407	224	131
Faro-et-Deo	248	2732	7755	119	79	55
Mayo-Banyo	2458	2948	11944	445	84	71
Mbere	801	14175	15459	342	363	179
Vina	3246	7583	32557	942	485	275
CENTER	*106848*	*408370*	*52049*	*5135*	*1452*	*1192*
Haute-Sanaga	1429	24651	4285	139	100	65
Lékié	1338	89770	997	195	51	60
Mbam	13154	36904	8125	1096	652	404
Mefou	885	69112	954	52	54	52
Mfoundi	81866	109651	17188	3065	325	394
Nyong-et-Kellé	3988	9070	19046	392	220	157
Nyong-et-Mfoumou	742	36774	314	58	9	16
Nyong-et-Soo	3446	32438	1140	138	41	44
EAST	*8975*	*93099*	*29339*	*2623*	*1137*	*741*
Boumbe-et-Ngoko	1172	8528	7137	407	224	183
Haut-Nyong	2193	37570	4839	910	322	233
Kadey	1253	22569	6336	582	251	127
Lom-et-Djérem	4357	24432	11027	724	340	198
FAR-NORTH	*29836*	*194996*	*180185*	*8567*	*9903*	*5426*
Diamaré	8286	22106	62687	2044	2043	1002
Mayo-Kaney (Kaélé)	1857	33312	19594	1304	1348	829

Province Division	*SDF* John Fru Ndi	*CPDM* Paul Biya	*NUDP* Bouba Bello Maigari	*CDU* Adamou Ndam Njoya	*MP* Jean Jacques Ekindi	*RFP* Emah Ottou
Logone-et-Chari	9048	39630	29760	300	428	151
Mayo-Danay	5684	34548	25271	2434	2146	1452
Mayo-Sava	1386	26888	17786	484	603	289
Mayo-Tsanaga	3575	38512	25087	2001	3335	1703
LITTORAL	*268455*	*54929*	*57304*	*10049*	*3488*	*955*
Moungo	87438	6972	3015	2536	625	326
Nkam	5897	4879	825	308	294	72
Sanaga-Maritime	10412	8778	24019	624	294	205
Wouri	164708	34300	29445	6581	2275	352
NORTH	*6950*	*94704*	*111387*	*3186*	*3087*	*1592*
Bénoué	4089	31824	60416	1378	1249	526
Faro	430	7271	6139	310	157	144
Mayo-Louti	1858	24674	36680	1194	1437	785
Mayo-Rey	573	30935	8152	304	244	137
SOUTH	*6874*	*183295*	*2376*	*602*	*92*	*72*
Dja-et-Lobo	8	74718	5	0	1	1
Vallée du Ntem	81	19495	52	93	6	3
Mvila (Ntem)	2711	51613	527	214	19	16
Océan	4074	37469	1792	295	66	52
SOUTH-WEST	*175472*	*15524*	*19168*	*1857*	*375*	*251*
Fako	47003	10921	7743	1343	238	151
Manyu	58725	1209	137	12	3	2
Meme	55511	1893	4389	224	62	36
Ndian	14233	1501	6899	278	72	62

Province Division	*SDF* John Fru Ndi	*CPDM* Paul Biya	*NUDP* Bouba Bello Maigari	*CDU* Adamou Ndam Njoya	*MP* Jean Jacques Ekindi	*RFP* Emah Ottou
NORTH-WEST	*294277*	*22574*	*10142*	*2742*	*411*	*237*
Bui	51887	2729	1811	558	82	55
Donga-Mantung	48025	6003	2634	188	21	54
Mentchum	25628	2205	766	206	64	38
Mezam	76387	3541	2214	865	133	9
Momo	41753	3486	1123	180	32	20
Ngo-Ketoundja	29150	1819	647	329	35	37
Boyo	21447	2791	947	416	44	24
WEST	*263873*	*19725*	*7351*	*74812*	*1951*	*1013*
Bamboutos	56776	2136	1003	1175	306	124
Haut-Nkam	36666	2220	574	866	170	78
Menoua	59027	3587	1344	1750	418	276
Mifi	81706	5292	1300	2854	622	336
Nde	20467	1965	690	972	271	101
Noun	9231	4525	2440	67195	164	98
TOTAL	1169355	1119126	547505	111828	23131	12190

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was established in 1983. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain, and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. The Institute, chaired by former Vice President Walter F. Mondale, is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has a staff of 70 with field offices in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

NDI has conducted democratic development programs with more than 50 countries. Programs focus on six major areas:

Political Party Training: NDI conducts multipartisan training seminars in political development with a broad spectrum of democratic parties. NDI draws expert trainers from around the world to forums where members of fledgling parties learn first-hand the techniques of organization, communication and constituent contact.

Election Processes: NDI provides technical assistance for political parties and nonpartisan associations to conduct voter and civic education campaigns, and to organize election monitoring programs. The Institute has also organized more than 35 international observer delegations.

Legislative Training: NDI has organized legislative seminars focusing on legislative procedures, staffing, research information, constituent services and committee structures.

Local Government: Technical assistance on models of city management has been provided to national legislatures and municipal governments.

Civil Military Relations: NDI brings together military and political leaders to promote dialogue and establish mechanisms for improving civil-military relations.

Civic Education: NDI supports and advises nonpartisan groups and political parties engaged in civic and voter education programs.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

Selected NDI Studies

- *Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections, February 27, 1991*
- *The October 13, 1991 Legislative and Municipal Elections in Bulgaria*
- *The June 1990 Elections in Bulgaria*
- *Chile's Transition to Democracy, The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* (English and Spanish)
- *Peaceful Transitions and the Cuban Democratic Platform: Report of an International Conference* (1991 English and Spanish)
- *1990 Elections in the Dominican Republic*
- *An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia*
- *The November 1990 General Elections in Guatemala*
- *The New Democratic Frontier: A Country by Country Report on the Elections in Central and Eastern Europe*
- *The 1990 General Elections in Haiti*
- *Nation Building: The U.N. and Namibia (1990)*
- *The October 1990 Elections in Pakistan*
- *The May 7, 1989 Panama Elections* (English and Spanish)
- *Voting for Greater Pluralism: The May 26, 1991 Elections in Paraguay*
- *Reforming the Philippine Electoral Process: 1986-1988* (Reissued Summer 1991)
- *The May 1990 Elections in Romania*
- *An Assessment of the Senegalese Electoral Code (1991)* (English and French)
- *Strengthening Local Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: 1990-1992*
- *The October 31, 1991 National Elections in Zambia*