

**BUILDING A CIVIL SOCIETY IN  
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV  
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

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# National Democratic Institute For International Affairs

conducting nonpartisan international programs to help promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions



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## NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was established in 1983. By working with political parties, civic organizations, parliaments, and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. The Institute is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has a staff of 120 with field offices in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This report details the first year of work undertaken by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and its partner organization in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Association for Civic Initiative (ACI).

The report was written by NDI Program Assistant Beki Bahar-Engler. The report was edited by NDI Program Officer Jonas Rolett, NDI Senior Program Officer for Central and Eastern Europe Susan Atwood and NDI Director of Public Information Sue Grabowski.

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**BUILDING A CIVIL SOCIETY  
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**I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) established a field office in Skopje, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in November 1993 to initiate a civic education program. FYROM's successful transition to a genuine democracy will depend in large measure on its ability to create a political environment in which citizens can actively participate in the public decisionmaking process. This is an enormous challenge in a country lacking democratic traditions and mediating structures and confronting considerable obstacles, including war in neighboring countries, strained relationships with three neighbors, and a struggling economy and ethnic divisions at home. NDI's program in FYROM is designed to promote a process of continuous dialogue and accountability between the citizenry and elected officials in order to build public confidence in democratic governance. This report summarizes NDI's first year of programming in FYROM.

During the first two months of field presence, NDI's in-country representative held weekly meetings in Skopje to discuss issues of democracy and political tolerance in order to meet potential civic activists. In January and February, NDI contacted different community groups and interested citizens outside of the capital to explore popular understanding of democratic processes and civic advocacy. At the same time, NDI's first field representative Richard Dickerson established working relationships with political parties and civic organizations at the national and local levels. Through this community outreach program, the field representative identified a core group of activists from various ethnic, civic and political organizations who were interested in creating a nonpartisan grassroots organization that would promote citizen participation and transparency in political decisionmaking.

In March 1994, this core group unofficially founded the Association for Civic Initiative (ACI) to act as a clearinghouse for civic and governmental information as well as to serve as a liaison between citizens and their government. Since ACI's formation, NDI has provided technical and financial assistance to help the Association develop into a nonpartisan,

multi-ethnic, public interest organization similar to civic counterparts in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. NDI's subsequent work with ACI has focused on strengthening the group's organizational capacity and on defining and developing its programmatic scope.

From March through June, NDI helped ACI recruit members, establish local branches, select national and regional staff, write its organizational statutes and begin registration procedures necessary for acquiring formal government accreditation. NDI guided ACI through its first public meetings in cities outside of the capital to recruit new members and to begin forming branch clubs.

In June, an NDI expert in grassroots organizing delivered a series of lectures on civic advocacy during recruitment meetings in four cities selected by ACI as potential sites for branch clubs. The forums, covered by the local media, served to popularize the notion of civic action. In addition to broadening ACI's membership base, these meetings allowed the Association to collect information on local issues for use in developing a national strategy and for planning initiatives to be undertaken by the branches. Also during this period, NDI helped ACI incorporate its organizational role and mission into formal statutes as required by law. The new organization officially registered with the Ministry of Interior on September 27, 1994.

On October 1, with 65 delegates and eight new clubs, ACI convened its founding national organizing conference in Skopje. At the conference, the members developed a national strategy, elected officers to the executive council, appointed an executive director and discussed plans for future activities.

ACI's formal commencement coincided with the announcement that the country's first parliamentary elections since independence would be held on October 16. ACI decided to take advantage of the timing of this event by organizing a domestic monitoring effort as its inaugural undertaking. The aspiring civic group perceived the elections as an opportunity both to focus its efforts on a narrowly defined, immediate project and to establish itself as an effective, broad-based public advocate.

While FYROM's election law permitted independent and party candidates to assign monitors to the polls on election day, it was widely believed that the partisanship of the monitors would limit their public credibility. ACI determined that a nonpartisan domestic election monitoring effort would help overcome public skepticism about the credibility of the country's electoral process.

In the weeks between its founding conference on October 1, the first round of elections on October 16 and the final round of voting on October 30, ACI responded to popular sentiment for a transparent electoral process by offering training to prospective election monitors. Public response to ACI's call transcended FYROM's often uncompromising ethnic boundaries, finding support among the Albanian and Turkish minority communities, as well as the Slav majority. For the elections on October 16 and 30, ACI deployed 450 volunteer domestic monitors to 1,000 polling sites and 650 monitors to 1,500 polling sites respectively. NDI's East European-based staff traveled to FYROM to support ACI's efforts during the elections.

At post-election press conferences, ACI and international observer groups raised concerns about the incomplete condition of the voting lists. Monitors also noted problems with ballot secrecy and the system by which ballots were invalidated. On the whole, however, they agreed that there was no pattern of disenfranchisement and that the irregularities should be considered administrative rather than intentional. ACI's independent evaluation helped separate objective and well-founded criticisms from partisan allegations.

ACI's election activities vaulted the organization into the public eye. Offering citizens the chance to participate as domestic monitors brought hundreds of volunteers onto the Association's membership rolls. Due to the nationwide monitoring effort, ACI also solidified its national and local structures and developed its organizing capabilities. While ACI's training informed a section of the public about FYROM's election law and system, the domestic effort highlighted the role of citizens in the democratic process.



The nonpartisan group now faces the challenge of moving beyond election monitoring to define its role in supporting the development of democracy at the national and local levels between the elections. As a volunteer-based organization, ACI is now looking ahead to strengthen its branch clubs and increase its grassroots support by organizing advocacy campaigns and raising public awareness on issues of interest to citizens.

## **II. BACKGROUND**

FYROM is a land-locked country on the Balkan peninsula, bordered by Serbia/Montenegro to the north, Greece to the south, Bulgaria to the east and Albania to the west. With approximately 2 million inhabitants, FYROM is an ethnically diverse country with a sizable and often vocal ethnic Albanian community.

FYROM's history has been turbulent, as the territories frequently exchanged hands between the Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Turks ruled the region for almost 500 years until the disintegration of the Ottoman empire at the end of the 19th century. In the late 1800s, a nationalist trend swept across the region, culminating in a struggle for independence in the Balkans. Unlike Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, Macedonia failed to advance toward autonomy, primarily due to its isolation from Western influence and a lack of continuous political, religious and constitutional traditions.

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), founded in 1893, promoted Macedonian nationalism; however, the organization failed in its goal to establish a union of Slavic Serbs, Bulgarians and Macedonians, without portioning the land to different bordering countries. When the Balkan allies defeated the Turks during the First Balkan War in 1913, Greece acquired "Aegean Macedonia," Bulgaria gained "Pirin Macedonia," and Serbia controlled "Vardar Macedonia." The latter region became part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, formally designated Yugoslavia in 1929.

During World War II, Bulgaria reoccupied the majority of Yugoslav Macedonia while partisan resistance groups, led by General Marshall Josip Broz Tito, fought against the occupying forces. At the end of war, the communist Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was formed and included the former Vardar Macedonia, which was awarded status as a federal partner in Yugoslavia.

To maintain an inter-ethnic balance of power among the republics, and in particular, to help neutralize potential Serbian domination, Tito engineered a system of checks and balances that devolved government power to the republic level. In this vein, Tito supported a notion of Macedonian identity. Decentralization, while preserving the power of the Communist Party, enabled the republics to maintain their identities and a considerable independence. It did not, however, extinguish ethnically based nationalist sentiments or desires of the republics for greater autonomy, nor did it instill a deep-rooted sense of Yugoslav national identity.

Following Tito's death and throughout the 1980s, the communist apparatus in Yugoslavia slowly unraveled as several of the republics began to express growing demands for greater autonomy. In September 1989, the Republic of Slovenia adopted constitutional amendments asserting its economic and political sovereignty from the republic, denying the federation the right to intervene and claiming the right to secede. Shortly thereafter, the Republics of Croatia and Macedonia followed Slovenia with their own assertions of independent statehood. In an attempt to appease Macedonia and other republics, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia approved the introduction of a multiparty election system. In Macedonia, this political opening prompted the republic's first multiparty elections since 1934, held in November and December 1990.

In early 1991, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia supported European Community (EC) proposals to form a confederation of sovereign states from the former Yugoslav republics. However, after failed attempts by the EC and other groups to maintain a single Yugoslav entity, voters in Macedonia approved a referendum on independence on September

8, 1991. Nine days later, the republic formally seceded from Yugoslavia. On November 17, the Macedonian Assembly adopted a new constitution.

In the transition to a democratic political system and a market economy, FYROM confronts many challenges. These impediments include increasing ethnic division at home, economic dislocation reinforced by economic blockades and international embargoes, the threat of an expanded Balkan war and a lack of democratic traditions and culture. Growing ethnic divisions in this heterogeneous country with several sizable and often vocal ethnic minorities may be the most destabilizing factor.

Following the collapse of the collective system, people turned to "ethnicity" as a basis to organize themselves. Since the political system is based on ethnic identity, population counts ultimately equate to political strengths of all groups. According to a 1991 census, the country's population of 2.2 million comprises 65 percent ethnic Macedonians, 22 percent ethnic Albanians,<sup>1</sup> and 10 percent Serbian, Romany, Turkish and other ethnic groups.

Ethnic Albanians boycotted the 1991 census, objecting to what they alleged were misleading ethnic options listed on the survey form. According to census questions, citizens could choose to describe themselves as Albanian, Macedonian or Muslim among other categories. Since 90 percent of ethnic Albanians are Muslim, the Albanians considered the choices confusing. Turkish, Romany, Albanian and Muslim groups raised similar objections to the results of the internationally financed census conducted in summer 1994 and labeled the findings inconclusive.

FYROM's relations with its neighbors are also problematic. The increasing tension between Slavic and Albanian Macedonians at home soured FYROM's relations with Albania. In the last three years, diplomatic tension has been manifest in FYROM's deportation of ethnic Albanians, Albanian opposition to FYROM's membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), minor border clashes between the two

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<sup>1</sup>Albanian Macedonians maintain that they constitute between 35 to 45 percent of the population.

countries, and most recently the violent clashes over the establishment of an Albanian University in Tetovo.

FYROM's southern neighbor, Greece, posed the chief opposition to international recognition of the new republic -- a diplomatic strategy that barred receipt of economic and technical assistance from international aid agencies for two years. The Greek government objected to recognizing FYROM as the "Republic of Macedonia" for fear that such an admission would lead to territorial claims over its northern province, also known as Macedonia. Additionally, Greece opposed the country's flag, which contains the star of Vergina, a symbol affiliated with Greek heritage. Only after the United Nations admitted the country in 1993 under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), did a number of European countries recognize the FYROM. The United States established diplomatic relations in February 1994. Greece continues to oppose FYROM's name, flag, symbols and constitution, and has imposed a unilateral trade embargo since the spring of 1994.

Serbian leaders also denounce the existence of Macedonian ethnicity and claim FYROM as part of a greater Serbia. FYROM's adherence to the U.N. imposed embargo on Serbia further weakened its relationship with the former Yugoslavia. The embargo also hurt FYROM's economy since Serbia was FYROM's largest export partner.

Beset with discordant relations with its neighbors and ethnic tensions at home, FYROM's tenuous political stability in its first two years of independence accentuated economic and social disruptions. The stability of the government, elected during the pre-independence November 1990 elections, has rested on weak coalitions, unified only by the shared goal to keep FYROM out of a Balkan war. In the November 1990 elections, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE),<sup>2</sup> established in 1990, won a plurality (38) of the seats in the 120-member parliament. With support drawn from the younger population and intellectuals,

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<sup>2</sup>VMRO-DPMNE represents a merger between VMRO, named after the historic group that fought for independence from the Turks, and DPMNE, a party formed by Macedonian migrants living in Sweden.

VMRO-DPMNE credits its success to its public identity as the first party to label the Yugoslav army (JNA) an "occupying" army, urge the military forces to withdraw and actively promote international recognition.

The Social Democratic Union (SDS), founded in April 1990, won 30 parliamentary seats in the 1990 elections. SDS, the inheritor of the Yugoslav League of Communists, asserts adherence to social democracy, a market economy, and the protection of human and minority rights. The SDS position on ethnic relations categorizes the country as a multinational territory, not a multinational state, and stresses the need to cooperate with the ethnic minority groups.

The third largest party in the 1990 parliament was the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) with 23 seats. Founded in April 1990, PDP represents the principal forum for supporting Albanian interests. The National Democratic Party (NDP), formed subsequent to the PDP, represents the radical faction of Albanian interests. Other ethnically based parties include the Democratic Party of Romany and the Democratic Party of Serbia.

In January 1991, VMRO-DPMNE formed a coalition government with SDS and PDP. However, ethnic tensions began to escalate as FYROM waited for international recognition and membership in the United Nations, and as Serb aggressions increased in other parts of the former Yugoslav federation. By October 1991, VMRO-DPMNE refused to govern any longer with the former communists and officially joined the opposition.

In July 1992, the government collapsed after failing to gain international recognition for the country. In September 1992, a new government formed, comprising of SDS, the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party of Macedonia and PDP. This coalition government represented a marriage of convenience between left-of-center parties and the ethnic Albanian party.

In 1993 and 1994, both the government and the parliament increasingly lacked credibility because of their inability to adopt urgently needed reform legislation.

Parliamentary sessions were regularly disrupted as a result of walk-outs by Albanian and VMRO-DPMNE deputies. The PDP frequently voted against government proposals or abstained from voting when reform issues such as government administration, the election system, the constitution and the census were debated in the parliament. Rumors of early elections started in early 1994, but after repeated failures to adopt amendments to the election law, the government finally called for new national elections to take place in October 1994.

### **III. NDI ACTIVITY IN FYROM**

In April 1993, NDI sponsored a survey mission to FYROM to assess the political environment and to identify democratic development opportunities. The survey delegation included NDI Program Officer Lisa McLean and Tom Kelly, a member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland. The team met with political party representatives in the parliament, including minority party legislators, government and city council officials, civic organization leaders and journalists. The team recommended that NDI concentrate on supporting public participation in the political process and promoting a process of continuous dialogue and accountability between the citizenry and elected officials in order to build public confidence in democratic governance.

Based on the findings of the mission and sustained contacts throughout the year, NDI developed a civic organizing project that builds on the successful efforts of civic associations already supported by NDI in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. In November 1993, NDI established a full-time field presence in Skopje to launch the civic and political organizing program.

### **IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A CIVIC GROUP**

In November 1993, NDI field representative Richard Dickerson, an expert in grassroots organizing, opened a field office in Skopje to initiate NDI's civic and political

organizing program in FYROM. The program is designed to educate individuals about democratic processes and mediating structures and their role in the promotion of citizen participation and ethnic harmony in a democracy. NDI activities focus on promoting nonpartisan citizen participation in the political process.

In FYROM, there is a collective sense that no ordinary citizen, or group of citizens can have a meaningful voice, much less decisive influence in the political process. Most people, concerned with their daily survival, do not perceive nonpartisan civic organizations as a means to solve a problem or to help mobilize general political will into an effective instrument of governance. Moreover, there is broad public distrust of partisan groups. Indeed, the few existing domestic organizations generally hold clear links to specific political parties or groups.

Based on these findings, NDI decided to help found a new nonpartisan grassroots group that would aim to identify local problems, educate the citizenry about these issues, allow people to express their opinion and work toward concrete solutions. NDI believed that such a process, which enabled citizens to influence decisions affecting their daily lives, would ultimately lead to increased confidence in democracy.

### **Community Outreach**

During NDI's first six months in FYROM, field representative Dickerson contacted potential civic activists through public lectures and informal discussions. NDI also sponsored weekly community meetings for government officials, political party leaders, trade union representatives, journalists, civic organizers, interested citizens and the international community. At these meetings, participants from across ethnic and political party lines discussed issues of democracy and political tolerance. Participants frequently remarked that specific discussion of political, and to a lesser extent, economic issues contributed to their understanding of the reform process underway in their country. Many also said that the discussions on minority rights increased their appreciation and empathy with the concerns of minority groups.

To supplement the community forums, Dickerson conducted a series of public lectures on democratic and governance issues at high schools and universities. In addition, he periodically met informally with nongovernmental associations and local media in and around Skopje. Interested faculty and students drawn from the lectures as well as members of the civic and media community were invited to attend the community meetings.

Through this community outreach program, NDI developed contacts with more than 200 people between November and March, and established a close working relationship with community leaders from across the political spectrum and ethnic divide. Dickerson gradually identified a core group of activists who were interested in creating a nonpartisan civic organization that would promote citizen participation and transparency in political decisionmaking.

#### **Association for Civic Initiative**

In March 1994, the core group of activists informally founded the Association for Civic Initiative (ACI). By creating ACI, the founders envisaged that the new organization would: 1) serve as a bridge for communication between the people and their elected representatives; 2) function as a vehicle for educating citizens at the grassroots level about their role in an evolving representative democracy; and, 3) act as a clearinghouse for civic and governmental information. Since ACI's formation, NDI has provided technical and financial assistance to help the indigenous group develop into a nonpartisan, multi-ethnic public interest organization. ACI's cooperative agreement with NDI from September 1994 through August 1995 amounts to \$50,000 and is expected to increase in the coming years as the organization grows.

NDI initially focused its efforts on establishing a strong foundation for the nascent Association by working to enhance ACI's organizational capabilities. During the start-up phase of the group, NDI's field representative provided ACI with assistance to: 1) establish structures and procedures to enable the organization to function professionally; 2) nurture and



enhance the leadership resources; and, 3) design and implement a program of activities that would serve to attract new members.

### **Recruiting Members and Establishing Branch Clubs**

The success of ACI will, in part, depend on the organization's ability to attract a national multi-ethnic membership base that can encourage dialogue across social, ethnic and political lines. To recruit new members and to form branch clubs, ACI organized a series of roundtable discussions and town meetings throughout the country from April through June 1994. John Swanson, who replaced Dickerson as NDI's interim field representative, and Dik Saalfeld, his permanent successor, guided ACI through its first public meetings.

In April, ACI members, accompanied by Swanson, and NDI Washington, D.C. staff members Jonas Rolett and Jason Keiles, visited five communities throughout the FYROM. The cities of Bitola, Ohrid, Sveti Nikole, Tetovo and Gostivar were selected for their demographic and geographic diversity. While the first three have mostly Slavic-Macedonian populations, the latter two are Albanian cities. The public meetings brought together representatives from various political parties and local civic groups, journalists, students and interested citizens. The ensuing public discussion helped ACI identify local issues around which to organize future events. In addition to hosting the public meetings, ACI consulted with and secured the cooperation of municipal officials in each city. The Association also made a concerted effort to involve the local media in these meetings as a means to publicize the new organization and its activities. In these meetings, ACI laid the foundation for branch clubs in all five cities and established a growing network of ACI volunteers.

To broaden its membership base, ACI also solicited the support of and worked with other local civic groups. In May, ACI co-sponsored a public meeting with the Inter-Ethnic Women's Association in Struga and Strumica to address issues of concern to the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities in these cities. Through these two events, ACI familiarized several hundred people with the goals of the group and its program plans.

In May and June, ACI initiated a program to systematically contact the youth groups of political parties. ACI held a series of small roundtable sessions with youth leaders from PDP, VMRO-DPMNE, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party to discuss political apathy among young people. These informal meetings enabled ACI to introduce itself as a nonpartisan group, and establish relationships within varied political circles.

In June, NDI sent grassroots organizer Rick Ridder to FYROM to conduct a series of popular talks on the subject of civic initiatives and to help recruit new members for ACI. At lectures in Bitola, Skopje, Stip and Tetovo, Ridder discussed the philosophy, history and tactics of civic organizing. Attendees received a handbook (translated to Macedonian and Albanian) entitled "How to Solve Problems in Your Community,"<sup>3</sup> which covered the basic steps involved in civic advocacy. (See Appendix A.) As a result of this trip, ACI attracted 50 new members in four cities. Meetings with local officials contributed to a cooperative atmosphere at the municipal level in each of these towns. Promotions for the meetings included local and national television, radio and newspaper advertisements, as well as posters and fliers. (See Appendix B.) In addition, local television and press covered the meetings as news stories, which reached a wider audience.

### **Formalization of ACI**

In order to formalize its operations, ACI was required by law to register with the Ministry of Interior and conduct a national conference. NDI's representative Saalfeld helped ACI's working committee on statutes prepare the proper legal paperwork. In May, ACI initiated the registration procedures with the Ministry of the Interior.

In writing the statutes, ACI officials were compelled to face and answer difficult questions about the role and mission of the organization. To aid this process, NDI sponsored a visit to Skopje by representatives of the Society for Democratic Culture, NDI's civic organizing partner in Albania. Society officials conducted a training seminar on civic

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<sup>3</sup> NDI training material.

organizing in a post-communist society for ACI membership. Selected ACI leaders also visited Sofia to observe the activities of the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civic Rights (BAFECR), ACI's counterpart in Bulgaria.

Following ACI's formal registration in September, the new Association held its first organizing conference in Skopje on October 1. (See Appendix C.) Eight new clubs and 65 members, including representatives of civic organizations with similar goals, attended the conference. The organization formally adopted statutes, elected an executive board and appointed staff members to run the day-to-day operations. In order to fulfill ACI's goal of national representation, the delegates specified that eight seats for the 11-member board be filled by regional representatives and the remaining three seats by members from Skopje. The board also included four women and three Albanians. Fidanka Taneskova, a journalist, was elected president, and Goran Ivanov, a law student, was elected ACI's executive director.

## **V. DOMESTIC MONITORING EFFORT**

ACI's formal commencement coincided with the announcement that national elections would be held on October 16. More than 1,700 candidates from 37 parties (as well as independent aspirants) competed for 120 parliamentary seats. Two candidates, Ljubisa Georgievski of VMRO-DPMNE, and Kiro Gligorov of the Alliance for Macedonia,<sup>4</sup> ran for president. The election law stipulated that if no candidate for an office received more than 50 percent of the votes, all candidates with more than 7 percent of the vote would advance to the second round scheduled for October 30.

NDI's activity during the election period focused on assisting ACI with plans to organize a domestic election monitoring effort. The monitoring program comprised three

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<sup>4</sup>The Alliance coalition group comprised SDS, the Liberal Party and the Socialist Party of Macedonia.

phases. The pre-election phase consisted of volunteer recruitment, training and deployment, as well as publicity and limited voter education activities. Election-day plans involved monitoring and reporting. ACI's post-election activities included writing a statement and holding a press conference.

In addition to ACI's domestic monitors, NDI sponsored an eight-member team to monitor the first round of elections on October 16. The team comprised: NDI's Washington staff members, Susan Atwood, Beki Bahar-Engler and Jonas Rolett; NDI regional representatives, Christin Engelhardt, Lisa McLean, Dik Saalfeld and John Swanson; and Lucian Branea, the parliamentary liaison of the Romanian Pro Democracy Association.

### **Pre-Election Phase**

In late September, NDI Senior Associate for Election Processes Patrick Merloe and Bulgaria Field Representative Lisa McLean travelled to Skopje to help ACI establish a personnel structure for the core group of national volunteers. The resulting job positions covered the principal tasks of coordination, scheduling, deployment, communication, finance, media and materials development. To fulfill these functions, ACI hired new staff who soon developed into a committed, cohesive and effective group.

On October 2, Merloe led the first training session for ACI members interested in serving as independent election monitors. Merloe discussed the legal basis to monitor elections, the steps that needed to be taken to organize a monitoring effort and the specific assignments of monitors on election day. Subsequently, ACI's core group in Skopje and members from the branch clubs assumed the monitor training regimen.

During the volunteer recruitment phase of the program, ACI was able to tap into two veins of popular sentiment: mistrust in the process of government and a desire to participate in the political system. In the weeks between its founding conference on October 1, the first round of elections on October 16 and the second round of voting on October 30, ACI reached out to more than 1,000 interested citizens to conduct monitoring training. Public

response transcended FYROM's often uncompromising ethnic boundaries, finding support among Albanian and Turkish minority communities as well as the Slav majority.

To recruit monitors, ACI advertised in newspapers, distributed fliers, sought free media on national television and conducted interviews with local TV and radio stations. ACI members actively recruited friends and relatives, who proved to be fruitful sources of volunteers. ACI also sought help from other local groups, recruiting their members as volunteers in the ACI-coordinated domestic monitoring effort.

ACI's agenda for its training workshop briefly discussed all aspects of election monitoring, but focused especially on election day itself, emphasizing the elements that domestic monitors should examine and investigate at the polling sites. As part of the training, ACI distributed a packet of monitoring materials that included a three-page election monitoring reference guide, a detailed checklist for election-day monitoring and a copy of the Macedonian election law. The first two were developed by ACI and NDI, based on sample materials gathered from monitoring organizations in other countries. (See Appendix D.) At the end of the training session, interested volunteers signed an ACI monitor pledge sheet obliging them to be objective, impartial and precise.

In preparation for election day, ACI and NDI developed a communication structure for the national office and the branch clubs. ACI targeted eight cities to conduct monitor training and establish a core structure. In each city, ACI assigned a regional director to carry out training sessions in the area, plan election-day deployment, and maintain contact with the national office. With the help of NDI, ACI also established an accounting system for each branch club to manage the finances during the election period. By election day, ACI expanded to 10 cities and established a strong network in Skopje, Sveti Nikole, Stip, and Prilep in central Macedonia, Bitola, Resen, Ohrid, and Struga in the south, and Tetovo, and Kicevo in the west.

Before election day, ACI negotiated with the State Election Commission (SEC)<sup>5</sup> to secure accreditation for its monitors. Although SEC initially resisted recognizing nonpartisan domestic observers, international pressure including from members of the U.S. Congress was instrumental to ensure that domestic observers would be permitted to pursue their civic duty during the elections. (See Appendix E.) By election day, ACI secured 450 credentials for its national network of monitors as well as assurances that the local election authorities would be informed of the legality of domestic monitors and their right to enter polling sites.

ACI also cooperated with the international monitoring effort undertaken by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly. ACI briefed approximately 100 international monitors on the domestic monitoring activities as well as the local political situation.

Although ACI's effort focused primarily on election-day monitoring, ACI and NDI met with representatives of several political parties, including VMRO-DPMNE, PDP and the Democratic Party, at the local and national levels in order to record grievances during the pre-election period. To comprehend and appreciate the popular public mood, ACI and NDI also followed major political events in the media, and when possible, attended political party rallies.

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<sup>5</sup>In a separate program, NDI was asked by several ministers and political party leaders to prepare a comprehensive review of the current election law and pending amendments. In January 1994, NDI presented the parliamentary party leaders with comments and suggestions on the draft election law including an amendment to include nonpartisan domestic monitors in addition to party and candidate monitors. Gordana Siljanovska, the minister without portfolio responsible for legislative drafts, welcomed NDI's efforts and forwarded the comments to an inter-ministerial group working on a new election law draft. Siljanovska later reported that a majority of the NDI comments would likely be incorporated into the draft election law to be presented to parliament in March 1994. However, factional conflict in the parliament impeded agreement on amendments to a new election law in time for the October 1994 elections.

## **Election Day**

### ***First round of elections -- October 16***

On October 16, ACI deployed more than 400 volunteers in teams of two covering more than 1,000 polling sites in 10 targeted municipalities. NDI deployed five small international election observation teams, which supported the domestic effort.

ACI monitors were identified by their ACI election-day buttons and the official credentials issued ultimately by the SEC. The ACI teams observed the election while situated at polling sites from the opening of the polls at 7 am until the end of the vote-count. ACI's checklist helped monitors record the extensive procedures at the polling sites. The observer teams reported regularly to their respective regional offices, which then reported to ACI-Skopje.

Some ACI observers initially faced difficulties in monitoring the elections. In certain areas, ACI monitors with proper domestic credentials were turned away from polling sites in the morning. ACI contacted the SEC and notified it of the problem. The Commission responded quickly, and ultimately monitors were allowed into all sites.

In the first round, ACI noted incomplete voter lists, lack of ballot secrecy and unevenly trained polling officials. More than 50 percent of the voters had not received the official invitation that imparted information on the location of the voter's polling site. Moreover, voter lists were inaccurate, incomplete and out-of-date. For example, in many cases, names of people who were long dead or had emigrated appeared on the voter list. Similarly, while names of part of a family were included on a voter list at one polling site, other members from the same family were not registered there. ACI volunteers also observed that a number of people were not allowed to vote because they did not possess the necessary documentation such as a new passport or a citizenship certificate. Finally, ACI noted that in many polling sites many family members voted together.

ACI concluded that most of the problems stemmed from a lack of direction provided by the SEC to the regional committees and poor planning and organization at the regional election committees. Incomplete training of polling officials contributed to voter confusion and agitation. All ACI monitors confirmed that the vote count was conducted in a more orderly manner than the balloting process. (See Appendix F.) ACI concluded, therefore, that irregularities were the result of administrative problems, and not an organized attempt to manipulate the process.

### *Interim period -- October 17 to 29*

In the period between elections, ACI resumed its efforts to recruit and train new volunteers in the previously targeted cities as well as to reach out to new cities, including Kriva Palanka, Krusevo, Strumica and Gevgelia. Based on their first-round experiences, ACI also modified the checklist and added a tally sheet for the vote count. In addition, ACI supplied Albanian translations of its monitoring materials to the Association's ethnic Albanian monitors.

In the aftermath of the first round, opposition parties, VMRO-DPMNE and the Democratic Party (DP), declared a boycott of the second round of voting in protest of alleged manipulation. To maintain its neutral stance, ACI had to turn away several hundred party volunteers from the boycotting factions who wanted to observe the elections under ACI auspices.

### *Second Round of Elections -- October 30*

For the second round of elections, ACI deployed more than 650 volunteers covering 1,500 sites in 11 municipalities. The boycotting parties established unofficial "alternative" polling sites in some communities as a symbolic protest. In order to gain a comprehensive picture of the local situation, ACI monitors visited these sites and noted that the alternative voting effort was peaceful. However, in some cities, the polling officials claimed that the opposition was blocking entry to official polling sites.



While ACI volunteers noted the overall improvement in efficiency during the second round of elections, they also witnessed continued problems with inaccurate voter lists, delays in opening polling sites and failure to provide complete privacy. This time, more people received their invitation to vote, but about 25 percent did not acquire this official notification. In addition, many citizens, especially ethnic Albanians, were not able to vote because they lacked proper Macedonian identification such a new passport or a citizenship certificate. Municipalities, overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of requests for such official papers, could not adequately meet the demand before the second round.

### **Post-Election**

On the whole, ACI and international observer groups agreed that as there was no pattern of disenfranchisement -- that the irregularities should be considered administrative rather than intentional. ACI's independent evaluation helped separate serious criticisms from partisan allegations. ACI's statements at two post-election news conferences were widely reported in the national television and print media.

Following the elections, ACI Executive Director Goran Ivanov visited the district clubs and conducted informal meetings with ACI volunteers on the election process. Based on election-day reports and these meetings, ACI will release a comprehensive report, to be circulated to political party representatives, government officials and interested citizens.

### **Election Results**

More than 77 percent of the eligible voters participated in the country's first national elections since independence. Kiro Gligorov of SDS was reelected as president with 52.4 percent of the vote. The Alliance for Macedonia secured 95 of 120 parliamentary seats. Of those, SDS gained 57, the Liberal Party took 27 and the Socialist Party of Macedonia acquired 5 seats. The ethnic Albanian PDP gained 10 seats, and both the NDP and the radical Albanian independent group each sent four delegates to the parliament. The Romany

and the Turkish parties each won one seat. As a result of their boycott, VMRO-DPMNE and DP are not represented in the parliament.

The new government is composed largely of members of the former cabinet, and contains four Albanian (PDP) ministers. Branko Crvenkovski remains Prime Minister. Over the next few months, parliamentary priorities include the adoption of a local self-government law, a law on privatization, a political party law, a political party financing law and a law on radio and television management. It is not yet clear what the extra-parliamentary parties will employ to express their opposition to the government's program.

## **VI. FOLLOW-UP WORK**

ACI's election activities have brought the organization new public attention and recognition. The nationwide monitoring effort generated hundreds of new members and solidified the Association's national and local structures. Today ACI faces the challenge of moving beyond election monitoring and define a nonelectoral role for itself in supporting the development of democracy at the national and local levels. The organization's future activities will need to engage a diverse citizenry in a dialogue on a number of key political and economic reform issues.

As its first post-election activity, ACI co-organized with NDI a regional conference entitled "Women in Politics" in Skopje on January 25 to 28, 1995. The conference brought together women in elected office from 13 countries in Central and Eastern Europe for training on decisionmaking, leadership and communication skills. In FYROM, as in many of the post-communist states, few women are active in politics, and fewer still hold leadership positions. In addition to the international conference, ACI conducted a one-day seminar for women political and civic activists from FYROM on problem-solving and program development. By sponsoring both these events, the Association raised its public image as an organization that considers women a crucial force in the development of democratic institutions.

ACI's continuing success depends on its ability to help solve local problems. NDI, in cooperation with ACI, will continue to work to increase citizen participation in the political process. It is however difficult to engage citizens in political participation if they do not have a basic understanding of the legislative process. In the coming year, NDI and ACI will work to provide citizens with information on the political decisionmaking processes at the local level. NDI and ACI will also look to promote a process of ongoing dialogue between citizens and elected officials by organizing town meetings on issues of local concern. To these meetings, local clubs will invite mayors, city councilmembers, city administrators and interested citizens to discuss government organization and functions with citizens.

Beyond providing civic education on local government institutions, NDI and ACI also plan to involve citizens in redressing issues of public concern at the local level. Accordingly, NDI's field representative and outside trainers will provide instruction in basic community organizing principles such as identifying and researching local issues, building coalitions with various groups, and devising strategies to influence the decisionmaking process.

Ultimately, NDI plans to move its partner organization in FYROM toward self-sustainability. NDI and ACI efforts will concentrate on expanding the Association's presence at the local level, improving its organizational structure, and strengthening the management, financial, communication, and political organizing skills of its staff. If ACI is to promote grassroots political engagement, it must enhance its presence at the local level by expanding its most mature clubs and establishing new clubs. In the next year, NDI will work with ACI both at the national and local levels in leadership development, project planning and membership expansion.

Organizational and staff development are also crucial to ACI's long-term success. ACI is a new organization with talented national staff, an enthusiastic volunteer membership and a committed board of directors. The challenge for the new organization will be to delineate further the powers and responsibilities of the national staff, executive board and local branch clubs vis-à-vis one another. ACI also needs to develop clearer communication

arrangements as well as program and financial systems both for the home office and the local branches. In addition to on-the-ground guidance, NDI will look for opportunities for ACI staff and board to share their experiences with and learn from the Society for Democratic Culture in Albania, the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights, and the Pro Democracy Association in Romania.

## VII. CONCLUSION

The consolidation of a stable, democratic society depends on the development of a strong civic culture. Developing a civic culture means promoting the concept of citizenship. It means creating an appropriate relationship between the responsibilities of the state to citizens and the responsibilities of individual citizens to the nation and to one another.

In FYROM, as elsewhere in the region, the command approach of the communist system attempted to destroy civic culture, and it nearly succeeded. People developed little awareness of how they could participate in government to change their lives and those of their neighbors. In a country lacking democratic traditions and mediating structures, the support and development of civic culture represents an enormous challenge. This requires both grassroots education to increase understanding of citizen rights, responsibilities and opportunities, and increased efforts by national politicians to enhance citizen confidence in the democratic process. It is hoped that this mutually reinforcing effort will, over time, lead to full-scale participatory democracy.

This report chronicles the concrete steps taken to encourage the development of a nationwide civic organization to educate citizens and politicians about their roles and responsibilities in a democracy. ACI's nonpartisan, heterogenous character is crucial for its success as an agent of change and democratization in the areas of civic education and citizen participation in FYROM. As ACI expands its membership base and fortifies its structure at the national and local levels, the Association plans to grow into an institution through which citizens increasingly involve themselves in the political process to address local issues and concerns.

**APPENDIX A**

Excerpts from NDI Training Material  
"How to Solve Problems in Your Community"

# How To Solve Problems In Your Community

It takes a lot to solve problems. Hard work, intelligence, commitment. Discipline, good faith, endurance. These are all internal attributes people have in varying degrees. But to get the most out of people you must provide some external structure to channel their efforts. You must *organize* them.

This handbook describes the major steps in organizing a campaign to solve problems. Whether you want to do something about crime or improve your child's school, the process is largely the same. It involves identifying problems, then formulating a plan to deal with them. The major steps, explained in the next few pages, are as follows:

1. Choose the issue
2. Develop a strategy
3. Target decision makers, allies and opponents
4. Develop a message
5. Work in coalition with other interested groups
6. Use volunteers
7. Develop effective tactics
8. Evaluate

# CHOOSE THE ISSUE

**Issue: a problem or part of a problem that can be defined and addressed by citizens.**

In order to be effective in solving problems in your community, you must first identify problems that can be solved. Don't take on projects that are too ambitious, complex or difficult. Don't, for example, ask your neighbors to help you eliminate unemployment in your town. Instead, choose a problem or *part* of a problem that you have a reasonable chance of fixing. Instead of trying to eliminate unemployment, you could focus on re-educating people who are out of work so that they are more likely to find a job.

When you think about an issue you want to address, ask yourself the following questions:

*Is it...*

- ...easy to understand?
- ...winnable?
- ...worthwhile?
- ...consistent with the values of your organization?
- ...widely and deeply felt by others?

*Does it...*

- ...result in real improvement in people's lives?
- ...give people a sense of their ability to make change?
- ...alter the relationship of power?

*Are there...*

- ...clear targets?
- ...clear timetables?

## ***DEVELOP A STRATEGY***

**Strategy: a detailed plan for reaching a desired goal**

There are six main elements to a strategy. As you think about how to solve your problem, think about each of them, then write it all down. This is the master plan you will use to organize your actions.

1. **Set goals:** decide what it is you want to accomplish in the short term. Are there longer term goals you can address as well?
2. **Identify resources:** where and how will you get the money, volunteers and expertise needed to accomplish your goals?
3. **Targeting:** who cares about the issue? What do they stand to win or lose? What power do they have? How are they organized? Establish primary and secondary targets.
4. **Develop a message:** decide how you are going to talk about the problem. Keep it simple. Select a message that works with your targeted audience. Plan a timetable for when and how you use your message.
5. **Coalition building:** who are your allies in solving this problem? What are their strengths and weaknesses? In what areas can you work together?
6. **Tactics:** how will you get the attention of decision makers? What actions can you take to get access to them?



# TARGETING

**Targeting: the process of identifying decision makers, organizations and individuals who care about the issue or might be persuaded to help you solve the problem.**

Decide who can help you achieve your goal. Then decide how you can best use their help. Here are some questions you should think about when deciding who to work with:

How many organizations are there?

How many members do they have?

Do they work or vote for an elected official?

Will they give money or time to your campaign?

Do they have special credibility or appeal?

Are they part of a larger network?

Do they have special skills (lawyers)?

Are they likely to attract the interest of the media?

## SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR MEDIA RELATIONS

### General Rules for Publicity

1. Publicity in and of itself should not be an objective. Negative publicity can be infinitely more damaging than positive publicity.
2. Anticipation of events is one of the fundamental keys to press success.
3. Only go to the press if there is something important to announce. (*e.g.* a "Dog Bites Man" headline won't sell papers while a "Man Bites Dog" will)
4. Publicity is like a snowball. In order to keep the snowball rolling it is important to create further interest in an issue.
5. Media techniques will not serve a purpose unless your message is first fully developed.

### Guidelines for Beneficial Press Relations

6. Treat journalists with respect.
7. Always be well-prepared.
8. Be available at all times, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.
9. Never lie.
10. Always be objective and avoid propaganda.
11. Be aware of your limitations.

### Television Communication Techniques

12. What a person sees is often more powerful than what a person thinks they read.
13. You should be visual, using gestures or utilizing background movement.
14. Capitalize on your location targeting sites that positively reinforce your message (*e.g.* if focusing on the education system, speak from a school).

# VOLUNTEERS

**Volunteer:** person who gives freely of his time to a cause or activity in which he believes

One of the most important elements in solving problems is the role of volunteers in carrying out the work that results in bringing about change. Volunteers provide the guidance, labor and influence that are critical to your success. Without them your ability to get anything done is severely limited. Following are important points for your volunteer program:

## Benefits of Volunteers

- Increase ability to solve problems in your community
- Expand membership
- Draw on expertise of a greater number of people
- Boost influence of events and activities with more people in attendance

## Reasons People Volunteer

- Personal interest in changing his or her community for the better
- Specific interest in a certain issue or dilemma
- Belief in the organization
- Professional interest in learning new skills
- Social interest in making new friends or meeting new people

## Ways to Recruit Volunteers

- Ask friends, family, neighbors, and community leaders to join in an activity or attend a meeting
- Keep sign-in sheets at every event or activity. Contact and recruit all new-comers following each event
- Ask new people to attend events, not just meetings
- Keep an ongoing entry-level program for new people to orient them to your organization

**APPENDIX B**

ACI Poster: Civic Organizing Meetings

# ДОЈДЕТЕ НА СЕМИНАРИ ВО:

- Тетово - 14 Јуни 1994 во 18.00 ч      во салата на Собрание на  
општина Тетово
- Битола - 15 Јуни 1994 во 11.00 ч      во Домот на Културата
- Скопје - 15 16 Јуни 1994 во 19 ч      во Салон 19.19
- Штип - 17 Јуни во 18.00 ч      во Домот на Културата

## ТЕМИ:

- Граѓанско организирање
- Политичко организирање
- Формирање асоцијации
- Како да се влијае на владата
- Како да се влијае на граѓаните

Бесплатен материјал за граѓанско организирање на македонски и албански јазик.

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**ОРГАНИЗАТОР: НАЦИОНАЛНИОТ  
ДЕМОКРАТСКИ ИНСТИТУТ НА  
СОЕДИНЕТИТЕ АМЕРИКАНСКИ ДРЖАВИ.**



**APPENDIX C**

ACI's agenda of October National Organizing Conference

## ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIC INITIATIVE SKOPJE

Welcome to the founding conference of the Association for Civic Initiative (ACI). The goal of this first meeting is to draw the general directions in which ACI will focus all its energy in order to better materialize our working platform in concrete actions and specific projects. These projects will be of tremendous importance in accomplishing our strong desire for a civic society, a society of lawfulness, tolerance, peace and universal progress. The keys to our success will be knowledge, information, and successful organizing.

We can do it and we will achieve our goals...

Our work will allow us to get to know each other better, and from now on, will create a new level of communication in our relations.

Saturday 01.10. 1994 12:00pm

### AGENDA

1. Presenting the goals and tasks of the Association;
2. Reporting on the official registration of ACI, opening of an ?-account, and announcing the NDI and ACI Partnership Agreement;
3. Discussing the Statutes of the Association and the various possibilities to regulate different activities of the Association in compliance to the statutes;

#### Lunch Break

4. Establishing Committees for the different projects and discussing their activities;
5. Electing representatives to the organs and various bodies of ACI;
6. Preparing for the training seminar for the election observers.

Sunday 02.10. 1994 12.00pm


Training seminar for the observers of the Parliamentary Elections '94.

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) based in Washington -- an institute that helps organizations and associations around the world with ideas and activities similar to the ones conducted by our association -- plans to assist us in our civic organizing efforts. In order to achieve this goal, NDI provided us with its own experts educated in election monitoring who assisted our domestic observers to prepare for every small detail and actively participate in a whole array of activities that ensured the entire organization of Elections'94 and the validity of its results. NDI assisted in confirming whether the elections were fair or fraudulent, and whether there were irregularities by the political parties or the election authorities involved in these elections.

Attached is the Handbook for Election Observers that was developed according to the Canadian election law.

Attached also find the Statutes of ACI, a concise version of the NDI-ACI Partnership Agreement, and the Election Guidelines for Observers.





## ЗДРУЖЕНИЕ ЗА ГРАЃАНСКА ИНИЦИЈАТИВА СКОПЈЕ

Почитувани,

Добредојдовте на Основачкото Собрание на Здружението за граѓанска иницијатива.

Целта на одржувањето на седницата на нашето здружение е да му го дадеме основниот лик на истото, основните правци во кои тоа би ја насочило својата енергија за да може навистина својата платформа за работа да ја материјализира во конкретна акција и конкретен проект кои би биле ако не од огромно, тогаш барем од доволно големо значење да помогнат да ги реализираме нашите амбиции како граѓани - а тоа е граѓанско општество со сите белези на општество, во кои законитоста, толеранцијата, мирот и сеопштиот напредок би биле над секоја кратковида или егоистична формула на поставување на работите. Клучот се знаењето, информацијата и успешната акција.

Ние тоа го можеме и ќе го постигнеме...

Ова среќавање ќе овозможи да се запознаеме подобро меѓу себе и ќе отвори простор за нов вид на комуникација меѓу нас отсега па натаму.

**Сабота 01.10. 1994 12.00ч.**

### Д Н Е В Е Н Р Е Д:

1. Воведно излагање за целите и задачите на Здружението;
2. Извештај за официјалното регистрирање на Здружението, отворањето на жиро-сметката на истото и известување за "Договорот за соработка" помеѓу NDI и ЗГИ;
3. Разгледување и произнесување по предлог на Статутот на Здружението и запознавање со можностите за регулирање на некои посебни прашања со други акти во согласност со Статутот;

### Пауза за ручек

4. Формирање на комитети за поединечни проекти и разгледување на идеи во однос на нивната дејност;
5. Избор на претставници во органите и телата на Здружението на Републичко ниво;
6. Подготовки за семинарот за обука на набљудувачи за изборите;

Недела 02.10. 1994 12.00ч.

---

Семинар за обучување на набљудувачите на Претседателските и  
Парламентарните избори '94;

Националниот Демократски Институт од Вашингтон - САД,  
институт кој ширум светот помага здруженија и асоцијации  
со идеи и активности слични на оние кои нашето здружение  
планира да ги остварува на планот на граѓанското организирање,  
за горенаведената цел обезбеди сопствени експерти - обучувачи за  
набљудување на избори, за оспособување на домашните набљудувачи  
(во случајов заинтересираните членови и доброволци на  
здружението ) да можат солидно подготвени да се вклучат во  
таквите активности низ кои во крајна линија ќе можат да ги оценат  
сите детаљи во однос на целосната организација и резултатите  
од изборите '94 и потврда дали имало или не фалсификувања и  
разни други подметнувања од страна на партиите и службените  
органи директно вклучени во истите тие избори.

Во прилог е доставен материјалот  
**ПРИРАЧНИК ЗА НАБЉУДУВАЊЕ НА ИЗБОРИТЕ**  
кој е работен според изборните искуства во Канада.



**Во прилог се доставени следните материјали:**

- 1. Статут на здружението**
- 2. Скратена верзија на Договорот за соработка помеѓу Здружението за граѓанска иницијатива - Скопје и Националниот Демократски институт за меѓународни работи од Вашингтон - САД**
- 3. Водич, упатство и формулар за набљудувачи на изборите ( Работен според изборни искуства од Канада)**

**APPENDIX D**  
**NDI-ACI Domestic Monitoring Training Materials**

## ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIC INITIATIVE

### DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY

I promise to act in an objective, non-partisan manner as an election observer for the Association for Civic Initiative.

Name:

Address:


Telephone:

What would be the best time to contact you?

Do you own a car?

Would you be able to give rides to election observers during election day?

I would be able to bring along \_\_\_\_ persons who will participate in monitoring the elections.



ЗДРУЖЕНИЕ ЗА ГРАЃАНСКА ИНИЦИЈАТИВА  
СКОПЈЕ

ПРИСТАПНИЦА

Ветувам дека ќе бидам објективен, непартиски изборен набљудувач за Здружението за Граѓанска Иницијатива.

ИМЕ И ПРЕЗИМЕ \_\_\_\_\_

АДРЕСА \_\_\_\_\_

ТЕЛЕФОН \_\_\_\_\_

Кое би било најпогодно време да контактираме со вас \_\_\_\_\_

Дали поседувате автомобил \_\_\_\_\_

Дали би можеле да ги превезувате набљудувачите на денот на изборите  
\_\_\_\_\_

Би можел-а да доведам и приклучам \_\_\_\_\_ лица кои ќе учествуваат во набљудувањето на изборите.

## REPORT GUIDELINES

### QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE ELECTION OBSERVER

1. Observer's Full Name
2. When was the election site opened? (for the first election site visited)  
Were the ballot boxes empty and correctly sealed?
3. Was there more than one election site in the building?
4. Did the voting booth guarantee the privacy/secretcy of the vote?
5. Was there any evidence for waging political party campaigns on the grounds of the election site?
6. Were there any candidate representatives present at the station?
7. Was the police or the military present?
8. Were there cases of other armed individuals present at the election site?
9. Was the election site organized to provide the uninterrupted and continuous work of the election team (commission)?
10. Describe any problems with voter identification.
11. Describe any problems with the voter rolls.
12. How were such problems resolved?
13. Were all voters allowed to vote under the same conditions?
14. Were there cases of handicapped or illiterate voters, and what arrangements were made for them to cast their vote?
15. Were there cases of casting votes later than 7pm?
16. Were there complaints about the election process? Attach any written complaints.
17. What persons other than the members of the election commission were present at the vote count?
18. Who were the members of the election commission present at the vote count?
19. Describe the counting procedure...
20. Were the number of voters, the number of total ballots casted, and the number of valid and invalid ballots reported and compared?
21. Who was responsible for the election report and materials after the vote count, and in whose presence was their transportation carried out?
22. Describe the activities of the observer in the municipal election commission?

## ПЛАН - ПОТСЕТНИК ЗА СОСТАВУВАЊЕ ИЗВЕШТАЈ

1. Име и презиме на набљудувачот
2. Кога било отворено изборното место ( за првото изборно место )  
-дали гласачките кутии биле празни и соодветно запечатени
3. Дали имало повеќе изборни места во една просторија?
4. Дали параванот гарантирал тајност на гласањето?
5. Дали имало било какви докази за воене кампањи? (опис)...
6. Дали биле присутни претставници на кандидатите?
7. Дали имало присуство на полиција или војска? (опис)
8. Дали имало случаи на присуство на останати вооружени лица на изборното место?
9. Дали изборното место било организирано така да овозможува непречена работа на избирачкиот одбор?
- 10.Опис на проблемите со идентификација на гласачите?
- 11.Опис на проблемите со изборните списоци  
-од гледна точка на гласачите  
-од гледна точка на службените лица
- 12.Како биле решени сите тие проблеми?
- 13.Дали на сите гласачи им било дозволено да гласаат на ист начин?
- 14.Дали имало хендикепирани и неписмени гласачи и како било организирано нивното гласање?
- 15.Дали имало случаи да се гласа и после 19 часот?
- 16.Дали имало жалби за изборниот процес? (со приложени потпишани изјави)
- 17.Кој друг освен членовите на изборниот одбор присуствувал на броењето на гласовите?
- 18.Кои членови на изборниот одбор присуствувале на пребројувањето на гласовите?
- 19.Опис на начинот на пребројувањето!...
- 20.Дали била направена споредба помеѓу бројот на гласачите, бројот на вкупно донесените гласачки ливчиња и бројот на искористени и неискористени гласачки ливчиња?
- 21.Кој останал заедно со изборниот материјал после пребројувањето и како и во чие присуство е извршен транспортот на истиот?
- 22.Опис на активностите на набљудувачот во општинската изборна комисија!...



## OBSERVATION SHEET FOR THE DAY OF THE ELECTIONS

This sheet must be supplemented with a detailed election report following the instructions specified in the REPORT GUIDELINES FOR THE ELECTION OBSERVER.

Subject            Election Site #   Election Site #   Election Site #   Election Site #  
of Observation

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1. When did the observers arrive at the election site?
2. What time did they leave the site?
3. Were all members of the election commission present?
4. Were there any other observers that were monitoring the election site with us or before our stop?
5. Was the police or the military present?
6. Was there any signs of political campaigning on the grounds of the election site?
7. Were the ballot boxes correctly sealed?

### THE ELECTION PROCESS

8. Were there any problems with the voter rolls?
9. Were there any problems with voters' identification documents?
10. Were the members of the election commission helpful with and responsive to the problems arising?
11. Were the ballot cards correctly sealed?
12. Did the election process guarantee the privacy/confidentiality of the vote?
13. Was the confidentiality of the vote broken when handicapped or illiterate voters went to the polls?
14. How long did it take for voters to cast their ballot from the time they entered the voting booth to the time they were finished?
15. Did the voters believe in the confidentiality of the elections?
16. What was the total number of voters expected to cast their ballots at this election site?
17. What was the number of voters that had casted their ballots before the appearance of the observers?

18. When was the election site closed?
19. Were the necessary election reports prepared properly upon closing the election site?
20. Was the vote count done on the election site?
21. What time was the vote count started?
22. Were there other observers present at the election site?
23. Did the Election Organization write down the results of the count?
24. How long did it take to finish the vote count?
25. Did the Election Organization announce the results of the vote count?
26. Were all materials sealed in envelopes?
27. Did observers participate in the transportation of the materials?

## ФОРМУЛАР ЗА НАБЉУДУВАЧОТ НА ДЕНОТ НА ИЗБОРИТЕ

Сите заклучоци "ДА" и "НЕ", бројчани и други завршни податоци кои ќе бидат запишани во овој формулар за денот на гласањето треба да бидат дополнети со опишен извештај врз основа на планот-потсетник за составување на извештај

<b>БР.</b>	<b>ПРЕДМЕТ НА НАБЉУДУВАЊЕ</b>	<b>ИЗБОРНО</b>	<b>ИЗБОРНО</b>	<b>ИЗБОРНО</b>	<b>ИЗБОРНО</b>
		<b>МЕСТО #</b>	<b>МЕСТО #</b>	<b>МЕСТО #</b>	<b>МЕСТО #</b>

1	Во кое време набљудувачите пристигнале?				
2	Во кое време набљудувачите замонале?				
3	Дали сите членови на изборниот одбор биле присутни?				
4	Дали биле присутни и други набљудувачи пред нас или со нас				
5	Дали имало присуство на војската и полицијата во гласачкото место				
6	Дали имало било какви знаци на згитација?				
7	Дали гласачките кутии биле запечатени безбедно?				
<b>ИЗБОРНИОТ ПРОЦЕС</b>					
8	Дали имало проблеми со гласачките списоци				
9	Дали имало проблеми со документите за идентификација				
10	Дали членовите на изборниот одбор биле подготвени да помогнат проблемите да се разрешат				
11	Дали гласачките личиња биле соодветно запечатени?				
12	Дали процесот доволно ја гарантирал тајноста на гласањето?				
13	Дали при гласањето, на хендикепираните и неписмените лица им била нарушена тајноста?				
14	Колку време било потребно за гласање вклучувајќи го времето на влегување и излегување на гласачите во гл. место?				
15	Дали гласачите верувале во тајноста на нивното гласање?				

16.	Колку вкупно гласачи биле предвидени за гласање на изборното место				
17.	Колкав бил бројот на гласачите кои гласале до моментот на присуство ?				
<b>ЗАТВОРАЊЕ НА ИЗБОРНОТО МЕСТО</b>					
18.	Кога изборното место било затворено ?				
19.	Кога изборното место било затворено и дали барањите извештаи биле завршени ?				
20.	Дали броењето било извршено на Изборното место ?				
21.	Кога започнало броењето ?				
22.	Дали присуствувале и други набљудувачи на изборите ?				
23.	Дали И.О. го запишал записникот од броењето ?				
24.	Колку време требало да се заврши со броењето ?				
25.	Дали И.О. ги објавил резултатите од броењето ?				
26.	Дали сите материјали биле запечатени во шпикови ?				
27.	Дали во транспортот присуствувале набљудувачи ?				

ELECTION TABULATION SHEET

Precinct #:  
Election Site:

The vote count started at \_\_\_\_\_.

Total Registered Voters:

TOTAL NUMBER OF BALLOTS  
(distributed to the Election Organization)

Regular:

Additional:

Total Valid:

Invalid:

VOTES CAST

According to voting rolls:

Difference from voting rolls:

TOTAL VOTES CAST

ТАБЕЛАРЕН ПРЕГЛЕД

Изборна единица: \_\_\_\_\_

Гласачко место: \_\_\_\_\_

Броњето на гласовите започнало во \_\_\_\_\_ часот

ВКУПНО РЕГИСТРИРАНИ ГЛАСАЧИ: \_\_\_\_\_

ВКУПНО ГЛАСАЧКИ ЛИВЧИЊА  
(доставени до ИО)

Редовни \_\_\_\_\_

Дополнителни \_\_\_\_\_

Искористени \_\_\_\_\_

Искористени \_\_\_\_\_

Неискористени \_\_\_\_\_

Неискористени \_\_\_\_\_

ВКУПНО ИСКОРИСТЕНИ \_\_\_\_\_

ВКУПНО ВАЖЕЧКИ \_\_\_\_\_

НЕВАЖЕЧКИ \_\_\_\_\_

ВКУПНО НЕИСКОРИСТЕНИ \_\_\_\_\_

ГЛАСАЛЕ

Според списокот \_\_\_\_\_

надвор од списокот \_\_\_\_\_

ВКУПНО ГЛАСАЛЕ \_\_\_\_\_

1 \_\_\_\_\_  
2 \_\_\_\_\_  
3 \_\_\_\_\_  
4 \_\_\_\_\_  
5 \_\_\_\_\_  
6 \_\_\_\_\_  
7 \_\_\_\_\_  
8 \_\_\_\_\_  
9 \_\_\_\_\_  
10 \_\_\_\_\_

11 \_\_\_\_\_  
12 \_\_\_\_\_  
13 \_\_\_\_\_  
14 \_\_\_\_\_  
15 \_\_\_\_\_  
16 \_\_\_\_\_  
17 \_\_\_\_\_  
18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX E**

Letter from the U.S. Congress addressed to President Kiro Gligorov

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

October 12, 1994

His Excellency Kiro Gligorov

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to bring your attention to our concerns about reported recent developments with regard to the preparations for the legislative and presidential elections on October 16, 1994.

As you know, the international community will be sending observers, at your invitation, to these elections. Your invitation has been widely welcomed. Our concerns, however, relate to indications that nonpartisan domestic observers may not receive credentials to observe the elections.

As you may know, the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) has been working in your country since November 1993 to support the work of the Association for Civic Initiative (ACI), a nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization. Over the last few weeks, the NDI representatives in Skopje have received repeated assurances from Speaker Stojan Andov, Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski and Minister Gordana Siljanovska that credentials for ACI domestic observers would be forthcoming. However, in a meeting on October 7 with the CSCE liaison office and the officials responsible for credentialing observers, NDI and ACI were informed that this may not be the case.

We strongly support the principle that it is in the citizens of a country themselves who are the ultimate guarantors of the electoral process and its outcome. Since 1986, in conformity with the CSCE Copenhagen Document that endorses election monitoring by domestic groups, NDI has supported the activities of domestic observers around the world. The nonpartisan nature of groups such as ACI enables them to offer a uniquely neutral observation of the process and helps secure the credibility of elections.

We therefore hope that you will promptly take every appropriate step to ensure that the ACI volunteers are permitted to pursue their civic duty as domestic observers during the two




His Excellency Kiro Gligorov  
October 12, 1994  
Page 2


rounds of voting on October 16 and 30. We believe the efforts of ACI enhance confidence and participation in the electoral process.

With best regards,


Sincerely,



Claiborne Pell  
Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Relations



Richard G. Lugar  
Ranking Minority Member  
Subcommittee on European Affairs  
Committee on Foreign Relations



Lee H. Hamilton  
Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Affairs



Benjamin A. Gilman  
Ranking Minority Member  
Committee on Foreign Affairs




Dennis DeConcini  
Chairman  
Congressional Commission on  
Security and Cooperation  
in Europe



Steny H. Hoyer  
Co-Chairman  
Congressional Commission on  
Security and Cooperation  
in Europe

**APPENDIX F**  
ACI Post-election Statements



THE ACI REPORT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLAMENTARIAN  
ELECTIONS- FIRST ROUND

SKOPJE, 17.10. 1994.

The Association for Civic Initiative is a non-partisan, non-governmental and independent organization, whose members are citizens of The Republic of Macedonia. Currently, ACI has been working on the organizing of domestic monitoring for the first time in our country. For the first round we have succeeded in recruiting around 450 volunteers, who during the election day covered more than 10 cities and dozens of towns and villages.

During the first hours of election day, the ACI observers were not allowed to enter polling sites, although they had credentials provided by the State Electoral Commission. After we intervened, the State Electoral Commission informed the Regional Electoral Commissions about the decision concerning the presence of domestic observers, and the problem was solved.

The biggest problem noticed by the ACI members was the delay of the invitation for voting, which again caused another problem - those citizens who were not on the voter registration lists were not able to vote. For example, according to the ACI reports, around 25% of the eligible voters in some municipalities and villages could not vote. Although this problem was more present in the places populated by non-slavic ethnic groups, the problem was so widespread that ACI considers it a major technical flaw. Since the invitations were based on the voter lists, the citizens who were not registered did not receive them. The invitations were not delivered in a consistent manner.

Another area in which the domestic observers noticed problems was the work of the polling boards. Although some of the election officials did their duty in a firm and efficient way, the ACI observers noticed that there were some election officials who insufficiently protected the integrity of the polling site. For example, a lot of polling sites were opened later than the time determined (07.00). Also, voting privacy was nearly non-existent in most cases; while voting blinds were provided, they were very low, and, for the most part, were in areas accessible to onlookers.

The atmosphere during the voting process is a topic that attracted the attention of the domestic observers. A high level of confusion and political agitation was noticed in a large number of polling sites. We conclude, with a concern, that in some polling sites our observers noticed the presence of the armed members of the police.

Compared to the problems during the voting process, the process of the counting of the ballots was much more orderly. The only exception was the unsolved question about what ballots were invalid. There were no firm criteria for excluding ballots that may or may not have been invalid.

On the basis of the monitoring and the conclusions reached by the ACI board, and having in mind the importance of the second round, ACI gives the following recommendations:

1. The problem with the voter registration lists has to be corrected as much, and as soon, as possible.
2. The voter registration lists should be announced and posted in public places so that citizens can check if they are on the list any time.
3. The polling board has to have clear instructions, in order, for example, to inform the citizens about the citizenship requirement and what documents are required.
4. The invitations should be delivered to all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, at least 2-3 days before the election day, if not earlier.

5. The space for voting should be better organized in order to protect the secrecy of voting.
6. More tables should be provided in polling sites, so that the whole process can be conducted in a more efficient way.
7. A mobile ballot box should be provided for the infirm and very old people and for all the others who can not come to the polling place.

The Association for Civic Initiative agrees with the CSCE statement, which says that the second round will be very important, and for that goal it will again organize groups of volunteers, citizens of The Republic of Macedonia, in even larger numbers.




The Association for Civic Initiative Report  
on the Parliamentary Elections – Second Round

Skopje, 31.10.1994

The Association for Civic Initiative mobilized over 650 volunteers to monitor the second round of the Macedonian elections. The non-partisan, non-governmental association of citizens of all ages and nationalities reported many of the same irregularities that were reported during the first round, in addition to some new problems.

Many polling boards had still not been informed of the right of citizens to monitor their elections. They welcomed party monitors and international monitors, but a large number of polling stations were not informed about ACI's credentials and the group's right to be present. Monitors were turned away from some polling sites when polls opened, but this problem was quickly resolved by telephone calls to the electoral commission. More serious problems developed in Ohrid mid-afternoon of election day, as well as just before the vote count. Police stopped a car carrying monitors and questioned the validity of their credentials; they took them to a police station, and upon reaching election officials, released the monitors with apologies. Just before the vote count, the same police officers removed the legally credentialed monitors from the polling site, took them to a police station, and confiscated their monitoring materials; this instance of intimidation is still being investigated.

The voting process was, generally, improved compared with the first round, with several exceptions. Invitations were sent earlier, and voter lists were updated. Citizens without invitations were allowed to vote by proving their citizenship.



ЗДРУЖЕНИЕ ЗА ГРАЃАНСКА ИНИЦИЈАТИВА  
СКОПЈЕ

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Almost in all places where our observers were present, there were different kinds of political campaigning. One of the biggest problem that was noticed was the unpreparedness of the polling boards and their ignorance concerning their work and the election law. Members of the polling boards consulted party agents about some problems that appeared which implies that several hours of training of the polling board members were not enough for conducting the election process,

The counting process was almost consistent with the provided regulations.

Although the Association for Civic Initiative met with some obstacles and was not treated in an appropriate manner, we will continue with our activities according to our Statues.