

THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA

A Post-Election Assessment Report

November 28, 1999

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ABBREVIATIONS

DPR - *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (People's Representative Assembly)

DPRD I - *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I* (Provincial People's Representative Assembly)

DPRD II - *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II* (District People's Representative Assembly)

FKKI - *Fraksi Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia* (Indonesian National Unity Bloc)

FPDU - *Fraksi Perserikatan Daulat Ummat* (Union of Muslim Sovereignty Bloc)

GBHN - *Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara* (Broad Outlines of State Policy)

Golkar - *Partai Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups Party)

KPU - *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (Election Commission)

MPR - *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (People's Consultative Assembly)

NU - *Nahdlatul Ulama* (Awakening of the Muslim Scholars)

PAN - *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party)

Panwas - *Panitia Pengawas* (Oversight Committee)

PBB - *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Moon and Star Party)

PBI - *Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia* (Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party)

PDI-P - *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan* (Indonesia Democratic Party - Struggle)

PDKB - *Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa* (Love the Nation Democracy Party)

PK - *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party)

PKB - *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party)

PKD - *Partai Katolik Demokrat* (Democratic Catholic Party)

PKP - *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* (Unity and Justice Party)

PNI-FM - *Partai Nasional Indonesia-Front Marhaen* (Indonesian National Party-Marhaen Front)

POLRI - *Kepolisian Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian National Police)

PPD I - *Panitia Pemilihan Daerah I* (Provincial Election Committee)

PPD II - *Panitia Pemilihan Daerah II* (District Election Committee)

PPI - *Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia* (Indonesian Election Committee)

PPP - *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (Development Unity Party)

TNI - *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Military)

Wanhankamnas - *Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional* (National Defense and Security Council)

Executive Summary

On October 20 and 21, 1999, exactly 17 months after President Soeharto resigned and Indonesia's transition to democracy began, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri to be Indonesia's new president and vice president, respectively. These elections represent the first largely democratic and relatively peaceful transfer of executive power in Indonesia's history. They also mark the end of an extended electoral process that began with the passage of the new legal framework for elections on January 28, 1999 and was highlighted by national, provincial and district legislative elections on June 7. The establishment of a legitimate government through these elections and the announcement of the formation of the National Unity Cabinet on October 26 herald a new era of democratic transformation in Indonesia. Although much has been achieved in the democratic transition in Indonesia over the past 18 months, the hard work of consolidating these gains and overcoming the economic and social crisis has just begun.

This report examines developments in Indonesia's electoral process in September, October and early November 1999. It focuses on the completion of the process of forming the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) and the MPR and on the 1999 MPR General Session. As such it represents a continuation of the series of reports and statements NDI has issued during the past year on this electoral process. The most recent of these reports, issued in August 1999, discussed developments up to that time in the formation of the DPR and the MPR. This report was prepared on the basis of direct observation of the General Session, discussions with MPR members and political party leaders, and analysis of various written materials produced by the Election Commission (KPU) and the MPR.

The Composition of the DPR and Provincial and District Assemblies
The KPU completed the process of allocating seats to parties in the DPR only on September 1, nearly three months after the June 7 elections. After weeks of rancorous debate, the KPU finally decided on August 30 to retroactively change the rules and abolish vote sharing agreements, known as stembus accords, at the national level. The consequence of this decision was to take DPR seats away from some parties and give them to others. These changes occurred on the margins, and therefore did not significantly affect the overall makeup of the DPR. Nevertheless, the KPU decision to alter the rules that determined whether parties won seats after the election results were known did not comply with basic legal norms.

For the provincial and district assemblies, the final vote count and the allocation of seats to parties was the responsibility of the corresponding election committee: the PPD I at the provincial level and the PPD II at the district level. Although the formula for allocating seats to parties is a straightforward arithmetic calculation, there are some districts in which it has not been followed. In addition, there are some districts where arguments as to the validity of stembus accords at the local level are still not resolved, with some seats left vacant.

Attempts by the disadvantaged parties to address their complaints about this problem through the appropriate election committees have met with no success, and there does not appear to be any effective mechanism for redress through the courts.

As NDI has pointed out in earlier reports, the lack of a proper complaint resolution mechanism has been a general area of concern. Where the relevant level of the election administration or election oversight committee (*Panwas*) has failed for whatever reason to resolve a problem by discussion or consensus, no further action has been taken.

The hybrid electoral system used in Indonesia in 1999, in which proportional representation by province was combined with assignment of candidates to districts and some importance being given to district-level results, required very complex rules for the determination of elected candidates. According to these rules, seats won by "full quotas" were to be filled in a manner not subject to party discretion, whereas the KPU gave parties full discretion over seats won by "largest remainders." In practice, parties were permitted substantial discretion in filling all of their seats, including full quota seats, and 97 out of 462 elected DPR members (21 percent) "represent" districts other than those to which they were originally assigned. It appears that the KPU in effect changed the rules after the elections. The consequence of these developments was to reduce the significance of the district element of Indonesia's hybrid electoral system.

The Composition of the MPR

The selection of functional group⁽¹⁾ delegates continued to be mired in controversy during the months before the MPR General Session and even after the MPR was sworn in on October 1. In some instances, controversy surrounded the KPU's choice of which organization had the right to be represented. In other cases, the controversy surrounded the KPU's rejection of certain individuals to represent organizations it had already selected. A third type of controversy concerned the selection of delegates from particular organizations. These examples demonstrate that functional group representation, at least in the current situation in Indonesia, is unworkable if not undemocratic. In any event, there appears to be an emerging consensus that functional group representation in the MPR should be abolished before the 2004 elections.

The provincial assemblies seem to have chosen provincial delegates for the most part through the procedures suggested by the Minister of Home Affairs. As NDI pointed out previously, these procedures had majoritarian tendencies, in which a majority coalition in a provincial assembly could sweep all five provincial delegate seats. This method meant that in some cases the political affiliation of the provincial delegates differed significantly from the political makeup in the provincial assemblies produced by the June 7 elections.

The MPR General Session

Most of the formal meetings of the MPR General Session were open and relatively transparent, especially in comparison to previous MPR sessions. Of course, political decision making was not limited to the formal meetings; the critical negotiations and political horse trading took place in private.

Fortunately for the consolidation of Indonesia's democratic transition, the results of the MPR session suggest that a broad consensus now exists that the 1945 Constitution must be amended to address weaknesses in the country's political structure. The 1999 MPR

General Session produced a First Amendment to the Constitution that made changes to nine of the constitution's 37 articles. The most important parts of this Amendment assert the DPR's dominant role vis-a-vis the president in the legislative process. Although the First Amendment is not as sweeping as some had hoped, the MPR also passed a decree authorizing its Working Body to continue to meet and draft further amendments to be presented for approval by the full body at its first Annual Session in August 2000.

Under the rules the MPR adopted, the president and vice president were chosen in separate elections that followed the same procedures. The rules provided for multiple rounds of voting if necessary to ensure that the president and vice president would be elected with a majority of those present as opposed to a mere plurality.

With respect to East Timor, the MPR considered various options that would have fallen short of complete acceptance of the results of the UN-supervised referendum on August 30, but in the end passed a decree entirely acceptable to the international community. This decree recognized the results of the August referendum, rescinded the 1978 MPR decree formalizing Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and ordered the president to take steps to protect the rights of East Timorese who wish to retain their Indonesian citizenship. Transitional administration of the territory now passes to the UN for several years.

The MPR also exercised its constitutionally mandated duty to determine the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) for the coming five years. President Abdurrahman Wahid is required by an MPR decree to present a report to the MPR during each of its Annual Sessions from 2000 to 2003 and to be held accountable for his government's policies at the next MPR General Session in 2004. The 1999-2004 GBHN lays out a largely reformist policy agenda across many sectors, including the economy, politics, law, foreign affairs, defense and security, the civil service, religion, education, society and culture, regional development, natural resources and the environment.

The report also reviews the coalition building and power sharing arrangements that led first to the election of Amien Rais as Speaker of the MPR and Akbar Tandjung as Speaker of the DPR and later to the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President.

The Role of the Military

Since Indonesia's democratic transition began in mid-1998, the military has come under intense criticism for human rights abuses and corruption during the New Order. In addition to these past abuses, fresh cases have occurred in many parts of the country over the past 18 months.

In response to this criticism, the military developed the "New Paradigm," a blueprint for reducing its political profile. This blueprint has created controversy within the military among officers unwilling to give up the political and economic power to which they have become accustomed. It has also been criticized by civilians for not going far enough, because it is still based on the assumption that the military has a rightful role to play in domestic politics. Restructuring civil-military relations is one of the greatest challenges facing Indonesia's democratic transition.

The military's behavior in the months leading up to the General Session demonstrated its ambivalence over its proper political role in the emerging Indonesian democracy. The military was assertive in

defending its positions regarding East Timor and tried to influence domestic political developments as well. The military/police bloc, however, maintained a relatively low profile during the General Session, and military commander General Wiranto abandoned his bid for the vice presidency twice. Although the new cabinet still includes military officers in important posts, there are other signs of incipient improvement in civil-military relations in Indonesia.

Looking Ahead

The Working Body of the MPR is required to draft more thoroughgoing constitutional reforms before August 2000. One of the primary issues on the agenda is the direct election of the President and Vice President; there appears to be emerging consensus for direct elections which would occur for the first time in 2004. There is also consensus on the need to abolish military representation in the DPR, which is called for in the new GBHN, and functional group representation in the MPR. The constitutional reform process will address the future of the MPR, including alternatives of abolishing it altogether or transforming the provincial representatives in the MPR into an upper house of the national legislature. In addition, the Working Body will consider whether Indonesia should transform itself from a unitary into a federal state. There will also need to be further reforms to increase the independence and the powers of the legislative and judicial branches, as well as to establish stronger checks and balances among the three branches of government.

Introduction

On October 20 and 21, 1999, exactly 17 months after President Soeharto resigned and Indonesia's transition to democracy began, the People's Consultative Assembly, or MPR, elected Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President of the country. These elections represent the first largely democratic and relatively peaceful transfer of executive power in Indonesia's history. They also mark the end of an extended electoral process that began with the passage of the new legal framework for elections on January 28, 1999 and was highlighted by national, provincial and district legislative elections on June 7. The establishment of a legitimate government through these elections and the announcement of the formation of the National Unity Cabinet on October 26 herald a new era of democratic transformation in Indonesia. Although much has been achieved in terms of democratic development in Indonesia over the past 18 months, the hard work of consolidating these gains and meeting the economic and social challenges has just begun.

This report examines developments in Indonesia's electoral process in September, October and early November 1999. It focuses on the completion of the formation of the People's Representative Assembly, or DPR, and the MPR and on the 1999 MPR General Session.⁽²⁾ As such it represents a continuation of the series of reports and statements NDI has issued during the past year on this electoral process.⁽³⁾ The most recent of these reports, issued in August 1999, discussed developments up to that time in the formation of the DPR and the MPR. The present report was prepared on the basis of direct observation of the General Session, discussions with MPR members and political party leaders, and analysis of various written materials produced by the Election Commission, or KPU, and the MPR.

The Composition of the DPR and Provincial and District Assemblies

The People's Representative Assembly or DPR, Indonesia's national legislature, consists of 500 members, 462 elected on June 7 and 38 appointed from the military and the police. Once election results were

made official at the end of July, then seats could be allocated to parties and candidates assigned to those seats. These processes were completed in August and September, concluding the election of Indonesia's new legislative bodies.

The Allocation of Seats to Parties in the DPR: Retroactive Changes in the Rules

The PPI (Indonesian Election Committee) finally completed the process of allocating DPR seats to parties on September 1, nearly three months after the June 7 legislative elections. As NDI explained in an earlier report, the most controversial issue surrounding this process was the use of "stembus accords," or voluntary agreements among parties to combine their remaining votes with those of other parties in order to improve their chances of winning more seats.⁽⁴⁾ After much uncertainty regarding the exact nature of these agreements, in July the KPU determined that only two national-level stembus accords were valid. When the eight Muslim parties to one of these accords discovered that their agreement did not actually work to their benefit (in fact, collectively they lost three seats due to the accord), they attempted to convince the KPU to change the rules under which these accords would be implemented.⁽⁵⁾ After weeks of rancorous debate, the KPU finally decided on August 30 to abolish retroactively both existing stembus accords at the national level, apparently as the path of least resistance in breaking the deadlock.

The eight parties made political, not legal, arguments for changing the rules once election results were known. In abolishing the accords, the KPU reversed the rules it had made before the elections took place. The consequence of this decision was to take DPR seats away from some parties and give them to others. In particular, PKP and PBI each lost two seats, and PDI-P, PPP and PAN each lost one seat. The beneficiaries were PDKB and PNU, which each gained two seats, and PK, PKD and PPIIM, which each gained one.⁽⁶⁾ Under the rules governing stembus accords established before the elections, 19 parties would have won seats in the DPR; once stembus accords were abolished, 21 parties won seats. Although these changes occurred on the margins, and therefore did not significantly affect the overall makeup of the DPR, it was neither appropriate nor in line with basic legal norms for election officials to change the rules that determined whether parties won seats after the election results were known.

Within days of the KPU's final decision, the PPI had completed and announced the final allocation of DPR seats among parties.⁽⁷⁾ Twenty-one out of the 48 parties that contested the elections won seats, although only six of those won the minimum of 10 seats necessary to pass the 2 percent electoral threshold for eligibility to contest the 2004 elections: PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN and PBB.⁽⁸⁾ These six parties won a total of 429 of the 462 elected seats (93 percent). Therefore, unless the DPR revises this element of the electoral law, 15 of the 21 parties currently holding representation in that body are faced with the choice of either merging with other parties or dissolving themselves before the 2004 elections.⁽⁹⁾

Once parties have representation in the DPR, they must form or join blocs (*fraksi*). It is these blocs that have rights to nominate candidates for speaker, assign members to commissions, and make speeches on the floor.⁽¹⁰⁾ There is no minimum number of members to form a bloc, but blocs with less than 10 members lose certain rights. A small bloc, for instance, cannot nominate one of its members to be speaker and does not have the right to place a member on all nine commissions.

The 21 parties represented in the DPR have formed nine blocs. The military is a tenth, separate bloc.⁽¹¹⁾ Of these nine blocs, three were formed jointly by two or more parties. The Reform Bloc is a coalition of PAN and PK, two parties with substantial support from urban Muslim voters. The Indonesian National Unity (KKI) Bloc unites the representatives of eight secular nationalist parties. The Union of Muslim Sovereignty (PDU) Bloc is a coalition of five Muslim parties.

Geographical Patterns of Party Support

The election results bear out the common analysis that the political landscape on the most densely populated islands of Java and Bali differs from that on Sumatra and in Eastern Indonesia (Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Irian Jaya, and East and West Nusa Tenggara).⁽¹²⁾ Although PDI-P and Golkar were the only two parties to win seats in every province, much of their support came from different parts of the country. Java and Bali, the most developed parts of the country and the birthplaces of Megawati Soekarnoputri's ancestors, were dominated by PDI-P, which won 92 of the 243 available seats (38 percent) on those islands. Eastern Indonesia, the least developed part of the country and birthplace of then-President B.J. Habibie, was dominated by Golkar. Golkar won 55 of the 119 seats apportioned to these 13 provinces (46 percent), compared to its national result of 120 of the total of 462 contested seats (26 percent). In the four provinces on the island of Sulawesi, Habibie's birthplace, Golkar won 26 of the 41 seats (63 percent). Unlike the other two regions, the political landscape of Sumatra is fairly evenly balanced among the major parties.

Similarly, PKB's regional pattern of support was skewed heavily in favor of Java and Bali, and 34 of its 51 seats come from the two provinces of Central and East Java alone. In fact, this regional imbalance in PKB's support explains why, although it won a greater share of the national popular vote than PPP, it garnered seven fewer DPR seats. PPP's support was more evenly spread throughout the country. Indeed, support for the three other major parties - PPP, PAN and PBB - was largely balanced among the regions of Java and Bali, Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia.

The Allocation of Seats to Parties in Provincial and District Assemblies: Problems in Some Locations

For the provincial and district assemblies, the final vote count and the allocation of seats to parties was the responsibility of the corresponding election committee: the PPD I at the provincial level and the PPD II at the district level. These results were then to be ratified by the KPU, although it does not appear that the KPU ever formally took this step. The provincial and district results were ratified by the same presidential decree that made official the national results.

Although the formula for allocating seats to parties is a straightforward arithmetic calculation, there are some districts in which it has not been followed. In Pekanbaru municipality (Riau province), for example, PDI-P and PAN both have received one more seat in the district assembly than they are entitled to according to the election results; PBI and PP each have one fewer seat.⁽¹³⁾ This is alleged to have been the result of local political intimidation. In addition, there are some districts where arguments as to the validity of stembus accords at the local level are still not resolved, with some seats left vacant. These include Gowa (South Sulawesi) and Musi Rawas (South Sumatra).

Attempts by the disadvantaged parties to address their complaints

about this problem through the appropriate election committees have met with no success, and there does not appear to be any effective mechanism for redress through the courts. It is thus a significant failing of the electoral process that in certain specific instances parties entitled to seats have been prevented from claiming them and that there appears to be no effective recourse. These specific instances, however, do not appear to have been widespread enough to call into question the legitimacy of the electoral process itself.

The Hearing of Complaints and Grievances

The lack of a proper complaint resolution mechanism has not only affected the allocation of seats to parties; as NDI has pointed out in earlier reports, the complaint resolution process has been a general area of concern.⁽¹⁴⁾ Where the relevant level of the election administration or election supervision committee (*Parwas*) has failed for whatever reason to resolve a problem by discussion or consensus, no further action has been taken.

It is not clear whether the court system can or will entertain and exercise jurisdiction over grievances arising out of the election process. There are no precedents, and the electoral legislation and regulations themselves are unclear. It is to be hoped that a disadvantaged party or individual will test this system, not only to gain a hearing for a grievance but also to establish a precedent for future elections.

The police are responsible only for cases in which a criminal offense is alleged to have been committed and for which a criminal penalty exists. They have no role in purely civil questions or in cases where only a civil remedy is defined, such as, for example, breaches of the election law relating to the size of campaign donations, for which the penalty defined is the disqualification of a party from the election. The police have not, however, succeeded in assembling enough evidence to prosecute any of the alleged cases of "money politics" from the election campaign period.⁽¹⁵⁾

The Determination of Elected Candidates

The hybrid electoral system used in Indonesia in 1999, in which proportional representation by province was combined with assignment of candidates to districts and some importance being given to district-level results, required very complex rules for the determination of elected candidates. NDI has described these rules in greater detail elsewhere.⁽¹⁶⁾ According to these rules, seats won by "full quotas" were to be filled in a manner not subject to party discretion, whereas the KPU gave parties full discretion over seats won by "largest remainders." In practice, as discussed below, parties were permitted substantial discretion in filling all of their seats, including full quota seats.

The larger parties gained most of their seats through full quotas, and therefore many more of their elected candidates were determined on the basis of the parties' district-level results and should not have been determined after the election by party leaders.⁽¹⁷⁾ Smaller parties, on the other hand, gained all of their seats through largest remainders, and thus their central party leaders were able to select all of their representatives in the DPR.

Each party was required to assign candidates to specific districts. Elected candidates were to come from the districts within a province where a given party fared best, and under the rules in place before the elections parties would not have been able to move candidates to new districts once the election results were known. In practice, 97 out

of 462 elected DPR members (21 percent) "represent" districts other than those to which they were originally assigned.⁽¹⁸⁾ In other words, after the elections parties moved these candidates from the districts to which they had been previously assigned. This is evident from comparing the districts listed in the presidential decree that makes their membership in the DPR official to those in the final candidate list published by the PPI.

It appears that, in this instance, the KPU in effect changed the rules after the elections. Parties were in practice allowed essentially complete discretion in determining their lists of elected candidates; at the very least, there was a major lack of consistency and clarity. PAN, for example, moved 15 candidates from one district to another, even though it had only eight "largest remainder" seats for which the party should have had full discretion under the rules. PAN leaders explained that the original assignment of candidates to districts had been done hurriedly. Predictably, there were internal protests and dissatisfaction as a result.

There are a number of reasons that so many members were switched from one district to another after the election. First, the KPU decided that the fixed number of seats per district (with a minimum of one) that it established as part of the process of apportioning seats to provinces also applied to the process of determining elected candidates. As NDI pointed out in a previous report, such a rule results in a high number of anomalous outcomes.⁽¹⁹⁾ Second, the central leaders of most parties chafed at the district element of the electoral system, which effectively reduced their power. They did everything they could to undermine that element. Third, some parties had specific reasons for taking advantage of the permitted flexibility in the process of determining elected candidates. For example, PDI-P had been criticized during the campaign for nominating a disproportionate number of non-Muslim (especially Christian) candidates. In response, after the elections PDI-P took advantage of the discretion allowed by the KPU and the PPI to ensure that a larger share of its elected candidates were Muslim.

In addition to the significant proportion of elected candidates who switched districts, in technical violation of the rules, there are also two members of the DPR who were elected from different *provinces* than the ones from which they were originally nominated. These are Probosutedjo from PNI-FM, who switched from North Sumatra to Central Java, and Marcus Mali from PKD, who switched from West Kalimantan to Irian Jaya.⁽²⁰⁾ Each is the chairman of his party, and each party won only a single seat in the DPR. Having guessed wrong about which province would be most likely to provide their parties' original candidates from those provinces to be seated. Each took advantage of the KPU's lax enforcement of the rules. After all the candidates nominated from the provinces in which these parties had actually won a seat resigned their candidacies, each chairman switched his own nomination to that province and thereby claimed the seat. Probosutedjo and Mali were not sworn in as members of the DPR until after October 1, because of the time necessary to complete these processes and gain the approval of the KPU.

The consequence of these developments was to reduce the significance of the district element of Indonesia's hybrid electoral system. This served to undermine the original rationale for that element of the system, which was designed to establish the connection between a DPR member and a certain geographically defined constituency, thereby increasing the member's accountability to that constituency and reducing the power of central party leaders.

While the KPU ultimately permitted the parties to make such changes, this was inconsistent with the spirit of the election law.

The June 7 elections have dramatically altered the demographic makeup of the DPR, as compared to the two previous national legislatures.⁽²¹⁾ As would be expected, turnover has been much higher than in the past; only about 20 percent of current DPR members were also in the final New Order legislature of 1997-1999. As part of this turnover, there has been a radical shift in the occupational background of DPR members, with the share of civil servants and retired military officers dropping significantly and members with a background in the private sector taking their place. In addition, the first democratically elected national legislature in four decades contains members who are slightly younger and more well-educated than previous DPRs. The gender imbalance, however, has actually grown, with fewer female legislators than ever.

The Composition of the MPR

The 695-strong People's Consultative Assembly, or MPR, is made up of the 500 members of the DPR plus 65 functional group delegates and 130 provincial delegates.⁽²²⁾ The MPR is charged by the Constitution with electing the president and vice president and defining the Broad Outlines of State Policy.

Functional Group Delegates⁽²³⁾ (Utusan Golongan)

The selection of functional group delegates continued to be mired in controversy during the months before the General Session and even after the MPR was sworn in on October 1.

In some instances, controversy surrounded the KPU's choice of which organization had the right to be represented. For example, some elements of the Buddhist community protested the selection of Walubi as their representative organization, because Walubi's chairwoman Siti Hartati Murdaya was considered to be close to both former President Soeharto and then-President Habibie. These protests were ignored on the grounds that Walubi was the most broadly representative Buddhist organization, and Murdaya took her seat in the MPR.

In other instances, the controversy surrounded the KPU's rejection of certain individuals to represent organizations it had already selected. For instance, Abdurrahman Wahid and Muchtar Pakpahan at first were barred from representing the largest religious organization in the country, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and the independent labor union *Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia* (Indonesian Prosperous Labor Union or SBSI), respectively, because they were considered to be partisan figures with ties to PKB and *Partai Buruh Nasional* (National Labor Party or PBN). After intensive lobbying, Wahid was allowed to take NU's seat, but SBSI had to find another representative. Apart from sheer power politics, in which NU has much greater political clout than SBSI, it is unclear why the KPU applied what appears to be a double standard to these two individuals and organizations.

A third type of controversy concerned the selection of delegates from particular organizations. Problems occurred within at least three organizations selected by the KPU to represent their category: the Indonesian Film Actors' Guild (PERFI), the Chamber of Commerce (KADIN), and the Indonesian Christian Womens' Association (PWKI).

The Actors' Guild could not reach consensus on a candidate, and finally chose Heroe Syswanto NS in a vote. Nonetheless, the defeated candidate, Eva Rosdiana Dewi, continued to protest publicly for some time after the vote.

The Chamber of Commerce first nominated Adiwarsita Adinegoro, who was approved by the KPU. After the fact, however, KADIN attempted to change its choice to its chairman Aburizal Bakrie, known to be close to then-President Habibie. When Adinegoro refused to give up his seat, he was expelled from KADIN, which continues to refuse to recognize him as its MPR delegate.

The national leadership of PWKI claims it never nominated Mary B. Harun to represent it. PWKI claims her approval by the KPU was due to the efforts of KPU member Clara Sitompul, the national chairwoman of the Krisna Party. PWKI claims that Harun has never been among its national or regional leaders, that she is instead the chairwoman of the Krisna Party's West Java provincial leadership board, and that she is Sitompul's daughter.

These examples demonstrate that functional group representation, at least in the current situation in Indonesia, is unworkable, if not undemocratic. In principle, these groups are already represented through the political parties that won seats in the general elections. Their separate representation as functional groups gives them a second, and much more powerful vote for the president and vice president and a disproportionate voice in national policymaking. In practice, it is difficult to justify why certain broad categories and specific organizations and not others should be granted the right to have such representation. Moreover, the specific individuals who fill these seats are also chosen in a process that has no connection to the voting public or sometimes even to the membership of the organizations they purport to represent. Nor is functional group representation effective in practice at protecting minority interests. In any event, there appears to be an emerging consensus that functional group representation in the MPR should be abolished before the 2004 elections.

Functional group representation has also allowed outgoing cabinet ministers and other members of the political elite who did not run for the national legislature to nevertheless claim important positions as members of the MPR. One member of Habibie's cabinet, Minister of Tourism, Culture and the Arts Marzuki Usman, for example, resigned his post to become the delegate of the Indonesian Association of Economics' Graduates (ISEI).

The KPU's approval of two particular functional group delegates perhaps marks the end of New Order-style ostracism for certain political points of view. Sri Mulyono Herlambang and Arief Biki both represent the category of veterans and independence heroes, but the former is a symbol of the "extreme left" (*ekstrem kiri*) and the latter is a symbol of the "extreme right" (*ekstrem kanan*). The New Order created two sets of enemies of the state, and then posited the military as the only bulwark against them. The "extreme left" was communism and the "extreme right" was political Islam. Sri Mulyono Herlambang is the son of one of the Air Force officers (with the same name) accused of participation in the events of September 30-October 1, 1965. Under the New Order, even descendants of people linked to these events were ostracized. Arief Biki's brother, Amir Biki, was one of those killed when the military cracked down on Muslim activists in Jakarta's port area of Tanjung Priok in 1984.

On the theory that the 65 functional group delegates were nonpartisan, they were allowed to form their own bloc in the MPR. This represents a break from past practice, when they were rolled into Golkar's bloc. Eight provincial delegates who did not want to join party-based or military blocs also joined the functional group delegate

bloc. It was difficult to determine the political inclinations of this bloc; its members apparently did not vote in a unified manner.

Provincial Delegates (Utusan Daerah)

Provincial delegates, chosen by provincial assemblies sworn in over several weeks in late August and early September, trickled into Jakarta in late September and early October. Only 65 of the 130 delegates had been formally approved as members of the MPR by a presidential decree before the swearing-in ceremony on October 1. Nonetheless, approximately 85 provincial delegates participated and voted in the first phase of plenary sessions, held from October 1 to October 4. It appears that the additional 20 of these 85 delegates were sworn in on October 1 despite lacking the formal approval of the president. These 20 and the remaining 45 delegates were formally approved in three separate presidential decrees dated between October 5 and October 12, and a second swearing-in ceremony was held on October 12.

The provincial assemblies seem to have chosen these delegates for the most part through the procedures suggested by the Minister of Home Affairs. As NDI pointed out in an earlier report, these procedures had majoritarian tendencies, in which a majority coalition in a provincial assembly could sweep all five provincial delegate seats.⁽²⁴⁾ This method meant that in some cases the political affiliation of the provincial delegates differed significantly from the political makeup in the provincial assemblies produced by the June 7 elections.

Nearly all of the individuals chosen by provincial assemblies as provincial delegates had clear party affiliations; only eight of the 130 delegates chose to join the more politically unaffiliated functional group delegate bloc. Significantly, nearly half (62) chose to join the Golkar bloc, almost twice as many as the 32 who joined the PDI-P bloc. This was in part due to Golkar's greater strength in the 20 Outer Island provinces, which sent 100 of the 130 delegates. It was due also to the political inexperience of other parties' provincial leaderships. For example, in North Sulawesi, PPP split its vote between two candidates, allowing Golkar to choose all five delegates. In North Sumatra, PDI-P controlled 30 of the 85 seats in the provincial assembly, but ended up with none of the provincial delegates to the MPR. It was defeated by a coalition of Golkar (17 seats), PPP (eight), PAN (seven), TNI/POLRI (nine), and a joint bloc of PKB and other parties. Each of these five blocs nominated one delegate, but apparently the TNI/POLRI delegate did not choose to join that bloc in the MPR.

A proposal to allow the establishment of a separate bloc in the MPR for the provincial delegates, as was the practice in New Order-era MPRs, was defeated. Instead, each delegate was given the opportunity to choose which of the other 11 blocs he or she would join.⁽²⁵⁾ One consequence of the defeat of this proposal was that Marzuki Darusman was able to be elected to the chairmanship of the Golkar bloc in the MPR. Darusman, now Attorney General, was a provincial delegate from East Nusa Tenggara.⁽²⁶⁾ He was the vocal leader of the anti-Habibie faction within Golkar, and his election to the chairmanship of the Golkar bloc was another blow to then-President Habibie's chances at re-election.

As with the example of Marzuki Usman among the functional group delegates, five members of Habibie's cabinet resigned their posts to become provincial delegates for Golkar: Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid, from Riau; Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry Ginanjar Kartasasmita, from West Java;

Minister of Labor Fahmi Idris, from South Kalimantan; Minister of Housing Theo Sambuaga, from North Sulawesi; and Minister of Youth and Sports Agung Laksono, from Southeast Sulawesi. In addition, former chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council A.A. Baramuli, one of the leading figures in the Bank Bali scandal, gained a seat as a provincial delegate for Golkar representing South Sulawesi. Furthermore, prominent figures from the New Order also became provincial delegates to the MPR. These included former deputy speaker of the MPR Abdul Gafur representing Aceh (after failing to be elected as a provincial delegate from South Sumatra), who joined Golkar's bloc; former development trouble-shooter (*Sesdalopbang*) Lt. Gen. (ret) Solichin Gautama Purwanegara representing West Java, who joined PDI-P's bloc; former Minister of Finance Fuad Bawazier representing Yogyakarta, who joined the Reform bloc; and former Minister of Cooperatives Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya representing East Java, who joined PKB's bloc.

The MPR General Session - Issues of Democratic Process

The MPR was sworn in on October 1 and met as a full body for the next four days. During that time, it chose its leaders, passed its rules of procedure and established the membership of its Working Body (*Badan Pekerja*). The Working Body then met from October 6 to 14 to discuss the MPR's various draft decrees. This subcommittee of the MPR consisted of 90 members chosen proportionally to the strength of each bloc. The Working Body divided itself into three ad hoc committees. Ad Hoc Committee I discussed the draft Broad Outlines of State Policy, Ad Hoc Committee II discussed the MPR's other draft decrees, and Ad Hoc Committee III debated proposed constitutional reforms.

The full MPR reconvened on October 14 to hear the President's accountability speech and the reports of these ad hoc committees. On October 17, four commissions of approximately 175 members each were formed to discuss further these issues. Commissions A, B and C were tasked with the same issues as Ad Hoc Committees I, II and III, respectively; Commission D discussed the President's accountability speech. After commission meetings on October 18, the MPR met in plenary session on October 19 to pass its decrees and vote on the President's accountability speech. The presidential election was held October 20, with the vice presidential election following one day later.

Openness and Transparency

Most of the formal meetings of the MPR General Session were relatively open and transparent, especially in comparison to previous MPR sessions. There were four basic types of formal meetings: (1) plenary sessions of the entire MPR membership; (2) meetings of smaller bodies within the MPR such as the ad hoc committees of the Working Body and the commissions; (3) consultative meetings between the MPR leadership and bloc leaders; and (4) internal bloc meetings. Updated schedules of these meetings were available in the media center on a regular basis, which facilitated public attendance and media coverage of them. In all of these meetings, members were free to speak their minds and express strong differences of opinion, facilitated by the fact that for the first time ever each member had the use of a microphone installed on the front of his or her desk. If anything, there was sometimes too little control over meetings, which allowed them occasionally to descend into shouting matches and to drag on much longer than scheduled.

All plenary sessions and some of the meetings of the smaller bodies were open to the accredited public and were broadcast live on state-run TV (TVRI) and radio (RRI), as well as on some private TV stations. All of the crucial votes took place during the plenary

sessions, and thus the results of these votes were known immediately to the Indonesian public. The meetings of the smaller bodies debated such crucial issues as the policy direction of the new government, the future of East Timor, constitutional reform, and procedures for the election of the president and vice president. The early consultative meetings among the interim MPR leaders and the unofficial bloc leaders, before definitive leaders were chosen on October 3, were also open to the public and were broadcast live through the electronic media. These meetings addressed the structural and procedural issues mentioned above. Once definitive MPR and bloc leaders had been chosen, these consultative meetings were no longer open to the public or the media. Internal bloc meetings, of course, were also never open to the public.

MPR members were distinctly aware that many of their sessions were being broadcast live across the country (and sometimes even across the world, such as on CNN). Although some members took advantage of this fact to grandstand, others constantly reminded their colleagues of their responsibility to the Indonesian public. In addition to the live broadcasts, both electronic and print media covered the General Session extensively, setting aside daily air time and newspaper space for special coverage of the MPR. This coverage was facilitated by members' frequent availability to the media for interviews. Political observers also contributed independent analysis through regular commentary and interviews. Of course, the general public was much more attentive to this General Session because, unlike in the past, its outcome had not been scripted in advance.

Nevertheless, as is the nature of any political system, democratic or otherwise, political decision making is not limited to the formal meetings. More often than not the critical negotiations and political horse trading took place in the hotels where members stayed or at the private residences of certain key leaders. Although there had been rampant public speculation about the role of "money politics" in the General Session, in practice little concrete evidence came to light.

During the initial days of this MPR session, there was also a much less obvious military presence in and around the Senayan area, where the MPR/DPR complex is located, and other strategic locations in Jakarta, as compared to previous MPR sessions (especially March and November 1998) during which the city had taken on the feel of an armed camp. For the first week of the General Session, the MPR/DPR complex and its environs were notably free of demonstrations, which may have been a sign of the greater public legitimacy accorded to this body as a result of the democratic nature of the June 7 elections.

As the presidential election neared, however, supporters of both Megawati Soekarnoputri and B.J. Habibie were mobilized from Jakarta and other parts of the country, and people poured into the capital by the thousands. Daily demonstrations by PDI-P supporters began taking place at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in downtown Jakarta, while Habibie supporters often rallied at major mosques around the city. Accordingly, the military presence was beefed up to prevent clashes between these groups and to prevent demonstrators from entering the MPR complex. Nonetheless, on most days for the three weeks of the General Session, the front gate of the complex on the Gatot Subroto toll road was open for members, media and the accredited public.

Decision-Making Procedures

Former President Soeharto liked to claim that voting and majoritarian decision-making were Western liberal democratic practices alien to

Indonesian (and East Asian) culture, which allegedly emphasizes collectivism and harmony - values that he claimed were better achieved through deliberation (*musyawarah*) and consensus (*mufakat*). Among its other achievements, the 1999 MPR General Session demonstrated that both consensual and majoritarian decision-making procedures have an important role in Indonesian democracy.

Whenever possible, the MPR and its smaller bodies seemed to give priority to the achievement of consensus. This consensus, however, was not forced as in the past but the result of often extended and vigorous debate as well as intensive negotiations. Surprisingly, consensus was achieved even on such controversial issues as East Timor and constitutional reform. Nonetheless, in a 695-member body composed of members representing a wide range of political views and interests, consensus on some issues was just not possible. This was especially true in the election of political leaders.

The MPR, however, never seemed uncomfortable turning to voting on issues about which consensus could not be achieved. The first several votes on structural and procedural issues demonstrated that both members and the MPR secretariat staff lacked experience in voting procedures, but these wrinkles were soon ironed out and subsequent votes proceeded more smoothly. Votes on issues were conducted openly, by asking members to stand and be counted. Members sat in blocs, and thus it was rarely difficult to determine how blocs voted in these open votes.

In contrast, votes on individuals were conducted by secret ballot. As fellow MPR members, the public sitting in the gallery and television cameras looked on, members were called up one by one. Each was handed a blank paper ballot, which she or he filled out in a voting booth and dropped into a transparent ballot box before leaving the plenary hall. Immediately after all members had voted, the ballots were shuffled together and counted to ensure the total number matched the number of members voting. Each ballot was then opened in turn and its contents read out loud for all to hear, much like at the polling stations on June 7. A running tabulation was kept on a large whiteboard at the front of the hall. Interestingly, members refused to use the electronic voting devices installed by the MPR secretariat just before the opening of the General Session, for fear of manipulation or recording of their votes.

The MPR General Session - Substantive Issues

Constitutional Amendments

Under the New Order, former President Soeharto and the military held the 1945 Constitution essentially sacred because it granted flexibility and a wide range of powers to the executive branch. Any proposals to amend it were thus considered tantamount to treason. For this reason, the simple fact that amending the Constitution is on the national political agenda is already an important step in the democratic transition. In addition to providing a dominant position to the executive branch, the 1945 Constitution lacks clarity. Many of its clauses state that certain powers will be "delineated by law," a phrase that in practice gave both Presidents Soekarno and Soeharto the ability to implement and interpret the Constitution in any way they pleased. These weaknesses are not surprising given that this Constitution was a temporary emergency document written just days before the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945.

Fortunately for the consolidation of Indonesia's democratic transition, a broad consensus now exists among the political elite and perhaps

the citizenry as well that the 1945 Constitution must be amended to address these weaknesses in the country's political structure. Interestingly, there is also broad consensus that whereas the main body and the explanations sections of the Constitution are fair game for amendment, the preamble should be left untouched. The preamble establishes Pancasila, the pan-religious state ideology; in the 1950s, the Constituent Assembly (*Konstituante*) failed to enact a permanent Constitution in part because of conflict over whether Indonesia should be a Pancasilaist, Islamic or socialist state. The contemporary consensus over leaving the preamble alone, even among Muslim parties, means that there is much less chance that this polarizing debate will be reopened as Indonesia struggles to strengthen its new democratic institutions.

The 1999 General Session of the MPR produced amendments to nine of the Constitution's 37 articles. The MPR decided to follow U.S. practice in amending the constitution, in which the full original text is accompanied by the changes to these nine articles, which as a whole are referred to as the First Amendment.

The First Amendment focuses on strengthening the position of the legislative and judicial branches vis-a-vis the executive branch. The most important parts of this Amendment assert the DPR's dominant role vis-a-vis the president in the legislative process. In the original Constitution, Articles 5 and 20 state that the president "holds the power to establish laws with the approval of the DPR." Under the First Amendment, Article 20 now states that the DPR "holds the power to establish laws." Article 5 now only grants the president the right "to present bills to the DPR." Under the amended Article 20, a bill "is debated by the DPR and the President to achieve common approval." Once approved, a bill is signed into law by the president. The MPR apparently decided not to adopt another clause stating that if an approved bill sits on the president's desk for more than 30 days, it automatically becomes law.

The nine amended articles in the First Amendment are many fewer than the 20 articles originally identified as open to amendment by Ad Hoc Committee III of the MPR Working Body. Furthermore, the remaining parts of this amendment are largely cosmetic and do not address the root of the problems with the 1945 Constitution. For instance, the DPR now has a greater role in the formation of the cabinet, the assignment of Indonesian ambassadors to foreign countries and the accreditation of foreign ambassadors to Indonesia. The DPR and the Supreme Court have also been given a role in advising the president on the reduction of sentences. For these decisions, however, the president must only "consider the views of," not gain the approval of, the DPR or Supreme Court. The power of the president to confer state honors is now to be restricted by law. Finally, the MPR reaffirmed the amendment passed at the MPR Special Session in November 1998 that limits the president and vice president to a maximum of two five-year terms.

Although the First Amendment is not as sweeping as some had hoped, the MPR also passed a decree authorizing its Working Body to continue to meet and draft further amendments to be presented for approval by the full body at its first Annual Session on August 18, 2000. Changes adopted next August would therefore be referred to as the Second Amendment.

The Procedures to Elect the President and Vice President

The MPR's most important constitutionally defined duty is to elect the president and vice president. The 1945 Constitution, however, says only that these individuals are elected by a vote of a *suara yang*

terbanyak, which has been variously interpreted as a special majority, a simple majority and a plurality. Thus the MPR itself had to determine more detailed procedures for these elections.

Under the rules it adopted, the president and vice president were chosen in separate elections that followed the same procedures.⁽²⁷⁾ The president was chosen first. A quorum for these elections was two-thirds of the MPR. Candidates must have been nominated either by a bloc or by a petition of 70 members (10 percent) of the MPR, and nominations closed 12 hours before the start of the plenary meeting in which the election took place. If only one candidate had been nominated, then that person would have been automatically approved by the full body. Since there was more than one candidate, voting took place by secret ballot on a one-member, one-vote basis.⁽²⁸⁾

Depending on the number of candidates, there could be multiple rounds of voting. In any round, a candidate who won the votes of a majority of members present was automatically declared the winner.⁽²⁹⁾ If there was no majority winner in the first round, then the top three vote-getters would advance to the second round. Failure to produce a majority winner in the second round would result in a third round of balloting between the top two remaining candidates. In the unlikely event that there was still no majority winner in the third round, perhaps because of a high number of abstentions or invalid votes, balloting could be repeated up to twice within the following 24 hours with the same two candidates. If these re-votes still did not produce a majority winner, then all nominees would be declared ineligible and a new round of nominations would have to take place, after which the above voting procedures would be repeated. In the 1999 MPR General Session, multiple rounds of voting were not necessary because in both elections only two candidates remained when voting commenced, and a majority winner was achieved on the first ballot.

The MPR decree establishing these voting procedures also set out a number of criteria for an individual to be eligible for nomination, including for the first time the filing of a declaration of assets. It was the responsibility of the MPR leadership to determine if an individual met these criteria. One criterion that was proposed but eventually dropped required all candidates to be in good physical health. This criterion, had it remained in the decree, could have proved fatal to the candidacy of the man who was eventually elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid.

The decree also requires that the president and vice president "must be able to work together," even though they are elected separately. Although President Wahid was intimately involved in the negotiations regarding most of the vice presidential candidates, when MPR Speaker Amien Rais announced the four official candidates on the morning of October 21, he said that there was no requirement that the president must be consulted about all of the nominees. These procedures left open the possibility, at least on paper, that a vice president undesirable to the president could have been elected by the MPR. The decree did not specify what actions were to be taken if this situation occurred.

East Timor

Another of the important items on the MPR's agenda was the future of East Timor. The result of the August 30 UN-administered referendum, timed to occur before the General Session, was an overwhelming victory for independence. The international community thus expected the MPR to ratify these results and grant East Timor its independence, especially in light of the atrocities committed by the Indonesian military and the militias it supported. Nonetheless, the

MPR was also faced with both a general nationalist backlash and the specific entreaties of pro-Indonesia East Timorese during the General Session.

The MPR considered various options that would have fallen short of complete acceptance of the referendum results, but in the end passed a decree entirely acceptable to the international community. This decree recognized the results of the August referendum, rescinded the 1978 MPR decree formalizing Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and ordered the president to take steps to protect the rights of East Timorese who wish to retain their Indonesian citizenship. Transitional administration of the territory now passes to the UN for several years.

The Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, or GBHN)

Besides electing the president and vice president, another of the MPR's constitutionally defined duties is to determine the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) for the coming five years. This decree is one of the most important yardsticks by which the president's performance, as summarized in his accountability speech, is measured at the end of his term. In the past, the GBHN was a verbose and general document, and President Soeharto was never held truly accountable for his policies and other decisions. In contrast, the 1999-2004 GBHN is a more concise document, and the MPR may be much more vigilant in holding President Wahid accountable. The rejection of President Habibie's accountability speech, in part because he was considered to have failed to carry out the directions of the 1998 GBHN, is an important precedent in this regard.

President Abdurrahman Wahid is required by an MPR decree to present a report to the MPR during each of its Annual Sessions from 2000 to 2003 and to be held accountable for his government's policies at the next MPR General Session in 2004.⁽³⁰⁾ Apparently, the MPR scrapped the proposal for an annual accountability speech. If there were such a requirement, the MPR would have had an annual opportunity to reject the speech, thus rendering the president's political position untenable.

During the New Order, the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (*Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, or Wanhankamnas*) drafted the GBHN and presented it to the MPR as a fait accompli. This year the Wanhankamnas played a much less significant role. In the months before the 1999 MPR General Session, political parties drafted their own versions of the Broad Outlines of State Policy and then formed an inter-party team to compare and consolidate these versions. The 1999-2004 GBHN itself requires that ordinary citizens should be much more actively involved in the development of the GBHN in the future, although it does not specify how this is to be done.

The 1999-2004 GBHN lays out a largely reformist policy agenda across many sectors, including the economy, politics, law, foreign affairs, defense and security, the civil service, religion, education, society and culture, regional development, natural resources and the environment.⁽³¹⁾ The prescriptions for the economy include taking a market-based approach that recognizes the inevitability of globalization while remaining socially and environmentally friendly. This will be achieved by playing to Indonesia's comparative advantages as an agrarian and maritime country, while emphasizing the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises and cooperatives.

The prescriptions for domestic politics emphasize the needs for national reconciliation and further democratization. The policy guidelines note that constitutional and electoral reforms are necessary to achieve checks and balances among the three branches of government. The 2004 elections will be conducted by a national election commission that is to be independent and nonpartisan. Civil-military relations will also be restructured, including by ending military representation in the DPR and restricting it to the MPR. The GBHN also emphasizes the importance of a free press to democracy in Indonesia. At the intersection of economics and politics, the DPR is to be more heavily involved in decisions about the levels of foreign debt Indonesia assumes, relations with international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and the privatization of state-owned assets.

Proposed legal reforms include restructuring and cleaning up the judicial system and the police force and placing an emphasis on human rights. Corruption is also an issue for the civil service at all levels, but especially in terms of increasing the transparency of auditing the personal wealth of high government officials. As part of this effort, the GBHN requires the government to increase the salaries of civil servants, the police and the military. The political neutrality of the state bureaucracy is to be maintained.

Although the GBHN calls for civil-military relations to be restructured, it also continues to adhere to the theory of "total people's war" that justifies the military's territorial system. The police are to be fully separated from the military, and both institutions are to increase their professionalism. In foreign affairs, Indonesia is to focus its diplomacy on ASEAN and the solidarity of the developing world, while continuing to integrate itself into the emerging global and Asian free trade regimes.

Religious policy is to focus on developing nondogmatic religious educational curricula and on fostering interfaith dialogue, as well as improving government administration of the haj pilgrimage for Muslims. Education policy must emphasize decentralization and curriculum reform, while improving teacher salaries. In the area of society and culture, policy should emphasize improving health care, social security, family planning programs, and the lives of the handicapped. Freedom of artistic expression is to be guaranteed, and traditional culture is to be promoted, both for its own sake and as a means of attracting eco-friendly tourists. Promoting gender equality and developing youth programs to foster entrepreneurship and stem drug abuse are also a priority.

Regional autonomy is to be implemented in the economic, political, legal, religious and cultural spheres. Autonomy granted to regional governments, however, must be accompanied by the empowerment of elected regional assemblies (DPRDs) as watchdogs on these governments. Integrated rural development is also to be emphasized over the coming five years. In addition, Aceh, Irian Jaya and Maluku are to receive special attention. Decentralization of resource control and the promotion of sustainable development are the main priorities in the natural resource and environmental sector.

The MPR General Session: Coalition Building and Power Sharing

The primary impact of the distribution of provincial delegates among other blocs was to pull Golkar's strength nearly even to PDI-P's.⁽³²⁾ The Central Axis (*Poros Tengah*), a loose coalition of Muslim parties formed in July by PAN chairman Amien Rais, also controlled a significant share of the MPR: 132 seats not counting PKB, or 189 seats including PKB (which never actually joined the Central Axis but

ultimately supported the same presidential candidate).

In negotiations, PDI-P acted as if it had an overall majority with what was widely perceived as a stiff and uncompromising negotiating style. But Indonesia's proportional representation electoral system did not produce a majority party and instead spread significant numbers of DPR seats among a number of larger parties. This outcome required all parties to negotiate and form coalitions. PDI-P's failure to do so evidently adversely effected its record in the MPR General Session.

Votes on Structural and Procedural Issues

On October 2, the second day of the MPR General Session, the longstanding coalition of PDI-P and PKB lost three votes in a row to the Golkar/Central Axis coalition on structural and procedural issues. First, PDI-P's proposal to abolish separate blocs for both functional group delegates and provincial delegates was defeated by a vote of 379 to 250, in favor of allowing the functional group delegates to form a separate bloc while forcing the provincial delegates to join other blocs. Second, PDI-P's efforts to limit the number of deputy speakers to five was defeated, 391 to 248, in favor of having seven deputy speakers. This had the effect of providing the military and PBB, PDI-P's most ardent political opponent, the two additional leadership positions. Third, PDI-P's proposal to prioritize consensual decision-making over voting in the election of the MPR speaker was also defeated, 403 to 230. Although the substance of these votes was not particularly important, as a political matter these defeats exposed the weakness of the PDI-P/PKB coalition and emboldened the Golkar/Central Axis coalition in its bid for the MPR and DPR speakerships in subsequent days.

The Election of the Speaker of the MPR

On October 3, the MPR elected its speaker. There were eight candidates, representing the eight largest blocs, and the candidate with the most votes was elected speaker, with the other seven candidates automatically becoming deputy speakers. Leading up to the general session, Abdurrahman Wahid had been considered the leading candidate for this post. Instead, Wahid threw his support to Amien Rais, who defeated PKB chairman Matori Abdul Djailil (supported by PDI-P as well) by a vote of 305 to 279.

Rais's victory was evidently based on a coalition of Golkar and the Central Axis; Golkar supported him in an apparent deal to give Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung the speakership of the DPR. The military bloc evidently voted for its own candidate, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, who came in third place with 41 votes. This strategy could be seen as either part of an effort to remain politically neutral on key votes - as a further step toward reforming the military's role in politics - or as a tactical move to avoid taking partisan stances before the most important vote on the president. In any event, it was a clear demonstration of the military bloc's power as a swing vote, because Djailil would have defeated Rais with those 41 additional votes.

The Election of the Speaker of the DPR

Two days later, on October 5, the DPR elected its speaker. There were five candidates, representing the five largest blocs, and the candidate with the most votes was elected speaker, with the other four candidates automatically becoming deputy speakers. The Central Axis held up its end of the bargain referred to above. When it became clear that Tandjung would win, PDI-P and PKB tried to throw their support to his candidacy through a consensus decision to avoid another embarrassing defeat in a vote. Consensus was achieved at the level of the inter-bloc leadership meeting. When the matter came to the floor in a plenary session, however, members of the PBB bloc

refused to accept the consensus decision and demanded a vote, which Tandjung won handily with 411 out of 491 votes. The military bloc evidently supported Tandjung, as it was safe to do so for a consensus candidate. Fifty-four members of PDI-P's 153-strong bloc voted for the party's own candidate, Soetardjo Soeryogoeritno.

President Habibie's Accountability Speech

At the end of his term, the president is required to make a speech before the MPR outlining his achievements and failures vis-a-vis the policy platform set out for him by the MPR at the beginning of his term. The MPR then decides to approve or disapprove of the speech. Although a rejection of the speech has no legal ramifications for the president, it is the functional equivalent of a parliamentary vote of no confidence, and it is expected that he would no longer pursue re-election.

After President Habibie gave his accountability speech on October 14, each bloc was given an opportunity to respond over the next two days, followed by a second speech by the President on October 17 addressing their criticisms. During their speeches, only four blocs (PDI-P, PKB, KKI and PDKB) with 261 votes rejected Habibie's speech outright, whereas only two small blocs (PBB and PDU) with 22 votes publicly accepted the speech. The remaining five blocs with the majority of votes (Golkar, PPP, Reform, military and functional group delegates) criticized the speech but did not make public an overall evaluation. MPR Commission D then further discussed the speech and the mechanisms for achieving an overall evaluation of it on October 18. Since Commission D could not achieve consensus, the issue was brought to a vote of the entire MPR on the evening of October 19, approximately 12 hours before the scheduled presidential vote. With President Habibie's political future hanging in the balance, the speech was narrowly rejected, 355 to 322, apparently by a coalition of PDI-P, PKB and some in Golkar and the Central Axis. Within hours, Habibie announced his withdrawal from the race.

The Election of the President

Habibie's withdrawal left Golkar and the Central Axis scrambling for another candidate, and they finally settled on NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid after Akbar Tandjung and Amien Rais declined to run. PBB nominated its chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra, but he withdrew his candidacy just before the voting started, leaving a race between Wahid and PDI-P's Megawati Soekarnoputri. Faced with the first opportunity in Indonesia's history for a president from NU, PKB members, drawn primarily from the ranks of NU, could not vote against Wahid, despite their party's long-standing coalition with PDI-P and the close relations between Megawati and PKB's chairman Matori Abdul Djaliil. On Wednesday, October 20, 1999 at approximately 2:30pm, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected Indonesia's fourth president, the first chosen through a democratic process, by 373 votes to Megawati's 313. Because the balloting was secret, it remains unclear how the military bloc voted in this election.

That afternoon and evening, riots erupted in Jakarta, Medan, Solo and Bali, as PDI-P supporters and others vented their frustrations. Several people were killed when two bombs exploded in Jakarta. Tensions eased only after Megawati was elected vice president the following day.

The Election of the Vice President

Given President Wahid's health problems of the last several years (he is diabetic, had two strokes in 1998 and is nearly blind), the post of vice president suddenly gained increased significance. On Thursday morning, MPR Speaker Amien Rais announced the nomination of four

candidates: Akbar Tandjung, PPP chairman Hamzah Haz, General Wiranto and Megawati (in a conciliatory gesture, nominated by PKB rather than PDI-P).

The voting, scheduled to begin at 11 am, was postponed until 2 pm for furious inter-bloc negotiations. When the plenary session reconvened, Tandjung announced the withdrawal of his candidacy, and Rais read a letter from Wiranto doing the same. The session was then delayed for nearly another full hour while pressure was put upon Hamzah Haz to withdraw as well so that Megawati could be declared the consensus candidate. This effort was unsuccessful, and a vote was held, which Megawati won in a convincing manner, 396 to 284, due to the apparent support of PDI-P, PKB, the military bloc, and some from Golkar and the Central Axis.

Nonetheless, the result in the race for vice president was seen by many observers as less a vote in support of Megawati than it was an effort to assuage her supporters and avoid chaos. Within hours of the announcement of the results, calm had returned to the streets of Bali, where rioting had continued on Thursday.

The Role of the Military

Since Indonesia's democratic transition began in mid-1998, the military has come under intense criticism for human rights abuses and corruption during the New Order. In addition to these past abuses, fresh cases have occurred in many parts of the country over the past 18 months.

In response to this criticism, the military developed the "New Paradigm," a blueprint for reducing its political profile. This blueprint has created controversy within the military among officers unwilling to give up the political and economic power to which they have become accustomed. It has also been criticized by civilians for not going far enough, because it is still based on the assumption that the military has a rightful role to play in domestic politics. Restructuring civil-military relations is one of the greatest challenges facing Indonesia's democratic transition.

East Timor and the "Silent Coup"

Since late 1998, the Indonesian military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI) had been quietly increasing its support for militias inside East Timor. When the East Timorese people voted overwhelmingly for independence on August 30, TNI and these militias began rampaging throughout the territory. This led to calls for the insertion of an international military presence to restore order.

The military was reportedly unalterably opposed to the presence of foreign troops on "Indonesian soil." Thus, when President Habibie began hinting that he might accept such a presence, it was alleged that on September 8 General Wiranto confronted him on the issue and asked him to step down.⁽³³⁾ When Habibie refused to resign, Wiranto reportedly agreed to allow him to keep his position on the condition that Wiranto, and not Habibie, would make all strategic decisions from then on.

The Indonesian and international media widely referred to these alleged events as a "silent coup." Within days of this "silent coup," Wiranto announced that Indonesia would accept the UN-sponsored military force.

The Military Attempts to Wield its Influence

Perhaps believing that it now had the upper hand, the military attempted to wield further influence over political developments. TNI's

Deputy Commander (now Commander) Widodo AS hinted on September 13 that the MPR General Session might need to be postponed because the national atmosphere was "not conducive" to holding such a politically charged event. This statement galvanized civilian politicians from across the political spectrum, and several responded publicly that perhaps the General Session should instead be expedited. (In the end, the election of the president and vice president did take place about three weeks earlier than originally planned.) The Team of Seven, an interparty consultative forum formed on September 11, began meeting to discuss issues leading up to the General Session. The early meetings of this forum did not include military representatives, who began joining later meetings just days before the General Session began.

For several months, the military had been pushing a new bill on state security and national emergencies through the holdover DPR elected during the New Order. This bill had languished for 10 years in the state secretariat before finally being presented to the DPR in 1999. The DPR substantially revised the bill, so that some commentators viewed it as an improvement on the draconian 1959 law it was meant to replace. Nonetheless, the bill became a flash point for student protests against military influence in politics. When the DPR passed the bill anyway on September 23, one day before its term ended, the demonstrations escalated into deadly riots (the so-called "Semanggi II Incident"). On September 24, in an unusual move, the military (not the government) announced that the president would not sign the bill until it could be "socialized" - that is, better explained - to the public.

On September 28, just four days after the riots, Wiranto took advantage of the Team of Seven forum to again assert the military's national leadership. He invited the leaders of the seven major parties to a meeting at the Museum of the Drafting of the Declaration of Independence in Menteng, Central Jakarta. Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Akbar Tandjung and Amien Rais were among those present. At this meeting, Wiranto emphasized the need to maintain order during the upcoming General Session and extracted a promise from all present that their parties would not mobilize supporters during the MPR's deliberations.

The Military's Low Profile during the MPR General Session

In contrast to this activist role played by military leaders, the military/police bloc in the MPR took a much lower profile during the General Session itself. For instance, the military representatives rarely wore their uniforms, preferring suits and ties. In the consultative and plenary meetings that took place from October 1 to 4, they rarely joined the debates. The military/police bloc also refused to take sides in the highly contested race for MPR speaker; instead the entire bloc voted for its own candidate, the political equivalent of abstention. The military's representatives did abandon their neutral stance and vote in the presidential and vice presidential elections, although it is not known exactly who they voted for or even if they voted uniformly. Military representatives were active in pushing for a more confrontational stance on East Timor and for retaining their DPR representation after 2004, but when these positions became politically untenable they were abandoned.

General Wiranto's Vice Presidential Candidacy

The most visible sign that the military is divided over its political role was Wiranto's on-again, off-again vice presidential candidacy. He had been careful to establish the military's neutral position in the June 7 elections, which allowed him to maintain relations with all parties and political leaders. This strategy appeared to be paying off, because at one point in August, he was being spoken of as a potential running mate to both Habibie and Megawati. As September wore on, however,

it appeared that Megawati was not inclined to offer him the position. Thus, he reportedly became more aggressive in courting Golkar.

At Golkar's leadership meeting in May, when the party named Habibie its sole presidential candidate, Wiranto was tapped as one of its four possible vice presidential candidates, along with Akbar Tandjung, Ginanjar Kartasasmita and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. Golkar again held a leadership meeting on October 11 and 12, in the middle of the MPR General Session. In an unusual move, one week before the meeting, five provincial chapter chairmen who were retired military officers quietly received promotions to brigadier or major general. This meeting reaffirmed Habibie as Golkar's presidential candidate, but it also gave the party leadership the flexibility to change candidates in light of subsequent events. The party could not achieve consensus on a vice presidential candidate, despite support for Wiranto among some provincial chapters. The decision was left up to Habibie, and he chose Wiranto despite the potential for unrest generated by this ticket.

On October 18, one day before the vote on Habibie's accountability speech and two days before the presidential election, Wiranto announced that he "would not participate in the competition over the presidency and vice presidency." This decision was apparently due to intense pressure from other active and retired officers, and it was a grave blow to Habibie's candidacy. Some analysts believe that this was a calculated move and that Wiranto expected to be considered again once the president had been elected. (He did subsequently again become a candidate.) In any case, the announcement sent a signal to MPR members, especially those from the military/police bloc, that it was acceptable to reject Habibie's accountability speech, because Wiranto was no longer explicitly tied to Habibie.

President Abdurrahman Wahid owed his election more to a coalition of civilian parties than to military support. Thus, he did not need to turn to Wiranto to pay some of these debts with the vice presidency. For his part, Akbar Tandjung cleverly took Wiranto's announcement at face value, and he himself became Golkar's candidate for vice president. When the official candidates were announced, Wiranto had not even been nominated by the military/police bloc, but rather by the PDU bloc and a petition of 74 members that included none of the military representatives. Wiranto reportedly came under intense pressure to resign his candidacy from regional military commanders who had already been facing demonstrations and riots due to the MPR's failure to elect Megawati as president. Thus, rather than lose a three- or four-way vote, Wiranto was forced to withdraw his candidacy for the second time in four days.

The Role of the Military in the New Cabinet

The new "National Unity" cabinet contains some important firsts for civil-military relations. President Abdurrahman Wahid changed the name of the Ministry of Defense and Security to the Ministry of Defense, implying a sole focus on external threats. The new Minister of Defense, Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, is the first civilian to occupy that post in 40 years. He is highly respected within TNI and was the deputy governor of the National Resilience Institute (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* or Lemhannas), the military's think tank, for a number of years. He is also a professor of international relations at the prestigious University of Indonesia and has an M.A. from the University of California at Berkeley and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. Another first is that the new TNI commander, Admiral Widodo AS, is from the Navy; this is the first time ever that TNI has been led by an officer from other than the Army. This underscores President Wahid's new emphasis on Indonesia as a maritime nation and may signal a reduced political role for the Army.

The cabinet also contains five active and retired officers, four from the army and one from the navy. Although this suggests the military will continue to exert significant political influence, it is also the fewest officers in any cabinet in decades. These officers are General Wiranto as Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Lt. Gen. (ret) Surjadi Soedirdja as Minister of Home Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Minister of Mining and Energy, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar as Minister of Transportation and Communications, and Rear Admiral Upper Half Freddy Numberi as Minister of Utilization of the Civil Service.

Looking Ahead

The Composition of the New Cabinet

The National Unity Cabinet is largely a result of the political bargains struck during the elections for the president and vice president. It contains at least one representative from each of the seven major parties: PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB and PK.⁽³⁴⁾ The new cabinet contains many new faces; only four ministers have served in previous cabinets. Although most ministers thus lack experience in the executive branch, many share a broad commitment to reform.

Indonesians quickly began to raise a number of concerns about the cabinet. Some have criticized the continued placement of military officers in ministerial positions. Others have questioned the suitability of certain ministers for their new posts. Another concern has been whether a cabinet consisting of such diverse political interests will be able to work together to formulate and implement a coherent policy agenda. Finally, many have lamented the lack of a formal (party-based) opposition and have expressed doubts about the ability of the DPR to provide oversight of a government consisting of all major parties. Procedures for accountability in the DPR are weak and need to be reviewed. A coalition of NGOs has already declared its intentions to act as a "Cabinet Watch" in the absence of a formal opposition in the DPR.

Soon after its formation, the cabinet was shaken by President Wahid's announcement that three ministers were under investigation for alleged corruption. Weeks later, the government has still not announced the names of these three ministers. On November 18, however, Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare and Poverty Alleviation Hamzah Haz announced his resignation. Although his name had been widely speculated to be among the three, Haz claimed that his resignation was due to dissatisfaction over Wahid's decision to open trade ties with Israel.

President Wahid has also come under criticism, primarily from employees of the affected bureaucracies, for his decision to not name a new Minister of Information, Minister of Social Services and Minister of Agrarian Affairs. The Ministry of Information will be abolished in another step toward ensuring the freedoms of expression and of the press. The services provided by the Ministries of Social Services and Agrarian Affairs will be among the first services to be devolved to lower levels of government.

The New Government's Policy Platform

As discussed above, the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) set the overall policy direction for the new government. The following describes some of the early moves made by the new government, which admittedly is only about one month old at the time of the

publication of this report.

The maintenance of Indonesia's national integrity appears to be of singular importance to President Wahid. Regional sentiment is running high in Indonesia at this time. Although the cabinet contains the first Irianese minister ever, Freddy Numberi, representatives of the ethnic communities of West Sumatra and North Sulawesi publicly expressed disappointment at the lack of Minangkabau and Manadonese representation in the cabinet. Wahid has assigned Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri to address the specific problems facing the provinces of Riau, Maluku and Irian Jaya.

In the first weeks of his term, Wahid has made conciliatory gestures to address longstanding grievances in the province of Aceh. He has already met with some of the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or GAM), and has declared that a separate regional military command will not be established in Aceh as long as he is president. President Wahid established a fact-finding commission and promised that trials of military officers accused of human rights abuses would begin immediately. The new president appointed prominent human rights activist Marzuki Darusman to the post of Attorney General; Darusman has called publicly for these trials to be conducted by the civilian rather than the military judicial system.

Furthermore, President Wahid created a new cabinet position, the State Minister of Human Rights, and filled it with a prominent Acehnese politician from PAN, Hasballah Saad. Wahid also appointed a Navy admiral and an Acehnese general as commander and deputy commander of the military. In one of his first public statements, the new commander declared that the military would no longer pursue a "security approach" to the problems in Aceh and would instead support a political solution. Nonetheless, violent clashes between the military and both unarmed civilians and armed rebels have continued to occur and public support in Aceh for a referendum on independence appears to have increased substantially. President Wahid himself agreed in November that a referendum, though not necessarily a referendum on independence, should be held within seven months, but this idea has drawn vocal opposition from the DPR, the MPR, the military and others. Resolving the political future of Aceh, including addressing demands for a referendum, is perhaps the most critical question facing Indonesia at this time.

Restoring international confidence in the Indonesian economy, cleaning up official corruption, especially at the highest levels, and recapitalizing the banking system appear to be the key points in the new government's economic strategy. Wahid has said he will pardon former President Soeharto if convicted, in part because of the latter's poor health, but that the same will not be true for Soeharto's family and cronies. Marzuki Darusman is likely to be an activist Attorney General, and a Commission on Civil Service Corruption is expected to be formed soon. The government has made public the long version of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report on the Bank Bali scandal, an important prerequisite for reestablishing relations with the IMF and the World Bank.

Further Constitutional Reform

The Working Body of the MPR is required to draft broader constitutional reforms before August 2000. One of the primary issues on the agenda is the direct election of the president and vice president; there appears to be emerging consensus that this is necessary and will occur for the first time in 2004. There is also consensus on the need to abolish military representation in the DPR, which is called for in the new GBHN, and functional group

representation in the MPR. The constitutional reform process will address the future of the MPR, including alternatives of abolishing it altogether or transforming the provincial representatives in the MPR into an upper house of the national legislature. In addition, the Working Body will consider whether Indonesia should transform itself from a unitary into a federal state. Indonesians also see the need to increase the independence and the powers of the legislative and judicial branches, as well as to establish stronger checks and balances among the three branches of government.

1. The 1945 Constitution stipulates that the membership of the MPR includes functional group representatives who are intended to represent certain under-represented sectors of society. The decision as to which organizations are included as functional groups is made by the Election Commission.

2. The 1945 Constitution provides that the MPR should meet at least once every five years. These regularly scheduled meetings are referred to as General Sessions. In 1999 the MPR also decided to hold Annual Sessions, beginning in the year 2000. The MPR can also meet in Special Sessions.

3. NDI, *The New Legal Framework for Elections in Indonesia*, February 23, 1999; NDI, *The Prospects for Democratic Elections in Indonesia*, May 28, 1999; *Statement of NDI and The Carter Center International Election Observation Delegation to Indonesia's June 7, 1999, Legislative Elections*, June 9, 1999; NDI and The Carter Center International Election Observation Mission, *Indonesia's June 7, 1999, Legislative Elections: Counting and Tabulation of Votes*, June 20, 1999; Post-Election Statement No. 3 of NDI and The Carter Center International Election Observation Mission, *Indonesia's June 7, 1999, Legislative Elections: Vote Tabulation and the Electoral Process*, July 15, 1999; and NDI and The Carter Center, *Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: The Formation of the DPR and the MPR*, August 26, 1999.

4. NDI and The Carter Center, *Post-Election Developments in Indonesia*, pp. 2-3.

5. The eight Muslim parties were *Partai Umat Islam* (Islamic People's Party or PUI), *Partai Kebangkitan Umat* (Islamic People's Awakening Party or PKU), *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (Development Unity Party or PPP), *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905* (1905 Indonesia Muslim Association Party or PSII 1905), *Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi* (Masyumi Indonesian Muslim Political Party or PPIIM), *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Moon and Star Party or PBB), *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party or PK) and *Partai Nahdlatul Umat* (Nahdlatul Umat Party or PNU).

6. See Appendix 1.

7. Appendix 2 contains a copy of the PPI's official allocation of DPR seats by party and province.

8. It does not appear that any other parties besides these six have passed the alternative threshold: 3 percent of the seats in the provincial and district assemblies distributed across half of the provinces and half of the districts in Indonesia.

9. See also NDI, *The New Legal Framework*, p. 7.

10. DPR commissions are the equivalent of American legislative

committees.

11. The table in Appendix 3 provides the party composition of each bloc.

12. The table in Appendix 3 provides a breakdown of DPR seats by party and region.

13. See Appendix 4.

14. NDI and The Carter Center, *Indonesia's June 7, 1999, Legislative Elections: Vote Tabulation and the Electoral Process*, p. 4.

15. *Ibid.*

16. NDI, *The New Legal Framework*, pp. 2-6; NDI, *The Prospects for Democratic Elections*, pp. 17-19; NDI, *Indonesia's Unique Electoral System*, June 1, 1999.

17. See the table in Appendix 5.

18. For a full list of these 97 members, see Appendix 6.

19. NDI, *The New Legal Framework*, pp. 13-23.

20. Probosutedjo is former President Soeharto's half-brother.

21. See the tables in Appendix 7. Appendix 8 contains a demographic breakdown of the current DPR by party.

22. The number of MPR members had been set at 700, including 135 provincial delegates, but the five provincial delegates from East Timor could not be chosen in September given the conditions there following the August 30 referendum. Thus the actual number of provincial delegates was 130, and the total membership of the MPR was 695.

23. The 1945 Constitution stipulates that the membership of the MPR includes functional group representatives who are intended to represent certain under-represented sectors of society. The decision as to which organizations are included as functional groups is made by the Election Commission.

24. NDI and The Carter Center, *Post-Election Developments in Indonesia*, p. 6.

25. The distribution of the provincial delegates across the 11 blocs is given in the table in Appendix 9.

26. Darusman was born in Solo, Central Java, and has lived in Jakarta for many years. There were no residency requirements for provincial delegates, which significantly undermined their stated purpose of providing a mechanism for regional representation. It was a common practice for parties to ensure that their national leaders not elected to the DPR in June were accommodated in the MPR as provincial delegates.

27. MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/1999.

28. The Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO), a Jakarta-based nongovernmental organization, conducted a short but intense

campaign for an open presidential election, including the use of open balloting, to increase transparency and accountability. Although this campaign was successful in raising public awareness about the issue, and some of its recommendations were adopted by the MPR, the campaign failed to convince MPR members to use an open ballot in these elections.

29. Since the basis for the overall vote count was members present (as opposed to present and voting), abstentions and invalid ballots counted in determining the number of votes necessary to achieve a majority. This rule was designed to ensure broader support and legitimacy for the elected president.

30. MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/1999.

31. MPR Decree No. IV/MPR/1999.

32. See the table in Appendix 9.

33. *Kompas*, September 9, 1999, pp. 1, 11; *Kompas*, September 13, 1999, pp. 1, 11.

34. The table in Appendix 10 provides more details on the ministers and their political affiliations.

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APPENDIX 1

THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF ABOLISHING STEMBUS ACCORDS

PARTY	DPR SEATS (with 2 accords)	DPR SEATS (no accords)	NET GAIN (LOSS)
PDI-P	154	153	(1)
Golkar	120	120	
PPP	59	58	(1)
PKB	51	51	
PAN	35	34	(1)
PBB	13	13	
PK	6	7	1
PDKB	3	5	2
PNU	3	5	2
PKP	6	4	(2)
PDI	2	2	
PBI	3	1	(2)
PKD	0	1	1
PDR	1	1	
IPKI	1	1	
PP	1	1	
PSII	1	1	
PNI-MM	1	1	
PNI-FM	1	1	
PPIIM	0	1	1
PKU	1	1	

Two National Stembus Accords:

8 Muslim Parties	82	85	3
3 Secular Parties	6	6	0

Sources:

Two Accords: NDI's calculations, based on official election results.

No Accords: PPI official seat allocation, September 1, 1999.

Unfortunately, NDI is unable to provide the following appendix to this document:

Appendix 2: The PPI's Official DPR Seat Allocation

APPENDIX 3

THE BREAKDOWN OF DPR SEATS BY BLOC/PARTY AND REGION

Bloc/Party	Total Seats	Java & Bali		Sumatra		Eastern Indonesia	
		Seats	Percent*	Seats	Percent*	Seats	Percent*
1) PDI-P	153	92	60%	32	21%	29	19%
2) Golkar	120	41	34%	24	20%	55	46%
3) PPP	58	28	48%	17	29%	13	22%
4) PKB	51	43	84%	5	10%	3	6%
5) Reform	41	22	54%	14	34%	5	12%
PAN	34	17	50%	12	35%	5	15%
PK	7	5	71%	2	29%	0	0%
6) PBB	13	6	46%	4	31%	3	23%
7) KKI*	12	6	50%	1	8%	5	42%
PKP	4	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%
PDI	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%
PP	1	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
PNI-FM	1	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
PNI-MM	1	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
PBI	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%
IPKI	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%
PKD	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%
8) PDU*	9	5	56%	2	22%	2	22%
PNU	5	2	40%	2	40%	1	20%
PKU	1	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
PDR	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%
PSII	1	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
PPIIM (Masyumi)	1	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
9) PDKB	5	0	0%	1	20%	4	80%
10) TNI/POLRI	38						
Total	500	243		100		119	

*Percent of bloc's/party's total seats

*KKI = Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian National Unity)

*PDU = Perserikatan Daulat Ummat (Union of Muslim Sovereignty)

APPENDIX 4

THE PROJECTED AND ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF THE PEKANBARU MUNICIPALITY DPRD II, RIAU PROVINCE

PARTY	VALID VOTES	QUOTA SEATS	VOTE REMAINDERS	LARGEST REMAINDER SEATS	TOTAL PROJECTED SEATS	ACTUAL SEATS	GAIN (LOSS)
Golkar	57,765	9	2,127	1	10	10	
PDI-P	55,791	9	153		9	10	1
PAN	51,157	8	1,701		8	9	1
PPP	37,280	6	188		6	6	
PBB	13,019	2	655		2	2	
PK	5,186	0	5,186	1	1	1	
PKP	4,188	0	4,188	1	1	1	
PKB	2,669	0	2,669	1	1	1	
PBI	2,169	0	2,169	1	1	0	(1)
PP	1,968	0	1,968	1	1	0	(1)
TNI/POLRI					5	5	
Totals		34		6	45	45	

Sources:

Total Projected Seats: NDI's calculations based on official election results. No stembus accords were valid.

(Total Valid Votes =247,295; Quota =6,182)

Actual Seats: Speaker's Office, Pekanbaru Municipality DPRD II.

APPENDIX 5

DPR SEATS WON BY FULL QUOTAS AND LARGEST REMAINDERS

Party	Total Seats	Full Quota Seats		Largest Remainder Seats		Members Switch Districts	Members Switch Provinces
		#	%	#	%		
PDI-P	153	135	88%	18	12%	19	
Golkar	120	99	83%	21	18%	10	
PPP	58	39	67%	19	33%	17	
PKB	51	40	78%	11	22%	10	
PAN	34	26	76%	8	24%	15	
PBB	13	2	15%	11	85%	8	
PK	7	1	14%	6	86%	4	
PDKB	5	0	0%	5	100%	3	
PNU	5	0	0%	5	100%	3	
PKP	4	0	0%	4	100%	2	
PDI	2	0	0%	2	100%	1	
PBI	1	0	0%	1	100%		
PKD	1	0	0%	1	100%		1
PDR	1	0	0%	1	100%		
IPKI	1	0	0%	1	100%	1	
PP	1	0	0%	1	100%	1	
PSII	1	0	0%	1	100%	1	
PNI-MM	1	0	0%	1	100%		
PNI-FM	1	0	0%	1	100%		1
PPIIM	1	0	0%	1	100%	1	
PKU	1	0	0%	1	100%	1	
Totals	462	342	74%	120	26%	97	2

APPENDIX 6

DPR MEMBERS WHO SWITCHED DISTRICTS

Party	Name	Province	Representing District*:	
			Final Candidate List	Presidential Decree
PDI-P	Karimun Usman	Aceh	Kab. Aceh Besar	Kodya Sabang
	T. Zulfikar Taib Aly, S.H.	Aceh	Kab. Aceh Barat	Kab. Aceh Timur
	Irmadi Lubis	N. Sumatra	Kab. Tapanuli Selatan	Kab. Mandailing Natal
	Marah Simon Mhd. Syah, S.H.	W. Sumatra	Kodya Padang	Kodya Padang Panjang
	Yohanes Lukman	W. Sumatra	Kab. Pasaman	Kodya Payakumbuh
	Agnita Singedikane Irsal	Jambi	Kab. Batanghari	Kodya Jambi
	Pramono Anung	E. Java	Kab. Probolinggo	Kab. Tulungagung
	I. Emir Moeis	E. Kalimantan	Kab. Pasir	Kab. Berau
	Julius Bobo	E. Nusa Tenggara	Kab. Sumba Barat	Kab. Ngada
	Jacob Nuwa Wea	E. Nusa Tenggara	Kab. Ngada	Kab. Manggarai
	Matheos Pormes	E. Nusa Tenggara	Kab. Kupang	Kodya Kupang
	Sophan Sophiaan	S. Sulawesi	Kodya Ujung Pandang	Kodya Parepare
	Fauziah Abdullah	C. Sulawesi	Kab. Donggala	Kodya Palu
	Engelina Andaris Pattiasina	N. Sulawesi	Kab. Sangihe & Talaud	Kodya Bitung
	Theo Syafei	S.E. Sulawesi	Kab. Buton	Kodya Kendari
	J.E. Sahetapy	Moluccas	Kab. Maluku Tengah	Kab. Maluku Tenggara
	Daniel Yoku	Irian Jaya	Kab. Jayapura	Kab. Fakfak
	Lukas Sabarofak	Irian Jaya	Kab. Manokwari	Kab. Biak Numfor
	Lukas Karl Degey	Irian Jaya	Kodya Jayapura	Kab. Timika
Golkar	Edi Ramli Sitanggung	N. Sumatra	Kab. Simalungun	Kodya Pematang Siantar
	Rambe Kamarul Zaman	N. Sumatra	Kab. Labuhan Batu	Kodya Tanjung Balai
	Eki Syachrudin	W. Java	Kab. Pandeglang	Kab. Lebak
	Daryatmo Mardiyanto	C. Java	Kab. Grobogan	Kab. Brebes
	Hajriyanto Y. Thohari	C. Java	Kab. Karanganyar	Kodya Magelang
	Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi	E. Java	Kab. Jombang	Kab. Tuban
	Irsyad Sudiro	E. Java	Kab. Kediri	Kodya Probolinggo
	Iris Indira Murti	E. Java	Kab. Tulungagung	Kodya Malang
	Sarwoko Soerjohoedojo	E. Java	Kab. Bojonegoro	Kab. Lamongan
	Sylvia Ratnawati	Bali	Kab. Buleleng	Kab. Jembrana
PPP	H.M. Danial Tandjung	N. Sumatra	Kab. Langkat	Kodya Sibolga
	H.A. Syahrudji Tanjung	W. Sumatra	Kab. Pasaman	Kab. Pesisir Selatan
	Aisyah Aminy	W. Sumatra	Kab. Agam	Kab. Lima Puluh Kota
	Abdul Kadir Ismail	Jambi	Kab. Bungo Tebo	Kab. Sarulangun Bangko
	DW. Javauddin A.R.	S. Sumatra	Kab. Ogan Komering Ulu	Kab. Lahat
	Achmad Ferial Husein	Bengkulu	Kab. Rejang Lebong	Kodya Bengkulu
	A.M. Saefuddin	W. Java	Kodya Bandung	Kodya Tangerang
	Ali Hardi Kiaidemak	W. Java	Kodya Bekasi	Kodya Cilegon
	Akhmad Muqowam	C. Java	Kab. Semarang	Kab. Kudus
	Lukman Hakim Saifuddin	C. Java	Kab. Demak	Kodya Tegal
	Husnie Thamrin	Yogyakarta	Kab. Sleman	Kab. Bantul
	Nadhier Muhammad	E. Java	Kab. Jember	Kab. Bangkalan
	Rusnain Yahya	C. Kalimantan	Kab. Kotawaringin Timur	Kodya Palangkaraya
	Arsyad Pana	S. Sulawesi	Kab. Sinjai	Kab. Maros
	Noer Namry Noor	S. Sulawesi	Kodya Ujung Pandang	Kab. Majene
	Muhammad Nawir	C. Sulawesi	Kab. Donggala	Kab. Buol Tolitoli
Sukardi Harun	N. Sulawesi	Kab. Gorontalo	Kodya Gorontalo	
PKB	Aris Azharai Siagian	N. Sumatra	Kab. Langkat	Kodya Binjai
	Awaluddin Burhanan	S. Sumatra	Kab. Ogan Komering Ulu	Kodya Pangkal Pinang
	Imam Mawardi Sanjaya	Lampung	Kab. Lampung Tengah	Kab. Way Kanan

Party	Name	Province	Representing District*:	
			Final Candidate List	Presidential Decree
PKB (cont.)	Agus Suflihat Mahmud	W. Java	Kab. Bandung	Kab. Sumedang
	Abdul Khaliq Ahmad	W. Java	Kab. Indramayu	Kodya Tangerang
	Abdul Wahid Karim	C. Java	Kab. Purwodadi	Kab. Grobogan
	Syaifulloh Adnawi	C. Kalimantan	Kab. Kotawaringin Timur	Kab. Barito Utara
	Khalilurrahman	S. Kalimantan	Kab. Banjar	Kab. Tanah Laut
	Machrus Usman	Bali	Kodya Denpasar	Kab. Bangli
	Mochtar Noer Jaya	S. Sulawesi	Kodya Ujung Pandang	Kab. Enrekang
PAN	Ahmad Sanoesi Tambunan	N. Sumatra	Kab. Deli Serdang	Kab. Asahan
	Ambia H. Roestam	W. Sumatra	Kab. Padang Pariaman	Kodya Solok
	Radja Roesli	Riau	Kodya Pekanbaru	Kodya Batam
	Ẓikifli Nurdin	Jambi	Kab. Tanjung Jabung	Kab. Kerinci
	Tibrani Basri	S. Sumatra	Kab. Ogan Komering Ilir	Kab. Bangka
	Suminto Martono	Lampung	Kodya Bandar Lampung	Kodya Metro
	Mochtar Adam	W. Java	Kab. Bandung	Kab. Majalengka
	Munawar Sholeh	C. Java	Kab. Banyumas	Kab. Tegal
	Djoko Susilo	C. Java	Kab. Boyolali	Kab. Jepara
	Akhmad Risaf Iskandar	Yogyakarta	Kodya Yogyakarta	Kab. Sleman
	Wahyudi Indrajaya	E. Java	Kab. Sidoarjo	Kodya Mojokerto
	Noor Adenan Razak	S. Kalimantan	Kodya Banjarmasin	Kab. Tabalong
	Nurdiati Akma	E. Kalimantan	Kodya Balikpapan	Kab. Bulungan
	Moh. Askin	S. Sulawesi	Kodya Ujung Pandang	Kab. Mamuju
	Rahman Sulaiman	Irian Jaya	Kodya Jayapura	Kab. Yapen Waropen
PBB	Nur Balqis	N. Sumatra	Kab. Deli Serdang	Kodya Tebing Tinggi
	MS Kaban	W. Sumatra	Kodya Bukittinggi	Kodya Solok
	Yusril Ihza Mahendra	W. Java	Kab. Cianjur	Kab. Bekasi
	Hartono Mardjono	W. Java	Kab. Bandung	Kab. Cirebon
	Yusuf Amir Feisal	W. Java	Kodya Bandung	Kodya Cirebon
	M. Qasthalani	S. Kalimantan	Kab. Barito Kuala	Kab. Tapin
	Hamdan Ẓelva	W. Nusa Tenggara	Kab. Bima	Kab. Lombok Barat
Ẓbair Bakry	S. Sulawesi	Kodya Ujung Pandang	Kab. Selayar	
PK	Irwan Prayitno	W. Sumatra	Kodya Padang	Kab. Tanah Datar
	Rokib Abdul Kadir	Lampung	Kab. Lampung Tengah	Kab. Lampung Utara
	Ẓlyrosa Jamil	W. Java	Kodya Depok	Kab. Karawang
	Mutammimul 'Ula	C. Java	Kab. Cilacap	Kab. Banjarnegara
PDKB	Seto Harianto	W. Kalimantan	Kab. Bangkayang	Kab. Sambas
	Arnold N. Radjawane	Moluccas	Kodya Ambon	Kodya Ternate
	Astrid Susanto	Irian Jaya	Kab. Timika	Kab. Nabire
PNU	Tgk. Muhibbuddin Waly	Aceh	Kab. Aceh Barat	Kab. Simeuleu
	Abdullah Al Wahdi	W. Java	Kab. Bogor	Kab. Sukabumi
	Yunani Hashar	S. Kalimantan	Kab. Banjar	Kab. Hulu Sungai Tengah
PKP	Sutradara Gintings	N. Sumatra	Kodya Medan	Kab. Dairi
	Tjetje Hidayat Padmadinata	W. Java	Kab. Bandung	Kodya Bogor
PDI	Massardy Kaphat	W. Kalimantan	Kab. Sanggau	Kab. Sintang
IPKI	Hamid Mappa	S. Sulawesi	Kodya Parepare	Kab. Jeneponto
PP	Hussein Naro	W. Java	Kab. Bogor	Kab. Tangerang
PSII	Amaruddin Djajasubita	W. Java	Kab. Garut	Kab. Tasikmalaya
PPIIM	Sayuti Rahawarin	W. Java	Kab. Bandung	Kab. Kuningan
PKU	Asnawi Latief	E. Java	Kab. Banyuwangi	Kab. Pasuruan

Note:

Kab. =Kabupaten =Regency

Kodya =Kotamadya =Municipality

APPENDIX 7

THE DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP OF THE 1999-2004 DPR, COMPARED TO PAST DPRs

TABLE 1: FORMER OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION	1992-97	1997-99	1999-2004
Previous DPR	40%	24%	20%
Private Sector	42%	40%	71%
Civil Service/ Military*	19%	37%	10%

*Active and retired civil servants and military officers.

TABLE 2: HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

EDUCATION LEVEL	1992-97	1997-99	1999-2004
Secondary School	27%	15%	17%
College	66%	70%	64%
Postgraduate	7%	15%	19%

TABLE 3: AGE GROUP

AGE GROUP	1992-97	1997-99	1999-2004
<35	3%	3%	4%
35-49	34%	36%	39%
≥50	63%	61%	57%

Source: *Kompas*, October 1, 1999, p. 15.

APPENDIX 8

THE DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP OF THE 1999-2004 DPR, BY PARTY/BLOC

TABLE 1: FORMER OCCUPATION

PARTY/BLOC	1997-99 DPR	1997-99 DPRD	PRIVATE SECTOR	CIVIL SERVICE/ MILITARY*	OTHER
PDI-P	0%	0%	61%	14%	25%
Golkar	59%	8%	22%	6%	6%
PPP	38%	19%	24%	5%	14%
PKB	0%	4%	31%	10%	55%
Reform	0%	0%	51%	10%	39%
PBB	0%	0%	38%	8%	54%
KKI	0%	8%	75%	0%	17%
PDU	0%	0%	67%	0%	33%
PDKB	0%	0%	20%	0%	80%
TNI/POLRI	63%	0%	0%	37%	0%
Totals	23%	5%	39%	11%	23%

*Active and retired civil servants and military officers.

TABLE 2: HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

PARTY/BLOC	SECONDARY SCHOOL	COLLEGE	POST-GRADUATE
PDI-P	29%	54%	17%
Golkar	5%	73%	23%
PPP	21%	70%	9%
PKB	22%	61%	18%
Reform	2%	76%	22%
PBB	0%	69%	31%
KKI	33%	58%	8%
PDU	22%	67%	11%
PDKB	0%	0%	100%
TNI/POLRI	5%	71%	24%
Totals	16%	65%	19%

TABLE 3: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

PARTY/BLOC	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	HINDU	OTHER
PDI-P	63%	25%	7%	5%	1%
Golkar	86%	9%	4%	1%	0%
PPP	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
PKB	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Reform	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
PBB	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
KKI	42%	8%	50%	0%	0%
PDU	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
PDKB	0%	60%	40%	0%	0%
TNI/POLRI	76%	8%	8%	8%	0%
Totals	81%	11%	5%	2%	1%

TABLE 4: AGE GROUP

PARTY/BLOC	<35	36-45	46-55	56-64	>65
PDI-P	4%	23%	33%	35%	5%
Golkar	4%	36%	39%	19%	2%
PPP	3%	17%	28%	40%	12%
PKB	12%	37%	16%	31%	4%
Reform	0%	44%	29%	20%	7%
PBB	0%	38%	15%	46%	0%
KKI	0%	8%	42%	33%	17%
PDU	0%	44%	22%	33%	0%
PDKB	0%	0%	20%	80%	0%
TNI/POLRI	0%	5%	82%	13%	0%
Totals	4%	27%	35%	29%	5%

TABLE 5: SEX

PARTY/BLOC	MALE	FEMALE
PDI-P	91%	9%
Golkar	88%	12%
PPP	93%	7%
PKB	94%	6%
Reform	100%	0%
PBB	100%	0%
KKI	100%	0%
PDU	100%	0%
PDKB	80%	20%
TNI/POLRI	100%	0%
Totals	93%	7%

APPENDIX 9

THE COMPOSITION OF THE MPR - 1999 GENERAL SESSION

Bloc/Party	DPR Seats	Additional UD Seats	Total MPR Seats
1) PDI-P	153	32	185
2) Golkar	120	62	182
3) PPP	58	12	70
4) PKB	51	6	57
5) Reform	41	8	49
<i>PAN</i>	34		
<i>PK</i>	7		
6) TNI/POLRI	38	0	38
7) PBB	13	0	13
8) Indonesian National Unity (KKI)	12	2	14
<i>PKP</i>	4		
<i>PDI</i>	2		
<i>PP</i>	1		
<i>PNI-FM</i>	1		
<i>PNI-MM</i>	1		
<i>PBI</i>	1		
<i>IPKI</i>	1		
<i>PKD</i>	1		
9) Union of Muslim Sovereignty (PDU)	9	0	9
<i>PNU</i>	5		
<i>PKU</i>	1		
<i>PDR</i>	1		
<i>PSII</i>	1		
<i>PPIIM</i>	1		
10) PDKB	5	0	5
11) Functional Group Delegates (65)	0	8	73
Total	500	130	695

APPENDIX 10

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL UNITY CABINET

Minister	Previous Position(s)	Party/Organizational Affiliation(s)*
1) CM, Politics & Security: Wiranto	M, Defense and Security; TNI Commander	TNI-AD (General)
2) CM, Economy, Finance & Industry: Kwik Kian Gie	Deputy Speaker, MPR; Head, Research & Development,	PDI-P (DPP, DPR)
3) CM, Public Welfare & Poverty Alleviation: Basri Hasanuddin	Rector, Hasanuddin University (1989-1997)	Hasanuddin University, [Golkar]
4) M, Foreign Affairs: Alwi Shihab	Head, External Relations, PKB	PKB (DPP, DPR)
5) M, Defense: Juwono Sudarsono	M, Education and Culture; SM, Environment	University of Indonesia, National Resilience Institute
6) M, Home Affairs: Surjadi Soedirdja	Governor, Jakarta	TNI-AD (Lt Gen, ret)
7) M, Laws & Regulations: Yusril Ihza Mahendra	National Chair, PBB	PBB (DPP, DPR)
8) M, Finance: Bambang Sudibyo	Dean, MBA Program, UGM	Gadjah Mada University, [PAN]
9) M, Mining & Energy: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	TNI Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs	TNI-AD (Lt Gen)
10) M, Industry & Trade: Jusuf Kalla	Provincial Delegate, MPR; Businessman	Golkar (MPR)
11) M, Agriculture: Muhamad S Prakosa	Professor, Agriculture; FAO Representative in Indonesia	Bengkulu University, [PDI-P]
12) M, Forestry & Plantations: Nur Mahmudi Ismail	President, PK	PK (DPP, DPR)
13) M, Transportation & Communications: Agum Gumelar	Governor, National Resilience Institute	TNI-AD (Lt Gen)
14) M, Maritime Exploration: Sarwono Kusumaatmadja	SM, Environment (1993-98); SM, Utilization of the Civil Service (1988-93); Sec'y Gen,	[Golkar]
15) M, Labor: Bomer Pasaribu	Chair, Federation - All-Indonesia Trade Union (F-SPSI)	[Golkar]
16) M, Health: Ahmad Sujudi	Director General, Contagious Diseases, Ministry of Health	Career Civil Servant
17) M, National Education: Yahya Muhaimin	Education & Culture Attache, Indonesian Embassy, Washington, DC	Gadjah Mada University, [PAN]
18) M, Religion: Mohammad Tolchah Hasan	Chair, Malang Islamic University Foundation; Head, Rois Syuriah, NU	[PKB]
19) M, Housing & Regional Development: Erna Witoelar	Functional Group Delegate, MPR; NGO Activist	Indonesian Consumer Institute Foundation (YLKI)
20) SM, Research & Technology: Muhammad AS Hikam	Researcher, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)	[PKB]
21) SM, Cooperatives & Small & Medium-sized Enterprises: Arkasih Nur	Chair, PPP	PPP (DPP, DPR)

Minister	Previous Position(s)	Party/Organizational Affiliation(s)*
22) SM, Environment: Sonny Keraf	Lecturer, Philosophy and Ethics, Atmajaya University	Atmajaya University, [PDI-P]
23) SM, Regional Autonomy: Ryaas Rasyid	Director General, Regional Autonomy & General Gov't, Ministry of Home Affairs	Institute of Government Science (IIP)
24) SM, Tourism & the Arts: Hidayat Djailani	Commissioner, Postal Service	[PKB]
25) SM, Investment & State Enterprises: Laksamana Sukardi	Treasurer, PDI-P	PDI-P (DPP, DPR)
26) SM, Youth & Sports: Mahadi Sinambela	Provincial Delegate, MPR; KPU Member, Golkar	Golkar (DPP, MPR)
27) SM, Public Works: Rafik Boediro Soetjipto	Director General, Mining, Ministry of Mining and Energy	Career Civil Servant
28) SM, Women's Empowerment: Khoffah Indar Parawansa	Deputy Speaker, DPR; Chair, PKB	PKB (DPP, DPR)
29) SM, Human Rights: Hasballah M. Saad	Chair, PAN; KPU Member, PAN	PAN (DPP, DPR)
30) SM, Transmigration & Population: Al-Hilal Hamdi	Deputy Secretary General, PAN	PAN (DPP, DPR)
31) SM, Utilization of the Civil Service: Freddy Numberi	Governor, Irian Jaya	TNI-AL (Rear Admiral, Upper Half)
32) SM, Community Problems: Anak Agung Gde Agung	Functional Group Delegate, MPR; Businessman	[PDI-P]
33) Attorney General: Marzuki Darusman	Chair, Golkar Bloc, MPR; Chair, National Human Rights Commission	Golkar (DPP, MPR)
34) TNI Commander: Widodo AS	TNI Deputy Commander	TNI-AL (Admiral)
35) State Secretary: Ali Rahman	Head, Education and Training, National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas)	[PKB]

Key:

- 1) CM = Coordinating Minister
- 2) M = Minister
- 3) SM = State Minister (without portfolio)
- 4) TNI = Indonesian National Military
- 5) TNI-AD = Army
- 6) TNI-AL = Navy
- 7) DPP = Central Leadership Board

*When the party's name is listed in brackets, this individual has only an indirect affiliation.