

KOSOVO ASSESSMENT REPORT

JULY 1999

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Executive Summary

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducted a political and programmatic assessment in Kosovo from July 2 thru July 5, 1999. The delegation held discussions with Kosovar political and civic leaders and international officials (see Appendix 1 for listing of meetings). The assessment mission was limited to Kosovo's capital, Pristina, due to security considerations.

Forming the assessment delegation were Senior Program Officer Alicia Allison of NDI's Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Region; Senior Program Officer Aaron Azelton of NDI's Strategy and Evaluation Team; CEE Deputy Director Robert Benjamin; and NDI consultant Ross Reid, a former Canadian parliamentarian, Cabinet Minister, National Director of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, and NDI resident representative in Ukraine.

The delegation is grateful to assistance provided by the NDI/Macedonia office, the Kosovo mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Office of Transition Initiatives of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The assessment mission was funded by USAID.

The assessment assumed three tasks: 1) to gain an understanding of Kosovo's political structures and climate in the wake of NATO's military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); 2) to re-introduce NDI to Kosovar political and civic leaders; and 3) to produce recommendations for NDI program activity in Kosovo.

The assessment followed an advance trip by NDI Romania representative Mary Cummins to Macedonia just prior to the cessation of military hostilities (see Appendix 2). NDI has visited Kosovo once before, in 1997, during a program assessment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

- Approximately three weeks after the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), police, and paramilitary units from Kosovo, and during a period of great political uncertainty and personal grief, Kosovar political and civic leaders – both Albanian and Serb – said that they are prepared to work with the international community to build a democratic Kosovo. In light of recent events, it is imperative that their calls for multi-ethnic coexistence be backed up by action. Dialogue and reconciliation, without which shared governmental and political institutions cannot properly function, will clearly require external support.
- Kosovar political and civic leaders uniformly welcome the presence of international security and civilian structures, if not for the same reasons. All view Kosovo *de facto* as an international protectorate through which Kosovar political and governmental institutions are to be developed to serve ultimately as the basis for self government.
- There is in Pristina a great deal of uncertainty and complexity about the form and content of the

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and about the Kosovar governmental institutions that will succeed it. The relationship between the U.N. and other implementing governmental agencies is unclear, particularly as to how decision-making authority is to be shared. The degree of cooperation, or lack thereof, between the United Nations, UNHCR, OSCE, and the European Union, and also KFOR – both in Kosovo and at their respective headquarters – will be a key factor in determining UNMIK’s success or failure.

- The extent of Kosovar political representation in the interim administration of Kosovo, according to U.N. officials, will be advisory in nature. It is likely to take the form of multi-ethnic advisory councils to U.N. civilian bodies. Most Kosovar Albanian leaders are concerned about the multi-ethnic composition of advisory councils formed or proposed by UNMIK, and there has been disagreement over the political composition of Kosovar Albanian representation.
- Kosovo’s political climate is fluid. A power vacuum is evident as KFOR and the U.N. begin to establish military and civilian authority. Ethnic Albanian political forces are divided into two self-declared governments led, respectively, by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). However, the power vacuum thus far has been filled by the KLA. Despite the presence of these two rival blocs, the political landscape could change substantially, particularly as the KLA transforms and divides into one or possibly more political factions. Kosovar Serb leaders, fearing a complete exodus of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo, are organizing under the auspices of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its secular partner, the Serbian Democratic Movement.
- Kosovar Albanian political leaders have the sovereign independence of Kosovo as their main political goal, but many view independence as being decided by democratic means in a regional context. Most stated that Kosovo’s final political status result from the creation of democratic institutions and processes, reflect the will of Kosovo’s people, and take into account regional security and political factors. However, ethnic Albanians, traumatized, on one hand, by personal suffering and loss, and celebrating, on the other hand, Belgrade’s withdrawal from Kosovo, may not share their leaders’ tactical patience concerning independence. In contrast, Kosovar Serb political leaders want Kosovo to remain part of the FRY but are cognizant of political factors favoring independence.
- Prevailing international sentiment in Pristina holds that the election of a Kosovar government is approximately 18 months away. Kosovar Albanian political leaders expressed a desire for earlier elections, citing the political impasse between the two provisional and rival Kosovar Albanian governments which may impede needed political consensus.
- The NDI delegation found that political and civic institutions will need to be created anew and will need long-term assistance, although an ethnic Albanian “parallel”, or underground system of

governance had existed for 10 years. It appears that a top-down approach and centralized decision-making often characterize both political parties and civic associations. NDI was strongly encouraged by all interlocutors to conduct a multi-year, democratic development program in Kosovo. The delegation recommends that the NDI program include a political party building effort to strengthen parties' organizational structures and public outreach capabilities; a civic education initiative to enhance Kosovar understanding of democratic political systems and to encourage them to participate in political processes; and legislative/governance capacity building work after elections are held in Kosovo.

- Despite ongoing episodes of violence and property destruction, the NDI delegation found Pristina to be safe for internationals. Daily life in the city appeared to be increasingly normal. Electricity and running water were available. People, the vast majority assumed to be Kosovar Albanians, circulated freely. Restaurants and food stores were open for business and increasing in number. City streets were filled with private cars. The KFOR presence, noticeable and reassuring, was not overwhelming. If anything, the city bore the tattered effects of 10 years of neglect by Belgrade. Still, the effects of the war were palpable: dangling girders of a bombed building, looted stores, and emotional reunions in the streets. Assuming that a secure environment is reinforced in Pristina and takes hold throughout Kosovo, the delegation recommends that a democratic development program for all of Kosovo should begin as soon as is feasible

I International Framework

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 upholds “*the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*” while calling for “*substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo*”. The resolution calls upon the U.N. Secretary General “*to establish an international civilian presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration that will develop and oversee provisional, democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo*”. Thus the resolution anticipates an eventual transfer of governmental authority – presumably through elections – to Kosovar institutions. Unlike the Rambouillet Accords, no timetable is offered.

The language above implies that Kosovo can attain a degree of autonomy up to but not including independence. Yet elsewhere in the document, the Security Council leaves open Kosovo’s final political status. The resolution calls for a political process to “*...determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords*”. Rambouillet called for an international conference to be convened in three years to create a mechanism by which final status could be determined, on the basis, inter alia, “*...of the will of the people...*”.

UNMIK

A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) will oversee the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK’s SRSG is Bernard Kouchner, former French Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and founder of *Medecins Sans Frontieres*. UNMIK is founded upon four “pillars” to be implemented and overseen by international governmental bodies, with substantial contributions by the nongovernmental sector:

- interim civil administration (U.N.)
- humanitarian affairs (UNHCR)
- institution-building and democratization (OSCE)
- reconstruction (European Union)

Deputy SRSGs – representing each of the four lead organizations – will oversee the four pillars. The duration of UNMIK’s mission is open-ended.

UNMIK’s first priority is to secure “basic stability”, which is taken to mean the formation of civilian bodies able to provide food, health, education, etc. to the Kosovar population. Institution building, democratization, and economic reconstruction processes stipulated in the Security Council resolution are to follow.

The U.N. Security Council specified that, in an initial, 30-day period, an UNMIK advance team would establish UNMIK's presence and make recommendations for its civilian structures and Kosovar participation in a formal report to the Secretary General. The NDI delegation visited Pristina as the 30-day period was drawing to a close. The delegation was cautioned by UNMIK advance officials that their decisions and recommendations may be amended by the succeeding UNMIK administration and/or U.N. headquarters.

UNMIK civilian structures will be present at provincial and municipal levels. A recent Council of Europe report on Kosovo suggests using the 29 municipal districts that existed under the Yugoslav system.

The UNMIK advance team has recommended that UNMIK's executive body and civilian structures be supplemented by Kosovar advisory councils. The advisory councils would be consulted on civilian affairs and have the possibility to offer recommendations to UNMIK authorities. The advisory councils would not have a legislative or decision-making mandate, however.

The top advisory council would be comprised of 12-15 seats, divided between ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks, and Turks. Kosovar Albanian representation has been provisionally allocated by UNMIK primarily to those represented at Rambouillet, although one party represented in the shadow Kosovar assembly elected in 1998 has been included.

Similar councils would be formed for such sectors as health, education, and agriculture and at the local level. One such council, which was formed for judicial affairs, sparked indignation among Kosovar Albanians who claimed that among the Serbs appointed to the council are several judges who in the past ignored due process and other judicial norms in convicting Kosovar Albanians of alleged crimes. The multi-ethnic composition of the councils would fluctuate within a range of 75 percent ethnic majority to 25 percent ethnic minority. Ethnic representation on local advisory councils would be calibrated to match local population ratios. It is not clear if pre-war demographics will be applied as reliable census data is either unavailable or difficult to compile.

Most relevant to political development work is the institution-building pillar to be led by the OSCE. This pillar carries five components: democratization, which includes political party and NGO development and civilian service training; the conduct and monitoring of elections; the development of independent media; human rights monitoring, including the creation of an ombudsman; and the training of police and judges.

The OSCE mission to Kosovo, which implemented the Kosovo Verification Mission prior to evacuation in March with the onset of NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia, is in the process of returning its expatriate personnel to Pristina. In the coming months, OSCE plans to establish offices in each of 29 municipal districts. Training academies for judges, police and civilian administrators are envisaged, as are political party service centers. Assistance will also be provided to independent media

and other civil society sectors.

Daan Everts, formerly the OSCE Head of Presence in Albania, will lead OSCE's efforts in Kosovo as the Deputy SRS in charge of institution-building. OSCE's relations to UNMIK will be handled through a democratization and governance planning group, and guided by a mission integration strategy. In this regard, although the OSCE is lead agency for the institution-building pillar, UNMIK is likely to reserve decision-making authority on such matters as whether or not appropriate conditions exist for democratic elections and the selection of Kosovars to sit on advisory bodies.

II Kosovar Albanian Politics

Background

Following Milosevic's repeal of Kosovar autonomy in 1989 and the disappearance of the Kosovar communist organization, Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) was the preeminent political force in the ethnic Albanian community. Yet the balance of political power among Kosovar Albanian political forces has shifted considerably in the past year with the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and growing LDK uncertainty over its leadership.

Established as a national movement in 1989 and claiming a pre-war membership of 600,000, the LDK established a comprehensive grassroots network across Kosovo during the past decade and led the Kosovar parallel system of taxation, education and health services. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosova in 1992 "parallel" presidential and parliamentary elections, considered illegal by Belgrade and not recognized internationally. The elections, which resulted in a "shadow" parliament and government-in-exile, may have represented popular will, but were not independently verified nor internationally monitored. Ethnic Albanians boycotted official elections in the FRY. Critics of this decision argued that had the Kosovar Albanians participated, they may have altered the balance of power in Serbia and had a more effective platform from which to air their grievances.

Less a traditional political party and more a broad-based political movement, the LDK enjoyed broad support in the early 1990s as it pursued an independent Kosovo through nonviolent resistance. The LDK and the Kosovar Albanian political system were in many ways synonymous, albeit increasingly less so as the decade progressed and non-LDK political forces grew. Disenchantment with Rugova's peaceful resistance surfaced in the post-Dayton period as it became clear that the international community would not take on the Kosovo question, presumably because of the widely held view that Milosevic's cooperation was required for Dayton to succeed.

Developments in 1997 presaged a shift in the balance of power. The international community's refusal to support independence, widely reported by the independent newspaper, *Koha Ditore*, contradicted the impression fostered by the LDK that western leaders favored sovereignty for Kosovo.

Student demonstrations unsanctioned by the LDK went forward in October 1997, and fissures within the LDK leadership resulted in the departure of several senior officials. The Kosovo Liberation Army grew increasingly active in 1997. Media coverage, in particular by the *New York Times*, gave it wider international exposure.

The KLA's increasing strength and boldness led to a Yugoslav Army (VJ) offensive in February 1998 in the Drenica region, a KLA stronghold, during which the VJ killed one of the movement's founders, Adem Jashari, and 79 members of his community. They were viewed as martyrs by Kosovar Albanians increasingly exasperated by what they viewed as LDK's ineffectual passiveness.

Military skirmishes and attacks against civilians throughout 1998 saw considerable population displacement within Kosovo and unsteady control by the VJ, as KLA soldiers and weapons, fed by the Albanian diaspora, grew in number. The guerrilla group was transformed into a political player as Albanians increasingly put their fate in the hands of the rebel force. It became clear by the end of 1998, as Belgrade's offensive continued in violation of a ceasefire agreement signed in October by Milosevic and U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, that there could be no peace settlement in the province without the KLA.

Meanwhile, in March 1998 shadow elections, Rugova was re-elected as president and a Government of the Republic of Kosova was formed under incumbent Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi, serving in exile. The election, however, was opposed by key non-LDK figures on the grounds that Kosovo was in a state of war. Among the dissenters were Veton Surroi, publisher of *Koha Ditore* and a respected political figure, Rexhep Qosja of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals, Adem Demaci of the Parliamentary Party of Kosova, then the leading opposition party; and KLA leaders. In October 1998 Qosja founded the United Democratic Movement (LBD) from a coalition of parties in opposition to the LDK.¹

Milosevic's failure to abide by a ceasefire agreement, evidenced by the January 1999 massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians in Racak, led to the beginning of the Rambouillet negotiations. Of the 17-member Kosovar Albanian delegation, five represented LDK, KLA and the LBD respectively. Two seats were filled by Veton Surroi and another prominent, independent journalist, Blërim Shala.

On February 23, 1999, four key delegation members -- Rugova, Qosja, Surroi and KLA leader Hashim Thaci -- signed the "Agreement Between the Political and the Military Subjects of

¹The LBD comprises seven political parties: the Albanian Democratic Movement, the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), the Albanian Unification Party, the Albanian Liberal Party, the Albanian National Party, the Green Party of Kosovo, and the Albanian Republican Party. The PPK was the second largest political force for much of the 1990s and will presumably enjoy some remnants of organizational infrastructure around the province, although it appeared that Pristina-based political leaders had not yet begun to take stock of their grassroots support.

Kosova," thus forming a coalition provisional government, to be led by Thaci as prime minister, that would represent Kosovar interests until elections were held as part of the Rambouillet process. The unity of the ethnic Albanian political leaders was possible at that moment perhaps due to their real belief that Rambouillet represented an historic opportunity to secure self-rule, if not independence in the future. The momentary cohesion of the delegation, however, belied divergent political and personal interests that have resurfaced in the post-war period.

Hashim Thaci announced his swearing-in as Prime Minister of the "Provisional Government of Kosova" (PGK) in April 1999, just weeks after Belgrade refused to sign the Rambouillet Accords and NATO initiated its bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of the failed Rambouillet process, however, Rugova and his LDK declared null and void the agreement on the formation of the PGK, maintaining that the legitimate government for Kosovar Albanians is that led by Bujar Bukoshi, elected in the March 1998 shadow elections.

Current Kosovar Albanian Political Parties

The once monolithic Kosovar Albanian political community is now characterized by a kaleidoscope of interests, personalities and partnerships. The assessment team found two major political blocs – the LDK and KLA – but three main political actors, as described by one observer: one party without a leader, the LDK; one set of leaders without a party, the LBD; and a military force transforming to a political organization(s), the KLA. The LBD has joined the KLA as a junior member of the Provisional Government of Kosova. The LDK asserts its primacy as the leader of the Government of the Republic of Kosova, and is supported by a host of smaller parties.

While a bi-polar political dynamic seems to have emerged, it is important to note that the political scene is by no means established. New parties, alliances, and leaders could and are likely to emerge.

Hashim Thaci, the 30 year-old leader of the PGK, is considered by many to be the leading political figure in Kosovo, particularly given Rugova's absence during the early days of the transition. Cordial, affable, and soft-spoken, Thaci does not lend himself to the image of a hardened guerilla leader. His modest assertion of political inexperience to the NDI delegation belies what appears to be a sophisticated strategy. As the first Kosovar Albanian group back in Kosovo, Thaci's KLA quickly filled the power vacuum left by Belgrade by appointing mayors and other local officials, taking advantage of UNMIK's gradual deployment. Even observers who anticipated Thaci's actions are astonished by how quickly he and the KLA were able to move.

Thaci has yet to formally announce his stated intention of creating a new political party out of KLA's political leadership. He maintains that he can unite all Kosovar Albanians, including most LDK supporters disaffected from Rugova. He also maintains that Kosovo should be multi-ethnic, and pledges himself to work with the Kosovar Serbs to that end.

He has established a relationship of mutual need with UNMIK and KFOR. Thaci desires and has received legitimacy from international officials. In return, UNMIK and KFOR, both in the process of constituting themselves, call upon Thaci's local network of officials to provide social infrastructure, and upon Thaci to defuse inter-ethnic tensions, most notably in Mitrovica. One UNMIK official complained that Rugova's ongoing absence from Pristina had forced UNMIK to rely exclusively on Thaci.

Thaci's PGK, in literature distributed by its New York office, claims to "control the Kosova Liberation Army." The public relations piece continues by stating that "while the KLA retains its autonomy of military actions, on all the other matters, its General Staff and the Officer Corps are responsible before the political authorities of the PGK."

To speak of the KLA as one entity, however, is imprecise. Divisions have appeared. The first political party to emerge from the KLA was founded earlier this month by Bardhyl Mahmuti, a former political prisoner who fled to Switzerland in the late 1980s. Mahmuti was reportedly involved in the Popular Movement of Kosova (LPK in Albanian), an outlawed political group considered by many to have provided the inspiration for the KLA. Mahmuti's new Party of Democratic Union claims the support of at least four regional KLA commanders. It offers a set of pro-western, progressive principles. Its creation, without public sign of Thaci's participation or endorsement, suggests that the KLA transformation to the political realm may yield more than one organization.

Indeed, as a popular movement, the KLA represents a variety of interests. Some former soldiers will return to their families and professions, while some will seek to become part of the province's police force. Yet others will seek to participate directly in the political life of the Kosovo. It is possible that at least two, and perhaps more, parties will be formed out of the armed guerrilla movement.

What appears to be an absence of significant grassroots political organization supporting the LBD belies the stature and respect Dr. Qosja enjoys among Albanians throughout the region for his academic work. Appointed as one of four authorized signatories at Rambouillet, he has served as one of the Kosovar Albanian leaders at small bi-communal meetings convened by UNMIK's provisional SRSG Sergio de Mello in the early days of the transition. Qosja states that Kosovo is closer in politics and spirit to Tirana than to Belgrade, and espouses a romantic type of nationalism associated with the 19th century. Still, he eschews a greater Albania for practical reasons, and speaks of his firm commitment to the transition under way in Kosovo led by UNMIK.

Other senior figures in the LBD include Bajram Kosumi, who has been involved in resistance politics for a number of years, first as a student leader. Kosumi heads the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PPK), and serves as Minister of Information in the PGK. Founded by Veton Surroi in 1990, the PPK was the second largest Kosovar Albanian political force throughout much of the decade (despite Surroi's departure from the party in 1992), and took part in the shadow elections organized in

1992. Adem Demaci, called the "Mandela of Kosovo" by some after serving a 28- year jail sentence imposed by Belgrade, was the hard-line PPK leader until Kosumi succeeded him earlier this year. Demaci served as the political advisor to Thaci during Rambouillet and advised him to reject the agreement as the proposed text did not ensure independence for Kosovo. Demaci has not carried a strong political profile since the conflict ended.

Kosumi and fellow PGK Minister Hydajet Hyseni, a senior LDK defector in 1997, expressed to NDI their appreciation for international efforts in "liberating" Kosovo and a desire to build a democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo in the years to come. At the same time, they believe that the PGK deserves credit for asserting its control over Kosovo and filling the power vacuum responsibly. Both grasp the importance of developing an identity and platform for political parties and the LBD coalition beyond the national issue, and acknowledged that for much of the decade it had been impossible for any party to articulate what set it apart from the others.

Overall, LBD will play an important role in the ongoing transition due to its position vis-a-vis the international community and the contribution it makes to the appearance of a pluralistic Kosovar Albanian political spectrum. Nevertheless, the coalition's ties to the KLA cannot be understated. It remains to be seen if LBD will survive as a player at the local level and attract support as Thaci establishes his own political party.

Given Thaci's power and standing, it would be easy to dismiss the LDK as no longer predominant. While this may turn out to be correct, several factors argue in favor of LDK's staying power. First, the outpouring of popular support for the KLA's military exploits may not have destroyed an abiding faith in the LDK as the leading political force of Kosovar Albanians, a faith unbroken by Rugova's controversial audiences with Milosevic during the military conflict and his prolonged and unexplained absence from Kosovo in the weeks after the conflict ended. Second, smaller, so-called "parliamentary" parties formerly aligned with the LDK remain supportive, in particular the Albanian Demochristian Party of Kosova (ADPK), the Liberal Party of Kosova (LPK), and Social Democratic Party of Kosova (SDPK).² Third, the LDK did possess the most developed organizational infrastructure of any Kosovar Albanian political organization. Finally, the LDK represents centrist or center-right bulwark against what many perceive as a leftist KLA. LDK and affiliated parties point to Albania's socialist government's support of the KLA as a disturbing sign. Albania's Socialist Party is rumored to have had ties with marxist elements of the KLA throughout the 1990s. One LDK official went so far as to suggest that Kosovo could turn into a Cuba-type entity should KLA sustain its power.

LDK officials and others whom the delegation visited insist that the party still holds appeal for a considerable number of Kosovars. According to one senior LDK official, local activists are contacting

²There are two parties calling themselves the Social Democratic Party of Kosova. After a split in the party, Luljeta Pula-Beqiri formed her SDPK, which does not support the LDK.

headquarters and are resuming weekly meetings. The first such meeting was reportedly held on July 2, just three weeks after KFOR's entry into the province.

Despite these factors favoring the LDK's survival, the party's position has undoubtedly been weakened by recent events. A number of local LDK leaders have reportedly changed allegiances, especially in areas hardest hit by the Serb military and paramilitary actions. Second, Rugova's failure to return to Pristina until July 30 left the party leaderless during the crucial first days of the transition and contributed to Thaci's ability to fill the power vacuum which followed the end of hostilities. Finally, the murder of Fehmi Agani by Serb forces dealt a blow not only to the LDK, but to the entire Kosovar Albanian political scene. A senior advisor to Rugova known for his ability to build consensus between ethnic Albanian political factions, Agani would likely have fulfilled the need for leadership in Rugova's absence, but for his execution in May.

III Kosovar Serb Politics

Of primary concern for Kosovar Serbs during the NDI assessment was the exodus of a significant portion of the estimated 200,000 ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. This concern has been deepened with daily reports of escalating violence against Kosovar Serbs. KFOR pledges of protection, Kosovar Albanian' calls to end the violence, and the arrival of 3,000 Russian troops seems to have done little to convince Kosovar Serbs to stay. More persuasive may be uninviting political and economic conditions in Serbia and heavy-handed treatment by Belgrade.

Belgrade, it is fair to say, initially abandoned ethnic Serbs remaining in Kosovo and provided few if any resources for those seeking refuge in Serbia proper. The recent formation of an official, Belgrade-based council to liaise with international authorities, and the presence of two official Belgrade representatives at the funeral of the 14 slain farmers could be an attempt to undermine self-representation by Kosovar Serbs.

Maintaining a critical mass of Kosovar Serbs in Kosovo and representing their interests effectively are the principal concerns of the community's two main representatives: the Serbian Orthodox Church and its secular partner, the Serbian Democratic Movement. The Serbian Democratic Movement was until recently called the Serbian Resistance Movement, and grew mainly out of a desire to defend Kosovar Serbs from KLA attacks. The Orthodox Church in Kosovo has been criticized for its relative silence on the subject of widespread and substantial human rights abuses orchestrated by the Serbian government in Kosovo during the past 10 years.

With the end of the NATO bombing campaign, the Orthodox Church has publicly acknowledged Serbian atrocities in Kosovo and has called for Milosevic's resignation. Church representatives insist that this position is nothing new, and that the Church has been manipulated by Belgrade which has invoked religious dogma in promoting its nationalist agenda. Official Belgrade routinely labels the leadership of both the Church and the Serbian Democratic Movement as traitors for

cooperating with UNMIK and KFOR and for engaging in UNMIK-sponsored dialogue with Kosovar Albanian leaders. Both the Orthodox Church and the Serbian Democratic Movement are politically aligned with the Serbian opposition and, it should be noted, have openly criticized Belgrade's Kosovo policy over the past year.

At the same time, the Church and the Serbian Democratic Movement are highly critical of KFOR and Kosovar Albanian leaders, particularly Hashim Thaci, for not doing enough to prevent violent retribution against Kosovar Serbs and Serbian cultural and religious centers in Kosovo, which they see as the patrimony of Kosovo. They point to celebrations surrounding Kosova National Day, July 2, commemorating the declaration of the Republic of Kosova in 1990, which this year triggered the murder of several Kosovar Serbs and the destruction of ethnic Serb houses. Tensions remain extremely high. The NDI delegation met the head of the Serbian Democratic Movement as he came upon his looted store in the center of Pristina. He and Orthodox Church officials assert that it is up to KFOR and Kosovar Albanian leaders to provide security to Kosovar Serbs.

Kosovar Serbs see themselves as powerless, surrounded by a hostile Belgrade, an indifferent international community, and a vengeful Kosovar Albanian majority. Both church and secular leaders nonetheless stated, as had their Kosovar Albanian counterparts, that they are prepared to build a multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo based on reconciliation, the rule of law, and the strict adherence to human rights. The two organizations were preparing to nominate Serbian candidates to fill positions in Kosovar advisory councils to UNMIK. Subsequent to NDI's visit, they have boycotted cooperation with UNMIK to highlight their concern over security.

The Orthodox Church seems prepared to contemplate sovereignty for Kosovo, noting that it be considered in light of Kosovo's ability to build multi-ethnic, democratic political institutions and to achieve and sustain economic self-sufficiency and social stability, along with due deference to regional security and political factors. The Serbian Democratic Movement is not prepared to endorse independence, holding as its political goal the maintenance of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Orthodox Church would like to hand over responsibility for Kosovar Serb political representation to the Serbian Democratic Movement, and to other Serbian opposition parties that may still have representation in Kosovo. At a meeting on July 6, convened by Archbishop Artemije and Momcilo Trajkovic, Kosovar Serbs were to nominate individuals to serve on advisory councils to UNMIK. It is perhaps the case that Kosovar Serbs are too few in number and too weak in political power to afford more than one political representative at this point.

As with their Kosovar Albanian counterparts, Kosovar Serb political and civic organizations will be in dire need of external assistance to aid in their development as effectively managed, democratic, and representative bodies engaged in the political development, economic reconstruction, and social rehabilitation of Kosovo.

IV Challenges Facing the Transition

Against the backdrop presented in this document, a number of important issues should be considered in the coming months as the international community sets out to assist Kosovars in the process of building democratic institutions in the province:

Competing Kosovar Albanian Governments

A political impasse between the two provisional and rival Kosovar Albanian governments may impede needed political consensus among Kosovar Albanians. While Rugova's recent decision to participate in the transitional council is a positive one, it remains to be seen whether or not the ethnic Albanian political factions in Kosovo can find common ground as to what is in the best interest of the province's citizens. An absence of some form of consensus building might well result in a level of polarization and gridlock that characterizes the political environment in neighboring Albania.

Power Vacuum Filled by KLA

There is a destabilizing power vacuum as Yugoslav political and military structures disappear and the international security and civilian presence begins to assume its authority. The KLA has asserted itself at the local level, appointing mayors and other officials to provide some degree of local civil infrastructure and, some critics allege, engaging in improper activities such as the seizure of property and businesses, and unauthorized tax collection. As it sets out to create its own interim civilian administration, UNMIK's early strategy is not to overturn the KLA appointments, but to provide needed training and resources. However, this process has barely begun and, according to SRSK Kouchner, is hampered by the slowness of the international community to provide civil administrators and a promised 3,000 armed police.

Representation on UNMIK Councils

This was perhaps the largest political issue discussed during the delegation's visit to Pristina. All of the Kosovars with whom the delegation met stated their acceptance of UNMIK as the chief civilian and political authority in Kosovo during the transition period. UNMIK has categorically stated that it does not recognize either Kosovar Albanian government.

Most Kosovar Albanian leaders are concerned over the multi-ethnic composition of advisory councils formed or proposed by UNMIK. And there is disagreement over the political composition of Kosovar Albanian representation. The LDK boycotted the first meeting of the top advisory council,³ arguing that smaller parties politically affiliated with the LDK, which were elected in 1998 but not represented at Rambouillet, were not seated on the council, thereby creating an unfair advantage for the KLA. The smaller parties insist that, as longstanding political organizations advocating peaceful change,

³Rugova subsequently announced that he and the LDK will participate. A representative of the Albanian Demochristian Party of Kosova, an LDK ally, has also been invited to sit on the council.

they have a greater right to participation than those groups more recently created and which are currently seated.

There is recognition that Kosovars should have an adjunct role in the transitional administration as the development of indigenous governmental and political institutions proceeds. While Kosovar leaders of both sides express a desire to work toward fulfillment of the U.N. resolution, they insist that, in the transition period, they be accorded a reasonable degree of involvement in decision-making processes.

Serb Exodus/Multi-ethnic Coexistence

Discoveries of appalling acts of mass murder and episodes of violent retribution suggest that a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo will require appropriate vision and leadership among Kosovar political leaders and substantial and long-term support from the international community. Initial attempts in early July by UNMIK's provisional SRSG, Sergio Vieira de Mello, to bring together four Kosovar Albanian leaders with four Kosovar Serb counterparts⁴ to produce a public statement on inter-ethnic peace have met with qualified success. There is particular concern in some quarters over a mass Kosovar Serb exodus that, if not reversed, will render Kosovo to all intents and purposes an Albanian entity.

Civil Society Development

There is a need to transform Kosovar Albanian civil society from an underground network of political resistance and social services to one that is open, transparent, and democratic, contributing to the political, social, and economic development of Kosovo. The past 10 years have provided Kosovar Albanians with a wealth of organizing experience, although there has been little direct experience in the application of democratic principles. It appears that a top-down approach and centralized decision-making often characterize civic efforts. Despite the presence of numerous local networks across Kosovo, there is a need to enhance the inclusiveness of and the process by which citizen political participation is undertaken in matters large and small. Coordination among international organizations promoting civil society initiatives will be imperative as a multitude of actors are poised to enter this area.

Political Party Development

While some parties gained some degree of democratic political experience through the shadow electoral and governance systems, ineffective hierarchical and autocratic structures and decision-making processes persist. Most parties lack organizational skills, and many have a vague sense of modern communications strategies. The lack of political and organizational skills stems from a decade-long isolation from the region's democratic transition process, and from a willingness to subordinate

⁴ Kosovar Albanians: Hashim Thaci (Kosova Liberation Army), Rexhep Qosja (United Democratic Movement), Blerim Shala (independent), and a vice president of the Democratic League of Kosova. Momcilo Trajkovic (Serbian Democratic Movement), Bishop Artemije and Father Sava (Serbian Orthodox Church) were among the Serb participants attending a first, seven-hour exchange.

individual rights to the struggle for collective political rights and the national cause. Unaddressed, this will impede Kosovo's political and democratic development. Political party training across the board is seen by Kosovar political leaders as necessary and welcome.

Although the goal of Kosovo independence remains a shared aspiration for the Kosovar Albanian political parties, there is recognition that in this period of democratic transition, parties must develop identities and identify new issues that resonate with their constituents.

Finally, the development of mainstream, democratic, representative political parties in the interim period, before indigenous governmental institutions are created, is pivotal to Kosovar enfranchisement in the province's political system.

Autonomy or Sovereignty?

Because the Security Council resolution defers consideration of Kosovo's final political status, the "endgame" of the U.N. transitional administration and the development of Kosovar political and governmental institutions is not known. This is currently complicated by the absence of a clear and universally understood definition of "substantial autonomy", as set forth in the Security Council resolution. Kosovar Albanian citizens chafe at Kosovo's ambiguous political status, their nominal citizenship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the absence of clear commitments by the international community to Kosovo's independence. These factors may impair Kosovar relations with UNMIK and KFOR down the road. In addition to its potentially negative effect on the UNMIK-Kosovar relationship, the absence of final status also brings considerable ambiguity to the task of developing economic and political institutions.

V Recommendations

It is important to note that the three months of war were preceded by one year of Belgrade's violent suppression of an armed ethnic Albanian rebellion, 10 years of oppression by Belgrade, and decades of enmity among Kosovar Albanians, Serbs, and other ethnic groups. Some Kosovar leaders see an historic opportunity to resolve the political and ethnic problems that have plagued Kosovo and are ready to seize this opportunity. This opportunity, they believe, has come about only as a result of full-scale international intervention into the conflict and the subsequent international security and civilian presence--described by one Kosovar Albanian leader as a moral force--to underwrite the reconciliation, democratization, and reconstruction processes.

Despite daunting challenges and uncertainty, there is some room for optimism. Kosovo is likely not to have a formalized ethnic division (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina) thus favoring ethnic reconciliation and the formation of a multi-ethnic body politique. Kosovar leaders maintain that Kosovo is pro-western in political orientation which will facilitate cooperation with the international community.

This optimism is tempered, however, by the realization that, even if Kosovar Albanians and

Serbs put into practice their intentions, their good faith efforts can be subverted by external forces, principally the Milosevic regime and by Albanian national extremists.

NDI offers the following recommendations with the acknowledgment that its visit to Pristina occurred during the very early days of the post-war period.

- *The international presence must be united in reality and in perception.* The participation of four large international governmental organizations in the security, reconstruction, and governance of Kosovo speaks volumes about the international community's commitment to a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Kosovo. The successful co-existence of such large entities requires substantial communication and coordination. The UNMIK framework, as set down on paper, provides for ample cooperation. It will be incumbent upon the SRSG and his deputies to ensure this cooperation before the people of Kosovo will regard UNMIK as one institution. In particular, the co-location of offices among UNMIK implementers would go a long way to ensure the appropriate level of inter-agency coordination.

The perception of a unified and effective UNMIK is particularly important when considering the some 8,000 soldiers discharged from the KLA. They will be a source of instability if UNMIK cannot effectively deal with their political and economic expectations and unchanneled hostilities.

- *Kosovar political leaders must find consensus on political rules of the game.* As in any democratic political system, ideology, policy and self-interest create differences among political forces which compete for popular support to win political power. In Kosovo, the political system has never been based on consensually derived democratic rules. The current attempt to create a democratic political system risks being subverted by age-old authoritarian and/or ultra-nationalist tendencies. It is crucial that political leaders, while promoting their own fortunes and those of their supporters, make every effort to ensure an open and participatory political culture, one based on mutual respect for collective and individual rights and a categorical rejection of nationalist agendas. They would do well and set a strong example by organizing their own political parties democratically. The international community must do its utmost to ensure an equitable allocation of resources to appropriate political groups. And the people of Kosovo must have access to reliable information on the activities of their political representatives, primarily through a vigorous and independent Kosovar media properly trained in objective reporting.
- *The international community must ensure an appropriate degree of responsible Kosovar political representation during the interim period.* Although inevitably controversial, UNMIK's attempts thus far to create mechanisms for Kosovar participation in the transitional administration are laudable. The international community should continue to look for opportunities to promote Kosovar ownership of the political process and to build Kosovars'

capacity to govern in the years ahead. It is extremely important, given the absence of a timetable for Kosovar self-governance and Kosovo's unresolved political status, that UNMIK create a partnership with appropriate Kosovar counterparts that leads to increasing self-rule rather than build a monopoly of power that leads to dependence and, eventually, resentment. At the same time, Kosovar political leaders must demonstrate, through actions in addition to words, a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as a capacity to govern.

- *A framework and implementation timetable for the conduct of elections should be established as soon as possible.* Elections in Kosovo are not yet scheduled. The U.N. resolution offers no timetable for the transfer of power to Kosovar governmental institutions, nor guidance on what those institutions should in fact be. There will be considerable debate as to when elections should be held, and on the possible sequencing of elections, assuming that both provincial and local offices are to be elected. To date the debate has taken two sides.

On the one hand, some international experts are calling for a slower track election process, drawing lessons from post-Dayton Bosnia where early elections were viewed by some as polarizing and favoring ultra-nationalist forces. This school of thought suggests a waiting period of 18-24 months to ensure that the elections do not reinforce the polarization of a post-conflict situation, nor institutionalize the power of hardline political forces. More time would also allow for better technical and legal preparation, such as the establishment of civil registries and voter lists, and the organizational development of political parties. Finally, more time would allow for public education and debate about the process thereby enhancing public confidence in the electoral outcome.

However, advocates for more immediate elections note the clear differences between Bosnia and Kosovo. They point to the Kosovar experience of the last 10 years in managing a parallel system of governance which penetrated every aspect of Kosovar society. It is argued that by delaying elections the international community will be seen as an occupying force, frustrating the Kosovar Albanians and making the democratization process more difficult. Long delays can contribute to negative outcomes by creating a lack of indigenous ownership of the political process. Finally, there are those experts who view elections as a tool for *creating* democratic conditions, by providing opportunities for citizens and political parties to begin the practice of democracy.

The experience of the National Democratic Institute in the Southeastern Europe and elsewhere in the world has shown that there can be a middle ground between these views. At a minimum, two factors should guide the discussion on the timing of elections. First, a specific timetable for elections should be established as soon as feasible, thus establishing a framework for Kosovar enfranchisement in the province's political affairs during the interim period.

Second, the international community and the people of Kosovo need to ensure that progress is being made toward the establishment of adequate democratic conditions before elections are held. They include a stable, peaceful political environment, sufficient voter registration and education and access to credible information about contesting political forces, a functioning independent media, and a competitive campaign environment based on fair treatment and a reasonable equality of resources among contesting political forces. These efforts can begin immediately and should involve Kosovar organizations and institutions at each step and in all decisions.

VI Conclusion

The NDI delegation concluded that years of ethnic hostility, political polarization, an authoritarian political tradition, and horrific human rights abuses have made the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo a long-term task. This conclusion is reinforced by ongoing, if not increasingly numerous acts of violence in Kosovo since the delegation's visit.

While the delegation noted with optimism the stated commitments to tolerance, rule of law, and ethnic reconciliation made by Kosovar political and civic leaders and earnestly supported by international representatives, it is clear that stronger international policing efforts are needed, as are unequivocal calls for peace and condemnations of violence by Kosovar political leaders.

Still, the delegation believes that the creation of democratic self-governance in Kosovo, based on multi-ethnic coexistence, if not reconciliation, is possible in the long-term. It requires security and stability both within and outside Kosovo, economic recovery and development, a unified and directed interim international administration, the development of self-sustaining and democratic Kosovar governmental and political institutions, and, above all, the ability of the people of Kosovo to express themselves democratically.

The delegation believes that democratic development groups like NDI can play a significant role in contributing to Kosovar and international efforts to build a multi-ethnic democratic Kosovo. To this end, the Institute is considering a long-term program focused primarily on political party development, with additional components in the areas of civic education and citizen political participation, particularly in the area of electoral processes, as well as legislative/governance capacity building. Assuming that Kosovo achieves a reasonable level of security and stability, the NDI delegation recommends that such programs begin as soon as possible.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ADPK	Albanian Demochristian Party of Kosova
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
KFOR	Multi-national NATO-led military presence in Kosovo
LBD	United Democratic Movement
LDK	Democratic League of Kosova
LPK	Liberal Party of Kosova
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PGK	Provisional Government of Kosova
PPK	Parliamentary Party of Kosova
SDPK	Social Democratic Party of Kosova
SPO	Serbian Democratic Movement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UCK	Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves; Albanian for Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VJ	Yugoslav Army

Appendix 1

Kosovo Assessment Meetings

International Community

Ambassador Morton Abramowitz

Jeanne Bourgeault, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID

Bridget Brink, Political Officer, US Embassy/Skopje

Anne-Sophie Ducreaux, Democratization Officer, OSCE

Julia Goette, Acting Director, Democratization Division, OSCE

Bruce Jones, UNMIK Advance Team

David McLachlan-Karr, Coordinator of Four Pillars, UNMIK Advance Team

Peter Pollis, Democratization Officer, OSCE

Phil Walsh, Mercy Corps International

KFOR/Civil Military Affairs (CIMIC) Office

Coordination Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, UNHCR

Kosovars

Zenullah Agruda, Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms

Bujar Bukoshi, LDK, Prime Minister of 1992/1998 “Government”

Gjergj Dedaj, Chairman, Liberal Party of Kosova (PLK)

Hydajet Hyseni, LBD, Minister of Justice, Provisional Government of Kosovo

Aferdita Kelmendi, *Radio 21*

Bajram Kosumi, LBD, Minister of Public Information, Provisional Government of Kosovo

Kadri Metaj, Vice-President, Social Democratic Party of Kosova (PSDK)

Rexhep Qosja, Chair, United Democratic Movement (LBD)

Adem Rusinofiti, Artist, Former Student Union leader

Father Sava, Serbian Orthodox Church

Fatmir Sejdiu, LDK, Chair of 1992 Parliament

Blerim Shala, Editor, *Zeri*

Veton Surroi, Publisher, *Koha Ditore*

Edita Tahiri, LDK, International Affairs directorate

Hashim Thaci, KLA, Prime Minister of “Provisional Government of Kosova”

Momcilo Trajkovic, Chairman, Serbian Democratic Movement

Milaim Zeka, Journalist

Cegrane Refugee Camp

Appendix 2

PRE-KOSOVAR ASSESSMENT VISIT TO MACEDONIA

June 5-8, 1999

Mary Cummins

National Democratic Institute

Purpose of Assessment

To ascertain the need for and purpose, goals and activities of a technical assistance and training program for Kosovar deportees that would help to foster democratic initiatives among deportees and contribute to subsequent democratization assistance in Kosovo following the return of deportees.

Purpose of Pre-Assessment Visit

To identify groups and individuals who can provide information on the political formations and characteristics among Kosovar leaders and citizens displaced in Macedonia. To ascertain in general the degree of receptivity toward a NDI program among displaced Kosovars. To understand differences in political characteristics that may apply between displaced Kosovar communities in Macedonia and Albania. To ascertain logistical information concerning location of camps, camp accreditation, local transport, and other related matters.

Summary

It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which political organizing occurs in the camps. The level of political organizing appears to be relatively low, but may rise as repatriation prospects improve and political leaders try to persuade others to follow their political program. Already there have been some reports of political agitation which erupted into some minor outbreaks of violence.

It seems from a very unscientific and limited survey that many people support Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK). I heard almost no criticism of him. Broadly speaking, it seems that people want Mr. Rugova to be their leader and perhaps an interim national government lead by Mr. Rugova and Hashim Thaci, the political representative of the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK) until elections are held.

In all of our meetings in the camps NDI was asked to conduct civic education programs-- both by the camp managers and the community leaders with whom we met. All of them suggested programs to explain what a peace agreement entails; how it will affect the displaced upon repatriation; fundamental principles of democracy; civic rights and responsibilities; the form, content, and significance of elections; local government models; community development, etc. Skills training in election administration, self-governance, and civil society building – along democratic lines – were also mentioned. There is sense of urgency among the displaced to start rebuilding Kosovo politically, in order to develop the province as fast as possible and to connect it to the West.

Political Observations

The question arises as to whether or not the UCK can transform itself into a political party. The general impression among internationals is that Mr. Thaci is not politically experienced and that Mr. Rugova is very much still in the picture. Veton Surroi, a leading political figure, Rambouillet negotiator, and newspaper editor, currently in hiding within Kosovo, was also constantly mentioned in the camps as someone who will play a very important role in the political future of Kosovo, if he survives.

Most high level political leaders are abroad or in Tirana. Mr. Rugova's government seem to be mostly in third countries, Mr. Thaci's provisional government seem to be mostly in Tirana. Some work is currently underway to identify all political representatives both inside and outside the camps, mayors of local municipalities, local representatives at various levels etc.

The LDK is present in Macedonia, the UCK formally not. The UCK keeps close contacts with the Democratic Party of Albanians, the LDK with the Party of Democratic Prosperity, another ethnic Albanian party and junior member of the coalition government.

Political unity may be a problem, between LDK and UCK supporters, between the displaced in camps and their more numerous counterparts (in Macedonia) in private accommodation, between those who left Kosovo and those who stayed behind. The challenge is to encourage unity among leaders. It will be important to encourage younger, more moderate leaders, many of whom, though, are feared to be in prison or otherwise held by Serbs in Kosovo.

The Camps

Each camp there has a Macedonian interior ministry official to whom visitors report about the purpose of their visit, show identification etc. There are a small number of police at the entrance to each camp. There are also representatives from the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. They keep records of movements, etc. in the camps and liaise with relief agencies. It was suggested that we would need to inform them of any work we would conduct in the camps.

UNHCR has a representative in each camp. CARE, IRC, the Turkish Red Crescent Society have camp managers. (Appendix: Page 1 and 2 lists Agencies in charge of various projects in the camps and population of the camps as of June 8, 1999). Each camp has different methods of organization depending on the international organization managing the camp and the camp's size.

Cegrane

Cegrane, the largest camp with approximately 41,000, is divided into 16 sections. Each section has between 1,500 and 4,000 people. (Average approx. 2,500). I met with Ahmet Jema, Leader of Sector B, and his family. The leaders are chosen by the camp management mainly by personality and ability. Section leaders in turn appoint a camp row leaders. Meetings are held daily with row leaders.

Section leaders meet camp managers every morning. NGOs and all UN organizations meet every day at 5 pm.

Cegrane has open access. People come and go to the village to buy merchandise and leave the camp for a few hours. Some political organizing going on. Most people would support LDK, some support for KLA but these people are more aggressive.

Neprosten

At Neprosten, population 8,300, the teachers seem to have taken the lead. We met with Prof. Osman Mejinolli, (Arts Faculty, University of Pristina), Prof. Shaban Rexhedi (Mathematics Faculty, University of Pristina) and Shankett Hazari, ARS TV (Tetovo) reporter, who arranged our visit.

There are 25 Kosovar teachers present and they immediately organized a school for the children when they arrived. This is one of the better-organized camps with one TV available and a number of classrooms furnished with proper school furniture in tents. Every two weeks the Parents' Council meets. There is some political organizing in the camp but the teachers do not get involved. They have no time for politics. However most people would support the LDK according to the professors. If people have problems they come to either Prof. Mejinolli or the other teachers. They have very good relations with the camp manager. The Camp is enclosed but there seems to be easy access to Tetovo.

Bojane

At Bojane, population 3,800 people, I met with Mr. Hakan, Assistant Camp Director. There is one community leader and seven committee members who have been elected by camp residents. Bojane is very much a transit camp. We also met with Ajet Havoli, a committee member. Here leaders and committee members change as people leave for third countries. There had been Kosovar teachers but they have emigrated and now they have to reorganize and try to send students to the local school. They are hoping that local teachers will provide some education during the summer holidays for the camp children. Three hot meals a day are provided by the camp. There's a TV room and some showers. People can go to the village. There are many problems with the government over facilities, etc. The committee meets all the refugees once a week.

Most people would support Mr. Rugova. Not much political organizing is occurring because it is a transit camp. People in the camp will not return to Kosovo if Russia is not under NATO command.

Meetings

International Community: There is a lot of coordination now beginning to happen. The UN has created a new post of Regional Coordinator for Systems Assistance in the Balkans under Martin Griffiths. There are four pillars under this Coordination System although it was stressed that as of now not all organizations

UNHCR – Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE - Democratization and Institution Building
NATO - Security
EU - Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.
Rapporteur from each group meetings with UN on regular basis.

Each Group holds its own meetings with other donors/NGOs etc. USAID would attend OSCE meetings. Twice a week there is an Inter Agency Meeting in the Hotel Continental for all donors and NGOs.

OSCE hoped NDI would fit into the political party training particularly if the camps are here over the winter. However, if the return of the refugees begins soon, they suggest civic education would be essential at this point.

KDOM are in the middle of conducting an assessment of refugees in the Struga and Debar area and early indications suggest that the main issues for people are security, mines, water supplies, medical centers, infrastructure and housing.

The EU (ECHO) is funding community services and coordinates with UNHCR and US State/USAID. Its difficult to do precise planning but they hope to base their Regional Coordinator in Skopje. They are drawing up an initial three-month plan for reconstruction, the aim of which is to secure one room in each house before winter, assuming there is a peace agreement in place. They also have long term plans.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is funding various projects including NDI civic partner ADI (Gostivar), which is running a number of programs such as a database of host refugees. OTI has a help hotline, a website, transport for students to attend high school and university, and legal aid centers. OTI is also looking at a proposal on mine awareness, small enterprise projects, education program etc. OTI plans to open an office in Pristina and have chosen a director for it.

According to the Democratic Party of Albanians, the LDK are reorganizing in Albania where it is easier and their main people are based in Albania. They are playing games politically about the Thaci Government. UCK will not disarm or become political until NATO troops enter Kosovo. Then some of the soldiers can perhaps become policemen and Thaci will probably start a political party. Veton Surroi's people are in Macedonia.

Fatmir Sejdiu, MP, General Secretary of Parliament of Kosovo and former General Secretary of .the LDK. MPs are scattered everywhere in Kosovo, Albania and not so many in Macedonia and of course third countries. Both UCK and LDK are active and some LDK members are now fighting side by side with UCK to defend their homes. LDK have just opened a Tirana office. They try to combine activities between Tetovo and Tirana but it is difficult to organize politically in Macedonia, given the transit factor and presumed surveillance. Mr. Sejdiu thinks that a national government is the answer for now. They do not object to Thaci's provisional government but they do object to the division of ministries. Believes civic education for now is the answer, to give hope to people that life will improve, provide some realism for the people.

According to the Party of Democratic Prosperity, NDI should stay close to Kosovo refugees and LDK, as well as other political parties, will need lots of assistance. While its difficult to organize politically here civic education is a good way to help out.

Meetings

Philip Reeker, Head of USIS

Tina Kaidanow, US Embassy/Skopje

Tudorka Janeveska, Head of Red Cross, Skopje

Dina Chernobregu, OTI

Julie Goette, Programme Coord. OSCE Pristina

Peter Pollis, Programme Officer for Political Party Development (new) OSCE Pristina

Bernd Borchardt, Dept Head of Mission, OSCE, Pristina

Andreaas Raab, Political Affairs Officer, OSCE Macedonia

Baton Haxhiu, Editor, Koha Ditore

Shkelzen Maliqi, Soros Foundation

Adelina Marku, Spokesperson, DPA

Fatmir Sejdiu, MP, General Secretary, Kosovar Assembly, former LDK General Secretary

Ramiz Kelmendi, Professor of Journalism, University of Pristina

Abdylmenaf Bexheti, PDP

Emshe Ejup, Mayor of Cegrane PDP

Ahmet Jema, Sector B Leader, Cegrane

Dept. Head of CARE, Cegrane

Adem Rusinovci, Former President Of Students Union, Pristina

Professor Osman Mejinolli, Prof. Shaban Rexhedi, Neproshten Camp

Shankett Hazari, Reporter/Producer ARS TV Tetovo

Mr. Hakan, Assistant. Director, Bojane

Ajet Havoli, Member of Camp Committee

Roberta Canulla, ECHO Office EU

Frank Pavich, USAID Pristina

Gail Long, STAR (AFSC, American Friends Service Committee).

Stefan Krause, International Crisis Group

Ben Parker/Kevin Kennedy, UN Regional Coordination Office

John Ryan, UNHCR political coordinator