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Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

SAMPLE FORMS FOR MONITORING ACCESS

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to a registration center to observe the process of registering voters. On [insert date], you should go to the registration center assigned to you. You should arrive there at [insert time] before the registration center opens and remain there throughout the day until [insert time]. On this form you should document your observations. Remember that the registration officials are in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you are concerned that an individual is wrongly being turned away or wrongly being permitted to register, you should bring this, respectfully, to the attention of the individual in charge of the center. This form will be collected by your supervisor.

Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance.

1. Name of Monitor					
2. Registration center's name and location					
3. Registration center's number					
4. Date you visited the registration center	Time		Day		Month
5. Name of official in charge of the registration center					
6. Was the registration center open?				Yes	No
7. If Yes, what time did the registration center open?				Time	
8. When was the center originally scheduled to open?			Day		Month
9. On what date did the registration center first open?			Day		Month
10. Has the center been forced to close for any reason?				Yes	No
11. If Yes, why has the center been forced to close? (use additional paper if necessary)					
12. If Yes, how long has the center been closed?				Days	
13. How many people are expected to register at the center?					
14. How many people had already registered at the center when you arrived?					
15. How many people register during the day you observed registration?					
16. Did the election official correctly follow the registration procedures?				Yes	No
17. If No, what did the election officials do wrong? (use additional paper if necessary)					
18. Did you witness any attempt to bribe or intimidate any prospective voter or registration official, in or around the registration center?				Yes	No
19. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)					

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
Sample Form

Generic
(Back)

20. Was anyone permitted to register who you thought was ineligible?		Yes	No
21. If Yes, how many?			
22. Was anyone not allowed to register who you thought as eligible?		Yes	No
23. If Yes, how many?			
24. Was every individual who was registered given a receipt (if applicable)?		Yes	No
25. If No, how many?			
26. Was a photograph taken of every individual who registered (if applicable)?		Yes	No
27. Was a finger print taken of every individual who registered to vote (if applicable)?		Yes	No
28. Were there representatives of political parties or civic organizations present at the registration center?		Yes	No
29. If Yes, which political parties or civic organizations? (use additional paper if necessary)			
30. Were any formal complaints lodged about the registration process?		Yes	No
31. If Yes, what complaints were filed? (use additional paper if necessary)			
32. Monitor Signature and Date			

Use the rest of this form to write detailed notes about problems that you have witnessed at the registration center. If necessary use additional paper to record your observations.

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
 Sample Form used by All Political Parties

Lesotho
 (Front)

Form for Political Parties Monitoring Voter Registration
Lesotho 2001

Instructions

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent by your political party to a registration centre to observe the process of registering voters. On this form you should document your observations. Remember that the registration officials are in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you have a concern that someone is wrongly being turned away or wrongly being permitted to register you should bring this to the attention of the person in charge of the registration centre. This form will be collected by your party supervisor.

*Please write clearly as many people will read this form. Remember to sign this form.
 Thank you for your assistance in this monitoring effort.*

1. Name of monitor (your name) _____
2. Your political party _____
3. Registration centre's name and location _____
4. Registration centre's constituency _____
5. Name of official in charge of the registration centre _____
6. Date you visited the registration centre _____
7. What time did you arrive at the registration centre? _____
8. Did the centre open at all today? Yes No
- 8a. If No, why did the centre not open today?

If the centre did not open today then you are finished.

9. Did the centre open on time? Yes No
10. Has the centre been forced to close before today? Yes No
- 10a. If Yes, for how many days has the centre been forced to close? _____
- 10b. If Yes, has the centre been forced to close due to a lack of staff? Yes No
- 10c. If Yes, has the centre been forced to close due to a lack of materials? Yes No
- 10d. If Yes, which materials were missing? _____
11. Including today, how many days has the centre been open? _____
12. How many people had registered at the centre before today? _____
13. How many people had registered at the centre today? _____

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process Form
Sample Form used by All Political Parties

Lesotho
(Back)

- | | | | |
|--|-----|----|-------------------------|
| 14. Did the officials correctly follow the registration procedures? | Yes | No | |
| 15. Did the officials conduct themselves impartially and professionally? | Yes | No | |
| 16. Was anyone permitted to register who had ultraviolet indelible ink on his/her hands? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 17. Was anyone permitted to register who did not have identification documents or a competent witness who verified his/her identity? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 18. Was anyone permitted to register who was not yet 18 years old? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 19. Was anyone permitted to register who was not a Lesotho citizen? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 20. Was anyone no allowed to register who you thought was eligible? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 21. Was a fingerprint taken of everyone who was permitted to register? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 22. Was a photograph take of everyone who was permitted to register? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 23. Was indelible ultraviolet Ink applied to a finger of everyone who registered? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 24. Was everyone given a slip (receipt) when they registered? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 25. Did anyone attempt to disrupt registration? | | | Yes No |
| 26. Including today, how many days has the centre been open? | | | _____ |

Use the rest of this form and additional paper to write detailed notes about problems that you may have witnessed at the registration centre.

Signature

Date

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
 Sample Form used by the Church/NGO Consortium

Malawi
 (Front)

Malawi Presidential and National Assembly Elections 1999
Assessing the Voter Registration Process

Go to the registration centre you are assigned to on the day you get this form. If you can not get the information needed that day, try again every day up to and including Monday, 12 April.

1. Monitor Name _____
2. District _____
3. Constituency _____
4. Registration Centre _____
5. Name of the person in the Church/NGO Consortium from whom you received this form? _____
6. Date you received this form? _____
7. Date you visited the registration centre and got the information needed to fill in the form? _____
8. Time you arrived at the registration centre? _____
9. Was the registration centre open when you went there? Yes No
If the registration centre was not open skip to Question 19.
10. Name of the person who was in charge of the registration centre when you visited? _____
11. Date the registration centre first opened? _____
12. Has the registration centre been forced to close because of a lack of forms? Yes No
13. Has the registration centre been forced to close because photos could not be taken of those coming to register? Yes No
14. Since the registration centre first opened, how many total days has the centre been forced to close? _____
15. How many people have register to vote at the registration centre? (See the Registration Supervisor or DRAF) _____
16. How many people have not been permitted to register to vote at the registration centre? (See the Registration Supervisor or DRAF) _____
17. Were calendars entitle "Konzani Tsogolo Lanu" at the registration centre? Yes No
18. Were representatives of political parties at the registration centre monitoring the process? Yes No

Use the back of this form to describe any problems you observed at or near the registration centre.

Signature

Date

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
Sample Form used by the Church/NGO Consortium

Malawi
(Back)

Use this space to describe any problems you observed at or near the registration centre.

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
 Sample Form used by Etica y Transparencia 96 (ET 96) (Spanish)

Nicaragua
 (Front)

**Observacion de Inscripcion Ad Hoc
 Desde Afera**

Lugar de Observación	_____	Número de JRV	_____
Municipio	_____	Departamento	_____
Fecha	_____		

1. Hora de arribo a JRV _____
2. Número de policías presentes en la JRV _____
3. ¿Cuántos de ellos estaban armadas? _____
4. ¿Cuántas personas hicieron fila (aproximadamente)? _____
5. Tiempo promedio para inscripción por persona _____

CONTESTE SI O NO. SI LA RESPUESTA ES NO, PROPORCIONE DETALLES AL REVERSO DE LA HOJA.

- | | | |
|--|-------|----|
| 6. ¿Había rótulo visible que indicaba que esa era JRV? | Si | No |
| 7. ¿Había orden fuera del local? | Si | No |
| 8. ¿Una vez inscritos, fué entregado a cada ciudadano una libreta cívica? | Si | No |
| 9. ¿Se permitió la inscripción de todos los que asistieron a la JRV? | Si | No |
| 10. ¿Fueron cordiales sus relaciones con las autoridades? | Si | No |
| 11. ¿Era seguro el lugar donde se encontraba la JRV? | Si | No |
| 12. ¿Estaba ubicada la JRV tal como lo establece la ley? | Si | No |
| 13. ¿Notó la presencia de algún coordinador o delegado municipal? | Si | No |
| 14. ¿Fue publicada la lista de ciudadanos inscritos los 2do, 3er y 4to días? | Si | No |
| Detallar número de personas | _____ | |

CONTESTE SI O NO. SI LA RESPUESTA ES SI, PROPORCIONE DETALLES AL REVERSO DE LA HOJA.

- | | | |
|---|----|----|
| 15. ¿Tiene Ud. alguna prueba irrefutable de que la inscripción no se realizó de acuerdo a la ley? | Si | No |
| 16. ¿Hubo alguien que tardó más de 45 minutos en llegar a la JRV? | Si | No |
| 17. ¿Hubo evidencia de intimidación? | Si | No |
| 18. ¿Hubo quejas sobre seguridad? | Si | No |
| 19. ¿Hubo propaganda de partidos políticos en/alrededor de la JRV? | Si | No |
| 20. ¿Se presentó algún caso donde los testigos fueron rechazados? | Si | No |
| 21. ¿Si Usted tuvo la oportunidad de hablar con las personas que se registraban, conocen alguna persona que quedó sin inscribirse y saben porqué? | Si | No |

Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process
Sample Form used by Etica y Transparencia 96 (ET 96) (Spanish)

Nicaragua
(Back)

SUBRAYE LA(S) RESPUESTA(S) QUE CORRESPONDAN

22. Si Usted tuvo la oportunidad de hablar con las personas que se registraban, ¿como supieron ellas que ese era el lugar y la fecha, por qué medios se enteraron?:
- a. Radio b. Televisión c. Vista del CSE d. Ong: _____
- e. Iglésia: _____ f. Partido Político: _____ g. Otro: _____

Si su respuesta a las preguntas del 6 al 14 fue No, explique en el siguiente párrafo el porque de su respuesta, especificando el número exacto de la pregunta a la cual se está refiriendo. DETALLE.

Si su respuesta a las preguntas del 15 al 21 fue SI, explique en el siguiente párrafo el porque de su respuesta. Especificando el número exacto de la pregunta a la cual se está refiriendo. DETALLE.

Nombre de Oservador
Firma del Observador

Monitoring State-Initiated Voter Registration (Enumeration)
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

SAMPLE FORM FOR MONITORING ENUMERATION

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you will accompany an enumeration team as it travels door-to-door registering people to vote. For each day you are with the enumeration team you should record your observation on a separate monitoring form. Remember that the enumeration team is in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you are concerned that people are wrongly being registered to vote or incorrectly not being allowed to register you should, in a respectful manner, bring this to the attention to the person in charge of the enumeration team.

This form will be collected by your supervisor on [insert day, time and place]. Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.

1. Name of Monitor				
2. Enumeration Team's Number				
3. Leader of the Enumeration Team				
4. Names of Other Team Members				
5. Date you observed the enumeration team		Day	Month	
6. Time you joined the enumeration team			Time	
7. Time the enumeration team started work			Time	
8. How many people had the enumeration team registered to vote before today?				
9. Did the enumeration team go door-to-door to register voters today?			Yes	No
10. How many house/homes did the enumeration team visit today?				
11. How many people did the enumeration team register to vote today?				
12. How many people who wanted to register to vote were not permitted to by the enumeration today?				
13. Was anyone not permitted to register to vote who you thought was eligible?			Yes	No
14. If Yes, how many?				
15. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)				
16. Was anyone registered to vote by the enumeration team who you thought was ineligible?			Yes	No
17. If Yes, how many?				
18. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)				

Monitoring State-Initiated Voter Registration (Enumeration)
Sample Form

Generic
(Back)

19. Did anyone attempt to interfere with the work of the enumeration team?		Yes	No
20. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)			
21. Did you witness any attempt to bribe or intimidate any voter or member of the enumeration team?		Yes	No
22. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)			
23. Did the members of enumeration team behave in a politically impartial manner?		Yes	No
24. If No, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)			
25. Did the members of the enumeration team follow the registration procedures correctly?		Days	
26. If No, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)			
27. Was everyone who registered to vote given a receipt (if applicable)?		Yes	No
28. If No, how many?			
29. Was a photography taken of everyone who registered to vote (if applicable)?			
30. Was a finger print taken of everyone who registered to vote (if applicable)?			
31. Were there representatives of political parties or civic organizations present with the enumeration team?			
32. If Yes, which political parties or civic organizations? (use additional paper if necessary)			
33. Were any formal complaints lodged about the registration process?		Yes	No
34. If Yes, what complaints were filed? (use additional paper if necessary)			
35. Time the enumeration team finished working		Time	
36. Time you left the enumeration team		Time	
37. Monitor Signature and Date			

Use the rest a separate piece of paper to detailed any problems that you have witnessed with the enumeration team.

Monitoring Training of Registration Staff
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to observe a training session for registration staff. On [insert date], you should get to the training location you have been assigned and monitor the training of registration staff. You should stay at the training session from start to finish. Document your observations on this form. Do not disrupt the training session.

This form will be collected by your supervisor on [insert day, time and place]. Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.

SAMPLE FORM FOR MONITORING TRAINING OF REGISTRATION STAFF

1. Name of Monitor				
2. Location of Training Session				
3. Trainer(s) Name(s)				
4. Date of the Training Session		Day	Month	
5. Were the date, time and venue for the training appropriate?			Yes	No
6. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary)				
7. How long did the training last?				
8. Was there adequate time provided for the training?			Yes	No
9. Were the trainers knowledgeable?			Yes	No
10. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary)				
11. Were the training materials adequate?			Yes	No
12. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary)				
13. Did the training accurately explain the registration process?			Yes	No
14. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary)				
15. Did the training accurately explain the requirements to be eligible to register to vote?			Yes	No
16. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary)				

Monitoring Training of Registration Staff
Sample Form

Generic
(Back)

17. Did the training accurately explain the rights of voters during the voter registration process?		Yes	No
18. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary)			
19. Did the training accurately explain the rights of monitors (from political parties or civic organizations) during the voter registration process?		Yes	No
20. If No, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary)			
21. Were the registration staff attentive during the training session?		Yes	No
22. Overall was the training adequate?		Yes	No
23. Monitor Signature and Date			

Use the rest of this form to write detailed notes about positive aspects or problems that you witnessed during the training session. If necessary, use additional paper to record your observations.

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

SAMPLE FORMS FOR LIST-TO-PEOPLE TESTS

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to find people whose names appear on the voters list. You have been provided a separate document with the names and address of individuals selected at random from the voters list. You should try at least once every day for [insert number of days, e.g., four] days [insert days, e.g., Friday through Monday] to locate each individual. If you cannot find the address, ask in the area if anyone knows the address of the person. If you find the address, but the person no longer resides there, attempt to discover the individual's new address. In either case, if you learn a new address for the individual, record it, and go to that address to attempt to locate him or her if it is close by. If the address is far away, report the person's name and new address to your supervisor so that someone in that area can attempt to locate the individual. If the person lives at the address but is not home, you should leave a message and try to arrange a time to meet. On the morning after this exercise you need to return all of your forms (filled out) to your supervisor.

*Please write clearly because many people will read this form
Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort?*

1. Name of Monitor			
2. Name of the person you are attempting to locate as contained in the voters list			
3. Address of the person you are attempting to locate as contained in the voters list			
4. Voter ID number of the person you are attempting to locate as contained in the voters list			
5. Were you ultimately able to find the person?		Yes	No
<i>If Yes, to Question 5, go to Question 6; otherwise, go to Question 16 on the back of this form.</i>			
6. Is the person eligible to vote?		Yes	No
7. If No, explain why not			
8. Did the person live at the address contained in the voters list?		Yes	No
9. If No, write in the person's correct address			
10. Did the person's voter ID number from the voters list match the voter ID number on his/her voter ID card?		Yes	No
11. If No, write in the voter ID number from the person's voter ID card			
10. Was the person's name from the voters list spelled correctly?		Yes	No
11. If No, write in the correct spelling of the person's name			

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
Sample Form

Generic
(Back)

12. Was the person's gender as recorded on the voters list correct?		Yes	No
13. If No, write in the person's correct gender			
14. Was the person's date of birth as recorded on the voters list correct?		Yes	No
15. If No, write in the person's correct date of birth			
16. Which of the following statements best describes what you learned about the address contained in the voters list for the person you were trying to locate?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) The address did not exist. b) The address exists, but the individual never lived there. c) The address exists and the individual used to live there, but the individual moved to another address – which you were able to learn. c) The address exists and the individual used to live there, but the individual moved to another address – which you were unable to learn. d) The address exists, but the person was temporarily away. e) The address exists and the individual was there. 			
17. Which of the following statements best describes what you learned about the person you were trying to located?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Nothing was learned about the person. b) The person is eligible and registered to vote. b) The person is eligible to vote, but did not register to vote. d) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she has died. e) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is too young. f) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is not a citizen. g) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she does not live in the country. h) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she has been ruled not mentally competent (if applicable). i) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is in prison (if applicable). j) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is a member of the military (if applicable). 			
18. Monitor's Signature & Date			
19. Person's Signature & Date			

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society

Azerbaijan
(Front)

Voter Registration People-to-List Audit (Test)

District Number _____
District Name _____
Precinct Number _____
Supervisor _____

I. Case Information

List Number on the Official List _____
Voter's full name (as it appears on the list) _____
Passport Number _____
Address _____

II. Voter Is At Address

Were the particulars correct? Yes No
If yes, how were they verified? _____
What verification? Passport Form 9 Military Ticket Other _____

If particulars were not correct, please describe the problem.

III. Voter Is Not Living At This Address

Voter Has Moved? Yes No
Where did the voter move? _____
When did the voter move? _____
Who did you speak with to verify this? Family Member Neighbor Friend Co-worker Other

Please include the name and address of anyone you spoke with to get verification. If possible, include passport number. Be sure you talk to at least two independent people.

Verification #1 (Date, Time, Name, Address and Passport Number)

Verification #2 (Date, Time, Name, Address and Passport Number)

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society

Azerbaijan
(Back)

IV. Voter Is Dead – Death Certificate Copy Obtained

A copy should be made of the Notary Office and attached to this form.

V. Voter Is Dead – Death Certificate Not Obtained

How was the death verified? _____

If observer saw death certificate, but was unable to obtain a copy who has verified the death?

Verification #1 (Name, Date, Time and Relations to Deceased)

Verification #2 (Name, Date, Time and Relations to Deceased)

If no death certificate was obtained, what was the date, time and place of the voter's death?

What was the serial number on the death certificate? _____

Which Registry Office has the death certificate? _____

What are the names of the officials who signed the document? _____

VI. Record of Verification Activities

Number of attempts made to verify information on this voter. If you have not been able to verify a case after three attempts, call your supervisor or the ACI office.

1.	Time and Date _____	Resolved	Not Resolved
	What Happend? _____		
2.	Time and Date _____	Resolved	Not Resolved
	What Happend? _____		
3.	Time and Date _____	Resolved	Not Resolved
	What Happend? _____		

Please use this space and additional paper if necessary to describe in detail any problems you had in verifying this case.

Signature

Date

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
 Sample Form used by the Electoral Assistance Bureau

Guyana
 (Front)

Validation of the Voters List

Form 1. Work in the field Sample Number: _____
 Area Type: _____
 Last Name: _____
 Information Other Names: _____
 from the list Address: _____
 Was the person located: YES/NO
 If YES, Complete the following information:
 Id Number: _____
 Occupation: _____
 Date of birth: _____
 day month year
 Over 18: YES/NO
 Was the person visited by an enumerator? YES/NO
 Did the person register for the election? YES/NO
 Did the person register at a registration centre YES/NO
 Any other comments: _____

- Question No.
 1 - 4
 5

 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13

If answer to question 6 is NO, tick for which reason:

1. No such address.
2. No reply at the address.
3. Person not at home.
4. No such person resident at given address.
5. Person has migrated.
6. Person temporarily out of the country.
7. Person has migrated.
8. Person has died.
9. Person refused to answer or co-operate.
10. Other reason (please state): _____

14-15

Please get signature or mark:

Signature of interviewee: _____
 Signature of field worker: _____

For Office Use

Information tallies with electoral list: YES/NO
 Signature of checker: _____

16

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
Sample Form used by the Electoral Assistance Bureau

Guyana
(Back)

[Intentionally Left Blank]

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
 Sample Form used by Transparencia (Spanish)

Peru
 (Front)

Ficha de Verificación Del Padrón Electoral 2001
Asociación Civil Transparencia – Jurado Nacional de Elecciones

DEPARTAMENTO	PROVINCIA	DISTRITO	
_____	_____	_____	
NOMBRES	APELLIDO PATERNO	APELLIDO MATERNO	
_____	_____	_____	
DIRECCION			

OCUPACION			

L.E.	D.N.I.	FECHA DE NACIMIENTO	SEXO
_____	_____	_____	_____

En visita que hizo a la dirección indicada se encontró que:

1. La persona si se encontró en la dirección indicada SI NO
2. Si la respuesta fue NO, marque con una X en las siguientes opciones:

<p>a. La persona se ha mudado <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Se mudó a:</p> <p>Calle/Pasaje _____</p> <p>Distrito _____</p> <p>Provincia _____</p> <p>Departamento _____</p> <p>Pais _____</p>	<p>d. La dirección consignada no existe.</p> <p>e. La persona ha fallecido. <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>La partida de defunción está registrada en:</p> <p>Distrito _____</p> <p>Provincia _____</p> <p>Departamento _____</p> <p>Fecha aproximada _____</p>
<p>b. La persona nunca ha vivido en esta dirección. <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>c. No se encontró en este momento. <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Próxima visita:</p> <p>Fecha <input type="text"/> Hora <input type="text"/></p>	<p>f. La persona está encarcelada <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Desde: <input type="text"/> ¿Tiene sentencia condenación?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">SI NO</p>

Nombre de la persona que informó (En el caso de no haber encontrado a la persona verif)

Nombre del Voluntario que realizó la verificación Comité Transparencia:

Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test
Sample Form used by Transparencia (Spanish)

Peru
(Back)

[Intentionally Left Blank]

Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

SAMPLE FORMS FOR PEOPLE-TO-LIST FIELD TESTS

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to find registered people at random. You have been provided with specific methodology and criteria for selecting individuals. It is important that you follow this methodology and criteria exactly. For example, if you have been assigned to collect information from 4 young men, 2 middle aged men, 2 old men, 4 young women, 2 middle aged women and 2 old women, you must collect information from exactly that distribution. You need to collect information from all of the people on [insert day and date]. For each person whom you collect information from you need to complete one of these forms. You should only collect data from people who say they have registered to vote. On [insert day, time and date] after this exercise, your supervisor will collect all of your completed forms at [insert place].

Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.

1. Name of Monitor					
2. Name of person chosen at random					
3. Person's address					
4. Person's gender				F	M
5. Person's age					
6. Person's date of birth	Day		Month		Year
7. Did the person say he/she had registered to vote?				Yes	No
<i>If No, you should interview another person</i>					
8. Did the person have a voter ID card (if applicable)?			Day		Month
9. Did the person know his/her voter ID number				Yes	No
10. If Yes, person's voter ID number					
11. Does the person know where he/she is supposed to vote?				Yes	No
12. If Yes, where					
13. Was the person register to vote for the last election?				Yes	No
14. Did the person vote in the last election?				Yes	No
15. Has the person moved since the last election?				Yes	No
16. If Yes, what other addresses has he/she lived at?					

Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test
Sample Form

Generic
(Back)

17. Has the person's surname changed since the last election?		Yes	No
18. If Yes, what was the person's former surname?			

Sample Additional Voter Education Questions			
A. Had the person heard any radio advertisement informing people why it is important to vote?		Yes	No
B. Did the person know how many ballots he/she had to mark on election day?		Yes	No
The correct answer to Question B is [insert correct answer, e.g., two]. If the person answered something else please inform him/her [insert the correct answer, e.g., on ballot for president and one ballot for parliament, and he/she must mark each ballot].			
If the person has not registered to vote please tell to him/her that there is still time to register, if applicable. Explain where, how and why to register to vote.			
19. Monitor's Signature and Date			
20. Person's Signature and Date			

Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society

Azerbaijan
(Front)

Voter Registration People-to-List Audit (Test)

The goal of this people-to-list audit (test) is to select a cross section of voters from the general public (people walking down the street, in a tea shop or other public area) to verify if their names are accurately listed on the voters list.

Of particular interest are voters who may have turned 18 since the last election. This process will help verify how effective the procedure is for adding new names to the list after they have become eligible.

First, make some effort to decided where you will locate voters. Approcach people couteously and explain what you are doing and how their participation will help us verify the accuracy of the voters list. Complete each verification one at a time.

You will verify a total of 10 voters.

You should verify 5 women and 5 men voters. Look for young people who might have turned 18 since the last election.

Find out the following information:

Name _____

Date of Birth _____

Passport Number _____

When did you last vote? _____

Where did you vote? _____

Have you moved since the last election? YES NO

If you moved, did you de-register you name? YES NO

After you have this information, check the voters list to see if the voter's name is there and if the information is correct.

Voters Name on the Voters List YES NO

Please describe any additional information on the back of this page.

Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society

Azerbaijan
(Back)

Use this space to record additional information

Monitoring Claims and Objections Form
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to a registration/claims and objections center to observe individuals filing claims or objections to make additions, deletions or corrections to the voters list. On [insert date], you should go to the registration/claims and objections center assigned to you. You should arrive there at [insert time] before the center opens and remain there throughout the day until [insert time]. You should document your observations on this form. Remember that the registration/claims and objections officials are in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you are concerned that an addition, deletion or correction is being made to the voters list improperly, you should, in a respectful manner, bring this to the attention of the person in charge of the center.

This form will be collected by your supervisor on [insert day, time and place]. Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.

SAMPLE FORMS FOR MONITORING CLAIMS AND OBJECTIONS

1. Name of Monitor					
2. Registration/claims and objections center's name and location					
3. Registration/claims and objections center's number					
4. Name of the official in charge of the center					
5. On what date was the voters list to be posted or made publicly available?		Day		Month	
6. On what date was the voters list actually posted or made publicly available?		Day		Month	
7. Has the voters list remained posted or available the entire period required by law or regulation?				Yes	No
8. Has this registration/claims and objections center been closed for any period when it was supposed to be open filing of claims and objections?				Yes	No
9. If yes, for how long and for what reason? (use additional paper if necessary)					
10. Is the voters list legible?				Yes	No
11. How many names are on the voters list at the center?					
12. How many claims to add a person's name to the voters list had already been filed when you arrived?					

Monitoring Claims and Objections Form
Sample Form

Generic
(Front)

13. How many claims to update or correct a person's information on the voters list had already been filed when you arrived?			
14. How many objections to remove a person's name from the voters list had already been filed when you arrived?			
15. How many claims to add a person's name to the voters list were filed while you were at the center?			
16. How many claims to update or correct a person's information on the voters list were filed while you were at the center?			
17. How many objections to remove a person's name from the voters list were filed while you were at the center?			
18. Did the officials correctly follow the claims and objections procedures?		Yes	No
19. If not, was the integrity of the process compromised?		Yes	No
20. Monitors Signature and Date			

Please explain in detail at the bottom of this form if the officials deviated significantly from the claims and objections procedures. Please quantify as best as possible the extent of the problem.

Report on Computer Tests of the Voters List
Sample Report by the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB)

Guyana

Analysis of the 1997 Preliminary Voters List (PVL)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Three broad types of tests were undertaken by the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) in analysing the 1997 Preliminary Voters List (PVL). These were field, computer and in-house tests. All tests were completed within three weeks.

Two field tests sought out randomly generated samples among those voters who were photographed and those who were not photographed. In the first field test, 89.17% of a sample of 1754 voters were found at their listed address. Of this number, 93.61% had all their particulars listed correctly. 6.27% of the sample were either out of the country temporarily, had moved, migrated or died. 4.56% could not be found, either because there was no such address as listed or because there had never been such a person at the listed address. This test had an accuracy level of $\pm 1\%$. Thus, the "not found" figure for the entire PVL lies between 15,926 and 24,873 voters. Additionally, this test revealed that most voters believe a National ID Card is being prepared for them.

The second field test of 78 persons not photographed found that 22% had actually not taken their photo. 18% claimed to have taken their photo. 26% had either died or migrated while 15% had moved or were temporarily out of the country. 19% of the sample could not be found due to there being no such address as listed or no such person ever resident at the listed address.

Several computer tests were undertaken on the PVL. Seven discrepancies demonstrated that modifications to the PVL took place during the printing of the PVL. ID number tests found no errors, as did tests to ensure all voters were of age and that all voters had a surname. Tests for multiple registration yielded 148 possible cases that were not previously identified by the Elections Commission.

In-house tests focused on the legality of polling division names and numbers, and checked for instances of persons with a listed address belonging to a polling division other than that in which the voter was actually found to be listed. The first test found one error in a division name while the second test identified 899 possible cases of persons being listed out of division. The 899 cases represents a relatively low percentage of 0.2%.

B. COMPUTER TESTS

The computer tests which EAB wished to execute had been communicated to the Commission prior to the tests. On Monday, June 23, a meeting of the technicians involved in the testing determined the inputs and outputs required. The tests were then executed on Wednesday, June 25.

EAB's computer tests were executed at the Elections Commission on a Personal Computer (PC) which had been detached from the Commission's computer network and relocated to the Commission's Board Room. Copies of the relevant databases and programmes had been earlier transferred to the hard drive of that computer.

The computer used to conduct the tests was a Pentium, 166Mhz machine, equipped with Microsoft Access, a software database programme. All queries and reports used in the testing of the PVL were created by the Commission's technical staff and examined by EAB prior to the commencement of the tests.

The tests were carried out by Commission staff with assistance from EAB. At no time did EAB execute any commands on the PC. Total test time was under 90 minutes, due in large part to the preparedness of the Commission's technical staff and the high quality of the hardware and software being used.

If only as a matter of public record, it must be noted that this Commission's ignoring of the precedent set by earlier Commission's in granting EAB diskette copies of voters lists can only be considered a retrograde step.

SAMPLE REPORT ON COMPUTER TESTS

EAB found the new arrangement where tests were done at the Elections Commission to have been confining, not only because of the awkwardness of having to coordinate the availability of time for two busy sets of people but because other tests, such as were later thought of, could not be done due to the protocols required and the lateness in the granting of permission to test the PVL. EAB hopes to test the Final Voters List (FVL) under conditions which are more flexible, timely and accommodating than those under which the PVL was tested.

1. Confirmation of Database

In order to validate later findings, EAB had to be able to first show that the computer database being tested was the same database from which the PVL was printed.

The PVL data are contained within a larger database of all registrants, which includes all those between the age of 14 and 18. Only those who will be 18 on or before September 30, 1997 are qualified to be included on the PVL. Thus, in printing the PVL, the Commission actually executes commands which allow for all registrants born before a certain date to be extracted from the larger database of all registrants. EAB therefore had to test whether the database under consideration would yield the same printed PVL which had been given to EAB by the Elections Commission.

To begin, a 1-page printed summary of regional and national totals was shared with EAB. This summary was date stamped May 20, 1997 - well prior to the beginning of the Claims and Objections period. It was confirmed that, upon extraction of the PVL from the database, the total number of voters corresponded with that indicated on the printout - 466,566.

EAB then compared random samples on 5 printed divisional lists of totals and voter particulars with the information on the computer. No discrepancies were discovered.

Next, EAB was given a printed PVL report that detailed the total number of registrants in each polling division in the country, date-stamped May 21. The computer was then commanded to extract a similar report based on the database being tested. This report was date stamped June 25, 1997, the day the tests were being executed. Later checks by EAB confirmed that the two reports were identical.

A final confirmation test was later conducted at EAB's office. In this test, printed divisional lists - dated as being printed on May 20, 1997 - were checked against the PVL divisional summary report to confirm that the totals corresponded. The results of this test showed 7 discrepancies (see Appendix F). In two polling divisions, the printed list had one voter more than the computer database. In two other divisions the difference was one voter less. In a fifth case the printed list had two voters more than the database.

Analysis & Recommendations

The 7 discrepancies are a cause for concern, if only that they demonstrate that the database which EAB tested was not exactly the database from which the PVL was printed. It is also possible that printed PVLs which were shared with the political parties differed from each other and from the database EAB tested. The Commission must therefore investigate the reason for these discrepancies which now cast a shadow on the findings of all subsequent computer tests. While the discrepancies may seem minor, it is clear that the Commission had not preserved the database from which the PVL was printed. In future, the Commission should be sure to extract and keep separate from other work-in-progress databases any information which has a basis in law - such as the PVL and the Final Voters List (FVL).

Outside of this test, EAB found that Computer Test #1 passed all other checks.

2. ID Numbers

The ID numbers being used in the database are those found on the Master Registration Card (MRC), which is filled out upon the registration of a voter. The purpose of ID number tests was to ensure that each voter on the PVL had a unique ID number and that the ID number was only composed of digits and not characters.

The programmes which the Commission had used to enter data into the database were examined and

found to have commands that would have prevented duplicate ID numbers or characters from being entered into the ID number field. Tests on the PVL itself confirmed that no errors as described in the previous paragraph existed. By comparison, the 1992 PVL tests turned up 28 pairs of duplicate ID numbers while the 1992 FVL, used as the 1994 PVL, contained over 32,000 voters with no ID number whatsoever.

Analysis & Recommendations

The final question to be asked of ID number accuracy is whether the ID numbers on the PVL correspond with the MRC number. This is a test which the Elections Commission should itself execute, if it has not done so already.

EAB considers the question of ID numbers to have been answered positively by the computer tests conducted.

3. All Voters of Age

All registrants who will be 18 years of age on or before September 30, 1997, qualify for inclusion on the PVL. The test to ensure that all 466,566 electors on the PVL were of the qualifying age found no instances of underaged persons being included in the PVL.

The Commission's staff conducted an un-requested but useful test to demonstrate that no registrant had an age greater than 120 years. This test demonstrated efforts at quality control in the entry of registrant birth dates.

Analysis & Recommendations

EAB found no errors caused by underage voters being on the PVL.

4. Surnames

In another Commission-initiated test, it was demonstrated that no person on the database had a blank surname. While it is possible that a registrant might have no first name, *all* registrants must have a surname. The Commission had instituted measures in the entry of surnames to ensure quality control by prohibiting the computer from accepting any voter whose surname had not been entered.

Analysis & Recommendations

EAB found no errors caused by the omission of voters' surnames.

5. Multiple Registrants

The issue of multiple registration had been raised by several political parties who felt that persons had deliberately registered more than once. The Elections Commission had earlier in June published a list of "persons found to have been registered twice." This list contained over 1500 such persons. The Commission had arrived at this list by asking the computer to identify all voters who shared an identical surname, first name and date of birth. EAB understands that checks were also made of registrant signatures, as found on the voter's MRC, to confirm whether the two signatures matched.

EAB's test for possible multiple registrants excluded first names. The computer was asked to identify all voters who shared an identical surname and date of birth.

Subsequent checks revealed 148 more cases of possible multiple registration. This is in addition to the Commission's printed list of 1500 names.

The multiple registrants test was constrained by the printout information, which did not indicate polling divisions. A request to the Commission for the test results on diskette was, up to the time of preparation of this report, unanswered. Thus, the Bureau was unable to establish whether there were any demographic patterns to the list of possible multiple registrants.

Analysis & Recommendations

Multiple Registration as a PVL feature does exist, but for multiple registration involving persons who used the same surname and date-of-birth to register, the number is relatively low - under 1700 cases.

EAB's tests could not detect cases where persons may have used different surnames and/or dates-of-birth in order to register more than once. It may be that such cases have occurred, especially given the 4.56% of "Not founds" in the field test of photographed voters and the 19.2% of "Not Founds" in the test of not photographed voters. The parties and the Elections Commission can do much to reduce such instances.

Press Release on Voter Registration

Cambodia

Sample Press Release by COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC (Unofficial Translation)

COMFREL

COFFEL

NICFEC

**Joint Statement on the Voter Registration
for the Commune Council Elections**

(Unofficial Translation by COMFREL)

Phnom Penh, September 07, 2001

According to the News Release of the National Election Committee on August 26, 2001, only 83.06% of about 6 million eligible voters had been registered for the commune council elections throughout the country. Therefore, approximately 1 million potential voters have not been registered. We note that the registration rate for this election is down 10%, if compared to the percentage of voters registered in the 1998 elections that was more than 90%.

However, we would like to acknowledge the NEC in its efforts for extending the voter registration period for an additional three days in some locations, even if this period was not responded to the demand of the three coalitions submitted to the NEC for at least two weeks extension. The number of registered voters during the extension period has increased only 2.2% (80.84% on August 21 and 83.04% on August 26).

Reason for Low Registration

Comfrel, Coffel and Nicfec have identified several factors that contributed to the lower voter registration, some clearly violations of the election law, but the majority related to poor organization and training, and a lack of time and materials:

- Inadequate voter education and training of election officials, primarily caused by lack of resources and the lateness of the finalization of regulations governing registration, but in some cases the result of unequal dissemination of information by politically affiliated PEC, CEC and RSO (Registration Station Officers) members;
- Because of confusion about the registration requirements, or for political reasons, many voters were not allowed to register on their normally scheduled registration days or at their local registration station;
- Inadequate quantities or late distribution of registration materials and equipment meant many registration stations opened late or closed early;
- Unanticipated increases in population, and difficult geography meant that in many places inadequate time was allocated for the registration process.;
- Moreover, the commune council election is complex and more different than the national one. The initial requirement that voters had to register at their permanent residences made it difficult for students, workers, monks and others who have moved to the cities to continue and find jobs. Although this requirement was removed midway through the registration process, and NGOs did their best to inform the people of the change, many people did not hear in time, and others could not be bothered to try again;
- Small numbers of voters are not interested in or do not understand fully the importance of commune council election.

Irregularities and Violations

The report obtained from the nationwide COMFREL networks at 10,647 stations (which is equal to 86.10% of the NEC voter registration stations of 12,378) showed that 65.14% of the monitored voter registration stations (6,936 out of 10,647) ran smoothly, with minimum technical irregularities. (These figures are as of August 21, while the data from the reopened and new stations have not been aggregated yet). COMFREL found unacceptable problems at 29 stations. 7,477 cases of the technical irregularities were reported at 3,711 voter registration stations. (Of these, multiple reported irregularities might have occurred at a single station).

The technical irregularities and violations observed include:

- In 2,298 registration stations (21.60%) information for voters about the location and schedule for registration centres and the 1998 voter list were not well publicized;
- At 598 stations (6.22%), 819 cases of threats or intimidation of voters took place;
- 2,754 cases of non-neutral behaviour by PEC, CEC or RSOs and failure of them to comply with correct procedures was reported at 2,558 stations (24.10%);
- There were 1,011 cases of refusal the presence of observers and/or confiscation of observers' accreditation cards;
- 652 ineligible, unidentified, suspect and illegal immigrants were allowed to register at 100 stations;
- In 275 stations, the form no. 1201 and 1202 (refusal and complaint forms) were not provided to voters;
- There were 27 cases of voters who had registered more than once;
- There were 87 cases of confiscation voters' card by local authorities.

Referring to the report obtained from COFFEL networks in 16 provinces and municipalities, eligible voters in 1998 based on the News Release of the NEC are 5,771,635 eligible voters, while 4,846,635 voters were registered which was equal to 84.55%. 11,446 registration stations were operated from July 21 to 27, 2001. COFFEL revealed irregularities of 5,052 cases (in one station the problems could have happened between one and five times), including:

- 1,378 cases related to the shortage of registration materials and equipment;
- 1,722 cases of the improper performance by PEC, CEC and RSOs;
- 1,013 cases of improper performance by local authorities;
- 673 cases concerning the voters' nationality;
- 266 cases of corruption and threats.

According to NICFEC's report from 1,244 communes in 171 districts ,which comprised 7,879 voter registration stations equal 63.66% of the NEC ones (on August 20, 2001), most irregularities had emerged similarly to those findings by COMFREL and COFFEL with additional issues as follows:

- Irregularities in the recruitment of PEC, CEC and RSOs in some areas resulted in corruption;
- The poor performance of many PEC, CEC and RSOs decreased voters overall confidence in the NEC;
- Some local authorities and political party activists interfered in the work of the registration station officers;

- Military and police officials in some areas were allowed to register more than once to increase the turnout of the registered voters.

The Coming Elections

Based on our observation of the registration process, Comfrel, Coffel and Nicfec still have serious concerns for the upcoming commune council elections. With the experience of the registration process in mind, we would like to submit some recommendations to NEC for improvement of the election process:

- Expand and intensify public voter education on all of the processes related to the commune council elections;
- Allow enough time and provide a clear schedule for each of the steps in the election process;
- Strengthen the neutrality and independence of NEC, PEC, CEC and RSO officials;
- Effectively resolve citizen's complaints both fairly and transparently;
- Effectively verify the voter list;
- Conduct more training courses for the electoral officers at all levels about their duties and responsibilities.

Finally, Comfrel, Coffel and Nicfec insist that all political parties who participate in the upcoming commune council elections firmly respect the Law, Regulations and Procedures of NEC and do not use the violence and threats to solve their problems, and we appeal to the Royal Government to ensure order, security and safety for every commune council candidate, and for the whole electoral process.

For further information, please contact:

Comfrel: Mr. Thun Saray, Tel: 012 880 509

Coffel: Mrs. Chea Vannath, Tel: 016 831 905

Nicfec: Mrs. Gek Galabru, Tel: 012 902 506

Press Release on Voter Registration
Sample Press Release by Transparencia (Spanish)

Peru

Nota de prensa 2001 - 03

**TRANSPARENCIA PRESENTA CONCLUSIONES
DE VERIFICACIÓN MUESTRAL DE LAS LISTAS DEL PADRÓN INICIAL**

Después de concluir la verificación muestral del padrón electoral, en virtud del convenio suscrito con el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) el pasado 12 de diciembre de 2000, la Asociación Civil TRANSPARENCIA presentó su informe al JNE y al Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil (Reniec).

Las siguientes son las conclusiones y recomendaciones del informe de TRANSPARENCIA:

I. CONCLUSIONES

1. Es de resaltar el esfuerzo realizado por el Reniec y el JNE para la depuración del padrón electoral.
2. Debe también resaltarse que el análisis de los procedimientos utilizados por el Reniec para la formación y depuración del padrón arroja una imagen positiva del padrón y de los esfuerzos realizados por la institución. La cobertura del padrón llega al 90%, valores comparables con los encontrados en otros países de la región. En lo que respecta a los casos de inclusiones indebidas — fallecidos, militares y policías en actividad, personas inhabilitadas por sentencias de penas privativas de la libertad —, los datos globales y el examen de los procedimientos utilizados sugieren que las imperfecciones del padrón son irregularidades de limitada importancia cuantitativa.
3. A diferencia de lo ocurrido en el último proceso electoral, esta vez el JNE realizó tareas concretas de fiscalización electoral. Así, habilitó una línea gratuita para el reporte de irregularidades en el padrón. Además, realizó una masiva campaña de difusión para que los ciudadanos participaran de la depuración del padrón electoral.
4. Los plazos para la exhibición del padrón y la presentación de tachas u observaciones a su contenido de parte de los ciudadanos siguen siendo muy cortos, lo que limita la participación efectiva de los ciudadanos en la depuración del padrón.
5. De la muestra seleccionada por TRANSPARENCIA, no se halló a la persona en los domicilios consignados, ni hubo vecino que pudiera dar información alguna sobre ella, en el 10.1% de los casos. Nuestros voluntarios lograron entrevistar personalmente al 75.9% de la muestra, y del porcentaje restante, la información fue obtenida por familiares o vecinos.
6. Las deficiencias, en términos de personas que figuran en el padrón y no deberían figurar, han disminuido. Así:
 - a) El porcentaje de fallecidos presentes en el padrón bajó del 2.39% al 0.44% del total del padrón. Este dato nos permite estimar que el número aproximado de fallecidos indebidamente incluidos en el padrón electoral es de 65,451.
 - b) Los peruanos con domicilio legal en el Perú pero que residen en el extranjero representan el 1.7% en comparación con el 2.18% detectado en la misma situación en el estudio del año pasado. Esto significa alrededor de 250,000 personas.
 - c) No se halló a policías o miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas en la muestra y tampoco se ha tomado conocimiento de denuncias en el mismo sentido.
 - d) No se halló en la muestra a personas condenadas a pena privativa de la libertad.
7. Sin embargo, lo crucial no es que aparezcan fallecidos o que haya un importante número de residentes en

el extranjero con domicilio en el país, sino que no haya suplantaciones y que se realice una adecuada fiscalización del sufragio.

8. La modificación del artículo 315° de la Ley Orgánica de Elecciones es muy importante porque impide que en los cómputos oficiales aparezcan más votos que electores. Sin embargo, esta disposición debe ser complementada con una adecuada fiscalización de parte de las autoridades electorales para asegurar que no haya suplantación de electores fallecidos (0.45%) o de los que se encuentran fuera del país (1.7%) el día de los comicios.
9. El porcentaje de las direcciones que presentan errores y de las que no existen es del 11.91%. A pesar que este porcentaje ha disminuido con relación al año pasado, aún es considerable.

II. RECOMENDACIONES

1. Este estudio se completaría introduciendo, como variable adicional de análisis, la verificación de la asistencia a sufragar de los electores de la muestra que no fueron hallados. Esta tarea se puede hacer tomando como referencia las tres últimas elecciones celebradas y la próxima del 8 de abril.
2. Debe crearse un Padrón Pasivo que, de manera provisional y sin que se cancele los registros, esté conformado por aquellos ciudadanos que no hayan sufragado en las tres últimas elecciones. El estudio de este registro proporcionaría elementos útiles para las campañas dirigidas a promover la participación, así como para detectar los registros que deben cancelarse del padrón. Además, el número de registros que conformen ese pasivo debería ser deducido del total que se toma para realizar el cálculo de adherentes a solicitudes de iniciativa legislativa y de referéndum, así como para las nuevas disposiciones que lo exijan.
3. Debe emprenderse estrategias para analizar con mayor profundidad las características de los no inscritos. Esa mejor comprensión permitiría el diseño de estrategias de acción efectivas para disminuir la incidencia de ese fenómeno.
4. TRANSPARENCIA insiste en la necesidad de adoptar todas las medidas legales y presupuestarias para realizar un cambio gratuito y obligatorio de todos los documentos de identidad preexistentes por el DNI. El costo de este cambio debería ser asumido por el Estado. Cuando se realice, el país contará con un padrón actualizado.
5. Los plazos para la exhibición pública del padrón y la presentación de tachas u observaciones de su contenido de parte de los ciudadanos siguen siendo muy cortos, lo que limita la participación efectiva de los ciudadanos en dicho proceso. Deben extenderse para, de esta forma, hacer más efectiva la depuración previa a cada elección.

Lima, 9 de enero de 2001

DIRECCIÓN DE COMUNICACIONES

Para mayor información comunicarse con Daniel Torres, jefe de prensa, al 893-1637 o al 441-3995

Press Release on Voter Registration

Peru

Sample Press Release by Transparencia (Unofficial English Translation)

Press Release 2001 - 03

**TRANSPARENCIA PRESENTS CONCLUSIONS
OF THE INITIAL VOTERS LIST SAMPLE CHECK**

After finishing the sample check of the voter's registration list (*padrón*), in compliance with an agreement entered into with *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* – JNE (National Electoral Board) on December 12th 2000, the civic organization TRANSPARENCIA submitted its report to the JNE and the *Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil* – RENIEC (National Identification and Civil Status Registry).

The following are the conclusions and recommendations of TRANSPARENCIA's report:

I. CONCLUSIONS

1. The effort made by RENIEC and JNE to update the voter registration list should be noted.
2. The analysis of the procedures used by RENIEC for the production and updating of the voter registry should also be noted given that it reflects a positive image of the list itself and of the efforts made by the institution. The list coverage [percent registered of the voting age population] is 90%, comparable to other countries in the region. Regarding the cases of improper inclusions (deceased individuals, military personnel, active police officers, those sentenced to imprisonment), overall data and the examination of the procedures used suggest that the list's flaws are non-significant quantitative irregularities.
3. Unlike during the last electoral process, this year the JNE undertook concrete electoral oversight tasks. For example, it established a toll-free number to report irregularities about the list. In addition, it carried out a massive dissemination campaign for citizens to participate in the updating of the voter registry.
4. The time period for the voter registry to be publicly displayed and for citizens to submit challenges or remarks about its content is very short, which limits the effective participation of the citizens in the updating of the list.
5. Out of the sample selected by TRANSPARENCIA, 10.1% of the listed voters could not be found and no neighbors could give information about them. 75.9% of the sample was personally interviewed by our volunteers, and the information of the remaining percentage was obtained either through relatives or neighbors.
6. The number of voters who should not be listed but still are has decreased. Therefore:
 - a. The percentage of deceased voters decreased from 2.39% to 0.44% of the entire list. This data enables us to estimate that the approximate number of inappropriately included deceased voters is 65,451.
 - b. Peruvians with legal domicile in Peru but living abroad account for 1.7% of the sample as compared to 2.18% with the same situation in last year's study. This accounts for 250,000 voters.
 - c. No police officers or members of the Armed Forces were found in the sample. Likewise, no reports or complaints have been received to this effect.
 - d. No people sentenced to imprisonment were found in the sample.

7. However, the main problem is not having deceased or a significant number of people living abroad with legal domicile in Peru, but having impersonations, therefore polls should be adequately overseen.
8. Amendment of Article 315° of the Organic Electoral Law is very important given that it prevents the official vote counts from having more votes than voters. However, this provision should be complemented with appropriate oversight by the electoral authorities so that there is no impersonation of deceased voters (0.45%) or of those living abroad (1.7%) on election day.
9. The percentage of mistaken or non-existent addresses is 11.91%, which is still substantial despite the fact that it has decreased in comparison to last year's percentage.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Verifying whether those voters included in the sample who were not located actually vote on election day as an additional analysis would complete this study. This task can be undertaken through using the last three electoral processes and the upcoming April 8th elections as a reference.
2. A Passive Voter's List made up by citizens who have not voted in the past three elections should be provisionally created - without canceling entries. The study of this registry would provide three useful elements to campaigns to promote voter participation as well as to detect entries that should be removed. Likewise, the number of entries that make up the passive list should be subtracted from the total amount taken to calculate those who sign up for legislative initiatives and referendums, as well as for the new provisions that are required.
3. Strategies should be designed to analyze in more depth the characteristics of unregistered citizens. This would help inform the design of an effective action strategy to decrease the incidence of this phenomenon.
4. TRANSPARENCIA insists on the need to adopt every necessary legal and budgetary measure to change in a free and mandatory manner all identification cards to DNI's. The cost of this change should be incurred in by the State. Once this is fully completed, the country will have an updated voter's list.
5. Deadlines for public display of the list and for citizens to submit challenges or remarks about its content are very short, which limits the effective participation of the citizens in this process. These time limits should be extended so that the updating process followed before every election is more effective.

Lima, January 9th 2001

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT

For further information, please contact Daniel Torres, Head of Press Department, at 893-1637 or 441-3995



DATOS ELECTORALES



18

Lima, martes 11 de enero del 2000

Estimaciones muestrales: Cerca de un millón y medio de ciudadanos inscritos irregularmente en el padrón electoral


+ 345 mil fallecidos.
311 mil peruanos en el extranjero registrados en el territorio nacional.

+ Más de 800 mil electores corren peligro de no votar por no haber canjeado aún su Libreta Mecanizada por el DNI.



En la muestra de 1004 electores, Transparencia encontró 24 fallecidos (2.39%). A continuación, a modo de ejemplo, se presentan cuatro partidas de defunción.

Gloria Elsa Atto Merdives
Fallecida el 27 de julio de 1992
en Jesús María, Lima.



Eulogio Buciriza Chino
Fallecido el 8 de abril de 1984
en Trapaza, Puno.



Raymundo Gómez Pacomía
Fallecido el 25 de enero de 1988
en Julibaca, San Román.



Balmir Vázquez Putuola
Fallecido el 25 de febrero de 1989
en Pacacaca, Piéuta.



El informe completo sobre Verificación del Padrón Electoral puede ser revisado en www.transparencia.org.pe



Conclusiones del Informe

PRIMERA:

La Ley Orgánica del Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil, RENIEC, (*Ley N° 26497*), en su Segunda Disposición Transitoria, fija un plazo de 6 años para la desaparición de toda referencia a los documentos de identidad actualmente existentes, y su sustitución generalizada por el DNI. Este plazo vencería el 11 de julio del año 2001, un año después de las próximas elecciones. El cambio general de documentos de identidad pudo haberse adelantado para generar confianza en el Padrón Electoral. No se hizo así. El legislador ha querido que las elecciones del 9 de abril del año 2,000 se realicen en base a un Padrón Electoral originado en la reinscripción de 1984, es decir, un Padrón cuya antigüedad es de 16 años.

SEGUNDA:

El 23 de agosto de 1999, con más de siete meses de antelación a las próximas elecciones, TRANSPARENCIA propuso que se procediera al cambio obligatorio y gratuito de todos los documentos de identidad pre-existentes, por el DNI, lo que hubiera implicado dotar al país de un Padrón nuevo, completamente actualizado. Según estimaciones públicas del Jefe Nacional de la RENIEC, esta operación hubiera costado 20 millones de soles adicionales (*es decir menos del 10% del costo estimado -a tarifa fría- de la publicidad del Estado en los medios de comunicación de alcance nacional, entre enero y noviembre de 1999*).

TERCERA:

En la misma fecha recién citada, y con la explícita finalidad de generar confianza en el sistema electoral, TRANSPARENCIA propuso que se contratara una auditoría internacional al Padrón Electoral, como las que se han efectuado recientemente, con éxito, en otros países de la región, en los que el Padrón podría haber sido motivo de desconfianza, como Guyana, Guatemala, México, Nicaragua, Paraguay y la República Dominicana. Esta auditoría no fue contratada.

CUARTA:

En virtud del convenio suscrito el 22 de noviembre de 1999 entre el RENIEC, el Diario EL COMERCIO y TRANSPARENCIA, esta última asumió la doble tarea de: (a) recabar observaciones sobre el padrón de las fuerzas políticas inscritas, de los medios de comunicación y de la ciudadanía en general, incluyendo la concurrencia a los lugares de exhibición del mismo; y (b) extraer una muestra aleatoria de 1,004 ciudadanos, para entrevistar personalmente a quienes la integran, o, en su defecto, recabar de sus vecinos información sobre ellos.

QUINTA:

Para el cumplimiento de los cometidos recién señalados,
a. Se movilizaron los 194 Comités Provinciales de TRANSPARENCIA y 224 voluntarios, en todo el país;

- b.** Hubo numerosas personas e instituciones que ofrecieron su colaboración voluntaria en materia de transportes (terrestres, fluviales y aéreas) y comunicaciones;
- c.** Se instalaron líneas telefónicas de cobro revertido que funcionaron las 24 horas del día;
- d.** El Diario EL COMERCIO apoyó permanentemente el trabajo y publicó, el viernes 31 de diciembre de 1999, la lista de los 291 ciudadanos de la muestra que no habían sido hallados hasta esa fecha, invitando a quien tuviera información sobre ellos a hacerla llegar a TRANSPARENCIA;
- e.** La Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y los Señores Cónsules del Perú en Córdoba, La Plata y Rosario (*Argentina*), Miami y San Francisco (*EEUU*), México D.F., Tokio (*Japón*), Madrid (*España*), Génova y Milán (*Italia*) y Ginebra (*Suiza*), remitieron la información disponible sobre los 12 electores residentes en el extranjero que fueron parte de la muestra;
- f.** Se consultó la metodología del estudio con los responsables de algunas de las principales empresas de estudios de opinión pública del país (*Apoyo, CPI, Datum e Imasen*).

SEXTA:

La ley establece que el Padrón es un documento público y fija plazos para su publicación. Hemos constatado que estos plazos se han cumplido en lo sustancial y que el padrón ha estado expuesto en más del 95% de los 1,358 distritos en que los voluntarios de TRANSPARENCIA acudieron a revisarlo. Se han reportado algunas diferencias entre las copias expuestas en algunos distritos y las entregadas a TRANSPARENCIA, comprensibles en razón de las fechas de cada versión y de los problemas logísticos que acarrea la distribución nacional de las copias. También se han reportado dificultades con los horarios de exhibición y con el cumplimiento de las instrucciones del RENIEC por parte del personal de las oficinas locales. La exhibición del Padrón, a pesar de estas lamentables limitaciones, ha sido un paso positivo en la dirección de mejorar la publicidad del Padrón e incrementar la transparencia administrativa en materia electoral.

SÉTIMA:

Los plazos establecidos por el RENIEC para la publicación del Padrón y para hacer rectificaciones han sido demasiado cortos (*5 días*), así como el conjunto del cronograma electoral decidido por el Congreso de la República, que ha merecido observaciones del JNE, la ONPE, TRANSPARENCIA y muchas otras instituciones. La brevedad de este plazo de publicación y la insuficiencia de la campaña de educación ciudadana explican la escasa participación ciudadana en la verificación del padrón, participación que seguirá siendo objetivo prioritario de TRANSPARENCIA en las elecciones venideras.

DISEÑO MUESTRAL

Luego de consultar con las contrapartes del convenio (*El RENIEC y El Comercio*), con los diversos especialistas y con los responsables de algunas empresas de estudio de opinión pública, se optó por tomar una muestra simple al azar del conjunto de electores incluidos en el padrón. Este diseño permite hacer inferencias sobre la totalidad de los electores, a costa de prescindir de cualquier análisis en profundidad de determinados segmentos del universo, como podrían haber sido, por ejemplo, las zonas de emergencia, de mayor alfabetización y pobreza relativa, o de mayor abstención electoral.

Teniendo en cuenta las limitaciones de tiempo y recursos se decidió extraer una muestra aleatoria de 1004 electores (*1 de cada 14,413*). Este tamaño de muestra, bajo el supuesto más desfavorable de heterogeneidad máxima, permite inferencias con

un intervalo inferior a ± 0.05 y una certeza de 99% (*esto es con una probabilidad de error inferior a 1%*); o, si se prefiere, permite intervalos de ± 0.03 con una certeza de 95% (probabilidad de error de 5%). Ambos modelos estadísticos alternativos trabajan con combinaciones de precisión y certeza más exigentes que los estándares habituales en las ciencias sociales. (**Anexo 22**).

Se prefirió una muestra simple al azar a cualquier tipo de estratificación o conglomeración debido a que el diseño escogido es el más potente estadísticamente, o sea, el que permite menores márgenes de error y garantiza un mejor ajuste (*"fitness"*) o proporcionalidad entre la muestra y el universo. No habiendo ningún indicio de sesgo en el orden de los electores dentro de la base de datos de RENIEC, el método sistemático de selección resultaba el más simple y apropiado.

de Verificación del Padrón



OCTAVA:


El Registro Nacional de Ciudadanos no es susceptible de ser revisado por los partidos políticos de forma permanente, como ocurre en España o Chile, o por períodos prolongados (*superiores al mes*), como ocurre en Uruguay y otros países en los que TRANSPARENCIA ha podido consultar al respecto con las autoridades electorales respectivas.

NOVENA:

La publicidad del padrón se ve seriamente limitada desde que las copias entregadas a TRANSPARENCIA y a los partidos habían sido sometidas a innecesarias e injustificables limitaciones logísticas de acceso, que impedían los procedimientos normales de búsqueda en cualquier base de datos convencional. Esta limitación, sin embargo, fue superada, aunque sólo en parte y luego de insistentes gestiones, en la versión entregada a TRANSPARENCIA.

DÉCIMA:

TRANSPARENCIA lamenta que los partidos políticos y movimientos



independientes, con una sola excepción (*Somos Perú*), no hayan entregado sus propias versiones de las deficiencias encontradas en el Padrón o de las dificultades habidas en el proceso de su verificación, pues la responsabilidad por la limpieza de las elecciones corresponde, en primer lugar, a las fuerzas participantes en el proceso electoral.

UNDÉCIMA:

TRANSPARENCIA reitera que su ofrecimiento voluntario para realizar la exploración del Padrón correspondió a su voluntad de contribuir a generar confianza en el electorado, disminuyendo las fuentes de controversia y sospecha. Se trataba, por lo tanto, de ofrecer una estimación del estado del Padrón, a fin de dotar de referentes empíricos concretos a las numerosas preocupaciones expresadas en esta materia.

DUODÉCIMA:

El Padrón es obsoleto: no hay vecino que pueda dar información alguna referente al 8.5% de los ciudadanos sorteados en la muestra aleatoria. Sobre dicha muestra, se han reportado errores en el 34.4% de las direcciones consignadas para los electores, cifra que incluye un importante número de emigrantes. Hay además fallecidos y personal castrense.

DECIMOTERCERA:

El 61% de nuestros entrevistados votará con la Libreta Electoral y el 29% con el Documento Nacional de Identidad. En la muestra, queda aún un 6% de ciudadanos (*equivalentes aproximadamente a*

833,515 electores en el universo) que, pese a los esfuerzos de RENIEC, sigue en posesión de la Libreta Electoral Mecanizada. Esta proliferación de documentos hubiera podido evitarse si se hubiera atendido a la sugerencias de proceder al cambio obligatorio y gratuito de documentos.

Este estudio no ha considerado la situación de los ciudadanos identificados con el Documento Provisional de Identidad (*DPI*), dado que ellos no figuran ni podrían figurar en el Padrón Electoral entregado a TRANSPARENCIA.

DECIMOCUARTA:

El número de peruanos residentes en el extranjero que figura en el Padrón con direcciones dentro del territorio de la República, puede estimarse, a partir de la muestra, en no menos de 2.18%, lo que significa no menos de 311,677 electores (*entre 289,828 y 333,526, con un certeza estadística de 95%, y su correspondiente probabilidad de error de 5%*). Se trata de emigrantes que no han registrado su cambio de domicilio en el consulado peruano respectivo. Si bien esta situación no es ilegal, sin duda podría ser fuente de sospechas respecto a la posibilidad de suplantación de electores, sospechas que sería importante eliminar.

DECIMOQUINTA:

Hay fallecidos en el padrón electoral. El cuerpo de este informe documenta, entre otros, los casos de 194 fallecidos en el distrito de Río Tambo, provincia de Satipo, departamento de Junín; 71 fallecidos en el distrito de San Pedro de Coris, provincia de Churcampa, departamento de Huancavelica; y 21 fallecidos en el distrito de Pachangara, provincia de Oyón, departamento de Lima.

El número mínimo de fallecidos indebidamente incluidos en el padrón puede estimarse, a partir de la muestra, en no menos del 2.39%, lo que significa 345,851 electores (*entre 327,417 y 364,285, con una certeza estadística de 95%*). Esta sería deficiencia también puede ser fuente de sospechas sobre la posibilidad de suplantar electores del Padrón.

DECIMOSEXTA:

No han aparecido presos en la muestra.

DECIMOSÉTIMA:

Hay personal castrense en el padrón electoral. Los efectivos policiales Teniente PNP Juan Martín Ruiz Ríos y el Especialista Técnico de Tercera PNP David Pinedo Torres, que fueron declarados como efectivos en actividad por el Director de la Policía, General Fernando Dianderas Otone, el 05 de diciembre de 1999, figuran en el padrón entregado a TRANSPARENCIA.

Sin embargo, no ha aparecido ningún elector en la muestra, que haya declarado ser militar o policía, o que haya sido reconocido como tal por sus vecinos, a pesar de haberse preguntado expresamente por la ocupación u ocupaciones de los electores.

DECIMOCTAVA:

No se ha podido comprobar si los difuntos o los efectivos castrenses detectados han votado o no en los últimos procesos electorales, debido a que no se recibió del RENIEC la información solicitada para este efecto.

Desatendidas las sugerencias hechas en el pasado por TRANSPARENCIA para generar confianza en el padrón electoral, resulta deseable y urgente adoptar medidas prácticas para mejorar las condiciones del actual Padrón Inicial antes de su conversión en Padrón Definitivo.

¹ Costo estimado por la empresa Supervisora de Medios y Publicidad S.A.C. en 62'639,571.15 dólares americanos. El Poder Ejecutivo no ha proporcionado una cifra oficial que indique el monto efectivo del gasto publicitario del Estado en este período, aunque ha ofrecido darla.



Verificación del Padrón

RECOMENDACIONES DEL INFORME

DE PLAZO MEDIATO

(luego de las elecciones del 9 de abril del año 2000)

PRIMERA: tomar todas las medidas legales, presupuestales y administrativas pertinentes para asegurar el rápido cambio general de documentos, a fin de que todos los ciudadanos peruanos dispongan de su DNI.

SEGUNDA: mejorar las formas y plazos de exhibición del Padrón, a fin de que sea efectivamente público El Registro Nacional de Ciudadanos debe ser accesible de forma permanente. Dicho Registro debe ser exhibido por lo menos seis meses antes de cada elección, durante el plazo mínimo de un mes. Con la misma anticipación debe entregarse copias (sin restricciones de acceso) a todos los partidos políticos y medios de comunicación social.

DE PLAZO INMEDIATO

(antes de las elecciones del 9 de abril del año 2,000)

PRIMERA: Se recomienda al Presidente de la República que, en demostración de la voluntad de celebrar elecciones transparentes y plenamente confiables, convoque a una Legislatura Extraordinaria con el propósito de discutir y aprobar una ley que prolongue el periodo de observaciones y la elaboración definitiva del Padrón Electoral hasta 30 días antes de las elecciones.

SEGUNDA: Se recomienda al Jurado Nacional de Elecciones y al RENIEC entregar, a partir de la fecha, a todos los partidos y movimientos inscritos y a todos los medios de comunicación, copias del Padrón Inicial sobre un soporte magnético sin restricciones de acceso, a fin de contribuir a la transparencia y a la confianza en el Padrón.

TERCERA: Habida cuenta de que el JNE dispone de sólo diez días para aprobar el Padrón Electoral, y de que hay información que debe mantenerse reservada (por ejemplo, la relación de efectivos militares y policiales, que tiene implicancias sobre la seguridad nacional), se recomienda al JNE que solicite el concurso de la Defensoría del Pueblo para que, dotada de los recursos necesarios y con la aceptación de las instancias castrenses, de las autoridades en materia penal, del RENIEC y de los municipios, contribuya a depurar el Padrón Inicial de manera que:

- a) No queden militares ni policías en el padrón definitivo;
- b) No haya ningún preso sentenciado;
- c) Se elimine al mayor número posible de fallecidos; y
- d) Se certifique que no ha habido personal castrense ni presos sentenciados ni difuntos votantes en los últimos procesos electorales, en los que la abstención ha disminuido de manera notable.

Lima, 5 de enero del año 2,000.

FE DE ERRATAS

En la gráfica N° 1 de Datos Electorales 16 figura un porcentaje mal calculado. El siguiente cuadro corrige la información antes proporcionada: el gasto de publicidad estatal creció en 109% (entre 1997 y 1999) y no en 52 % como se consignó. Las cifras absolutas y los otros porcentajes son correctos.

Gráfica 1. Costos de la publicidad de organismos del Estado
Sobre lista de primeras seis marcas / Años 1997, 1998 y 1999

Costos en millones de dólares EUA por marca y año (1)

	1997	1998	1999 (2)	+/- 1997/99
Cervezas	65'989,720.83	51'488,722.88	39'204,460.18	-40.59%
Bancos	49'638,101.81	44'540,112.98	23'737,345.25	-52.18%
Gaseosas	49'151,456.76	40'218,061.57	31'244,163.14	-36.43%
Detergentes	37'833,007.72	21'703,239.72	23'390,155.28	-38.18%
Champús	34'311,702.27	21'633,244.65	19'353,216.38	-43.60%
Org. del Estado	29'970,328.64	38'615,298.46	62'639,571.15	+109.01%

(1) En base a precios de lista (tarifa fija).
(2) Para el año 1999 se ha considerado el periodo enero/noviembre.

Porcentaje corregido

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DATOS ELECTORALES es un material de análisis de coyuntura, producido y difundido por la Dirección de Informaciones de TRANSPARENCIA.

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WHY IS VOTER REGISTRATION AN IMPORTANT PART OF AN ELECTION PROCESS?

Voter registration is critical to the integrity of elections. Political parties, civic organizations, news media and others can reduce errors, deter fraud and promote public confidence in an election by monitoring voter registration and other elements of the election process. Monitoring by political parties and candidates helps ensure that their supporters will be provided a proper opportunity to vote. Nonpartisan monitoring by civic organizations builds general confidence that the electorate will be able to exercise voting rights.

WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES USED TO REGISTER PEOPLE TO VOTE, AND HOW CAN THEY BE MONITORED TO ENSURE THEY ARE CONDUCTED FAIRLY?

HOW ARE A PRELIMINARY, REVISED AND FINAL VOTERS LIST COMPILED AND WHAT TECHNIQUES CAN BE USED TO ASSESS THEIR QUALITY?

This guide is designed for political and civic leaders who are committed to safeguarding electoral rights. It provides an overview of voter registration and how to monitor the process. The first part of the guide introduces the issues that should be considered during any voter registration process. Specific techniques for monitoring different aspects of voter registration are detailed in the second part. Topics related to organizing a monitoring effort are addressed in the third part. Appendices provide sample monitoring forms and reports used by political parties and civic organizations in different countries around the world.

HOW CAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS HELP GUARANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THEIR SUPPORTERS AND THE PUBLIC TO REGISTER TO VOTE?

The guide is intended to help political parties and civic organizations enhance their capacity to monitor the voter registration process. Readers interested in broader election monitoring issues should also refer to *NDI's Handbook on How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: An A to Z Guide*, and other NDI publications.

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