DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA:
An International Experiment in Nation Building

The First Pre-Election Study
June 1989
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA:
An International Experiment In Nation Building

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONALAffAIRS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................1

I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................7

II. BACKGROUND...........................................................................9
    A. Historical Setting.............................................................9
    B. The Role of the U.N.......................................................10
    C. Resolutions 385 and 435................................................11

III. THE KEY ACTORS.................................................................17
    A. The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group.............17
    B. The Administrator General.............................................17
    C. The Special Representative............................................18
    D. Political Parties............................................................18
    E. Media.............................................................................20

IV. AN ATMOSPHERE OF INTIMIDATION........................................21
    A. Koevoet...........................................................................21
    B. The Fears of Tribal Leaders............................................22
    C. SWAPO Detainees..........................................................23
    D. Student Boycotts............................................................23
    E. Returnees........................................................................24
    F. O'Linn Commission........................................................25

V. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.....................................................27
    A. Voter Registration..........................................................27
    B. Legal and Administrative Framework for Elections..............29

VI. CONCLUSION...........................................................................33

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDICES

1. Delegation List, Team Reports and Itinerary
2. Report to Martti Ahtisaari
3. Local media articles on NDI delegation
4. S/12636
5. Nujoma letter to the Secretary General
6. Students demonstration notice
7. Resolution 435
8. Population per district
9. Polling station locations
10. Registration application
11. Registration card
12. Sample ballot
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is based on the findings of an international delegation of election experts that visited Namibia from May 29 to June 6, 1989 to evaluate the laws and procedures for the November elections. A preliminary report was presented to United Nations Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari on June 5.

This presentation offers an historical perspective for the upcoming elections. It analyzes problems that could undermine a free and fair process. While some changes in the electoral system have been made, the delegation continues to be concerned about certain key aspects of the process. Based on their extensive experiences in elections, members of the delegation propose a series of recommendations for consideration by the South African Administrator General, United Nations officials and all other interested parties.

The report was prepared under the auspices of the sponsoring organization, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), after consultations with members of the delegation. While these consultations indicate a consensus for the conclusions reached herein, NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the report.

NDI Senior Consultant Patricia Keefer drafted the report with assistance from the delegation's rapporteur, Merritt Becker, and NDI Senior Consultant Larry Garber. The report was edited by NDI Executive Vice President Kenneth Wollack. NDI staff members Sue Grabowski, Maria Griener, Ellen Frawley and Thomas Williford helped in the production of the report.

NDI wishes to extend special thanks to Christopher Edley, the delegation's legal advisor, for his guidance, recommendations and contribution. The delegation particularly acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Joan Bingham who made all the arrangements for the delegation's itinerary. NDI Program Assistant Katherine Moore accompanied the group in Namibia, made all the necessary logistical arrangements and prepared the briefing materials. Her contribution added measurably to the success of the mission.

August 1989
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An eight-member delegation from six countries visited Namibia from May 29 to June 6 to review the political situation in the territory and to evaluate the administrative procedures for the November elections. The delegation, sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), met with all the major political actors and traveled to four regions of Namibia. NDI also sponsored follow-up visits to Namibia from June 21-26 and from July 20-24, during which additional information was gathered on the transition process.

NDI recognizes that a free and fair election, as is called for in UN Resolution 435, should be the first step towards a political system that guarantees the rights of all Namibian citizens. The community of democratic nations has a responsibility to support a full transition process, and it is in this spirit that NDI sponsored the study mission.

The delegation concluded that:

1. The level of intimidation poses a direct threat to the electoral process. If allowed to continue, such intimidation will undermine the ability of voters to cast a free ballot.
2. The election system currently being devised by the Administrator General (AG) is overly-centralized, deprives political parties an opportunity to scrutinize all aspects of the balloting process, and does not provide for a speedy tabulation of the results.

3. The unique role of the UN is critical to the success of the transition process. The UN Special Representative for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, must assure that the process is conducted in a manner that provides Namibians an opportunity to select representatives to a constituent assembly through free and fair elections. The presence of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) also increases confidence in the process.

4. Despite the problems that must be overcome, there is widespread hope in Namibia that the November elections will lay the foundation for a full democratic transition. If this goal can be realized, Namibia will be a model for others who seek to promote or maintain democratic government.

   Based on the delegation's collective experience in election processes, the following recommendations are presented for consideration by the Administrator General and other interested parties:
Intimidation

-- Remnants of the Koevoet must be removed from SWAPOL immediately. Once removed from SWAPOL, a concerted effort is required to prevent former Koevoet members from intimidating and harassing the population.

-- SWAPOL must revise its operational practices to conform with accepted police practices. Its use of armored troop carriers (casspirs) for routine police patrols and at political rallies constitutes a violation of Resolution 435 and is psychologically intimidating to the population.

-- The Commission for the Prevention and Combating of Intimidation and Election Malpractice should interpret its mandate broadly. The Commission should investigate patterns and practices of intimidation, rather than limiting its attention to individual complaints. To fulfill its mandate, the Commission should be provided sufficient resources, and should conduct its investigations in an expeditious manner.

-- UNTAG should exercise its authority in a more aggressive manner. UNTAG representatives should accompany SWAPOL officials
in conducting investigations and should review all relevant investigative files. Where circumstances warrant, UNTAG should undertake independent investigations into allegations of intimidation.

**Election System**

-- To increase public confidence in the administration of the election, an independent election commission responsible for administering the entire election process should be appointed by the AG.

-- The existing 23 electoral districts should be subdivided. Each district would be responsible for compiling accurate registration rolls, for organizing the balloting process and for tabulating the ballots. An absentee ballot process should be devised for those unable to vote in his or her district on election day.

-- A voter's identification should be verified at the polling station by matching the information on the registration card with that included in the registration roll. In the case of challenges, tendered ballots should be used. Challenges should be reviewed in the first instance by the district election officials.
The balloting system should be designed to assure voters that they will be casting a secret ballot. This may require modifying the current system which requires the placement of the voter's registration card number on the ballot envelope.

An extensive voter education program should be instituted to instruct voters on how to cast their ballots.

Party representatives should be permitted to observe the entire balloting process and to file challenges. The presiding officials, however, should retain ultimate control over the polling site, including the authority to exclude certain party representatives if they seek to interfere with the election process.

To expedite the tabulation of results, ballots should be counted at district election centers rather than transported to Windhoek. This system will also discourage intimidation that might occur if ballots are counted at the actual polling sites. Complete results should be available within 48 hours after the elections.
The Campaign Period

-- Political parties must be permitted to organize meetings and rallies, subject only to those restrictions necessary to maintain law and order. The parties also should be provided equal access to the government-controlled radio and television (SWABC). In addition, parties should be permitted to purchase media time.

-- The media should contribute to an open and fair campaign by adhering to the principles of balance, objectivity and accuracy in all news coverage. SWABC also should develop a civic education program that is acceptable to all parties participating in the elections. Political parties should respond to SWABC's invitation to advise the management on the broadcast coverage of the election.
I. INTRODUCTION

The last barriers to the implementation of UN Resolution 435, which serves as the basis for the independence of Namibia, were removed with the signing of the Namibia Accord on December 22, 1988. The Accord, a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, set April 1, 1989 as the date to begin the transition process. Events since April 1, however, reflect the contentious nature of Namibian politics that has characterized the territory for the past 25 years.

In addition to its consequences for the people living in the territory, the Namibian transition process currently underway has important implications for the United Nations' role in the resolution of armed conflicts and for South Africa's system of minority rule. Because of the international community's interest in Namibia's electoral and transition processes, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Representative for Namibia, has welcomed outside observers, and has solicited their advice. Responding to this broad invitation, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) organized an eight-member delegation composed of political party leaders, election officials, and academics from six countries to study the political environment and administrative preparations for the elections scheduled for November 1989.

The fact finding mission assessed: 1) the Namibian people's awareness of and confidence in the electoral process; 2) consultation between the Administrator General (AG), UNTAG, political party officials and civic leaders; 3) the level of intimidation and its potential affect on the electorate; 4) the role of leading institutions in the transition process; and 5) the resettlement of Namibians returning after more than a generation in exile.

The delegation was led by Senator Alisdair Graham of Canada. Senator Graham's experiences include serving as a leader of NDI-sponsored international observer delegations for the May 1989 Paraguayan elections and the May 1987 Philippine legislative elections. Other delegation members included: Dennis Smith, Chief Electoral Officer of Barbados; Charles Mokobi, Clerk to the National Assembly of Botswana; Humayen Mohammad Kahn, Joint Secretary to the Election Commission of Pakistan; Frederic Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky in the United States; and Masipula Sithole, Chairman of the Department of Political Studies, University of Zimbabwe. Christopher Edley, Jr., professor of law at Harvard University served as the delegation's legal advisor; NDI Senior Consultant Patricia Keefer organized the visit as the Institute's Namibia project director.
The delegation members were selected for their experience and expertise in electoral politics and management. Collectively, the delegates have administered, contested or observed some 50 elections in 20 countries.

The delegation visited Namibia from May 29 to June 6. For two days, the delegation divided into teams, visiting four of the administrative territories -- Ovambo, Kavango, Namaland and Damaraland -- and two magisterial districts -- Marienental and Gobabis (see Appendix 1). Meetings were held in a dozen cities, towns and villages. Approximately 80 percent of the population live in the areas visited. NDI teams made two subsequent visits to Namibia -- June 21-27 and July 18-24 -- to gather additional information on the transition process.

The delegation sought to understand the respective roles of the South African-appointed Administrator General and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Lengthy meetings with A.G. Visser, Chief Registration Officer, and his staff in Windhoek and in the districts provided the delegation with an understanding of the plans for registration, campaigning, ballotin and vote counting. Senior UNTAG personnel in Windhoek were forthcoming about their responsibilities for election and police monitoring, and the repatriation of Namibians in exile. The delegation also met with a variety of civilian, military and police personnel in six of the ten UNTAG regional offices.

The delegation met with the leadership of the central and local committees of the two major contending political parties -- the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) -- and with leaders of other smaller parties, including the National Party, the United Democratic Front, and the Namibia National Front. The delegation also sought to determine the role and capabilities of others involved in the Namibian election process, such as the press, churches, human rights groups, senior headmen, tribal chieftains, farmers, union organizers, students, teachers and police officials.

Given the concern over the level of intimidation, the delegation reviewed the plans of the newly-formed Commission for the Prevention and Combating of Intimidation and Election Malpractices. The delegation received information and logistical assistance from the Namibia Peace Plan Study and Contact Group (NPP 435), a non-partisan group organized to support the implementation of UN Resolution 435.

On June 5, 1989, at the conclusion of the mission, the delegation briefed Ahtisaari and his staff (see Appendix 2). The delegation highlighted the problem of intimidation, particularly in the north, and the cumbersome administrative procedures that the AG had devised for the elections. The delegation urged that UNTAG be more assertive in pressuring the
AG to increase confidence in the process. Ahtisaari said that he agreed with the concerns expressed, although he did not endorse the delegation’s recommendation for an independent election commission. He argued that such a commission would further erode UNTAG’s supervisory role.

The following day, the delegation briefed Administrator General Louis Pienaar. He expressed reservations concerning certain findings of the delegation, which he maintained reflected an anti-South Africa bias. Pienaar suggested that any major changes in the plans for the elections would result in delays, which he was seeking to avoid. However, he indicated that the delegation's call for the establishment of an independent election commission was worthy of consideration.

The delegation's preliminary report was distributed widely to the Namibian media, which featured it prominently (see Appendix 3), and to other organizations and individuals who are monitoring the transition process. Upon return to their respective countries, members of the delegation prepared reports describing their individual observations, and briefed their governments.

II. BACKGROUND

Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa, is one of the world's most sparsely populated territories with a population of 1.3 million and a land mass of 319,000 square miles (3.7 persons per square mile). Over half of the population lives in the 30,000 square miles of Ovamboland, located in northern Namibia on the border with Angola.

The population is 87 percent native African, seven percent white, and five percent colored. The native African population consists of ten ethnic groups with the Ovambos accounting for approximately half of the African population. The other groups include the Kavangos, the Hereros, the Damaras, the Namas, the Caprivis, the Bushmen, the Basters, and the Tswanas. Over half of the white inhabitants are Afrikaans; the remainder are English, Portuguese and German. About a quarter of the population lives in urban areas, of which one-third reside in the capital city of Windhoek.

In addition to the two official languages -- English and Afrikaans -- the major languages are Ovambo, Nama, Herero, Kavango and German. Approximately 60 percent of the native African population is illiterate.

A. Historical Setting

The current geographic concentration of the native African ethnic groups reflects historical settlement patterns. The nomadic Bushman were the first inhabitants of Namibia. In the 17th century, the Namas, Hereros and Damaras, traditional cattle
farmers and herdsmen, settled in the region. The Ovambos, who were mainly farmers, settled in the north. During the 19th century, the Basters, a northern Cape colored clan, and the Namas settled in an area south of Windhoek. Conflict over land rights, leadership and cattle frequently occurred during the pre-colonial period.

The first European in Namibia was the Portuguese navigator Diogo Cao. He was followed by Dutch, British and other Portuguese explorers. German colonization began in the late 19th century. The Herero and the Nama wars in the early 1900's consolidated the German position in Namibia. Nearly 80 percent of the Herero population was eliminated as a result of military actions or privation. All of the Herero land was confiscated, as was the property of the Namas. The Germans established Windhoek as the administrative capital, and divided the country into regions and districts.

During the First World War, the Union of South Africa invaded South West Africa (SWA) to protect the Cape sea-route from the Germans. After a year of fighting and the engagement of over 33,000 South African troops, Germany surrendered. SWA was initially administered under martial law as a South African protectorate. In 1920, SWA was entrusted to South Africa by the League of Nations but the administrative structure put in place by the Germans was kept intact. The 1925 SWA constitution provided the white population with administrative authority over the territory. A white-only Legislative Assembly was established, and an Administrator was designated to exercise executive authority.

B. The Role of the United Nations

After World War II, the United Nations terminated the mandate system. In its place, a voluntary international trusteeship was established. South Africa, however, refused to relinquish its claim to SWA, having benefitted considerably from the mineral resources of the colony.

In 1962, the South African government established a Commission of Inquiry into Affairs of South West Africa to investigate the welfare of the inhabitants of SWA, and to recommend how the indigenous population could develop more rapidly. The Commission report (referred to as the Odendaal Plan) proposed a homeland policy for the native African population, modeled on the Group Areas Act (1950) and the Resettlement of Natives Act (1954) in South Africa. Under this policy, ten bantu regions were established. The Development of Self-Government for Native Africans Act authorized each homeland to establish legislative and executive councils.
The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was founded in 1960 as a national liberation movement. SWAPO, with Sam Nujoma as president, emerged from an earlier nationalist workers movement in northern Namibia, the Ovamboland People's Organization. SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), launched a guerrilla war against South African security forces in 1966 that continued until April 1989. SWAPO, however, was never legally banned in Namibia, though many of its internal leaders were periodically arrested, and most of its senior leadership lived in exile.

In 1966, the UN officially terminated South Africa's mandate over SWA/Namibia. The issue of South Africa's continued occupation of SWA was presented to the International Court of Justice. The court initially ruled in South Africa's favor but reversed its decision in 1971, deciding that South Africa was illegally occupying the territory.

A year after terminating South Africa's mandate, the UN General Assembly established an 11-member UN Council for South West Africa (1967) and, in 1973, recognized SWAPO as the "sole authentic representative" of the Namibian people.

In January 1976, the Security Council passed Resolution 385, which called for UN supervised elections as a precursor to Namibian independence. The following year, South Africa took several steps to abide by the resolution. It appointed an Administrator General (AG) to prepare for Constituent Assembly elections, accepted the appointment of a UN representative to ensure the impartiality of the elections, and initiated the withdrawal of South African troops that were to be completely removed by the time of independence. However, disagreement between the UN and South Africa continued over certain elements of 385; ultimately, the UN revised the terms of Resolution 385 with the passage of Resolution 435, adopted in September 1978.

C. Resolutions 385 and 435

Five Western members of the UN Security Council, known as the Contact Group -- Canada, France, Great Britain, United States and West Germany -- proposed Resolution 435. Resolution 435 restated the basic principles of 385 and, in addition, incorporated a more elaborate document prepared by the Contact Group entitled "The Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation" (S/12636) (see Appendix 4).

Resolution 435 provided that the South African-appointed Administrator General (AG) administer the elections to the satisfaction of the UN Special Representative (SR) after a cessation of hostilities. Resolution 435 further states that the SR should exercise "supervision and control" of the election process, a role that is vaguely defined. A special UN force, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), is authorized to monitor the process.

-11-
Pursuant to the Contact Group document, there is to be a phased withdrawal of South African troops within 12 weeks of implementation. 1500 troops would remain in the territory, but be restricted to base until the certification of the election results. Amnesty would be extended to Namibian exiles and all apartheid legislation would be repealed. South Africa's willingness to accept Resolution 435, though, was contingent on the following: that the status of Walvis Bay (Namibia's only deep-water port, which was annexed by South Africa in 1977) would not be addressed until after the elections; that the reduction of South Africa's military presence would be linked to "some cessation of hostilities;" and that South African troops would be permitted to remain after the elections, if the Constituent Assembly so requested.

After first agreeing to abide by Resolution 435, South African Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha announced, in September 1978, that his government was reversing its position. Unilateral plans were prepared for Constituent Assembly elections, without any international involvement.

The elections were held in December 1978 and the South African government reported that approximately 300,000 voters went to the polls. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), with 82 percent of the vote, won 41 of the 50 seats being contested. SWAPO and several other political organizations boycotted the elections, which contributed to the relatively low turnout. The UN declared the elections illegal.

In May 1979, the Constituent Assembly reconstituted itself as a National Assembly. The South African government granted the new National Assembly legislative powers, but deprived it of the authority to alter the status of the territory. The following year, a Council of Ministers with executive powers was established, a new constitution was passed by the National Assembly, and local elections resulted in the creation of ten ethnically-based regional governments. The Council of Ministers was headed by DTA Chairman Dirk Mudge.

This so-called "internal settlement" for Namibia resulted in the establishment of two security forces -- the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) and the South West Africa Police Force (SWAPOL). At the same time, a counter-insurgency police unit known as 'Koevoet' (Afrikaners for crowbar), was organized by Major General Johannes Dreyer.

The DTA became increasingly fragmented as a result of South Africa's attempt to broaden the political base of the interim regime through interaction with other political parties. In 1983, the Council of Ministers resigned in protest over the actions of the AG, and the South African government dissolved both the National Assembly and the Council. All executive powers reverted back to the AG.
In addition to South African policy, other factors prevented the immediate implementation of Resolution 435. In 1979, SWAPO's military wing, PLAN, intensified its attacks. Units of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and the South Africa Defense Force (SADF) responded by conducting search raids into Angola. Subsequently, the Reagan administration adopted a policy of "linkage," tying the Namibian settlement with the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola. South Africa rejected a proposal from the Contact Group to establish bases for SWAPO forces in Namibia and to create a demilitarized zone.

In November 1983, a Multi-Party Conference (MPC) was convened by 19 Namibian political parties to discuss the deadlock in negotiations with South Africa. The MPC proposed the establishment of an "interim mechanism for the internal administration of Namibia." In 1985, South African President P.W. Botha announced his government's acceptance of the plan, and an interim government was installed. It consisted of an eight-member Executive Council and a 62-member National Assembly, chaired by Johannes Skrywer of the DTA. The Assembly was dominated by the DTA with 22 seats; the Labor Party, the National Party of South West Africa, the Rehoboth Free Democratic Party, the South West African National Union Party and SWAPO-Democratic Party were each granted eight seats.

Louis Pienaar was appointed the new Administrator General (AG) on July 1, 1985. Pienaar was given a veto power over all legislation adopted by the National Assembly, thus ensuring that the interim government could not unilaterally declare independence. In February 1987, the interim government published a program of action that included measures to expand its powers by the creation of two new ministries -- Internal Security and International Cooperation. The interim government, the regional ethnic councils and the SWA Territorial Force were suspended on March 1, 1989, pursuant to the terms established for implementation of Resolution 435.

With U.S. government mediation, delegations from Angola, Cuba and South Africa met in London, Cairo and New York from May 3 through August 1988 to break the impasse and discuss a regional settlement. On July 13, 1988, an agreement was reached for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-Western Africa). In August 1988, the parties met again in Geneva and released a statement announcing the immediate cessation of hostilities. In a letter to the UN Secretary General in August, Sam Nujoma indicated that SWAPO, although not a signatory to the agreement, would observe the Geneva cease-fire agreement (see Appendix 5).

The Namibia Accord, a trilateral agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, was formally signed on December 22, 1988. It committed Cuba to withdraw its 50,000 troops from Angola within 27 months and South Africa to withdraw its troops from Namibia by November 11, 1989. On January 23, 1989, the Security Council unanimously agreed to April 1, 1989 as the date for implementing Resolution 435.

-13-
Despite more than a decade of preparations by the United Nations, the long-awaited beginning of the transition process on April 1 was marred by violence. In fact, the entire independence process was in jeopardy and it was salvaged only through the intervention of multinational forces.

South Africa had been protesting to the UN for months about the presence of armed SWAPO camps in areas of Angola prohibited by the tri-partite peace agreement. The South Africans produced maps with the locations of the SWAPO camps as well as U.S. satellite information showing at least 3,000 guerillas south of the 16th parallel. The South Africans also reported that 1,900 guerillas were ready to cross the border. The UN took no action in response to these reports.

On March 31, UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari was informed by South African Foreign Minister Botha that 150 armed SWAPO guerrillas had infiltrated Namibia from across the Angolan border. Unable to determine the reliability of the reports and with less than 1000 ill-equipped UN troops on the ground, Ahtisaari affirmatively responded to the South Africans' request to reactivate some units of their security forces. South African and South West African troops, many of whom had been demobilized in accordance with the peace plan, were redeployed. The soldiers were supported by nearly 2,000 members of Koevoet, the counter-insurgency unit of the police force. Violent clashes took place between SWAPO and South Africa forces resulting in the death of more than 300 SWAPO supporters and 30 security personnel. The AG would later say that the Koevoet units were the "saviors of democracy."

SWAPO maintained that the South African claim of an incursion was a public relations ploy designed to derail the transition process and to undermine SWAPO's international support. SWAPO officials denied that clashes in northern Namibia involved guerrillas who had crossed the border from Angola. They asserted that the fighting involved guerrillas based in northern Namibia who were regrouping for confinement to bases under UN supervision.

Following a meeting with leaders of the Front-Line states in Luanda, Nujoma ordered all PLAN troops inside Namibia to stop fighting, regroup and report to Angola so that the implementation of Resolution 435 could continue without armed conflict. He requested UNTAG to designate assembly points in Namibia where troops could regroup and be escorted to Angolan bases. South African Foreign Minister Botha assured SWAPO guerrillas safe passage to Angola if they surrendered their arms to UNTAG. Eight assembly points on the border and ten south of the border were designated. Angola agreed to insure that guerrillas would be escorted to bases monitored by UNTAG north of the 16th parallel. Following the May 19 meeting of the Joint
Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC) -- which consists of government officials from Angola, Cuba and South Africa with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers -- the parties seemed content that the transition process had been restored.

Election Framework According to 435

According to the principles established in Resolution 435, every adult Namibian will be eligible to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. All political parties can contest the elections and votes will be cast by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The Resolution implies that a system of proportional representation will be used by stating that the electoral system will ensure fair representation in the Constituent Assembly for the political parties that gain substantial support in the election.

The South African-appointed Administrator General (AG) is authorized to draft legislation relating to the holding of elections, the registration of voters and the functions of the Constituent Assembly. The plan authorizes the UN Special Representative (SR) to consult with the AG at each stage of the process. The UN, however, is granted no independent authority to alter or modify the electoral code or voting procedures.

After the counting of the ballots, the SR must certify that the election was free and fair. The Constituent Assembly will then meet to draft a constitution, establishing an independent government. South Africa will continue to administer Namibia until the constitution is formally adopted by the Assembly.

Constitutional Framework

While Resolution 435 does not detail the specific parameters for a Namibian constitution, the Contact Group had outlined several basic requirements. These requirements provide for an elected Constituent Assembly that will formulate and adopt a constitution with a two-thirds majority. Further requirements stipulate that the constitution be the supreme law of the state, only amended by a designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum.

The recommended constitutional system would provide for a system of government with three branches: an elected executive branch responsible to the legislative branch; an elected legislative branch responsible for the passage of laws; and an independent judiciary. To insure citizen participation, there would be "periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret ballot".
The constitution also should include a declaration of fundamental rights, provide for the balanced structuring of the public, police and defense services, and promote equal access to such services by the citizenry. The establishment of elected councils for local and/or regional administration would also be provided for in the constitution.
III. THE KEY ACTORS

Many external and internal institutions expect to play a role in the electoral process. Collectively, they will administer, judge, monitor, contest and otherwise participate in the elections. The following section outlines the separate roles of the key actors and the interactions among them.

A. The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG)

UNTAG has both a civilian and military component. The military force includes up to seven infantry battalions. Originally set at 7,500 personnel in 1978, the Security Council reduced the military force to 4,650 based on cost estimates of the total UN operation. This action was strongly opposed by the Front-Line States. The UN Secretary-General, however, retains the authority to employ additional forces should the need arise.

The responsibilities of the UNTAG military force include monitoring the cessation of hostile acts by all parties, restricting activities by the South African Defense Forces (SADF), and the dismantling of command structures of citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces.

The UNTAG civilian component assists the Special Representative as election monitors and observers. Resolution 435 calls for 800 monitors drawn from UN member countries.

The UNTAG civilian police force monitors the South West African police forces, SWAPOL, which retains primary responsibility for maintaining law and order during the transition period. The role of SWAPOL has been a subject of concern among international observers due to the integration of Koevoet forces into SWAPOL in the north. The UN Secretary-General doubled to 1,000 the size of the UN police force because of alleged intimidation and because the AG failed to reduce the size of SWAPOL.

B. The Administrator General (AG)

Appointed by South Africa, the Administrator General has both legislative and executive responsibilities, and is subject to few constitutional restraints. The most important constraint is the power of the South African government to remove him.

The impartiality of the AG and the civil service is suspect in the eyes of many Namibians, particularly given the history of
South African presence in Namibia and the difficult relationship between Pretoria and SWAPO. For years, these antagonists fought on the streets, in courtrooms, in the United Nations and in the bush: nevertheless, Resolution 435 contemplates their working as close partners in the independence process.

C. The Special Representative (SR)

Given the UN's role in overseeing the electoral process, the Special Representative (SR) has been authorized, if circumstances warrant, to declare that the elections have not been free and fair. Such a declaration would inevitably result in international condemnation of the election results, with serious consequences for the transition process.

The SR is empowered to negotiate with the Administrator General (AG) regarding specific aspects of the electoral process, but he is not authorized to overrule the AG. However, the SR's objection to specific AG proposals has influenced the latter's decisions. This was the case when the AG suggested limited amnesty for exiles and proposed the abolition of only a few discriminatory laws. When the SR threatened to withhold his approval, the AG offered broader legislation.

D. Political Parties

There are more than 40 political parties in Namibia representing diverse ideologies as well as racial and tribal affiliations. Two leading parties emerged in the late 1960's and early 1970's to dominate the political scene -- the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Both of these political organizations appear to have adequate funding for waging a competitive campaign.

The smaller parties have become increasingly fractionalized. Several of these parties acknowledge that they are little more than extended families, others allegedly were created and supported by interests in South Africa in order to fragment Namibian politics. Still others represent specific ideological, ethnic and economic interests. Individually, these parties find it difficult to acquire the funding necessary to compete in this election. Consequently, there are a growing number of formal political alliances.

SWAPO

As noted earlier, SWAPO was founded in 1960. An "internal wing" has engaged in legal political activity within Namibia since that time, but has been the target of intimidation and harassment by police and South African military. Under
Resolution 435 on April 1, 1989, SWAPO lost its status as the "sole authentic representative of the Namibian people".

SWAPO describes itself as a nonaligned, nationalist party. Its constitution states that "SWAPO is a national liberation movement rallying together on the basis of free and voluntary association." The party leadership has stated that upon independence their priorities would be to develop the economy and redistribute wealth in partnership with Namibia's white community.

The membership of SWAPO is predominantly Ovambo, but also intertribal with strong support among migrant workers, urban professionals, public sector employees and the rural population in the north. Many supporters are active members of the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches.

SWAPO has maintained an external and internal leadership structure. With the return of the former, the structure has had to be integrated and reorganized. The President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, has yet to return to Namibia. In addition to Nujoma, SWAPO's leadership includes Hendrik Witbooi, Vice President; Andimo Toivo ja Toivo, Secretary General; Hage Geingob, Election Director; and Theo-Ben Gurirab, Foreign Secretary.

**Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)**

DTA is a multiracial coalition of white, colored and native African groups. It encompasses several internal parties including the Bushman Alliance, the Namibia Democratic Turnhalle Party, the National Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union, the National United Democratic Organization (NUDO) and the Republican Party, organized in 1977 by former members of the National Party of South West Africa. The DTA is largely comprised of the Herero tribes of central and southern Namibia.

The DTA was founded in the wake of the South African-sponsored Turnhalle Conference in 1975. The conference delegates approved a draft constitution that would have provided for equal ethnic representation and a federal solution to oppose SWAPO domination. The constitution was opposed by SWAPO as well as the UN Contact Group.

Ideologically, DTA regards itself as centrist. The Alliance's aim is to achieve independence for Namibia on the basis of equal rights, personal freedom, democracy and free enterprise. The DTA has gained political experience through participation in the "internal settlement" elections; it recently trained 600 political commissioners in preparation for the upcoming elections.
The Chairman of the Alliance is Dirk Mudge, who also serves as Chairman of the Republican Party; DTA President is Chief Kuaima Riruako, leader of the National Unity Democratic Organization.

E. Media

Namibians have access to daily and weekly newspapers, eight radio stations and one television channel run by the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC). Although the newspapers are independent, South Africa reserves the right to impose restrictions on reporting of defense issues, and can ban publication under South Africa's Publications Act. Similarly, SWABC, although an independent broadcasting corporation, receives its budget of approximately 25 million rand from the Administrator General (AG) whose office is also responsible for appointing the SWABC Board of Control.

With the exception of the trilingual Namibian Times published in Walvis Bay, all newspapers are published in Windhoek. The two most widely circulated dailies are Die Republikein, an Afrikaans newspaper supportive of the DTA, and The Namibian, an English-language newspaper aligned with SWAPO. Both these papers print approximately 13,000 papers daily. Other dailies include the long established Windhoek Advertiser, a right-wing newspaper supportive of the National Party; Algemeine Zeitung, a German newspaper that is also pro-National Party; and an Afrikaans paper, Die Suidwester. The weekly newspapers are the Windhoek Observer, founded by the current editor of The Namibian, and The Namibian Northern, a German left-wing newspaper.

The South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC) was established in 1979. It broadcasts in the 13 indigenous languages spoken in Namibia via radio services on eight FM channels. This FM service reaches 85 percent of the population. There also are 19 short wave and two medium wave stations. The single television channel broadcasts in Afrikaans and transmits only to the main towns in the country. There are approximately 30,000 television sets.

The media will function as the primary means for educating voters about registration, campaigning and election procedures. SWABC plans to develop programs on voter education, emphasizing the registration process and voting procedures. SWABC also is contemplating selling time to private organizations for voter education purposes. Finally, SWABC has allotted the UN five minutes daily on the radio and 10 minutes weekly on television to explain the election procedures.

The media will also provide the political parties a means for campaigning and advertising. The parties have begun placing advertisements in newspapers offering their political positions.
and announcing public rallies and meetings. However, newspapers supporting a particular party sell advertising space only to that party. SWABC, on the other hand, has yet to decide how it will sell advertising time to political parties. In addition to paid advertisements, SWABC representatives indicated their intention to provide political parties the opportunity to broadcast their positions on radio. They are anxious, however, about encouraging a "political war" on the air. SWABC may seek to reach an agreement with all the parties for the allocation of air time and the establishment of guidelines for presentations. The large number of parties is creating a problem for SWABC, although there is hope that after the parties are formally registered, they may join in alliances, making the distribution of air time more feasible.

In February 1989, the SWABC Board of Directors announced its policy to present balanced and impartial coverage of the election, and to provide, as a public service, information on the implementation of Resolution 435. However the broadcast media has been accused by various political parties and organizations of slanted news coverage. The Namibian Peace Plan 435 asserts that its monitoring of news broadcasts during the month of July demonstrates SWABC biases.

IV. AN ATMOSPHERE OF INTIMIDATION

Given Namibia's turbulent history, it is almost inevitable that charges and counter-charges of intimidation would dominate the political debate. Rumors, as well as actual instances of intimidation, fuel a fire of distrust, suspicion and anxiety between the various political factions. The challenge in Namibia is to draw a line between permissible partisan enthusiasm and acts that undermine free and fair political activities.

Headmen and chiefs who worked with the South African government in administering the homelands policy fear retaliation by SWAPO repatriated forces. For their part, SWAPO and its supporters describe widespread intimidation and violence by members of the security forces, particularly Koevoet, and by veterans of SWATF.

A. Koevoet

Koevoet, which is Afrikaans for 'crowbar,' is officially designated as SWAPOLCOIN (South West Africa Police Counter Insurgency Unit). It was created in 1978 by Major General Johannes Dreyer and modeled on a similar unit used by the South African police to support the Rhodesians during their counter insurgency war. Ninety percent of the operational force are native Ovambos, but the command structure is all white.
Koevoet was specifically organized and trained by South Africa to conduct aggressive and unorthodox counter insurgency campaigns against SWAPO guerrillas. Koevoet forces, according to the Administrator General, are trained to be intimidating. Resolution 435 required that Koevoet and the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) be disbanded. However, it did permit the Administrator General's transition government to maintain a civilian police force. Pretoria maintains that the Koevoet veterans have been retrained as civilian policemen and integrated into normal police functions. The South African government estimates that 1200 former Koevoet members now serve in SWAPO (other sources cite higher numbers).

The AG defends the continuing presence of Koevoet as a necessary security measure. He argues that not only are the men needed to maintain the size of the police force, but that the aggressive tactics of Koevoet saved the implementation process in early April. Critics argue, however, that Koevoet members are incapable of performing routine police duties. They fear continuing intimidation as the election campaign heats up, particularly in the north. A related problem in the north is the use of "casspirs" by the police forces. Casspirs are heavily-armed troop carriers with side holes for automatic rifles that until recently had two .50 calibre Browning machine guns mounted on top. Security forces maintain that casspirs are needed because of mines left from the war and the possibility of renewed combat with returning SWAPO fighters. However, the UNTAG police say there has not been a mine explosion since their arrival. There is certainly no valid explanation for the use of casspirs at political events, where their presence creates a siege atmosphere.

B. The Fears of Tribal Leaders

Tribal leaders, who have worked with the South African regime in administering the regional governments and in opposing SWAPO, are fearful that their lives and property are endangered by the thousands of SWAPO supporters returning to Namibia. Led by Chief Gabriel Kautima, 11 headmen from the northern regions have petitioned the Windhoek Supreme Court for protection.

The tribal leaders also have expressed the concern that not all SWAPO soldiers have returned to their bases in Angola north of the 15th parallel, and that those remaining outside these bases will infiltrate Namibia to intimidate the local population into voting for SWAPO in the November elections. They maintain that SWAPO fighters will disguise themselves as refugees and cross the border into Namibia to collect arms that they allege have been buried in various weapon caches by SWAPO insurgents since April 1, 1989.
Chief Kautima's house is riddled with bullet holes and he claims to have been physically attacked seven times by SWAPO partisans. The chief believes that the refugee reception center, which is located close to his land, will be converted into a SWAPO military base once all of the returnees are resettled. He did, however, note that in several respects conditions have improved since the end of the war.

In their petition to the Supreme Court, the chiefs demand that the Council of Churches and other organizations associated with SWAPO, be prohibited from participating in the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. They also seek SWAPO's exclusion from the elections. On May 29, the chiefs obtained a court order, which stipulated that the Commissioner of Police must "make the necessary arrangements to protect the lives and property of the headmen" and that "the Commissioner may avail himself of auxiliary support at his disposal...should his available resources prove inadequate." At a government press conference, the AG spokesperson indicated that former Koevoet might be used to provide "auxiliary support" alongside the regular police reservists.

The headmen and chiefs have legitimate concerns about possible retaliation from the returnees. Like all Namibians, they are entitled to normal police protection, but the use of former Koevoet members is likely to increase tension and violence.

C. SWAPO Detainees

SWAPO has acknowledged that during the war Namibians accused of spying for South Africa were arrested and detained in camps in Angola and Zambia. Access to the detainees was denied to the International Committee for the Red Cross and only recently, for purposes of refugee repatriation, has access been granted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Acting in what it called a spirit of reconciliation, SWAPO released 204 detainees in early June. Some of those released accused SWAPO of murder and prolonged torture. They also maintained that hundreds more remain in detention. These matters should be subject to a complete investigation and appropriate action, consistent with relevant human right norms, should be considered to deal with this problem.

D. Student Boycotts

Students constitute one-third of the population in Ovambo. As a consequence of living in a war zone, many of these students are highly political and schools have been used to mobilize their protest movements. Teachers accused of using classrooms for political discourse have been suspended, dismissed or detained. Such actions often provoke teacher strikes.
To demonstrate against continued Koevoet presence in the north, the Namibian National Students Organization (NANSO) organized a boycott of classes on April 11. In Ovambo, nearly the entire student population of 189,000 was participating by early June. The boycott was supported with strikes by the Namibian National Teachers Union (NANTU) and the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). The protests were terminated on June 20 without a resolution of the Koevoet issue; they were then renewed in early July (see Appendix 6).

Students and teachers who do not want to join the protest movement are also victims of intimidation. They are often pressured to participate against their will and steps should be taken to protect their rights.

E. Returnees

During the 23 years of guerrilla war, thousands of Namibians left their homes to live in exile. Most lived in refugee camps in neighboring Angola and Zambia. They were supported by the refugee programs of the UN and other countries. This aid was terminated on April 1, at which time the repatriation process was scheduled to begin under the direction of Nirdas Bwakira, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, the return of refugees was stalled by the inability of the Administrator General to satisfy the UN Special Representative's concerns with regard to amnesty legislation and the repeal of the discriminatory laws.

On June 6, more than two months after the implementation began, Proclamations 13 (on amnesty) and 14 (on anti-discriminatory laws) were signed by the state president of South Africa. These proclamations were envisioned as an integral part of Resolution 435 (see Appendix 7).

The Amnesty Law provides that no criminal proceeding can be instituted against an exile if he or she returns to Namibia through designated entry points. However, there is no provision in the law relating to amnesty for detainees inside South Africa, for prisoners currently in Namibia or for exiles who return to Namibia after the existing entry points and reception centers have been closed. Although this is a serious omission, the Administrator General (AG) could exercise his authority and broaden the amnesty laws.

Proclamation 14 provides for the repeal of discriminatory laws, including many "native ordinances" dating back to 1917 and the more recent security laws. Among the security laws are provisions that impose conscription of Namibians into the South African Army and that permit the South African president to end court proceedings against members of the security forces.
Proclamation 14 also contains a provision that allows those "interested in the elections" to request the repeal of other discriminatory laws. The AG may act upon such requests if he considers that the laws could jeopardize free and fair elections. However, as defined by the proclamation, those having an "interest in the elections" are limited to government and municipal officials. Political parties and civic groups are excluded from this process.

One significant law that was not amended or repealed is AG 8, which provides for the ethnically based, regional governments. These local governments form the basis of apartheid in the territory. The failure to repeal AG 8 has been condemned by both major political parties -- DTA and SWAPO -- as well as by Namibian and international human rights groups.

Forty-one thousand refugees were registered with the UNHCR and began their repatriation once the laws described above were promulgated. SWAPO estimates that there are as many as 80,000 refugees, although within the first two months approximately 35,000 had returned.

The Council of Churches in Namibia is a partner with the UNHCR in the repatriation process. Returnees are initially processed for no longer than a five-day period at one of the main reception centers. If they have difficulty in locating family members, they are moved to secondary centers operated by Namibian churches. The objective is to integrate the returning exiles quickly into society so that they can participate in the election process. However, returnees at the Dobra Center outside Windhoek refused to resettle in the north because of fear of intimidation by the security forces.

F. O'Linn Commission

The independent Commission for the Prevention and Combating of Intimidation and Election Malpractices was established by the Administrator General (AG) to investigate and redress acts of intimidation related to the conduct of the elections. The Commission, composed of four members appointed by the AG, is chaired by Bryan O'Linn, an attorney and former chairman of the Namibian Peace Plan and Contact Group. O'Linn is a long-time civil rights activist, with a reputation for impartiality and integrity. The other Commission members are Danie van Vuuren, a retired civil servant and a former secretary in a regional government; Reverend Lapindja Tukendjela Nghole from Ovambo; and Elton Hoff, a former regional magistrate of the southern region.

While some have questioned the Commission's independence, representatives of the DTA, SWAPO, UNTAG, the Council of Churches and the Legal Aid office all viewed the creation of the Commission as a positive step. They expect that it will play an important role in promoting free and fair elections. At the
very least, the decision to create the Commission indicated the South African government's recognition that the intimidation factor could affect the entire electoral process.

The Commission, which has subpoena powers, is authorized to hold hearings and to investigate complaints of intimidation. In addition, it may: recommend legislation to the AG; order persons found guilty of intimidation to cease such actions and their removal from government or party positions. If the Commission finds that the media has published false or misleading information, it may order the publication to print "the true and correct facts in a conspicuous place." Decisions by the Commission are binding and persons failing to comply can be fined a maximum of 5,000 Rand or sentenced to to prison for a term not exceeding two years, or both. The AG, however, retains the authority to reverse Commission decisions on appeal.

In defining acts of intimidation, the law is broad and comprehensive. It covers electoral fraud, corruption, bribery, misinformation and physical danger from the period beginning with the voter registration process through the campaign and final vote count. The law applies to individuals, political parties, the press, government officials, civic organizations and security personnel.

The creation of the Commission is clearly a positive development, particularly since UNTAG has been unable to redress problems of intimidation. In the past, the AG has been skeptical of the reports of intimidation by Koevoet and government officials, even when those reports are offered by UNTAG personnel. Under O'Linn's leadership, the Commission may have sufficient political weight to force corrective action by the AG.
V. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Resolution 435 guarantees every Namibian the right to vote by secret ballot in a free and fair election. To meet this goal, the AG and his electoral staff are proposing a centralized election system, which they feel is necessary to satisfy the SR because it provides more control. However, this system is complex and cumbersome, and has raised fears that the process administered by South African appointees may be manipulated.

The following is a description of the plan as it is currently formulated. The registration of voters has begun, but the electoral code has yet to be promulgated.

A. Voter Registration

The registration of voters began on July 3, 1989 and ends September 15. Persons are eligible to register if they are 18 years of age or older at the time of registration, are born in Namibia or a resident of Namibia for at least four years or the natural child of a person born in Namibia. The government estimates that there are potentially 685,000 eligible voters in Namibia (see Appendix 8). After two months of registration 95% of the eligible voters had registered.

Registration, like all other aspects of the electoral process, is administered by the AG, who has designated A.G. Visser as the Chief Registration Officer. Twenty-three District Supervisors will oversee the registration drive. Altogether, 720 individuals will be involved in the registration process. The senior personnel are civil servants, with at least eight years in "white collar" positions. To monitor this process the UN has a three-member team - a monitor, an interpreter, and a police escort - at every registration location.

There are 36 permanent registration sites, 35 temporary sites and 104 mobile units. Each mobile unit has a four-member team accompanied by a police escort. Each team is in the field for a period of one to three weeks, with district registration officers conducting site-inspection in some areas by helicopter (see Appendix 9).

A draft proclamation on voter registration appeared in the Official Gazette on April 24, 1989. The AG received comments from 70 individuals, political parties, religious groups and human rights organizations between April 24 and May 28. During negotiations between the AG and the UN Special Representative, these comments were considered and several changes were made in the registration law. The final proclamation was signed by South African President P.W. Botha on June 30.

Under the final law, a person may register at any registration center in Namibia. At the place of registration, an applicant establishes his or her identity by presenting an -27-
official identity card or introducing a sworn statement of identification by a "reliable" individual or showing other proof such as a birth certificate, land deed, or employment identification card. The applicant completes an application form, swears to its contents, and signs it or affixes a fingerprint (see Appendix 10). A registration officer may refuse to register an applicant if his or her qualifications are in doubt. The officer must record the refusal on the application form and return it to the applicant. The applicant has the right to appeal within 21 days.

After the application form is received, the registration officer completes a registration card in duplicate. The card is then signed or fingerprinted; the original is given to the registrant and the duplicate is sent to the chief registration officer (Appendix 11).

A list of all the registrants was to be published weekly in the Official Gazette. The forms are available for public inspection for 21 days and any registered voter may object to a name in the registry within that time period. However, the procedures for objections are so onerous that they seem designed to discourage objections. Moreover, since only registered voters are permitted to file an objection, UNTAG officials and other interested parties are excluded from the process.

Most of the procedures in the voter registration law are identical to the 1978 registration law, and leave room for potential abuse. One provision, for example, gives the AG the power to alter the period of registration for certain districts or for the entire territory. This leaves open the possibility that the AG could shorten or lengthen the registration period for certain districts to benefit a particular party.

Another potential problem with the registration law is the provision allowing a person to register anywhere in the country. A prospective voter can therefore register multiple times with relative ease. The only safeguard to prevent multiple voting on election day is the application of a chemical to the hand of the voter.

Registration officials have the discretion to "enter upon any land on which there is or is suspected to be any person who is qualified for registration..." This provision provides the registration officials wide latitude in their decisions to enter some lands and not others. There should be a uniform procedure to ensure fairness.

As a result of the comments received after the draft registration laws were published, various aspects of the law were changed and new sections were added. While some changes and additions were inconsequential, others should contribute to a free and fair process. For example, the law now specifies
that a list of officials appointed for the registration of voters be published in the Official Gazette. The weekly publication of registered voters was another important change in the registration law as was the more liberal qualification requirements for those returning under the amnesty proclamation.

Newspaper advertisements have appeared in South Africa encouraging those who were born in Namibia or have parents who were born there to return to register and vote. This could account for another 40,000 to 100,000 additional voters.

One serious controversy that has developed over the registration law is the status of Angolan refugees in Namibia who are qualified to register and vote. According to the District Registration Supervisor, there are approximately 40,000 Angolans living in Kavango in the north. Unlike the South African military forces, there is no requirement for these refugees to certify their intention to maintain permanent residency in Namibia.

B. Legal and Administrative Framework for Elections

Since the initial NDI mission to Namibia, the Administrator General (AG) has proposed an election code for the November elections. On July 21, the draft election code was published for comment in the Official Gazette. Although it is largely based on the 1978 law, NDI delegation was struck by the lack of information about the process among the political parties, the press and the UN.

The AG has announced that there will be 72 seats in the Constituent Assembly. One reason for proposing this number is its divisibility by three (Resolution 435 mandates a two-third's majority for approval of the constitution by the Assembly). The threshold for gaining representation is established by dividing the number of votes by 72; therefore, a party must garner 1.38 percent of the vote to secure a seat in the assembly.

The AG has indicated that he will designate A.G. Visser, already serving as chief registration officer, as chief electoral officer. Visser will be responsible for the overall administration of the elections. He will appoint the electoral officers for each district, who will in turn appoint presiding officers and polling officers for each polling station. UNTAG will have 800 civilian election monitors to observe the voting and counting processes.

To register, a political party must submit to the chief electoral officer the party name, abbreviation, symbol and constitution. It must also provide the names and addresses of 2,000 party members who are registered voters and a receipt for
deposit of 10,000 rand in the Central Revenue Fund. A judge may refuse to accept a party's symbol if it portrays a military image or resembles the symbol of another registered party. A list of the parties that meet the requirements will be published in the Official Gazette and will appear in alphabetical order on the ballot (see Appendix 12). Parties were able to appoint observers inside the polling station in 1978. The AG, however, is strongly objected to such observers this year, arguing that their presence could be intimidating and only allows access by party agents at the opening and closing of the balloting process.

Because of Namibia's size and the dispersion of the population, the elections will take place over a period of four or five consecutive days. It is anticipated that there will be at least 400 polling stations designated by the Chief Electoral Officer. Each resident will be no further than 30 kilometers from a polling station and there will be no voting by mail. Many of the polling stations will be located at the registration centers (see Appendix 9), but the majority will be mobile.

On election days, a voter may present himself or herself at any polling station. Upon arrival, the voter must produce his or her registration card to the presiding officer. The voter then signs or fingerprints the card, which is retained by the presiding officer.

The voter is given a ballot and a numbered envelope. On the voter's registration card is recorded the numbers on the envelope and on the ballot box in which the ballot is to be placed. The voter proceeds to a voting booth (a four-cornered white cloth tent) and marks the ballot. The ballot is placed in the envelope and deposited in the ballot box.

After voting, the voter's fingers are marked with a chemical that will not dissolve for seven days and only shows under an ultra-violet light. Every polling station will be equipped with an ultra-violet light and each voter will be checked before he or she votes.

The polls open and close at the time scheduled by the election officers. At the close of each day, the presiding officer and the UNTAG monitor affix their seals to the opening of the ballot box in a manner that will prevent tampering during the night. In the morning, the seal is broken by the presiding officer in the presence of UNTAG and other authorized personnel.

When voting is completed on the fourth or fifth day, the number of ballots that were issued and the number of registration cards that were received are recorded on a tally sheet, which is signed by the election officials and UNTAG monitor. The tally sheet is placed in the sealed ballot box and
the voter registration cards are filed in a separate locked box. The boxes are sent to the district election offices, where each numbered box is checked in. All boxes are then transported to the Showgrounds in Windhoek.

After all the ballot boxes have been received, the Chief Electoral Officer begins to verify identification cards and count ballots in the presence of UNTAG, political party representatives and other designated officials. Based on the 1978 experience, this complicated process is expected to take a minimum of two to four weeks.

The Chief Electoral Officer first checks the seals on the ballot boxes to ensure they are not broken. He then opens the boxes, and compares the number of envelopes and registration cards. The ballot boxes are then locked in a vault at the Showgrounds.

Prior to the actual counting, all registration cards are checked to determine whether a voter used multiple cards and whether the voter presenting the card to the polling officials was in fact the person whose name was on the card. In making the latter determination, the electoral official examine the signature or fingerprint on the card and compares it to the signature or fingerprint on the duplicate card on file, relying on the opinions of 40 handwriting and fingerprint experts.

When cards do not compare, Visser and an UNTAG monitor must agree to invalidate the vote. The numbered envelope containing the ballot is retrieved from the ballot box and burned.

After this process is completed, the actual counting begins. The ballots are removed from the envelopes; before they are unfolded, ballots from different boxes are mixed together to ensure that the vote of a particular individual and the votes from a particular ballot box cannot be determined.

Challenges by party agents to ballot counting are referred to reference boards established by the AG. These boards are comprised of judicial officers and advocates who have practiced law for at least ten years. Decisions by the reference boards are final.

The AG is responsible for announcing the official results, including the number of representatives each party can designate for the National Assembly. The election paraphernalia is then sealed and delivered to the registrar of the Supreme Court in Namibia, where it is kept for a period of at least six months in bundles of one hundred.

There are many problems in the design of these electoral
procedures. The most striking is the counting process, which will require two to six weeks before the results are announced. This highly centralized and controlled process lends itself to administrative breakdowns that can result in the disruption of the election and perceptions of manipulation. In short, the entire process should demonstrate greater trust in the voter, the competing political parties and the U.N. monitors. The first count of ballots should take place at District Offices within 24 hours after the polls close. Specific matters of concern include the reliance on mobile units rather than stationary polling stations. The plans for manpower also appear inadequate, and the verification procedure for a voter's identity is cumbersome and should occur at the polling station. Political parties should be given official observer status at every stage of the voting and counting process.
VI. CONCLUSION

UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari faces a difficult task in this electoral process. On the one hand, he is obliged to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free and fair manner, and that the other provisions included in the various U.N. resolutions and working papers are respected by the parties. On the other hand, he is under pressure to ensure that the process leads to a denouement, thus making less credible his authority to denounce the process if he is dissatisfied with the measures taken by the Administrator General. Given these competing pressures, and others of a more bureaucratic nature, it may be difficult for Ahtisaari to criticize publicly the AG and the other parties participating in the process.

Ahtisaari's task is complicated by the suspicions of the major protagonists. South Africa suspects that the U.N. desires a SWAPO victory in the elections, given the longstanding contacts between UN bureaucrats and SWAPO officials. SWAPO, meanwhile, fears that the UN will bend over backwards to demonstrate its impartiality, and that this will permit the South Africans to develop and implement an election system that will not reflect the true level of SWAPO support in Namibia.

The seriousness of the intimidation problem requires concrete action by UNTAG. While pressure on the South African government to disband the Koevoet forces is necessary, intimidation undoubtedly will continue even if these forces are removed. The presence of the UNTAG forces throughout the country, though, should contribute to a more peaceful election environment.

UNTAG police and election monitors are authorized to receive complaints from party activists and ordinary citizens and to recommend investigations, although they lack the authority to make arrests and institute legal proceedings. Because of their status as international civil servants, UNTAG monitors should have no problem maintaining contact with the local authorities, they should use their "good offices" to help resolve problems that arise. UNTAG also can play a role in the civic education campaign, focusing particular attention on the significance of a secret ballot as a means for combating pressure to vote for a particular party.

Despite the extensive UN role in monitoring the process, nongovernmental organizations also have a role. These organizations should continue to review the activities of the UN and the AG, and to urge a more activist role when necessary. There is also experiences that nongovernmental organizations can share in helping develop an administratively efficient election system. Nongovernmental organizations can assist in educating Namibian voters regarding the electoral process and on the importance of instituting and maintaining a democratic system of government. However, with 60 percent of the
population unable to read, there are real limits on the ability to develop effective civic education programs.

Those monitoring the process should not be surprised that there is a high level of suspicion and fear among the populace. This poses particular challenges to the outside observer intent on objectively evaluating the extent of intimidation and its potential consequences in the elections.

Finally, there is the question of broader international interest in the Namibian election process. Is the election viewed as merely a vehicle for achieving Namibian independence? Or is the goal to help Namibia develop a democratic system of government, where meaningful elections are held periodically and where human and political rights are respected? Based on our observations, we are convinced that Namibians seek the establishment of an independent and democratic state. While the importance of independence should not be minimized, the delegation firmly believes that a successful transition process requires more than just a free and fair election in November. A pluralistic society as envisioned in Resolution 435 is the only means by which the aspirations of the Namibian people can be realized. The international community should do all it can to assist this effort.
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Botswana

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Chairman, Department of Political and Administration Studies
University of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe

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Attorney
Rapporteur

conducting nonpartisan international programs to help maintain and strengthen democratic institutions
MEMBERS OF DELEGATION
Study of Campaign Environment in Namibia
July 1989

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United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

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Leon Tempelsman and Son, Inc.
New York, New York

Father Robert Brooks
Congressional and Diplomatic Representative
Bishop Edmond L. Browning, North America Episcopal Church
Washington, D.C.

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Assistant to Executive Director
African-American Labor Center, AFL-CIO
Washington, D.C.

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Vice President
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conducting nonpartisan international programs to help maintain and strengthen democratic institutions
Appendix 1

GROUP I
NDI REPORT
TRIP TO KAVANGO DISTRICT NAMIBIA

Kavango lies in the north eastern zone of the territory and south of the Angola border. With a population of 110,000 or 9.3%, it has the second largest population in the Ovambo region with 587,000 or 49.7%. The residents speak Kwanyama, the principal Ovambo language.

We were met at the airport by Father Wirth of the Roman Catholic Church who was kind enough to be our guide throughout our stay in Rundu. Meetings were held with representatives of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), South West Africa People's Association (SWAPO) and the Kavango administration on the 1st June, 1989. The meetings although short in duration provided us with a better understanding of the problems facing the people in the north of Namibia.

MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF SWAPO

This meeting was attended by four persons all of whom were under the age of 30 years and included two members of the Namibian Teachers Union. There were wide ranging discussions over the future of Namibia. The major concern related to the attitude of South Africa to Namibia. There were doubts about the sincerity of South Africa in its plans for holding elections in November.

The view has been expressed that the "Koevoets", the name given to the para-military forces which were disbanded, have been intimidating the people of Kavango. The general feeling has been one of suspicion in that since these disbanded forces are still being paid salaries by the South African authorities, the only change in their status is the removal of the uniform.

Another major concern was the treatment of teachers as a result of reports made by these Koevoets. The report of seven Teachers being involved in party politics on the school premises has been denied by the representatives. They consider these charges as acts of intimidation and cited an instance in which a member was delayed on route to a meeting 70 kilometers from Rundu. While admitting that the Teachers Union is sympathetic with the struggles of SWAPO, members are fully aware of the rules governing public officers and their association with political parties.
The representatives also expressed concern over the failure of the Police to act on reports of intimidation made by members of SWAPO. The view was also expressed that UNTAG seems to be impotent in this area.

Much discussion centered on the registration of electors. The view was expressed that Mr. Visser, the Chief Registration Officer should not have been appointed to such a position since he is a creature of the South African Government. The registration officers are also employees of the Administrator General and obviously there will be some element of bias in their actions.

Concern was also expressed at the possible registration of those Angolans in Namibia since a very high percentage of those persons will lend support to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The registration qualifications of four years seem to be designed to accommodate a certain group in Namibia.

In outlining the proposals being considered for the counting of votes, the representatives expressed concern over the infelicities most likely to occur in making the results of an election known three weeks after the poll.

In general the representatives are convinced that South Africa is doing everything possible to deny the people of Namibia their rights by trying to keep SWAPO out of the election which it is expected to win with a 80% vote.

MEETING WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE KAVANGO ADMINISTRATION

The Registration Officer of this area indicated that he anticipated some problems in conducting the registration programme since many of the potential voters reside far from the main highways. When questioned as to his method of communication with these persons, he indicated that he would be using headmen as well as radio announcements to give notification of the locations of the teams.

The assurance was given that he would commence the programme with eleven mobile teams to cover Kavambo and Western Caprivi. It was also proposed that weekly visits by helicopter would be made during the programme.

It has been estimated that there would be approximately 104,000 voters to be processed. Although much difficulty has been anticipated in the course of the programme, there is every good reason to believe that the registration process would be completed within the specified time.
We have been made to understand that the training sessions for the Registration Officers would commence in Windhoek on Wednesday the 7th June, 1989. We were however disappointed to learn that the Registration Officers were not provided with the draft registration bill and therefore were not in any position to discuss the process of registration including the matter of objections.

MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF UNTAG

Our discussion with UNTAG's representative centered on the arrangements for the registration of electors. The representative indicated that they had not yet seen the draft proclamation and therefore were not in a position to express their views.

On the subject of intimidation, the general opinion formed seemed to be that UNTAG was powerless in dealing with this matter.

In general the atmosphere of the meeting seemed to be one of caution and in my view something seemed to be lacking.

MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLE ALLIANCE (DTA)

The representatives at the meeting although not familiar with the electoral process, expressed confidence that the elections would be conducted in a manner satisfactory to all.

Like most persons we contacted, they only heard about the proclamation on the draft registration of voters law and as such did not submit any comments.

On the matter of intimidation the representatives hold the firm view that much of the problems have been caused by the supporters of SWAPO. The recent problem with the Teachers is a case in point. It has generally been felt that the Teachers Union is a front for SWAPO and has been instrumental in causing disturbances in the schools.

On the matter of the election campaign, it was stated that four of the five tribes are committed to the DTA. The estimated expenditures for the campaign would be approximately 500,000 Rands. The representative expressed confidence that the DTA would win between 55 - 75% of the votes.
When asked about their position on the proposal to permit the agents of political parties in the polling stations, the representative informed us that such an arrangement would lead to intimidation and may prevent many persons from attending the polling stations. The view was further expressed that the language barrier which most of UNTAG's officials would encounter, together with the use if signals by the agents would not contribute to free and fair elections.

Dennis A. Smith
Chief Electoral Officer
Barbados
GROUP II
NDI REPORT

TRIP TO GOBABIS, GIBEON, AND NAMALAND

Our initial visit was to a farm about 100 kilometers north of Gobabis. The farmer was a DTA member and a DTA rally had been held on his farm. He told us, nevertheless, that he would permit other parties to address the workers on his farm. His attitude was very positive about things that were going on in the country. He was concerned about several things. First, he wanted to make sure that all the weapons held by former commandos had been returned to the proper authorities. He was also concerned that the National Teachers Union might be involved in some type of intimidation. He thought that it was important that voter education be carried out.

He thought that if parties were allowed in the voting places themselves that it would intimidate voters.

We then traveled to Gobabis where we spoke to a United Nations representative. She informed us that a type of apartheid still existed in the town because restaurants still discriminated against blacks. She also indicated that rumors were widespread about political intimidation of voters by threatening to abduct their children and the feeling that ballots were not going to be secret in fact. She expressed some concern that some farmers would not allow political parties access to their farms.

A government official we talked to did not believe that intimidation was a big problem and indicated that the citizens would live with the outcome no matter what. Frankly, however, he did not seem terribly concerned about the whole issue. And our group was somewhat surprised.

We talked to a prominent local businessman, who was also quite positive about the election. He did indicate, however, that citizens were concerned about intimidation and that they were uncertain about the role of UNTAG, but that they were getting used to it. He did not believe that there were any bitter divisions among his 80 or so workers concerning politics. He also counted it as a good sign that very few whites had given any indication that they wanted to leave the country, thus demonstrating their commitment to Namibia long term. He did that UNTAG should be more involved in the electoral process since it has the ability to diffuse tensions.

We also talked to an older white couple who were farmers in the area. They were concerned that returning refugees, who had been promised additional land, would forcibly enter their property and take it over. They nevertheless seemed resigned to whatever the outcome of the election might be and clearly
had a love of their country.

That evening we spent the night at Anton von Wietersheim's farm and had dinner with several teachers at his school. These individuals, most of whom probably had a ninth or tenth grade education, were quite concerned about the upcoming election and what it would mean for them. They were uncertain as to what "independence" would actually bring in terms of changing their personal lives. It was clear that even these (for Namibian purposes) highly educated individuals face the future with a sense of anxiety. Nevertheless, we also believe that they also face it with a sense of optimism.

The next day we traveled to Gibeon and Namaland. There we spoke with a gentleman who was the founder of a prominent school, was the traditional chief of the ethnic group called Namas and was also a vice president of SWAPO. We found him to be highly intelligent, articulate, and committed. He also believed that UNTAG should be more involved in the electoral process and suggested an increase in the number of monitors on a day-to-day basis. He also thought that UNTAG should assert some control over the media which he felt was biased against SWAPO. He had no confidence in the government's ability to fairly administer the elections and believed that UNTAG should also be closely involved in the registration process and should also make appointments with local farmers to make sure that political parties could enter farmland for the purpose of talking with workers. He did not like the idea of centralized counting of the ballots as proposed by the Administrator General, but he did believe it was important to go ahead with the elections. He also was concerned that some of the former commandos still had weapons and might use them for purposes of intimidation or otherwise.

Later, we visited the local UNTAG office and talked with a number of UNTAG officials. They indicated to us that they were winning the confidence of the people in the area, but that subtle intimidation of the voters was present. They believed that additional police monitors were needed and they were also somewhat uncertain about exactly what their role was with respect to investigations of intimidation. They felt that the South West African Police Force (SWAPOL) was a weak link in the investigative process and that it should be held to a strict timetable for conducting investigations. They indicated that they would be going on farms with the government officials to explain the registration process to farmers. They also stated that police should be kept away from polls for fear of intimidating voters. They suggested the possibility of using sample ballots when they travel as part of a voter education program.

We also visited a church elder in the area who was the
principal of the same school we had originally visited. He informed us that police were talking to citizens asking whom they supported politically. He felt that this was improper. He also believed that some students were wrongfully expelled from school for their political beliefs. He said that he did not understand UNTAG's role in the election process and did not fully trust UNTAG. He certainly did not trust the police. In his opinion, the government-controlled radio broadcasts were clearly biased and he believed that something should be done about that.

All in all, we were left with the impression during our two-day visit to the eastern and southern parts of the country that there were great concerns and anxieties about the upcoming election, but that the country would somehow survive the elections and go forward. In these sparsely populated areas, there did not seem to be overwhelming concern about potential violence, although that certainly that was a fear only slightly below the surface.

Frederic J. Cowan
Attorney General
Commonwealth of Kentucky
GROUP III

NDI REPORT

TRIP TO THE OVAMBO REGION

Introduction: Ovambo

The Ovambo region in northern Namibia borders Angola. It is the most densely populated area of the country, with approximately half of the nation's population. There are seven principal tribes, which have closely related customs and languages. There are two major towns, Oshikati and Ondangwa, perhaps a dozen lesser villages, and countless clusters of traditional huts, generally surrounded by fields for corn, sorghum, and small grazing herds.

I. INTIMIDATION

Intimidation is by far the most important problem in the North of Ovamboland. We reached several subsidiary conclusions. The definition, interpretation and application of the term "intimidation" is quite vague in the minds of everyone. SWAPO officials tend to use an excessively narrow definition that will not include assaults on individuals wearing SWAPO or DTA "colors" unless the assault includes some words by the assailant tending to demonstrate specific intent to coerce a change in political behavior or belief. The statute does not require words; this is a matter of police and prosecutable policy. Having concluded that the assault is not to be classified as political intimidation, the only thing left will be the relatively minor assault or destruction of property offense, which SWAPO considers undesired of significant investigatory or prosecutable resources. In contrast, SWAPO and DTA supporters view all forms of verbal or physical harassment as intimidation if, under all circumstances, the action seems motivated by political disagreement. This more realistic definition of intimidation reflects the reality: attacks and insults designed to persuade or coerce.

The definition is complex in another respect. At the time of our trip, Ovambo was in the grip of a student boycott of classes mounted primarily to protest the continued presence of the Koevoet forces. In the minds of some, the boycott, or "strike", has included significant coercion of those who either oppose SWAPO or simply want to go to classes. We accept the fact that some students and teachers feel the strike to be a form of political intimidation -- in that their coerced participation in the strike is a form of coerced political expression. The continuation of the strike affects the possibility of creating an atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections.
We found that both SWAPO and DTA supporters have been victims of political intimidation in recent weeks. There are widely conflicting reports on the number, direction and trend in incidents of intimidation, even among official reports. While UNTAG sees signs that intimidation is declining because the substantial proportion committed by SADF members has declined as those forces have been confined to bases and withdrawn southward. On the other hand, leaders in both parties agree with human rights workers that intimidation is increasing. Moreover, reporting is seriously deficient. Many SWAPO supporters report incidents to UNTAG rather than SWAPOL, especially when the alleged is a policeman. On the other hand, DTA supporters often only contact SWAPOL. While UNTAG shares its information with SWAPOL, the reverse is not often the case. At this time UNTAG has an indomitable incomplete sense of the magnitude of intimidation against SWAPO supporters, and an even less accurate sense of the intimidation against DTA members. This inadequate official assessment of the problem -- apart from general agreement that it is a large problem which threatens free and fair elections -- it is an important obstacle to generating effective responses from the UNTAG and AG bureaucracies.

Many incidents of intimidation take place off of the main roads, in the bush. UNTAG does not generally travel in these areas because SWAPOL has warned them that those back roads are dangerous without Casspirs or other mine-resistant vehicles. The presence of UNTAG does, we found, deter intimidation. This deterrent effect is sadly limited by the number and deployment of police monitors. There is every indication that this is a ploy by SWAPOL to undercut the effectiveness of UNTAG's monitoring role. The local population, church workers, human rights workers, and many international visitors use these back roads constantly, on foot and in vehicles.

While we have no reliable count of incidents (under any definition), it is beyond fair-minded dispute that former members of Koevoet are responsible for most of the incidents and for the general atmosphere of psychological intimidation directed against SWAPO supporters. Local SWAPOL admit to some 1200 former Koevoet members who have, they claim, been discharged by the unit, retrained as police and "assimilated" into the normal police functions of SWAPOL. The reality, however, is that Koevoet units remain largely intact within SWAPOL, often under the guise of "riot police". They have not received any effective training, as evidenced by their lack of familiarity with basic police procedures such as powers of arrest or procedures to follow at the scene of a traffic accident. UNTAG police monitors from around the world view the Koevoet as totally unprofessional.
Koevoet were and remain indoctrinated as military forces eager to use military methods to combat SWAPO fighters and supporters. The post-implementation realities have, we found, caused only limited change in the thinking of typical Koevoet members. They are poorly supervised, and even the most well meaning officers are not in complete control of their men.

The presence and actions of Koevoet are a major source of intimidation. General police practices, however contribute to an atmosphere of psychological intimidation directly related to political expression and belief. The best example of this is the widespread use of Casspirs in ordinary police work, including those with large, front-mounted machine guns that cannot possibly be brought within the customary notion of "small arms" to be used by police forces under the governing implementation plans.

A second form of psychological intimidation are certain police practices that can only be described as provocative and purposefully intimidating. For example, we heard of incidents in which SWAPOL Casspirs positioned themselves right on the edge of political rallies, inoffensive formation with machine guns pointed toward the crowds. UNTAG officials and SWAPO supporters are firmly convinced that SWAPOL officials abuse their authority to disperse crowds.

SWAPOL has sufficient resources to investigate incidents of intimidation, but lack the necessary skill and motivation. Even if they completed effective investigations, however, there are insufficient resources in the prosecutor's office and the court system to process cases swiftly, making deterrence problematic.

There are no full-time advocates in Ovambo, and the part-time and paralegal assistance now available creates an appalling limited capacity for victims of political intimidation to assert their legal and human rights. This great shortfall in legal resources will worsen as the registration process, with challenges and appeals, gets underway.

Even though there is widespread intimidation, the fact remains that these incidents represent far less of a threat to personal security than the oppressive and warlike conditions of the long years before implementation of 435. To that extent, we can simultaneously say that life has improved in Ovambo, yet there is a strong likelihood that, absent effective action by the AG and UNTAG, escalating intimidation will jeopardize free and fair elections.
II. UNTAG

UNTAG's presence, both in general and in particular settings, engenders confidence, trust and hope. The breadth of this sentiment is, in turn, the greatest reason for hope we have found. It is a crucial starting point for creating a positive atmosphere for democratic change.

This positive general view is coupled, however, with a widespread concern that UNTAG is not present in sufficient numbers to provide that confidence and security on an ongoing basis.

UNTAG's effectiveness in the crucial areas of police monitoring and public information is severely limited by resources. While Windhoek management believes that monitors accompany most SWAPOL patrols, the reality on the ground is that there are far too few monitors and far too few UNTAG vehicles for the job. The planned increase in monitors will not completely close lack of numbers. Similarly, civilian UNTAG personnel are far too few to have thus far made significant headway in explaining the electoral process to community leaders. Given the problems of intimidation and perceived biases of government officials, this deficiency poses a significant risk to free and fair elections.

UNTAG's effectiveness is also seriously compromised by the narrow interpretation of its authority under Resolution 435 and supporting documents. The neat distinction between monitoring and administration makes a little bit of sense around a conference table in New York or even Windhoek; in Oshikango it is almost nonsensical. Without power to investigate or enforce, UNTAG cannot possibly assure free and fair elections given the current disappointing performance of SWAPOL.

Finally, UNTAG's effectiveness has been slow to develop because of very uneven progress at building relationships with community leadership in the tribes, churches and parties. We could discern no strategic plan for outreach and liaison or, indeed, accomplishment of the ultimate goal.

Finally, on a more positive note, we found the receiving centers in a high state of readiness for the returnees. We were troubled by the absence of specific plans to assist several hundred returnees per day with the challenge of finding their families, the assurances by church and tribal leaders were consistent and unequivocal. "The people will look after their children," said one senior headman.
III. THE GOVERNMENT

Officials in the second tier administration have the view that the electoral process, including voter education, is "none of our business".

Their appearance of neutrality is paper thin. The events of April 1st are examples of palpable antagonism towards SWAPO, despite the formal commitment to neutrality. In short, just beneath the surface, second tier officials, like SWAPOL, sound as though they are still in battle with SWAPO.

With respect to the ongoing student strike, administrators believe that a few teachers are behind it and that the demands are illegitimate. While accepting "responsibility" for resolving the strike, the administrators say they do not want to act "too quickly", that they want to "let things slide for awhile", and seem generally suspicious of the "true" motives of the protesters. In general, the administrators were not interested in urgent action, and seemed to have neither specific ideas nor an odd mixture of responsibility and impotence.

The local administration is identified with South Africa by the people, and the administrator's acknowledge this. Individual officials have been subject to intimidation and threats.

With respect to the election process in general, administrators are concerned that intimidation will make a free and fair vote impossible, and that delays in Windhoek will cause the election date to be postponed beyond the rainy season, which neither the government nor UNTAG can afford.

IV. ELECTORAL PROCESS

The people generally knew nothing. Mobile centers are essential.

Delay in counting will generate tremendous frustration and suspicions of corruption.

Most parties and community leaders felt strongly that the presence of UNTAG and party representatives in the polling stations and at the counting site would be important in building confidence in the process.

It is very doubtful that headmen and community leaders will be an effective screen against ghosts and others ineligible on the voter rolls in Ovambo, because the population is so large.
ITINERARY FOR NDI ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION
MAY 29 - JUNE 6 1989

MONDAY, May 29

8:40 pm : Delegation arrives

TUESDAY, May 30

8:00 am - 10:00 am : Delegation Briefing

10:30 am - 1:00 pm : Briefing: Administrator General's Office, Tinten Palace, Conference Room, 2nd Floor

Ambassador Karl von Hirschburg
South African Dept. of Foreign Affairs

11:15 am : A.G. Visser
Chief Registration Officer

2:30 - 5:30 pm : Briefing: UNTAG

Steven Fanning
Commander of UNTAG Police
Prem Chand
Commander of UNTAG military
Cedric Thornberry
Director of the Office of Mr. Ahtisaari
Nicholas Bwakira
UN High Commissioner of Refugees

7:00 pm : Dinner

Speaker: Bryan O’Linn
Chairman, Commission for the Prevention and Combatting of Intimidation and Election Malpractices

Wednesday, May 31

7:30 am : Delegation Briefing

9:00 am : Meeting: Danny Tjomgarero
Deputy National Chairman
SWAPO
Wednesday, May 31 (cont.)

10:45 am : Meeting: DTA
          Dirk Mudge, Andrew Matjila, Katuutire Kaura

1:00 pm  : Lunch
          Speaker: Joshua Hoebbe
          Secretary for Education, SWAPO

3:00 pm  : Briefing I: Action Christian National
          Kosie Pretorius, National Party
          Hans Diergaardt

3:00 pm  : Briefing II: Gert Englebrecht
          Deputy Chief Registrar
          Briefing III: Ottilie Abrahams
          Secretary General and Secretary for
          Information and Publicity
          Vekuil Rukora

4:30 pm  : Briefing: Chief Justus Garoeb
          United Democratic Front

6:00 pm  : Return to Hotel

8:00 pm  : Dinner
          Namibia Peace Plan and Contact Group
          (NPP 435)
          Peter Koep, Chairman

Thursday, June 1

Delegation divided into their Teams
(Itineraries follow)
DELEGATION ITINERARY (cont.)

Saturday, June 3

7:30 am : Delegation Briefing
9:00 am : Briefing: Roger Keyes
          Dean, Anglican Church
11:00 am : Briefing: David Smuts
           Legal Assistance Center
12:30 pm : The Namibian - Gwen Lister
4:30 pm  : SWABC (Television) - P.J. Venter, Chairman
           Antonie van der Smit
7:30 pm  : Dinner
           Host: The Canadian Observer Mission

Sunday, June 4

9:00 am - 12:00 midnight : Delegation Drafting Session

Monday, June 5

9:00 am : Delegation Briefing
12:30 pm : Presentation to UNTAG:
           Martti Ahtisaari, Special Representative, UN
7:30 pm  : Dinner
           Guests:
           Frontline States Diplomatic Mission
           U.S. and Canada Liaison Officers
           NPP (435)

Tuesday, June 6

10:00 am : Meeting:
           Louis Pienaar
           Administrator General
           Peter Roux
           Press Director
3:00 pm  : Bus leaves for airport.
ITINERARY
July 20 - July 24, 1989
Study of Campaign Environment in Namibia

Thursday, July 20

1:00 p.m. : Lunch
2:30 p.m. : Guests: Peter Koep
Chairman, Namibia Peace Plan Study &
Contact Group (NPP 435)
Fanuel Tjinggaete
Economist, Lecturer, University of
Namibia
3:00 - 4:00 pm : Briefing: Des Matthews
President, Chamber of Commerce &
Industries in Namibia
4:15 - 5:15 pm : Briefing: Barnabas Tiju
General Secretary, Metal Allied
Namibia Workers Union (MANWU)
Five colleagues
6:00 - 6:45 : Dinner
8:00 p.m. : NPP Leadership Seminar
NDI and Soviet Delegations
Panel Discussion:
"Prospects for the Independence
Process"
Chairman, Peter Koep

Friday, July 21

8:00 - 9:00 a.m. : Delegation Breakfast & Briefing
9:30 - 11:00 a.m. : Briefing: Cedric Thornberry
Director, Office of Special
Representative UNTAG
11:15 - 12:10 p.m. : Briefing: Raymond Matthews
Chief Liaison Officer, Electoral
Office
12:30 - 2:30 p.m. : Lunch: Frontline-States Ambassadors
Friday, July 21 (cont.)

3:00 - 4:00 p.m. : Briefing: DTA Conference
A. Matjila, Vice Chairman
K. Kaura, Vice President
DTA Headquarters

4:15 - 5:30 p.m. : Briefing: SWAPO
Theo-Ben Gurirab
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Hage Geingob
Election Director

6:00 - 6:30 : Dinner

7:30 p.m. : NPP Symposium
Keynote Speech:
U.S. Representative Donald Payne
Remarks: "Perestroika and Democracy"
Ouzhas Saleimanov
Deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet
Open discussion
Conclusion: Richard Aitken
NPP Executive Board, Lecturer
University of Namibia

Saturday, July 22

7:30 a.m. : Delegation Breakfast and Briefing

8:30 - 9:30 a.m. : Briefing: Bishop Hendrik Frederik
President, Council of Churches in Namibia

10:00 - 11:00 a.m. : Briefing: Dr. Kenneth Abrahams
Secretary for Publicity and
Information, Namibian National Front (NNF)

11:30 - 12:15 p.m. : Briefing: Robert Bentley
Political Officer
U.S. State Department

12:30 - 1:30 p.m. : Luncheon
Guest: Bryan O'Linn
Chairman, Commission for the
Prevention and Combating of
Intimidation and Election Malpractices
Saturday, July 22 (cont.)

2:00 - 3:00 p.m. : "Democracy and Independence: An African Perspective"
Speaker: Dr. Patrick Molutsi
Director, The Democracy Project
University of Botswana
Chairman: Peter Koep

3:00 - 4:30 p.m. : Media Panel: "The Media, Democracy, and Independence"
Julian Marshall
Journalist, BBC African Service
Gwen Lister
Editor, The Namibian
Jean Sutherland
Editor, The Times

5:30 - 7:30 p.m. : Political Panel: "The Responsibilities of Political Power in Democracy"
Helmut Angula, SWAPO
J. de Wet, National Party
Norah Chase, United Democratic Front
K. Kaura, DTA

7:30 p.m. : Post-Symposium Reception

Sunday, July 23

6:30 a.m. : Plane leaves for Ovamboland, Oshakati

9:00 a.m. : Plane met by Olof Erikson
Evangelical Lutheran Church

9:30 - 10:30 a.m. : Briefing: John Rwambuya
Regional Director, UNTAG

11:00 - 12:30 p.m. : Tour: Ongwediva Reception Center
Thomas Andreas

1:00 - 2:30 p.m. : Lunch

2:30 - 4:30 p.m. : Audience with: Simon Kaukunqua
SWAPO's Central Committee
Bishop Kleopas Dumeni
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN)

4:30 p.m. : Plane leaves Oshakati

7:30 p.m. : Farewell Dinner
GROUP I - KAHN, SMITH, KEEFER, BECKER

Thursday, June 1

7:30 am : Plane departs for RUNDU in Kavango
9:00 am : Arrive in Rundu
10:00 am : Meeting: SWAPO
           Mr. Ambrosio Hamutenya
           Legal Assistance Center
           Mr. Simon Maruta
           Justice and Peace Commision
11:00 am : Meeting: UNTAG officials
           Linda Cohen
           Regional Director
           Mohammad Abdul Aziz
2:00 pm  : Meeting: Mr. Carl Botha
           Secretary of Administration
           Ben Baytal
           Election Officer
3:00 pm  : Meeting: DTA Leaders
           Tal Burges and Aloys Gende
3:30 pm  : Meeting: SWAPO
           Esra Kakukuru
           Chairman in Rundo
           Sebastian Kantema
           Secretary of Nantu - Kavango Region
           Samuel Koavoto Mbambo
           National Teacher's Union

Friday, June 2

7:30 am : Plane departs for KHORIXAS, Damaraland
9:30 am  : Arrive Khorixas
10:00 am : Meeting: Mr. Shultz
           District Registration Supervisor
           Chief Ackman
11:00 am : Meeting: DTA Party Leaders
           E.H.L. of SWAPDUF
GROUP I (cont.)

June 2 (cont.)

12:30 pm : Lunch at Rest Camp with Pastor Lebe and Father Patrus of the Catholic Church
2:00 pm : Meeting: Kavango SWAPO Committee
3:15 pm : Meeting: UNTAG Regional Staff
          Anthony Lydon
          Regional Director
5:00 pm : Leave airport in Khorixas for Windhoek

GROUP II - COWAN, SITHOLE, BINGHAM

8:30 am  : Plane departs for GOBABIS
9:30 am  : Farm of Heinrich Meinert in Owingi
10:30 am : Arrive in Gobabis:
            Blandina Negga
            Regional Director, UNTAG
            Koli Kouame, UNTAG
11:00    : Meeting: Members of local DTA
1:00 pm  : Lunch
2:00 pm  : Meeting: Sorel Jacobs
          Magistrate, Gobabis Region
3:00 pm  : Meeting: Johan Smits
          Leading businessman in Gobabis
4:00 pm  : Meeting: UNTAG personnel
4:45 pm  : Depart for Kalkrand
8:00 pm  : Dinner: Erica and Anton von Wietersheim
            Four Teachers, Mariental Region
Overnight: Anton von Wietersheim's Farm
GROUP II (cont.)

Friday, June 2

9:00 am : Leave by plane for GIBEON
10:30 am : Arrive Gibeon
11:00 am : Meeting: Reverend Hendrik Witbooi
            Chief of the Nama's and
            Vice-president, SWAPO
1:00 : Lunch
2:00 pm : Meeting: UNTAG Headquarters
            Mr. Hussein K. Rahim
            Regional Director
            Mr. Geoffrey Mariki
            Head of Gibeon Center
4:00 pm : Mr. J. Issaks
            Elder, Lutheran Church and
            Headmaster, Private School
5:00 pm : Leave Gibeon for Windhoek

GROUP III - GRAHAM, MOKOBI, EDLEY, MOORE

7:30 am : Plane departs for OVAMBOLAND
10:00 am : Met at airport
            Reverend Olof Erikson
            ELCIN, Lutheran Church
11:00 - 12:15 pm : Meeting: UNTAG offices
                    J.G. Rwambuya
                    Regional Director
                    Matti Amadhila
                    Deputy Leader, ELCIN
                    Oluseyi Bajulaive
                    Deputy Head - Oshakati/Ongenga
                    Peter Fitzgerald
                    UNTAG, Civil Police Monitor
                    Patrick Agboba
                    Coordinator--Oshakati
                    Lt. Col. Mislan Saiman
                    Commanding Officer--Malbatt
                    Lt. Col. Farooq Afzal
                    Chief Coordinator Monitor--Oshakati
                    Lt. Col. Yumos Othman
                    Col. Malaysian Monitors--Oshakati
GROUP III (cont.)

June 1 (cont.)

12:30 - 1:30 pm : Briefing: SWAPOL Representatives
                 Brig. Erich Van Molendorff
                 Col. G. Van Tonder

1:45 - 2:45 pm : Lunch
                 Olof Erikson
                 ELCIN
                 Matti I Amadhila
                 ELCIN

4:00 - 6:30 pm : Briefing: Kuganwa Tribe
                 Gabriel Kautwima
                 Omedi/Ohangwena

OVERNIGHT : The Lutheran Church Guest Quarters in ONIIPA

Friday, June 2

7:30 am : Briefing: UNTAG Regional Representatives
          C. Verneulen
          Frank Weber
          Paavo Pitumen
          Head, UNTAG District Center--Ondangwa
          Mpuli Saniula
          Head, Okenkolo District Center

9:00 - 10:00 am : Briefing: SWAPO Representatives
                  Eliaken Shimi
                  SWAPO, Chairman, Ondangwa Branch
                  Johanna Mweshida
                  Teacher

11:00 am - 12:15 pm : Meeting: 2nd Tier Administration Officials
                       A.M. Mundt
                       Acting Secretary of General Services
                       Dennis K. Nandi
                       Secretary of Education

1:00 - 2:00 pm : Lunch: Peter Kauluma
                 Senior Headsman, Ondangwa Tribe

2:30 - 3:00 pm : Meeting: Human Rights Center
                 Foibe Louise Jacob
                 Assistant Director--Oshakati

4:30 pm : Leave Oshakati for Windhoek
Appendix 2

REPORT TO MARTTI AHTISAARI, UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Windhoek, Namibia
June 5, 1989

As citizens of six countries of the community of nations, we are pleased to present this report to you. It is based on our own personal observations in Namibia over the past seven days. It is designed to provide you as objective a view as humanly possible of the election procedures currently in place or being contemplated for Namibia's election this November. In the report, we provide some recommendations which we hope will assist you in achieving the free and fair elections that are the foundation of a democratic society.

Although our visit to Namibia has been short, we believe that our observations and recommendations merit your attention. Each member of our delegation has had significant experience in the election process in our own countries. We found a sense of wonder and awe in the citizens throughout the country; being present at the birth of a nation is a rare and special moment in history, and Namibians are universally excited and eager to carry on with the election process.

On the other hand, we found a number of distressing strains in the national fabric that threaten to rip apart and unravel the entire election process. These strains, if not repaired, could cause a nation with great hopes and expectations to be tragically stillborn.

An atmosphere of distrust permeates the political scene. None of the major political parties trust one another; few trust the Administrator General to adequately and impartially administer the elections; some do not trust the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group.

A startling lack of communication about proposed election laws and procedures is also evident. Key actors in the process seem at times to be communicating only through rumor and innuendo. A sense of participation in the process of developing the laws regulating the election is noticeably missing. Uncertainty about the process is rampant.

Finally, and most seriously, an atmosphere of intimidation seems to hang over the country like a great sword. Charges and counter-charges of intimidation seem to be uppermost on the political parties' agendas. Rumors, as well as actual instances of intimidation, fuel a fire of distrust, suspicion and anxiety. If unchecked, these rumors and instances of intimidation could be disastrous.
We believe that as the United Nations Special Representative, you must move quickly to assert firm supervision and control of the election process as contemplated by Resolution 435. We believe that virtually every citizen of Namibia desires to see the election take place on schedule and is willing to take steps to ensure free and fair elections. Resolute leadership is necessary to secure that goal.

We are honored to be able to participate in this small way in a noble endeavor. We hope that our report will be useful to you, the Administrator General and the citizens of Namibia. Our greatest satisfaction will come from the birth in November of a free, peaceful and democratic nation.

I. INTIMIDATION

The atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and fear easily leads to intimidation of individual voters to such an extent that some feel they may not cast their ballots freely and with confidence that their votes will remain secret. Under paragraph 10 of the Settlement Proposal (S/12636), the Special Representative is directed "to take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter." Immediate steps are essential to carry out that responsibility.

The NDI delegation considered reports and allegations from six different regions of the country it visited, as well as press reports and other information provided by party leaders, community leaders and UNTAG personnel in Windhoek. It is important to note that misconduct was reported or alleged on behalf of at least two of the major political parties.

Some of the allegations and reports included police attendance at political rallies with an unnecessary show of force; individuals threatened with abduction of their children; violence at political rallies; destruction of crops and houses for failure to demonstrate political support; disruption and politicization of the educational process; and concern that all weapons of demobilized commandos may not have been returned to authorities.

In addition, the NDI delegates have a special concern based upon numerous reports and observations in the northern part of the country. Despite the official disbanding of the counter-insurgency police force, Koevoet, the units' "assimilation" into existing forces has clearly not removed the threat citizens feel. The fear of Koevoet looms large in the minds of citizens. In fact, the delegates received reports that Koevoet members have remained as operating units within SWAPOL. No factor contributes more to the atmosphere of intimidation.
Given these widespread allegations and reports, it is not surprising that an atmosphere of intimidation exists that threatens to undermine the guarantee of free and fair elections. We believe the following steps are imperative:

First, remnants of the Koevoet must be removed from SWAPOL immediately. The SR should insist on this, without compromise, in order to discharge his responsibilities under the Settlement Proposal. All necessary steps must be taken to ensure that former Koevoet members, once removed from SWAPOL, do not continue, as civilians, to intimidate and harass those with whom they disagree.

Second, SWAPOL must revise operational procedures to conform with accepted police practices. In particular, the use of casspirs in routine police patrols, and at political rallies, are psychologically intimidating. Moreover, the use of casspirs, especially those with cannon or machine guns, is a violation of the Settlement Proposal: "The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties" [S/12636, para. 9]. SWAPOL should be absolutely impartial. Its officers should not engage in any political activity whatsoever, and in controlling crowds should be scrupulously nonpartisan.

Third, the Commission of Inquiry into Intimidation must be assured sufficient investigatory and other resources. It must complete its investigations expeditiously if it is to enjoy public confidence. The Commission should interpret its mandate broadly to investigate patterns or practices of intimidation, rather than limiting its attention to individual complaints.

Fourth, UNTAG officials must take more decisive action to satisfy themselves that all complaints of intimidation receive prompt, fair and thorough attention from SWAPOL, the Commission on Intimidation, prosecutors and magistrates. UNTAG police monitors should assert and exercise authority to accompany SWAPOL investigations or undertake investigations on its own, referring the results to prosecutors or the Commission on Intimidation, when appropriate. Exercising this authority is essential if the SR is to discharge his responsibilities under paragraph 10 of the Settlement Proposal.

II. MEDIA

The mass media will be indispensable in voter education. Because SWABC is in effect controlled by the government, it has special obligations to be impartial and to educate voters in the mechanics of registration and balloting. Radio is particularly crucial because so many voters are illiterate and population density is so low.
We understand there are as yet no comprehensive plans or principles shaping SWABC's role in this all-important election. We make the following basic recommendations:

First, SWABC should provide an equal amount of time, in comparable time periods, to every registered party.

Second, SWABC should apply the principles of fairness, balance and access in news reporting, commentary, and the sale of advertising time to political parties.

Third, UNTAG should take immediate advantage of the time allotted to it by SWABC TV and Radio.

III. ELECTION PROCEDURES

During the past seven days we studied the electoral process, including the proposed methods of voter registration, election procedures and counting of votes. We paid particular attention to the draft registration law and to the planning underway by the AG's office.

We appreciate the enormous challenge facing those responsible for the election, and we commend their intentions and efforts to design a process that will withstand the strictest scrutiny. However, we find the planned mechanisms for registration, voting and the counting of ballots to be unnecessarily complex and time consuming. This creates a perceived risk of manipulation and potential abuse.

The centralized registration and voting system creates possibilities for fraud. The plan for verifying voter identity and counting ballots is cumbersome, unnecessary, and jeopardizes ballot secrecy. The time involved in the process -- a minimum of two weeks -- will undoubtedly give rise to allegations of tampering.

The continuing delay in the promulgation of laws and regulations has undermined public confidence in the electoral process.

Given these concerns we make the following recommendations:

A decentralized system of voting, registering and counting is necessary to keep an accurate check on the process and make it more efficient and accountable. In achieving this, we propose that every person should register and vote in the district in which he or she resides.

The twenty-three districts should be subdivided for the purposes of compiling accurate registration rolls and for voting.

This decentralized process will facilitate the fair and expeditious resolution of challenges to registration rolls. As monitors, UNTAG personnel should certify every registration form.
Ballots should be counted in district election centers, which will provide more timely results and, if properly designed, reduce risks to ballot security.

In order to promote confidence in the system we recommend that all registered political parties be permitted to designate agents to observe voting inside the polling stations. Their role is to observe, not to interfere in the voting process or in any way violate ballot secrecy.

IV. INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION

Public confidence in the efficiency and integrity of the election process is essential to the goal of free and fair elections. Without public confidence, voters may decline to participate and are more likely to be intimidated. Essential to establishing and maintaining that public confidence is faith that those who administer and enforce the election laws will be strictly impartial and vigilant.

In Namibia, for a variety of historical reasons, we found a wide spectrum of the electorate does not believe that the present government can or will administer the process fairly. Simply put, these individuals believe that the government is aligned with the South African government and cannot be truly independent and impartial. The lack of confidence is a serious impediment to the government's ability to conduct the process efficiently and fairly no matter what its intentions. It is also a serious impediment to assuring the peaceful acceptance of the results of the election since it invites charges of fraud and manipulation of the results.

We recommend that the AG establish an independent Election Commission "to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process" (S/12636, para. 6). The members of the Commission should be appointed by the AG, subject to the approval of the SR.

The Commission would be responsible for the administration of all aspects of the election process. This recommendation is consistent with the approach taken by the AG in establishing the independent Commission of Inquiry into Intimidation.

Election commissions are common throughout the world. They exist primarily to insure public trust in the system. Their effectiveness depends on their independence and their appointment of individuals without a political stake in the outcome of the election. For this reason, it is critical that the appointees of the Commission be universally regarded as individuals of unquestioned integrity.

We believe that this simple step will in itself greatly enhance the likelihood of free and fair elections in Namibia.
V. CONCLUSION

Namibians and members of the international community are grateful to the people who come from many areas of the globe as part of the United Nations force to keep the peace and assist in the implementation of Resolution 435.

Most everyone, especially the younger generation in this country, have placed their hopes in 435. All they want is a stable society in which they can get on with their lives.

In the long history of these negotiations there has always been time. What is needed is the combined efforts of all concerned, and the human will to succeed.

If the United Nations does not succeed at this time, we may not have another Namibia to save in the future.
More control needed – NDI

WINDHOEK: An international delegation organized by the United States-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs has urged the United Nations’ Special Representative, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, to assert firm supervision and control over the election processes as contained in Resolution 435.

In a report to Mr. Ahtisaari, the delegation said it was concerned at the atmosphere of intimidation which could undermine the electoral process and a starting lack of communication about the proposed election procedures.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The delegation made a number of recommendations including the establishment of an independent election commission to promote confidence in the system; the immediate removal of all remnants of Koevoet from Swakop and enhanced powers for the UN police monitors and the Commission of Inquiry into Inimidation.

“arately, we believe that virtually every citizen of Namibia deserves to see the election take place on schedule and is willing to take steps to ensure free and fair elections. Resolute leadership is necessary to assure that goal.”

DELEGATION

The delegation was led by Senator Alastair Graham of Canada and included election officials from Barbados, Botswana, Pakistan, the United States and Zimbabwe. Cumulatively, members of the delegation have observed elections in 40 different countries.

Its report was based on a seven-day fact-finding mission between May 29 and June 6 this year.

These are two recommendations made by a US-based international organization, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

The NDI, which has just been on a fact-finding mission to Namibia, conducts non-partisan democratic development programmes around the world.

In a report to UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari, the NDI urged the UN to “move quickly to assert firm supervision and control of the election process as contained in Resolution 435.”

They said there were “disturbing strata in the national fabric” which threatened the Namibian election process.

The delegation’s most serious concerns are an atmosphere of intimidation that could undermine a free and fair electoral process; and “the starting lack of communication about the proposed election laws and procedures.”

Recommendations

The delegation, led by Senator Alastair Graham of Canada, made a series of recommendations including:

- The establishment of an independent election commission to promote confidence in the system.
- The immediate removal of all remnants of Koevoet from Swakop.
- A decentralized system to registering voting and counting to make the process more efficient and accountable.
- Equal access to the media by competing political parties, and
- Decentralized powers for the UN police monitors, and the Commission of Inquiry into Inimidation.

“We believe that virtually every citizen of Namibia deserves to see the election take place on schedule and is willing to take steps to ensure free and fair elections. Resolute leadership is necessary to assure that goal,” the NDI delegation report said.

40 elections

Apart from Senator Graham, the group included election officials and experts from Barbados, Botswana, Pakistan, the United States and Zimbabwe.

Taken together, members of the delegation have studied and observed elections in 40 countries.

Their report to Mr. Ahtisaari was based on a seven-day fact-finding mission in Namibia, from May 29 to June 6.

During this time they visited six of the Territory’s regions and met with government and UN officials responsible for the elections, party political leaders, tribal chiefs and headmen, security personnel, media representatives of other organizations involved in the implementation of Resolution 435.

Prior to their arrival in Namibia, the group received extensive briefings in preparation for their mission.
DEMOCRATS REPORT:
'Distressing strains in national fabric'

"DISTRESSING strains in the national fabric" threaten the Namibian election process, according to a report presented this week to UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari.

The report, prepared by an international delegation organised by the United States-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), urged Mr Ahtisaari to "move quickly to assert firm supervision and control of the election process as contemplated by Resolution 435".

The delegation's most serious concern involved an "atmosphere of intimidation" that could undermine a free and fair electoral process, and the "startling lack of communication" about the proposed elections laws and procedures.

The delegation was led by Senator Alasdair Graham of Canada, and included election officials and experts from Barbados, Botswana, Pakistan, the United States and Zimbabwe. Together, the members of the delegation have studied and observed elections in some 40 countries. Its report was based on a seven-day fact-finding mission to Namibia, which ended on Tuesday. Chaired by former US Vice President Walter Mondale, NDI conducts nonpartisan democratic development programmes around the world.

The delegation's report forwarded to Mr Ahtisaari's this week stated that a number of distressing strains in the national fabric had been found "that threaten to sap energy and unravel the entire election process".

"These strains, if not repaired, could cause a nation with great hopes and expectations to be tragically self-bom," said the report.

It added: "An atmosphere of distrust permeates the political scene. None of the major political parties trust one another; few trust the Administrator General to adequately and impartially administer the elections; some do not trust UNTAG."

Referring to the lack of communication, the report pointed out that key factors in the process "seem at times to be communicating only through rumour and unsubstantiated".

"A sense of participation in the process of developing the laws regulating the election is noticeably missing. Uncertainty about the process is rampant."

Describing the atmosphere of intimidation as hanging over the country "like a great sword", the NDI report stated: "Charges and countercharges of intimidation seem to be uppermost on the political parties'
ELECTION PROCEDURES

After studying the draft law on registration and the planning underway by the Administrator-General's office, the NDI delegation found the envisaged 'mechanism of registration, voting and the counting of ballots to be unnecessarily complex and time consuming'.

The report said: "This creates a potential risk of manipulation and potential abuse."

'The centralized registration and voting system creates possibilities for fraud. The plan for verifying voter identity and counting ballots is cumbersome, unnecessary, and jeopardizes ballot secrecy.

The team involved in the counting process - a minimum of two weeks - will undeniably give rise to allegations of tampering and rigging,' the report added.

INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION

"In Namibia," the report said, "we found a wide spectrum of the electorate does not believe that the present government can or will administer the process efficiently and fairly, no matter what its intentions. It is a serious impediment to assuring the peaceful acceptance of the results of the election, since it invites charges of fraud and manipulation of the results." it said.

The delegation recommended that the Administrator-General establish an independent Election Commission to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. (S/12636 para 6).

The NDI report suggested that members of the Commission should be appointed by the Administrator-General, subject to the approval of the Special Representative.

"The Commission would be responsible for the administration of all aspects of the election process. This recommendation is consistent with the approach taken by the AG in establishing the independent Commission of Inquiry into Intimidation," it said.

Pointed out that election commissions are common throughout the world, the delegation said "they exist primarily to ensure public trust in the system."
In conclusion, the delegation said that virtually everyone, "especially the younger generation in this country, have placed their hopes in 435." "All they want is a stable society in which they can get on with their lives. What is needed is the combined efforts of all concerned, and the human will to succeed."

"If the United Nations does not succeed at this time, we may not have another Namibia to save in the future," the report said.

The NDI plans to send in July a delegation of US Democratic Party leaders to Namibia to "assess the political environment of the campaign period." A third delegation will visit Namibia at the time of the actual election.

In the United States, which has such prominent US politicians as Edmund Muskie, Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young serving on its Senior Advisory Committee, also intends to design a mass voter education programme to familiarise people with the process of voting.

Recent election observation missions by the NDI include the delegation to Panama, led by former President Jimmy Carter, and Poland, Paraguay, Chile, Pakistan and the Soviet Union.
Koevoet still hot issue in Namibia

By Lindewe Kgaswe

THE “assimilation” of the infamous Koevoet (Crowbar) counter-insurgency police force into the existing forces is the main source of sensitiveness in Namibia as it prepares for independence. The Koevoet’s intimidation of the Namibian people is also a cause for great concern.

This is the conclusion drawn by members of the American-based National Democratic Initiative for International Affairs (NDI), who recently visited Namibia.

An NDI delegation left Namibia on Tuesday after a week’s visit and a member of the delegation, Mr. Robert Powers, said they feared the dreaded Koevoet, which instead of being disbanded, had been assimilated into the Namibian police force.

Mr. Powers said they had not stopped Koevoet’s dirty tricks and that Namibians were suffering from a lack of free and fair elections which could not be held when the people were still being intimidated.

He quoted Mr. Namibia and Mr. Dr. Mamphokobotsane who said there was no way in which the group would be dismissed as they had “protected democracy” up until April 1 the day that SWAPO guerrillas went into the country to hand themselves in, only to be measured by the racist forces.

Dr. Mamphokobotsane said they went to hand themselves in only to be measured by the racist forces.

Mr. Vukobotsane said they also recommended that any new members of the National Assembly be selected through a fair system.

The NDI also expressed concern over the unannounced deaths and remaining prison sentences.

However, some of these people were freed in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government and the opposition.

The Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Robert Runcie visited the country during which time he met with President Dr. Kwidjana and government leaders and representatives of liberation movements as well as diplomatic envoys.

The church leaders also conducted two church services and visited places like Gaborone, Tlokweng and Francistown. Picture above shows Dr. Runcie with Archbishop Walter Makhulu (who invited him for the visit) in front of Sir Seretse Khama Institute of African Studies, University of Zimbabwe. (F. Kahn)
Koevoet: Still hot issue

The NDI was also concerned about the lack of communication in Namibia and that all the parties did not trust one another. Many even feared that SAGPAO had buried the bones for the area after independence.

Regulations

The NDI also called for the regionalisation of training, regularising and counting which is necessary to keep an accurate check on the process to make it more efficient and accountable.

The Office of the Administrator-General has sought to coordinate the counting system and has estimated that the counting would take up to two weeks or more.

The NDI was concerned about the move saying it should only continue nationally.

The democratization process will facilitate the fair and consistent resolution of challenges to registration," says the group in its report.

In conclusion, the NDI says most Namibians have placed their hopes on the success of UN Resolution 43.

"In the long history of these negotiations, there has always been a desire. What is needed is a sustained effort of all concerned, and the families will succeed."

"If the United Nations does not succeed this time, we may not have another Namibia to look forward to in the future," says the NDI.

The winner of the May draw was
MR ROSS MOLAUDI
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On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation and to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

The objective of our proposal is the independence of Namibia in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. We are continuing to work towards the implementation of the proposal.

(Signed) William H. BARTON
Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

M. Jacques LEPRÉTTE
 Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

Rüdiger von WECHMAR
Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations

James MURRAY
Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Andrew YOUNG
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation

I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted with the various parties involved with the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.

2. To this end, our Governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. While the proposal addresses itself to all elements of resolution 385 (1976), the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with an appropriate United Nations role in accordance with resolution 385 (1976). A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would then be assumed during 1978 by the Government of Namibia.

II. The electoral process

4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our Governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing resolution 385 (1976) while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities the Special Representative will work together with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator-General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the legality of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.

5. In accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976), free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, to enable the people of Namibia to freely and fairly determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of
all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration
before such measures take effect. Moreover the Special Representative may himself
make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process. He will have at
his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition
Assistance Group, sufficient to carry out his duties satisfactorily. He will
report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, keeping him informed and
making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the
discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the
mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.

6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a
Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the
organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will
be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to
vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be
by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The
date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the
electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls, and other aspects of electoral
procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and
interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair
opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of
speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. The official electoral
campaign shall commence only after the United Nations Special Representative has
satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral
procedures. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper
registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of
voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special
Representative.

7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the
United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and
fair elections:

A. Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator
General will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations,
or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit that objective.

B. The Administrator General shall make arrangements for the release, prior
to the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners
or political detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can
participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention,
imintimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political
prisoners or political detainees shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the
Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of
international standing who shall be designated by the Secretary-General to be
legal adviser to the Special Representative.

C. All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the
territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully
and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention,
imintimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these
purposes.
D. The Special Representative with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other appropriate international bodies will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia are given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.

8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts shall be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. The annex describes provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia, and with respect to the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:

A. A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base.

B. Thereafter a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshiwelvo or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.

C. The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos, and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.

D. Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside of the territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process.

9. A military section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group to make sure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary-General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The Five Governments, as members of the Security Council, will support the Secretary-General's judgement in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary-General informed of developments in this regard.

9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator General to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative shall make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.
10. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against
the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from
whatever quarter.

11. Immediately after the certification of election results, the Constituent
Assembly will meet to draw up and adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia.
It will conclude its work as soon as possible so as to permit whatever additional
steps may be necessary prior to the installation of an independent Government of
Namibia during 1978.

12. Neighbouring countries shall be requested to ensure to the best of their
abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of
the election, are respected. They shall also be requested to afford the necessary
facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations
personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures
as may be desirable for ensuring tranquillity in the border areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>SAG</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Other action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) At date unspecified:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) As soon as possible, preferably within one week of Security Council action:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Transitional period formally begins on date of UNSC passage of resolution adopting STG's plans:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 April 1989:

| | General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to base of all South African forces including ethnic forces. | General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to base. | As soon as possible: UNSR and staff (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia to assume duties. UN military personnel commence monitoring of cessation of hostile acts and commence monitoring of both South African and SWAPO troop restrictions. Begin infiltration prevention and border surveillance. Begin monitoring of police forces. Begin | Release of political prisoners/detainees wherever held begins and is to be completed as soon as possible. |

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>SAG</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Other action</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Within six weeks:</td>
<td>Restriction to base continues. Force levels reduced to 12,000 men.</td>
<td>Restriction to base continues.</td>
<td>Appropriate action by UN High Commissioner for Refugees outside Namibia to assist in return of exiles. All UN activity continues.</td>
<td>Establishment in Namibia of provisions to facilitate return of exiles. Establishment and publication of general rules for elections. Completion of repeal of discriminatory laws and restrictive legislation. Dismantlement of command structures of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, including the withdrawal of all South African soldiers attached to these units. All arms, military equipment, and ammunition of citizen forces and commandos confined</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>R&amp;G</td>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Other action</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Within nine weeks:</td>
<td>Restriction to base continues. Force levels reduced to 8,000 men.</td>
<td>Restriction to base continues. Peaceful repatriation under UN supervision starts for return through designated entry points.</td>
<td>All UN activity continues.</td>
<td>Completion of release of political prisoners/detainees wherever held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximately end of May/beginning of June 1989:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Within 12 weeks:</td>
<td>Force levels reduced to 1,500 men, restricted to Grootfontein or Cashivello or both. All military installations along northern border would by now either be deactivated or put under civilian control under UN supervision.</td>
<td>Restriction to base continues.</td>
<td>All UN activity continues. Military Section of UNTAG at maximum deployment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Other action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Start of thirteenth week:</td>
<td>Facilities which depend on them (e.g., hospitals, power stations) would be protected where necessary by the UN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Official start of election campaign of about four months' duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) On date established by AG to satisfaction of UNSR:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Election to Constituent Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) One week after date of certification of election:</td>
<td>Completion of withdrawal.</td>
<td>Closure of all bases.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Convening of Constituent Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) At date unspecified:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion of Constituent Assembly and whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to installation of new government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5

Protocol of Geneva

Delegations representing the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola/Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, 2-5 August 1988, with the mediation of Dr. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, United States of America, have agreed as follows:

1. Each side agrees to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that 1 November 1988 be established as the date for implementation of UNSCR 435/78.

2. Each side agrees to the establishment of a target date for signature of the tripartite agreement among Angola, South Africa, and Cuba not later than 10 September 1988.

3. Each side agrees that a schedule acceptable to all parties for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be established by Angola and Cuba, who will request on-site verification by the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties accept 1 September 1988 as the target date for reaching agreement on that schedule and all related matters.

4. The complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola shall begin not later than 10 August 1988 and be completed not later than 1 September 1988.

5. The parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures of restraint in order to maintain the existing de facto cessation of hostilities. South Africa stated its willingness to convey this commitment in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Angola and Cuba shall urge SWAPO to proceed likewise as a step prior to the ceasefire contemplated in resolution 435/78 which will be established prior to 1 November 1988. Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel. The parties deemed it appropriate that, during the period before 1 November 1988, a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General be present in Luanda to take cognizance of any disputes relative to the cessation of hostilities and agreed that the combined military committee contemplated in paragraph 9 can be an appropriate venue for reviewing complaints of this nature that may arise.

6. As of 10 August 1988, no Cuban troops will deploy or be south of the line Chitado-Cuacua-Calusque-Faulila-Cuamatoto-M'Giva. Cuba furthermore stated that upon completion of the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola not later than 1 September 1988 and the restoration by the People's Republic of Angola of its sovereignty over its international boundaries, the Cuban troops will not take part in offensive operations in the territory that lies east of meridian 17 and south of parallel 15 degrees, 30 minutes, provided that they are not subject to harassment.
7. Following the complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, the Government of Angola shall guarantee measures for the provision of water and power supply to Namibia.

8. With a view toward minimizing the risk of battlefield incidents and facilitating exchange of technical information related to implementation of the agreements reached, direct communications shall be established not later than 20 August 1988 between the respective military commanders at appropriate headquarters along the Angola/Namibia border.

9. Each side recognizes that the period from 1 September 1988, by which time South African forces will have completed their withdrawal from Angola, and the date established for implementation of UNSCR 435, is a period of particular sensitivity, for which specific guidelines for military activities are presently lacking. In the interest of maintaining the ceasefire and maximizing the conditions for the orderly introduction of UNTAG, the sides agree to establish a combined military committee to develop additional practical measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of unintended incidents. They invite United States membership on the committee.

10. Each side will act in accordance with the Governors Island principles, including paragraph 2 (non-interference in the internal affairs of states) and paragraph 6 (the acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states).

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA:

[Signature]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA:

[Signature]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:

[Signature]

Geneva, 3 August 1988
LETTER DATED 17 AUGUST 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TUNISIA
AND ZAMBIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We, the representatives of the States mentioned below, have the honour to
transmit the enclosed letter dated 12 August 1988 addressed to Your Excellency
by Dr. Sam Nujoma, the President of the South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO).

We request that the enclosure be circulated as a document of the Security
Council.

(Signed) I. Z. CHABALA
Charge d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Republic
of Zambia to the United Nations

(Signed) M. Ahmed GHEZAL
Ambassador/Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Tunisia to
the United Nations

88-20611  0508b (E)
It is now nearly 10 years since the United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978) was adopted.

In my letter dated 8 September 1978 addressed to your predecessor, I stated SWAPO's views on the various aspects of the Secretary-General's report, containing the United Nations Plan, submitted to the Security Council pursuant to the relevant provisions of resolution 435 (1978) concerning the decolonization of Namibia.

During the ensuing years since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), I have on many occasions and in various places reiterated SWAPO's unassailable position of goodwill, flexibility and a spirit of compromise whenever serious efforts were made aimed at ensuring progress and speeding up the independence of Namibia, through the implementation of the said resolution.

It is hardly my intention here to overrate the case about SWAPO's credibility which is well-known to all men of reason and honesty. But I can say in full confidence that it has all along been SWAPO's willingness to make the necessary concessions, while at the same time remaining committed to the letter and spirit of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), that the continuing efforts to implement these seminal resolutions are still on course, in spite of many years of despicable provocations, repeated demonstrations of bad faith, a lack of sincerity and endless recourse to condemnable prevarication on the part of South Africa.

Since Your Excellency's assumption, in 1982, of the High Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I have continued to send numerous communications to you in which I have time and again reiterated SWAPO's readiness to co-operate with the United Nations and in particular with you and your staff concerning the signing of a cease-fire agreement with South Africa as the first vital step in the implementation of the United Nations Plan for the independence of Namibia, as endorsed in resolution 435 (1978).

In this connection, I would like to recall Your Excellency's latest reports to the Security Council contained in documents S/18767 of 31 March 1987 and S/19234 of 27 October 1987. These reports, as the previous ones had done, clearly and categorically corroborated my contention that SWAPO has never been found equivocating on any serious matter relating to cease-fire, composition and emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia or willingness to co-operate with the United Nations.

In paragraph 5 of resolution 601 (1987), the Council decided "to authorize the United Nations Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a cease-fire between South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization in order to undertake administrative and other practical steps necessary for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)".
Once again, immediately following the adoption of that resolution, I promptly sent a letter dated 1 November 1987 to Your Excellency reassuring you of SWAPO’s readiness to sign and observe a cease-fire, on the basis of resolution 435, provided that the South African régime is going to have to do likewise.

Now we have reached a most decisive stage concerning the independence of Namibia which demands of us all to make earnest efforts, in good faith, towards hastening the peace process in the South West African region.

Your Excellency, it is with this deep concern in mind that I have decided to write to you at this time.

SWAPO, which derives its legitimacy from the persistent and overwhelming support of the oppressed people of Namibia as the leader in the liberation struggle, has earned the universal recognition as the sole and authentic representative of the fighting masses of our embattled country.

It is this popular and continuing support from the masses which assures the rank and file of our movement that the thousands of our best sons and daughters who have sacrificed and are sacrificing their precious lives in the struggle shall not have died in vain.

The legacy of their courage and heroism is what gives us confidence and strengthens our determination to continue providing leadership with courage and imagination to act decisively in war and in peace with the sole purposes of saving lives, defending the interest of our people and seizing all favourable opportunities to give back to them the power to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence.

Against this background of both setbacks and of tremendous progress in the heroic struggle, I wish to inform Your Excellency that SWAPO has by its own sovereign and unilateral decision, as a national liberation movement, in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva agreement reached by the Parties participating in the Quatrupartite talks, committed itself to take the necessary steps to help make the peace process in the South West African Region irreversible and successful.

In this context, SWAPO has agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of all hostile acts which started as of 10 August 1988 in Angola. By the same token, SWAPO will be ready to continue to abide by this agreement until the formal cease-fire, under resolution 435, is signed between SWAPO and South Africa, thereby triggering the implementation process.

The cessation of SWAPO’s combat actions against the South African Forces in Namibia will only hold provided South Africa also shows the necessary political will to do the same.

In order to enhance the prospects for peace and tranquillity in the country and to create appropriate conditions for the speedy implementation of resolution 435, South Africa should be called upon to refrain from committing any acts of repression against SWAPO members and supporters inside Namibia during this period.
In welcoming the fixing of 1 November 1988 as the firm date for the commencement of the implementation of resolution 435, SWAPO would like to urge Your Excellency to avail your good offices of the opportunity created in the current preliminary phase of the cessation of acts of hostilities by initiating consultations with the parties concerned.

(Signed) Sam NUJOMA
President of SWAPO
ON THE 11th APRIL 1989

DEFEND AND FIGHT FOR YOUR FREEDOM

A state of terror, intimidation, harassment and killings has erupted in our country. Once again, racist South Africa has put the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 and Namibia’s path to independence in jeopardy. Notwithstanding the cease-fire agreement that came into force on April 1st, racist Pretoria has initiated the bloody military conflict, provoked and attacked PLAN freedom fighters who were observing the cease-fire agreement.

Since April 1st, bloodshed and the massacre of our people by the illegal occupationist troops of racist South Africa have become the order of the day. Following the deliberate reduction of UNTAG military components by the permanent members of the Security Council, the special representative of UN Secretary General in Namibia has authorised the redeployment of the notorious and murderous battalion 101 and 202 to murder our people. More lives have been lost at the hands of such notorious troops. The situation in the north is deteriorating. Racist brutality and destruction continue. Our people are becoming refugees in their own land. Racist Pretoria together with her imperialist allies, the USA and Britain continue to deliberately confuse the international opinion on the situation in Namibia. Our freedom is once again in danger.

STUDENTS TAKE ACTION IN DEFENCE OF OUR STRUGGLE

* Students express their solidarity with those massed by the enemy. We salute the gallant PLAN freedom fighters. We honour their blood and the highest price they paid for our freedom. We shall take forward their fight.

* Students express solidarity with our comrades in the north whose lives are once again at stake. School in the northern part of our country is once again in danger as a result of the redeployment of the murderous 101 and 102 squads. We say AN INJURY TO ONE IS AN INJURY TO ALL.

* Students demand protection of our people against racist military aggression. We demand the immediate deployment of all 7500 UNTAG forces. We demand the immediate demobilisation of racist troops.

* Students demand that PLAN fighters inside Namibia be confined to bases inside their own country.

WE SHALL STAY AWAY FROM CLASSES ON THE 11TH APRIL 1989!

UNITY IN ACTION, SOLIDARITY FOR EVER!

SWAPO WILL WIN, NAMIBIA

WILL BE FREE!

Issued by: NANSO

NAMIBIA NATIONAL STUDENTS' ORGANISATION

NAMIBIA NATIONAL STUDENTS' ORGANISATION

united we stand divided we fall
4. Welcomes the preparedness of the South West Africa People’s Organization to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General’s report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from its President of 3 September 1978.

5. Calls upon South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution:

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and the present resolution, are null and void:

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of the present resolution.

Adopted at the 2087th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decisions

At its 2088th meeting, on 30 September 1978, the Council decided to invite the representative of Guinea to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2092nd meeting, on 31 October 1978, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Burundi, Egypt and Ghana to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

“The situation in Namibia:

“(a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia (S/12903);”

“(b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)”.

At the same meeting, the Council also decided to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to a delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, composed of the President and three Vice-Presidents of that body.

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

At the same meeting, the Council further decided, at the request of the representatives of Guano, Mauritius and Nigeria, to extend an invitation to Mr. Theobald Guntrao under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At its 2094th meeting, on 1 November 1978, the Council decided to invite the representative of Bangladesh, Benin, Guyana, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Zambia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2095th meeting, on 2 November 1978, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Cuba, Mozambique and Yugoslavia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2096th meeting, on 6 November 1978, the Council decided to invite the representative of Algeria to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 439 (1978)
of 13 November 1978

The Security Council,


Having considered the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 435 (1978),

Taking note of the relevant communications addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,

Having heard and considered the statement of the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Taking note also of the communication dated 23 October 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization to the Secretary-General,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and its continued commitment to the implementation of resolution 385 (1976), in particular the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control,

Reiterating the view that any unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in contravention of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978),

1. Condemns the decision of the South African Government to proceed unilaterally with the holding of elections in the Territory from 4 to 8 December 1978 in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978); and

2. Considers that this decision constitutes a defiance of the United Nations and in particular the authority of the Security Council;

3. Declares those elections and their results null and void and states that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member States to any representatives or organ established in that process;

4. Calls upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections it has planned in Namibia in December 1978;

5. Demands once again that South Africa cooperate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 432 (1978);

6. Warns South Africa that its failure to do so would compel the Security Council to meet forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof, as to ensure South Africa's compliance with the aforementioned resolutions;

7. Calls upon the Secretary-General to report the progress of the implementation of the present resolution by 25 November 1978.

Adopted by the 2096th meeting by 10 votes to 0 with 5 abstentions (Cuba, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America).

Decisions

At its 2103rd meeting, on 4 December 1978, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Congo and Angola to participate, without vote, in discussion of the item entitled "The situation in Namibia: letter dated 1 December 1978 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12945)."
### POPULATION PER DISTRICT
**PERSONS 18 YEARS AND OLDER**

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<thead>
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<th>District</th>
<th>(1) 18+</th>
<th>(2) +5%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bushmanland</td>
<td>1739</td>
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<td>7541</td>
</tr>
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**TOTAL**

652645          685276

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(1) **1981 - Census Statistics multiplied by a factor 1.247 to arrive at figures for 1989.**

(2) **Add 5% to allow for possible undercount in 1981 census.**
Om registrasie vir alle registreerbare persone te vergemaklik, sal daar regoor die land permanente en tydelike registrasiepunte wees. Mobiele registrasiepunne sal die mees afgelede plekke besoek. Volledige besonderhede oor die mobiele spanne se besoekpunte sal in koerantte en oor die radio bekend gemaak word.

Die permanente registrasiepunte in die groot stede en dorpe sal van Julie tot 15 September beman word. Die mobiele spanne sal tussen 10 en 30 werkdie in die veld wees.

Die program kan verander

### REGISTRASIEPUNTE: 1 = permanent; 2 = tydelik

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/Dorp</th>
<th>1 Address/Adres</th>
<th>2 Address/Adres</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>Houtregistrasiekantoor, Kruppstraat 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pionierspark</td>
<td>Pionierspark Post Office, Fritsche Street</td>
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<tr>
<td>Windhoekmioedstad</td>
<td>Cohen-gebou, Kaiserstraat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klein Windhoek</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Municipal Office at Kronlein and</td>
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<td>Kaiser Street</td>
<td>Tseiblaagte</td>
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<td>Ludentsz</td>
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<td>Peri-Urban Board Office Nautilus</td>
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<td>Post Office, Aranos</td>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Note</td>
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<td>Municipal Office, Epako</td>
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<td>Commissioner's Office, Opuwo</td>
<td>Woolfstraat, Nomtsoub</td>
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<td>Kalima Mulilo,</td>
<td>Magistrat's Office, Ngwezi (1st month)</td>
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<td>Post Office, Ngwezi (rest of the time)</td>
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<td>Eerste Nasionale Bank</td>
<td>Tribal Office</td>
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<td>Onesi</td>
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<td>Tandji</td>
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<td>Omungweuleme</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Okahandja</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oshifu</td>
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<td>Town Office</td>
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<td>Commissioner's Office, Otjinene</td>
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<td>Hereroland</td>
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</table>
Appendix 10

SUIDWES-AFRIKA/NAMIBIE * SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

AANSOEK OM REGISTRASIE AS 'N KIESER INGEVOELGE DIE PROKLAMASIE OP DIE
REGISTRASIE VAN KIESERS (GRONDWETGEWENDE VERGADERING), 1989
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AS A VOTER IN TERMS OF THE REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS (CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY) PROCLAMATION, 1989

1. Surname (block letters) .................................................................
   Surname (block letters) .................................................................

2. Voornaam (voluit in block letters) First names (in full — block letters)
   First names (in full — block letters)

3. Vaste woonadres op datum van aansoek
   Fixed residential address at date of application

4. Besigheds- of werkplekadres op datum van aansoek
   Business or employment address at date of application

5. Identiteit vasgestel of bevestig deur
   Identity determined or confirmed by
   a. SWA-identiteitsnommer
      SWA identity number
   (b) ander (spesifiseer)
      Other (specify)

6. Geboortedatum
   Date of birth
   Jaar _______  Maand _______  Dag _______
   Year _______  Month _______  Day _______

7. Geboortedatum vasgestel of bevestig deur
   Date of birth determined or confirmed by
   (a) identiteitsdocument
      Identity document
   (b) geboortekaartje
      Birth certificate
   (c) ander (spesifiseer)
      Other (specify)

8. Is u in die gebied Suidwes-Afrika gebore?
   Were you born in the territory of South West Africa?
   Ja/Nee
   Yes/No

9. Ingebe in die gebied Suidwes-Afrika gebore nie, ononderbroekte tydperk van gewone ver- 
   byvit in die gebied Suidwes-Afrika op die datum van hierdie aansoek:
   If not born in the territory of South West Africa, continuous period of ordinary residence in 
   the territory of South West Africa at the date of this application:

10. Tydperk van vertrek vasgestel of bevestig deur
    Period of residence determined or confirmed by

11. In die geval van 'n persoon in artikel 3 (1) (c) bedoel:
    In the case of a person referred to in section 3 (1) (c):
    (a) Vader/Moeder se naam en van
        Father/Mother's name and surname
    (b) Vader/Moeder se plek van geboorte
        Father's/Mother's place of birth
    (c) Inhoud van (a) en (b) vasgestel of bevestig deur
        Content of (a) and (b) determined or confirmed by

12. Andere (spesifiseer)
    Other (specify)

13. Lydbewijs (spesifiseer)
    Lydbewijs (specify)

** Ex-klara hierby dat die bovenaand vermelde en waar en juist is en dat ek nie onteigende die Proklamase op die Registrasie van Kiesers
     (Grondegewende Vergadering), 1989, gedeelstrydiger is om as Kieser te registreer nie.

   Handtekening/Insentrumuratie van aansoekenaar/Signatures/thumb print of applicant/impres of other

   Wpens: Spesifiseer
   Wpens: Specify

   * Stap woorde wat nie van toepassing is nie
   * Delete words which are not applicable.
**Appendix 11**

**REGISTRASIEKAART: KIESER • REGISTRATION CARD: VOTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surname (block letters):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First names (block letters):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence address:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3A number:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth date:</td>
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**Handtekening en datum van aanvraag (of ander vinger): tekenaar)**
Signature or signature of applicant (or other finger: specify)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By regulator</th>
<th>At registration</th>
<th>Op stemdag</th>
<th>On polling date</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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**Handtekening van Registratiedepartement (signature of Registration Officer)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aksiefront vir die Behoud van die Turnhalle-Beginsels</td>
<td>AKTUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratiese Turnhalle-Alliansie</td>
<td>DTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herstigte Nasionale Party</td>
<td>HNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation Front</td>
<td>LF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia Christelike Demokratiese Party</td>
<td>NCDP</td>
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Instructions:
- Vote for one party only.
- Record your vote by a X in the square opposite the symbol of the party for which you wish to vote.

Stem slegs vir een party.
Stem deur 'n X te maak in die vierkant teenoor die kantteken van die party vir wie u wil stem.