Domestic Monitoring of Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: A Report on NDI and Partners’ Participation

Abuja, Nigeria
March 2004

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Acknowledgements

As was the case in 1998 and 1999, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) is grateful for the opportunity to play a role in Nigeria’s recently concluded 2003 national and state elections. Our two election–related programs – an international observation mission and support to Nigerian civil society election monitoring efforts – gave us an incredible chance to participate in Nigeria’s complex and fascinating political environment.

Two things stand out at the conclusion of our elections program: first, we learned as much from our partners as we taught, and second, we appreciated the tremendous group of talented people who devoted their time, energy and thought to ensuring that Nigeria’s elections were observed fairly and accurately reported. There were many firsts during the 2003 elections, particularly by domestic organizations, and many lessons learned, which will be documented in the proceeding pages. A collaborative communication and reporting system was an impressive first; in the end, however, the organizations and people involved in the process were the most impressive accomplishment.

First and foremost, credit must go to the tens of thousands of Nigerians who, despite significant challenges, took up their civic responsibility to observe and report on the elections. Our partner organizations – the Transition Monitoring Group, the Nigerian Labor Congress and the Trade Union Congress, the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria, the Muslim League for Accountability, the Center for Development and Population Activities – and the civil society organizations that observed under its umbrella – the Outreach Foundation, the Yakubu Gowon Centre and the Interfaith Mediation Centre of Kaduna – deserve the credit for the success of NDI’s partnership with them. They contributed energy, talent and ideas for the domestic monitoring program, and it was a pleasure to support them in their efforts.

In the field, we are particularly grateful for the tremendous support we received from our Washington, DC, office and a group of skilled NDI staff from around the globe as well as African and North American consultants. They are listed later in this document, but we can never fully recognize them or express our appreciation to them for joining us on this journey. Not only did they make that journey easier through their technical skills, but they also made it fun because of
the commitment they brought to Nigeria. NDI’s local staff made substantial and crucial contributions, including committed involvement for and implementation of the domestic elections program. Finally, the tireless efforts of over 120 young Nigerians who worked night and day to enter the nearly 20,000 monitor checklists into the database under considerable time constraints must be recognized.

And, of course, NDI’s domestic and international programs could not have been possible without the direct support of USAID and the US Embassy, support that encouraged and sustained the program. Other international organizations, such as the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD), the European Union (EU) and the Solidarity Center, also assisted NDI and domestic groups and made the domestic observation program truly international in character. We are glad for the many opportunities to work with them and hope the spirit of collaboration during the elections will continue as all of us sustain partnerships with and support of Nigeria’s emerging democratic institutions.

As was often noted during the elections period, democracy does not begin and end with a successful election, or even a second or third successful election. It is a long, continuous process that requires diligence, determination and courage. We at NDI observed first hand the courage and determination of Nigerians throughout this country during the elections and were all inspired by their efforts.

— Wayne Propst
Country Director, NDI/Nigeria
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**Acronyms**

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy and Development, Ghana</td>
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<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>Centre for Development and Population Activities</td>
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<td>COWAN</td>
<td>Country Women’s Association of Nigeria</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<td>DOMES</td>
<td>Domestic Monitoring and Election System</td>
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<td>DTC</td>
<td>Data Transfer Center</td>
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<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
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<td>FIDA</td>
<td>International Federation of Women’s Lawyers</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FOMWAN</td>
<td>Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations of Nigeria</td>
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<td>IDASA</td>
<td>The Institute for Democracy in South Africa</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>Interfaith Mediation Centre of Kaduna</td>
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<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing partner</td>
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<td>IRF</td>
<td>Incident report form</td>
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<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Internet service provider</td>
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<td>JDPC</td>
<td>Justice, Development and Peace Commission</td>
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<td>LEMT</td>
<td>Labour Election Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
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<td>MULAC</td>
<td>Muslim League for Accountability</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
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<td>National Council of Women’s Societies</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Information Center</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>Nigeria Labor Congress</td>
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<td>OF</td>
<td>Outreach Foundation</td>
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<td>PACE</td>
<td>Political and Community Empowerment Consortium</td>
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<td>PVT</td>
<td>Parallel vote tabulation</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
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<td>UNEAD</td>
<td>United National Electoral Assistance Division</td>
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<td>TMG</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>TOT</td>
<td>Training of trainers</td>
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<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<td>YEDA</td>
<td>Youth for Environment and Development Activities</td>
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<td>YGC</td>
<td>Yakubu Gowon Centre</td>
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Executive Summary

From January through April 2003, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) engaged with seven major Nigerian organizations to devise and implement a comprehensive domestic observation program for Nigeria’s 2003 elections. The program covered two separate elections: the April 12 National Assembly elections and the April 19 presidential and gubernatorial elections.

Project components included strategic thinking sessions, joint program design, materials and checklist development, training, monitoring, data analysis systems design and implementation, technical assistance (TA), management support and data systems transfer. NDI and its partners worked hand-in-hand and derived important lessons learned through a series of post-election consultations with Nigerian domestic observation groups.

Partners

NDI worked with seven primary partners listed described below and also provided selective assistance to seven additional groups.¹ NDI was honored by the opportunity to work with each of our partners. The seven domestic monitoring organizations most deeply involved in the project included:

- **Transition Monitoring Group (TMG).** TMG is Nigeria’s largest coalition of NGOs, and the largest focusing on election-related issues. With a membership of more than 170 separate organizations, TMG works throughout Nigeria. TMG’s targeted the deployment of 10,000 monitors at polling stations in all 36 states. In 1998-99, NDI worked closely with TMG in Nigeria’s first democratic transition election.

- **Labor Election Monitoring Team (LEMT).** Comprised of Nigeria’s two largest trade unions (the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC)), the LEMT represented a first-ever coalition of these two important unions. Although the NLC had a presence in observing the 1998-99 elections, neither the NLC nor the TUC had ever undertaken an election-related project of this magnitude. The LEMT’s target was to train and deploy 4,000 monitors.

- **Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) and Muslim League for Accountability (MULAC).** This innovative collaboration between Islamic women and men deployed monitors in 15 Northern states — areas where they had comparative advantage because of their familiarity with local religious and traditional customs and norms. This was the first time that either had participated cohesively and actively in election monitoring. They collectively set a target of training and deploying 2,000 monitors.

¹The seven additional groups included a chapter of the International Women Lawyers (FIDA); the Country Women’s Association of Nigeria (COWAN); the National Council of Women’s Societies (NCWS); the Church of Christ Women’s Federation; and the Youth Environment and Development Association (YEDA). NDI provided trainers’ manuals, checklists and incident report forms to the Justice, Development and Peace Commission of Nigeria’s Catholic Bishopric (JDPC), one of the largest domestic monitoring groups, to ensure consistency and comparability of observations and findings. It also gave support for a monitors training workshop and materials to a grassroots organization in Delta State.
Center for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA). Although CEDPA is an international non-governmental organization, it supported the work of several Nigerian organizations, particularly those focusing on women and youth. CEDPA facilitated training and deployment and provided technical and logistical support for election-related activities. Groups observing under the CEDPA umbrella set a target of deploying up to 500 monitors.

Outreach Foundation. The Foundation – traditionally focused on women’s empowerment and financial development – undertook its first-ever election observation for the gubernatorial and presidential elections, reaching out to women in its network. The Foundation targeted the deployment of 1,000 election monitors and provided technical and logistical support to them.

Interfaith Mediation Council of Kaduna (IMC). An ecumenical organization embracing Islamic and Christian leaders, IMC has a particular presence in Kaduna and its surrounding communities – areas that have been striven by inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts. IMC expected to deploy approximately 50.

Yakuba Gowon Centre (YGC). The Gowon Centre is engaged in conflict reduction and constructive dialogue, particularly among young Nigerians. It also participated in the 1998-99 elections. YGC was able to mobilize monitors to observe elections in the Federal Capital Territories (FCT - Abuja).

Achievements

Despite Nigeria’s complex environment, Nigerian domestic observation groups achieved several notable breakthroughs in a relatively short time. These include:

- All partners agreed to use the same training manuals or materials; training methodologies; monitoring approaches; checklists; incident report forms; data processing and analysis points and principles; and procedures for issuing interim reports or statements on the conduct of elections.
- NDI staff traveled to nine states in all six geopolitical zones to facilitate 15 training workshops that resulted in training more than 375 master trainers; nearly 60 monitors; 47 TMG zonal and state supervisors and staff; 30 FOMWAN and MULAC state and deputy state coordinators; and approximately 100 persons in the use of the data reporting system or as analysts for preparing statements; as well as provision of TA to others.
- NDI and its partners distributed large amounts of materials, including 475 copies of the master trainers’ manual; 4,000 copies of the monitors’ manual; 50 project management manuals; 90,000 checklists; and 180,000 incident report forms (IRFs).
- An innovative National Information Center (NIC) and satellite Data Transfer Centers (DTCs) in four key sites across Nigeria (Lagos, Kano, Asaba and Port Harcourt, with a drop center in Kaduna) was developed and implemented to make the intake of forms more convenient for partners. This system facilitated

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2 Some organizations such as TMG and LEMT took responsibility for printing and distributing either master trainers or monitors manuals or both. The figures cited above are the number distributed by NDI.

3 Checklists and IRFs were customized for each partner. Even though NDI did not work with partners on the state Houses of Assembly elections in May, it provided checklists and IRFs for those elections.
and sharply accelerated the collection, collation, processing and analysis of forms received from deployed monitors. Moreover, this was the first time that a concept like the NIC had been implemented by NDI anywhere in the world, and the first time a combined effort by all major domestic observation groups had been attempted in Nigeria.

More than 28,000 checklists and nearly 3,000 IRFs were processed through the NIC for the first two elections. The number of checklists increased by 8.5 percent between the first National Assembly elections and the second gubernatorial and presidential elections, while the IRFs declined almost 40 percent between these two elections. Most participants believe that partners’ interim statements and reports of malpractices had a salutary effect on the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC') election administration; many changes were made to improve the conduct of subsequent elections based on these reports and may have attributed to the decline in IRFs for the second election.

**Challenges**

NDI assisted partners in addressing many substantial challenges posed by the elections’ administration and environments. For example, it was extremely difficult to train or provide accurate information or TA when final INEC guidelines for observers were released the week before the first election. NDI often served as an interlocutor and provided or distributed accurate information to partner networks as soon as it was available.

INEC guidelines presented an extremely narrow view of the role of domestic monitors in particular. In many polling stations, well-trained monitors often knew more than the polling station officials and were asked to serve in capacities beyond their mandated authority. This made resorting to presiding officers difficult where malpractices were observed. To its credit, INEC recognized that linkages to, and constructive dialogue with, domestic monitoring groups was in its best interest. INEC established a Consultative Forum that assisted in addressing key concerns.

Primary among these concerns was the issue of accreditation – an issue that threatened to derail domestic monitoring especially for larger groups like TMG and Labor. As originally conceived, INEC would have required organizations to present their entire proposed lists of monitors before accreditation could begin, meaning that TMG, for example, would have had to provide all 10,000 monitors’ names before receiving credentials. All accredited monitors were also to complete a form and provide two photographs. NDI and its partners, through the INEC Consultative Forum, developed a compromise process that allowed domestic monitoring organizations to establish a rolling accreditation process, submitting forms and photographs as completed.

A final major challenge was the general lack of effective voter and civic education. All participants agreed during post-elections consultations with NDI that this is a critical area that needs to be addressed before the 2007 elections.
Lessons Learned

While the lessons learned from the 2003 elections is, and should continue to be, an ongoing process, NDI, through it post-election consultations noted the following major lessons learned that were shared by almost all participants in the project:

1. The process of preparing for elections must begin much earlier than was the case in 2003. In fact, efforts should be made to coordinate and collaborate with likely domestic monitors throughout the intervening period between now and the 2007 elections.
2. Support to domestic monitoring should be decentralized, including support for monitors’ training. Careful attention and application of selection criteria are required for both master trainers and monitors.
3. Master trainers are often underutilized. They can be an effective resource for monitoring, particularly during Election Days, and for providing preliminary analyses of checklists and IRFs.
4. Nigerian civil society should consider conducting parallel vote tabulations (PVT) for the 2007 elections to address Nigeria’s complicated vote tabulation process that proved to be a source of many electoral malpractices observed by domestic groups in 2003.
5. More training is required in completing and analyzing checklists and IRFs and care should be taken to incorporate country-appropriate terminology and usage. Instructions for use of the forms should probably be a separate document.
6. Candor and accountability about the resources that are available to partners and better resource-sharing strategies are needed. In this respect, donors play a key role, and their coordination and involvement are essential.
7. Intensive TA and training is needed in managing multifaceted projects. In many instances, problems of logistics, information flow, poor planning and inadequate budgeting skills hampered project implementation.
8. Technology transfer should be the objective of NDI and all international organizations involved in supporting domestic monitoring.
9. Domestic monitoring groups should examine ways in which they can integrate civic and voter education with domestic observation efforts. In 2003, it appeared that many voters did not understand their rights or the roles of monitors in upholding those rights.
10. The data processing approach pioneered in 2003 should be strengthened and replicated. In addition, a review of local systems capacity (i.e., Internet, broadband, etc.) should be undertaken so that DTCs can be better positioned and more organizations can benefit from the system.
11. NDI and partner organizations should continue to engage with INEC, particularly as it appears that INEC will be undertaking some internal restructuring and reforms. Perhaps an ongoing dialogue will further reduce mistrust or suspicion and result in more effective election strategies and implementation in 2007.
I. Introduction

A. Primary Objectives

NDI began working in Nigeria in 1998 when the Institute provided TA, primarily to TMG, during the 1998-99 elections and fielded an international observer mission. Since that time, NDI has continued to work in the country by conducting legislative strengthening activities with the National Assembly. In April 2003, NDI again provided TA to domestic monitoring organizations and fielded an international observer mission. NDI learned numerous lessons from its first foray into Nigeria’s electoral systems and sought to apply those lessons in the period between 1999 and 2003. This report is an account of those lessons and reflects NDI’s – rather than partners’ – experiences and observations. For example:

- NDI learned that Nigeria’s electoral processes were as complicated as the country itself. NDI depended upon informed local partners to advise and help make effective decisions about strategies and activities.
- Many of NDI’s local partners had substantial needs, especially TA to build capacity for planning, resource mobilization, advocacy, information flow and exchange, monitoring and reporting.
- TMG and its members used laborious manual processes to review data and often resorted to anecdotal information for its 1998-99 statements and reports, citing this as a major challenge. This was one factor that led to the creation of the sophisticated database and data processing approach described in Section IV.
- Many organizations had trouble mobilizing resources and sustaining activities between 1999 and 2003, so some had to re-tool and begin anew as late as January or February to prepare for the April 2003 elections.
- Donors had other priorities and programs during the intervening period between 1999 and 2003 that inhibited their investment in ongoing civic and voter education activities.

NDI’s objectives were shaped by these realities but initially it had scant resources to address them. In fact, until early December 2002, the Institute’s election activities were associated with its joint international observer mission with The Carter Center (USA). Nonetheless, between January and April 2003, NDI/Nigeria and its local partners were able to design an efficient and effective domestic monitoring program that yielded several firsts for such programs in Nigeria.

Several program objectives were the foundation for organizing and providing technical support for domestic monitoring, but others evolved as the program faced challenges, including lack of timely information, abrupt changes in procedures and direction and inaction by INEC. The domestic monitoring program also had to harmonize different agendas of several domestic groups and ensure better coordination, collaboration and information flow. In addition, to ensure local ownership of the domestic monitoring process, NDI held several consultative meetings with potential partners to define appropriate program objectives.

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4 Ultimately, The Carter Center did not participate in the international observer mission.
Initially, local partners had some similar objectives, but many were non-collaborative. As discussion proceeded, individual group and organizational objectives became more complementary and the Institute sought to maximize these synergies by asking domestic partners to use the same tools and techniques in their own circumstances and environments.

### A Series of Firsts

**NDI implemented many ground-breaking initiatives for Nigeria, including:**

- Using the same master trainers and monitors manuals for all groups.
- Using the same techniques to train, follow up and deploy monitors at grassroots levels.
- Using the same checklists and incident report forms.
- Using the same database and data processing facilities.
- Using a decentralized data collection and entry system, which employed the Internet for data transfer.
- Joining with domestic and international partners in regular consultative forum meetings with INEC.
- Assisting partners in analyzing data that reflected actual statistical aggregates from their monitors and preparing interim statements no later than 48 to 72 hours after each election.
- Transferring databases and technology to partners, preparing a Manual for systems use and providing on-going TA.

- Establish mechanisms by which local partners could receive data from monitors around the nation that facilitated rapid analysis and contributed to the preparation of credible and probative interim statements and recommendations.
- Prepare partners to use nationwide mobilization techniques and supporting technical systems for future election observation efforts, including providing database tools and information management techniques.
- Assist local partners in interfacing more effectively with INEC, especially through the accreditation process.
- Develop a comprehensive list of lessons learned to be shared with principal stakeholders, including local partners, the global NDI community, other implementing partners (IP), donors and Nigerian agencies involved in the electoral process.
Encourage local partners to strategize on building capacity and conducting additional activities, such as civic education and advocacy for election law reform, in the intervening period between 2003 and 2007.

Increase the public’s respect for and appreciation of the contributions of domestic monitoring groups in ensuring transparent, fair and legal procedures that protect and uphold the rights of Nigerian voters and deter fraud.

For the most part, these objectives were met. Groups coordinated their efforts in unprecedented ways, especially at the level of implementation (i.e., Local Government Areas (LGAs) or grassroots locations):
- Meeting to discuss ways to reduce redundancy in observing at polling stations (i.e., spreading monitors around to other stations so that there was only one trained monitor for each station);
- Transporting each other’s checklists and incident report forms to one joint NIC in Abuja or to the nearest DTC;
- Joining in reporting major or recurring infractions to INEC;
- Implementing conflict management strategies; and
- Reconvening after the elections to share lessons learned and the way forward.

Equally important, NDI worked with several new groups – some observing elections for the first time – and identified potential partners for future activities while transferring skills to them applicable in other areas, such as advocacy, participatory processes, training and planning.

B. Organizing Principles

NDI recognized at the onset of this project that assisting and participating in domestic monitoring activities would be resource intensive and worked with partners to find ways to reduce burdens for itself and partner organizations. The result was a high degree of mutually beneficial interaction that bodes well for future collaboration among civil society organizations (CSOs). Some achievements were particularly impressive as Nigeria is a complex country and the organizational mix of local partners – faith-based, gender oriented, human rights focused, grassroots, ecumenical, development and peace building groups – was equally complex and unique. NDI adopted a method of project implementation that enabled it and its partners to function effectively. As the section of this report on lessons learned indicates, the method was not always completely or smoothly implemented, and some things might have been done differently with more positive impact. But overall, the partners achieved a level of collaboration that is not often characteristic of multiparty efforts.

C. Project Activities

The team adopted an operating style that was at once interactive and structured to achieve objectives and maximize performance in a highly decentralized and complex environment. The table below describes the basic pattern of project activities.
Basic Pattern for Project Activities

- Conduct consultations with partners.
- Develop and produce joint materials for distribution.
- Conduct master trainers’ seminars.\(^5\)
- Assist master trainers in planning step-down training for local monitors and coordinating with other local groups to ensure strategic deployment.
- Refine and distribute checklists and incident report forms – for each election stream and run-offs if necessary – for distribution to trained monitors.
- Develop communications strategy taking into account partner capacities, logistical and infrastructural conditions, and reporting time requirements.
- Develop reporting and analysis tools (reports) that assess INEC, party and public behavior with respect to partner priorities and adherence to electoral law, norms and standards.
- Build the database for each partner so data from their monitors’ forms can be entered.
- Conduct monitoring visits to identify potential DTCs and determine whether step-down training was occurring.
- Conduct training sessions with partners to explain the communication system including procedures for transferring forms and intervals at which reports would be available.\(^6\)
- Open the NIC and DTCs; train staff from partners, ISPs and other sources on information management and data entry.
- Provide onsite TA for analyzing data and preparing statements.
- Execute parliamentary and presidential election observation programs.
- Conduct consultations with partners on development of interim statements.
- Transfer databases and technology to all partners.

Two important issues that emerged during the run-up to the elections were monitoring of partner readiness and ownership of data generated by respective organizations’ monitors. NDI lacked human and financial resources to conduct the kind of project monitoring that would have yielded optimal results, although at least two monitoring trips were made to each of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. A second type of monitoring was done during decentralized one-day seminars on the data collection and processing system, involving all the partners operating in areas contiguous to the NIC or a DTC. These seminars were held on April 8, 2003, in five locations (Abuja, Lagos, Kano, Asaba and Port Harcourt).

\(^5\) An additional seminar on planning and management issues (especially financial management) was conducted for TMG’s zonal and state coordinators.

\(^6\) DTCs were established in Kano, Lagos, Asaba, Port Harcourt and Abuja. A separate drop was established in Kaduna because conditions for implementing a DTC there were not optimum. In addition, while “fast track” forms were to reach the NIC in the fastest way possible (i.e., by fax, through data entry at the DTCs, or by physical transfer) there was some confusion about the fast track mechanism; some coordinators kept all forms until a critical mass was reached – a situation NDI anticipated. Also, familiarization with DTCs among partners was conducted in a decentralized fashion to assist them in discussing local coordination, collaboration and strategic deployment. This initiative was viewed positively.
With hindsight, it is clear that the process would have benefited from more extensive and careful NDI monitoring of the step-down training or an on-the-job critique of step-down training conducted by master trainers. NDI facilitators might also have conducted training sessions for master trainers to observe and participate in as a way of transferring skills. Step-down training of monitors was frequently derailed and delayed due to difficulties with INEC in securing accreditation of monitors (or “domestic observers” as INEC guidelines described them) or because of partners’ logistical and other problems. Distribution of funds and materials were frequently cited as problematic, but other factors played a role, such as lack of planning and focus by domestic groups, insufficient human resources, or budgeted funds to adequately monitor training sessions.

As for ownership of data, NDI agreed that partners should have complete ownership and control over data generated by their monitors. This was somewhat controversial, as others who are also stakeholders in the process (e.g., donors) were interested to know details about monitors’ observations and findings at polling stations. The NDI database built in firewalls to segregate each partner’s data; provided specific correlations and reports; and gave performance data by state. These data, both electronic and completed paper forms, were transferred to partners at the end of the presidential/gubernatorial elections for both rounds. A manual for using the database was also prepared. NDI lacked resources to assist partners in monitoring elections for state Houses of Assembly but provided TA to local partners who did so, namely the TMG and the CEDPA consortium (See Section IV and Annex E).

As NDI headquarters was coordinating an international observer mission and making statements based on those participants’ observations, the Institute adopted a policy of not making statements about domestic monitoring. Moreover, NDI recognized that domestic monitoring was sensitive, and its local partners owned the terrain – that is, they expected an uncluttered political space for making their own observations and recommendations. NDI played a facilitative role in relationships with local organizations and learned significant lessons as a result of working in the background.

This report describes the principal actors in greater detail; presents NDI’s achievements; outlines the challenges NDI faced and the lessons learned as a result; and makes a series of recommendations to strengthen government monitoring in the period between 2003 and 2007. Clearly, these are issues and programs that should be given more, not less, support during the intervening period – this is one of the most significant lessons learned from NDI’s work during the 2003 elections.
II. Principal Actors

The importance of developing and nurturing local monitoring efforts by encouraging non-partisan domestic election monitoring groups cannot be understated. This stance has allowed NDI to play a role in promoting non-partisan, fair and generally acceptable election processes in the more than 70 countries in which it has worked on such initiatives. Domestic monitoring aims to yield four positive results: a) building public confidence; b) deterring fraud; c) promoting citizens’ participation; and d) verifying results. In Nigeria, during the 2003 elections, the first three results were realized, but the last – verifying results – requires more intensive efforts in Nigeria’s complicated environment if domestic monitoring is to succeed in the future (See Section V).

In the 2003 elections, NDI expanded the scope and number of domestic monitoring groups it assisted compared with 1998-99 and worked with an unprecedented alliance of approximately 10 CSOs. While the TMG was the dominant group and the largest coalition of civil society organizations among NDI’s partner during the 2003 elections, a significant breakthrough was achieved in collaborating with other civil society groups.

For example, participation by faith-based organizations FOMWAN/MULAC and IMC; women monitors’ groups, including Outreach Foundation; groups observing under the CEDPA banner, such as the International Federation of Women’s Lawyers (FIDA), the Country Women’s Association of Nigeria (COWAN), the Church of Christ’s Women’s Federation, and the National Council of Women’s Societies (NCWS); and youth-oriented organizations, such as Youth for Environment and Development Activities (YEDA), vastly increased and was generally more professional than previous efforts. Participation by these groups – many for the first time on such a large scale – also generated widespread interest throughout civil society and created options for future collaboration. (See Annex A for a detailed description of NDI’s domestic monitoring partners.)

Most of NDI’s 2003 election monitoring partners concentrated mainly in areas where they have good geographical coverage and in-depth knowledge of local environments. With the exception of the TMG and LEMT (both deployed monitors throughout the 36 states and the FCT other groups limited their coverage to states where they have comparative advantages in terms of membership; familiarity with the area’s institutional mix, norms and values; and the ability to penetrate communities that would have been ordinarily difficult for outside monitors to mobilize (e.g., FOMWAN and MULAC's decision to work in 15 predominantly Islamic states in the North). This enriched these groups’ contributions and ensured mutual learning by NDI and partner organizations.
III. Domestic Monitoring Program

Three factors provided context and ultimately helped define NDI’s domestic monitoring program. First, the election calendar provided for three successive rounds of polls: National Assembly on April 12, presidential/gubernatorial on April 19 and state Houses of Assembly on May 3. Second, NDI was asked to provide TA to domestic monitors very late in the process and was unable to implement any major program activities until January 2003. Finally, coordination of multiple partners proved more difficult than originally thought, especially when some of the major partners were themselves coalitions of several distinct groups. Despite these problems, partners’ positive and mutually beneficial collaborations enabled both domestic monitoring groups and NDI to make lasting contributions that should be built upon in future elections.

In 2003, NDI’s largest IPs – the TMG and the LEMT – attempted to improve upon their 1998-99 election monitoring efforts. In large part, NDI’s success was tied to how well it helped these two major partners meet this objective. Reflecting consultations with and inputs from its partners, NDI made substantial changes and adopted significantly improved strategies to implement its domestic monitoring program for the 2003 elections.

Table 1: Domestic Monitoring Group Deployment Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Monitoring Partners</th>
<th>Monitor Deployment Target</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Presidential/ Gubernatorial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>7,848</td>
<td>8,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEMT</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>3,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMWAN/MULAC</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>1,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YGC</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17,480</td>
<td>12,834</td>
<td>15,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both TMG and LEMT successfully recruited, trained and deployed monitors during the 1998-99 elections cycle. TMG, in particular, launched an impressive inaugural monitoring effort by deploying 10,000 monitors spread over every state. However, both

7 In 2003, NDI and TMG, its principle partner during the 1998-1999 elections cycle, sometimes had severely strained relations because of factors, including a) intensive donor interest in and independent support of TMG that was determined and announced before NDI began its domestic monitoring initiatives; b) feelings among a number of influential TMG officials that NDI and others had not continued to consistently provide needed capacity building or other support between 1999 and 2003; and c) significant staff turnover and reorganization of TMG senior staff that affected institutional memory and procedures. In the final analysis there was mutual learning and productive collaboration that overcame most of these difficulties.
groups had difficulty in assembling information culled from their monitors’ checklists into a cogent report. In fact, despite deploying several hundred monitors, the NLC did not publish a final report on its findings in 1999, while the TMG did issue interim statements for each election and a final comprehensive report. Still, these reports were largely anecdotal and lacked quantifiable information. It was therefore apparent that assistance in analyzing vast quantities of information in a timely manner would be beneficial to both groups.

Many more domestic groups wanted to monitor the 2003 elections than had come forth in 1998-99. NDI’s work during the 2003 elections was influential in expanding the pool of groups involved in domestic monitoring beyond the principle actors involved in 1998-99. With assistance from the Political and Community Empowerment (PACE) Consortium and USAID, among others, NDI was able to identify and work with a total of 11 groups: seven major partners and four that were supported by CEDPA as one umbrella domestic monitoring team. NDI established close relationships with several of its new partners’ leadership to guide them through their monitoring debut.

Based on its institutional capacity and access to financial resources, each group set goals for the number of monitors it planned to deploy. Table 1 below shows targets and performance. The Table should be reviewed with several caveats, including the fact that some organizations actually deployed more monitors but were unable to collect and collate some forms in time to be included in the official databases. NDI was keenly interested in hearing from partners about the logistical and other challenges that affected attainment of targets. It therefore conducted in-depth consultations around the country and with partners’ leadership to identify impediments and recommendations for greater effectiveness and efficiency. (See Section V.)

A. Training

Given the mammoth task of training almost 18,000 monitors in eight weeks, NDI adopted the cascade or training of trainers (TOT) methodology. Under this model, NDI assumed responsibility for the first tier of training and the second tier or step-down training was organized and facilitated by each monitoring group.

In the first tier training, master trainers received instruction for two days on basic principles of election observation, information on election procedures and skills in workshop facilitation. These trainings were designed to balance the need for

Examples of Master Trainer Handouts

- Electoral procedures and offenses (culled from the INEC Manual for Polling Officials 2003 in the absence of observer guidelines)
- Do’s and don’t’s of monitoring
- Monitoring on Election Day
- Tips on training monitors
- Common sense planning tips (including action plan and events planning formats)
- Additional exercises, role plays and icebreakers
- Developing and monitoring training plans
- Dealing with difficult behaviors in training
- Program and financial report formats and procedural guidelines for preparing reports
- Examples of open-ended questions to facilitate interactive sessions
- Checklists, incident report forms for review, discussion and revision as needed
- Election Day simulation kits (see next box)
- Master trainer and monitor manuals
Master trainers were shown how to conduct an Election Day simulation. This was viewed as an important tool because many potential Monitors had little or no frame of reference for understanding election procedures and being able to spot infractions or problems to be documented and reported. For Master Trainers to fully understand the exercise, they actually participated in a simulation and then discussed what they had observed. Not only was this highly interactive session a great success at every Workshop, it also evoked great comedic and other talents as participants enacted the best, and the worst, that they might observe in polling stations.

Participants were asked to volunteer for or were assigned roles, such as polling station officials, security agents, monitors, party agents and voters. Some were asked to commit an infraction to see if others would observe it. Others were asked to use the checklists and incident report forms as observers to increase their familiarity with the forms and see if the forms were appropriate.

The steps in the simulation mirrored those in polling stations:

A. Nametags were given.
B. T
   placed to show what was happening at each stage or location.
C. The presiding officer opens the polling station.
D. Properly accredited and
   some create or have problems.
E. Voting ensues; some voters
   create or have problems.
F. Voting ends and counting takes place.
G. P
   and points for emphasis in training.
H. Forms are completed & taken to Collation Centers.
I. The master trainer
   discusses the entire exercise and
   identifies key issues and points for emphasis in training.

All master trainers were given simulation kits to use in step-down monitor training workshops.

In addition, since INEC’s electoral guidelines were not published until one week before the April 12 polls, NDI’s workshops were the only reliable source of detailed information on the balloting process. In this respect, the master trainer workshops were one part civic education forums and one part capacity building seminars. The NDI Team prepared several handouts; many were conceptualized by workshop facilitators for master trainers’ use and based on original thinking and experience with other monitoring programs. The box at the left lists the most important handouts and points for emphasis in training.

IDASA’s toolkit on conflict reduction or the PACE Consortium’s simulated ballot for civic education (see Annex D), these too were distributed during master trainers’ workshops for use in step-down monitor training. To promote ownership, training materials were customized for each major group. In particular, the master trainer and monitor manuals included specific sections on TMG’s and LEMT’s background and rationales for

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8 During the initial training, in the absence of official INEC guidelines, NDI and its partners adopted the term “domestic monitors” to connote local citizens who would be observing elections. This seemed consistent with their roles, with previous experience in Nigeria and other African countries and
monitoring elections. Consistent with the dual purpose of imparting election-specific information as well as training skills, the Master Trainer Manuals included a summary of the election procedures, a list of monitors’ roles and responsibilities, model training workshop agendas, instructions on conducting an Election Day simulation and perforated handouts or exercises. Monitor manuals incorporated user-friendly icons and graphics, diagrams of a proper voting booth set-up and a Monitor’s Pledge.

Partners were consulted in preparing the manuals. NDI also drew upon voter education and monitor manuals from Nigeria’s 1998-99 elections, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Namibia and Zambia to reflect the African electoral context and ensure their relevance to the Nigerian situation.

By traveling to nine states covering all six geopolitical zones, NDI trained more than 375 master trainers – 144 for TMG, 116 for LEMT, 39 for MULAC, 29 for CEDPA, 24 for FOMWAN and 23 for the Outreach Foundation. (See the activities schedule in Annex B for more details.) All training and deployment materials including manuals, checklists and incident report forms were uniform; and international norms and standards were observed. Although JDPC – a very large domestic monitoring group affiliated with the Catholic Church – did not participate in master trainer workshops, they used the same manuals, checklists and forms. This was a significant feat in that for the first time Nigeria mounted a truly national monitoring effort in which all domestic monitors (observers) had the same training and tools for capturing election information.

Several organizations expressed an interest in organizing their own domestic monitoring effort at the eleventh hour. Due to time constraints and limited resources NDI could not include these groups in its master training scheme. However, to broaden the monitoring pool, NDI made arrangements to train 35 monitors for YGC and 23 monitors for IMC. NDI contributed materials, resources and TA to a civil society organization in Delta State that wanted to monitor to curb anticipated violence in several LGAs.

In addition to organizing and facilitating master trainer and monitor workshops, NDI also conducted workshops on other election-related topics. For example, to help build TMG’s capacity, NDI financed and facilitated a workshop in Lagos for 37 state and six zonal coordinators and four staff in February 2003 on project and financial management. This workshop was designed to help TMG institute more rigorous systems for program reporting and accounting.

NDI participated in a materials development workshop convened by TMG early in the process in Kaduna. This workshop provided essential inputs and feedback on drafts that were used in preparing the final training materials. Similarly, NDI traveled to Kano to participate in a workshop for FOMWAN/MULAC state coordinators to help them develop a strategy for deploying their monitors in northern states. Heads or senior officials of partner organizations were invited to a buy-in meeting to explain the project’s proposed comprehensive data processing approach and secure their willingness to participate.

international norms and standards. However, as discussions with INEC unfolded, it became clear that the term preferred by the Commission was “domestic observers.” Thereafter, NDI facilitators were careful to emphasize the proper nomenclature and permitted activities of domestic observers under the guidelines.
Decentralized workshops were also held at DTCs to explain the Communication System and planned flow of information on Election Day for state coordinators from all local partners. Finally, NDI hosted a one-day seminar on analyzing election data for partners’ senior staff who would be involved in report writing.

In all, **NDI had more than 540 training contacts** during the election period. It distributed approximately 475 copies of its master trainer manual, 4,000 monitor manuals, 50 project management manuals, 90,000 checklists and 180,000 incident report forms. On the following pages, participant feedback from selected workshops is illustrated graphically. Evaluations on the overall workshop, including materials and facilitation, were extremely positive. Unfortunately, no comparable data is available for the step-down training of monitors. This is one aspect of the project planning and implementation that, as Section V indicates, would be remedied by more systematic monitoring, demonstration and critique of step-down monitor training at the grassroots level.

### B. Analysis of Workshop Evaluations and Feedback

The following charts illustrate evaluations of a representative sample of workshops facilitated by NDI. In general, these findings and comments were reflected across all workshops and among all participants. In some instances, respondents skipped a question, so that all samples do not add up to 100 percent, and in a few instances participants left before the evaluation forms were distributed. However, these charts provide a generally accurate and consistent picture of all responses received from the evaluations of Master Trainer workshop participants.

Most participants expressed enthusiasm about the workshops and rated key aspects as excellent or very good. Respondents felt that facilitators had a good grasp of the subject matter and were accessible and organized. One noted, “the commitment of the trainers and the trainees was remarkable” and was particularly impressed by the commitment from those who don't have a direct stake in the Nigerian elections.

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9 NDI distributed one customized checklist for each of approximately 18,000 potential monitors/election for each of five possible elections (the three major elections and two possible run offs) or 90,000 checklists and two customized incident report forms for each potential monitor and each election or 180,000 forms. This total does not include those given to JDPC for their use.
Workshop Duration: Aggregate of 4 LEMT Workshops

Workshop Duration: Aggregate Views From Other Partners' Workshops
There was a marked difference of opinion on duration, with most of the LEMT participants finding the workshops too short, while most other groups found it to be about right. Generally, the materials were praised and 100 percent of the respondents felt that they had acquired the necessary information to fully understand the electoral process and serve as an effect Master Trainer. Many participants felt that interaction among participants was either excellent or very good.

The evaluations yielded numerous constructive suggestions and NDI incorporated those suggestions into their program. For example, several respondents suggested that NDI solicit INEC participation. An invitation was then extended to INEC to send a speaker or representative to all subsequent training sessions, although they were not always available. Many participants also requested additional INEC materials or updated information on the Electoral Act. These were difficult to respond to, as NDI’s program did not include assistance to INEC in the production of materials. INEC did not produce most of its materials until immediately before the elections (i.e., after training), and the Electoral Act was in litigation during most of the training period.

While several respondents praised the workshops’ structure and interactive character, many felt that the agenda was too tight and more breaks were needed. These respondents were generally those who also suggested that the duration of the workshops be increased. Some recommended that additional small-group work, role-plays or simulations would have helped participants more fully understand technical aspects of election monitoring. Some made specific suggestions for additional materials but these suggestions varied by organization. For example, MULAC members seemed concerned about having more information on conflict management, while CEDPA was interested in the impact of the electoral process on women and techniques to get them to participate more.
Other very useful, practical suggestions that could be incorporated into future workshops included:

- Contextualizing the materials even more, taking into account the "Nigeria factors," especially socio-economic problems and inter-ethnic or inter-religious strife that could "threaten Nigeria’s nascent democracy."
- Relying less on Nigerian resource persons to present papers and using them more as co-facilitators.
- Using a similar interactive workshop approach for civic education, particularly in rural areas.
- Conducting refresher courses during the intervening period between 2003 and 2007 so that master trainers have a more in-depth understanding of the technical aspects of electoral processes and appropriate training techniques.
- Trying to send materials in advance so that participants have time to study them before the workshops.
- Integrating presentations by persons who have monitored other elections.
- Including comparative analyses of other African electoral systems and distribution of materials prepared by Nigerian groups such as TMG.
- Trying to get more media coverage of the workshops and their topics such as a simulcast of some sessions on radio.
- Continuing to find ways to distinguish between training monitors and actually monitoring (a source of confusion for many master trainers).

NDI, like all groups working on domestic monitoring, had significant human and financial resource constraints but succeeded in making a lasting contribution by creating a pool of well-prepared, enthusiastic master trainers who then trained others.

C. Strategic Thinking

One challenge for domestic monitoring groups was trying to cover the 120,000 INEC polling stations throughout the country. Even with a well-coordinated effort, there were not enough accredited domestic monitors to cover every polling station. Consequently, NDI advised its partners to use criteria such as population density, number of polling stations in a specific area and potential for violence when drafting deployment plans. Smaller groups, such as FOMWAN/MULAC and Outreach Foundation, particularly benefited from this approach. In addition, larger groups such as TMG and LEMT who planned to deploy monitors in every LGA found that applying these criteria enhanced the effectiveness of their monitoring efforts by placing monitors at polling stations where there was greater likelihood of larger numbers of voters and more opportunities to observe if voting irregularities occurred.

NDI encouraged groups to share their deployment plans to avoid duplication of monitors and ensure maximum polling station coverage. Master trainers gave monitors instructions that if they arrived at a polling station where another NDI-trained monitor was stationed they should relocate to another polling site. Although these instructions were not always followed, they reflected a commitment by these groups to cooperate and share scarce resources. Although some international observers noted the presence of more than one monitor at some polling stations, NDI’s independent review of monitors’ checklists and incident report forms showed that only 555 covered polling
stations had more than one monitor from domestic partner groups during the National Assembly elections. The figure was slightly higher for the presidential and gubernatorial elections (approximately 610), but the number of monitors was also higher.

A number of groups took the issue of strategic deployment very seriously. For example, FOMWAN and MULAC conducted a one-day strategic thinking seminar in Kaduna attended by all state and deputy state coordinators and facilitated by NDI and the PACE Consortium. After developing specific criteria for selecting target polling stations in the 15-state area of coverage, participants used maps, census reports, the INEC 2003 polling station lists, program analyses and other documents to pinpoint where they would deploy in each state. Participants prepared a matrix listing their choices of polling stations to cover by state and by LGA. They also committed to discussing their preliminary selections with other domestic monitoring groups working in those states to minimize duplication.

D. Data Gathering, Transfer and Reporting

As noted, one of NDI’s principle objectives was to improve the quantitative and qualitative reporting of monitoring groups’ efforts through their release of interim statements to the media. Standardization of the checklists and incident report forms was a prerequisite for implementing a communication system that would provide reports and analysis in a timely fashion. However, the cultural significance of this achievement cannot be overstated. Convincing CSOs with different regional, religious and other areas of interest in a country as ethnically and religiously diverse as Nigeria to adopt the same training methodology and use the same materials was unprecedented. NDI designed these forms in collaboration with its partners and tested their user-friendliness at Master Trainer workshops. After working through several drafts, final documents were produced bearing the name of each monitoring group. (See a sample checklist and incident report form in Annex E.)

As the repository of information forming the basis for all election analyses, monitors’ checklists and incident report forms were the foundation of the partners’ communication system. All training, deployment plans, logistical arrangements, technology and coordination centered on transferring checklists from the monitor to a centralized data processing facility managed by NDI in consultation with partner state coordinators. Once again, the significance of this level of cooperation and collaboration cannot be overstated. Nigeria is a country characterized by distrust and suspicion. Initially some groups balked at the idea of releasing control of their checklists and incident report forms into a shared data transfer mechanism. Others had concerns about the security of their election data even with regard to other Nigerian partners. However, NDI reassured and ultimately convinced all groups that safeguards would be put in place to ensure that they would have sole access to, and control over, their data.
Another benefit of NDI serving as a principle coordinator for domestic monitoring activities was improved coordination and communication among monitoring groups. In addition to the historic partnership between TUC and NLC to form the LEMT, other groups and CSO networks assisted each other in delivering forms to the DTCs and the NIC.

Each election was conducted on a Saturday. Beginning on Saturday evening after the closing of the polls, DTCs and the NIC operated around the clock, staffed with three eight-hour shifts of data entry staff and team members functioning as supervisors in order to ensure that a substantial percentage of forms were processed by noon on the Monday following Election Day. Section IV details the number of forms processed. More important than the number, each domestic monitoring partner was able to make an interim statement within 48 to 72 hours of each election based on quantitative aggregate data from the checklists returned by their monitors. (See news clips featuring TMG and Labor statements in Annex D.) In the view of many commentators, these statements were extremely persuasive, well documented, probative, clear and of high quality – in many ways an improvement from those statements issued for the 1998-99 election.

These interim statements, particularly those issued following the National Assembly elections highlighted the late arrival of voting materials, poorly trained election officials and lack of voter secrecy, thereby increasing pressure on INEC to make changes before presidential elections the following weekend. INEC issued additional guidelines based upon domestic monitoring group observations and dispatched headquarters and local INEC officials to reinforce them. Consequently, logistics for the April 19 presidential and gubernatorial elections were vastly improved, and reports indicated that voting materials arrived the night before, thereby ensuring that most polling stations opened on time. Election officials also were reported to be more knowledgeable about the election procedures and provisions to protect voter secrecy were strengthened. (See FOMWAN/MULAC April 22, 2003, Press Release in Annex D.)

E. Technology Transfer

Due to limited financial resources, NDI was not able to maintain the decentralized communication system for the state Houses of Assembly elections. However, as part of
its commitment to sustainable development, NDI transferred the database along with documentation and training to each domestic monitoring partner. In the interim between the presidential and state assembly elections, NDI conducted site visits to each partner’s office to inspect their existing software and hardware and determined their compatibility with the database. NDI staff also offered TA in upgrading and networking equipment in readiness for further use of the database and provided contact information for its trained data entry staff for use by partners as needed. Priority was given to installing the database for groups planning to monitor the state assembly elections.

With technical support from NDI, the TMG and the consortium of women’s groups under CEDPA used the database system at their facilities in Abuja to process their own checklists and produce reports using the database. Both groups also made interim statements based on the data they processed. (See COWAN/NCWS May 4, 2003 Press Release at Annex D.)

Although other groups did not monitor the state assembly elections, many have reported plans to expand the database for internal usage. For instance, the NLC requested that the database be installed in the office of its secretary general to maximize its organizational management. With the permission of its partners, NDI may, in the future, provide a copy of the database to an academic institution, such as the Political Science Department at the University of Jos or the Center for Advanced Legal Studies at the University of Lagos, for archival and research purposes.

F. Interface with INEC

Relations between CSOs and INEC were often tense. INEC’s seeming intransigence or inability to meet reasonable deadlines for implementing or disseminating vital guidelines and completing other aspects of Nigeria’s electoral process exacerbated these tensions. As mentioned above, INEC’s observer guidelines, which should have been part of the basis for training and domestic monitoring groups’ own procedural guidance, were issued during the week of the first election. This precluded their use and forced NDI and others to rely on copies of the polling officials manuals obtained through informal channels (also not issued in a timely fashion) and copies of the draft observer guidelines.

To its credit, INEC realized that the latent hostility between INEC, domestic groups and their sources of support was not helpful to the overall effort and thus convened a consultative forum of several domestic and international groups, including NDI, in March 2003. The Forum met regularly to discuss the contents of the observer guidelines and other pressing issues. The process itself was very cordial and constructive, but one of
the outcomes – the requirements for accreditation of all observers – created significant burdens for all domestic monitoring groups.

Initially, INEC insisted on receiving a list of all monitors for each organization before transmitting necessary documentation for accrediting each monitor. Not only was this an implausible workload for INEC in so short a time (accrediting 35,000 to 50,000 monitors at once) but it also was illogical for domestic monitoring groups who would only choose monitors after training them and observing their performance at workshops.

Under INEC’s proposed accreditation procedures, all observer groups (domestic and international) were required to provide two passport size photos and a completed form for each person intending to monitor. The cards were to be laminated with one photograph affixed; the second was to be attached to the form. Most international observer groups were relatively small (i.e., under 100 persons), and this process also coincided with their own credentialing and visa processes thus posing few difficulties. However, this process created significant financial and logistical problems for most domestic groups (e.g., TMG, LEMT and JDPC all of whom planned to deploy thousands of monitors nationwide). An additional complicating factor was that INEC promised to facilitate accreditation at the state level through INEC resident commissioners, but this process proved to be very disappointing as most Commissioners claimed to know nothing about this agreement.

Since most organizations had yet to begin step-down training for monitors, it was impossible to compile lists in advance. NDI strongly advocated on this issue which resulted in INEC conceding this point and issuing the number of forms and badges requested by organizations in advance. The organizations were then responsible for processing the forms and cards and returning them to INEC at least three days before the first election. Some organizations adopted a rolling process of submitting requests for accreditation and sent in lists as they were compiled or following each step-down training session. This meant that time was taken to fill in accreditation application forms and collect or take passport size photos at each step-down training workshop. Most groups were able to satisfy INEC’s compromise requirements and secure accreditation for a majority of those wishing to monitor.
IV. Domestic Monitoring Election System (DOMES 2003)

A. Communication System Overview

A crucial element of any domestic monitoring effort is an effective and efficient system for collecting, transmitting, tabulating and analyzing of monitors’ checklists. NDI worked with local partners to develop the DOMES system to address this challenge, taking into account the difficult infrastructure and information management issues in Nigeria. NDI’s partners in Nigeria had identified this as a priority problem and one of the biggest challenges they faced during the 1998-99 elections. In response, NDI assembled a team of local and international IT experts to conduct a pilot project and implement a locally appropriate communication network while increasing domestic partner capacity in this area for future elections.

The establishment of a sophisticated, accessible, multi-faceted communication system was a first on two levels. It was the first time NDI had attempted this kind of decentralized data entry and transfer initiative anywhere in the world. It was also the first time that such an effort was implemented in Nigeria. The communication system was nicknamed “DOMES” for Domestic Monitoring and Election System.

Through consultations with partners, NDI developed the DOMES system to transmit, tabulate and analyze monitors’ checklists and incident report forms from a representative sample of polling stations within 48 hours of the end of voting. DOMES was also designed to transmit, tabulate and analyze monitors’ checklists and incident report forms from all remaining polling stations in time for inclusion in a final report on the elections.

DOMES was developed to maximize limited resources by developing one system for use by all domestic monitoring organizations, recognizing that different domestic organizations have different needs and hence their data must be kept separately and not mixed with data from other organizations. The system involved:

- Distributing fast track monitor’s checklists to a limited number of monitors in a limited number of states from a limited number of domestic monitoring organizations;
- Distributing “standard” monitor’s checklists to all remaining monitors in all states from all domestic monitoring organizations;
- Creating a system for transmitting fast track monitor’s checklists and incident report forms to the NIC involving faxing fast track monitor’s checklists from state level centers;
- Creating a system for transmitting standard monitor’s checklists and some incident report forms to four DTCs and the NIC by ground transportation;
- Establishing the NIC in Abuja and four DTCs in Asaba, Kano, Lagos and Port Harcourt with computers and data entry personnel where both fast track and standard monitor’s checklist will be entered into a computer;
Establishing reliable and redundant systems for electronic transfer of data from DTCs to the NIC; and

Developing a database for tabulating and analyzing fast track monitor’s checklists, standard monitor’s checklists and incident report forms that keep data from different domestic monitoring organizations separate and confidential.

B. System Components

The DOMES was designed to make data transfer as convenient and rapid as possible. A decentralized system was adopted to accommodate groups working in various locations. The NIC – or the hub of the system – was located at the Chelsea Hotel in Abuja. Five DTCs served as form collection, data entering and transferring points. These points were located in Lagos, Kano, Asaba, Port Harcourt and Kaduna. Observer forms were transferred to DTCs or the NIC by partner organizations. From the DTCs data were entered into the database and transferred electronically via the Internet to the NIC or physically brought into the NIC or DTCs by state coordinators or supervisory monitors.

States served by each DTC were:

- **Lagos** -- Lagos, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Kwara, Ogun
- **Kano** -- Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi
- **Kaduna** -- Kaduna, Taraba, Plateau, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Adamawa
- **Port Harcourt** -- Rivers, Imo, Cross Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Abia
- **Asaba** -- Delta, Anambra, Enugu, Edo, Ebonyi
- **Abuja NIC** -- FTC, Benue, Kogi, Nassarawa, Niger

C. System Elements

In an effort to accelerate the processing of partners’ forms, analyzing partners’ data and issuance of reports, NDI and its partners divided the states into those where so-called fast track forms would also be used, and states where only standard forms would be used; all states had some standard forms. While both forms contained exactly the same information, the fast track forms were distributed proportionally among partners in 15 fast track states (based on the number of monitors they were deploying) to provide an important and timely representative picture of how elections were conducted across Nigeria. Criteria for selecting the fast track states included: a) geographic coverage; b) population density and demographic significance (including unique cultural or population groups); c) hotly contested races at any level; d) areas with a history of conflict or political rivalry; e) areas that partners had designated as priorities. Incident forms also had fast track status. Fast track and incident forms received by state coordinators were processed immediately upon receipt at the various DTCs or faxed to the NIC. The fast track states were:

- Borno
- Enugu
- Kaduna
- Kano
- Kogi
- Kwara
- Lagos
- Nassarawa
- Niger
- Oyo
- Plateau
- Rivers
- Sokoto
- FCT

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10 Kaduna was a drop point only, but several states related to Kaduna for convenience. Regular pick up and delivery of forms to the NIC was instituted.

11 LEMT distributed fast track monitoring checklists to Imo state rather than Rivers state.
Standard forms were used in all 36 states and the FCT. Standard forms were transported by ground to the nearest DTC or to the NIC and were entered continuously as received. However, they were given second priority to fast track and incident forms during the peak 48-hour period after elections on Saturday.

One of the most important objectives of the observation exercise was to analyze aggregate information on happenings at the polling stations. Throughout the post-election period, a range of analytical information and reports were made available to each partner based on the data collected by each partner’s deployed monitors. All observer data were segregated, ensuring each partner was able to only view information collected by its network of observers. Thus, each partner’s data was secure. Following the elections, the secure electronic databases were provided to our partners for further analysis and preparation of final reports. In addition, all paper forms that had been used as inputs for the databases were returned to the respective partner organizations.

D. Level of Coverage

DOMES provided total coverage of the April 12 National Assembly elections and April 19 presidential and gubernatorial elections. Due to financial constraints, NDI was unable to provide comparable services for the third state Houses of Assembly elections on May 3. However, NDI provided full technical support for partners like TMG and CEDPA that monitored this election.

Institutionally, NDI established two types of data management centers. The first – the NIC – was designed to centralize all data and control reporting to partners. It functioned as the DOMES’ nerve center. Partner staff managed the paper flow through the NIC, including logging all forms received, monitoring data entry and filing and sorting the more than 17,000 checklists that flowed through the facility. At least 60 data entry staff (recruited largely from local universities) worked at 20 computers to enter the forms. Reports were generated at intervals allowing partners to track field performance and determine if some states were lagging behind in submitting monitors’ data. The NIC processed data down to the polling station level and could aggregate by LGA, state or zone. Reports included correlations and percentages, and allowed analysts from partner organizations to make comparisons within and among polling stations and areas covered by their monitors (See Annex D for sample reports.) They were also able to discuss the frequency of key positive and negative events in the election process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Report: 9:00 a.m. ED* + 1 (Sun.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Report: 12:00 p.m. ED + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Report: 15:00 ED + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Report: 20:00 ED + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Report: 8:00 a.m. ED + 2 (Mon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Report: 12:00 p.m. ED + 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Other reports/updates available upon partners’ request.]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ED means Election Day.
Training on the Communication System

April 2: Half-day meeting with heads of partner organizations to ensure interest in and will to participate

April 4: One-day meeting with two persons, nominated by the head of each organization, to serve as analysts of data and reports generated by the NIC and assist in writing interim statements and final reports.

April 8: Decentralized one-day meetings with partners’ zonal and state coordinators to discuss communication systems procedures.

April 9-10: Training of data entry staff at the NIC and DTCs on protocols for data entry.

The second tier of centers – the DTCs – was decentralized to make the transfer of checklist and incident report forms easier for partners. DTCs were networked with the NIC so that DTC data entry staff (usually 15 to 21 per site) could enter forms into a local copy of the database or fax the forms to the NIC for processing. Data was electronically transferred to the master database at the NIC on two-hour intervals. Faxing was used more extensively for fast track forms submitted immediately after each election.

In addition, DTC staff served as a resource for partners, providing advice about the best means of collecting and transmitting data to the NIC – the ultimate destination. DTC infrastructure consisted of one server (a laptop) that housed data inputs from six workstations for data entry in a networked environment. DTCs replicated the three-shift, 24-hour approach of the NIC in the periods immediately following elections and, like the NIC, changed to two shifts per day to complete processing of standard and other forms. Data inputs from the various DTCs were exported via the Internet (http transfer, ftp and email systems were in place) to the NIC in Abuja for import into the central database.

Each DTC had a two-person DOMES team to manage its activities and oversee the work of the data entry staff. The team included one IT and one program or training expert so that NDI could provide tailored advice and review all aspects of the reporting process. A partner organization (CEDPA) assisted by providing a program officer who served as part of the DTC management in Kano. Once deployed, the DOMES team began its work by training partner field staff on the use of and procedures required by the communication system, interfaced with the ISP, recruited and trained data entry staff and organized the DTC for action. This approach worked well and appeared to be appreciated by partners’ field operatives who often had encountered the trainers in workshops and felt comfortable discussing issues with them.
E. Implementation

1. Software Application
James Liu, the Database Developer recruited by Geekcorps\textsuperscript{12}, developed a Microsoft Access 2000 database for DOMES. The database used a client/server architecture to capture observer checklists and Incident Reports for each partner and each election. The system allowed data entry staff to designate the partner from which each checklist originated and checklist status (Fast-Track or Standard) as they entered forms so that data could be tagged accordingly for flexible and secure reporting.

2. Data Transfer
The decentralized data entry strategy consisted of local copies of the database residing at each DTC. Data was exported periodically from each DTC database and transferred to the NIC using the Internet. An FTP server was available at the NIC, and a Yahoo! Group facility was set up as was another backup http transfer site (pran.net) and email facilities. Most DTC operators found the Yahoo! Group the most reliable and efficient way to transfer data from the DTC. Email and instant messaging alerts were sent to the NIC after each successful export/transfer. The export files were then downloaded to the NIC server and imported into the database. Mechanisms were in place at the DTC and NICs to ensure that duplicate data was not exported or imported into the master database. A software administration tool was provided so that DTC administrators could easily export only checklist data entered since last export.

3. Reporting
The checklist questions and aggregate reports were designed using an electoral analysis framework facilitated by Vladimir Pran and Richard Klein to establish the following:

- Election Administration (INEC)
  - Central (Abuja)
  - Logistics – materials and polling station production and distribution
  - Competence (training and behavior of election officials)
- Polling Station
  - Knowledge of and Adherence to Electoral Guidelines
  - Evidence of Partisanship
- Political Parties
  - Representation
  - Fair Play
  - Manipulation
- Voters
  - Participation
  - Education
  - Intimidation

See Annex E for sample reports.

\textsuperscript{12} Geekcorps is a US-based, non-profit organization that places international technical volunteers in developing nations. See www.geekcorps.org.
4. Contingency and Scenario Planning

A key to the success of the DOMES system was the backup procedures and scenario planning that ensured that no single point of failure could jeopardize the observation process. The system was designed using basic and well-established techniques and Internet technologies, and several backup systems were always in place to handle problems or failures that arose.

Each DTC and the NIC had completed scenario-planning exercises for anticipated problems. This planning paid off as the following issues were encountered, all of which were dealt with minimal or no interruption and none of which had a negative impact on the system:

- Regular power outages at the NIC and some DTCs;
- Due to heavy rainstorms, DTC facility at Lagos flooded the day before first (parliamentary) election due to heavy rainstorm;
- Serious virus attack originating from rented equipment at Lagos NIC, laptop (server) failover( WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?) to backup server;
- Sporadic operating system and Access incompatibilities resulting in the need to distribute a software patch and new version of the database to each DTC on Election Day and between elections;
- Hardware failure (wireless modem) at NIC resulting in complete Internet blackout for several hours;
- Complete Internet outage at DTC facility and throughout the whole city in Asaba during presidential election period;
- Yahoo! Groups database crash – outage for a short period;
- Poor rental PC equipment at Port Harcourt and Lagos facilities, some requiring hardware service and software upgrades;
- Failed PCs at NIC – replacements on hand.

F. At a Glance – The Elections Database

The tables below indicate the statistical breakdown of the database generated (standard, fast track and incident reports forms) by each partner during the April 12 National Assembly elections and the April 19 presidential and gubernatorial elections.

1. National Assembly Elections Data Processing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Fast Track</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMWAN/MULAC</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOWON</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEMT</td>
<td>2824</td>
<td>2123</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>7848</td>
<td>6769</td>
<td>1079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total**: 12834  10325  2509
2. National Assembly Elections Incident Report Data Processing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Number of Processed Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMWAN/MULAC</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOWON</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEMT</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>1243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1842</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Presidential-Gubernatorial Elections Data Processing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Fast Track</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMWAN/MULAC</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1371</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOWON</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEMT</td>
<td>3772</td>
<td>2606</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTREACH</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>8126</td>
<td>6683</td>
<td>1443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15175</strong></td>
<td><strong>11315</strong></td>
<td><strong>3860</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Presidential-Gubernatorial Elections Incident Report Data Processing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Number of Processed Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMWAN/MULAC</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEMT</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTREACH</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1106</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G. Information Technology Transfer

All observer data was segregated and delivered to each partner after each election. Transfer of information and database technology to partners was accomplished by furnishing each partner with its respective electronic database, training manual and technical assistance for partners’ independent use of the technology. For partners who monitored the May 3 state assembly elections, NDI provided full technical support such as networking computers, installing the DOMES database software and offering helpdesk support. This effort was successful, as shown in Annex D for TMG’s interim statement on the May 3 elections.

V. Challenges & Lessons Learned

Complex projects, such as this one, produce lessons and useful observations at a rapid pace during implementation and thereafter. In some cases, NDI and its partners altered approaches and objectives swiftly and in mid-course, based on changing conditions, resource limitations, or clear indications that the proposed strategy, focus or activity was unfeasible or unwieldy. As a result of consultations and dialogue with partners, changes occurred at all project levels: at the implementation level in the field, during training workshops and at the NIC. This section will highlight the most important lessons learned and the rationale for noting them as priorities.

NDI adopted a decentralized process for deriving and verifying lessons learned in the hope that it would obtain a prismatic and candid view of partners’ concerns and recommendations. First, two members of the NDI Team visited partners’ staff in Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Kano and Kaduna. Then, staff met with the heads of partner organizations or their representatives to obtain their inputs. The process had two components: a set of questions designed to focus and engender discussion on major aspects of the program and a questionnaire to be filled out anonymously so respondents could be as candid as possible. Responses were analyzed and served as the basis for priority lessons learned and recommendations.

A. Challenges

This report has noted several achievements that could serve as a basis for monitoring the 2007 elections. However, these successes were achieved in a challenging environment with many factors and uncertainties that inevitably influenced decisions, options for implementation and perceptions about the program. The challenges listed below reflect some priorities noted by partners and the NDI team. They include:

- **An extremely short timeframe for project implementation.** Some activities – including logistics, training, monitoring and consensus building – were often rushed. In retrospect, many activities could have been planned before resources became available to be ready for timely and swift implementation.

13 An unsuccessful attempt was made to set up a meeting in Port Harcourt.
Partners conceded this point, and some, including NDI/Nigeria, have conducted self-assessment exercises to see where improvements can be made in the future.

- **Institutional self-interests**, especially with regard to resource mobilization and data processing. It was initially difficult to encourage partners to see the benefits of sharing human and financial resources, and there was often a lack of disclosure and candor in discussions about available budgets, deployment plans and targets and linkages with important local organizations, including government.

- **Competing strategic and political demands**, which led many partners to feel it necessary to mount an effort in every state. This made it difficult to balance capacity with coverage and to think strategically about deployment. For example, even those organizations that felt strongly about national coverage might have clustered resources for greater impact in more populous or significant areas, leaving other areas with proportionally fewer monitors, yet with coverage nonetheless.

- **Effective monitoring of step-down training and other field activities.** In some instances partner organizations did not always use appropriate criteria for selecting trainees or provide adequate oversight. NDI lacked adequate resources to conduct its own planned monitoring and was hampered by delays in partners’ starting step-down training. These delays were caused in large measure by INEC’s accreditation procedures and publication of key guidelines extremely late in the process.

- **Logistical difficulties.** There were substantial difficulties with distributing resources, materials and payments to coordinators, supervisor and monitors; reporting on program performance and finances to headquarters; and identifying venues or notifying workshop participants in a timely manner. Almost everyone underestimated the intensive time, labor and resources required for this domestic monitoring program.

- **Weaknesses in communication and information flow and linkages.** NDI and other partners planning to work together were often confronted with theoretical structures and strategies, while the realities were often different and required much more support or a different approach. These problems were
horizontal and vertical; within and among organizations; between NDI and its partners; and between INEC and major CSOs and domestic monitoring organizations.

✔ **Partners’ staff were often engaged in several civic and voter education programs at once.** This situation was exacerbated because some related programs, such as critical civic education initiatives, were implemented later than originally planned and they competed with election monitoring activities. This did both programs a disservice because the lack of comprehensive, effective voter and civic education was reflected in the seeming inability of many Nigerian voters to recognize and argue for their rights. Simultaneously, some critical aspects of the election-monitoring program did not get adequate attention because key actors’ attentions were elsewhere.

✔ **Balancing decentralization and institutionalization.** While a decentralized model was very appropriate for election monitoring at individual polling stations (more attention and support should have been given to field-driven activities), many field staff and member organizations looked to their leadership or headquarters to provide guidance and strategic focus or vision. This was either slow in coming, confusing, or not communicated at all, at times leading to frustration and feelings of isolation at the implementation level.

✔ **Chaotic implementation of election procedures and polling station site selection by INEC.** Most domestic monitoring organizations tried to comply with INEC’s observer guidelines, but they were not aware of how the guidelines had changed between 1998-99 and 2003 because INEC did not complete the guidelines until Monday, April 7 – less than one week before the first elections. Much of the training material was necessarily based on 1999 guidelines or borrowed copies of the polling officials training manual, also released fairly late in the process (March 2003). Tension between INEC and CSOs was high and was only defused late in the process when INEC established a consultative forum (of which NDI was a member) to review INEC guidelines and proposed issuances. INEC’s accreditation processes were another potential impediment to extensive participation by domestic monitoring groups, but the consultative forum had a positive impact, and INEC amended its accreditation procedures to make them more workable.

✔ **An overly complex counting and collation process.** Most domestic monitoring organizations could not track or lacked resources
to track these complicated procedures effectively. Nigeria is the only country where counting and collation occurs at four levels – polling station, ward, LGA and state – providing many opportunities for manipulation and malfeasance. All agree that more attention must be given to the collation processes in the next election and that some reform of the system is essential. However, it will take creative and strategic thinking to derive viable solutions that enable monitors to spot fraud and manipulation or to conduct parallel vote tabulations (PVTs).

✓ **Finding ways to link NDI’s international and domestic monitoring efforts and securing relatively equal investments and interest by NDI and donors in both.** NDI has a wealth of experience in conducting international observer missions but has not often had to manage both domestic and international observers simultaneously. This created some challenges and missed opportunities, and potential interdependencies were not always exploited. NDI should continue to deliberate on this issue so better strategies for achieving objectives and optimum results for both kinds of programs will be developed in the future.

✓ **Building technical capacity with smaller NGO partners that have limited staff resources or computer skills is challenging.** While the technical transfer of the final database product was successful, challenges in building capacity within partner organizations to develop databases and communication systems remain. In this case it may be adequate and appropriate to build the capacity among partner managers to define the requirements and effectively outsource these services. As in this case, it was much more practical to build technical capacity with the private sector companies that provided these services, which will likely be tapped to do so in future elections.

**B. Lessons Learned**

1. **General**

   - Domestic monitors *do* make a difference. All partners agreed that the efforts of domestic monitors were crucial to the success of and peaceful manner in which elections were conducted in most parts of the country and to the public's confidence in the electoral process. During NDI's consultations with partners throughout Nigeria, it was noted that domestic observers were often more highly respected – and highly trained – than INEC staff. Thus, voters turned to observers for assistance and guidance rather than to polling officials. In addition, domestic observers were perceived as the most neutral and non-partisan presence at polling stations. Their dedication and focus was clear and respected.
Better planning, engaging all levels of participating organizations, is needed. Once a plan is developed, it should be shared with and followed by leaders and membership. If changes are needed, the rationale for them should be clearly communicated as quickly as possible to principal actors within each organization (e.g., zonal or state coordinators).

Communication and information flow should be improved at all levels: vertically (within organizations from their headquarters or secretariats to field staff, coordinators or member organizations); horizontally (between and among organizations working toward common or complementary goals); and with facilitating organizations such as NDI, donors or other IPs.

More attention must be paid to levels at which implementation occurs. Any organization that is facilitating or supporting domestic monitoring should visit field operations frequently. Partners should be encouraged to meet regularly at that level as well as the central level over the next three years.

The checklists and incident report forms were considered extremely useful by most respondents but should have been available earlier to facilitate training and ensure monitors’ comprehension. In the run-up to the next election, all partners should participate in reviewing the forms and making suggestions for improvement; forms should also be budgeted for and produced in adequate numbers. In 2003, some partners used outdated or earlier drafts of the forms, creating difficulties for data entry staff and analysts.

The momentum of domestic monitoring organizations and groups should be maintained between now and the next elections. Several approaches should be incorporated into regular meetings within and among partner organizations -- including meetings on key issues and strategies; designing materials; interfacing and advocacy with INEC and the National Assembly to encourage electoral reforms; exchanging ideas with other nations that have successfully conducted domestic monitoring (e.g., Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Zambia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, etc.); providing civic and voter education; and addressing logistics and strategic deployment issues.

Capacity building of new entrants into domestic monitoring during 2003 should be a priority for
Domestic monitoring groups should mobilize resources within Nigeria as well as from international donors. Donors should continue to coordinate and ask for candor from domestic monitoring groups about these groups’ adherence to expected standards for performance, accountability, transparency and focus.

2. Recruitment and Training

- Using the same materials and techniques in training master trainers was effective. Most organizations were comfortable in exchanging ideas and views about training approaches.

- When member organizations were involved in the recruitment and selection of master trainers, the process was most effective. Some partners apparently pre-selected master trainers and monitors without adequate consultation with member organizations or field staff, leading to sub-standard trainees.

- Master trainers’ workshops did not include enough instruction on how to train. Although most master trainers felt that the materials were excellent, it is not clear that they knew how to use them effectively when training monitors in the field.

- Use of master trainers as roving supervisors or monitors proved extremely effective. The master trainers knew the monitors, the terrain and the election procedures. Also, several respondents noted that checklists arrived more swiftly at a DTC or the NIC when picked up by a master trainer or monitor, versus being carried to a collection point by the monitor.

- The step-down training in Nigeria took place too close to the election, thereby making it difficult for master trainers to follow up with trainees and correct any misconceptions. NDI/Nigeria learned that a bit more time before the election day may be better to allow sufficient time for follow up. It is also possible that a one-day step-down training session for monitors is too short. However, the resource implications of this lesson may result in fewer monitors.
More attention should be given to collation centers during the next set of elections. NDI suggests that a group of monitors or master trainers receive special training to monitor the centers or even to conduct PVTs. Although this may be difficult given the Nigerian electoral framework and the additional time required for strategic thinking and training, some partners have even proposed that advocacy is needed to streamline the collation process before the next elections. Collation can then be monitored more easily, and incidents of malfeasance can be reduced.

3. Materials Distribution and Logistics

Greater emphasis should have been placed on the importance of logistics. Most issues that compromised training effectiveness were logistical, and field staff reported that their senior management often changed schedules or venues with little notice. Planning by NDI and partner organizations should have included more discussion on the significance of logistics in terms of communication and information flow. For example, in one instance, one part of the country received only page 1 of a checklist, while another part of the country received only page 2. Checks were sent to areas where a bank did not operate or where a signatory was not recognized. In addition, partners should carefully review budgets in light of logistical requirements. Many budgets were too small to manage logistics and program needs.

In some areas, cooperation among partners enabled smoother functioning. For instance, several groups collaborated in collecting and transporting checklists and incident report forms to DTCs and the NIC with swifter results and greater effectiveness.

The debate over stipends for monitors (how much to give, when to give it, how to link it to submission of checklists) raged on after the elections. On one hand, several partners felt that the average stipend of N 2,000 per election was too low; others felt that monitors should be encouraged to be more civic minded and volunteer to participate. Although many respondents conceded that voluntarism is not highly regarded in the culture, they would never have sufficient funds to cover even 50 percent of Nigeria’s 120,000 polling stations without some volunteers. It was suggested that domestic monitoring groups start early to engender a patriotic approach to monitoring for 2007. It was also generally agreed that posting monitors at or near their homes was a preferred approach.

4. Communications, Information Flow, Coordination and Collaboration

Problems of communication and information flow affected program implementation for most partner organizations. Partners should be a) more systematic in communicating with state and local level operatives;
b) clear in explaining what is required and expected from the field; and c) willing to involve coordinators in determining scheduling, logistical arrangements, monitoring and feedback. Similarly, member organizations participating in domestic monitoring should have been required to report regularly on issues, needs and expectations in their respective areas.

- Even though implementation was affected by a lack of time, NDI and partner organizations could have met more frequently and involved a broader range of staff from NDI and partners in these consultations.

- Partners and facilitating organizations must be more trusting and forthcoming about their strategies, plans and resources instead of insular or vertical. Donors should have played a more forceful or enabling role in facilitating information sharing to reduce duplication and redundancies.

5. Strategic Deployment

- Deployment was generally not strategic for several reasons and resulted in more than one monitor from partner organizations at the same polling station.\(^\text{14}\) This meant that most groups did not maximize their coverage, even in areas close to where monitors lived. INEC’s delay in identifying polling stations was another part of the problem. Groups now agree that they should have met together with maps at even the 1999 polling station locations at the state or LGA level and made preliminary assignments even before actual training and deployment of monitors began. The same approach using 2003 data is advocated for 2007.

- The message that a monitor *must* move on to the next polling station if a monitor is already at the polling station to which s/he is assigned was not properly reinforced or observed. This was particularly problematic where a facility like a school or an LGA secretariat had several polling stations in the same place, but all monitors converged at one place and ignored others that were contiguous.

- Concerns about safety may have influenced monitors’ decisions to stay together in one place. These fears were justified in some areas; several monitors reported abuse, especially from party agents. During the state Houses of Assembly elections, several monitors were physically abused.

- Logistical costs must be better represented in program budgets. In many instances, the amounts allocated for field implementation were not adequate or timely at several levels: Monitors received travel stipends...\(^\text{14}\) After several international observers noted this problem, NDI examined the collective database to ascertain the number of polling stations with duplicative coverage. For the National Assembly elections, duplications appear to have occurred in approximately 555 polling stations with a slightly higher figure of approximately 610 for the presidential and gubernatorial elections, during which more persons monitored.
late, thus affecting their ability to deploy quickly; roving monitors or supervisors received insufficient funds to track monitors and trouble shoot where needed; and funds for collecting, transporting or faxing checklists and incident report forms could have been distributed better.

6. Reports and Preliminary Statements

- Several field respondents felt that statements issued by their headquarters staff did not accurately reflect the reports submitted by monitors or their own eyewitness experiences. Some had even reviewed and summarized the checklists that were sent to headquarters. Partners should rely on some type of synthesis or reports from state coordinators or roving supervisors for producing their interim reports, even though this might increase the time needed to produce an interim statement.

- Most member organizations or field staff have not seen any data or systems outputs since information was turned over to partners’ headquarters. A system should be devised so that data can be summarized and sent to the field; the final reports given to partners could also be used for this purpose.

- On the whole, partners and other international observers viewed interim reports as more credible and coherent than in 1999. However, additional analyst training was needed to assist partners’ staff in using statistics more effectively. Also, some monitors did not understand sections of or questions on the checklists, so data distortions were inevitable.

For example, most monitors did not understand that “tendered ballots” were a special type of ballot being used in Nigeria for the first time. Instead, most monitors understood “tendered” as “gave” or “given” and vastly overstated the use of tendered ballots by counting all ballots distributed or given out to voters. This is clearly a training issue, but also suggests that the checklists, incident report forms and instructions should be reviewed, streamlined and framed in a more Nigerian context.

- Monitors rarely referred to the instructions on the back of the checklists and incident report forms. Perhaps it would be better to make them a handout and integrate them into the training for greater clarity.
Too much attention was paid to Election Day and not enough to events before the elections (such as voter registration, primaries and conventions) and post-election (primarily collation or counting and the election tribunals where results are challenged). Partners may want to think about how they can divide oversight so that these important aspects of the electoral process can also be covered and reported.

7. DOMES and Data Processing

More DTCs were needed to facilitate collection, collation and transmission of data to the NIC. Selection of DTCs was based on IT setup and capability, but conceivably more drop centers (modeled on Kaduna but better staffed and with a clearer pick up and delivery schedule) could also be established to increase efficiency.

While faxing forms seemed feasible and expeditious as the DOMES was being developed, it turned out to be a relatively poor substitute for either the paper form or data entry from a DTC. Partners preferred not to fax for a variety of reasons, such as lack of available facilities on a Sunday and a preference to collect and transfer all forms together. In addition, NITEL lines were unreliable, faxes were often unreadable and many persons tried so long to get a reliable fax connection that they could have driven the forms to a DTC or the NIC in the same amount of time.

Satellite phones were not used and should not be necessary for future DOMES set-ups. Conversely, the GSM or cell phones were extremely useful, and provisions should be made to ensure that they are available to all key actors, including roving monitors and supervisors, and that everyone working together has an accurate list of numbers.

More in-depth TA should be given during the technology transfer phase of the project. Even though all partners now have their respective databases, many still do not know how to use the database to access information for their final reports. Some partners felt that the transfer was haphazard. NDI should visit each partner, ascertain specific needs and develop a training or consultative meeting schedule to ensure that partners comprehend the system well enough to use it independently.

NDI did not communicate clearly or early enough that it did not have resources to keep the NIC and DTC structures in place for state Houses of Assembly elections. Many partners felt let down when they discovered that they would have to manage this phase of the activities on their own and – as was noted above – needed more in-depth TA and training on systems use before this third election.
As part of the lessons learned process, NDI asked partners to complete a questionnaire anonymously to encourage candid and focused responses. The following are graphic illustrations of headquarters (11 respondents) versus aggregated field level responses from partners’ local staff in Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Kano and Kaduna (31 respondents). [Respondents were able to pick more than one response. Numbers = persons selecting this item out of 11 partners’ HQ staff.]

### Positive Aspects of the Program: HQ

#### Headquarters/Secretariat Evaluations

- **Overall**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Training**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Org. Supp.**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Agenda**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Activities**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Materials**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Interaction**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]

### Field Evaluations

- **Overall**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Training**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Org. Supp.**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
- **Agenda**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
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- **Interaction**: [Chart showing evaluations for various aspects such as Training, Org. Supp., Agenda, Activities, Materials, Interaction.]
Respondents were able to pick more than one response. Numbers = persons selecting this item out of 31 partners’ field staff.

8. Analysis of Partner Evaluations

Evaluations by partners’ headquarters and field staff were a treasure trove of information, insights and recommendations. They are reflected in explanations of the challenges, lessons learned and recommendations contained elsewhere in this report.
However, partners’ views were so illuminating that they are also treated separately here. Variations between the perceptions of headquarters and field staff are intriguing.

Headquarters and field staff both responded that training, data processing and materials were positive aspects of the program. A greater proportion of field staff found NDI’s TA excellent, and all but one field respondent found it either excellent or very good. All but two headquarters staff found it very good. The majority of the field staff noted that their organizations’ support was very good or good, and approximately 21 percent rated the support as excellent. While 12 percent of the headquarters staff rated their own support as excellent, approximately 80 percent thought it was very good.

Training was universally praised and drew high marks from respondents. Many field staff reported that the election day simulation was extremely useful, enjoyable and a realistic portrayal of what was likely to occur (and often did) at polling stations. They also appreciated the detailed discussions of the checklists, incident report forms, form retrieval and reporting. The field staff was also very excited about the opportunity to think strategically and gave that greater weight in evaluating the program.

While headquarters and field staff cited improved organization at the grassroots level as a significant achievement, many more field staff felt that coordination at the grassroots or implementation level was more significant. Approximately 75 percent of the headquarters staff felt that recognizing and addressing significant issues in the field was a major improvement, but only 50 percent of the field staff cited this. Both cited INEC as a major factor, but headquarters was more concerned with INEC processes such as accreditation, while the field took the view that they had greater success at the polling stations where they interfaced directly with INEC polling officials, giving them practical advice and noting electoral malpractices. Field staff felt that they made strides collecting checklists and incident report forms while headquarters acknowledged this positive change by citing improvements in their reporting overall.

Field staff identified several other positive aspects of the program, while the headquarters staff cited none other than those provided on the evaluation form. Field staff thought that communication was more effective in 2003; more attention was given to logistics; financial assistance was much needed and appreciated; some efforts were made to deploy strategically; and more member organizations were involved in mobilizing and training monitors. Headquarters staff felt that monitors brought sanity to the electoral process and was concerned about threats to monitors’ safety and security by party agents or other operatives; however, field staff did not mention this. Headquarters staff also indicated that an action agenda is emerging from their 2003 election experience, including advocacy for electoral reform, guaranteeing secrecy in balloting and working to improve INEC.

Both groups outlined similar challenges to monitoring efforts. Both headquarters and field staff felt a “helplessness” in their inability to deter repeated malpractices, infractions and manipulation of results. Both groups found the logistical hurdles daunting, including strategic deployment of monitors to maximize coverage and prevent redundancies of checklists. Inadequate security, voter harrassment and intimidation, crowded and small polling stations, and the power of incumbency also troubled both
Both headquarters and field staff cited their non-partisanship as a positive aspect of their image, but noted that INEC officials, police and security agents joined party agents in blatant displays of partisanship. Several respondents felt handicapped by their inability to follow polling station results through the collation process and suggested that this be addressed in time for the 2007 elections. Both groups united in their respect and appreciation of the tenacity of Nigeria’s voters and felt that monitors’ presence, despite the lack of cooperation from INEC or security officials, contributed to relative peace, on-the-spot problem solving and increased faith in the electoral process.

Table 2 shows comparative answers from partners’ headquarters and field staff on open-ended questions in the survey. Only responses appearing more than three times are included on the list.

### Table 2: Partners’ Additional Feedback From Lessons Learned Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Questions</th>
<th>Headquarters Response</th>
<th>Field Staff Response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. Most significant achievements in monitoring the elections</strong></td>
<td>➢ Solid interim statements; excellent output from DTC/NIC&lt;br&gt;➢ Uniform reports from monitoring groups that facilitated comparisons&lt;br&gt;➢ Increasing awareness of the electoral process; being given an opportunity to be part of the process of promoting an enduring and sustainable democracy&lt;br&gt;➢ Deterring malpractices and fraud at polling stations&lt;br&gt;➢ Conducting an effective exercise in so short a period</td>
<td>➢ Promoting civic education and democratic values&lt;br&gt;➢ Cultivating confidence in the electoral process among voters&lt;br&gt;➢ Increasing awareness of positive roles monitors can play and that monitoring is a civic responsibility&lt;br&gt;➢ Deterring malpractices and fraud at polling stations&lt;br&gt;➢ Increasing participation of women in the process&lt;br&gt;➢ Assisting INEC to improve its administration of elections between April 12 and April 19&lt;br&gt;➢ Timely retrieval and transmission of checklists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11. Priority recommendations</strong></td>
<td>➢ Give training earlier and over a longer period&lt;br&gt;➢ Higher level of cooperation/collaboration with other groups&lt;br&gt;➢ Earlier overall planning and preparation&lt;br&gt;➢ Train separate monitors for polling stations and collation centers&lt;br&gt;➢ More engagement with INEC and press INEC to make structural and programmatic reforms and train officials</td>
<td>➢ Better, more extensive training for monitors&lt;br&gt;➢ Increased capacity building&lt;br&gt;➢ More widespread deployment, especially to rural communities&lt;br&gt;➢ Better coordination among partners&lt;br&gt;➢ Timely disbursement and distribution of funds and materials&lt;br&gt;➢ Make checklists less ambiguous and more useful for reporting actual events&lt;br&gt;➢ Increase monitoring to include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Questions</td>
<td>Headquarters Response</td>
<td>Field Staff Response</td>
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<td></td>
<td>more effectively</td>
<td>all aspects of the electoral process, including voter registration, conventions and post-election tribunals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better civic and voter education</td>
<td>Equalize monitoring at collation centers and polling stations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Genuinely strategic deployment</td>
<td>Earlier preparation and selection of monitors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved vertical and horizontal communication</td>
<td>Better caliber of monitors for future elections</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Continue TA for data processing, analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improvements of stipends (versus increased voluntarism)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Release monitors’ data on a state-by-state basis</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 12. Recommendations to improve NDI’s or other facilitators’ performance | More DTCs if resources permit | NDI should help break the monopoly on monitoring by funding competitive groups |
|                                                                       | Earlier training of master trainers | Early and continuous training and adaptation of training materials to local needs; more systematic inputs from the field during materials development |
|                                                                       | Earlier planning and preparation: two to three years before elections | More scrutiny of domestic monitoring groups |
|                                                                       | Set up DTCs within domestic monitoring groups | Promote voluntarism |
|                                                                       | Increased funding and resources; also encourage groups to generate resources locally | Develop strategies to broaden the base of and support for domestic monitoring, including empowering women, using community residents (versus CSO members), youth |
|                                                                       | More support for INEC | Increased funding for deployment, monitoring communication, training and coverage of all elections |
|                                                                       | Written agreements or MOUs with each group and NDI | Hold regular forums for coordination and exchanges |
|                                                                       | More effective communication | Support monitoring of all aspects of the electoral process |

<p>| 13. Major improvements in your group’s | Quicker, better reporting | Better training |
|                                       | More training | More groups participating in 2003 elections monitoring |
|                                       | Better technical support to |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Questions</th>
<th>Headquarters Response</th>
<th>Field Staff Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>performance between 1998-99 and 2003</strong></td>
<td>field staff</td>
<td>Better documentation, data analysis, quick turnaround of reports, and use of checklists</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Better, more accessible data</td>
<td>Improved understanding of the terrain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Final accreditation process worked out with INEC ensured real versus ghost observers</td>
<td>Increased visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More effective networking with other NGOs</td>
<td>Covered larger area and deployed more monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <strong>Major improvements in your group’s performance between April 12 and April 19</strong></td>
<td>Better use of DTCs</td>
<td>More specific areas of focus versus generalized observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher rate of checklist retrieval and transmission, especially due to collaboration with other groups</td>
<td>Improved networking with other groups</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Better coordination within our organization</td>
<td>Checklists more comprehensive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Called monitors to a meeting between elections to review performance, problems</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fewer logistical problems</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved deployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. <strong>Additional comments</strong></td>
<td>Compliments to NDI and its contributions to sustaining democracy in Nigeria</td>
<td>Ensure a database and systematic contacts for master trainers mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need monitoring system that allows a more active participation for monitors so they can discover and report malpractices</td>
<td>Increase civic education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cover all elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase number of trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strive to find ways to reform processes and solve problems of partisanship, violence and malfeasance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kudos to NDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. Recommendations and Conclusions

This report has outlined the scope of the domestic monitoring program for Nigeria’s 2003 elections and described NDI’s and partners’ various experiences, lessons learned and conclusions. It is by no means exhaustive but conveys some of the priority issues emerging from program implementation. It should be noted that the prospect of six potential elections – National Assembly, presidential and gubernatorial (with two possible run-offs), state Houses of Assembly and the yet-to-be-determined LGA elections – created anxiety and imposed extraordinary burdens on all involved. As is often the case with talented, thoughtful and dedicated persons, several constructive recommendations came from dialogues that were conducted during and after the elections. These recommendations are not in priority order because it was recommended – and heartily endorsed – that all groups including NDI meet when they have completed their final reports and develop a master list of prioritized recommendations that can be used to prepare proposals; facilitate coordination and collaboration; and help partners to prepare their own work plans, budgets and implementation approaches. Partners might use the master list to gauge their performance against agreed-upon standards that will have been set, and used to guide joint advocacy and initiatives, long before the run-up to the 2007 elections.

Specific Recommendations

1. Master trainers were generally underutilized. Those who took advantage of them to become roving monitors or supervisors benefited in two ways: a) they knew the monitors and knew more about electoral processes than most polling officials; and b) they should be used to complement zonal or state coordinators in the future.

2. Coordination and collaboration among partners are extremely important, especially at the implementation level (state, LGA and ward). Formal mechanisms to facilitate coordination should be established so that groups have the means for exchanging ideas and information, thus being more strategic in their deployment and sharing resources as appropriate.

3. More attention should be paid to the collation centers and counting process. This could occur in three ways: First, domestic monitoring groups could join forces with those engaged in electoral reform activities and advocate for streamlining the collation and counting process. Second, partners could train cadres of monitors (e.g., supervisors, master trainers or coordinators) to focus exclusively on the collation and counting process and even introduce PVT.
Finally, partners could agree to focus on a few states as part of a pilot project to monitor collation and counting more effectively. Lessons learned could be shared and used to sharpen monitoring of results for future elections.

4. After final reports are completed, NDI and its partners should gather and prepare a master list of lessons learned and recommendations to guide their collective and separate efforts related to the 2007 elections. They should also create a small working group to prepare a draft work plan that could be used for coordination and follow through.

5. After data is processed, it should be shared with members and staff in the field. Also, the databases could be modified for other purposes, such as tracking legislation, the votes of the National Assembly or state Houses of Assembly members, assessments, research, or surveys of citizen and members’ views.

6. Centralized databases and data processing should be replicated in 2007. Because mistrust and suspicion about data collection, analysis and use was common among all partners during the 2003 election program, NDI made a commitment to provide data security, integrity and confidentiality. However, many other stakeholders, including donors and academics, are anxious to use the data in positive ways. Perhaps partners should review their concerns and think about reposing the databases in an appropriate academic institution such as the University of Jos or the Center for Advanced Legal Studies at the University of Lagos. Also, partners should review the 2003 data as a basis for their thinking about strategic deployment in 2007.

7. Budgets should be more feasible and take into account the amount needed to ensure quality field efforts. This is especially true for training, deployment and monitoring. Partners should examine the relative proportions of funding for headquarters or secretariats versus levels where implementation will actually take place. Increasing interaction with and monitoring of field staff are essential. NDI and any other facilitator for domestic monitoring groups should consider conducting some monitors’ training in the field so this can be observed, and participated in, by master trainers before they embark on training alone.

8. Partners should meet and devise a series of joint activities that will take place between now and 2007 to strengthen the image and influence of domestic monitors. This should include interfacing with the media; meeting with members of the National Assembly and state Houses of Assembly to advocate greater INEC independence; encouraging an open legislative agenda and level playing field; working further toward a credible and more streamlined electoral processes; and sensitizing local citizens and leaders on the importance of civic education and rights. INEC should also participate in future training.

9. NDI and its partners should maintain contact with INEC to identify problems and suggest solutions arising from the 2003 elections. This might include reviewing and revising the observer guidelines, streamlining the collation and accreditation processes, advocating with the National Assembly and the executive branch for
greater financial and programmatic independence for INEC, upgrading training for INEC polling officials, and improving security and safety at polling stations.

10. NDI should communicate its limitations early. As a facilitator it had limited resources and needed to have more intensive dialogue with partner organization about roles and responsibilities, resource availability and program directions. Perhaps NDI should consider entering into more formal, written agreements with partners, such as letters outlining the most vital agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOU).
Annexes
Annex A:

Principal Actors –
NDI Domestic Monitoring Team and
Nigerian Partner Organizations
NDI’s Domestic Election Monitoring Team

Wayne Propst (Country Director, NDI/Nigeria) served as the overall manager of NDI’s election monitoring project activities. He coordinated project design and synergies; reviewed and implemented project budgets; and ensured complementarities between NDI’s international and domestic observation teams.

Fran Farmer (Senior Technical Advisor, NDI/Nigeria) was the lead project manager of NDI’s domestic monitoring project. She developed training materials and techniques; provided and coordinated training; facilitated partners’ strategic thinking; and ensured integration of all aspects of the project.

Chris Spence (Senior Advisor for IT Programs Worldwide, NDI/DC) was manager of Domestic Monitoring and Election System (DOMES 20003). He led the conceptual work, database development and report production; determined suitable sites and specifications for equipment; and ascertained the most appropriate ways to achieve connectivity for an effective, sophisticated, decentralized Communication System.

Smydge Perry (Training Consultant, US) is an experienced trainer who worked with NDI on Nigeria’s 1998/99 elections. She played a major role in providing master monitoring and management training to all groups; assisted with materials design; and served as the principal liaison for TMG with which she had worked during the previous elections.

Jumoke Ajayi (IT Consultant, Nigeria/Ghana) played a major role in implementing and managing the NIC and DTCs. She recruited and trained data entry staff and monitored on-going work at both. She also provided TA for site selection and internet servicep (ISP) selection in the Nigerian context.

James Liu (DOMES Database Software Programmer, Canada) was the software designer who customized Microsoft Access database software for DOMES 2003. He provided database setup instructions, updates, training manuals and full technical support for the database by helping to manage NIC.

Akeem Jagun (IT Program Officer, NDI/Nigeria) assisted with NIC, DTC and ISP selection; Checklist/Incident Form revision and production; and technology transfer. He also served as co-director of the Kano DTC.

Vladimir Pran (IT Consultant, NDI/Croatia) played a lead role in managing the NIC and providing training, most notably to Analysts from partner organizations, who were integral to preparing interim statements and to state
and zonal coordinators from several partners and areas. He also contributed to writing the Users’ Manual for the communications system (see Annex E).

Richard Klein (Senior Program Manager, NDI/DC) played an indispensable role in designing, tailoring and producing uniform checklists and incident report forms for all partners and users\(^{15}\). He also participated in training of master trainers and providing inputs into training on communication system use.

John Larvie (Training Consultant, Ghana) brought a wealth of experience as a trainer and expert on electoral systems from his work with IFES and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Ghana. He trained master trainers, conducted monitoring and served as a co-director of the Asaba DTC.

Deji Olaore (Program Officer, NDI/Nigeria) conducted training for master trainers, zonal and state coordinators and on communication system use. He also conducted monitoring and served as a co-director of the Lagos DTC. He also provided on-site technical assistance for partners who observed the State Houses of Assembly elections.

Ian Schuler (Program Officer, NDI/DC) assisted in NIC’s recruitment and training of Data Entry Staff and partners on communication system use. He also assisted with NIC set-up and with preparation of materials describing Communication System capabilities and served as co-director of the Lagos DTC.

Rosemarie McBean (Training Consultant, Nigeria) conducted master trainer workshops and project monitoring. For the National Assembly elections, she served as Co-director of the DTC in Port Harcourt.

Sunny Pianwi (IT Officer, NDI/DC) provided technical support for the NIC start-up, provided training on communication system use and served as co-director of the DTC in Port Harcourt.

Ehren Bray (Fulbright Scholar, US) became a full-time volunteer on the team because the university where he was conducting research closed. A talented computer expert, he assisted with the NIC set-up and reports generated by the NIC and served as a co-director for the Asaba DTC.

Christine Owre (Senior Technical Advisor, NDI/Nigeria) assisted by editing and making suggestions for an earlier version of this report.

\(^{15}\) Although not a partner in all aspects of the DOMES, the Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) used the Master Trainer and Monitors Manuals and the Checklists and Incident Report Forms to ensure comparability and consistency with other large domestic monitoring groups that partnered with NDI.
Principal Local Domestic Partners

A. Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)

TMG is a coalition of non-governmental and civil society organizations founded in August 1998 to monitor Nigeria’s 1998/99 transition to civilian rule. TMG has grown from a band of 12 Lagos-based human rights organizations in 1998 into a broad coalition of human rights NGOs and CSOs working throughout the country, with approximately 170 member organizations in 2003.

Currently, TMG has members in all the six geo-political zones. Structurally, TMG includes a Coordinating Committee, a Secretariat and zonal and state coordinators. The Coordinating Committee is the coalition’s core decision making-body. It is made up of 12 heads of member organizations elected at a plenary session during TMG’s Annual General Meeting and headed by a Chairman. The Secretariat’s Coordinator oversees day-to-day management and administration.

TMG, the largest coalition of CSOs working on election related issues, is headquartered in Abuja. TMG had a target of training and fielding 10,000 monitors to be deployed across the 36 states and the FCT for the 2003 elections. TMG also monitored voter registration, political party campaigns and conventions and all three elections and gave dozens of sub-grants for civic education projects to member organizations.

B. The Labor Election Monitoring Team (LEMT)

The LEMT was comprised of the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). LEMT’s target was to train and deploy approximately 4000 election observers for the National Assembly and presidential/gubernatorial elections in all of Nigeria’s 774 local government areas (LGAs). It planned to deployed 112 election observers per state in the Federation’s 36 states and Abuja. This is the first time Nigeria’s two largest union groups – NLC and TUC – came together to work jointly on such an important project as election monitoring.

During the 1998/99 general elections, the NLC participated in election monitoring along with the TMG but on a very limited scale. This year’s participation marked a significantly greater investment. Equally important, labor was very visible in engaging government institutions at the national and state level in the run up to the 2003 elections.
C. Centre for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA)

Headquartered in Washington, DC – and locally based in Lagos and Abuja – the Centre for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA) was founded in 1975. CEDPA’s mission is to empower women at all levels of society so they can be full partners in development.

Since the mid 80’s, CEDPA has been working in Nigeria in the areas of reproductive health (RH) and advocacy by partnering with women’s organizations and networks to which CEDPA provides grants. In 1996, CEDPA started work on democracy and governance projects to strengthen civil society’s contribution to democratic participation in general, and more specifically to increase women’s participation in development and political processes.

CEDPA has been actively engaged in building women’s and other CSOs’ capacity to advocate effectively for issues affecting women’s and youth’s health, social, economic and political lives. Through its network of NGOs, CEDPA has supported the NCWS; YEDA; COWAN; FIDA; and others in monitoring the National Assembly, presidential/gubernatorial and State Houses of Assembly elections. In all, approximately 370 monitors were trained and deployed by these organizations. This was the first attempt by most to participate directly in election monitoring and other electoral processes.

D. Federation of Women’s Muslim Associations of Nigeria and Muslim League for Accountability (FOMWAN/MULAC)

FOMWAN was established in 1985 to promote understanding and practice of Qur’an’s teachings on the true role and status of Muslim women. It is a well-respected organization with chapters in 32 of Nigeria’s 36 states. FOMWAN brings Islamic women together on issues of mutual concern to form a powerful advocacy force within the Muslim community. It also catalyses and implements effective programs and strategies by identifying priorities across gender, religious, ethnic, and cultural lines. It works within the Muslim community to advocate for girl-child education and health services, particularly maternal health and general reproductive services, including family planning.

During the 2003 elections, using funding from CEDPA and NDI, FOMWAN worked with MULAC to mobilize citizens for participation in election monitoring. MULAC is a national coalition of 22 NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs) and community-based youth and women’s groups. FOMWAN and MULAC jointly trained and deployed almost 2,000 domestic observers in 15 northern states. Although both FOMWAN and MULAC are activist organizations working in the North and within Muslim communities in other parts of the country, the 2003
election was the first time the two groups collaborated in such an extensive and visible way. Though some members of FOMWAN monitored the 1999 elections under TMG, this earlier effort involved fewer than 200 monitors.

As a unique operating principle, FOMWAN and MULAC divided leadership responsibility in each state. Where a woman was the state coordinator, a man was the deputy state coordinator and vice versa. This sharing of leadership roles resulted in nine (9) women state coordinators and six (6) male state coordinators, as well as a model for tolerance and cooperation between men and women in Islamic settings that has set off reverberations and replication in other joint initiatives. Eight lecturers from Bayero University in Kano also joined MULAC in its master training workshop, monitors’ training and deployment.

**E. Yakubu Gowon Centre (YGC)**

The YGC is a non-governmental, non-partisan and non-profit Institute established to promote the cause of Nigerian unity and nation building. The Centre also undertakes studies, research and publications on issues of national integration and conflict resolution. One of YGC’s unique features is that it has drawn most of its monitors from universities, especially the University of Abuja and other institutions of higher learning. Thus it has a focus or outreach that involves younger Nigerians in democratic processes.

As part of its promotion of democracy and good governance, the YGC partnered with NDI in 1998/99 to train approximately 200 monitors who were deployed in and around the FCT to monitor the elections. Building upon that experience, the Center also participated in the 2003 monitoring exercise although its recruitment was hampered by university closures.

**F. Outreach Foundation**

The Outreach Foundation is a non-profit NGO founded in 1996. Its vision is to promote development of Nigerian women and youth through education, empowerment and general improvement in their quality of life. Outreach Foundation carries out most of its activities through savings and micro-credit schemes; mobilization of women and youth for development projects; training and business advisory services; civic education and counseling; publication of information, education and communication (IEC) materials and newsletters; and research and advocacy on empowerment of women and youth. The organization is unique in that it is membership based. Since its inception, Outreach Foundation has extended credit facilities to about 200 trading groups and cooperative societies under its economic empowerment program, and its membership has grown to approximately 2000 persons. In its first attempt at
election monitoring, Outreach Foundation trained and deployed almost 1000 women observers in 6 states: Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Edo and Enugu.

**G. Interfaith Mediation Council of Kaduna (IMC)**

The IMC initiates grassroots, ecumenical response to areas riddled with inter-religious conflict and strife such as Kaduna. The group has a membership of approximately 100 local Islamic and Christian leaders. IMC focuses on identifying potential hot spots; engaging in conflict reduction and management activities; fostering constructive dialogue among key groups, especially youth who are vulnerable to exploitation and incitement, to prevent recurrence of conflict; and addressing some of the underlying causes of sectarian violence such as fear, poverty, misperceptions and rumor. It participated in monitoring elections for the first time in 2003, believing that some of the violence experienced in Kaduna was politically motivated. IMC also felt that they – as influential community and religious leaders – would be able to bring their moral suasion to monitoring and other election related processes, thereby reducing the potential for, or quelling any outbreaks of, conflict or violence.
Annex B: Calendar of Events
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<td>8 Consultation with partners begins.</td>
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<td>24 TMG Materials Development Workshop (Kaduna)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Manuals reviewed</td>
<td>Work on Communication System begins</td>
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<td>Manuals to printer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Trainer schedule confirmed</td>
<td>Simulation kits materials purchased</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Manuals returned from printer</td>
<td>First draft Checklists, Incident Report Forms prepared</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLC Master Trainer workshop/ Kano</td>
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<td>NLC M/T workshop/ Abuja</td>
<td>NLC M/T workshop/ Ibadan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>NLC M/T workshop/Owerri</td>
<td>TMG Zonal/ State Coordinators Management Seminar</td>
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February 2003
March 2003

1. TMG Management Seminar completed

2. TMG M/T Lagos
   TMG M/T Kano

3. TMG M/T Benue
   TMG M/T Enugu

4. TMG M/T Port Harcourt
   TMG M/T Bauchi

5. Monitoring trip to Kano

6. "techies" invited to join in NIC set-up; monitoring trip/ Lagos

7. Second draft Checklists, Incident Report Forms prepared, customized

8. Contact database preparation begins

9. Monitoring trip to Asaba/ PHC

10. FOMWAN M/T/ Abuja

11. MULAC M/T/ Abuja

12. MULAC M/T/

13. CEDPA/ Outreach M/T/Abuja

14. MULAC Strategic Thinking Seminar/ Kaduna

15. Report back on monitoring trips

16. Contact database preparation begins

17. Monitoring trip to Kano

18. Partner "techies" invited to join in NIC set-up; monitoring trip/ Lagos

19. Second draft Checklists, Incident Report Forms prepared, customized

20. FOMWAN M/T/ Abuja

21. MULAC M/T/ Abuja

22. MULAC M/T/

23. MULAC M/T/ Abuja

24. Contact database preparation begins

25. Monitoring trip to Kano

26. Partner "techies" invited to join in NIC set-up; monitoring trip/ Lagos

27. Second draft Checklists, Incident Report Forms prepared, customized

28. CEDPA/ Outreach M/T/Abuja

29. MULAC Strategic Thinking Seminar/ Kaduna

30. Report back on monitoring trips
April 2003

1. Checklists, Incident Report Forms distributed to partners
2. Half-day meeting with partners on Communications System at NDI
3. Training of YGC/IMC Monitors NIC Testing begins
4. Training for partners’ analysts
5. DTC set-up and decentralized Communication System training
6. NIC Ribbon Cutting / Opening [US Amb. Jeter, USAID Director Liberia, partners, media attend] DTC staff deploy
7. NIC, DTCs set up Meeting with TMG Zonal/State Coord. on Fast Track, NIC, DTCs
8. Training with partners working in field at DTC Data Entry Staff training begins
9. Test communications between NIC, DTCs
10. NIC, DTCs set up Meeting with TMG Zonal/State Coord. on Fast Track, NIC, DTCs
11. DTC staff deploy
12. NIC Ribbon Cutting / Opening [US Amb. Jeter, USAID Director Liberia, partners, media attend] DTC staff deploy
13. Begin processing Fast Track Forms
14. Standard forms processed throughout
15. Briefing for Internat’l Missions
16. Begin processing Fast Track Forms
17. Standard forms processed
18. Briefing for Internat’l Missions
19. Presidential/gubernatorial Elections
20. Begin processing Fast Track Forms
21. Standard forms processed
22. Begin processing Fast Track Forms
23. UNEADS meeting Data, Technology Transfer begins
24. NIC Closes
25. NIC Closes
26. NIC Closes
27. Briefing at USAID on monitoring
28. Standard forms processed throughout
29. Briefing at USAID on monitoring
30. Standard forms processed throughout
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<td>4 TA provided in using database, analyzing data</td>
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<td>7 Data gathering for final report begins</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14 Meeting with domestic team to outline report; assign sections</td>
<td>15 First draft report writing begins</td>
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<td>28 First draft of sections due, circulated within team</td>
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May 2003
Team members deploy for decentralized lessons learned meetings.

Meetings at NDI with HQ partner staff.

First consolidated draft report completed.
Annex C:

Sample Workshop Agendas and Manual Table of Contents
TMG Master Trainers Workshop:
Training monitors for Nigeria’s 2003 Elections

Arrival and Registration

**Day One**

8:30 a.m. – 9:30 a.m. **Welcome Address**: TMG Leaders,
Opening Remarks: Zonal, state coordinators, NDI
Participants’ Introductions/ Icebreaker (Press Invited)

9:30 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. **Workshop goals, objectives and materials**
Participants will be asked to state their goals and objectives for the workshop; the emerging list will be used at the end of the session to compare initial goals with final outcomes. Workshop materials (agenda, Manual, Checklist and incident report form) will also be reviewed.

10:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. **What’s At Stake? Why Monitor the 2003 Elections?**
This session will usually be a panel composed of leaders of the sponsoring organization. Panelists will discuss why the organization is choosing to monitor, what lessons were learned from monitoring in 1999, how the organization views the role of the master trainers and what their critical milestones will be as the organization moves toward the 2003 elections.

10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m. **TEA BREAK**

10:45 a.m. – 11:45 a.m. **The role of Civil Society in sustaining Democracy in Nigeria – Challenges of the 2003 Elections**: This session will usually be led by an expert selected by TMG to address the question of the unique role of civic organizations in sustaining democracy in Nigeria and the challenges posed by the upcoming elections.

11:45 a.m. – 1:00 p.m. **Defining Roles and Responsibilities: Master Trainers and Their Relationships with Zonal, State and LGA Coordinators and With the TMG Secretariat**
During this session, roles and responsibilities of TMG’s various key actors will be streamlined and clarified. For persons undertaking more than one role simultaneously, tips for synchronizing activities and coordinating with others will be derived.

1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. **LUNCH BREAK**

2:00 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. **Building Training Skills and Understanding Key Concepts: What “Basics” Must Be Communicated to and Retained by Monitors?**
This session will have three components:

A. The first session will be a thorough discussion of the role of a Monitor. Upon completion of the session Participants should understand the purpose of domestic monitoring (WHY); the various stakeholders involved in monitoring (WHO MONITORS); the various activities and things that get monitored (WHAT) and the various levels and approaches to monitoring (HOW). Finally participants will be asked to identify the qualities of a good monitor (recruitment criteria).

B. The second session will discuss key election concepts that will prepare monitors to more fully comprehend what will happen on Election Day and election-related processes. Some terms to be discussed may include but are not limited to:
- Election Day procedures
- INEC Guidelines
- Polling Station Officials

C. Participants will be divided into two small working groups to design a “session” explaining the role of a monitor and at least one-two key terms. Each group will conduct a mock session for all participants that will be discussed and critiqued during a plenary session.

Homework: Review the checklist, incident report form and instructions

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**Day Two**

8:30 a.m. – 8:45 a.m.  
**Reviewing the Previous Day’s Work**

8:45 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.  
**Conducting the Election Day Simulation**
Participants will learn how to train Monitors through an Election Day simulation by actually conducting one. The session will be divided into three parts: a) a review of the instructions for conducting simulations; b) actually conducting the simulation; and c) discussion of issues, questions or ambiguities raised by the simulation.

10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.  
**Preparing for Training Workshops: What is Provided, What is Needed?**
Participants will be told what is in the “kit” they will be given to assist them in conducting the Election Day simulation and other activities. They will then be asked to brainstorm about the other techniques they can use (e.g., role plays, team building exercises, participant-led sessions, etc.) or materials they will need to make the Workshop a success. Facilitators will take notes and – where it appears that additional materials should be distributed to all master trainers – will make a list of these items and forward it to sponsoring organizations’ secretariats or headquarters.

10:45 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.  
**TEA BREAK**

11:00 a.m. – 12:00 P.M.  
**Acquiring current information on election 2003: Presentation by INEC or SEIC OFFICIAL**
This will give participants an opportunity to ask INEC or SIEC officials to explain technical aspects of INEC’s Election Procedures or Observer Guidelines.
more specifically. Hopefully the just-concluded Election Day Simulation will inform the dialogue.

12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.  **Conflict Management: How To Recognize or De-Escalate Conflict While Serving As A Monitor**

Experts in peace building and conflict management will provide useful information or models to participants so that they are able to recognize and de-escalate conflicts that may occur during their election monitoring. This highly interactive session will give participants opportunities to share experiences, highlight potential “hot spots” in their communities, and derive practical approaches that address potential conflicts and violence effectively.

1:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.  **LUNCH BREAK**

2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.  **Reviewing the Checklists and Incident Report Forms: Step-by-Step and Point-by-Point**

Participants will be asked to brainstorm about roles they could play on Election Day such as serving as Roving Monitors, observing vote counting and tabulation, serving as “Supervisory” Monitors, etc. Facilitators will ask participants to review the forms again so they can be sure that, as master trainers, you can clearly spell out data requested, definitions, and procedural requirements to those whom you are training. In addition, elements of a proposed Communication System to enhance speed and accuracy of Data analyses will be described. Zonal buzz groups to ascertain the best way of retrieving completed forms in their areas. These ideas will be discussed in a short plenary session to facilitate exchanges of ideas and strategies. The Facilitator should also note that additional training on the communications system will be conducted during monitoring, and outline any other steps contemplated by the supporting unions such as monitoring, reporting, or follow-up.

3:30 p.m. – 5:30 p.m.  **Preparing Your Own Training Plan: Whom Will You Train; Where Will You Train; How Will You Monitor Training Effectiveness?**

Participants will be asked to use a format to prepare their own training plan. If several master trainers come from the same area, they will be asked to work together so their plans are coordinated. Copies of completed formats will be given to the sponsoring organization’s secretariat or headquarters to be used as a monitoring tool. The Format will include: a) the number of Monitor Training Workshops to be conducted by the master trainer; b) the number of participants/workshop; c) Possible locations or venues; d) the sources from which participants will be drawn; e) a simple format for outlining the steps for preparing to conduct a workshop; and f) How Trainees will be monitored or assisted. Workshop Facilitators will work with master trainers on their plans.

**Homework:** Participants should meet with other master trainers from their state as well as the state coordinator if available, to develop a state training plan.

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Day Three

8:30 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.  **The way Forward: Review of state training plans**

Participants will be asked to share their state training plans with the group.
10:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. **Plenary: Workshop Formalities – The Register, Workshop Reports and Monitors’ Pledge**
Facilitators will brief participants about the major requirements with which master trainers must comply and answer any questions about them. Specific handouts such as the Monitors’ Pledge will be reviewed in detail, and *the commitment that Monitors are making – namely to observe ALL elections as requested by sponsoring organizations or unions – will be clarified.*

10:30 a.m. -11:00 a.m. **EVALUATION & CLOSING**
Participants will be asked to take a brief “quiz” and to provide an evaluation of the overall Workshop. This is also the occasion for participants to ask any remaining questions or clarify any outstanding issues or questions.

**End of Workshop**
Annex D:

Sample Election Statements
Preliminary Report on the Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Held on Saturday, April 19, 2003

Introduction

As with the National Assembly Elections held on Saturday, April 12, 2003, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 170 human rights and civil society organizations, monitored the Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections held on Saturday, April 19, 2003 by deploying 10,000 trained observers throughout the country.

This preliminary report is issued based on the observations made by TMG monitors from the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. A more detailed report will be issued by TMG at the end of all the elections.

Pre-Election Day Observations

The integrity of the electoral process was undermined by factors such as the shoddy conduct of the voter registration exercise which resulted in many prospective voters being disenfranchised, and the primaries of many of the political parties, especially the older ones, where “kingmakers” within many of the parties foisted their preferred candidates on the parties through undemocratic processes.

Voter Registration

It is the view of the Transition Monitoring Group that the voters’ registration exercise organized by INEC in September 2002 and in the “make up” exercise held in January 2003 was not successful as they still left a substantial number of prospective voters disenfranchised. The voters’ registration and the display of the voters register were characterized by inefficiency, confusion and corruption. Thousands of prospective voters could not register for a number of reasons; including the fact that many INEC officials at voter registration centers claimed that they did not have enough registration materials.

For many months after the conclusion of the voter registration exercise, the Commission was unable to produce and display the voters’ register for inspection, as it is required to do by Section 10 of the Electoral Act 2002. When it finally produced the voters’ register, it did not display it in some states and in other states, the exercise was not accompanied by adequate publicity with the result that many people were unaware of it and did not verify their names. This lapse was responsible for the problems which arose on election days when many prospective voters across the country could not find their names on the voters’ register and were not allowed to vote in several polling centers.
In January 2003, the TMG published a report on its monitoring of the voter registration exercise. In the report entitled, "Registration of Voters 2003: Report of the Transition Monitoring Group", the TMG observed that the exercise was flawed given the numerous complaints from various parts of the country and well-meaning individuals. It recommended that INEC should give effect to the provisions of the Electoral Act by immediately commencing the continuous registration of voters.

It is regrettable that INEC ignored this recommendation and did not take adequate steps to ensure that all those qualified to register and desirous of doing so were given the opportunity to register and subsequently vote in the elections.

In addition to this, the Commission only began replacing tear-off slips issued to prospective voters during the voter registration exercise with the voters' card less than a week to the elections which left little or no time to complete the exercise. The process of replacing these tear-off slips with voters' cards has been so inefficient that a day before the elections began; millions of prospective voters had not been able to get their voters' cards. Conflicting and contradictory statements from different categories of INEC officials over whether those who were unable to get the voters' card would be allowed to vote with their tear-off slips also created uncertainty and confusion in the system which undoubtedly affected the ability of people to vote. The replacement of the tear off slips with voters' cards in so many polling stations during the National Assembly and Presidential elections created congestion, confusion and violent reactions in so many polling centers. The resultant disenfranchisement of thousands of prospective voters has a significant effect on the credibility of the elections.

Political Party Primaries
The conventions and primaries of many of the parties for the selection of their candidates, especially for the presidential elections, were characterized by manipulation, intimidation and other undemocratic practices. As the President and all incumbent governors of the 36 states schemed to remain in office for a second term, they sought to use their incumbency to intimidate any opposition and deployed state resources to further their desires.

The accreditation of delegates for the conventions of many of the political parties, especially that of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) amounted to a hide and seek game with the result that the delegates were mentally and psychologically exhausted, harassed, intimidated and effectively worn-out before the elections were conducted. The state of confusion and disinformation that pervaded the conventions of many of the parties was carefully orchestrated as part of an overall strategy aimed at preventing some of the delegates from voting during the conventions.

There was widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their vote in some of the conventions. Delegates were pressured by government agents using subtle threats and intimidation to compel them to vote for preferred aspirants.

The intimidation of delegates was aided, in the case of the PDP, by the use of serially numbered ballot papers, which undermined the secrecy of the ballot. It was therefore possible to determine how each delegate voted and subsequent to the convention, there were numerous reports by some delegates that they had come under attack from various government agencies for not voting as directed.
The PDP’s guidelines for the selection of a presidential candidate were structured to ensure that the incumbent President won the party’s ticket. There was no respect for the democratic principle of equal opportunities and a level playing field for all the aspirants. It adopted the use of special automatic delegates, including ministers, ambassadors, presidential aides and other appointees of the president, in a process carefully designed to ensure that they outnumbered other delegates and unduly tilted the contest in favour of the incumbent.

The ANPP placed too much emphasis on the emergence of a consensus presidential candidate with the result that its candidate that emerged from the convention was imposed on the members by those who viewed themselves as the “kingmakers” despite vehement protests by other aspirants. Five of the presidential aspirants walked out of the convention when the plan to impose a presidential candidate on the party became clear.

With the constitutions of many of the political parties prohibiting any resort to the judicial process and most courts viewing any judicial intervention in the nomination process as interference in the internal affairs of the political parties, the result was that there was no avenue for redress open to aggrieved aspirants.

On the other hand, the nomination process adopted by the National Democratic Party (NDP), the United Nigeria Peoples’ Party (UNPP) and some of the younger parties substantially respected democratic principles in the selection of their presidential candidates. The accreditation procedures adopted by the NDP and the UNPP were a marked departure from those of the PDP and ANPP.

The TMG notes that the foisting of unpopular candidates on the party by the party leadership amounted to a denial of the right of the people to a candidate of their choice as in many cases, the selection of a particular candidate by the party may in fact be more important than the general election.

Observations on Election Day

Preparation by INEC

The Independent National Electoral Commission appears to have overcome many of the logistics difficulties which attended the National Assembly Elections in most of the polling centers in the country. In most of the polling centers monitored, election materials, polling officials and security personnel arrived the polling centers before 8 a.m. Polling actually started in most of the centers at about 8 a.m. In Adamawa and Nasarawa States, for instance, INEC distributed election materials on Thursday and Friday.

It appeared that INEC did not make adequate arrangements for the transportation of election materials, polling officials and security personnel from the polling stations to the collation centers as officials in many polling stations in Kogi State could not report any concrete arrangements made for this purpose.

At unit 025 Abuja Road in Rigasa area in the Igbimi Local Government Area of Kaduna State, the counting of votes ended at about 10pm and candles had to be used for vote counting and in filling the relevant INEC forms. It would appear therefore that despite similar experiences during the National Assembly elections, INEC again did not make adequate provisions for
lighting up the polling stations which created an unwholesome atmosphere during this stage of counting and tabulation of the votes.

Voter turnout

Voter turnout was far higher than the turnout recorded during the National Assembly elections held on April 12. In many states, voters started arriving at the polling stations as early as 4:00am. But voter turnout was generally low in Enugu State and in one centre at the St. Peters Primary School, Ogbette, TMG observers recorded only 68 persons as having voted until 2.30pm when INEC officials took the ballot boxes away to an unknown place. Voter turnout in Benue and Edo States was also reported to be poorer than in the National Assembly Elections.

Although voter turnout in Kaduna State was generally impressive, the merging of some polling centers created confusion. At unit 025 Abuja Road in Rigasa area in the Ibadan Local Government Area of Kaduna, as at 3.00pm over 300 people had not cast their votes and this created tension because INEC merged three polling units into one. Voting and counting ended at this polling unit at 10pm with candles used for vote counting.

No elections

Elections did not take place in Ughelli North, Ughelli South, Okpe, Patani, some parts of Bomadi and Burutu local government areas of Delta State. In Bayelsa State, there were also no elections in many centers in Ogba Local Government Area, Sagbama Local Government Area, Nembe Local Government Area, Koko/Okokoma Local Government Area, Southern Ijaw Local Government Area, Yenagoa Local Government Area, Ekeremor Local Government Area, and Brass Local Government Area.

Availability of Electoral Materials

Voting materials were generally available during the elections as INEC appeared to have plugged the loopholes that were noticed in the National Assembly elections. However, in two of the centers monitored in Adamawa State, there were no voters’ registers. It is unclear why INEC did not take steps to rectify this problem since it had been discovered since the National Assembly elections held on April 12. Prospective voters were determined on the basis of production of voter’s card or tear-off slip. In Taraba State, there were several instances of shortage of election materials.

In Puje Ward, Kofar Inuwa Babaji Polling Unit (Code 001) in Taraba State, prospective voters held polling officers hostage and refused to vote because they did not have enough ballot papers to correspond with the number of names on the voters register at the centre. Ballot papers also ran out in some polling stations in Nasarawa State such as Angwan Yansanda Polling Unit in Ibia. About 80 people were therefore not able to vote in this station.

Shortage of election materials were also reported in Egor Local Government Area of Edo State.

In Ogun State, a few centers had insufficient ballot papers, although the situation was corrected. For example, the Odo Oyo, Ago Oba Igboere polling station was a merger of two polling stations (011 and 019) which resulted in its having 1,000 names on the register while it received a total of only 300 ballot papers.

Some polling stations had one ballot box while others had two boxes. In the stations where only one ballot box was provided, the same box was used for ballot papers for the gubernatorial and presidential elections which created delays in the sorting of votes before counting. In some
polling units in Benue State, only one ballot box was provided and when this was filled up, polling officials improvised by using baskets.

Conduct of Electoral Officials
Election officials in many of the polling stations monitored made attempts to educate voters before they cast their votes. For instance, Aishatu Abubakar, a presiding officer at Ungwan Sarki Busa 1 Polling Center, Minna, in Niger State diligently explained to the voters in Hausa and English languages the voting procedures and how to differentiate the two ballots. But there were still a few cases where election officials did not quite know what to do and had to seek the assistance of the observers to clarify some issues such as in Borno State.

Punctuality
Voting started between 8.00am and 9.00am in most of the polling stations visited. However, in Delta State, voting did not start earlier than 9.00am in any of the polling stations monitored and in a few polling centers in the state, election materials did not arrive until after 12.00 noon. This was mostly noticeable in the hinterlands. At the Ganaja Primary School Polling Station (Code 009) in Lokoja, Kogi State, voting started at 11.15 am due to the late arrival of voting materials occasioned by transportation difficulties.

Efficiency of Voting Procedures
The voting procedures were generally efficient as most of the election officials seemed to have mastered the voting procedures, although in cases where prospective voters or election officials insisted on tear off slips being exchanged for the voters' card before voting, the procedure resulted in delays. The accreditation process was much faster and better conducted than in the National Assembly elections.

Secrecy of the Ballot
INEC took commendable steps to ensure the confidentiality of voting in most of the polling centers resulting in a substantial improvement over the situation during the National Assembly elections. All the polling stations monitored made adjustments to the voting procedure to guarantee the secrecy of voting. In centers where schools were used, arrangements were made for a classroom to be used for thumb printing while the ballot papers were subsequently put in the ballot boxes in public view. In some polling stations, especially those where open spaces were used for the elections, election officials erected small compartments which enabled voters to thumb print their ballot papers away from the prying eyes of party agents, other voters and security personnel. This was a marked departure from the arrangement during the National Assembly Elections when the secrecy of voting was compromised in most polling stations due to the activities of party agents and the security personnel.

However, in Enugu State, lack of confidentiality in the voting process remained a major concern as polling officials in many polling stations did not make adequate arrangements to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot. Also in Nasarawa State, there were many polling stations that did not make adequate provisions to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot, while party agents exploited the illiteracy of some voters to influence their choice of candidates under the pretext of assisting them to cast their vote. In many centers in Kogi State, there were no adequate arrangements to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot.

Similarly, in Kaduna State, there were reports of voting in the full glare of security agents and party officials in some centers. These were noticed in places like Ungwan Rimi, Tudun Wada, Challawa Crescent and parts of Television Village.
Electoral Fraud

There were scores of cases of alleged electoral fraud in many states across the country, often with the collusion of election officials and security personnel. For instance, in Enugu State, TMG observers noted that polling officials in many centers stamped and gave bundles of ballot papers to agents of a political party which they then proceeded to thumb print in the full view of security personnel before stuffing them into the ballot boxes. This was the case in Nigerclose Primary School, Bigard Seminary and Achara Layout Primary School.

In Imo State, some election officials colluded with agents of one of the political parties and took ballot boxes to the Owuru Plaza Hotel where they were stuffed with already thumb printed ballot papers. TMG observers in Taraba State also observed stuffing of ballot boxes in polling centers in the state.

At Eziamma Autonomous Community in Ngw Okpala Local Government Area of Imo State, the INEC supervisor carted away the materials for the elections and took them to somebody’s house with the result that elections did not take place in this community. At Emekuku, in the same Imo State, some party thugs brought in ballot papers already thumb printed and mixed them up with genuine ballots during the counting process thereby creating confusion and pandemonium. At Assumpta Cathedral in Owerri, armed thugs stormed the polling centre in a bus, carted away the ballot box and made to escape. Voters gave a hot chase upon which the thugs abandoned the bus which was burnt by the voters, but the thugs managed to escape with the ballot box. At NKWO Ogwu in Mbaise, vigilant voters intercepted and destroyed a bus carrying already thumb printed ballot papers.

In many centers in Taraba State, thugs armed with knives, daggers, guns, and cutlasses attacked polling centers and snatched ballot boxes. In one case in Kachalla Sembe Polling Station (Code 007) in Jalingo Local Government Area, following reports lodged at the police headquarters by observers, about 30 armed policemen were deployed to restore law and order.

In Bayelsa State, groups of youths seized electoral materials and ballot boxes in Fanwa Ekunum Square (Code 012) polling station because they demanded to share in the financial largesse allegedly given out by a politician. Also in Ekpen-Ama (Code 103) Kolga, youths intimidated electoral and security personnel and carried away the electoral material.

A mini-bus belonging to one of the political parties but carrying election materials was intercepted by supporters of a rival party around 4:30am and handed over to the police. The vehicle and its driver were however released by the police on the ground that they were on election duty.

TMG Observers noted massive under aged voting in some polling stations such as Ejigho/Obono Polling Station (Code 08) in the Lokoja Local Government Area of Kogi State. The Presiding Officer and the two unarmed security personnel at the station declined to take action because they were not armed and were afraid that they could be overwhelmed by the sheer number of persons voting and remaining within the precincts of the polling station. They also claimed that the under age voters had their voters’ cards and their names were on the register of voters. At the Auje Kofar Ajikudu Polling station (Code 007) in Taraba State, a TMG observer witnessed a lot of under age voting and was chased away from the centre by the voters. TMG observers also recorded massive under age voting in unit 023 in Rigasa, Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State.
The symbols of the PDP and the ANPP were very prominent at the precincts of many polling stations. For instance, at Cinema/Ungwan Tivi Polling Station (Code 018), Ungwan Hamza (Code 004) and Kpakan Koto North (Code 001), all in the Lokoja Local Government Area of Kogi State, party posters littered the premisses and precincts of the polling station. This was also observed in polling stations in Taraba State. Similarly, in Kaduna State, there was open display of party symbols in most parts of the polling units. PDP agents were holding umbrellas with PDP emblem while ANPP agents shared corn at the polling stations and also canvassed for votes. In Kano State, TIMG observers noted multiple voting with some people voting up to five times.

Conduct of Security Agents

The conduct of security agents was largely civil and commendable in many states during the elections. There was also a visible improvement on the part of the police authorities in addressing the issue of lopsidedness in the distribution of their personnel to polling centres, which was noted in the preliminary report of the TIMG on the National Assembly elections. This shows that police authorities owned up to their short-comings in the last elections and took positive steps to remedy them.

However, despite improvements in security arrangements which resulted in greater coverage and better distribution of security personnel at the polling stations, some polling stations still retained an unreasonable proportion of security personnel. For instance, the Galilee Polling Station (Code 005) in Lokoja, Kogi State had a total of 13 security officers made up of the Police, Customs, Prisons, Immigration, Road Safety and National Defense and Security officials, while other polling stations in Kogi State had an average of three security personnel.

There were also troubling reports of police complicity in electoral malpractices in some states, reluctance to intervene in glaring cases of electoral misconduct on the part of some party agents, inability to maintain law and order in some centres, which gave room to some hoodlums to unleash mayhem. Furthermore, some polling centres did not witness security presence and in spite of the fact that steps were taken by the police to improve on the distribution of their personnel, the numbers still favored upper class/low density residential neighborhoods against lower class/high density areas, which created tense and unruly situations in densely populated areas. Instances of the foregoing abound:

In polling units 57, 23, 21, Abduloma ward in Port Harcourt Local Government Area in Rivers State, police personnel posted to the units were reportedly involved with INEC and PDP officials in stuffing ballot boxes.

In Ahmadu Mekoto Primary School Polling Unit, under Yara Ward in Keffi LGA, Nasarawa State, Party agents interfered in the voting process by openly telling voters which party to vote for. Both the INEC officials and Security agents at the unit were helpless and unable to either control the situation or restore law and order.

In polling centres in Ogbete, Etsu, TIMG observers reported that INEC officials gave ballot papers to party agents and allowed them to thumb-print same in the clear view of security agents after which they were pushed into the ballot boxes.
There were reports of electoral violence resulting in some deaths in Bayelsa State. The reports say six persons suspected to be ANPP supporters may have died when soldiers opened fire in Oporoma. The bodies of two of those killed, Abraham Young and Ndukari Salvation, were reportedly taken to Yenagoa and deposited at Okolobiri Mortuary.

Activities of Party Agents

There was overwhelming presence of party agents in some states of the Federation. Some conducted themselves irresponsibly through unhealthy interference in the electoral process. In Ungwan Rimi opposite market polling unit in Kaduna State, each political party had over 4 agents. They called some of them supervisors. The PDP and the ANPP had an average of two polling agents in all the polling stations monitored in Kogi State. This was a marked departure from the situation during the National Assembly elections when the parties posted as many as five party agents to one polling station. Furthermore, the party agents did not interfere with the process of voting and left the security personnel to assist non-literate voters.

In Ahmadu Mekoto Primary School Polling Unit, under Yara Ward in Keffi LGA, Nasarawa State, party agents interfered in the voting process by openly telling voters which party to vote for. Both the INEC officials and Security agents at the unit were helpless and unable to either control the situation or restore law and order.

Conclusion and recommendations

There were substantial flaws in some of the critical stages leading up to the elections which tended to undermine the credibility of the process. Preliminary election-day reports received from TMG monitors all over the country indicate a large voter turnout in most of the states and substantial improvements in the arrangements made by the Independent National Electoral Commission for conduct of the elections. The TMG observes that there were cases of electoral violence and numerous reports of electoral fraud in some parts of the country. Since this report is being issued ahead of the final release of all the results from the elections and the receipt and final analysis of all the data from TMG monitors in the field, the TMG will refrain at this stage from making a final determination as to whether the elections were free and fair.

The TMG, however, observes and recommends as follows:

1. **The Nigerian Voting Population**: The will and consent of the people must form and remain the basis of the legitimacy of any government. The Nigerian electorate has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt their preference for democracy and democratic processes. They trooped out in the rain, in the sun and in very difficult circumstances to exercise their civic responsibilities as demanded of them by the Constitution and the Electoral Law. They performed this task with dignity and sophistication despite the climate of fear and uncertainty created by the political class in their desperation to grab or retain power at all cost. This duty they performed on the understanding that their votes will count and form the basis for the legitimacy and credibility of government. The performance of the Nigerian people during the National Assembly and Presidential Elections confirms beyond any shadow of doubt that the Nigerian people are more advanced and attuned to democracy, democratic values and processes than the Nigerian political class. The political class in Nigeria must learn lessons in patriotism and democracy from the Nigerian electorates.
2. **The Results Already Declared by the Independent National Electoral Commission:**
The TMG observes that the results already declared by the Independent National Electoral Commission from some states, such as Rivers, Bayelsa, and Enugu, are far from being credible.

3. **TMG monitors deployed during the Presidential/Gubernatorial elections have reported credible allegations of electoral irregularities and malpractices in some states of the Federation.** The TMG strongly takes the position that all allegations of irregularities should be properly investigated by the responsible agencies of law enforcement. Political parties and candidates have a legal and political responsibility to take any complaints of irregularities that they may have to Electoral Tribunals established under the Electoral Act 2002.

4. **Electoral Tribunals are created by law, comprised by senior judges, and vested with the power to hear and determine complaints related to or arising from the elections.** Electoral Tribunals are empowered to hear petitions, receive evidence and arguments in support of or against alleged malpractices and decide on the petitions and complaints presented to them on the basis of evidence. They are empowered to provide adequate remedies in cases of established complaints. Such remedies may include invalidating the results of an election, ordering new elections, excluding any votes shown to have been unlawfully obtained or recorded, or, as the case may be, affirming the outcome of a vote as being in substantial compliance with the applicable laws. Election tribunals are essential in guaranteeing the integrity of both the electoral process and its outcomes. They are an essential institution of every elective democracy.

6. The judges who sit on Electoral Tribunals exercise a unique and weighty responsibility. In deciding on the petitions to be presented to them, these judges will be required to be manifestly independent, fair and impartial. TMG calls on all parties to co-operate with the Tribunals, respect their independence, respect the verdicts of the Tribunals when these are handed down and address any complaints involving the Tribunals to the National Judicial Council, chaired by the Chief Justice of Nigeria.

7. Only confidence in democratic institutions and fidelity to law can strengthen democracy and democratic processes in Nigeria. Parties and their candidates should therefore take advantage of the due process of law. TMG cautions all parties to refrain from the use of extra-judicial or extra-constitutional avenues that may threaten the future of elected government in Nigeria.

8. **Law enforcement organizations and institutions have a duty and power under law to bring the full weight of the law on all individuals, organizations or parties shown to have sought to corrupt or participated in corrupting the electoral process.** The electoral process will only have integrity when those that conduct themselves in unacceptable manner are punished in accordance with the laws of the land.

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**FESTUS OKOYE**  
**CHAIR – TMG**  
**21ST APRIL 2003**
### APPENDIX

Table 1: A Comparison of Electoral Administration: National Assembly and Presidential/Gubernatorial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>National Assembly % YES</th>
<th>Presidential &amp; Gubernatorial % YES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary election materials (e.g. voter register, indelible ink, ink pad, ballot papers and boxes) provided during the set up of polling centre?</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting materials ran out?</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling officials were non-partisan?</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling officials knew the voting procedures?</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy of voting</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign materials near polling station?</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures for set-up properly followed?</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting stopped or suspended?</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot box shown to be empty and sealed closed?</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters asked to show proper identification?</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters name checked in voters register?</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underage/multiple voting or voter impersonation?</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All voters in queue at 3 p.m. allowed to vote?</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the voting procedures followed?</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with identification and names in register denied the right to vote?</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign materials near the polling station?</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign near or in the polling station?</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence/disruption in or near the polling station</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidation of voters or polling officials</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot box stuffing or stealing of the ballot box?</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting commenced between 8.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m.</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Areas of significant improvement

- Punctual commencement of voting
- Allowing voters in queue at 3:00pm to vote
- Observance of procedures for set up of the polling centres
- Secrecy of voting
- Availability of necessary voting materials

#### Problem: Under-age voting increased slightly.

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1. This is a preliminary analysis; percentages will change as reports from more polling centers are available. TMC Monitors were deployed to 10,000 polling centers. INEC created 120,000 polling centers for the elections.
2. National Assembly (Senatorial and Representative) elections held on April 12, 2003
3. Gubernatorial and Presidential elections held on April 19, 2003
4. These figures were based on reports of monitors from 6977 polling centres.
5. These figures were based on reports of monitors from 1924 polling centres. The figures may alter slightly when further reports are received from more centres. But the pattern is not expected to change substantially.

I. PREAMBLE
The Justice, Development and Peace Committee (JDPC) as a follow up to the earlier statement on the National Assembly elections of 19th April 2003 make this statement.

The JDPC is a Non-governmental organization accredited by INEC as one of the Domestic Observers for the 2003 general elections. As stated in the Interim Report on the National Assembly Elections of 12th April 2003, JDPC trained and deployed 30,000 observers through our 48 offices and nine zonal offices spread across the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The conduct of presidential elections has been a Waterloo in Nigerian political history, hence all hands were on deck to ensure its success this time.

In the light of the above, both the Domestic and International Observers advised INEC on the proper and more effective conduct of the Presidential/Gubernatorial election following the anomalies observed during the National Assembly Elections. This was in consonance with the agreement between INEC and Civil Society groups. The success of the election is vital not only to Nigerians as a nation but to all of Africa and the International Community, as development of a genuine democratic practice is crucial to the continental peace vis-à-vis the Africa Union declaration on democratic rule as well as declarations on such issues as NEPAD.

2. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

2.1 Conduct of Elections by INEC:
INEC’s conduct of the Presidential/Gubernatorial Elections was quite an improvement on the National Assembly Elections. Reports from our Observers indicated that voting commenced generally between 8.30a.m - 9.30a.m in about 78% of the booths observed. In most of the booths, there were provisions for secret casting of votes. The INEC ad-hoc staff seemed to have a greater understanding of their duties and roles.
2.2. **Security:**
There was significant improvement on the security of the polling booths and its environs. The security men were better equipped this time around to ward off the atrocities of thugs and politicians as observed in the previous election. For instance there was low incidence of violence and deaths in many states such as Rivers, Edo, Delta, Enugu.

2.3. **Voter Turnout:**
The heavy downpour in most states did not deter voters from coming out to vote in the Presidential/Gubernatorial Elections. Indeed there was more turnout of Voters than was the case for the National Assembly elections. This shows that the mobilization efforts of the Civil Society organizations yielded dividend. Women also came out massively in many places including the Muslim dominated areas in Taraba, Zaria, Katsina etc. All of this is a confirmation of Nigerians readiness to participate in the process of choosing their leaders.

2.4. **Media:**
Coverage of the elections by the media is commendable. Their news analysis and situation report of events across the country while voting was going on, doused tensions in many areas. Also commendable is there matured relay of election results as released by INEC.

2.5. **Observers:**
Domestic and International observers deserve commendation for their non-partisan posture and collaboration of efforts in the discharge of their duties. The threat and intimidation by some politicians, including the heavy downpour did not deter them from carrying out their duties.

3. **INADEQUACIES OBSERVED**

The following inadequacies were noted.

3.1. **Political Education/Enlightenment:** Observers had, in its earlier statement on the 12th April 2003 election pointed out inadequate voter education leading to voiding of many votes. Unfortunately little was done in this area. Hence a substantial number of the non-literate population could neither recognize the party symbols nor vote properly for the candidates of their choice. Despite the improvement of the INEC's ad-hoc staff, about 35% of them still lacked adequate knowledge of election guidelines.

3.2. **Voters Register:**
The non-display of Voters' Register for claims and objections in many places and its late display of it in some places made it difficult for voters to ascertain the authenticity or otherwise of the register. This as pointed out in our earlier report further led to delays and disenfranchisement of eligible voters. There were cases of INEC's ad-hoc officials selling the cards to party officials who use them for multiple voting as observed in Idah, Kogi State.

3.3. **Election Boycott and Low Turnout:**
It is saddening that after our reports and supported by those from various Observer Groups for action to be taken on the high incidence of rigging, intimidation and even violence in Enugu, Anambra, Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo, Delta States, no positive action was
taken by INEC. The inability of INEC and Government to address the anomalies led to boycott of the election in Enugu and Ebonyi States and there was low turnout of voters for fear of further violence in Rivers, Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo and Delta States.

3.4. Collation of Results:
Massive rigging of elections were noticed to be always perpetuated at the collation centres: Hence there was need to involve observers in all the collation centres. However, various returning officers especially at the local government offices refused Observers access into the collation centres. This was observed in many Local Governments in Anambra such as Njikoka, Aguata, Onitsha and Nnewi, in Imo State such as Owerri North-East, Orlu, and in Rivers, Enugu and Delta States. The situation seemed better in the North-East, North-Central and South-West.

Form EC 8A(i) meant for statement of result does not have provision for writing of the number of total valid votes in words. This gives room to possible manipulation of numbers to alter the authentic result. Perhaps, that accounts for the 1.34 and the 2.09 million votes recorded in Enugu and Rivers States respectively despite the reported widespread boycott of the elections in Enugu and very low turnout in Rivers.

3.5. Monetary Inducements:
The heavy presence of security officials in the polling centres did not deter monetary inducements. This was prominent in Kogi, Katsina and Taraba States. Some INEC officials colluded with party agents to share unused ballot papers for fat financial rewards especially in Jalingo, Delta and Ekiti States. Bribing and intimidation of INEC officials and voters were recorded in Ikole local government area of Ekiti State, Ahiizu Mbaise local government area of Imo State, Idah local government area of Kogi State and many other areas.

3.6. Stealing/Stuffing of Ballot Boxes:
Stealing and stuffing of ballot boxes were observed in many States. In some areas like Aboh Mm endereco of Imo State, a vehicle with stuffed ballot boxes was apprehended and destroyed around 11:00 a.m on the election day. Also near Owerri Girls Secondary School in Owerri, a vehicle was burnt. In addition, the INEC office in Ahiizu Mbaise together with the local government office in Abo Mbaise all in Imo State were burnt down by irate crowd for similar incident. In Umudole Ndeshi Etche Ward 17, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, trouble broke out as the ballot boxes were snatched away. In Ward 11, 007 and Ward 19 in Port Harcourt, result sheets were said to be hijacked/snatched away from the presiding officers by some party agents.

3.7. Post Election Reaction:
The announcement of results in some States, created serious tensions. As at Sunday evening, April 20th 2003, there was serious tension in Imo, Enugu, Rivers and Delta States leading to massive deployment of security officers to those States. It is unfortunate that some of the anomalies in some States led to the non-signing and subsequent rejection of the election results by the loosing candidates especially in the gubernatorial elections.
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

4.1. Concluding Comments and Appreciation:
The JDPC was highly impressed at the resilience of Nigerians to discharge their civic responsibility. This is despite the obvious weaknesses in the structure and composition of INEC, the weather condition on the day of election and the seemingly looming violence. We commend also the dedication of the polling officials who worked tirelessly to overcome Election Day difficulties and the commitment of the non-partisan Domestic and International observers. We reiterate our earlier observation of the generally more impressive turnout of voters than during the National Assembly elections. The elections were also generally peaceful and devoid of violence except in some States, especially in the South-East and the South-South political zones where the ruling Party in each of the States, with the connivance of some INEC officials and Security Officers, unleashed tiresome intimidation against its opponents and was involved in widespread and blatant rigging of the election.

4.2. Recommendations:
In the light of the above observations, we make bold to proffer the following recommendations.

4.2.1. Public Enlightenment: Government, INEC and Political Parties should do more to compliment the Civil Society groups in the enlightenment of voters before the subsequent elections to wit: State Assembly and Local Council elections.

4.2.2. Voters Register: The INEC should ensure adequate revision of Voters Register in good time before the elections in future.

4.2.3. Political Will: There should be political will to deal with election related anomalies to forestall boycotts in the future. This will give credibility to INEC and the entire electoral process.

4.2.4. Continued Participation of Observers: To further give credibility to INEC and the entire electoral process, INEC should ensure that Observers, at the Ward and Local Government levels, have access into the Collation Centres as well as in the distribution of electoral materials. There should be better logistics in the distribution of materials in the riverine and the desert areas.

4.2.5. INEC’S Independence: Perhaps, more importantly and indeed as a matter of priority, the issue of INEC’s independence needs to be addressed towards making the Commission be, in word and action, truly independent and impartial.

__________________________
Rev. Fr. Iheanyi Enwerem O.P.
Director: Church & Society

[Signature]

21/04/2005
FOMWAN/MULAC

PRESS RELEASE
April 22, 2003

Preliminary Report on the
Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections

Continuing its mandate of full participation in the 2003 elections, the Federation of Muslim women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) and the Muslim League for Accountability (MULAC) deployed over 1,600 observers in Saturday's Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections.

We take this opportunity to congratulate the Nigerian people who continued to turn out in higher numbers than expected despite the many short-comings in the preparations for the elections and fears for safety in many parts of the country. It has been your commitment that has inspired the thousands of men and women, not only from FOMWAN and MULAC, but from other observer groups. Together we send a powerful message to our leaders and public officials that we have a strong desire for peace and democracy, and are determined to have fairness and transparency in our elections.

FOMWAN/MULAC is pleased to note the significant improvements in the conduct of Saturday's Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections; however, we are not yet prepared to pronounce the balloting free and fair in the 15 window states where our observers were deployed, as the results are not yet final.

Observers reported general improvements in a number of key areas:

- **Provision of Secrecy** -- officials made the effort to arrange for more secrecy in the voting booth, including the provision of curtains/cloth in some polling stations.

- **Timely distribution of election materials and earlier take-off of voting** -- Saturday's voting provided a sharp contrast to the National Assembly Elections. Most voters had a full seven hours during which to cast their ballots, with most polling stations starting operations prior to 8:30am. Timely take-off reduced
congestion, frustration, rage by officials, and allowed counting of ballots and collation to be completed earlier.

- **Generally peaceful conduct of elections and the determination of the electorate to participate in the electoral process** – Ordinary Nigerians continue to set an example for politicians and public officials. Despite the challenge of inclimate weather, logistical problems, and in some cases intimidation and violence, the people of the north still turned out in larger numbers than expected. These appeared to be among representation among women, not only enhancing the credibility of the election process but also contributing to the peaceful conduct of elections in most areas of the north.

- **Provision of security through a combined effort of military, mobile and regular police to keep any form of trouble at bay** – INEC and security agencies responded effectively to calls from observer groups for tighter security. For the most part, security agencies worked well together and with polling officials and observers. Their presence served as a deterrent and some reports suggest they were effective in quelling potentially serious problems. There were, however, a few reports that security agents were either ineffective or complicit in some of the irregularities at the polling stations.

Generally, FOMWAN/MULAC commends INEC for its responsiveness to the recommendations of both the international and domestic observers. The rapid adjustments in procedures showed that INEC could be more effective and efficient than its April 12 performance, and that Nigerians can hold the Commission to higher standards of operation in future elections.

FOMWAN/MULAC would also like to make special note of the warm reception provided to domestic observers by officials, security agents, and the electorate at the polling stations. We are happy to have been a part of the vanguard of Nigerians who are making positive contributions to the democratization process.

Despite the many positive improvements and generally smooth and peaceful administration of elections in the areas covered, incidents of intimidation were not altogether absent. For example, aggressive campaigning was rampant in some polling areas such as Kano/Shagari
quarters (Q9 013) where party officials actually threatened to stop the voting process if the polling officials would not let them campaign. In Jigawa at the Sabon Gari 1 polling station (J92306015) a monitor reported underage and multiple voting as well as impersonation by voters. In Kogi state at AUD 2 Otieba (KG 160106) polling station, a monitor reported that sounds of gunshots brought about a stampede and when a gunman was actually seen brandishing a gun voters ran for their dear lives. And in Nasarawa state, at Angwan Yan Sanda (O26A) more than 50 voters were turned away when voting materials were exhausted.

Against a backdrop of generally peaceful and orderly elections and in anticipation of the forthcoming elections, FOMWAN/MULAC would like to make the following recommendations:

- INEC should move quickly in its review/resolution of any irregularities/wrongdoings.
- The state election commissions should quickly adopt lessons learnt from the first two elections for the forthcoming elections – particularly in the areas of materials distribution, polling station and ballot security, and voter secrecy.

As longer term recommendations:
- INEC, judging from the dramatic improvement within a few days of the recommendations of the observer groups should work on increasing their productivity by continuously training its personnel in preparation for future elections.
- Civic/Voter education should become a continuous process properly resourced and carried out.

FOMWAN/MULAC is pleased to have played a role in safeguarding the rights of Nigerians to freely elect our leaders. We recognize that this responsibility does not end at the polling station, but continues through the collation process, reporting of results and any challenges to results based on irregularities and wrongdoings. FOMWAN/MULAC will provide additional information/findings in these areas in subsequent reports.

And finally, FOMWAN/MULAC has followed the elections more closely in the north, but we are very much aware and concerned about the many problems observed in the Southeast and South-South areas of our country as well. It is important that all of us – politicians, party
supporters, public officials, and ordinary citizens -- seize this opportunity to move our nation forward by acting with integrity and pride in what we have accomplished thus far in these elections and in what Nigeria can achieve under a leadership that truly reflects the will of the people.

We invite you to a press conference slated for 2:00 pm on Tuesday April 22, 2003 at the CEDPA office at 3255 TRC way, Maitama, Abuja (near Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) head office.
For more information, contact Hajiya Rekiya Momoh-Abaji on 0803 3499 200 or CEDPA office on 09 413 3042.

Rekiya Momoh-Abaji
National Coordinator for Elections
FOMWAN

Mariam Othman
Secretary General
FOMWAN
Addendum to Preliminary Report  
Presidential/Gubernatorial Election Observation in Northern Nigeria  
Released April 22, 2003

FOMWAN/MULAC projected a deployment of 1,600 to 1,700 observers for April 19 Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections. The following narrative report is based on an analysis of data from over the 1,493 checklists received from FOMWAN and MULAC observers and processed through the National Democratic Institute's National Information Centre between Saturday, April 19 and Tuesday morning, April 22. The narrative is followed by a summary table of key data.

With 12 of the 15 states in which observers were deployed submitting checklists, FOMWAN/MULAC can confidently report significant improvements in INEC's performance over the April 12 National Assembly elections. However, these improvements cannot mask some of the significant policy, procedural, and other problems that need to be addressed for future elections.

Set-Up at Polling Stations

Fewer polling stations experienced shortages of materials and slightly more observers reported that INEC officials were knowledgeable and appeared to be unbiased in their handling of the balloting. There was also a marked improvement in the number of polling stations that started voting prior to 8:30am - 69% in the Presidential/Gubernatorial elections versus 24% during the National Assembly elections. By starting on time, officials were able to close on time. This reduced the number of voters denied an opportunity to exercise their right to vote because of delays and shortened hours. Completing counting prior to nightfall also reduced logistical and security risks in transporting and collating ballots.

INEC officials were clearly responsive to calls for greater secrecy in the voting booth. The number of observers reporting that the voting booth was arranged to provide secrecy rose from 84% to 89%. There was also minor improvement in efforts to reduce campaigning in and around the polling stations. The number of observers reporting campaign materials near the station declined from 13% to 11%.

Observers also reported a general improvement in security at the polling stations, with more security agents (mobile and regular police, as well as military and other security agents). Though observer checklists did not include questions on security, fewer incident reports pointed to inadequate security as a problem.
Voting

While Nigerians are to be congratulated for turning out despite the many early missteps by INEC and because of security fears, it is still too early to discuss actual turnout rates. Observers did report generally higher turnout than on April 12 and noted that the turnout of women exceeded that of men in many polling stations.

There were a number of important improvements in the actual voting process as well. Though the percentage of polling stations forced to stop or suspend voting remained high at 9% (134 stations) this was an almost 3% decline from 12% (203) in the National Assembly elections. Fewer observers reported significant underage voting and voter impersonations, but at 11% this was still a significant problem requiring attention from election officials.

Observers reported that, in general, voting procedures (i.e. ballots stamped and signed, fingernails marked with indelible ink, etc.) were followed at almost 90% of polling stations, up from 86%. Observer reports show that officials at fewer polling stations denied people with proper identification and whose names were on the register the right to vote in the Presidential/Gubernatorial elections, declining from 5% to 3%.

Underage, multiple voting and voter impersonation continued to be a problem at about 11% of polling stations observed though there was a decline from the 13% in the National Assembly Election. There was also a decline in the number of observers reporting that polling officials allowed people who did not have proper identification or whose names were not on the register to vote, from 7% to 4%.

Counting of Ballots

As noted polling stations were able to start and complete counting earlier because of a significant decline in the number of polling stations that started voting after 8:30am. Almost 70% of polling stations observed started the counting of ballots before 4:00pm and 66% had completed counting by 6:00pm. The earlier completion of counting allowed many observers to follow ballot boxes to ward and LGA-level collation centres to verify proper tallying of ballot totals by INEC officials.

There continued to be problems with mismatches in number of votes parties received and valid votes cast, but INEC officials clearly learned from their experience in the National Assembly elections. That there were also fewer parties fielding candidates also contributed to improvements in counting accuracy.
Observers reported that 63% of polling stations had different totals in the April 19 election versus 77% on April 12.

**Incidents That Disrupted Voting or Caused Voting to Be Suspended**

There was a sharp decline in the number of serious incidents reported during the April 19 elections. Although observers often submitted incident reports when problems arose that did not lead to temporary suspension or discontinuance of elections, the number of such serious incidents reported declined along with the total number of incidents. For the National Assembly elections, there were 205 incident reports out of 12% of the polling stations observed and for the Presidential/Gubernatorial elections there have been only 75 incident reports, only 5% of the polling stations observed. Kano again reported the largest number of incidents (17 polling stations) and some of the most serious; however this number is down from the 45 reported during the National Assembly elections. Kogi, another state with a number of observers reporting violence and intimidation on April 12, also saw a decline in the number of incidents reported.

As with the National Assembly elections, most of the incidents involved vote buying/bribery, intimidation, and violence such as physical attacks or destruction of property. Once again, the problems were caused mainly by party supporters, with supporters of other parties and the voters being the main victims followed by polling officials.

Each of the incident reports is being reviewed to determine if the observer appropriately assessed the significance of the incident. The most serious incidents will be cataloged in the final report.
Annex E:

Sample Checklists and Incident Report Forms
FAST TRACK FOMWAN

MONITOR’S CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS

Thank you for serving as a monitor for the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN). These elections are very important for the democratic development of Nigeria. FOMWAN wants the elections to be “free and fair” and for all eligible Nigerians to have the opportunity to vote their conscience free of violence or intimidation. As a FOMWAN monitor you will help ensure that eligible Nigerians are able to exercise their right to vote and that hopefully for the first time Nigeria will have a peaceful civilian to civilian government transition.

What to Do
As a monitor you must arrive at your assigned polling station at least one hour before the opening of the polling station. Right now FOMWAN expects polling stations to open at 08h00 and therefore you must arrive at your polling station by 07h00 on election day. To be an effective monitor you must be alert, watchful and non-partisan throughout the day. Being a monitor is hard work, but your effort will be rewarded by a more democratic Nigeria.

Take with you to your assigned polling station all materials you will need during the day and into the night. Bring your monitor manual and this checklist with you, as well as copies of the Incident Report Form, pens, a note pad, food, water, a watch, and a torch to the polling station. You must remain at your assigned polling station from the time you arrive until counting is finished. This is critical to the integrity of the monitoring exercise. Do not move from one polling station to another. You have been assigned to one and only one polling station.

Problems
On Election Day some problems are likely to occur. This is to be expected. No election is perfect. All elections have both human error and manipulation. Your role as a monitor is to both deter problems as well as to document and report on problems when they do occur. When you see something that concerns you, bring it to the attention of the Presiding Officer. Do not try to resolve the problem yourself. As a monitor, you should not become part of the problem yourself. You are not in charge of the polling station. The Presiding Officer is in charge and you should inform the Presiding Officer about any problems you observer. If the Presiding Officer is unable or unwilling to help you then you should contact the Supervisory Presiding Officer. Beyond informing the Presiding Officer and the Supervisory Presiding Officer you must document any problems that are not resolved on this checklist.

Using the Checklist
You must fill out this form as you monitor at your assign polling station. The left hand column of the first page of the form is to capture information on the set up of the polling station. Complete the left hand column at the end of set up just before voting begins. The right hand column on the first page is on the voting process. Complete the right hand column at the end of voting just before counting begins. The second page is on counting. Complete this page at the end of counting.

When completing the checklist make your ticks very clear. Many people will handle this form and they will have to be able to easily read and understand your handwriting. In completing the form you must be honest and non-partisan. False or biased reports will not help FOMWAN in its effort to monitor the election. It is extremely important that you fill out the top portion of every page of the form. This is so that if the pages of the checklist become separated the FOMWAN will still be able to identify who completed the checklist and which polling station the checklist is from.

Returning the checklist
It is crucial that you return this checklist through your structures to the FOMWAN’s national leadership. The FOMWAN national leadership needs your checklist to be able to determine how the election went across all of Nigeria. Without your checklist FOMWAN will not be able to make a public statement on the conduct of the election. You will be provided information on how and when to return this form through the FOMWAN’s structures.

This form was developed with technical assistance from NDI and financial support from USAID
**Tally Space for Question 34** – How many people were denied the right to vote who had proper identification and whose names were on the voter registry?

**Tally Space for Question 36** – How many people were allowed to vote who did not have proper identification or whose name was not on the voter registry?

**Tally Space for Number of Voters**
Voting Procedures
At the time of the production of this checklist there was not definitive information on the voting procedures from INEC. However, it is believed that unlike the 1999 elections, in 2003 there will not be separate accreditation of voters and then voting. Rather, it is likely that accreditation of voters and voting will take place simultaneously.
The voting procedures will likely be approximately the following, however, again please note that INEC had not finalised or announced the procedures at the time this form was drafted and the voting procedures you see may vary.
1. Individual arrives at polling station and joins queue.
2. Polling Official checks Individual’s finger nails for indelible ink.
3. Polling Official asks to see Individual’s Voter Card and may ask questions of the Individual to determine if he/she is the proper owner of the Voter Card.
4. Polling Official checks back of Individual’s Voter Card for stamps indicating he/she has already voted.
5. Polling Official checks for Individual’s name in Voters Register.
6. Polling Official makes a mark next to the Individual’s name in the Voters Register.
7. Polling Official stamps the Individual’s Voter Card
8. Polling Official applies Indelible Ink to the individual’s finger nail.
11. Voter leaves the Polling Station.
Draft Code of Conduct for Monitors
[Taken verbatim from a draft INEC document entitled “Draft Guidelines for Domestic and International Observers for 2003 Elections”]
1. Observers are expected to perform their duties in strict compliance with the following code of conduct:
2. They shall wear their identity cards while executing their functions.
3. They shall be allowed to enter into voting and collation centres to observe the election process ranging from delivery of materials to collation of election results.
4. They shall observe the entire process of the election without participating or interfering in the election process.
5. Observers shall not direct, control, instruct or countermand decisions of the poll officials.
6. Observers however have the right to ask questions from voters outside the polling centre.
7. Observers shall not grant press interviews or comment at the polling centre.

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8. No observer shall wear any appear which: (a) bears a prohibited symbol; (b) reflects affiliation with a candidate or political party; (c) in any way canvasses for a candidate or political party.

9. No observer shall participate in any function or activity that could lead to perception of sympathy for a candidate or political party.

10. An observer shall not accept any gift or favour from any political party, candidate or person involved in the electoral process.

11. The maximum number of observers from any one group who may be resent within a polling area shall be three (3) and one (1) in a counting centre.

12. Observers can comment on the voting process and other related matters in their report to their organisations and the Commissions.

13. Observers shall display strict impartiality in the course of observing the elections and shall at no time indicate or express any statement capable of public incitement at the polling centre.

14. No observer shall carry or display any offensive weapon during his observation at polling centre.

15. Observers shall desist from doing anything that compromises the secrecy of the ballot.

16. All observers shall comply with lawful directives issued by the Commission or its representatives including an order to leave the voting centre by the presiding officer of the centre.

17. All observers shall take reasonable steps to be factual and substantiate information to be provided on the election. In a situation where they cannot substantiate their report, the observer shall, without fear, state their inability to verify the truth of the information.

18. Failure to comply with lawful directives would amount to a violation of the Electoral Act.

**Remember**

- An individual who has indelible ink on his/her thumbnail should not be allowed to vote!
- An individual whose name does not appear on the voter registry should not be allowed to vote at your polling station, but should be directed to the correct polling station where his/her name does appear on the voter registry.
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MONITOR’S CHECKLIST

INSTRUCTIONS

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15. Polling Official checks back of Individual’s Voter Card for stamps indicating he/she has already voted.
17. Polling Official makes a mark next to the Individual’s name in the Voters Register.
18. Polling Official stamps the Individual’s Voter Card
19. Polling Official applies Indelible Ink to the individual’s finger nail.
20. Polling Official issues the Individual his/her Ballot Paper and stamps and signs the back of the Ballot Paper. Individual goes to the Voting Booth and marks the Ballot Paper in secret with his/her Thumb using Ink Pad.
22. Voter leaves the Polling Station.

Draft Code of Conduct for Monitors
[Taken verbatim from a draft INEC document entitled “Draft Guidelines for Domestic and International Observers for 2003 Elections”]

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<td>Monitor’s Surname</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor’s First Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor’s Organisation</td>
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<td>State</td>
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<td>F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling Station (Code No.)</td>
<td>G.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SET-UP

1. What time did you arrive at the Polling Station?
   - Before 7 am
   - 7:00 – 8:00
   - 8:01 – 9:00
   - 9:01 – 10:00
   - 10:01 or later

2. Were you permitted to monitor Set-Up?

3. Were all of the following materials present during Set-Up: Voter Register, Indelible Ink, Ink Pads, Ballot Box, and Ballot Papers?
   - Yes
   - No

4. Was the Presiding Officer present during Set-Up?
   - Yes
   - No

How many of the following were present during Set-Up?

5. Number of Polling Officials
6. Number of Observers or Monitors
7. Number of Party Agents

Were the following done during Set-Up?

8. Ballot Papers counted?
   - Yes
   - No

9. Ballot Box shown to be empty and sealed closed?
   - Yes
   - No

10. Voting Booth arranged to provide secrecy?
    - Yes
    - No

Did any of the following occur during Set-Up?

11. Individuals disrupt Set-Up?
    - Yes
    - No

12. Campaign Materials near Polling Station?
    - Yes
    - No

13. Party Agents denied entry to Polling Station?
    - Yes
    - No

How many of each of the following during Set-Up?

14. Names on the Voters Register
15. House of Representatives Ballot Papers
16. Senate Ballot Papers

17. Presiding Officer’s Name? (if available)
   
   Surname _____________________ First Name _____________________

18. In general, were the procedures for Set-Up followed?
    - Yes
    - No

19. What time did voting start?
   - Before 8 am
   - 8:00 – 8:30
   - 8:31 – 9:00
   - 9:01 – 11:00
   - 11:01 or later
   - Never

[Sign here when you have completed Questions 1 thru 19]

Monitor’s Signature _____________________ Date ___________

VOTING PROCESS

In general, were these procedures followed consistently?

20. Voters asked to show proper identification?
    - Yes
    - No

21. Voters’ fingernails inspected for indelible ink?
    - Yes
    - No

22. Voters’ name checked in Voters Registry?
    - Yes
    - No
23. **Y** Ballot Papers stamped and signed?
24. **Y** Voters’ fingernails marked with indelible ink?

**Did any of the following occur during the Voting Process?**

25. **Y** Voting materials ran out?
26. **Y** Voting stopped or suspended?
27. **Y** Violence/Disruption in or near the Polling Station?
28. **Y** Campaigning near or in the Polling Station?
29. **Y** Intimidation of Voters or Polling Officials?
30. **Y** Underage/Multiple voting or Voter Impersonation?
31. **Y** Ballot Box stuffing or Stealing of the Ballot Box?
32. **Y** Other? Specify _________________________

33. **Y** Were people denied the right to vote who had identification and whose names were on the Voters Registry?
   34. If YES, How many? □ □ □

35. **Y** Were people permitted to vote who did not have identification or whose names were not on the Voters Registry?
   36. If YES, How many? □ □ □

37. **Y** All Voters in queue at 3 pm allowed to vote?
38. **Y** People who arrived after 3 pm allowed to vote?
39. **Y** Polling Officials were Non-Partisan?
40. **Y** Polling Officials knew the Voting Procedures?

41. **How many people Voted?** □ □ □ □

42. **In general, were the procedures for Voting followed?**  
   **Y**

43. **What time did Voting finish?**
   A) Before 3 am  B) 3:00 – 4:00  C) 4:01 – 6:00
   D) 6:01 – 8:00  E) 8:01 or later  F) Never

[Sign here when you have completed Questions 20 thru 43]

Monitor’s Signature ___________________________ Date ___________________________
# MONITOR’S CHECKLIST (Page 2 of 2)

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COUNTING PROCESS

44. **Ballot Papers Counted at the Polling Station?**
   - Y
   - N

45. **Were you permitted to Monitor Counting?**
   - Y
   - N

46. **Were Party Agents permitted to Monitor Counting?**
   - Y
   - N

47. **What time did Counting start?**
   - A: Before 3 pm
   - B: 3:00 – 4:00
   - C: 4:01 – 6:00
   - D: 6:01 – 8:00
   - E: 8:01 or later
   - F: Never

VOTE COUNT – HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

- **Total Number of Ballots Received**
- **Number of Unused Ballots**
- **Number of Spoilt Ballots**
- **Number of Tendered Ballots**
- **Number of Rejected/Void Ballots**

VOTE COUNT – SENATE ELECTION

- **Total Number of Ballots Received**
<table>
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<tr>
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<td>APGA</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
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</table>

**VOTE COUNT – OVERALL**

64. Did the Presiding Officer sign the Statement of Results?
   - **YE** Y
   - **N**

65. Did all of the Party Agents present sign the Statement of Results?
   - **YE** Y
   - **N**

66. Did you agree with the vote count?
   - **YE** Y
   - **N**

67. In general, were the procedures for Counting followed?
   - **YE** Y
   - **N**

68. What time did Counting finish?
   - **A** Before 6 pm
   - **B** 6:00 – 7:00
   - **C** 7:01 – 9:00
   - **D** 9:01 – 11:00
   - **E** 11:01 or later
   - **F** Never

[Sign here when you have completed Questions 44 thru 68]

______________________________  _______________________
Monitor’s Signature                Date
Annex F:

DOMES Power Point Presentation
COMMUNICATING ELECTION DATA: IMPLEMENTING A PILOT SYSTEM IN NIGERIA

THE SYSTEM’S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

- Assisting partners to prepare credible, timely statements
- Providing a basis for authoritative recommendations
- Building sustainable skills in data collection and analysis
- Providing data for comparative analyses in future elections
- Getting members involved in a participatory national effort that supports democracy

System Components

- Partners own/control their data. Safety and confidentiality emphasized.
- Data are segregated by organization.
- Data based on inputs from Monitors’ Checklists and Incident Report Forms.
- Two kinds of Forms: a) Fast Track and b) Standard
- Electronic and paper forms returned to each organization after processing.
- Aggregated data showing patterns, percentages, trends are outputs for analysis and reporting.

System Elements

- Monitors’ Checklists and Incident Report Forms completed accurately
- Collation points chosen by the partners.
- State/Zonal Coordinator offices or other sites for faxing Checklists.
- Data Transfer Centers (DTCs)
- National Election Information Center (NIC)

Checklist Flow Chart

- “Fast Track”
  - Allows rapid processing of a representative sample of partners’ data
  - 15 States chosen; percentages of Fast Track Checklists given to each partner for distribution in those States
  - Must be faxed or delivered the fastest possible way
  - Incident Reports treated as Fast Track
  - Reports back to partners within 48 hours
No Forms left behind. In other words, all Checklists and Incident Report Forms submitted will be processed. Standard Forms submitted after collection to DTCs or to NIC. While Fast Track are priority, Standard Forms will be processed simultaneously as received. Report on these data also produced at regular intervals. Standard Forms provide comprehensive data for use in all subsequent, final reports.

Roles and Responsibilities

- **Partners**: Establish site, network, address where NIC reports can be sent.
- **Monitors**: Complete Checklists/Forms accurately and submit as directed.
- **Coordinators**: Develop and disseminate system for collection: sort by type; fax and/or deliver to DTC. MARK EACH DOCUMENT THAT GOES THROUGH FAX WITH "FAX" ON TOP.
- **DTC staff**: process all forms submitted and fax Fast Track forms if received.
- **NIC**: collects/separates all data by partner; generates reports; sends reports to partners at regular intervals.

Reporting Intervals

- **Fast Track**:
  - First report: 9 a.m. day after election (ED + 1)
  - Second report: 12:00 ED + 1
  - Third report: 15:00 ED + 1
  - Fourth report: 20:00 ED + 1
  - Fifth report: 24:00 ED + 1
  - Sixth report: 08:00 ED + 2
  - Seventh report: 12:00 ED + 2

- **Standard**: Daily as batched
- **Partners can request other time parameters.**

Anticipated Challenges

- Think ahead! Design a system that is feasible and make sure everyone knows its requirements.
- Time is of the essence! Please get forms to the NIC as quickly as possible.
- Be ready to take initiative! If the infrastructure is not in place (e.g., fax line congestion, no working phones, power outages, equipment failure), what alternatives will you implement?
- Nominate an analyst for training!

What Do We Promise?

- High tech, state-of-the-art data processing
- Set-up at partners’ headquarters or designated locations to receive reports
- Timely, tailored reports for use by partners
- Skills transfer and capacity building for sustainability and future activities
- Comprehensive database segregated by partner
- Collaboration and coordination
- Joint, on-site problem solving or TA as requested/needed

We Are In This Together: Good Luck to Us All!!
Annex G:

DOMES User Manual
1. SETTING UP THE DATABASE
A) PREPARE ALL COMPUTERS TO RUN DOMES
   STEP 1 - Ensure that all Computers Meet Requirements
   STEP 2 - Install Required Software
   STEP 3 - Adjust Screen Resolution
   STEP 4 - Configure Access to Support Linked Tables
B) SET UP AND CONFIGURE NETWORK
   STEP 1 - Network all computers through hub or switch
   STEP 2 - Enable File and Printer Sharing
C) SET UP YOUR DOMES SERVER
D) PREPARE DOMES FOR USE ON EACH CLIENT
   STEP 1 - Map network drive
   STEP 2 - Copy Domes Front End to Client
   OPTION 3 - Add New Member Groups
   OPTION 4 - Create User Accounts

3. DATA ENTRY
   A) MONITOR’S CHECKLIST FORM
      STEP 1 - Entering Monitor’s Checklist Form
      STEP 2 - Noting the code
      STEP 3 - Enter the data
   B) INCIDENT REPORT FORM
      STEP 1 - Entering Incident Report Form

4. REPORTING
   A) REPORTING
      MENU 1 - Main Menu
      MENU 2 - Reporting Menu
      STEP 1 - Processing Status Report
1. SETTING UP THE DATABASE

A) Prepare all computers to run DOMES
All computers that will be used to run DOMES must be configured to allow the software to work properly. The steps below should be followed for each computer that will be used to run DOMES.

STEP 1 – Ensure that all computers meet requirements
Each Computer should be configured as follows:
- Windows 98 or later
- MS Access 2000 or XP
- Antivirus software installed and a full system scan run.**
- If you are using DOMES on more than one computer, each needs to have a network card

STEP 2 – Install required software
Two additional pieces of software must be installed to allow DOMES to function properly. Both are free and available on the Internet. For your convenience both have also been included in the “Software Patches” folder on the DOMES installation CD. Run both of these patches on every computer that will be using DOMES.

MDAC version 2.7

Visual Basic version 6.0
STEP 3 – Adjust Screen Resolution

Each computer’s resolution should be set to 1024 by 768 pixels:

1. Right click on the desktop and select “Properties.”

2. Under the “Settings” tab choose the Screen Resolution.

STEP 4 – Configure MS Access to support linked tables

Microsoft Access must be configured to support linked tables:

1. Open a blank database
2. Under “Tools” > “Database Utilities” choose “Linked Table Manager”
3. If linked tables are already supported, you’ll receive the message “There are no linked tables in the current database”
4. If linked tables are not currently supported, you’ll be asked to insert the Microsoft Office CD. Follow the set-up instructions given.
**b) Set up and configure network**
If DOMES will be used across multiple computers these computers must be networked to allow all to simultaneously update the master database. If DOMES will only be used on one computer, then you may skip this step.

**STEP 1 - Network all computers through hub or switch**
You may need your network administrator to help you with this. He/she will need to set the permissions such that you can install new software, enable file sharing, and map network drives.

**STEP 2 - Enable File and Printer Sharing**
Be sure that in your network administrator has set network properties to allow file and printer sharing for Microsoft Networks.

Ideally, the computers should all reside on the same workgroup to facilitate sharing network folders and mapping network drives.
C) Set up your DOMES server

The DOMES server houses the master [complete] copy of the database. As information is entered on the client computers, this information is constantly being added to the master database on the server. If you are using DOMES on a single computer, this computer will also function as the server.

IF YOU ARE USING DOMES ON A SINGLE COMPUTER:

1. In your “My Documents” folder, create a folder and call it DOMES.
2. Copy DOMES_BE and DOMES_WG to your newly created folder.
3. You may want to create a shortcut to DOMES_BE on your desktop.

YOUR COMPUTER IS NOW READY TO USE DOMES, SKIP AHEAD TO “E) SETTING UP SECURITY FOR DOMES”
IF YOU ARE USING DOMES ON SEVERAL COMPUTERS:

1. In your “My Documents”, create a folder and call it DOMES.

2. Copy the entire contents of the DOMES installation CD into your newly created folder.

3. From “My Documents” folder, right-click on the DOMES folder and choose “Sharing and Security”
Check the box to “Share this folder on the Network”. Be sure that the box to “Allow network users to change my files” is also checked.
D) Prepare DOMES for use on each client machine

If you are planning on using DOMES over several computers, you must complete the following step on all computers, including the server.

**STEP 1 – Map Network Drives**

1. In the client’s Network Neighborhood Folder, navigate to the DOMES folder that you shared on your server.
2. Right-click on the folder and choose “Map Network Drive.”
3. From the pull down menu choose the Z: drive.
4. Be sure to check the box for “Reconnect at Log in.”

**STEP 2 – Copy DOMES Front End to client**

1. Create a folder on the desktop of the client called “DOMES”
2. Copy the file DOMES_FE from the Z: drive to the newly created DOMES folder

**REPEAT THIS PROCESS WITH ALL CLIENT COMPUTERS**
E) Set up security for DOMES

The following steps will password-protect your DOMES system. If you choose, you may skip these steps and run DOMES without security. Installing the security features described below will allow you create individual user accounts for each of your Data Entry Operators (see Chapter 2: Administration). This will not only allow you to control who has access to the database and the various tools and features that each user has access to, but will also tag each record entered with the unique ID of the operator. The latter can aide in tracking the performance of your operators and in maintaining accountability for the accuracy of data entered.

ON COMPUTERS RUNNING ACCESS XP:

In Access, choose: “Tools” > “Utilities” > “Workgroup Administrator”

“Join” the DOMES workgroup by linking to “Z:\DOMES_WG.mdw”

Click Join...

Click Browse...

Select the Z: Drive

Select DOMES_WG.MDW

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From this point on, you will be required to enter a password anytime you start DOMES. Your username is “Admin” and the password is “Admin”. In the next section, you will learn how to create accounts for your data entry operators.”

REPEAT THIS PROCESS WITH ALL CLIENT COMPUTERS
ON COMPUTERS RUNNING ACCESS 2000:

Go to Program Files/Microsoft Office/Office and run the "MS Access Workgroup Administrator" program.

"Join" the DOMES workgroup by linking to "Z:\DOMES_WG.mdw"

Click Join…

Click Browse…

Select the Z: Drive

Select DOMES_WG.MDW

From this point on, you will be required to enter a password anytime you start DOMES. Your username is “Admin” and the password is “Admin”. In the next section, you will learn how to create accounts for your data entry operators.”

REPEAT THIS PROCESS WITH ALL CLIENT COMPUTERS
2. ADMINISTRATION

From the Main Menu screen click on the blue button next to the "ADMINISTRATION" menu. This will take you to the administration section of the database.

From this screen you can perform three types of administration:

1. Change the event to be monitored

   NOTE: *** presents options:
   1. Presidential & gubernatorial
   2. National Assembly
   3. State Assembly

2. Review and revise the records entered to data

3. Add new member groups to your monitoring organization.
OPTION 1 – Change the event to be monitored

1. From the Administration menu, choose the blue button next to “Data Transfer Center Information”

2. At the bottom of the DTC Location box is a pull down menu for the event. Choose the appropriate event and then select “Close Form”

3. You may not notice the change immediately, but once you return to the main menu, you should find that the event has been updated.

OPTION 2 – Review and revise the records entered to date

From the Administration menu, highlight a form type and select the blue button next to “Open Form”

An interface will appear that is similar to the data entry interface with a few notable differences:

At the bottom left of is a navigation bar that allows you to scroll through all records:

Record: ▼ ▼ ▼ 1 ▼ ▼ ▼ of 1

With this scroll bar, you can move to particular records and correct errors if necessary.

The interface will also allow you to:

- Delete faulty records
- Exit the interface
OPTION 3 – Add new member groups to your monitoring organization

1. From the Administration menu click on the blue button next to “Groups”.
2. To add a new group select the “new” button.
3. Close the Groups window by selecting close in the upper right.

OPTION 4 – Create User Accounts

1. From the DOMES Main Menu, close the Main Menu Window by selecting the close button in the upper right.
3. Select: New...
4. In the New User window: Key in the user’s login in the “Name:” field. Customarily this is created by combining the person’s first initial and his/her entire last name.
5. The “Personal ID” field allows you to enter in additional information about the person for your own record.
6. When the new user starts the database, he/she should enter the login that you created as their username, and should leave the password field blank.
3. DATA ENTRY

**MENU 1 - Main Menu**

From the Main Menu screen click on the blue button next to the “DATA ENTRY” menu. This will take you to the data entry section of the database.

**MENU 2 – Data Entry Menu**

Select type of the form you want to enter:

1. reports on incident forms (Nigeria 2003 Elections Incident Report Form)
2. reports on monitors’ checklist (State Assembly Elections Observation Form)

After selecting type of form, click on the blue button next to “OPEN FORM”

**NOTE**: DATA ENTRY IS AVAILABLE ONLY FOR STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS.

**A) MONITORS’ CHECKLIST FORM**
**STEP 1 - Entering Monitor’s checklist form**

The Default value in “PARTNER” field will be your organization and it is not changeable.

Select either “STANDARD” or “FAST TRACK” as the form type. This information can be found in the upper left corner of the form.

**STEP 2 – Noting the code**

Write the code that database generates on the top of the form.

**STEP 3 – Enter the data**

The Data entry interface follows the monitor’s checklists.

**NOTE:** THE BOTTOM HALF OF THE SCREEN CONTAINS INFORMATION ON THE POLLING STATION LOCATION. THE DATABASE IS DESIGNED SUCH THAT ONCE A STATE IS CHOSEN, THE OPERATOR ONLY IS GIVEN OPTIONS OF LGAS WITHIN THAT STATE; WHEN AN LGA IS CHOSEN, ONLY WARDS WITHIN THIS LGA ARE LISTED, ETC. THEREFORE THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN THE ORDER IT APPEARS ON THE SCREEN. OPERATORS MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY FINDING ALL OF THIS INFORMATION, AS SOME CHECKLISTS DO NOT INCLUDE INFORMATION ON THE WARD. IN SUCH AN INSTANCE, OPERATORS MAY SKIP DIRECTLY TO THE PULL DOWN MENU FOR THE POLLING STATION, HOWEVER IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO GENERATE A COMPLETE LIST OF POLLING STATIONS IN THE GIVEN LGA. IF LGA AND WARD ARE SELECTED, THE DATABASE WILL GENERATE LIST IN LESS TIME. IF THERE IS NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION GIVEN TO LOCATE THE
EXACT POLLING STATION, THAN WHATEVER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO FREE TEXT.

After entering all the data interface captures, click "NEXT" to proceed to following section.
Question 56 requires a separate worksheet. This can be accessed by pressing the button labeled: **“Click to Go to Question 56”**

Once the data entry operator chooses “submit” he/she will no longer have access to the form. Any changes to the record must be made from the administration menu.

Sample of data entry interface that captures votes parties received.

**NOTE:** IF YOU CLICK IN A FIELD NEXT TO A PARTY YOU MAY BE REQUIRED TO ENTER NUMBER. IF PARTY DIDN’T RECEIVE VOTES ENTER “0”.

After submitting a form you will return to Data Entry Menu. See **MENU 2** of Data Entry Section.
**B) INCIDENT REPORT FORM**

**STEP 1 - Entering Incident report form**

**Screen 1**

The Data entry interface follows Incident report form.

**NOTE:** IF THE INCIDENT REPORT ACCOMPANIES A CHECKLIST, ENTER THAT CHECKLIST FIRST. IN THE FIELD FOR THE FORM CODE ENTER THE CODE OF THE CHECKLIST. IF THE INCIDENT REPORT DOES NOT ACCOMPANY A CHECKLIST, THEN LEAVE THIS BLANK.

**Screen 2**

Button **“CLICK HERE FOR QUESTION 2”** opens text field that is used to enter description of the incident.

After submitting a form you will return to Data Entry Menu. See **MENU 2** of Data Entry Section.
4. REPORTING

**MENU 1 - Main Menu**

From the Main Menu screen click on the blue button next to “REPORTS” menu. This will take you to the reporting section of the database.

---

**MENU 2 - Reporting Menu**

Once in the reporting section, select between:

1. reports on incident forms
   (Nigeria 2003 Elections Incident Report Form)

2. reports on monitors’ checklist
   ( **** Elections Observation Form)

After selecting, click on blue button next to “PROCEED”

**NOTE:** YOU WON’T BE ABLE TO CHOOSE NETWORK, ONLY YOUR NETWORK WILL BE AVAILABLE.
STEP 1 - Processing Status Report

The Processing Status Report shows how many checklists have been processed (entered in database). Database provides you option to report by zones/states and LGAs.

To view the report by zones/states click to “REPORT BY ZONE/STATE”

To view the report by LGAs, choose state from drop down menu and click to button next to “REPORT BY LGAS IN STATE”

STEP 2 - Working with the report

Click here to Maximize or Close the report

Click here to Print the report

This toolbar allows you to browse through multiple pages report
**STEP 3 - Form Data Analyses reports**

The **FORM DATA ANALYSIS REPORT** is an analytical report based on data captured in monitors' checklists. You can view report grouped by zone, state, or overall (Nation).

Report is produced in 3 parts:
- Part 1: Questions 1-5
- Part 2: Questions 6-10
- Part 3: Questions 11-16

Once you select area and part, click **PROCEED**. Work with the report as described in **STEP 2**.

---

**STEP 4 - Individual Question report**

The **INDIVIDUAL QUESTION REPORT** shows the cumulative results for each individual question on the monitor's checklists.

Report can be grouped by states, or by LGA for even more detailed analysis.

Select question and grouping and click **PROCEED**. Work with report the described in **STEP 2**.
5. CONTACT MANAGEMENT

**MENU 1 - Main Menu**

From the Main Menu screen click on the blue button next to "CONTACTS" menu. This will take you to the contacts management section of the database.

**MENU 2 - Contacts Menu**
The Contacts menu gives 2 options:
1) Contact Management
2) Contact Reports

**Contact Reports** lists your contacts with several options. Options to list your contacts by state require two-letter state code. Select your option and click on blue button next to "OPEN REPORT"

Operate with report as described in section:
4. "REPORTING"

**STEP 2 – WORKING with the report**
STEP 1 – Contacts Management

The Contacts Management section provides you tools to browse, search, update and delete your contacts.

To Search for a contact:
1. Right click on field that you want to search.
2. Click on “FILTER FOR:” field, enter search letter and click enter. Use asterisk (*) before and/or after search letters to widen your options.
3. Remember to remove filter before next search.

To Browse for a contact:
Use the toolbar in the lower-left corner.
ANNEX H:

Workshop and Lessons Learned Evaluation Formats
NDI/Election Partners’ Evaluation Form

Thank you, most sincerely, for sharing your experiences on monitoring the 2003 Nigerian elections. We hope that you derived some practical information, tools and techniques through our work together that will help you in your work and strengthen your organization for future activities. NDI needs your brief assessment to make future activities of our organization even more effective. We will be asking some questions and hope that you will be candid in your responses. Thank you in advance for your help.

1. Overall, I found NDI’s technical assistance to be:

☐ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

2. Overall, I found the support I received from my organization
Please name your organization[          ] to be:

☐ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

3. The most positive aspects were:

☐ Training  ☐ Strategic Thinking  ☐ Data processing  ☐ Materials

☐ Other (Please specify):

______________________________________________________________

4. At the grassroots or local level, we were able to:

☐ Coordinate effectively with other organizations
☐ Recognize and address specific issues. Please specify:

______________________________________________________________

Liaise with local INEC or SIEC officials, especially for accreditation.
☐ Organize and find ways to submit reports quickly and constructively.

5. I participated in training Workshops as a master trainer. Please rate the following components:
a. Facilitation/Training

☑ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

b. Agenda

☑ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

c. Activities

☑ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

d. Printed materials/handouts

☑ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

e. Interaction and dialogue among participants

☑ Excellent  ☐ Very Good  ☐ Good  ☐ Fair  ☐ Poor

6. If you were not a master trainer, but received training as a monitor or as a zonal or state coordinator, please rate the following workshops on a scale of 1-5, with “5 “ being excellent and “1” being poor:

☐ Facilitation/Training  ☐ Agenda
☐ Activities  ☐ Printed Materials
☐ Logistics  ☐ Interaction/Dialogue among Participants

[Note: Please list at least three responses for questions 7-14. Thank you.]

7. The things you found most useful about the training or workshop:

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________
8. The things you found least useful about the training or workshop:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

9. The most significant issues I faced in monitoring the elections were:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

10. The most significant achievements we had in monitoring the elections were:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

11. The priority recommendations I would make to improve our performance in monitoring future elections are:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

12. The priority recommendations I would make to improve NDI’s (or other international or donor organizations’ support to enhance domestic monitoring in future elections are:

________________________________________________________________________
13. What were the major areas of improvement in your organization’s monitoring efforts in 2003 over those in 1998-9? What were areas where you did not improve upon the 1998-9 effort?

14. What were the major areas of improvement in your organization’s monitoring efforts between the National Assembly and presidential/gubernatorial elections in 2003, if any? Briefly what were the factors that contributed to those improvements?

15. Please provide additional comments if needed:
Participants’ Evaluation Form\textsuperscript{16}

Thank you, most sincerely, for agreeing to become a monitor for the 2003 elections in Nigeria. Your participation will make a major contribution to sustaining democracy in this great country. We need your brief assessment to make future training of monitors even more effective. Please fill out this form – anonymously – and return it to the workshop master trainer or facilitator. Thank you in advance for your help.

16. Overall, I found the workshop to be:

☐ Excellent    ☐ Very Good    ☐ Good    ☐ Fair    ☐ Poor

17. The Workshop’s duration was:

☐ About right    ☐ Too long    ☐ Too short    ☐ Uncertain

18. I have learned some useful information that I can apply in monitoring the 2003 elections.

☐ True    ☐ Not true    ☐ Uncertain

19. Please rate the following components of the workshop:

a. Facilitation/Training

☐ Excellent    ☐ Very Good    ☐ Good    ☐ Fair    ☐ Poor

b. Agenda

☐ Excellent    ☐ Very Good    ☐ Good    ☐ Fair    ☐ Poor

\textsuperscript{16} This format was used for master trainers as well.
c. Activities

☐ Excellent ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

d. Printed materials/handouts

☐ Excellent ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

e. Interaction and dialogue among participants

☐ Excellent ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

20. Please provide any additional comments, including suggestions about other topics that should be covered or issues that needed more information:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Thank You!!
The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

**Build Political and Civic Organizations**: NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well-organized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions—the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

**Safeguard Elections**: NDI promotes open and democratic elections. Political parties and governments have asked NDI to study electoral codes and to recommend improvements. The Institute also provides technical assistance for political parties and civic groups to conduct voter education campaigns and to organize election monitoring programs. NDI is a world leader in election monitoring, having organized international delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries, helping to ensure that polling results reflect the will of the people.

**Promote Openness and Accountability**: NDI responds to requests from leaders of government, parliament, political parties and civic groups seeking advice on matters from legislative procedures to constituent service to the balance of civil-military relations in a democracy. NDI works to build legislatures and local governments that are professional, accountable, open and responsive to their citizens.

International cooperation is key to promoting democracy effectively and efficiently. It also conveys a deeper message to new and emerging democracies that while autocracies are inherently isolated and fearful of the outside world, democracies can count on international allies and an active support system. Headquartered in Washington D.C., with field offices in every region of the world, NDI complements the skills of its staff by enlisting volunteer experts from around the world, many of whom are veterans of democratic struggles in their own countries and share valuable perspectives on democratic development.