LIBERIA: CIVIL SOCIETY’S ROLE IN THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

Prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

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The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

**Build Political and Civic Organizations:** NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well-organized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions—the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

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International cooperation is key to promoting democracy effectively and efficiently. It also conveys a deeper message to new and emerging democracies that while autocracies are inherently isolated and fearful of the outside world, democracies can count on international allies and an active support system. Headquartered in Washington D.C., with field offices in every region of the world, NDI complements the skills of its staff by enlisting volunteer experts from around the world, many of whom are veterans of democratic struggles in their own countries and share valuable perspectives on democratic development.
Acknowledgments

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 11, 2003, Liberian President Taylor stepped down from office and accepted asylum in Nigeria. Days later, the Liberian government and rebel forces signed the Liberia Comprehensive Peace Agreement (known as the “Accra Agreement”) after months of negotiations in Ghana. In addition to defining the terms of a ceasefire, the Agreement lays out the structure and scope for a transition authority to guide the country toward democratic elections in 2005. Signatories to the Agreement chose Gyude Bryant, a respected business leader, as chairman of the National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL), which was inaugurated in Monrovia on October 14.

Following the signing of the Agreement, a Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force deployed to Monrovia and environs to provide security during the initial months of the transition process. The United Nations (UN), recognizing that a much larger force would be necessary to stabilize the entire country, authorized a peacekeeping operation of 15,000 that began deploying on October 1. Within the framework of the Accra Agreement and under the protection of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Liberia has a historic opportunity to end the cycle of political discord and violence that has impoverished the country and destabilized the region for over a decade. However, conflicting interpretations of the Accra Agreement by the competing factions who signed it, confusion over the scope of the UN mandate, entrenched cultures of corruption and impunity, and the near complete destruction of the country's institutions, represent significant challenges that must be overcome if the transition process is to conclude successfully in 2005.

Liberian civil society has a critical role to play in ensuring the successful implementation of the Accra Agreement, although many organizations are struggling to regain their footing after years of persecution under the Taylor regime. While civil society normally functions outside the government in an oversight or advocacy position, the Accra Agreement outlines an unprecedented role for Liberian civil society representation within the transition authority. By holding formal positions in the NTGL and serving as representatives to the National Transition Legislative Assembly (NTLA) while trying to maintain their watchdog roles, civic leaders and their supporters are grappling with a number of unforeseen conflicting interests and constituencies.

NDI's past programs in Liberia have sought to strengthen the ability of civic groups to mobilize and broaden citizen participation in the country's political life. After a five-year hiatus, NDI returned to Liberia in October 2003 to begin preparations for a new program intended to support the important role of civic groups in the transition process. Based on the findings of the October assessment mission that included the hosting of a civil society roundtable, NDI presents in this report an analysis of the environment in which Liberian civic groups are currently operating and offers recommendations to civic groups, representatives of the transition authority and representatives of the international community on strengthening the participation of civic organizations and ordinary citizens in transition structures and processes.

Civic groups and civil society representatives in government need to actively consider and debate issues concerning the new role for civil society outlined in the Accra Agreement, and develop a strategic plan to ensure effective participation in the transition process. Civil society representatives participating in the transition authority either as representatives to the NTLA or in NTGL positions have a special responsibility to promote a more comprehensive understanding of the Agreement, both by members of the transitional authority and by the broader public, and to advocate for transparency and accountability from within. Civic groups
have similar roles to play outside government. Both sides have a responsibility to inform and report on the status of the Accra Agreement and the overall transition process. The transitional authority must respect the terms under which civil society is represented in government; but it must also recognize that representatives cannot speak for civil society as a whole and should not be seen as substitutes for engagement with civic groups seeking to perform an oversight role in the transition process. NDI would also hope that representatives from the international community, particularly UNMIL and ECOWAS, engage with civic groups in the implementation of the UN's broad mandate to support all aspects of the transition process. While a more inclusive framework for managing the transition could slow the decision-making process and overall implementation of the Accra Agreement, NDI has found through its work in post-conflict societies that international organizations must remain mindful of the need to build local ownership of long-term peace, stability and respect for democratic processes it to be achieved.
BACKGROUND

For six years following Liberia's 1997 national election, President Charles Taylor's government routinely persecuted opposition figures, human rights activists, the press and members of civil society while plundering the nation's natural wealth. Externally, Taylor's support for Sierra Leonean rebels and his involvement in illicit diamond trading and arms trafficking led the international community to impose economic sanctions on the government of Liberia in 2001. In 2000, an armed insurgency, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), invaded northern Liberia from bases in Guinea. The LURD repeatedly threatened the capital city, Monrovia, causing massive waves of population displacement and a deepening humanitarian crisis. A second rebel group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), composed primarily of members of the Krahn ethnic group, split from the Mandingo-dominated LURD in 2002. By August 2003, an estimated 75 percent of Liberia's population had fled the spreading conflict by migrating to the relative safety of Monrovia and its environs.

In early June 2003, Sierra Leone's UN-supported Special Court unsealed an indictment of Taylor issued in March, charging him with war crimes committed during Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war. In coordination with Interpol, an international warrant for Taylor's arrest was issued while he was participating in ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks in Accra, Ghana. At the same time, troops loyal to Taylor, who had not been paid for months, were unable to defend Monrovia as rebel forces moved closer, threatening the capital with mortar fire. Although Taylor was not arrested and returned to Monrovia with support from the Ghanaian government, mounting domestic and international pressure forced him to step down and accept Nigeria's offer of asylum in August. Days later, the Liberian government and rebel forces signed the Accra Agreement after months of negotiations in Ghana that included the participation of representatives from political parties and civic groups. The Accra Agreement defined the structure and scope of the NTGL and laid out a two-year transition process intended to culminate in UN-supported elections in 2005.

On October 1, the UN deployed to Monrovia. It has since faced repeated challenges in expanding its presence outside the capital, especially as contributing nations have been slow to deploy troops. The demobilization process suffered a false start in December when confusion over compensation provided to ex-combatants for turning in their weapons led to violent riots and civilian deaths on the outskirts of Monrovia. UNMIL has since delayed the process several times, despite concerns that the lack of results in this area could lead to smaller contributions from UN member states at the February 2004 donor conference in New York. During the aborted first attempt to begin the disarmament program, UNMIL registered over 12,000 combatants, most of them fighters loyal to Taylor's former government.

The NGTL took office on October 14, with Gyude Bryant, a respected business leader, as transition chairman. The primary responsibility of the NTGL is to ensure the implementation of the Accra Agreement, including provisions of the ceasefire. The NTGL is also responsible for promoting reconciliation, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the political and rehabilitation programs outlined in the Agreement and supporting the preparation and conduct of internationally supervised elections in October 2005.

Since its inauguration, the NTGL has faced daunting challenges. Intense competition for positions in the transitional government between rebel groups, representatives from the former government, political parties and civic groups nearly overwhelmed the new government in its first months in office. The matter was only resolved with Chairman Bryant's agreement to assign 51 of 86 assistant minister positions to the rebel groups and the former government, thereby
diminishing the representation of civil society and unarmed political parties. In addition, the cash-strapped government has struggled to pay civil servants, many of whom are owed many months’ back pay. The rehabilitation of infrastructure in Monrovia and outlying areas remains a pressing concern, particularly as displaced citizens in Monrovia and surrounding countries seek to return to their homes.

In this challenging context, Liberian civil society organizations have crafted a new and unique role for themselves. Their place in both the legislature and the executive takes them beyond their traditional roles as advocates, educators and watchdogs. The prominent, though unusual, role played by civic leaders in drafting the Accra Agreement is due in part to the perception of Liberia as a failed state and to the recognition that the active participation of all political actors is needed to rebuild the country. Liberian civic leaders who participated in the Accra talks have assigned to themselves the role of promoting democracy in government from within, while counterparts who remain outside government place more importance on their independence and traditional watchdog role. These dual roles will present challenges and opportunities for civil society organizations and their representatives. The primary challenge will be for those in government to live up to the high democratic ideals that they have set for themselves when confronted with the pragmatic realities and temptations of government. The opportunity is to leverage both sides of the coin in setting a new democratic agenda for Liberia while strengthening the broader political culture of the nation.
NDI IN LIBERIA

NDI has been working with Liberian civil society organizations since the mid-1990s. Prior to the 1997 national elections organized by the UN, NDI, supported by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), trained 1,200 members of the Liberian Election Observation Network (LEON), a coalition of Liberian democracy promotion civic groups, to conduct domestic election monitoring and civic education. Following the elections, NDI organized a network of civic education discussion groups reaching 1,600 people around the country to promote grassroots citizen participation in the political process. NDI also provided sub-grants to several Liberian groups to conduct civic education activities. NDI was forced to close its program in October 1999 following the withdrawal of US government aid for Liberia.

In early 2003, NDI sought to return to the country to assist Liberian civic groups interested in conducting monitoring and civic education activities in advance of elections, then scheduled for 2003. These groups included many former members of the LEON network, who had since come together to form the Coalition for Democracy in Liberia (CODEL). The dramatic turn of events did not allow NDI to return until October 2003, when the Institute sent an assessment team to Monrovia to gather information to inform the development of an NDI program intended to support the role of civil society in ensuring the success of Liberia’s two-year transition to democratic rule.

In Monrovia, from October 19 to 26, 2003, NDI examined the role of civil society in Liberia’s political transition following the implementation of the Accra Agreement. In addition to holding meetings with a range of officials from the transition authority, the international community and political parties, NDI held a day-long round table discussion with civic leaders to assess the opportunities and challenges facing Liberian civil society and help determine the direction of future programming. NDI staff returned to Monrovia in December to present civic groups with the findings of the round table and to hold further discussions on civil society’s participation in the transition process. Unfortunately, this mission was truncated when security conditions in the capitol deteriorated rapidly following the failed attempt to begin the disarmament process. NDI intends to establish a formal presence in Monrovia in February 2004.
FINDINGS

To many observers, Liberia qualifies as a failed state. After more than a decade of war, the social fabric of Liberian society has been torn apart, its moral values eroded by institutionalized corruption, widespread human rights abuses and the use of child soldiers. With little experience in genuine democratic practices or open citizen participation in politics, the challenges to reconstruction and reconciliation are overwhelming. The development of a democratic culture as outlined under the Accra Agreement is likely to be a long and arduous process.

In post-conflict environments, civil society is often called on to help promote a transparent and accountable transition process. The Accra Agreement outlines a unique role for civil society by including representatives from that sector in the NTGL and NTLA. While formalized participation in the peace process provides a certain degree of legitimacy to civil society, it has sparked a heated debate among civic leaders themselves. Also complicating the advancement of the peace process is the varied interpretation of the Agreement itself and the UN mandate. In addition, Liberia's countryside is looted and largely depopulated, with the majority of the population either internally displaced or living as refugees in neighboring countries, further weakening what remains of the country's social and political institutions. Despite its abundant natural resources, rebuilding the country's infrastructure and economy—critical preconditions to lasting peace and stability—will be an enormous task.

A New Role for Civil Society

Though Liberia has in the past benefited from a vibrant civil society, the deterioration of the country's social fabric and the authoritarian rule under Taylor have sapped and in some cases compromised the organizational strength and reach of many civic groups. In February 2002, Liberian civic groups claimed more than half a million members and a presence in every county in the country. By October 2003, with the LURD and MODEL groups in control of nearly all territories outside Monrovia, communication with members away from the capital was impossible.

Despite the difficult and often dangerous conditions under which they operated, some civic groups continued to conduct limited activities aimed at promoting democracy during Taylor's tenure. The LEON coalition conducted civic education and domestic monitoring activities in the lead-up to national elections in 1997 and during the post-election period. Other civic groups that continue to work toward strengthening and expanding Liberia's fragile democratic culture include Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW), the National Youth Council (NAYBCOL) and the Flomo Theater troupe. Some of the organizations that participated in LEON regrouped to form the CODEL to monitor the October 2003 elections. These polls were later postponed.

Many civic groups maintain strong membership bases on paper and those previously active outside Monrovia are eager to visit outlying counties once the security situation improves. They see an important role for themselves in helping citizens in the countryside understand the terms and implementation of the Accra Agreement. Some groups view this as one of their primary responsibilities in advancing peace and reconciliation in the country.

During the summer of 2003, Liberian civic leaders fought hard to be included in the Accra peace talks and to have formal recognition in the NTGL. By negotiating for positions in the NTGL, however, civic leaders are now competing for power in the same arena as Liberia's
political leaders. Some civic leaders suggest that the original intent to act in an oversight role during the Accra negotiation process was lost in the rush to assign NTGL positions and fundamentally altered the role of civil society. Those civic leaders serving in government positions refute accusations that they have become political insiders and maintain the primacy of their new role as setting an example for other government officials.

Although it formalized a substantial role for civil society in the transition process, the Agreement does not designate specific groups or individuals, or what their responsibilities should be. In meetings with the NDI assessment team, civic leaders themselves exhibited confusion and offered varied interpretations of their role in the transition process; they also differed on who among them should participate in the NTGL. Moreover, civic group representatives have wide-ranging and often contradictory definitions of the concept of civil society. Some of those who participated in the NDI roundtable include political parties in a broadly defined civil society; others identify civil society as fundamentally “non-political,” “non-governmental,” “broad based” and “representative of the masses.” Many questioned the motives of those who wish to remain prominent in civil society organizations while assuming positions in the legislative or executive branches of governments.

Civic leaders outside the government see their primary role as fulfilling an oversight function vis-à-vis the implementation of the Agreement and the performance of the NTGL, as well as monitoring civic group representatives participating in government. Some see having a foot in both camps as a dangerous development that could undermine the integrity of Liberia’s civic culture. Younger civic group representatives expressed their opinion that civil society representatives should not participate in government, but rather should act as an independent watchdog. Many roundtable representatives vowed to stay outside of what one civic activist called the “unseemly” race for government posts.

Even among those groups that supported civil society’s participation in the NTGL and NTLA, leaders heatedly debated the objectives of their new positions. They questioned whether agendas should be set by representatives as individuals or in consultation with their constituent organizations; they also debated how best to set reform agendas in both the executive and legislative branches of government. According to one NTGL representative, civil society members participating in government should “take center stage in promoting good government.” Another said civil society should act as a “referee” of the Accra Agreement. One other expressed the opinion that “to enhance good government,” civil society should help identify people of integrity for government service during the transitional period without necessarily taking the positions themselves to “ensure that the Agreement works.”

Although debate within civil society on this issue is healthy, tension between emerging factions could limit collaboration and reduce the ability of Liberian civic organizations to exert positive pressure during the transition. Promisingly, while the definition of civil society was debated widely, a consensus emerged on the roles that civic groups should play in the transition: that of watchdogs, advocates and educators.

*Ambiguous Terms of the Agreement and Confusion over the UNMIL Mandate*

Initially, the Accra Agreement called for an immediate end to armed hostilities and provided for an ECOWAS Interposition Force to facilitate disengagement and establish conditions for the future disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants from all sides. The ECOWAS force that had operated in Monrovia since July 2003 became part of a Chapter VII UN International Stabilization Force (ISF). The ISF would monitor the ceasefire,
conduct DDR activities, coordinate humanitarian assistance, provide support for the formation of a new Liberian Army and assist with security during elections envisioned in 2005.

The Agreement temporarily replaces many provisions of the constitution for the transitional period, although it does not suspend the country’s basic law. All government offices were deemed to have resigned upon the installation of the NTGL, which holds responsibility for all other appointments described in the Agreement. The Agreement allocated seven of 76 seats in the NTLA to civic leaders and called for the establishment of the Governance Reform Commission (GRC) and the Commission on Contracts and Monopolies (CMC), government oversight agencies whose leadership is reserved for civil society representatives.

Disconcertingly, an uneven understanding of the terms of the Accra Agreement, as well as varying interpretations of its clauses, exists at the highest level of government. Lack of consensus on the Agreement itself has already been the cause of significant obstacles to the transition process. In an interview with the NDI team, for example, senior officials emphatically denied the existence of a public ombudsman in the Agreement despite a reference in Article XVI that states that the GRC shall act in this capacity.

Additionally, Chairman Bryant’s appointment of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a former presidential candidate and leader of the Unity Party, to head the GRC was a source of controversy in the first weeks of the tenure of the transition authority. While Johnson-Sirleaf is widely respected and considered highly qualified for the job, many argued that the selection of a political party leader rather than a civil society representative as the GRC chairperson violated the Agreement, as did Bryant’s failure to consult widely beforehand on the appointment. In response to a firestorm of criticism by civic leaders in the media, Bryant apologized and promised to consult civil society representatives in future selections.

Further, Article XIX on the Organization of Elections is deliberately inclusive with section 4a stating that the NTGL "shall request the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and other members of the International Community as appropriate, to jointly conduct, monitor, and supervise the next elections in the country." However, senior NTGL and UNMIL officials emphatically claimed that the UN would be solely responsible for elections, despite the Agreement’s stated role for regional institutions.

Civic groups with whom NDI met were unaware of the UN’s role in assisting civil society as described in the Secretary General’s Report of September 11, 2003 (S/2003/875), which outlines a role for UNMIL “to assist and build the capacity of civil society organizations.” UNMIL will need to engage civil society groups if it is to forge the genuine partnerships that will be required to carry out the civil affairs, human rights and electoral components of its broad mandate. Many Liberian civil society representatives seem reluctant to engage UNMIL, even though they recognize the potential benefits of collaboration with the peacekeeping force. This is likely the result of mixed experiences with peacekeepers in the 1990s, including the ECOMOG force, which many Liberians perceived as partial to one side or the other in the conflict.

While differences in understanding of the Agreement at the level of civic and government leadership have, in some cases, resulted in political missteps, a confused, uninformed public could have significantly more dire consequences. One cause of the on-going cycle of civil war in Liberia is that citizens feel disenfranchised by the political process and see violence as the only mechanism for change. To break this cycle, Liberians need to feel confident that government officials are committed to peace and economic development in all parts of the country. Citizens
themselves must also be encouraged to develop peaceful strategies for affecting political change.

Culture of Corruption and Impunity

Educating the public on the commitment of the government to the successful implementation of the Accra Agreement is only possible if transition officials demonstrate dedication to the values of peace and reconciliation espoused in the Accra Agreement. This is a challenging goal given that the Agreement represents, unavoidably, a deal brokered largely by government officials and rebel leaders, many of whom were motivated by access to state resources and other “spoils” of office. Those who serve in the NTGL or NTLA are ineligible for elected office in October 2005, which has created the perception that those appointed to government posts may exploit them with impunity since this will ostensibly be their last chance to do so. One senior UNMIL official summarized widespread sentiment by saying that the “thugs are still in control.” There is little expectation that any of those who have committed gross human rights violations, engaged in widespread corruption or looted government coffers in the past will ever be called to account.

Finding people of honesty and integrity to fill the key positions of government as mandated by the Agreement is a daunting task. Under a carefully negotiated formula, many who loyally served Taylor or opposed him as rebel leaders now occupy key positions in the NTGL, undermining public confidence and the implementation of the Agreement. More than a decade of war and upheaval forced many respected and educated Liberians to flee the country in search of safety and employment opportunities in the United States and other countries. While many in the diaspora are exploring ways to support the transition process, few are prepared to return to Liberia at this early junction.

Post-Conflict Challenges

Beyond the depravations of war and displacement, the long-term destruction of government infrastructure has left Liberians chronically unhealthy, under-nourished and poorly educated. Citizens struggle to survive day-by-day and have little time or energy to attempt any meaningful form of citizen participation in the political life of the country. The brutality with which political opposition of any kind has been dealt in recent decades has made most citizens fearful of participating in the political process. Extraordinary efforts are required to engage citizens at all levels of society on the importance of the transition process.

The NTGL suffers from insufficient financial resources to conduct business and to implement reforms. Intense efforts are underway to pay civil service salaries that have been in arrears for months. The wholesale looting and destruction of public infrastructure has left the new government to conduct its business in abysmal working conditions. During the last months of Taylor’s tenure, for example, computers, furniture, carpets electrical appliances and even bathroom fittings from the National Assembly building were either removed or destroyed and many other government ministries and offices. Civic groups experienced the looting of their offices during this period as well.
RECOMMENDATIONS

In the spirit of international cooperation, NDI offers the following recommendations to Liberian civic leaders and groups operating both in and outside the government, the NTGL and the international community. While all Liberians have a responsibility for ensuring a successful peace and reconciliation process, civil society representatives have a unique role in the Accra Agreement to address the many challenges referenced above.

♦ In light of the unique role of civil society outlined in the Accra Agreement, civic leaders should work cooperatively to encourage active debate on specific objectives. They should also develop a strategic plan for civil society’s participation in the transition process, outlining specific responsibilities for individuals participating in the NTGL and NTIA and groups working outside of government.

♦ Civic leaders participating in the NTGL and NTIA should promote a more comprehensive understanding by their government colleagues of the terms of the Accra Agreement through internal debate and consensus building, and through consultation with a variety of citizens and groups.

♦ To ensure that they are not sidelined, civil society representatives outside the government should develop an advocacy plan to increase their exposure to UNMIL representatives, members of the international community, NTGL and NTIA representatives, and political parties. They should define the role they intend to play in carrying out civic education, promotion of human rights, gender equity and eventual monitoring of electoral processes. A failure to do so at an early stage will see international organizations define the objectives, pace and shape of the transition in the interests of achieving results, at the expense of developing an inclusive process that involves Liberian citizens and the groups that represent their interests.

♦ To encourage accountability and transparency, and to build public confidence in the transition process, civil society representatives should provide regular updates and information on transition activities through radio and other public media that can be accessed by the general population.

♦ Civil society should aim to improve citizens’ understanding of the Accra Agreement as a means of engaging the participation of all Liberians in the transition process. This could be accomplished through debates of clauses of the Accra Agreement in local languages in town hall meetings around the country, radio shows, or other non-written forms, such as video or theater. This would help to clarify the Agreement’s vague and controversial features, especially those articles that affect ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons. Public debates should include the participation of the NTIA, NTGL, political parties and civic groups to ensure that a variety of viewpoints are considered in government decision-making and to strengthen the legitimacy and prestige of the transition authority in the eyes of the Liberian people.

♦ Civic leaders represented in the NDGL or NTIA should make genuine efforts to promote transparency and accountability in their own actions and in those of their transition authority colleagues. The primary responsibility of the transitional government is to implement the Accra Agreement and to lead the country to peaceful, democratic and transparent elections in 2005. The NTGL should make every effort to adhere to the provisions of the agreement and to encourage public debate when changes to the Agreement are envisioned.
♦ The government should encourage civic groups to monitor transitional institutions, including the NTLA, GRC and CMC, and should devise mechanisms to invite feedback from the public.

♦ NTLA representatives from civil society should take the lead in encouraging and organizing constituency outreach activities through town hall meetings or other public gatherings that would strengthen the NTLA’s legitimacy and ability to respond to the concerns of the Liberian people.

♦ The NGTL, NTLA, GRC and other government agencies should open their proceedings to the local media and provide regular public updates and information on their activities in ways that can be accessed by the general community.

♦ UNMIL, ECOWAS and other representatives from the international community should engage regularly with as many civic groups as practical to solicit input and check progress toward implementation of the Accra Agreement and other aspects of the transition process. While a more inclusive framework for managing the transition could slow the decision-making process and overall implementation of the Accra Agreement, NDI has found through its work in post-conflict societies that international organizations must remain mindful of the need to build local ownership of long-term peace, stability and respect for democratic processes it to be achieved.
### APPENDIX I

#### Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accra Agreement</td>
<td>Liberia Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed August 18, 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDDRR</td>
<td>Cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Contracts and Monopolies Commission</td>
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<td>CODEL</td>
<td>Coalition for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Center for Promotion of Democracy</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>ECOM</td>
<td>Elections Commission</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>GRC</td>
<td>Governance Reform Commission</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>International Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>JPC</td>
<td>Catholic Justice and Peace Commission</td>
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<td>LCHRA</td>
<td>Liberia Civil and Human Rights Alliance</td>
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<td>LDI</td>
<td>Liberian Democracy Institute</td>
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<td>LDRC</td>
<td>Liberian Democracy Resource Center</td>
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<td>LEON</td>
<td>Liberian Election Observation Network</td>
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<td>LINDEM</td>
<td>Liberian National Democracy Monitors</td>
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<td>LIPO</td>
<td>Liberian Institute of Public Opinion</td>
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<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>LWI</td>
<td>Liberian Women’s Initiative</td>
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<td>MODEL (NGO)</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy and Elections in Liberia</td>
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<td>MODEL (rebel group)</td>
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<td>NAYMOTE</td>
<td>National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections</td>
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<td>NAYBCOL</td>
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<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTLA</td>
<td>National Transitional Legislative Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUL</td>
<td>Press Union of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHRAP</td>
<td>Rural Human Rights Activists Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX II

People Consulted

International Community

Denise Barrett    COP    Mercy Corps
Jacques-Paul Klein SRSG   UNMIL
Abiodum Bashua    PAO    UNMIL
Korto Williams    Program Officer USAID
William K. Massaquoi Program Officer USAID
John Blaney    Ambassador US Embassy

Government Officials

Saa Philip Joe    Member    NTLA
Commany Wesseh   Member    NTLA
Rufus Neufville   Member    NTLA
Ranney Baham Jackson   Member    NTLA
Gyude Bryant   Transitional Chair NTGL
Willie Belleh   Chief-of-Staff NTGL
Harry Greeves Economic Advisor NTGL
James R. Kasa    Chief Clerk NTGL
Francis K. Sio   Co-chairman ECOM
Morris A. Gardea Commissioner ECOM
Samuel T.K. Kortimai   Commissioner ECOM
Jea-Seajy Nma Twegby   Executive Director ECOM

Liberian Civil Society Organizations and Political Parties

Terrance Sesay    PUL
Malcolm Joseph    PUL
Winston Momoboe    PUL
Frances Morris    JPC
Boima Metzer    LDI
Romeo Bloh    LDI
Marcus Jones    Liberian Bar Association
Saa Philip Joe    Civil Society Movement of Liberia
Sumowood Harrism    Liberia Inter-Religious Leaders
Sheik Kafuma Konneh    Liberia Inter-Religious Leaders
Jerome J. Verdier    LDW
Peter Ballah Flomo Theater
Alfred Gobah Flomo Theater
Mike Gaydeh    LDW
Tony Sengbe    National Human Rights Center of Liberia
L. Abraham Gray    LINDEM
J. Lyndon Ponnie    LINDEM
J. M. Fromayam    LDRC
J. Eddie Grant    NAYBCOL
K. Hastings Panyannah    MODEL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerome Verdier</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Wallace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Marvey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frances Morris</td>
<td>JPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Segbe Naynfor</td>
<td>CPD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blamoh Sieh</td>
<td>National Human Rights Center of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Etweda Cooper</td>
<td>LWI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meimu S. Karneh</td>
<td>Women’s NGO Secretariat/LWI</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Minikon S. Nagbe</td>
<td>LDI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boimah Metzer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel B. Cole</td>
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<td>Bob Woods</td>
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<td>Sandee Cole</td>
<td>RHRAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorma Baysah</td>
<td>RHRAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian T.L. Peah</td>
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<td>Melvin M. Kaba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacob J.B. Baryogar</td>
<td>LAFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick A. Anderson</td>
<td>LCHRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenda Howard</td>
<td>LCHRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alfred Quayjandii</td>
<td>ASPFED</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ngema Tarley</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Forkey Sieh</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Whitfield</td>
<td>Secretary-General NPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Korbah</td>
<td>Secretary-General Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Brumskine</td>
<td>Senator Libarian Unification Party</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX III

Round Table Participants

Flomo Theater
Liberian Democracy Watch (LDW)
National Human Rights Center of Liberia (NHRCL)
Liberia National Democratic Election Monitors (LINDEM)
Liberian Democracy Resource Center (LDRC)
National Youth Council (NAYBCOL)
Movement for Democracy and Elections in Liberia (MODEL)
National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections (NAYMOTE)
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC)
Campaign for the Promotion of Democracy (CPD)
National Human Rights Center of Liberia (NHRCL)
Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI)
Women’s NGO Secretariat
Liberia Democratic Institute (LDI)
Liberia Civil and Human Rights Alliance (LCHRA)
Liberia Institute of Public Opinion (LIPO)
Press Union of Liberia (PUL)
Association of Students for the Promotion of Fair Elections and Democracy (ASPFED)
Liberia-America Friendship Organization (LAFO)