

POLITICAL ACTORS

The legalization of the anti-apartheid forces in February 1990 led to a new set of complex relationships among various political parties, the democratic movement and interest groups in South Africa. Organizations that had operated in exile or that used the established infrastructure of the internal Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) were compelled to accommodate each other. As well, such organizations had to acknowledge political entities that functioned within the apartheid legal framework and formerly jailed political leaders. By the March 11, 1994 final deadline for registration of parties, 29 political organizations had registered, although not all will ultimately contest the elections. The following is a discussion of the major political organizations currently involved in the South African transition.

African National Congress (ANC)

The ANC was founded in 1912 to unify African people in the fight against oppression by the white population that had settled in the region and had formed the Union of South Africa in 1910. From 1912 until 1960, the ANC followed a program of nonviolence and legal resistance. Following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which 67 demonstrators were killed by police, the ANC, initiated a campaign of armed struggle against the government in 1961 and established an external military wing, Umkhonto we Sizewe (MK), which means "Spear of the Nation." The ANC was banned that same year.

Over the next decade most of the ANC's leaders were imprisoned or forced into exile. Others who remained in the country were banned from political activity. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo enjoyed wide appeal among black South Africans. The ANC soon became known as the leading organization in the anti-apartheid movement. In the four years since the ban on the ANC was lifted and Mandela was released from prison, the ANC has emerged as one of the two crucial players in the negotiation process.

Nelson Mandela represents those in the ANC who are committed to the negotiation process. But despite their considerable influence, Mandela and the leadership must occasionally defer to the more militant elements within the ANC and its allied organizations. However the protagonists are characterized, the debate has centered around the strategy for the transfer of power.

At the top of the ANC's leadership structure are Mandela, who was elected executive president in July 1991; Deputy President Walter Sisulu; Thabo Mbeki, who became national chairperson following the death of Oliver Tambo in 1993; and Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa, a former trade union leader. The ANC has 56 elected positions on its 91-member National Executive Committee (NEC), which implements the organization's policies. A 20-member National Working Committee (NWC) selected from the NEC members is responsible for day-to-day decisionmaking. The ANC receives much of its funding from sources outside of South Africa, including private and public funders who have sustained the organization during its many years in exile.

Active within the ranks of the ANC are the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) and the ANC youth, who are represented by the South Africa Youth Congress (SAYCO), the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The ANCWL has a long history of involvement in the liberation struggle and was at the forefront of pressuring the leadership to pursue a gender-positive policy in the negotiations. The ANCWL was instrumental in drawing up candidate slates for the National Assembly. A third of the candidacy slots were assigned to women, which will likely reflect their similar representation in the future government administration.

The youth are among the most radical influences on ANC policy. Youth organizations have exhibited strong cohesion and have spearheaded some of the most successful mass action campaigns. However, the youth in the townships, often known as "comrades" or "young lions," still identify closely with the armed struggle and are an unpredictable force. They form the corps of the Self Defense Units (SDU's), or Street Committees, which are heavily armed. Often unrestrained cadres operate as vigilante groups terrorizing and protecting residents in the townships.

South African Communist Party (SACP)

Founded in 1921, the SACP has played a special role in the liberation struggle. Until 1985, when the ANC leadership ranks were opened to non-Africans, the Communist Party was the main organizational force for white and Indian participants in the liberation struggle.

The SACP, which was banned in 1950, co-founded the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961. The MK received education, training and arms from the former Soviet Union and other communist governments. The SACP's leaders, Chairman Joe Slovo and Secretary General Charles Nqakula, are also central figures in the ANC leadership.

The SACP's notorious reputation was, for the most part, the product of the government's relentless warning that a "total communist onslaught" threatened the entire region. Defense against communism was the government's justification for the maintenance of apartheid. This propaganda deeply penetrated the political psychology of the Afrikaners. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the regimes in the Eastern Bloc, the SACP has lost its ideological backing and has been forced to redefine its position.

The SACP held its first party congress since legalization in December 1991 and announced an economic policy based on "democratic socialist order." This new "order" would encompass common ownership of key means of production but would include protection of personal, "non-exploitative" property. In recognition of the new post-Cold War realities, the SACP supports regular, multi-party elections and religious freedom yet faces difficulties with the concerns of some church leaders over the atheistic tradition of communist ideology.

At the 1991 party congress the SACP reaffirmed its faith in Marxism and Leninism. The party acknowledged lessons learned by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, stating that

"it is impossible to sustain and develop socialism in an authoritarian environment." At the conference Chris Hani, chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), resigned from his ANC post to become secretary general of the SACP. Simultaneously, Joe Slovo became SACP chairman.

As noted earlier, the ANC-SACP relationship is considered a key issue in the context of the transition. While the SACP had its own seat in CODESA, in the MNF and in the TEC, it often plays a role within the ANC. The SACP is unlikely to pursue an agenda different from the ANC's and is contesting the elections under the ANC's banner. The SACP has identified 34 of its members on the ANC's list of 200 national parliamentary candidates with 16 of them placed in the top 50 positions.

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

As the umbrella for the ANC-aligned trade unions and in alliance with the ANC and the SACP, COSATU is a powerful political force. COSATU boasts a paid membership of nearly 1.3 million workers within the 14 member unions. Because the trade unions in South Africa were not banned, they developed a nationwide network of urban, industrialized workers. COSATU argued for the inclusion of a workers' charter in a future ANC bill of rights.

Despite COSATU's leading role in shaping ANC policy, particularly on economic matters, the ANC's economic platform calls for a "living wage" as opposed to labor's traditional stance for a "minimum wage." COSATU was instrumental in the establishment of the National Economic Forum (NEF), in which employers, trade unions and government negotiate all national macro-economic issues. COSATU has conducted its own negotiations with the government for labor law revisions and a minimum wage. Before the convening of CODESA, COSATU called for talks involving all parties, economic organizations and trade unions. This call went unheeded. Instead COSATU members were incorporated into the delegations and working groups of the ANC and SACP.

COSATU nominated 20 candidates from the trade union federation that the ANC accepted for its candidate list. However, officers such as former COSATU General Secretary Jay Naidoo had to resign from their union positions in order to run for office. Sam Shilowa, the current general secretary of COSATU, heads the federation's political action drive.

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Founded in 1975 as a cultural movement by Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Inkatha constituted itself in 1990 as a political party called the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Buthelezi is the IFP leader. Supporters of Buthelezi and the IFP point to the organization's nonviolent position, its opposition to sanctions, its support of a free-market economy and its pragmatic approach to negotiations. As the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland in the Natal region, Buthelezi refused to accept the release of Nelson Mandela.

Buthelezi maintains that the IFP represents the Zulu nation of 6 million people. A recent survey conducted in early February 1994 by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy concludes that Inkatha currently has national support of about 5.3 percent of the 22.7 million projected

electorate. Inkatha's support is mainly concentrated in the rural areas of Natal, which are referred to as KwaZulu. The IFP has in the last two years opened its ranks to non-Zulus and has viable political organizations in the Johannesburg-Pretoria area, where it is strong among migrant laborers.

Some observers argue that KwaZulu is, for all practical purposes, a one-party state. Although it is widely acknowledged that intimidation occurs on all sides of black politics in the Natal townships, critics of Inkatha claim that Buthelezi requires all KwaZulu government employees and traditional chiefs to join IFP. Those who refuse are threatened with the loss of position, services or land. Inkatha relies on a network of warlords, many of them quite well-known, to maintain the discipline of the organization in the region.

Inkatha is an important player in the transition. The IFP has deftly sided alternatively with NP and with the CP and non-integrationist homeland leaders to win concessions from the ANC. Chief Buthelezi led the walk-out by a number of parties in the MNF in July 1993.

As the NP reached accommodation with the ANC, the IFP occupied the center ground in advocating a highly decentralized system of federal government. It coalesced with the "independent homeland" administrations of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana and with the more right-wing elements of political opinion. This coalition, the concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), called into question Buthelezi's claims to leadership in the liberation movement. The association weakened the political message of the IFP.

The "Record of Understanding" between the ANC and the government infuriated Buthelezi, who saw the agreement as a calculated attempt to marginalize him. Increasingly, Buthelezi spoke of an ANC/NP alliance working in tandem to ensure that a new government would essentially be an ANC/NP government. In addition, Buthelezi spoke of the ANC as Xhosa-speaking people who would establish a one-party state and destroy the Zulu nation. Buthelezi, an uncle of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, continued to play the "Zulu card" and called on Zulus to heed his request and come to the aid of the king. In bilaterals with the ANC and the government, Buthelezi's attitudes hardened; when one of his demands was met, it was immediately replaced by another one. Buthelezi's demand for extreme federalism, became a demand for virtual autonomy; his demand for postponing the elections met opposition from virtually every other party. It was not until April 19 that the IFP agreed to take part in the elections.

Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) was formed in 1959 when an "Africanist" faction left the ANC. Arguing that the continued involvement of non-Africans perpetuated racist ideology and subjugation of Africans, the founders of the PAC identified an Africanist socialist democracy as its goal. Following the Sharpeville Massacre, the PAC was banned under the 1960 Unlawful Organizations Act. In 1990, the ban was rescinded along with bans on other political organizations.

As a liberation organization, the PAC has several wings: a student organization, the Pan Africanist Student Organization (PASO); a women's wing, the African Women's Organization (AWO); a youth wing, the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU); and an armed wing, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). While not formally affiliated, it also has a close association with the National Congress of Trade Union (NACTU).

The armed engagements by APLA were allegedly targeted at security personnel and facilities. Until recently, the armed struggle attracted little attention, although the APLA's adherence to the use of violence in the battle for liberation did attract a following of the more militant youth. However, due to substantial in-country and international pressure to cease the armed conflict, the PAC announced a moratorium on the armed struggle on January 15, 1994. The following week, APLA's armed factions announced their concurrence with the policy of the political leadership.

The PAC has long been opposed to negotiations with the South African government. Historically opposed to an internal settlement, the PAC had condemned the ANC's decision to negotiate with the government and refused to participate in the first round of negotiations -- CODESA I and II. The PAC advocated a transfer of power to the majority population. After a series of bi-lateral talks held with the government, the PAC was among the 26 parties that joined the Multi-Party Negotiations Forum (MNF).

At the MNF, the PAC offered a constructive and articulate opposition to the proposals that emerged from the alliance between the government and the ANC. Significantly, the PAC tabled the proposal that committed the South African government to transfer Walvis Bay to Namibia. This PAC initiative boosted the organization's credibility and stature.

The PAC did not take its seat in the TEC until April 19. Previously, the party's leaders had reasoned that by participating in the TEC, the party would implicitly legitimize the authority of the South African Government. The PAC is contesting the elections and will take seats in the Constitutional Assembly and provincial legislatures to have a say in the writing of the new constitution and to provide a voice of opposition.

The PAC draws its strength from the disaffected youth in the townships. Polls indicate that the softest constituency support of the ANC is among the 17-25 age group that overwhelmingly chooses the PAC as its second preference. Consequently, the PAC actively canvasses this group. Its position as the first party listed on the national and provincial ballots may help to advance the PAC's electoral standing. The party is strongest in the Cape and PWV regions. Clarence Makwetu is president of the PAC.

Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)

Founded in 1979, AZAPO advocates a Marxist Azania (the Africanist term for South Africa) to be achieved by the overthrow of the white colonial establishment. Consequently, AZAPO refuses to enter into negotiations with the current South African government. Of crucial importance to AZAPO is returning land to Azanians. AZAPO has criticized Mandela

for "betraying the solidarity of the oppressed people" through his negotiations with the government. The president of AZAPO is Itumeleng Mosala.

The Azanian People's Organization and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) represent the Africanist school of thought within the liberation movement. These organizations are adamant about a transfer of power to the majority. As the transition moves forward, these groups have become more riven over their respective positions in the negotiating process and in the elections.

The BCM coalesced during the 1970s under the leadership of prominent dissident Steve Biko. Biko's message emphasized black pride and encouraged the psychological liberation of blacks through nonviolent means. Biko's death, while in government custody, prompted an increase in radical streams of Africanist thought as characterized by AZAPO. As an active political movement, BCM has largely been replaced by other organizations. However, Biko's ideas remain an essential component of the philosophy of Africanist organizations.

Historically, the Africanists have emphasized black power and advocated socialist or Marxist economic policies, placing a high priority on the return of land to black Africans. Africanists also reject the principles of the ANC's Freedom Charter. While the BCM espoused a nonviolent philosophy, AZAPO supported armed struggle although it did not have an armed wing.

Neither AZAPO nor the BCM are contesting the elections. AZAPO advocates an electoral boycott and urges people either not to vote or to spoil their ballot.

National Party (NP)

Since 1948 the NP has presided as the ruling party in the all-white South African Parliament and, as such, created and maintained the system of apartheid. NP leaders gradually consolidated a tightly controlled security state supported by an over-employed civil service; the civil service in turn supported the standard of living of the NP's core constituency -- the Afrikaner middle class. The NP has amended the constitution three times since 1948. The third constitution of 1983 created a tricameral parliament that included Indians and coloureds in a second and third house, respectively. The leader of the National Party is South African President F.W. de Klerk.

The leadership of the NP is divided into at least two camps. The older "securocrats" or "hawks" believe in the strong executive-security force relationship of the 1980s and resist change. The "old breed" include Hernus Kriel, the current Minister of Law and Order and a candidate for premier in the Western Cape; former Minister of Defense Magnus Malan; former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok; and former Defense Minister Gene Louw. The older group is opposed by the generation of negotiators, who advance the notion of power-sharing. One of the more difficult tasks faced by President de Klerk has been the reconciliation of these forces within the government as well as sustaining the ranks of the key negotiators on his team, six of whom have been removed for personal and health reasons.

The "new breed" of NP leaders include such people as Minister for Constitutional Development Roelf Meyer, Minister of Planning Leon Wessels, Minister of Economic Coordination and Public Enterprise Dawie de Villiers and Finance Minister Derek Keyes. The "new" group is the architect of the constitutional framework for a power-sharing government and for guarding the economic restructuring.

The NP lost support from both the left and the right in the period before and immediately after February 1990. There have been defections to the Conservative Party and the reactionary white right wing. However, having moved forward with its reform initiatives, the NP has regained some support from those previously affiliated with the Democratic Party (DP). In 1991, the NP abandoned its white exclusivity and began an active recruitment of other racial groups. While the NP can no longer claim it represents the majority of white Afrikaners, it does boast that it is the largest political party in South Africa (with emphasis on "political party" since the ANC is identified as a liberation movement). The NP recently took steps to recast its image for broader appeal by changing its colors, flag and symbols to ones that its polls suggest are more attractive to African voters. The NP now calls itself the "new" National Party.

The "new" NP recently began to implement a strategy to expand its constituent base by engaging in such activities as organizing branches in townships and conducting motor car speeches in a Western-style campaign. De Klerk, in a move to bolster the NP's image, followed these efforts by appointing Indian and coloured ministers to his cabinet. The candidate lists of the NP are sprinkled with non-whites in the top echelons.

However, the four to six seats the NP is likely to win in the new cabinet are each contested by white males from the "new breed" faction of the party.

Democratic Party (DP)

The DP and its predecessor, the Progressive Federal Party, have long advocated systemic reforms within the white parliament and a federal structure in a new constitution. Former DP leaders, such as Helen Suzman and Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, have been outspoken opponents of apartheid and strong supporters of human rights. The party has engaged actively in the international debate on apartheid and is a member of the executive committee of the liberal International. The leader of the Democratic Party is Zach de Beer.

In addition to its white, liberal backing, the DP also has the support of many pragmatists within the business community who have long recognized that ending apartheid would serve South Africa's future economic interests. The party's opposition to international sanctions has suited these business interests.

President de Klerk's initiatives and the NP's dominant role in the negotiations threaten the future of the DP. Faced with the danger of being marginalized, DP leaders have recently emphasized the importance of the center in finding a common ground. The party played a critical role in CODESA, the MNF and the TEC, in which its advocacy of liberal constitutional principles suited the agenda of compromise. The DP's most significant contribution to the MNF was in connection with the appointment process for the Constitutional Court. The DP succeeded

in deleting a clause from the Interim Constitution that would have allowed the state president to have sole authority in appointments to the Constitutional Court.

The NP has posed more of a serious threat to the political autonomy of the DP than the ANC. Although many DP members are comfortable with the ANC as an ally, the communist influence within the ANC tends to repel potential DP defectors, particularly those in the business community. Five DP members of parliament joined the ANC in April 1992, while others moved in the direction of the IFP.

Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)/Freedom Front (FF)

A group of retired military and police generals in late 1993 constituted a "Committee of Generals" to stage a political campaign to unify the far-right wing to resist the transition. The Committee, led by Constand Viljoen (current leader of the Freedom Front and former head of the South African Armed Forces), sought to ensure self-determination for Afrikaners in an Afrikaner *volkstaat* (white homeland). The AVF was created in recognition that right-wing leadership was splintered and ineffective and that Afrikaners had a deep respect for military leaders. Other members include Tienie Groenewald, former head of military intelligence; Koos Bischoff, former army chief of operations; and Lothar Neethling, former deputy commissioner of the South African Police.

The Afrikaner Volksfront was an umbrella group consisting of the Herstigte National Party (HNP), the Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) and other small right-wing organizations. The delegates agreed to set up armed local security committees, composed of SADF and SAP reservists, to protect farmers and farm workers from attacks. Currently, about 40,000 Afrikaners belong to reserve units called "commandos." Groenewald hinted at the possibility of a military option: "If we cannot reach our aims through negotiation, other forms of action could be considered. These include mass action and ultimately violence."

The generals have boosted the right in terms of both respectability and vision. Afrikaner conservatives have now shifted their focus to self-determination and an Afrikaner *volkstaat*, instead of apartheid and white supremacy. Groenewald's Unity Committee has even mentioned a specific location for the *volkstaat*: a major portion of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, less a few large tracks set aside for "black nations" who wish to exercise their own right of self-determination. Its capital would be Pretoria. Whites would be a majority in the proposed *volkstaat*, which comprises 16 percent of South Africa. (Barely more than the 14 percent Hendrik Verwoerd once allocated to blacks on which to exercise their right to self-determination.)

The neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstansbeweging (AWB) has greeted the birth of the Volksfront very coolly. This may be an asset to the Volksfront for the bullying tactics of the AWB and its demagogic leader, Eugene TerreBlanche, have been targeted in the past as discrediting the Afrikaner right. The prospect of an alternative to an ANC-dominated government may cause a renewed hemorrhaging of the NP's hawkish right, posing a threat to de Klerk, who has already lost some members of Parliament to the IFP.

When the time came to decide whether to register the Alliance and its component parties for the elections, Viljoen as the alliance's leader filed a slate of 191 candidates on the national list and on eight regional lists.

Conservative Party (CP)/AVU/HNP

The Conservative Party (CP) represents the traditional right of white South African politics. The CP split from the NP in 1982 over the issue of the tricameral parliament and the enfranchisement of "coloureds" and Indians. By 1989, the CP had become the official opposition within the whites-only Parliament. Established and formerly led by Andries Treurnicht, who died in April 1993, the CP has a membership of mostly Afrikaner descent that is concentrated in rural South Africa. The CP has supported the partition of South Africa into separate nations for blacks and whites, with whites maintaining the 87 percent of the land that they currently control. The CP has been prepared to negotiate these boundaries but nothing else.

Following Treurnicht's death, the CP elected hard-liner and deputy leader, Ferdi Hartzenberg, as party leader. Hartzenberg served as education minister in the NP government but left office to follow Treurnicht in 1982 when the NP split over the issue of power-sharing. As education minister, Hartzenberg refused to authorize repairs at black schools involved in education boycotts, forcing many of the schools to close. Moderates in the CP managed to broker a compromise, prevailing in the election of Willie Snyman to the post of deputy party leader. In April 1993 during an address to Parliament by de Klerk concerning the Hani assassination, Snyman was thrown out of the chamber after dumping a bag of coins in front of de Klerk and accusing him of being a sell-out for dismantling apartheid.

The CP refused to participate in the negotiations at the National Peace Accord and CODESA and has maintained strong opposition to all reform initiatives. The party agreed to participate in the March 1992 referendum, although party leaders maintained that the process was stacked against them. They said that the referendum was about future black domination. However, in the wake of the referendum loss in which the CP advocated a "no" vote, the CP split. Leaders in the party who believed the party should have boycotted the referendum and who advocated a direct negotiating position formed a new party, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU). The CP initially joined the MNF but walked out with Inkatha in July 1993. The AVU continued an active membership with the MNF, but it did not enter the TEC nor is it contesting the elections.

Although the CP officially opposes violence, extremist groups under the CP's sphere of political influence, such as the AWB, have increasingly engaged in violent acts. Treurnicht often used the threat of right-wing violence as a bargaining tool, claiming ". . . there's no form of explosive we cannot make." Treurnicht said, "I've told Mr. de Klerk, it isn't me stirring up the people. It's you and your statements and what you envision for South Africa. I have to calm them down." The CP claims that it, not the NP, represents the white population in South Africa and pointed to recent by-elections as proof, but the referendum results have weakened this argument.

To the right of the CP and AVU is the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). A solely Afrikaner party, the HNP advocates white supremacy and a strict separation of races with a rigid homeland policy for "ethnic" groups. The HNP holds no seats in the current Parliament, but is represented on local councils in the Orange Free State and Northwest Transvaal.

Apartheid Political Formations

The 1983 Constitution created three houses of the National Parliament in a so-called reform by which individuals who were racially classified as "Coloured" or "Indian" could vote and obtain representation in a legislative body. The House of Delegates was created for "Indians," and the House of Representatives was constituted for "coloureds." Although the majority of coloureds and Indians did not vote in elections, nevertheless many political parties emerged from the creation of the new legislative houses. The most prominent and viable entities included the Democratic Party (unlike the party of the same name listed above, it is for "Indians"), the Labour Party, the National People's Party and the Solidarity Party. All of these parties were members of the MNF and took their seats in the TEC.

The so-called "homelands" and "independent states" also have generated a number of political formations. The governing bodies in the territories have usually included one-party legislatures -- some of which do not continue to exist, such as in the Transkei and Ciskei -- because of *coups d'etats*. Regardless of the current situation, a number of political parties have organized with more traditional ethnic orientations. Some of the more developed include: the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the North West Christian Democratic Party (NWCD), the Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA), the Intando Ye Sizwe Party (IYP) and the Inyanza National Movement (INM).

Other Parties

There are 26 parties representing a wide range of issues and constituents contesting the April 26 to 28 elections. Those that were not previously mentioned include: the Rights Party (RP), the South African Women's Party (SAWP), the Sports Organization for Collective Contributions and Equal Rights (SOCCER), the Green Party (TGP), the Keep It Straight and Simple Party (KISS), the United People's Front (UPF), the Wes-Kaap Federaliste Party (WKFP), the Women's Rights Peace Party (WRPP), the Workers International to Rebuild the Fourth International (WI), the Worker's List Party (WLP), the Ximoko Progressive Party (XPP), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the African Moderates Congress Party (AMCP), the African Muslim Party (AMP), the Federal Party (FP), the Islamic Party (IP), the Luso South African Party (LUSAP), the Merit Party (MP) and the Minority Front (MF).

CONCLUSION

In April 1994, the process of transition began to assume a life of its own. First Lebowa found itself in such financial distress that it ceded authority for its financial affairs to South Africa. In Bophuthatswana when some of the police joined other public servants in a strike concerning pension pay-outs, Lucas Mangope was unceremoniously dumped from office and replaced by two TEC-appointed South African administrators. Lucas Mangope's political demise was particularly welcomed by the ANC since the party was prohibited by Mangope from campaigning in Bophuthatswana.

Next in line was Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, who was forced to step down as Ciskei's head of state when militant policemen demanded to have their pensions dispersed before April 27. Again, the TEC appointed two South African administrators to run Ciskei's affairs.

The new South Africa is finally emerging from the darkness of the past into the light of hope.