Why isn't this working?

Identifying local bottlenecks to national poverty reduction policies

Alicia Phillips Mandaville The National Democratic Institute (NDI) February 11, 2005

overview

Define "politics and poverty" approach
Core assumptions
Methodology
Case studies
Potential applications
Questions and comments

"politics and poverty"

Response to three things:

- Clear evidence of failed poverty reduction despite technically sound reform
- Recognition of the role of "good governance" and political will
- Need for an analytical tool that political and economic development experts are both comfortable with.
 - A little public choice
 - A little game theory
 - A little cartel theory

A little anthropology A lot of politics


origins of approach

- Recognition of "good governance" as critical for effective reform
 - (WB, UNDP, etc)
- Progress in empirical research on governance
 - now that it *can* be measured at least we know the impact
- Demand for appropriate development responses to governance failure
 - DFID "Drivers of Change"

core assumptions


in the long run

functional democracy fosters a normal distribution of policies



Competitive political parties are a crucial component

political incentives are a powerful part of rational decision making



someone is going to be surprised

No one likes to discover structural, practical obstacles to effective poverty reduction or development.



methodology

in general

Qualitative, not quantitative

- But a good complement to empirical work
- Effort to uncover the institutions of political black markets
- Supplement pre-existing research on institutional structure with individual accounts

primary resources

- Takes direction from field office experience and feedback
- Desk review of existing literature
- Field research
 - Individual wandering interviews (75)
 - Field office information
 - Individual identical interviews (25)
 - Supplemented by public opinion research

Some examples

Nigeria, Bolivia, Peru

Nigeria

The role of the Nigerian National Assembly (Technically strong, practically weak)

Conclusion: Even inappropriate incentives can be leveraged for positive outcome

> + Patronage system Leg-exec relations OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

Bolivia

Cartel politics Parties collude as much as compete Job distribution as a means of political support Nash Equilibrium Need to recognize partisan nature of technical staff (adjust trainings?) Political and economic expectations? Seriously entrenched cynicism

Peru

Parties as electoral machinery

- Finance structure
- Of little official use after elections
- Thus can not perform coordination roles
- Why not?
 - That's the next part of the project...
- In the meantime
 - Technical assistance on communication, platform development, internal structures

swell, now what?

potential applications

- Identify gaps to avoid for critical policy measures
- Identify technical assistance targets and needs
- Complement and suggest directions for new empirical work
- Development public choice?

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