

Why isn't this working?

Identifying local bottlenecks to national poverty reduction policies

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overview

- ❑ Define “politics and poverty” approach
 - ❑ Core assumptions
 - ❑ Methodology
 - ❑ Case studies
 - Potential applications
 - ❑ Questions and comments
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“politics and poverty”

Response to three things:

- ❑ Clear evidence of failed poverty reduction despite technically sound reform
 - ❑ Recognition of the role of “good governance” and political will
 - ❑ Need for an analytical tool that political and economic development experts are both comfortable with.
 - A little public choice
 - A little game theory
 - A little cartel theory
 - A little anthropology
 - A lot of politics
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
origins of approach

- Recognition of “good governance” as critical for effective reform
 - (WB, UNDP, etc)
 - Progress in empirical research on governance
 - now that it *can* be measured at least we know the impact
 - Demand for appropriate development responses to governance failure
 - DFID “Drivers of Change”
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core assumptions


in the long run

functional democracy fosters a normal distribution of policies



Competitive political parties are a crucial component

political incentives are a powerful part of rational decision making



- **bureaucratic positioning**
- **political incentive**
- **financial incentive**
- **public service incentive**
- **other**

someone is going to be surprised

- No one likes to discover structural, practical obstacles to effective poverty reduction or development.



methodology



in general

- Qualitative, not quantitative
 - But a good complement to empirical work
 - Effort to uncover the institutions of political black markets
 - Supplement pre-existing research on institutional structure with individual accounts
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primary resources

- ❑ Takes direction from field office experience and feedback
 - ❑ Desk review of existing literature
 - ❑ Field research
 - Individual wandering interviews (75)
 - Field office information
 - Individual identical interviews (25)
 - Supplemented by public opinion research
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Some examples

Nigeria, Bolivia, Peru

Nigeria

The role of the Nigerian National Assembly
(Technically strong, practically weak)

- Conclusion: Even inappropriate incentives can be leveraged for positive outcome

Committee system

+ Patronage system

Leg-exec relations

OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

Bolivia

- Cartel politics
 - Parties collude as much as compete
 - Job distribution as a means of political support
 - Nash Equilibrium
 - Need to recognize partisan nature of technical staff (adjust trainings?)
 - Political and economic expectations?
 - Seriously entrenched cynicism
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Peru

- Parties as electoral machinery
 - Finance structure
 - Of little official use after elections
 - Thus can not perform coordination roles
 - Why not?
 - That's the next part of the project...
 - In the meantime
 - Technical assistance on communication, platform development, internal structures
-

swell, now what?

potential applications

- ❑ Identify gaps to avoid for critical policy measures
 - ❑ Identify technical assistance targets and needs
 - ❑ Complement and suggest directions for new empirical work
 - ❑ Development public choice?
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