*THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG
NDI POST-ELECTION REPORT #5*


*/July 30, 1998/*

*TABLE OF CONTENTS*

   1. *PREFACE* <#pre>
   2. *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY* <#exec>
   3. *ELECTION FRAMEWORK* <#frame>
   4. *ELECTION OBSERVATION* <#obs>
   5. *ELECTION ADMINISTRATION* <#adm>
         1. Balloting <#ballot>	
         2. Vote Count <#vc> 
   6. *VOTER TURNOUT* <#vt>
         1. Direct Elections <#de>
         2. Indirect Elections <#ie>
         3. Interpretations of the Turnout <#interp> 
   7. *ELECTION RESULTS* <#results>
   8. *BEYOND THE 1998 ELECTIONS* <#beyond>
         1. Local Government Restructuring <#lgr>
         2. Implementation of Article 23 <#art23>
         3. Progress Toward Full Democracy <#progress>
         4. Role of Political Parties and the Legislature <#polpty>	
         5. Attitudes Toward Full Democracy <#fulldem> 
   9. *ENDNOTES* <#END> 

------------------------------------------------------------------------

*PREFACE*
This report is the fifth in a series prepared by the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs about democratization in Hong Kong.
NDI expects to continue to study and report on the status of autonomy
and the prospects for democratization in the new Special Administrative
Region in light of international standards and benchmarks outlined in
the Basic Law, Hong Kong's new constitution. The Institute hopes that
this and its other reports will contribute to better understanding of
the ongoing transition process and assist those interested in promoting
democratization in Hong Kong.

This report was written by Eric Bjornlund, NDI Senior Associate and
Regional Director for Asia, and Andrew Fuys, NDI Program Assistant. The
report is based in part on the findings of an NDI team that visited Hong
Kong from May 20 to 26, 1998 and observed the May 24 elections. Eugene
Eidenberg, a member of NDI's Board of Directors and a former senior
White House official during the Carter administration, led the mission.
The delegation also included Kamal Hossain, former Foreign Minister of
Bangladesh, Somchai Homlaor, Secretary General of the Asian Forum for
Human Rights and Development, NDI Senior Program Officer Maryam
Montague, NDI Program Officer Sophie Richardson, Bjornlund and Fuys. All
had participated in previous NDI missions to Hong Kong within recent
months.

The team met with a broad range of political and governmental actors,
including Chief Secretary for Administration Anson Chan, Electoral
Affairs Commission Chairman Justice Woo Kwok-hing, other senior
government and election officials, political party leaders,
representatives of domestic and international nongovernmental
organizations, members of the domestic and international media,
academics and representatives of the diplomatic, business and legal
communities. Participants on the mission also traveled to polling sites
on election day to observe the election process.

NDI previously sent study missions to Hong Kong in March, August and
December 1997 and March 1998. These delegations have also included Dick
Thornburgh, former US Attorney General and Pennsylvania Governor; Sue
Wood, former head of the National Party of New Zealand; Tom Andrews, a
former member of the US House of Representatives; and Simon Osborn,
program director of the London-based Electoral Reform International
Services.

NDI wishes to thank the many residents of Hong Kong who have met with
representatives of the Institute and have shared their views on the
transition and democratization process. They have contributed
immeasurably to the work of the Institute. NDI also acknowledges the
support of the National Endowment for Democracy, which has funded this
project.

Kenneth D. Wollack
NDI President

------------------------------------------------------------------------

*EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
*On May 24, 1998, residents of Hong Kong went to the polls for the first
time since reversion to Chinese sovereignty. In spite of the driving
rain that fell for much of the day, nearly 1.5 million residents voted,
a record turnout for Hong Kong. Pro-democracy candidates won more than
60 percent of the vote and a decisive majority of the 20 seats that were
directly elected through universal suffrage. This vote represented a
greater opportunity for Chinese citizens to choose their political
representatives than exists anywhere in the mainland.

These elections were a positive step because they bring a measure of
democracy to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and
mark the establishment of a legislature constituted in accordance with
the Basic Law, Hong Kong's new constitution. The successful execution of
the elections does not, however, resolve the underlying problem that the
election framework in place severely restricted democratic processes.

/Election Administration and the Election Framework/
As expected, these elections were well organized and well administered.
Most, if not all, political leaders and observers considered the
Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC), Hong Kong's independent electoral
authority, and other involved government agencies and officials to be
highly competent and capable of administering a clean and efficient
vote. There was no expectation that voters or candidates would be
subject to coercion or intimidation, and candidates generally all were
afforded a fair opportunity to campaign.

Nevertheless, the process did not meet international standards for
democratic elections. The Basic Law does not provide for full democracy,
at least in the short term.**During a 10-year transition period, only
part of the Legislative Council (LegCo) is to be directly elected. In
this first legislative election of the new Special Administrative
Region, 20 of the 60 LegCo seats were elected by geographically defined
constituencies through direct elections, 30 were returned by so-called
functional constituencies comprising various business and professional
groups, and 10 were chosen by a specially constituted 800-member
Election Committee (EC) composed of political and economic elites.

Although the EAC and the SAR government had declared that observers
would not be allowed inside polling stations during the vote, three
teams of NDI observers visited polling sites on election day in each of
the SAR's five geographical constituencies to observe the election
process to the extent that they would be allowed. These teams noted few
if any irregularities in the election day process and heard few
complaints about violations of election rules from candidates or
political party representatives after the elections. A number of
innovative administrative features contributed to the transparency of
the vote, including information posted outside polling places about the
location and setup of polling sites, the identity of polling officials
and candidate agents, the platforms of candidates running for office,
the grievance process and the voter turnout on an hourly basis.

/Voter Turnout/
Despite predictions of a low voter turnout, based on indications that
much of the public did not show interest in the elections and did not
understand the election system, both the percentage of registered voters
who participated and the total number of voters substantially exceeded
the corresponding figures for 1995. Nearly 1.5 million residents turned
out to vote, a significant increase over the roughly 920,000 that
participated in the 1995 elections. This turnout represented 53 percent
of all registered voters and 36 percent of the estimated total voting
age population.

After the elections, political observers suggested a myriad of reasons
for why the people of Hong Kong had chosen to vote in such unexpectedly
high numbers. Many commentators suggested that the high turnout showed
that the people of Hong Kong valued the right to choose their political
representatives and were ready for a greater level of democracy. Several
suggested that an increasing dissatisfaction with the government and the
provisional legislature, fueled by a stagnant economy, motivated
residents to express their desire for change at the ballot box. The SAR
government publicly claimed the high turnout was a sign that the people
of Hong Kong were satisfied thus far with the implementation of "one
country, two systems."

/Election Results/
Beyond the turnout, the results of the direct elections themselves were
significant. In the races for the geographical constituency seats,
pro-democracy candidates won a clear popular mandate. More than 60
percent of the vote in the direct elections went to pro-democracy
candidates, winning them 14 of the 20 seats. Of the 20 pro-democracy
legislators who were elected in 1995 and then opted not to join the
provisional legislature, 18 were returned to office.

If the results for this year's direct elections were extrapolated to
reflect a 60-seat legislature directly elected by proportional
representation from the same five constituencies, pro-democracy groups
would have won about 39 seats. Because pro-democracy candidates only won
four of the 40 indirectly elected seats, however, the democratic camp
will constitute less than one-third of the new legislature. Due to their
broad popular support in the direct elections, though, members of the
democratic camp will likely have a moral authority that will allow them
to exercise influence disproportionate to their number of seats in the
legislature.

The most popular of the "pro-China" parties, the Democratic Alliance for
the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), also made a strong showing in the
direct elections. Compared to its showing in 1995, when the party won
only one directly elected seat, the DAB increased the percentage of
votes received in the direct elections from 15 to 25 percent, which won
the party five of the 20 available seats. Although the number of seats
that the DAB won through direct elections is in part a product of the
proportional representation system, it is also the result of increased
support for the party. Based on its showing in this year's direct
elections, the DAB would have won about 17 seats if the entire
legislature had been directly elected. This would have put the group in
the minority but would nonetheless have allowed it to form a formidable
block.

Pro-business candidates, however, fared poorly in the direct elections.
The Liberal Party, Hong Kong's leading pro-business party, ran lists of
candidates in two geographical constituencies and won seats in neither.
The avowedly pro-business and "pro-China" Hong Kong Progressive Alliance
(HKPA) chose not to run any candidates in the direct elections because,
as one party leader admitted, they had virtually no chance of winning
any seats. The results of the direct elections highlight the need for
pro-business groups to increase their ability to campaign at the popular
level, an area in which they are far behind both the DAB and the
pro-democracy parties.

/Political Parties and the LegCo/
Like past legislatures in Hong Kong, the new LegCo that took office on
July 2 has relatively narrow powers and does not form a government.
Rather, the legislature is essentially a monitoring body that can block
or amend government legislation and call on the administration to defend
government policy. Legislators have the power to introduce private
members bills, but not ones that involve public expenditure, the
political structure or the operation of the government.

In accordance with a schedule set out in the Basic Law, the number of
directly elected seats in the legislature will increase in the future.
This means that political parties will likely play an increasingly
important role in the body. As parties develop, the government will need
to build a relationship with at least some parties in the legislature in
order to pass legislation. Moreover, if the chief executive is popularly
elected in the future, party politics will presumably enter the
executive branch. These developments would lead to both an official
government party and functioning opposition parties (that is, parties
opposed to a specific governing party rather than the administration
generally) in the legislature. This would likely both strengthen
political parties and expand the role of the legislature.

/Local Government Reform/
A government-led effort to reassess the current local government
structure is already underway. Given the small size of the SAR, there is
concern that the current three-tier government structure, of which the
SAR administration is the highest tier, needs to be streamlined. Since
the introduction of direct elections to Hong Kong's local bodies, the
district boards and urban and regional councils, in 1994 and 1995, the
two lower tiers have become important training grounds for younger
politicians and have the potential to increase public interest and
participation in politics. When developing its reform package for the
bodies, the SAR administration and new LegCo should consider the
importance of increasing not only the efficiency of Hong Kong's
government structure but also the opportunity for citizens to
participate in local politics.

/Implementation of Article 23/
The legislature, along with the administration, will need at some point
to address the implementation of constitutionally required laws that
could affect the status of civil liberties. Article 23 of the Basic Law
requires the SAR to enact laws governing such concerns as sedition and
subversion and the relationship between political bodies in Hong Kong
and overseas political groups. To its credit, the SAR administration
decided last year to postpone the introduction of legislation
implementing Article 23 until after this year's elections. This will
allow for a legislature constituted in accordance with the Basic Law,
rather than the appointed provisional legislature, to scrutinize the
government's bill. Although it was expected that the implementation of
Article 23 would be one of the first issues that the new legislature
would face, the government indicated in June that it does not plan to
introduce a bill implementing Article 23 this year and that there was no
urgent need for such legislation.

/Pace of Democratization/
The SAR government stated immediately after the elections that it does
not plan to review the pace of democratization, as laid out in the Basic
Law, before the next legislative elections in 2000. For his part, Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa has not made any commitment to any specific
timetable for introducing full democracy. Nonetheless, political parties
of various points of view have thrown their support behind universal
suffrage. After the elections, editorials in both the Chinese- and
English-language press demonstrated support for an increased level of
democracy in the SAR. A public opinion poll taken in June showed that a
majority of residents supported implementing universal suffrage for both
the next legislative elections and the next election of the chief executive.

Support for universal suffrage seems widespread in Hong Kong. The high
turnout at the May elections and the clear popular support for
pro-democracy candidates adds further weight to this sentiment. If the
HKSAR is to live up to the promise of democratization, it must allow the
people of Hong Kong to directly choose their entire legislature as well
as their chief executive. Only then can residents truly assume the role
of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong."

*ELECTION FRAMEWORK*
On May 24, 1998, residents of Hong Kong went to the polls to choose the
first elected Legislative Council since reversion to Chinese sovereignty
and the advent of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong." These elections
took place under restrictive rules established by Britain and China and
were governed by an election law enacted by the provisional legislature
in September 1997 and election guidelines issued in February 1998. The
resulting framework ensured that the 1998 elections, like those held
previously under British sovereignty, would not meet international
standards for democratic elections.

As expected, these elections were well organized and well administered.
The successful execution of the elections does not, however, resolve the
underlying problem that the election framework in place restricted
democratic processes. The Basic Law does not provide for full democracy,
at least in the short term.**During a 10-year transition period, only
part of the Legislative Council is to be directly elected. In this first
legislative election of the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
20 of the 60 LegCo seats were elected by geographically defined
constituencies through direct elections, 30 were returned by so-called
functional constituencies comprising various business and professional
groups, and 10 were chosen by a specially constituted 800-member
Election Committee composed of political and economic elites.^(1)
<#N_1_> In effect, three separate elections took place on May 24. (See
Appendices I and II.)

Even beyond this constitutional limitation, as NDI has previously
reported, the election law enacted in September 1997 by the provisional
legislature interfered with the will of the majority and limited public
participation.^(2) <#N_2_> The election law provided that the 20
directly elected seats would be elected through a list system of
proportional representation. This replaced the "first-past-the-post"
system of electing representatives from single-member constituencies
that was used in the 1995 polls.

While proportional representation is used in democratic countries around
the world to ensure broad representation of various interests, the
adoption of such a system for just one-third of the legislature was an
unfortunate choice for Hong Kong. The framework established by the Basic
Law already ensured extensive representation of minority interests
through indirect elections for the other two-thirds of the legislature.
If the entire LegCo were directly chosen, electing members through
proportional representation may have been entirely appropriate.
Pro-democracy leaders themselves have contended that they would not
oppose proportional representation if the system was used to elect all
60 seats.

Furthermore, the new election law limited participation in the indirect
elections by reintroducing corporate voting and dramatically reducing
the eligible electorate.^(3) <#N_3_> In the last elections under British
sovereignty in 1995, more than one million voters together elected nine
of 30 functional constituency representatives, while smaller groups
elected the other 21 functional seats. The electoral system in place in
1998 replaced the nine broad functional constituencies with narrow ones,
disenfranchising the majority of functional voters who were eligible in
1995. Many in Hong Kong referred to the indirect elections as "small
circle" elections because of the small size of the electorates involved.
Moreover, competition was often lacking in this year's indirect
elections: in 10 of the 28 functional constituencies, candidates were
elected unopposed.

Certain election arrangements were complicated and unfamiliar. An
individual eligible to participate in the indirect elections, for
example, was entitled to cast two ballots: one in the direct elections
and one in the indirect elections. An individual designated to cast a
ballot on behalf of a corporate elector was able to cast up to three
votes: one in the direct elections, one as an individual in the indirect
elections, and one as a corporate representative. Under the prescribed
procedures, polling stations could have had as many as 29 separate
ballots, one for each functional constituency and one for the direct
elections. In practice on May 24, because 10 functional seats were
uncontested, each site for the direct elections actually had up to 19
different ballots available.^(4) <#N_4_>

Candidate lists on ballots did not include any party identification,
which was curious and may have made it difficult for some voters to
easily identify the candidates or parties they supported. The
proportional representation system necessarily reinforces and depends on
the role of political parties, and in most countries ballots typically
identify the party affiliations of candidates, under both proportional
and majoritarian electoral systems. The system in place was the third in
as many elections, and opinion polls during the campaign period
indicated that neither the list system of voting for the directly
elected seats nor the systems of indirect election was widely
understood.^(5) <#N_5_>

Although it did not provide for full democracy in the 1998 elections,
the Basic Law does establish the "ultimate aim" of elections for both
the legislature and the chief executive by universal suffrage after a
transition period of about 10 years.^(6) <#N_6_> The current
administration, however, has not committed to any specific timetable for
introducing full democracy, other than suggesting that the issue will be
addressed before the end of the 10-year transition period in 2007-2008.

*ELECTION OBSERVATION*
Election observation by independent organizations, both domestic and
international, is a common practice in countries around the world. This
work helps promote the integrity of an election process, regardless of
whether the election occurs in a new, emerging or established democracy.
Nonpartisan election observation contributes to a more competitive
election process by encouraging fairer campaign practices and by
reducing the possibility of fraud and irregularities on election day.
Domestic election observation also builds civic participation by
involving citizens and nonparty groups in the political process.

Moreover, election observation, particularly international observation,
gives visitors and hosts an opportunity to share experiences and
technical information about election processes. Observation of the
election process allows visitors to take away new ideas for election
administration that they can share with colleagues in their own
countries. Officials, candidates and voters from the host country have
the opportunity to learn about the election experiences of other
countries and similarly draw upon the strengths of election practices
elsewhere.

For a number of reasons, NDI did not organize a full-scale, traditional
observer effort for the Hong Kong elections. Few if any candidates had
indicated that they expected significant irregularities on election day.
Most, if not all, political leaders and observers considered the EAC and
other involved government agencies and officials to be highly competent
and capable of administering a clean and efficient vote. There was no
expectation that voters or candidates would be subject to coercion or
intimidation, and all candidates generally had a fair chance to
campaign. The most significant shortcomings of the 1998 elections in
Hong Kong lay not in the actual administration of the elections but in
the election framework, including certain election day arrangements,
that had been decided well before the campaign period began.

Despite the expectation of well-run elections, the EAC and the SAR
government repeatedly stressed that they would not allow observers
inside polling stations on the day of the polls. Government and election
officials argued adamantly that doing so would be tantamount to inviting
outside supervision of the polls. This, they maintained, would suggest
to the people of Hong Kong that the EAC could not adequately supervise
the vote and that there was some question about the integrity of the
administration of the process. They expressed their strongest objections
to the prospect of international observers at the polling stations but
declared that nonparty domestic groups and members of the press would
also be excluded.

Nonetheless, NDI organized a study mission to Hong Kong at the time of
the elections. On election day, three teams of NDI observers traveled to
polling sites to observe the election process to the extent that they
were allowed. The teams visited polling stations in each of the SAR's
five geographical constituencies. Polling officials usually greeted the
observer teams at the entrance to voting sites, openly answered
questions about the elections and in some instances, despite the EAC's
much publicized objections to observers, invited the teams to enter
polling stations and briefly see the voting process. The NDI observers
noted that the elections were proceeding efficiently and that the
secrecy of the ballot was ensured.

Outside the voting sites, the observer teams noted the extensive
information about the process and candidates that was available to
voters and observers. The teams spoke with polling officials and
candidate agents about the election process. The observers spoke to
voters at each site about their voting experiences and their general
impressions of elections and politics in Hong Kong. The teams also noted
campaign activity that took place in the streets surrounding the polling
stations and spoke to party supporters who were trying to rally support
for their candidates.

Based on the experience of its observer teams and international
practice, NDI recommends that election and government authorities in the
future reconsider their objections to independent observation of polling
places. Election observation by nonparty domestic organizations,
international groups and members of the media increases transparency and
is a common practice around the world. Such observation need not disrupt
or interfere with the process, nor would it suggest the existence of any
supervisory authority. Rather than fearing a loss of control over the
administration of the elections, the EAC and the government should
consider election observers to be an opportunity to demonstrate the
efficiency of the process to the people of Hong Kong and to the
international community.

*ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
*As noted above, the EAC administered the May 24 elections competently
and professionally. Polling officials appeared well trained and
efficient. Balloting and counting generally proceeded smoothly. Voters
could easily find important information about the election process at
the polling stations, which contributed to the transparency of the
elections.

/Balloting/
Voting took place at 496 polling stations throughout the SAR. Included
among these were four polling stations exclusively designated for the
800 members of the Election Committee, which selected 10 of 60
legislators. (Despite its designation as a "committee," the EC never
actually met in one place to select these legislators.) Large yellow
banners were placed along street railings and on the sides of public
buildings to indicate the location of polling stations. These banners
allowed residents to easily locate voting sites.

Most polling stations were located in school buildings, community
centers and other public sites. In some instances, voting took place in
courtyards of public housing estates, schools or other public
properties, but voters at these sites cast their ballots under shelter,
protected from the weather. Inside most polling places there was ample
room for voters, officials and all candidate agents, and voting took
place in a smooth and orderly fashion. Certain polling stations had
limited space inside, and voters at these sites were forced to stand
outside while waiting to vote.

Because of the heavy rains that hit much of the SAR on election day,
seven polling stations in the New Territories were closed around
noontime. The approximately 2,500 voters who were affected by the
flooding were permitted to cast their ballots at other nearby sites.^(7)
<#N_7_> NDI is not aware of any complaints from candidates or political
parties contesting these races that this arrangement compromised the
integrity of the vote or otherwise affected the outcome of the election.

Important and extensive information about the conduct of the elections
was made available to the public outside polling stations. Signs at the
entrance to voting sites identified all the polling officials who were
stationed at the site by photo and by name. Other signs showed the
different types of badges worn by polling officials and candidate
agents, which allowed voters to easily identify them.

Outside each polling site was a poster giving the phone number of the
EAC's complaint hotline, which voters or candidate agents could call if
they had any grievances about the election process. Election officials
also posted a running count of the number of residents who had voted at
the site, which they updated on an hourly basis. Officials had covered
all information with clear plastic, which protected it from the rain.

Also available outside of each polling station was information about all
candidates competing in the elections, which the candidates had provided
to the EAC. This included names and photos of candidates, party
affiliation and party logo, and a brief campaign statement in Chinese,
English or both. Many voters referred to this information before going
inside to vote. This suggests, among other things, that at least some
voters may have appreciated a minimal amount of party information, such
as names or logos, on the actual ballots.

Party activists were out in force on election day but generally
respected the no canvassing zone that the EAC established around the
immediate vicinity of polling stations. The size of this zone varied
among polling sites. It generally ranged from a few hundred meters to a
few blocks around the perimeter of the polling station. Signs indicating
the extent of this zone were posted at the entrance to the polling site
along with the other materials describing administrative procedures.

The information provided at polling sites about the administration of
the elections should be considered "best practices" in election
administration. Although little concern existed before the elections
that voters or officials would be subject to intimidation, or that
candidates or their agents would try to cheat at the polls, the
information available outside of the polling stations provided an
additional degree of transparency.

/Vote Count/
The vote count for all 60 seats was conducted inside Hong Kong's new
convention center, where reversion ceremonies had been held in 1997. The
atmosphere inside the counting station was festive. Shortly after the
close of the polls, Chief Executive Tung, trailed by other senior
government officials and a horde of media personnel, entered the floor
of the convention center and ceremonially emptied the first ballot box
that was counted that evening. The floor of the convention center was
filled with counting officials and tables at which ballots were counted.
Candidate agents milled about the floor and observed the count.

Observers, including members of the media, were prohibited from walking
among officials as they counted the ballots but were allowed to watch
the proceedings from afar from a grandstand inside the convention
center. A large video screen in front of the grandstand broadcast scenes
from around the convention hall. When the count for a constituency was
completed, candidates were brought out in front of the media stand and
stood there in front of the cameras as the results were announced. Like
a referee at a boxing match, an election official would raise the arm of
the victorious candidate after her or his name was announced. Party
supporters cheered on their colleagues from the grandstand as results
were announced.

The count began immediately after the polls closed on Sunday evening and
proceeded smoothly throughout the night. The EAC announced results for
each constituency as they were available. Results for all constituencies
were known in less than a day of when the polls closed on Sunday night.
The results of a number of races in the indirect elections, which had
small electorates and thus few votes to be counted, were announced
during the morning after the elections. Inside the convention center,
several results boards were posted to allow observers to note the final
tallies as they were made public.

At the counting station, ballots from one polling station were mixed
with those of at least one other. Results were therefore not available
on a polling station basis.

Candidates and political parties registered few complaints about the
vote count. The one notable challenge to the official results was lodged
by a candidate in the Regional Council functional constituency.^(8)
<#N_8_> In this race, Ann Chiang Lai-wan lost the race to Tang Siu-tong
by a 25-24 vote. She challenged this defeat on the grounds that four
ballots cast in the 50-member constituency were not marked with Arabic
numerals as required by the election regulations. The election for this
constituency was one of six that used a preferential elimination system
that required electors to rank their choices.

The EAC declined to investigate Chiang's complaint, contending that the
returning officer for the constituency had already deemed the ballots
acceptable and that only the courts could overrule such a decision.
Election guidelines indicate that the returning officer is authorized to
determine the validity of questionable ballots and that any candidate
who objects to the admission of a questionable ballot must file an
election petition to have the grievance reviewed.^(9) <#N_9_> The
following week, Chiang filed a petition to have her case heard in the
SAR court system.

Regardless of the court's decision in this case, Chiang's complaint
illustrates that a slight error, irregularity or inconsistency in the
indirect elections might affect the results, given the small sizes of
the constituencies involved. In this case, three of the four ballots
that were allegedly marked incorrectly favored Tang, who in the end won
the election by only one vote. If the four ballots had been voided from
the outset, Chiang would have won by one vote, and it is possible that
Tang would have lodged a protest.

*VOTER TURNOUT*

/Direct Elections/
There was little indication before the elections that voter turnout
would be high. Public opinion polls suggested that much of the public
was confused about the election system and the voting arrangements. Many
people said they would not participate because the legislature had
little power or because they were not interested in elections. The
results of a government-sponsored voter registration drive had been
disappointing, particularly among the business and professional groups
that made up the constituencies for the indirect elections. These
factors led to concern before the elections that there would be low
voter turnout.

Despite these predictions, however, both the percentage of registered
voters who participated and the total number of voters substantially
exceeded the corresponding figures for 1995. Nearly 1.5 million
residents turned out to vote, a significant increase over the roughly
920,000 that participated in the 1995 elections. (See Appendix III.)
This turnout represented 53 percent of all registered voters and 36
percent of the estimated total voting age population.^(10) <#N_10_> By
comparison, in the last elections under the British government in 1995,
the turnout rate was 35 percent of all registered voters.

The turnout was so much higher than expected that many polling stations
ran out of the souvenir cards that residents received upon casting their
ballot. The SAR government had introduced these souvenir cards as part
of its promotion of the elections. The EAC, however, had only ordered
enough cards to satisfy a 50 percent turnout, which it considered a safe
assumption given the level of participation in previous elections and
other indications.

/Indirect Elections/
The turnout of registered electors for the indirect elections was
generally higher than that for the direct elections. Overall, 63 percent
of all registered constituency functional electors cast ballots. In the
urban and regional council constituency elections, all eligible
individuals--50 local government officials in each--participated. Four
other functional constituencies--those for agricultural and fisheries,
insurance, labor and transport--saw turnout of more than 90 percent of
those registered. The lowest turnout was in the health services sector,
at 52 percent. (See Appendix IV.)

It would be misleading, however, to judge the voter interest in the
indirect elections solely on the turnout rates of registered electors.
The registration rate for many functional constituencies was
significantly lower than that for the geographical constituencies. In
nine functional constituencies, less than half of all eligible voters
were registered. Six others had registration rates lower than 70
percent, which was the registration rate for the direct elections.^(11)
<#N_11_> These figures suggest that the registration process for the
functional constituency elections weeded out disinterested electors to a
greater extent than did the registration process for the direct elections.

In addition, 10 of the 28 functional constituencies did not even hold
balloting on election day because there was only one candidate running
in the race. Five of these constituencies had registration rates of less
than 40 percent. That only one candidate ran for a seat in these
constituencies in itself is a sign that there was relatively low
interest among the eligible voters for competitively electing their
representatives.

Interestingly, the total number of votes received by all candidates for
the 10 Election Committee seats was only 7,750. Since each of the 800 EC
electors was supposed to have voted for 10 candidates, there should have
been a total of 8,000 votes counted. Although turnout for the EC
election was not publicly reported, this discrepancy means that 25
electors either did not vote or voted for less than 10 candidates, which
would have invalidated their ballots. Before the elections some EC
electors had indicated they would deliberately leave their ballots blank
or choose less than 10 candidates, which would invalidate their ballots,
in response to a lack of pro-democracy candidates among the 25
choices.^(12) <#N_12_>

/Interpretations of the Turnout/
After the elections, political observers suggested a myriad of reasons
for why the people of Hong Kong had chosen to vote in such unexpectedly
high numbers. Many commentators suggested that the high turnout showed
that the people of Hong Kong valued the right to choose their political
representatives and were ready for a greater level of democracy. Several
suggested that an increasing dissatisfaction with the government and the
provisional legislature, fueled by a stagnant economy, motivated
residents to express their desire for change at the ballot box.

Some observers have suggested that residents recognized the historic
nature of the first elections under Chinese sovereignty and "Hong Kong
people ruling Hong Kong," which motivated many to come out and vote. The
proportional representation system used in the direct elections made for
close races for the last seat in some constituencies, which may have
increased voter interest. It was also likely that since the last
elections political parties had increased their ability to mobilize
voters. In addition, one local retail chain offered a 40 percent
discount to anyone who brought in the souvenir card given to voters at
the polling sites. There was some speculation that many voters turned
out on election day so that they could take advantage of this offer.

The SAR government publicly claimed the high voter turnout was a sign
that the people of Hong Kong were satisfied thus far with the
implementation of "one country, two systems." After the elections, Chief
Executive Tung remarked that the turnout reflected "the very strong
support for the Basic Law, and the spirit of 'Hong Kong people running
Hong Kong' with a high degree of autonomy."^(13) <#N_13_> Chief
Secretary for Administration Anson Chan, the SAR's second ranking
official, suggested that residents understood their civic duty to
participate in the polls and that the high turnout was a sign that Hong
Kong people "are ready and willing to exercise their rights under the
Basic Law and to make the policy of Hong Kong people running Hong Kong
even more effective."^(14) <#N_14_>

After the elections, Hong Kong University's Social Sciences Research
Centre conducted a public opinion poll of more than 1,000 voters to
determine why residents chose to participate in the elections. When
asked to identify the primary reason that they went to vote, more than
60 percent of respondents said they voted to fulfill their civic
responsibility.^(15) <#N_15_> Fifteen percent of those interviewed
responded that they voted to support a particular political party.
Smaller percentages of voters gave reasons such as discontent with the
government and provisional legislature, concern about the economy and
the historic nature of these first elections since reversion.

In the same opinion poll, researchers asked voters whether various "push
factors" had encouraged them to vote. Again, fulfilling civic
responsibility was highest on the list, with 87 percent responding that
this was an important reason that they participated in the elections.
Notably, 78 percent of those questioned said that the desire to prove
that Hong Kong people deserve greater freedom and democracy was an
important motivation for participating in the elections. According to
the survey, this was the second most important factor that people voted,
ahead of both residents' economic concerns and their desire to support
"one country, two systems."^(16) <#N_16_>

NDI's observer teams spoke informally with voters on election day and
heard similar reasons for people's participation in the elections. A
number of residents claimed that they voted because it was their civic
duty and that by casting their ballot they could demonstrate that they
value the right to vote. Voters also suggested that the first vote in
Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty was a significant political event in
which they ought to participate. For some, the turnout was a vote
against colonialism; some voters suggested that only now with the
British government gone could their vote be meaningful.

There were clearly a variety of reasons that motivated residents to
participate in this year's elections. Nonetheless, many voters also
indicated that they would have preferred a system of fully direct
elections through universal suffrage instead of the complicated election
system in place. It remains to be seen whether the high voter turnout
will galvanize support for a faster pace of democratization and push the
government to sooner implement direct elections through universal suffrage.

*ELECTION RESULTS*
Beyond the turnout, the results of the direct elections themselves were
significant. In the races for the geographical constituency seats,
pro-democracy candidates won a clear popular mandate. (See Appendix V.)
More than 60 percent of the vote in the direct elections went to
pro-democracy candidates, winning them 14 of the 20 seats. Of the 20
pro-democracy legislators who were elected in 1995 and then opted not to
join the provisional legislature, 18 were elected back to office. The
Democratic Party (DP) won 42 percent of the direct vote, which led all
parties, and sent nine of its candidates to the LegCo through the direct
elections.

Two of the three smaller pro-democracy parties won seats through the
direct elections. The Frontier had three members elected to the
legislature, a stronger showing than many anticipated before the vote. A
fourth member of the Frontier, who ran on the list sponsored by a local
community organization, was also elected. The Citizens Party had one
candidate, its chairperson Christine Loh, elected to the LegCo. Of the
pro-democracy groups, only the Association for Democracy and People's
Livelihood (ADPL), which had four legislators elected in 1995, did not
win any seats.

If the results for this year's direct elections were extrapolated to
reflect a 60-seat legislature directly elected by proportional
representation from the same five constituencies, pro-democracy groups
would have won about 39 seats.^(17) <#N_17_> (See Appendix VI.) Because
pro-democracy candidates only won four of the 40 indirectly elected
seats, however, the democratic camp will constitute less than one-third
of the new legislature. (See Appendix VII.)

Because of their broad popular support in the direct elections, though,
members of the democratic camp will likely have a moral authority that
will allow them to exercise influence disproportionate to their number
of seats in the legislature. The 20 directly elected legislators can
claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people of Hong Kong in
a way that the 40 indirectly elected LegCo members cannot. Many
observers expect that this will allow members of the democratic camp,
who won a clear mandate in the direct elections, to play a more
prominent role in the LegCo than their numbers would suggest.

The most popular of the "pro-China" parties, the Democratic Alliance for
the Betterment of Hong Kong, also made a strong showing in the direct
elections. The group won five of the 20 directly elected seats, one in
each geographical constituency, and sent a total of 10 members to LegCo,
including those elected indirectly.^(18) <#N_18_> The party's showing in
the direct elections, though not as strong as that of the democratic
camp, was nonetheless better than many observers had expected. In one
closely contested race, DAB Chairman Tsang Yok-sing narrowly defeated
Frederick Fung, chairman of the ADPL, for the final seat in the Kowloon
West constituency. This victory over a popular pro-democracy leader
illustrates the growing strength of the DAB.

Compared to its showing in 1995, when the party won only one directly
elected seat, the DAB increased its percentage of votes in the direct
elections from 15 to 25 percent. Although the number of seats that the
DAB won through direct elections is in part a product of the
proportional representation system (something party leaders themselves
acknowledged), it is also the result of increased support for the party.
Based on its showing in this year's direct elections, the DAB would have
won about 17 seats if the entire legislature had been directly elected.
This would have put the group in the minority but would nonetheless have
allowed it to form a formidable block.

Before the elections, many in the "pro-China" community expressed
concerns that their candidates would be virtually shut out of a
legislature chosen through fully direct elections. The DAB's showing in
this year's geographical constituency races, and the indication that the
party is developing a broader base of popular support, may lessen this
opposition to direct elections.

Pro-business candidates, however, fared poorly in the direct elections.
The Liberal Party, Hong Kong's leading pro-business party, ran lists of
candidates in two geographical constituencies. In the New Territories
East, the list headed by party chairman Allen Lee, who was the only
member of the party to be directly elected in 1995, did not win enough
votes to receive any of the constituency's five seats. On Hong Kong
Island, the Liberal Party list finished well out of the running for the
constituency's four seats. The three-person Liberal team even finished
behind independent candidate Jennifer Chow, who had quit the party in
February.

The other major pro-business party, the avowedly "pro-China" Hong Kong
Progressive Alliance, chose not to run any candidates in the direct
elections because, as one party leader admitted, their chance of winning
any seats was virtually nil. The results of the direct elections
highlight the need for pro-business groups to increase their ability to
campaign at the popular level, an area in which they are far behind both
the DAB and the pro-democracy parties. The poor performance of
pro-business candidates also seems to refute the notion that the people
of Hong Kong want business leaders to play a leading political role in
the community.

The poor showing for the Liberal Party in the direct polls could hinder
the development of support for direct elections within the business
community. Like the "pro-China" camp, members of the business community
have feared that their candidates would be shut out of the LegCo if the
body was chosen through universal suffrage. This year's results from the
direct elections, in which pro-business candidates had even weaker
showings than most observers predicted, may further the resolve of those
business leaders who are opposed to universal suffrage for choosing all
60 LegCo seats.

*BEYOND THE 1998 ELECTIONS*
Several issues beyond this year's elections will affect the course of
democratization in Hong Kong. Foremost among these is the pace at which
the government will introduce fully democratic elections for the
legislature and chief executive. The Basic Law establishes the "ultimate
aim" of electing all legislatures and the office of the chief executive
through universal suffrage. Although it outlines a 10-year timetable for
increasing the number of directly elected seats in the LegCo, the Basic
Law does not guarantee a date for when the entire legislature or the
office of the chief executive will be directly elected. The future pace
of democratization will likely affect the interaction among political
institutions such as the legislature, the administration and political
parties.

In addition, a government-led effort to reassess the current local
government structure is already on the political agenda. This will
affect the opportunities for residents to be involved with politics at
the local level. The administration and the LegCo will also need at some
point to address the implementation of constitutionally required laws
that could affect the status of civil liberties. Article 23 of the Basic
Law requires the SAR to enact laws governing such concerns as sedition
and subversion and the relationship between political bodies in Hong
Kong and overseas political groups. Many expected the SAR government to
set forth such bills soon after the new legislature took its seats, but
the administration recently indicated that it would not introduce such
legislation this year and did not yet see an urgent need for these laws.

/Local Government Restructuring/
Hong Kong currently has a three-tiered government structure that
includes the Legislative Council as the highest tier, the Urban Council
and the Regional Council as the middle tier, and district boards as the
lowest tier. The Urban Council and the Regional Council, known together
as the municipal councils, are policy-making bodies responsible for
public health, cultural affairs and community recreation. Before 1986,
the Urban Council performed these functions for all of Hong Kong.

Before reversion, the Urban Council comprised 41 councillors, 32 of whom
were directly elected members from urban-district constituencies (Hong
Kong Island and Kowloon) and nine of whom represented each of the nine
urban district boards. The Regional Council had 39 members: 27 elected
directly from the geographical constituencies of the New Territories and
the Outlying Islands; one from each of the nine district boards in the
area; and the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen of the Heung Yee Kuk (rural
councils that represent residents of the New Territories), who were /ex
officio/ members. The last elections for the municipal councils under
British sovereignty took place in March 1995. Municipal council
elections were to be held every four years.

Hong Kong's district boards were established in 1982 to provide a forum
for public consultation and political participation at the district
level. The 364 members of the 18 district boards were all directly
elected for the first time in September 1994.

After reversion the membership of these local bodies was increased by 25
percent. The same selection committee that chose the provisional
legislature appointed the additional members, and the bodies became
known as provisional district boards and provisional municipal councils.

In June, the SAR government began a two-month review of the local
government structure. The administration issued a consultation document
in which it outlines four possible ways to reform the local government
system:

    * eliminating the municipal councils and reallocating their
      responsibilities to the SAR government and the district boards;
    * merging the two municipal councils into one body;
    * creating a smaller number of regional councils, which would
      encompass the functions of both the district boards and the
      municipal councils, to replace the existing 18 district boards; and
    * keeping the current local government structure but taking steps to
      improve the administrative coordination between the Urban Council
      and Regional Council and between these two municipal councils and
      the district boards.^(19) <#N_19_>

In the current review, the government is also considering the
composition of local government bodies. It suggests four possible
options for constituting the eventual local bodies:

    * eliminating all appointed and /ex-officio/ seats;
    * eliminating all appointed seats but retaining /ex-officio /seats
      for members of the Hueng Yee Kuk;
    * retaining a certain number of appointed and /ex-officio/ seats but
      providing for a majority of seats to be elected; and
    * having district board members elect some or all of the seats to
      the municipal councils, assuming those councils are retained.^(20)
      <#N_20_>

The public will have until July 31 to submit responses to this
consultation paper. The government expects to submit a bill to LegCo in
October that will propose the future local government structure. After
legislation creating the local bodies is in place, the government will
need to establish a system for electing members to the local bodies,
which could involve another round of public consultation.

Several political leaders have voiced concerns that Hong Kong is too
small to warrant three levels of government and that the system needs to
be streamlined. Particularly after a series of public health crises in
the past year, the administration is concerned about consolidating
administrative authority at one level of government. The administration
thus proposed in the consultation document that whatever structure is
established, the SAR government assume responsibility for food safety
and environmental hygiene.^(21) <#N_21_> There is also some sentiment
that Hong Kong is a uniform enough social and political entity that
there does not need to be two separate municipal councils, and that the
regional and urban councils could be merged into one body that would
carry out its functions for the whole of the SAR.

After the consultation document was released, however, several sitting
members of the municipal councils contended that the administration
portrayed the roles of the local bodies in a biased manner. They charged
the government with deliberately trying to engineer public support for
its taking over the administrative responsibilities of the municipal
councils. In particular, members of the councils protested the proposal
to strip the bodies of their administrative authority over food safety
and public hygiene. Members of the Hueng Yee Kuk, who are represented by
/ex officio/ seats on the Regional Council under the system in place,
also have opposed any reform to the current local government
structure.^(22) <#N_22_>

Since the introduction of direct elections to both the district boards
and municipal councils, the local bodies have become an important
training ground for younger politicians. When developing its reform
package for the local bodies, the SAR government should consider the
importance of increasing not only the efficiency of the bodies but also
the opportunity for citizens to be involved with politics at the local
level. Toward this end, the government should return to a system of
fully elected local bodies, regardless of the local government structure
that is ultimately in place.

/Implementation of Article 23/
Implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law represents one important
issue that could face the SAR's first elected LegCo. Article 23 requires
the SAR to enact laws "to prohibit treason, secession, sedition,
subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state
secrets." The article also requires laws "to prohibit foreign political
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities" in the SAR
and "to prohibit political organizations or bodies" from Hong Kong from
"establishing ties" with foreign political groups.^(23) <#N_23_>

Since reversion last July, Hong Kong residents have not experienced any
dramatic infringements on their civil liberties such as the right to
free speech or free assembly. On June 4 of this year, for example, an
estimated 40,000 people freely gathered in a public commemoration of the
1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. The activities of pro-democracy
organizations, including groups that focus on democratic development in
the mainland, have not been restricted.

Nonetheless, recent government-sponsored amendments to pre-reversion
laws have caused concern about the administration's attitude toward
civil liberties. Critics have charged that last year's changes to Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights and several laws governing labor rights have
diminished the legal protection for civil liberties. Although it is
difficult thus far to gauge the effect of these changes, such revisions
increased the concern that the government would seek to restrict civil
rights through the implementation of Article 23.

To its credit, the SAR administration decided last year to postpone the
introduction of legislation implementing Article 23 until after this
year's elections. This will allow for a legislature constituted in
accordance with the Basic Law, rather than the appointed provisional
legislature, to scrutinize the government's bill. Although it was
expected that this would be one of the first issues that the new
legislature would face, the government indicated in June that it does
not have a specific timetable for introducing the legislation and may
not even set forth the bill during the two-year term of the newly
elected LegCo. Elsie Leung, the Secretary for Justice, stated that
although the Basic Law requires the SAR to enact a law implementing
Article 23, she did not see an urgent need for this legislation and that
"the time for submitting the legislation is not bound by the two-year
term for the first SAR legislature."^(24) <#N_24_>

The government's recent decision to further delay the introduction of
this legislation may be an indication that pro-democracy leaders are
able to influence the administration on such issues despite lacking a
majority in the legislature. The democratic camp constitutes less than
one-third of the legislature but has a clear popular mandate based on
the results of the direct elections. If the government did not take into
consideration the views of the democratic camp regarding the
implementation of Article 23, it could not credibly argue that there was
public support for whatever laws it set forth.

Once a bill is proposed, it will challenge "pro-China" and pro-business
legislators to take a position on the issue of civil liberties. During
the campaign period, the DAB did not take a firm stance regarding the
implementation of Article 23. Party leaders said only that it was an
issue that its legislators would address after the elections. As the
number of directly elected seats increases, however, members of the
"pro-China" and pro-business camps may find it necessary to more firmly
support the protection of civil liberties or face difficulty appealing
to the broad public at election time.

/Progress Toward Full Democracy/
Although the Basic Law does not provide for full democracy in the short
term, it does establish a timetable for moving toward the "ultimate aim"
of electing a legislature and a chief executive after a transition
period of about 10 years.^(25) <#N_25_> The Basic Law provides for the
number of directly elected seats in the second LegCo after
reversion--now expected to be elected in 2000--to increase from 20 to 24
of the 60 total. The number of Election Committee seats will be reduced
to six. In the third LegCo--expected to be elected in 2004--the number
of directly elected seats increases again to 30, or half of the total,
and Election Committee seats disappear.

The Basic Law does not specify the number of directly and indirectly
elected seats in LegCo beyond the third elections after reversion. It
does state that after 2007 (10 years after reversion), the method for
forming the legislature is to be determined by a two-thirds majority of
LegCo members with the consent of the chief executive.^(26) <#N_26_>
Thus, even if all 30 directly elected members in the third HKSAR
LegCo--the legislature that will determine the election system in effect
after 2007--vote to extend universal suffrage to the election of the
full legislature, at least 10 functional constituency representatives
will also have to agree. This means, in effect, they will have to be
willing to vote themselves out of office for the promise of
democratization to be fulfilled.

Tung Chee-hwa's current five-year term will expire in 2002. According to
the Basic Law, an 800-member committee will select the next chief
executive at that time.^(27) <#N_27_> Such a committee will presumably
be similar in makeup to the Election Committee that chose 10 legislators
in this year's elections. The government must still draft a law
governing this process. The Basic Law does not specify how the chief
executive will be selected beyond 2002, but sets out elections under
universal suffrage as the "ultimate aim," which leaves open the
possibility--if it does not create the expectation--that the position
could be popularly elected beginning in 2007.^(28) <#N_28_> This, like
the introduction of full democracy in the legislative elections, would
require support of at least two-thirds of the legislature and the chief
executive who is in office at the time.

/Role of Political Parties and the Legislature/
The newly elected LegCo took its seats on July 2, replacing the
provisional legislature that had been appointed upon reversion. Under
the executive-led system of governance in place, however, the new LegCo
has relatively narrow powers and does not form a government. Rather,
like past legislatures, the new LegCo is essentially a monitoring body
that can block or amend government legislation and call on the
administration to defend government policy. Legislators have the power
to introduce private member bills, but not ones that involve public
expenditure, the political structure or the operation of the
government.^(29) <#N_29_>

The limited powers of the legislature and the lack of party politics in
the executive branch limits parties can influence the political process.
The way parties can most readily exercise political influence under the
current structure is to have party legislators attempt to block
government bills in the LegCo.

In the week after the elections, political parties demonstrated a more
aggressive approach. Leaders of the seven parties represented in the
LegCo held a summit to address the SAR's current economic problems and
to articulate counter-proposals to the administration's recovery
package. Parties likely recognize that there is strong public sentiment
for the legislature to be an active watchdog. The criticism that the
provisional legislature received for acting as a "rubber stamp" of
government policies could encourage parties to take a more resolute
stance against the government on many issues in an effort to win public
support.

As the number of directly elected seats in the legislature increases in
the future, the number of party representatives in the body will likely
increase and parties may take on a more important role in the body.
Whereas 16 of the 40 indirectly elected legislators are independents,
only one of the 20 directly elected legislators has no party
affiliation. (See Appendix VIII.)

As parties develop their political strength, the government will need to
build a relationship with at least some parties in the legislature in
order to pass legislation. Moreover, if the chief executive is popularly
elected in the future, party politics will presumably enter the
executive branch. These developments would lead to both an official
government party and functioning opposition parties (that is, parties
opposed to a specific governing party rather than the administration
generally) in the legislature. This would likely both strengthen
political parties and expand the role of the LegCo.

/Attitudes Toward Full Democracy/
The SAR government stated immediately after the elections that it does
not plan to review the pace of democratization, as laid out in the Basic
Law, before the next legislative elections. Michael Suen Ming-yeung, the
Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, stated publicly that "the Basic
Law already lays down a clear road map for the democratic progression in
Hong Kong in the first, the second and the third term of the LegCo up to
2004."^(30) <#N_30_> In a television interview during her visit to the
United States shortly after the elections, Chief Secretary Anson Chan
reiterated that the administration would not address the issue at this
time, remarking that "in 2007, in accordance with that timetable, the
people of Hong Kong can decide for themselves whether to move straight
away to universal suffrage."^(31) <#N_31_>

Chief Executive Tung has also suggested that the administration has not
considered accelerating the timetable for introducing full democracy to
the SAR. During his visit to the United States in September 1997, the
Chief Executive referred to the 10-year timetable and noted that the
Basic Law "says very clearly that at the end of that time we are going
to move into universal suffrage if it is at that time the wish of the
Hong Kong people." He also observed that, although the Basic Law can be
amended to accelerate the process, "we got it about right, a 10-year
process going forward, and looking at ultimately universal
suffrage."^(32) <#N_32_>

When meeting with an NDI delegation in March, Chief Executive Tung
emphasized that the decision on how and when to move to introduce full
democracy is not currently under consideration. Significantly, he was
unwilling to state that the move to a fully elected legislature and
direct election of the chief executive would necessarily take place
within the 10-year period suggested by the Basic Law. Rather he said
that the government, the legislature and the Hong Kong community would
consider the issue in or before 2007. Thus, he suggested, direct
elections of the chief executive and all members of the LegCo could be
more than 10 years away.

Parties in the democratic camp have explicitly supported accelerating
the timetable of introducing full democracy. On July 15, DP legislator
Andrew Cheng Kar-foo introduced a motion for the LegCo to endorse direct
elections of all members in the year 2000 and direct elections for the
office of the chief executive in the year 2002. This measure was
defeated in both divisions of the legislature, by a 15-14 vote among
geographical constituency and election committee representatives, and by
a 20-5 margin among functional constituency representatives.^(33)
<#N_33_> Voting was split along strict party lines. Members of the DP,
the Frontier and the Citizens Party supported the measure, as did
independents Margaret Ng and Andrew Wong. Legislators from the DAB, the
HKPA and the Liberal Party opposed the motion.^(34) <#N_34_>

Whereas the democratic camp has consistently supported introducing full
democracy as soon as possible, the DAB has taken a more cautious stance
toward direct elections, as the July 15 vote indicated. Last year, a DAB
member in the provisional legislature, Cheng Kai-nam, urged a debate on
the issue of amending the Basic Law to speed up the democratization
process, although few members of the appointed body supported that
effort. In a radio broadcast after this year's elections, Tsang Yok-sing
stated that a review of the pace of democratization laid out in the
Basic Law was "well warranted." The DAB chairman added, however, that
the Hong Kong people should bear in mind that the timetable in the Basic
Law is "the result of nearly five years of public consultations and
debate" and that it will be necessary to thoroughly review the
consequences of moving to fully direct elections before making such a
commitment.^(35) <#N_35_> This suggests that in the DAB there is not the
same unequivocal support for reaching full democracy as quickly as
possible as there is among the democratic camp.

Following the elections, a number of Hong Kong newspapers supported an
increased level of democracy for the SAR.^(36) <#N_36_> /Apple Daily/, a
leading Chinese-language paper that has often taken pro-democracy
stances, called for the amendment of the Basic Law to allow for a fully
direct election of the next LegCo in 2000. /The Hong Kong Economic
Journal/, another Chinese-language paper, endorsed greater democracy for
next elections, and the Chinese-language /Oriental Daily News/, though
conceding that the administration may not allow full democracy until
after 2007, called on the government to at least widen the franchise for
the functional constituencies in the next elections. The /South China
Morning Post/, a leading English-language paper, called the election
results and voter turnout "an overwhelming mandate for a review of the
slow pace of democratization in the Basic Law."^(37) <#N_37_>

The Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted a survey after the polls
which revealed that out of more than 600 residents interviewed, more
than half favored amending the Basic Law to allow for a fully direct
election of legislators in the 2000 polls.^(38) <#N_38_> An even larger
percentage, more than 60 percent, thought that direct elections should
be used for the next election of the chief executive. These survey
findings further reinforce the idea that there is growing interest among
the people of Hong Kong to directly choose their political
representatives, an interest that the high turnout in the May elections
has already demonstrated.

As these editorials and opinion surveys suggest, support for universal
suffrage seems widespread in Hong Kong. The high turnout at the May
elections and the clear popular support for pro-democracy candidates add
further weight to this sentiment. If the HKSAR is to live up to the
promise of democratization, it must allow the people of Hong Kong to
directly choose their entire legislature as well as their chief
executive. Only then can residents truly assume the role of "Hong Kong
people ruling Hong Kong."

------------------------------------------------------------------------
*ENDNOTES*

1. For a detailed analysis of the 1998 election framework, see /The
Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong: The New Election Framework/,
NDI Hong Kong Report No. 2, October 23, 1997 (NDI Hong Kong Report No.
2). According to Annex II of the Basic Law, the number of seats elected
by the three types of constituencies will change in the future. In 2000,
the number of seats directly elected from geographical constituencies
will increase from 20 to 24, six seats will be selected by an election
committee, and 30 seats will be elected by functional constituencies. In
2004, the number of seats directly elected by geographical
constituencies will increase again to 30, the number of functional
constituency seats will remain at 30, and the seats chosen by the
election committee will disappear.

2. NDI Hong Kong Report No. 2, p. 2.

3. /Ibid./, pp. 12-13.

4. For a detailed analysis of the election arrangements and pre-election
environment, see /The Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong: The May
24, 1998 Elections, /NDI Hong Kong Report No. 4, May 15, 1998.

5. Furthermore, the Basic Law mandates that the election system will
change again for the second and third LegCo elections, which are
expected to be held in 2000 and 2004. This will likely continue to make
it difficult for the public to understand the complex election system.

6. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (Basic Law), Annex III.

7. Stella Lee, "Voters Swap Poll Stations as Floods Rise," /South China
Morning Post/, May 25, 1998, p. 4.

8. Jimmy Cheung, "Loser Launches Challenge to One-Vote Defeat," /South
China Morning Post/, June 8, 1998.

9. Electoral Affairs Commission, /Guidelines on Election-Related
Activities in Respect of the 1998 Legislative Council Elections/,
February 28, 1998, Chapter 1, Section 127.

10. The voter turnout figures that the EAC released and that have been
generally cited in Hong Kong are based on the total number of registered
voters and not the total number of eligible voters, which is commonly
used to measure voter turnout in other countries.

11. "Zhengshi Xuanmince Gongbu, Duanji Lu Qi Cheng (Final Voter
Registration List Released, Registration Rate at 70 Percent)," /Ming Pao
Daily News/, March 14, 1998, p. A14.

12. Joyce Pang, "Bid to Thwart 'Evil' Pro-Beijing Candidates," /South
China Morning Post/, May 6, 1998.

13. Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, Washington DC, "Hong Kong
Voters Turn Out in Record Numbers," /Hong Kong Circle,/ June 1998, p. 3.

14. Statement by Anson Chan, Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office,
Washington DC, /Hong Kong Circle,/ June 1998, p. 5.

15. No Kwai-yan, "Most Voted out of Duty, Says Survey," /South China
Morning Post/, June 12, 1998.

16. Social Science Research Centre (SSRC), The University of Hong Kong,
"Survey on the Evaluation of the Legislative Council Elections - Reasons
for Voting," June 18, 1998, pp. 2-3.

17. This assumes that each of the five geographical constituencies would
have three times as many seats as they actually did in the 1998
elections (12 seats for Hong Kong Island, 9 each for Kowloon East and
West, and 15 each for New Territories East and West). This exercise
applies the system of proportional representation with the largest
remainder system of allocating seats (the system adopted for the 1998
elections) to actual vote totals received by each party list in the 1998
direct elections. The hypothetical results for each geographical
constituency are set forth in Appendix VI.

18. Chan Kwok-keung, who was elected to represent the labor functional
constituency, joined the party the week after the elections to bring the
total number of DAB legislators to 10.

19. HKSAR Government, /Consultation Document on the Review of District
Organizations/, June 1998, Chapter 6, Section 2.

20. /Ibid./, Chapter 6, Section 14/./

21. /Ibid./, Chapter 6, Section 1.

22. Genevieve Ku, "'Foul Play' Accusations Over Consultative Paper,"
/South China Morning Post/, June 17, 1998.

23. Basic Law, Article 23.

24. May Sin-mi Hon, "Subversion Law 'Will Not Be Rushed'," /South China
Morning Post/, June 30, 1998.

25. Basic Law, Articles 45 and 68.

26. Basic Law, Annex II.

27. Basic Law, Annex I.

28. Basic Law, Article 45.

29. Basic Law, Article 74.

30. "Tung Faces Democracy Clash," /South China Morning Post/, May 26,
1998, p. 1.

31. See "Newsmaker Interview with Anson Chan," a transcript of the Chief
Secretary's June 12, 1998 interview on the Lehrer News Hour, PBS. This
transcript may be available by searching the www.pbs.org Web site.

32. See "Conversation with Tung Chee Hwa," a transcript of the Chief
Executive's September 10, 1997 interview on the Lehrer News Hour, PBS.
This transcript may be available by searching the www.pbs.org Web site.

33. According to Annex II of the Basic Law, the passage of bills,
motions or amendments introduced by a LegCo member requires majority
support of two divisions in the legislature: one division comprising the
30 functional constituency representatives and a second division made up
of the 20 directly elected members and the 10 election committee
representatives. In contrast, bills which the government sets forth need
only a simple majority among all 60 legislators for passage.

34. Agnes Chan and May Tam, "Democracy Camp Loses First LegCo Battle,"
/Hong Kong Standard/, July 16, 1998.

35. "Tsang Says No to Quick Democratization," FBIS transcript of RTHK
Radio 4 broadcast "Letter to Hong Kong," June 7, 1998.

36. C.K. Lau, "Editorials Call for Quicker Reforms," /South China
Morning Post/, May 26, 1998, p. 18.

37. "Lessons of the Poll," /South China Morning Post/, May 26, 1998, p. 18.

38. "Poll Shows 50 Percent Favor Revising Basic Law," FBIS translation
of article in /Apple Daily, /June, 1 1998, p. A4.

39. Each functional constituency elected one member of LegCo, except for
the labor constituency which elected three.

40. Ten of these constituencies had only one candidate contesting the
election: architectural, surveying and planning; commercial I;
commercial II; finance; Heung Yee Kuk (rural councils); import and
export; industrial II; social welfare; textiles and garment; and
tourism. Electors registered in these constituencies did not cast
ballots on election day.

41. Nonprofit neighborhood associations.

42. In 1998, a third labor constituency seat will be added to the two
created in 1991.

43. Included in 1995 as part of primary, production, power and
construction.

44. Included in 1995 as part of financing, insurance, real estate and
business services.

45. Included in 1995 as part of transport and communication.

46. In many functional constituencies, the number of electors registered
decreased between the close of voter registration and election day. Some
individuals registered in a functional constituency gave up their voting
privilege in that constituency to become an elector on the 800-person
Election Committee. In other instances, registered corporate electors
did not designate an Authorized Representative, the individual who would
cast a ballot on behalf of the corporate elector. These registered
corporate electors could not exercise their voting privilege on election
day. The turnout rates above are based on the number of registered
voters on election day.

47. Includes independent candidates and candidates affiliated with
smaller parties or political groupings. These minor parties include the
Atlas Alliance, the Neighborhood and Workers' Service Centre, the New
Territories Alliance and the 123 Democratic Alliance. None of these
groups ran lists in more than one geographical constituency. One group,
the New Territories Alliance, had a relatively strong performance
Territories West constituency. The group won 38,627 votes (6.9 percent)
in that constituency, a better showing than both the ADPL and the
Liberal Party. A total of nine independent candidates ran in the direct
elections.

The National Endowment for Democracy provided funding for the
publication of this report and for NDI's program in Hong Kong.


Copyright © 2000 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(NDI). All rights reserved. Portions of this work may be reproduced
and/or translated for non-commercial purposes provided that NDI is
acknowledged as the source of the material and is sent copies of any
translation.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1717
Massachusets Avenue, 5th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036, Tel.:
202-328-3136, Fax: 202-939-3166