

The New Legal Framework for Elections in Indonesia

A Report of an NDI Assessment Team

February 23, 1999

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to achieve a transition to genuine democracy, Indonesia must establish a new governmental structure and elect a new government with popular legitimacy. The passage on January 28, 1999 of three new laws governing elections, political parties and the structure of legislative bodies is an important step in that process. Legislative elections are scheduled for June 7, 1999. Later in the year, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) will choose Indonesia's next president.

This report reviews important provisions in the new legal framework for elections in Indonesia, describes the election system to be clarified in subsequent regulations, and points out concerns and issues to be addressed. The report also makes recommendations about additional steps necessary to conduct democratic elections. The report is based in part on the findings of a five-member team from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which met with a broad range of Indonesian government officials, political party leaders, nongovernmental organization activists, representatives of the international community and others in Jakarta from January 29 to February 4, 1999.

The New Election Law: A Unique Hybrid

Despite concerns and criticisms, all major political parties and most other significant actors seem prepared to participate in the elections under the current rules. Whatever their defects, the laws provide sufficient basis for elections in which all significant parties and civil society actors will participate.

Enacted following intense political debate and negotiation, the new election law appears to be the result of last-minute political compromises. These compromises resulted in an election system apparently without exact precedent or parallel anywhere else in the world: a unique combination of proportional representation by province with some elements of a district system. But the law itself provides only general principles; details about exactly how the system will work remain to be specified.

Consistent with the system for previous elections in Indonesia, the new election law provides for elections for the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) by proportional representation by province. However, rather than assigning individual seats based on priorities stated in party lists as in the past and as in other proportional representation election systems, the law specifies that the actual winning candidates depend on how the parties performed at the district (regency or municipality) level.

This election system is complex and seems likely to lead to what may seem to be anomalous results across the country. Such anomalies could cause confusion and dissatisfaction after election results are announced. Accordingly, it is essential that political parties, civic groups, the media and the public are made aware of how the system will work.

In its choice of a mixed system, Indonesia follows a worldwide trend. Yet Indonesia has come

up with its own unique compromise between the values of a party list proportional system, which ensures participation of more parties and points of view, and a district system, which fosters the connection between representatives and their constituents. The significant actors in Indonesia appear willing at this point to accept elections governed by this compromise, but that acceptance may evaporate if some are later surprised by the consequences of that system.

Party and Candidate Eligibility

The election law requires a party to demonstrate support in one-third of the country's provinces to be eligible to contest the elections, which seems to run counter to the popular demands for greater regional autonomy. In addition, the law requires that political parties must reach a specified threshold in these elections in order to participate in the next (2004) elections, even though they may take their seats in the 1999 legislatures. Preventing parties from participating in the next election based on their performance in the current one would seem to inhibit their right to express their views at that time. A threshold for the current election, in contrast, would only say that some support has to be demonstrated to achieve representation; it would not bar anyone from participating.

While many provisions in the new laws are encouraging, the election and parties laws also establish ideological requirements for both parties and candidates. They must accept Pancasila as the state ideology, although parties are not required to adopt it as their own founding principle. In addition, they must not be linked to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or other banned organizations. The ban on mere ideological affiliation appears inconsistent with international norms of freedom of expression and association.

Election Administration and Supervision

The election law establishes a new Election Commission, or KPU, which is to be free and independent, to supervise the elections. Both the KPU and the election committees that carry out its policies at all levels are to be composed of representatives of the political parties participating in the election and of the government.

The KPU, however, cannot come into existence until after the parties are qualified for the elections and party representatives are named. The process of determining which parties are eligible is scheduled to be completed on March 4, one month after the law was signed. In the interim, the Minister of Home Affairs has appointed an 11-member advisory committee, popularly known as the "Team of 11," to determine which political parties are eligible to compete in the elections and to prepare guidelines and regulations for approval by the KPU.

The election law also provides for quasi-judicial overseer committees at all levels, and for party witnesses and domestic and international observers to be present at the polling stations. However, the law lacks details, and thus the relationships among all these oversight and monitoring bodies, and between them and the KPU and the election committees remain to be specified in further regulations.

The Role of the Military

The legislatures law continues to reserve seats for the military (ABRI) in the legislative branch at all levels. Many have criticized the new legal framework for failing to eliminate the seats for ABRI in the legislatures. At the same time, many share the expectation that the provision is a transitional one and that ABRI seats will be eliminated in the future.

Formation of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)

The MPR, whose main task is to choose the president every five years, includes representatives not chosen through a democratic process. The 700-member MPR is composed of the 500 members of the DPR (including the 38 military representatives), 135 representatives chosen by the provincial assemblies and 65 representatives of functional groups. In addition to the participation of the military, the existence of functional seats in the MPR gives certain, as yet unidentified elite-based groups substantial say in the choice of the president. Each member of one of these favored groups gets a second, more influential vote in choosing representatives for the MPR and thus in the indirect election of the president.

Selection of the President

The MPR does not have clear rules for the selection of a president in the event that consensus is lacking. No procedure is specified if no candidate has the support of a majority of the MPR’s 700 members. There does appear to be consensus that a majority of the MPR would be required, but there are no rules about how that majority is to be ascertained in the event that there are several candidates with significant support. Accordingly, if there is significant polarization and no candidate has a majority, there is the potential that the process of selecting a president could break down and/or exacerbate tensions.

Recommendations

The report also offers recommendations regarding election regulations; transparency, outreach and voter education; election observation; training of local election committee members; the independence and credibility of the Election Commission; the resolution of complaints; and access to media and news coverage of the campaign.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The NDI Assessment Mission	1
II. THE NEW ELECTION SYSTEM AS A BASIS FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS ..	2
Allocation of Seats under the New Election System	3
Implications of the New Election System	5
Party and Candidate Eligibility	6
Administration and Supervision of Elections	7
Overseeing, Monitoring and Observing the Elections	9
The Role of the Military	10
Formation of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)	10
Selection of the President by the MPR	11
III. RECOMMENDATIONS	11
APPENDIX I	13
TABLES	16
APPENDIX II	24

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to achieve a transition to genuine democracy, Indonesia must establish a new governmental structure and elect a new government with popular legitimacy. After the fall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998, Indonesian political and civic leaders and governmental officials began the process of developing a new political order, including a legal framework for early national elections to be held under democratic rules. On January 28, 1999, the existing parliament – which had been elected in May 1997 under the rules of Soeharto’s New Order – enacted new laws governing elections, political parties and the structure of legislative bodies. President B.J. Habibie signed these bills into law on February 1, 1999.

On June 7, 1999, more than 125 million Indonesians are scheduled to go to the polls to elect 462 of the 500 members of a new national parliament or People’s Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or DPR). The remaining 38 seats will be appointed from the Indonesia armed forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or ABRI). (Law on the Composition and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD, the “Legislatures Law,” Article 11.) Elections will be held simultaneously for the provincial assemblies (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I* or DPRD I) and the district assemblies (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II* or DPRD II). The 500 members of parliament will join with 135 representatives chosen by the provincial assemblies (five from each of the country’s 27 provinces) and 65 representatives of functional groups to form the 700-member People’s Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR). Sometime later in the year, currently expected to be in November, the MPR will meet to choose Indonesia’s next president.

This report reviews important provisions in the new legal framework for elections in Indonesia, describes the election system to be clarified in subsequent regulations, and points out concerns and issues to be addressed. The report also makes recommendations about additional steps necessary to conduct democratic elections.¹

The NDI Assessment Mission

From January 29 to February 4, 1999, a five-member team from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducted a program to assess the new legal framework for elections and to make recommendations about other steps necessary to ensure open, democratic polls. The team met with a broad range of Indonesian government officials, political party leaders, nongovernmental organization activists, representatives of the international community and others.

The NDI team included Andrew Ellis, a British expert on election systems in transition environments based in Brussels; Kamal Hossain, senior advocate and former foreign minister from

¹ NDI acknowledges in particular the substantial contribution of Andrew Ellis to the analysis in this paper and in Appendix I and the accompanying tables. While this report is based on the findings of the assessment team, NDI alone is responsible for the views expressed and for any errors herein.

Bangladesh; Donald Horowitz, professor of law and political science from Duke University in the United States; Eric Bjornlund, NDI senior associate and director of Asia programs, currently based in Jakarta; and Blair King, NDI program officer and an expert on Indonesian politics, also based in Jakarta. All members of the team had participated in previous political development programs in Indonesia within recent months. (For biographical information, see Appendix II.)

II. THE NEW ELECTION SYSTEM AS A BASIS FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

After Soeharto's resignation, Indonesians quickly came to a consensus on the need to establish new legitimacy for the country's governing structures. Notwithstanding that many believed that President Habibie had come to office in accordance with the process outlined in the Indonesian constitution and that the existing DPR still had four years remaining in its term, there was broad consensus on the need for early elections under new, reformed rules. Nevertheless, it was that same parliament and the pre-existing political establishment that had responsibility for developing and enacting the new system.

Broader sectors of society have charged that DPR committees carried out this process largely behind closed doors, with little input from outside the legislature. These charges have been leveled particularly by students, many of the new parties, and academics and intellectuals, all of whom had hoped to provide more input throughout the process. These groups saw such public hearings as were held as primarily window dressing. The major source of external input for the DPR committees seems to have been the team of professionals (popularly known as the "Team of Seven"), working under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs, that had prepared the original drafts of the political laws. The DPR evidently consulted the Team of Seven throughout the debate on these laws.

In such circumstances, for new elections to achieve the desired legitimacy, political and civic leaders outside the formal governmental structures must have confidence in the new rules. In the absence of their involvement in the process of developing the new legal framework and new system, such confidence cannot be presumed.

Despite concerns and criticisms, however, all major political parties and most other significant actors seem prepared to participate in elections on June 7 under the current rules. Whatever their defects, the laws provide sufficient basis for elections in which all significant parties and civil society actors will participate. Although some student factions continue to demand an interim government and further changes, no significant political forces appear at this point to be threatening a boycott or urging outright rejection of the process. In the words of one prominent opposition leader, "The law is enough. It [now] depends on us."

Enacted following intense political debate and negotiation, the new election law appears to be the result of last-minute political compromises. These compromises resulted in an election system apparently without exact precedent or parallel anywhere else in the world: a unique combination of proportional representation by province with some elements of a district system. But the law itself

provides only general principles; details about exactly how the system will work remain to be specified.

The election law leaves open critical decisions about how the new, complex system will work. **The law is not in itself specific enough to determine, given the number of votes cast for each party in each province and district (regency or municipality),² either (1) how many seats are allocated to each party, or, (2) once this number of seats has been determined, precisely which candidates of the party will fill those seats.**

The resolution of this issue is not a purely technical question. The acceptance of the election results by the participants and by Indonesian society in general depends on the existence of clear rules that are known and published in advance, understood to be impartial and in line with international standards, and seen to be fairly and transparently applied. Detailed regulations consistent with the law must be drawn up, approved by the new Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or KPU) and disseminated. Moreover, the issues underlying these regulations, as many involved in their development well understand, will be intensely political.³

Allocation of Seats under the New Election System

Consistent with the system for previous elections in Indonesia, the new election law provides for elections for the DPR by proportional representation by province. (Law on General Elections, the “Election Law,” Article 67.) That is, there will be separate elections in each of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, and seats will be allocated to parties in proportion to the parties’ overall votes in each province. This is the overriding principle that governs these elections.

Rather than assigning individual seats based on priorities stated in party lists as in the past and as in other proportional representation election systems, the law specifies that the actual winners will be determined “with consideration to the largest votes obtained by that particular political party in the districts.” (Election Law, Article 68.) In other words, which candidates are actually elected to the seats earned by the parties on a provincial basis depends on how the parties performed at the district level.

² Within each province, Indonesia is divided for administrative purposes into regencies (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kotamadya*). This report uses the term “district” to refer to both regencies and municipalities.

³ Controversy surrounding the July 1998 elections in Cambodia illustrates why this is so important. Before those elections, authorities changed the details of the formula for seat allocation, but did not draw the attention of parties and observers to the change. As a result, immediately after polling day there were two different projections of the number of seats each party had won. The treatment of the electoral system and the determination of the results as a purely technical and internal matter contributed significantly to the unwillingness of the parties disadvantaged by the change to accept the integrity and fairness of the election results.

The rules on how seats will actually be distributed to particular candidates within the total number earned by a party have not yet been specified. Interviews with key government officials and advisors, however, have clarified how the process is expected to work. The details that follow will be spelled out in regulations to be promulgated by the KPU. Because those regulations have yet to be enacted, the system described here is obviously subject to change. The proposed system and other alternatives consistent with the law are considered in detail in Appendix I.

Under the proposed system, each party will assign its candidates to individual districts. Voters will cast ballots for a party, rather than a candidate. Ballots will include only the name and logos of the eligible parties. But at the same time, the lists of which candidates have been assigned by the parties to given districts will be made public and will be posted at the polling stations. Although candidates will be matched to districts, there are no provincial or district residency requirements.

Seats will be allocated by proportional representation, but the law itself does not specify the allocation system. It is expected that the regulations will adopt a version of the “highest remainder” system. (See Appendix I, Table I.) This system of allocating seats is the one that has been used in Indonesia in the past and is one of several standard methods of determining seat allocation under proportional representation.

After establishing the principle that seats are allocated by party on a proportional basis by province (Article 67) and that consideration is taken of how the party has performed in each district (regency or municipality) (Article 68), the election law includes the following article, apparently to address the question of how the proportional system will work:

- (1) The remaining votes to determine membership in the DPR are used up in counting at the provincial level to divide the remaining seats.
- (2) The determination of the elected candidates to fill the above-mentioned remaining seats is made by the national leadership of the relevant political party.

(Election Law, Article 69.) This article is vague and poorly worded, but is apparently intended to refer to the allocation of seats after all full quotas have been established. Many seats are likely to be filled by candidates of parties that have not achieved such full quotas (the number of votes cast in the province divided by the number of seats plus one). If the provision is read to mean that seats without quota are entirely in the hands of party leadership, then it returns significant power to the center, particularly for smaller parties that may earn most or all of their seats from gaining the highest remainders of votes rather than full quotas. See Appendix I, Tables II (Version 2) and III (Version 2).

Once the number of seats for each party has been determined, each party’s seats are filled by the individual candidates assigned to the districts where that party fared best. Because the population of each district varies widely, the system must specify whether a given party’s best performances are to be determined as the districts in which the party gained the largest absolute numbers of votes or the districts in which it gained its highest percentages. Performance seems likely to be defined in

percentage terms, although the regulations could also define best performance in terms of total number of votes.⁴

Elections will also be held at the same time and under similar rules for the provincial and district assemblies.

Implications of the New Election System

The new election system fully respects the principle that party seats are allocated by proportional representation, and every party will gain the number of seats in each province to which it is entitled in accordance with an internationally recognized system of allocating seats by proportional representation. But the actual candidates who will fill those seats, and thus be elected, will be those that performed the best within their party at the district level.

Accordingly, the system seems likely to lead to what may seem to be anomalous results, as the examples in Appendix I illustrate. First, the elected candidates will not necessarily be those from the parties that have received the largest number of votes in a given district. Second, the system does not ensure that there will be a representative from each district.⁵ Indeed, both results seem likely to occur in at least some places in each province. That is, there will be districts where the candidate from the party with the most votes will not be elected – simply because the party has performed better elsewhere and thus has filled the seats it has earned in the province – and there will be districts with no representatives. While these results may appear strange and, without appropriate explanation in advance, would undoubtedly be surprising to candidates adversely affected, they are consequences of the particular hybrid system established by the law. Such results would be fully consistent with the principles established in the law.

Such anomalies could cause confusion and dissatisfaction after election results are announced. Accordingly, it is essential that political parties, civic groups, the media and the public are made aware of how the system will work. It is incumbent on the KPU, the government and others interested in successful elections and in acceptance of the results to explain this complicated system and its political consequences.

In its choice of a mixed system, Indonesia follows a worldwide trend. Yet Indonesia has come up with its own unique compromise between the values of a party list proportional system, which ensures participation of more parties and points of view, and a district system, which fosters the

⁴ Choosing the candidates in order of performance in percentage terms seems to provide a slight bias in favor of candidates from smaller districts, which might typically be found in more rural areas. See Appendix I and Table IV.

⁵ Because the election is for parties at the provincial level, not for individual candidates, technically there are not representatives from any district. But the system does require that the parties assign candidates to districts.

connection between representatives and their constituents. The significant actors in Indonesia appear willing at this point to accept elections governed by this compromise, but that acceptance may evaporate if some are later surprised by the consequences of that system.

Party and Candidate Eligibility

To be eligible to compete in the 1999 elections for the DPR, a party must have established party organizations in at least one-third (nine) of Indonesia's 27 provinces and in at least one half of the regencies/municipalities within those nine provinces. (Election Law, Article 82.)⁶ Once a party has qualified under these rules, it is eligible to run candidates anywhere in the country. (Election Law, Article 41.)

Former President Soeharto's New Order regime was highly centralized, both politically and economically. In recent years, the government had begun an effort to devolve revenue control and decision-making to the districts, bypassing the provinces. Demands for greater regional autonomy have escalated since May 1998, and the national government seems willing to meet some of these demands. A new draft law on regional government is currently being debated in the DPR.

The party eligibility criteria run counter to this trend because they in effect are a requirement that parties have national constituencies.⁷ Thus, parties will almost inevitably be run out of Jakarta. Smaller, regionally based parties, which cannot establish leaderships in at least nine provinces, will not be eligible to contest the elections, even if they represent significant political forces in those regions.

The election law provides that candidates must meet certain minimum requirements. A candidate must, among other things, be "loyal to Pancasila"⁸ and not be a member of the Communist Party or other banned organization. (Election Law, Article 43.) Similarly, the party law requires that a party must acknowledge in its charter that Pancasila is the state ideology of Indonesia and that the party's "principles or characteristics, aspirations and programs do not contradict Pancasila." (Political Parties Law, Article 2.) The party law also provides that the party's establishment "may not endanger national unity and integrity" (Article 3) and that a party cannot "follow, develop, or spread tenets or concepts of Communism/Marxism/Leninism and other tenets contradicting Pancasila." (Article

⁶ For the 2004 and subsequent elections, this requirement is raised to at least one-half (14) of the country's provinces and at least one-half of the districts. (Election Law, Article 39.)

⁷ Given the nine-province rule, parties must have party organizations on more than one of Indonesia's islands. Sumatra, the island with the single largest number of provinces, has only eight. Java, with approximately 60 percent of the country's population, has only five provinces.

⁸ Pancasila is the five-point state ideology originally developed by Sukarno that is included in the preamble to the 1945 constitution. It consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, consultative/representative democracy and social justice.

16.) The ban on mere ideological affiliation appears inconsistent with international norms of freedom of expression and association.

The law further requires that political parties must reach a specified threshold in these elections in order to participate in the next (2004) elections, even though they may take their seats in the 1999 DPR and DPRD. Specifically, a party must gain 2 percent of the seats in the DPR (10 seats) – or 3 percent of the seats in the provincial and district assemblies distributed in half of the provinces and half of the districts in Indonesia – to be eligible to run in the future. Parties that fail to meet this threshold must merge with other parties to be eligible to run in the next elections. (Election Law, Article 39.)

Preventing parties from participating in the next election based on their performance in the current one would seem to inhibit their right to express their views at that time. To prevent a party from appearing on the ballot based solely on performance in previous elections, without an opportunity to demonstrate its present strength, would seem to deny citizens their right to support a party advocating a particular point of view. A threshold for the current election, in contrast, would only say that some support has to be demonstrated to achieve representation; it would not bar anyone from participating.

A number of provisions in the parties law are encouraging. Parties are to be “independent,” controlled only by their members. (Parties Law, Article 1.) Even though parties must acknowledge Pancasila as the state ideology, a party need not adopt Pancasila as its own party ideology. (Article 2.) This clause especially accommodates the demands of some parties to be allowed to adopt Islam as their founding principle. Parties are nonprofit organizations, which cannot establish or own shares in for-profit firms. (Article 13.) The law requires parties to report their finances to the Supreme Court, and these reports can be audited. (Article 15.)

Administration and Supervision of Elections

The election law establishes a new Election Commission, or KPU, which is to be “free and independent,” to supervise the elections. (Election Law, Article 8.) The government appoints five members of the KPU, and each party eligible to compete in the elections can name one member. The party-appointed members, taken together, have votes equal to that of the government-appointed members. (Election Law, Article 9.) The KPU, however, cannot come into existence until after the parties are qualified for the elections and party representatives are named. The process of determining which parties are eligible is scheduled to be completed on March 4, one month after the law was signed.

In the interim, the Minister of Home Affairs has appointed an 11-member advisory committee, the Election Commission Formation Preparation Committee (*Panitia Persiapan Pembentukan Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or P3KPU), composed of prominent leaders of civil society and professionals involved in preparing the legal framework for the elections. The “Team of 11” (*Tim Sebelas*), as it is popularly known, is charged with responsibility to determine which political parties have met the

requirements under the law for eligibility to compete in the elections and to prepare guidelines and regulations for approval by the KPU.⁹

The Team of 11 must determine whether parties have met the requirement that they have established themselves in nine provinces. First, parties must file applications with the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry verifies that certain technical and administrative requirements have been met. Then the parties' applications are referred to the Team of 11 to undertake "factual verification" that the parties have established the required branches around the country. Beginning in mid-February, and continuing until the beginning of March, team members will carry out a series of field visits throughout the country to verify the existence of required party structures at the provincial and district levels.

The Team of 11 is also charged with the responsibility to prepare draft guidelines and regulations to implement the election law and govern administration of the process. Because there will be only about three months from the formation of the KPU until election day, it is essential that regulations have been prepared and are ready for adoption as soon as the KPU is constituted.

The Team of 11 has established three subcommittees: one for verification of the eligibility of parties, one to prepare election guidelines and regulations, and one to act as liaison with parties, civic organizations and others. The Team is working out of the office of the old Election Institute (*Lembaga Pemilihan Umum* or LPU).

The Team of 11 has no legal authority and thus formally makes its recommendations to the Minister of Home Affairs and/or the LPU. Proposed guidelines and regulations must be enacted by the new KPU. But the Team appears to have broad support among political, civic and governmental leaders in Indonesia. At the same time, some smaller parties – i.e. those parties more concerned about their ability to meet the criteria – have questioned the legitimacy of the Team to decide their eligibility to contest the 1999 elections.

⁹ The members of the Team of 11 are Nurcholish Madjid (chairman), a leading Muslim intellectual; Adi Andojo Soetjipto (vice chairman), a former Supreme Court Justice; Miriam Budiardjo, senior political scientist from the University of Indonesia and former vice chair of the National Commission on Human Rights; Eep Saefulloh Fatah, political scientist from the University of Indonesia; Afan Gaffar, political scientist from Gadjah Mada University and a member of the Team of Seven; Mulyana Kusumah, human rights lawyer and co-founder and secretary general of the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP); Andi Mallarangeng (secretary), political scientist from Hasanuddin University and a member of the Team of Seven; Adnan Buyung Nasution, prominent human rights lawyer and founder of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI); Rama Pratama, former chair of the University of Indonesia student senate and a leading figure in the 1998 student movement; Kastorius Sinaga, sociologist from the University of Indonesia and an NGO activist; and Anas Urbaningrum, chairman of the Islamic Students' Association (HMI) and a member of the Team of Seven.

Below the KPU, the election law provides that the bodies responsible for election administration at each level of the process consist of “representatives of political parties participating in the election and of the government,” including at the levels of the nation (Article 12), province (Article 14), district (Article 16), sub-district (*kecamatan*) (Article 18), and village (*desa*) or neighborhood (*kelurahan*) (Article 21). The bodies responsible for running polling stations are to be made up of “representatives of contesting parties and/or community (*masyarakat*) representatives.” (Article 23). The law does not appear to give each party a separate right to sit on each election committee.

Overseeing, Monitoring and Observing the Elections

The election law stipulates that Overseer Committees (*Panitia Pengawas* or *Panwas*) are to be established at the national, provincial, district and sub-district levels by the Supreme Court and the provincial and district courts. (Election Law, Article 24.) These committees have three duties: (1) “to oversee all phases of the conduct of the election,” (2) “to settle disputes that arise in the conduct of the election,” and (3) “to follow up findings and disputes that cannot be resolved by reporting to the proper legal authorities.” (Election Law, Article 26.) Nonetheless, the details of the relationships between the Panwas, on the one hand, and the KPU and implementation committees, on the other, “will be further regulated by the Supreme Court, in consultation with the KPU.” (Election Law, Article 25.)

The election law also permits each party to have a witness present at each polling station, and it is important that the parties organize themselves to recruit and train such observers to take advantage of this right. (Election Law, Article 23.) These witnesses have the right to lodge protests during the vote count at all levels, and such protests must be dealt with “immediately.” (Election Law, Articles 56, 58-62). However, these protests “cannot hamper the conduct of the election.” (Election Law, Article 63.)

The law also permits nonparty domestic and foreign observers to “undertake monitoring of the conduct of the election by registering with the KPU,” (Election Law, Article 27), although it does not specify details. The KPU is thus charged with responsibility for regulating these observers. The regulations should make clear that observers have access to the entire election process: registration, campaigning, polling, counting, tabulation, complaints and appeals. The regulations should also establish fair, reasonable and workable criteria for accrediting election monitoring organizations.

The Role of the Military

The new legislatures law provides that ABRI will appoint 38 representatives to the parliament or DPR (Legislatures Law, Article 11) and 10 percent of the seats in the provincial and district legislatures (Articles 18 and 25). In the previous system, there were 75 seats reserved for the military in the DPR, and 20 percent of the seats in the DPRDs.

The reservation of seats for the military in the legislative branch is inherently undemocratic, among other reasons because the military representatives are not elected. Moreover, the military's participation in parliament creates serious conceptual difficulties and potential conflicts of interest. By participating in politics in this way, the military seems to become, in effect, another faction or interest group, rather than an institution that acts on behalf of the entire country. And it would seem untenable for the military to act in parliament as an opposition.

Many have criticized the new legal framework for failing to eliminate the seats for ABRI in the legislatures. At the same time, many share the expectation that the provision is a transitional one and that ABRI seats will be eliminated in the future.

Formation of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)

As noted above, the 700-member People's Consultative Assembly, or MPR, is composed of the 500 members of the DPR (including the military representatives), 135 representatives chosen by the provincial assemblies (five from each of the country's 27 provinces) and 65 representatives of functional groups.

It remains unclear how representatives of the functional groups will be chosen in 1999 for the next MPR. In the past, this segment of the MPR has included representatives from such groups as labor, professional associations, the press, academia, religious communities, teachers and youth. The new election law states only (1) that the new Election Commission or KPU will determine which groups are eligible and the number of representatives to which each such group is entitled, and (2) that each group "proposes" its own representatives, who are then officially "appointed" by the KPU and "administratively formalized" by the president. (Election Law, Article 81.) In 2004, the DPR takes over the KPU's role, and the president apparently no longer has any role in filling these seats. (Legislatures Law, Article 2.)

The existence of functional seats in the MPR gives certain, as yet unidentified elite-based groups substantial say in the choice of the president. Each member of one of these favored groups gets a second, more influential vote in choosing representatives for the MPR and thus in the indirect election of the president.

Selection of the President by the MPR

The People's Consultative Assembly or MPR does not have clear rules for the selection of a president in the event that consensus is lacking. No procedure is specified if no candidate has the support of a majority of the MPR's 700 members.¹⁰ There does appear to be consensus that a

¹⁰ The constitution even seems unclear about whether it is a majority of the MPR that is required. The constitution requires that the president be elected with the vote of a *suara terbanyak*. In modern usage the term is understood to mean "plurality," or the most votes

majority of the MPR would be required, but there are no rules about how that majority is to be ascertained in the event that there are several candidates with significant support.

Accordingly, if there is significant polarization and no candidate has a majority, there is the potential that the process of selecting a president could break down and/or exacerbate tensions. On the other hand, if the MPR successfully establishes majority support for one candidate, notwithstanding multiple candidates with significant support, the precedent might be codified into future procedures.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Government officials, election advisers, political party leaders, civic activists and others across the political spectrum in Indonesia have emphasized the importance of upcoming elections. In light of this widespread commitment to democratic elections and in the spirit of international cooperation, NDI offers the following recommendations:

- *Clear Regulations.* Because the election law is vague and establishes a complicated hybrid system of proportional representation, it is essential that the details of the election system are clearly established in regulations governing the election process that have yet to be promulgated. The rules should be clearly set out, published, widely explained and not changed. The compromise election system is likely to lead to anomalous results in some districts, and thus to avoid controversy after the elections all parties should understand the system before election day and the subsequent announcement of the results.
- *Transparency, Outreach and Voter Education.* The KPU and government officials responsible for aspects of election administration should endeavor to explain the election regulations and their own procedures and policies to appropriate representatives of political parties, nongovernmental organizations, the media and the public. The KPU and the government should welcome comments and input from such sources. Voter education – to explain the complicated system to the larger public – is essential.
- *Observation.* The regulations should make clear that observers have access to the entire election process: registration, campaigning, polling, counting, tabulation, complaints and appeals. The regulations should establish fair, reasonable and workable criteria for accrediting election monitoring organizations.
- *Training.* The new law also establishes that local level election committees will include party and community representatives, rather than government officials. Training of the members of these bodies will present a significant challenge to election authorities.

whether or not a majority. Some scholars suggest, however, that in 1945 this term was understood to mean a “majority,” or 50 percent plus one.

- *Independence and Credibility of the KPU.* The credibility of the KPU is critical to public confidence in the elections, and thus it is important that the appointees on the commission named by the government have reputations for impartiality and professionalism. In order to maintain continuity, preserve institutional memory and ensure credibility, the government should consider drawing its appointees to the permanent KPU from the members of the Team of 11.
- *Resolution of Complaints.* Relationships between administrative bodies, *Panwas* (oversight committees) and the legal system are unclear and should be clarified in regulations. Hearings on election-related complaints should be open, and complaints should be resolved expeditiously and with due process.
- *Access to Media and News Coverage of the Campaign.* There seems to be substantial and relatively widespread confidence in the media. No rules on access of parties to radio and television for campaign messages have been established, however. Regulations should establish a fair system of access to publicly owned media. News and public affairs coverage should be fair and even-handed and should be monitored by appropriate groups.

APPENDIX I

Electoral System of Indonesia: Votes, Seats and Party/Candidate Relationships

This note considers some implications of the new, hybrid election system in Indonesia by providing some mathematical examples. More specifically, it considers the implications of the detailed system expected to be proposed to and adopted by the KPU as well as the effects of various other ways in which the principles established in the law could theoretically be implemented.

In seeking to devise a system in which the identity of the elected candidates of each party is linked to the best performances of the party in individual districts, in accordance with Article 68 of the new election law, Indonesia appears to be breaking new ground. The motivations for this “embryonic district system” are well understood: both the desire to develop some form of linkage between representatives and their districts, and the wish to take power from central party machines to electors at the local level. But because strict proportionality and district linkage are to some extent incompatible aims, there is a significant possibility that some of the results will be surprising.

Given the politically sensitive environment in which the results of these elections will be announced and the critical need for broad acceptance of those results, the exact system must be explained to and well understood by parties and candidates, domestic observers and other interested parties in the wider Indonesian community.

PR at Provincial Level: How Many Seats for each Party?

The first issue the system must address (and which must be expressed in the regulations) is how many seats are allocated to each party. While Article 67 of the election law provides for proportional representation at the provincial level, there are a number of different methods for allocating seats that would be consistent with this provision. Some examples of these methods are shown in Table I.

NDI understands that Indonesian authorities intend to use the “largest remainder method” with an “n+1 quota,” which is a well-established international standard for which procedures exist. (See Table I, Version A.2.) These procedures can easily be written as draft regulations and adopted by the KPU.

Which Candidates are Elected from a Given Party?

Once it is determined how many seats each party has won, the next question is to identify which individual candidates have won those seats. This issue is much less straightforward than the determination of how many seats the party has gained. The system seeks to link the identity of each party’s elected candidates to the best performances of the party in individual districts (regencies or municipalities).

Table II demonstrates the anomalous outcomes that might result from various ways of implementing the principles established by the law. The table is based on a hypothetical situation in which three parties compete in a province that contains five seats and five districts of equal size. Party A wins 40 percent of the vote, Party B wins 40 percent, and Party C wins 20 percent. They will therefore qualify (under any proportional allocation system) for 2 seats, 2 seats and 1 seat, respectively. Each party has one candidate attached to each district.

Version 1: Best Individual Performance (System reportedly planned for Indonesia)

Interpreting Article 68 as seeking the best individual performances of each party, Indonesian authorities currently plan to use the system shown in Version 1. In this system five candidates are declared elected, but these include candidates who had been assigned by their parties to only four of the five districts. No candidate from the other district (District 3) is elected. It needs to be very clear to the electorate of District 3 that the election is determined at the provincial level, not at the district level.

In addition, in this example, the elected candidates attached to District 5, the district from which two are elected, represent the parties that came in second and third in that district! It needs to be made clear to the Party A candidate in District 5 that Party A would have had to win at least four of the five seats in the province for him or her to fill one of those seats.

Districts where the vote is more evenly split among the parties are less likely to have an attached candidate (a candidate assigned by the party to that district) elected than districts where the vote for one party is strong.

Version 2: Best Individual Performance plus Plurality

Table II also shows two other variants that may be compatible with Article 68 (and Article 69). In Version 2, only those candidates whose parties are also plurality winners in their districts are declared elected, with the remainder filled by the national party leaderships. Thus, only Party A candidates in Districts 1 and 4 and the Party B candidate in District 2 are elected, because their parties won pluralities at the district level.

The effect of limiting the district association to those parties who also won pluralities would be to return a degree of power to the central party organisations. This effect looks likely to be more marked for smaller parties.

Version 3: Ensuring a Representative from Every District

Version 3 ensures that there is an elected candidate from every district. It does so by ranking the party performances in one combined list, rather than considering each party separately. It requires authorities to determine in advance the number of seats to be held by each district; they cannot be retained “at large” as they can, and as is proposed, in Version 1.¹¹ The

¹¹ Under the expected plan in Indonesia, authorities need not assign a set number of seats to each district. Rather seats will be held at large by each province. Parties may

representation of each district may, however, be achieved at the expense of rewarding good (or even adequate) individual party performances. In particular, the fact that the last seat to be allocated will always go to the party that remains one seat short of its provincial total can produce the result that a very poor performance by a party in a district can be rewarded with the attached candidate getting a seat.

Table III: Same Alternatives in Larger Districts

Table III demonstrates the same possible effects in an example with six parties competing in eight districts under the same conditions.

Expected System in Indonesia

As indicated above, the KPU is currently expected to adopt Version 1, where seats earned at the provincial level are assigned to the best performances of each party at the district level regardless whether they have achieved pluralities or not. Thus, it is likely that there will be districts where the attached candidates who are elected are from parties that did not receive pluralities in those districts and that there will be districts with no representatives.

Best Percentage or Highest Total Vote?

Since the districts within Indonesia's provinces are of different sizes, the system must also determine whether to consider that a party's best performances are (i) those places it received the largest number of votes, or (ii) those places where it received the highest percentages of the votes. It is expected that the KPU will choose the latter method.

Table IV illustrates the effect of this choice. The five districts here have electorates in the ratio 4:2:2:1:1. There is a big difference between the two methods: of the five candidates who are elected under the first alternative, only one is also elected under the second.

Under the highest total vote method, it is very unlikely that there will be a representative attached to any smaller district. Note in the example that the candidate attached to a district in which a party polls 71 percent of the vote is not elected. The link between districts and representatives will be confined to larger districts.

Under the percentage method, links are more likely to exist where a district of any size is a particular stronghold of one or more parties.

More Seats than Districts in a Province

These questions become even more complex – and pose significant challenges to the drafting of regulations – where there are more seats than districts in a given province. The questions to be determined appear to be:

determine how many candidates they wish to assign to each district. This effect is not shown directly in the example, which assumes that each party runs one candidate in each district.

- a. Should the seats for a province remain “at large,” or should they be assigned to individual districts in accordance with population?¹²
- b. Should a party be able to elect more than one representative attached to any particular district?

The proposal currently under consideration by election authorities has “at large” seats and provides that a party may nominate more than one candidate for any district. When a party vote is high enough to qualify for a seat in a given district, seats are then allocated to as many candidates as the party has nominated. If there is no restriction on the number, the proposed system will return power to central party organizations to determine the prioritization of their lists as long as they can correctly predict in which district they will poll best. This effect would be substantially less pronounced if the party were limited to, say, two candidates for each district. The lower this limit, the more districts will have attached representatives.¹³

Alternatively, the regulations could fix the number of seats for each district.¹⁴ This system is illustrated in Table V.

TABLES

Tables I through V provide examples to illustrate some of the issues that may arise in the preparation of regulations to implement the principles established in the new election law. These tables are constructed to make the points as clearly as possible. They are based on scenarios that are as realistic as possible, given the need to show each effect in isolation. They are, however, only illustrative examples. A full mathematical analysis of the underlying issues is beyond the scope of this report.

¹² Allowance must also be made to take into account the political consensus that seats should be divided more or less evenly between Java and Bali on the one hand and the rest of the country on the other.

¹³ The election law specifies that parties can nominate candidates up to twice the number of seats in a given electoral region (province for DPR and DPRD I, district for DPRD II). (Article 41.) Thus, it is expected, although not legally required, that parties will assign a maximum of two candidates to each electoral subregion (district for DPR and DPRD I, sub-district for DPRD II).

¹⁴ The assignment of seats to districts would work with either Version 1 (the version expected to be adopted by the KPU) or Version 2 and would be essential for Version 3.

Table I

PR at Provincial Level: Recognised Methods of Seat Allocation

The current intention is to use largest remainder with 'n+1' quota, which is a standard and recognised method. Procedures for this method should be adopted as regulations and published as early as possible.

Assumptions: A
Province with Five
Seats and three
parties winning
percentages (A 51%,
B 33% and C 16%)

Total % of Vote Won in Province per Party			Number of Seats Awarded		
A	B	C	A	B	C

A. Largest Remainder (two variations)

1. 'n' quota,
 $100/5 = 20$:

Full quotas	40.0	20.0		2	1	
Remainder	11.0	13.0	16.0			
Seats from largest remainders					1	1
Result				2	2	1

2. 'n+1'
quota, $100/6$
 $+0.01 =$
 16.67 :
(method currently planned in Indonesia)

Full quotas	50.0	16.7		3	1	
Remainder	0.99	16.3	16.0			
Seats from largest remainders					1	
Result				3	2	0

B. Highest Average

1. D'Hondt
divisors, 1, 2,
3...

Steps						
1	51.0	33.0	16.0	1		
2	25.5	33.0	16.0		1	
3	25.5	16.5	16.0	1		
4	17.0	16.5	16.0	1		
5	12.8	16.5	16.0		1	
Result				3	2	0

2.
Sainte-Laguë
divisors,
1,3,5...

Steps						
1	51.0	33.0	16.0	1		
2	17.0	33.0	16.0		1	
3	17.0	11.0	16.0	1		
4	10.2	11.0	16.0			1
5	10.2	11.0	5.3		1	
Result				2	2	1

Table II

Successful Candidates

Comparison of: Complete District Linkage and Best Party Performances

Winners shaded: (plurality winners shown in italics)

Assumptions:

- Province with five districts, each with one seat, all of identical electorate
- Uniform turnout assumed as:

		Party			
		A	B	C	Total
District					
	1	51	26	23	100
	2	7	71	22	100
	3	44	36	20	100
	4	60	30	10	100
	5	38	37	25	100
Total Votes		200	200	100	

Seats won by each party:	2	2	1
Plurality winners:	4	1	0

Version 1.

Winners are best performances of each party individually (method currently planned for Indonesia)

District			
1	51	26	23
2	7	71	22
3	44	36	20
4	60	30	10
5	38	37	25

District 3 has no representative
 District 5 has two representatives, from the parties which came second and third

Version 2.

Winners are best performances which are also plurality winners

District			
1	51	26	23
2	7	71	22
3	44	36	20
4	60	30	10
5	38	37	25

Regencies 3 and 5 have no representatives

Parties B and C each have a winner chosen from a list

Version 3.

Alternative method guaranteeing one representative from each District

Rank order of party performance with shaded candidates as winning representatives.

Rank	Candidate	Votes
1	B2	71
2	A4	60
3	A1	51
4	A3	44
5	A5	38
6	B5	37
7	B3	36
8	B4	30
9	B1	26
10	C5	25
11	C1	23
12	C2	22
13	C3	20
14	C4	10
15	A2	7

Allocation to achieve one representative in each district using the above ranking:

1. Candidate B2 wins the first of B's two seats
2. Candidates A4 and A1 win the two seats allocated to party A.
3. Candidates A3 and A5 do not qualify since their party already has its two seats.

4. Candidate B5 picks up the second seat for party B.
5. District 3 and Party C have no representation; Party C must pick its candidate from District 3.

Seats allocated to B for 2, to A for 4, to A for 1
 A has complete allocation of 2 seats: A3, A5 do not qualify for seats

Seat allocated to B for 5
 B has complete allocation of 2 seats: B3, B4, B1 do not qualify for seats

Seats 5, 1 and 2 have representatives: C5, C1 and C2 do not qualify for seats
 Seat allocated to C for 3

District			
1	51	26	23
2	7	71	22
3	44	36	20
4	60	30	10
5	38	37	25

District 5's representative comes from the party which came second
 District 3's representative comes from the party which came third

Table III

Successful candidates

Winners are shaded; (plurality winners shown in italics)

Assumptions:

- Province with eight districts, each with one seat, all of identical electorate
- Uniform turnout assumed

Version 1. Best performances within each party individually

Party						
A	B	C	D	E	F	Totals

District							
1	30	24	10	26	6	4	100
2	28	21	27	7	11	6	100
3	16	37	17	18	2	10	100
4	32	23	7	13	20	5	100
5	14	15	19	16	11	25	100
6	35	34	5	7	7	12	100
7	31	29	8	5	22	5	100
8	14	17	7	8	21	33	100
Total Votes	200	200	100	100	100	100	

Seats won by each party	2	2	1	1	1	1
Plurality winners	5	1	0	0	0	2

District 5 has no representative
 District 6 has two representatives

Version 2. Best performances which are also plurality winners

	Party						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	Totals
District							
1	30	24	10	26	6	4	100
2	28	21	27	7	11	6	100
3	16	37	17	18	2	10	100
4	32	23	7	13	20	5	100
5	14	15	19	16	11	25	100
6	35	34	5	7	7	12	100
7	31	29	8	5	22	5	100
8	14	17	7	8	21	33	100
	200	200	100	100	100	100	

Parties B (one seat), C, D and E determine their representative from a list
 Only four of eight representatives have district linkage

Version 3. Allocation to achieve one representative in every District

Seats allocated to B for 3 and to A for 6
 Seat 6 has a representative: B6 does not qualify
 Seats allocated to F for 8 and to A for 4
 A has its full allocation of seats: A7 and A1 do not qualify
 Seat allocated to B for 7
 A has its full allocation of seats: A2 does not qualify
 Seats allocated to C for 2 and to D for 1
 Last remaining seat in 5 to be allocated to E

Representatives allocated to districts 1, 2, 5 and 7 do not come from the highest polling party
 Representative allocated to district 5 comes from the lowest polling party

Table IV

**Successful candidates
 Largest Total Vote Compared with Largest Percentage Vote**

Winners indicated by shading:
 (plurality winners shown in italics)
 Assumptions:
 - Province with five districts, each with one seat, electorates of variable sizes
 - Uniform turnout assumed

Total vote in thousands	Party			
	A	B	C	Total
district				
1	<i>164</i>	148	88	400
2	98	66	36	200
3	80	74	46	200
4	12	<i>71</i>	17	100
5	<i>46</i>	41	13	100
Total Votes	400	400	200	

Seats won by each party	2	2	1
<i>Plurality winners</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>1</i>	

Version 1:

Winners are best performances of each party individually

Highest total vote

Party

	A	B	C
district			
1	164	148	88
2	98	66	36
3	80	74	46
4	12	71	17
5	46	41	13

Districts 4 and 5 have no representative

District 1 has three representatives, from all of the parties

Vote as percentage

	Party		
	A	B	C
district			
1	41	37	22
2	49	33	18
3	40	37	23
4	12	71	17
5	46	41	13

District 1 has no representative

District 5 has two representatives

Compared with the total vote method, A1, B1, B3 and C1 are replaced by A5, B4, B5 and C3

Table V

Successful candidates

Fixed Number of Seats in Each District

Winners indicated by shading:
(plurality winners shown in italics)

Assumptions:

- Province with four districts, one with two seats
- Electorate of district 4 is twice electorate of each one member district
- Uniform turnout assumed

Total percentage vote	Party			
	A	B	C	Total
district				
1	<i>51</i>	26	23	100
2	7	<i>71</i>	22	100
3	<i>44</i>	36	20	100
4 (2 members)	<i>49</i>	33.5	17.5	100
Total vote in province	200	200	100	

Seats won by each party	2	2	1
<i>Plurality winners</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>1</i>	

Version 1:

Winners are best polling candidates of each party

district			
1	<i>51</i>	26	<i>23</i>
2	7	<i>71</i>	22
3	<i>44</i>	36	20
4 (2 members)	<i>49</i>	33.5	17.5

District 4 has only one representative

District 1 has two
representatives, from the parties
which came first and third

APPENDIX II

PARTICIPANTS IN NDI ASSESSMENT MISSION

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

January 29 to February 4, 1999

Eric Bjornlund is a lawyer and Senior Associate and Director of Asia Programs at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), where he has worked since 1989. He is currently based in Indonesia. Mr. Bjornlund has developed and managed election monitoring and other democratic development programs in more than 25 countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East and presently oversees NDI's programs in 12 countries in Asia. He has testified before the US Congress and the United Nations and has written widely about election systems, election monitoring and democratic development. From 1984 to 1988, Mr. Bjornlund practiced law at Ropes & Gray, a 300-lawyer firm in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. He holds a BA from Williams College, an MPA from Harvard University and a JD from Columbia University in the United States.

Andrew Ellis is a British specialist on electoral systems who has designed and implemented technical assistance programs for elections in Cambodia, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Pakistan and Russia. He has carried out these activities on behalf of the European Commission, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NDI. Mr. Ellis has also served as Secretary-General of the UK Liberal Party and chief executive of the UK Liberal Democrats. He is presently a director of the worldwide holding company GJW, one of the leading UK political consultancies, and head of the company's Brussels-based project unit, a major part whose work is specializing in election and institution building projects. Mr. Ellis visited Indonesia in late November 1998 to assess and comment on the draft political laws and the legal framework for this year's general election.

Donald L. Horowitz is a professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University in North Carolina in the United States. He has written extensively on politics in developing countries, especially the politics of ethnic group relations, democratization, constitution-making and electoral law, and on law and legal change both in the United States and in Asia. Professor Horowitz received the Louis Brownlow Price of the National Academy of Public Administration for the best book in public administration in 1977 for his book on *The Courts and Social Policy*, the Outstanding Academic Book from Choice Magazine in 1987 for *Ethics Group in Conflict*, and the Raph J. Bunche Award of the American Political Science Association for the best book of 1992 on ethnic and cultural pluralism for *A Democratic South Africa?*. He has advised on the design of political systems in Nigeria, Russia, Tatarstan, Romania, Ireland, Fiji, and Bosnia. Professor Horowitz most recently visited Indonesia in August 1998.

Kamal Hossain is senior advocate to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and has been involved in public service in Bangladesh for more than 30 years. He served for many years as a Member of Parliament and as the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1973-74. Dr. Hossain has participated in a number of human rights and election observer missions, including the observation mission to the 1994 elections in South Africa organized by the Commonwealth Election Observer Group, and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) missions to the elections in Sri Lanka (1990) and Pakistan (1989), and NDI missions to assess the election framework in Hong Kong (1998). He is a board member of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development based in Montreal, Canada, and of a number of other organizations that promote human rights, good governance and sustainable development. Dr. Hossain visited Jakarta in September 1998 to participate in an NDI conference on political parties in Asia.

Blair King is program officer based in Indonesia for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, with a specialization in Indonesian politics. His dissertation topic is the political economy of rice production, sustainable agriculture, and peasant empowerment in Central Java, and he has also conducted research on elections, NGOs and the labor movement. In 1997-1998 Mr. King received a Fulbright-Hays grant to conduct dissertation field research in Central Java, and he previously worked for four years as an English teacher in Pekanbaru, Riau, Sumatra. Mr. King has a B.A. in International Relations and an M.A. in International Policy Studies from Stanford University. He is fluent in Bahasa Indonesia.