

LEGISLATIVE REFORM: THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS
An NDI Project

BACKGROUND

One of the objectives of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is to work with democratic party organizations in the field of governance. Democratic nations are as dependent on their governmental systems to inspire public confidence as they are on legal protections of an individual citizen's rights. It was with this principle in mind that NDI turned its attention to Argentina.

During President Raul Alfonsin's visit to the United States in the spring of 1985, representatives of his party foundation, the Arturo Illia Foundation, contacted NDI to propose a joint seminar on the subject of congressional reform. After some considerable preparation on both sides, the two institutions held the first seminar in Buenos Aires September 9-11, 1985. The seminar was co-sponsored by the Arturo Illia Foundation for Democracy and Peace, affiliated with Union Civica Radical Party of Argentina; the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, affiliated with the Free Democratic Party of West Germany; and NDI, affiliated with the Democratic Party of the United States.

Participants for NDI included: former Congressman James Shannon; Martin Franks, Executive Director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee; Burton Sheppard, author of the new book, Rethinking Congressional Reform; and NDI Executive Director Brian Atwood (see Appendix A for short biographies). A number of Senators and Deputies from the Argentine Congress also served on the panels, which were chaired by members of the Executive Committee of the Illia Foundation.

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The three seminars addressed the following subjects (see Appendix B for the schedule and list of panelists):

-- An overview of reform efforts in the U. S. and Argentina with emphasis on: the impact of reform on the policy process; the role of Congress in a democracy; and the role of political parties in Congress.

-- A discussion of the role of interest groups in electoral and legislative politics, with an examination of whether the activities of such groups constitute the exercise of legitimate interests or a threat to the system.

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-- An examination of the relationship between Congress and the Executive, covering the maintenance of channels of communication and the authority of Congress vis a vis the Presidency.

During the day, the NDI team had several meetings which served to provide additional background on the topics discussed at the seminar. (See Appendix C for a list of the meetings held)

Prior to the visit to Argentina, the NDI team received a State Department briefing on the political situation in the country conducted by the Director of the Southern Cone area and the Argentina desk officer. In addition, a memorandum prepared by NDI on the Argentine Congress was provided to the group (see Appendix D).

BACKGROUND ON THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS

In brief, the Argentine Congress has virtually the same powers as the U. S. Congress. However, because of severe party discipline, an election system which places party affiliation over the individual, weak or non-existent oversight, a lack of information provided to the opposition, overlapping committee jurisdictions and, most importantly, a powerful and dominant presidency, the Argentine Congress is institutionally very weak.

Past losses of faith in Argentine democracy and the resultant military interventions have occurred not when the Executive was perceived as ineffectual, but rather when the Congress was bogged down in a procedural morass. That this would occur again despite the renewed commitment to democracy is a real possibility.

Independent legislators, vigorous oversight of the executive branch, active lobbying on behalf of interest groups and presidential defeats on issues are unheard of in Argentina. These concepts, all consistent with the checks and balances structure which is the foundation of our system (and, in theory, the Argentine system) were relatively new to the Argentine participants at the seminar.

SUMMARY: SEMINAR DISCUSSIONS

The seminar's context, then, was one of divergent experiences with structurally similar systems. The following briefly summarizes each of the three seminar discussions.

Session I: Congress and Political Parties

National Representative Ricardo Terrile, member of the ruling Union Civica Radical Party (also the majority party in the Chamber of Deputies) began the discussion with a strong defense of the status quo. He said that Congress has a responsibility to enact legislation and, through its various activities, to reflect the ideological positions of the parties. Public opinion, he asserted, must be expressed through political parties, not through individual representatives. The public could influence the outcome only through the electoral process; an individual party member "should lose his seat if he doesn't carry out the wishes of the party." He explained that democratic debate occurs within the party caucuses but conceded that the executive, President Alfonsin, has the deciding vote in his party.

The representative of the opposition Peronist Party, Oscar Fappiano, did not see the issue in the same way. He began his remarks by suggesting that "political parties are not islands of virtue," and that if democracy occurs only during elections then a "vacuum" will be created. He then turned his attention to the need for making political parties (not Congress) more democratic.

U. S. panelist Burton Sheppard said that the NDI team was in Buenos Aires to share experiences, not to impose criticisms. He said that a degree of party discipline greater than that exercised by the U. S. parties was a virtue and observed that there appeared to be stronger links between the people and the political parties in Argentina. He then went on to explain the fundamental suspicion of any concentrated power, which is the bedrock of the American system of checks and balances. "Institutionalized conflict" characterizes the American system, he said, both within institutions such as the Congress and among the branches of government. This conflict sacrifices efficiency but broadens debate and participation.

Sheppard then reviewed efforts to reform the U. S. Congress, focusing on the 1970's as a period of perhaps the most sweeping reform to take place in any democratic legislative body in history. Discussing the intent of this electoral and legislative reform, he described the unintended effects of that reform, regretting that Congress is now fragmented and seemingly incapable of "mobilizing consent" and of formulating "comprehensive policy" for the nation. He acknowledged the inherent power of the president to persuade and suggested that the Executive had found ways to take advantage of the "incoherence" of the legislative process.

At the same time, Shepard underscored the value of the checks and balances system and cited many examples of it having worked to the benefit of the nation. The thrust of his remarks was to espouse the importance of the integrity of a separate-but-equal Congress and, at the same time, to warn against "tinkering" with the system if one is not sure what will be the consequence of a reform effort.

Questions from the audience reflected some wariness about the American system and some doubt that it could work in Argentina. At the same time, people seemed to agree that the Argentine Congress needed more independent authority.

Session II: Congress and Interest Groups

National Representative Jorge Vanossi, member of the Union Civica Radical Party and Chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs, began the discussion. He cited the Hamilton-Jefferson debates over the trade-offs that need to be made between a pluralistic society and the need to give government the power to satisfy the "common well-being." He pointed out that interest groups are "not static, but dynamic" and that they could easily become "tension groups."

Vanossi then recited the history of political parties in Argentina, saying that in this century they had "been ignored, then tolerated, then regulated and, finally, institutionalized." He suggested that interest groups could best express themselves through the parties in Argentina.

Brian Atwood said that the question should not be whether interest groups are allowed to influence the policy process in a democracy, but rather how they do so. He said that the "health of a democracy is directly related to the confidence the people have in it" and suggested that perhaps interest groups are operating in Argentina but in the shadows, outside the glare of public scrutiny.

Atwood said that parties in the United States are not as strong a force as they are in Argentina because of a variety of factors, not least of which is the highly heterogeneous and diverse nature of the American society and the size of the nation. At the same time, the U. S. Congress is a very strong institution which has played a significant role in maintaining the U. S. democracy. He suggested that the relatively homogenous nature of the Argentine society and the strong party discipline should contribute to a more open, democratic Congress which could take its place next to a strong presidency as pillars of democracy.

Atwood then discussed the lobbying undertaken by the Executive branch in the U. S., saying that the U. S. Executive is aware that it must gain congressional approval for its program. This awareness injects a degree of respect for the legislative process and, on important issues, it inspires a major effort to influence that process. He cited the Panama Canal Treaty as an example and described the lobbying efforts and means used to influence public opinion on that issue. The essence of a good lobbying effort, he said, is to understand the political problems the issue poses for the individual Member of Congress and try to address them.

Martin Franks reviewed the history of the lobbying laws of the United States and, in particular, the laws of disclosure. He described the 1974 reform effort which resulted in the creation of hundreds of political action committees (PACs) and then discussed the impact of PACs on the legislative process. The number of PACs, he observed, has grown at the same time that expenses for political campaigns have increased. Their impact on legislation is difficult to measure, but they have succeeded in institutionalizing the flow of information to a Member. This has both good and bad effects: the information is usually of a higher quality, but individual Americans may not have the same access to their representatives as they had before.

Franks said that Members are very discriminating when it comes to the lobbyists from whom they receive information. Lobbyists who have misled a Member will find themselves frozen out over time.

Franks then discussed some recent proposals to reform the PAC system, focusing on the bill offered by David Obey (D-WI) which would place an overall cap on the amount any one PAC could give in an election cycle. Underscoring Burton Sheppard's point about the unintended outcomes of reforms efforts, he expressed concern that PACs would find a way around a cap, perhaps resorting to the old "check-bundling" methods wherein several PACs collaborate to maximize their influence.

He suggested that the Argentines consider the one U. S. reform over which there is the least controversy: disclosure. Arguing that a democracy must operate in the light of day, he said that the involvement of powerful sectors of society and individuals in the election of officials must be known to ordinary citizens. Operating alongside a vigorous and vigilant free press, disclosure will -- over time -- do much to rid a democratic system of influences which distort the public will and, as a consequence, will restore the people's confidence.

Audience questions reflected a great deal of interest in the U. S. system and a sentiment that the interest groups in Argentina should be formally recognized by the government. This is a new area for the Argentines, whose history does not include experience with interest groups independent of political parties.

Session III: Congress and the Executive Branch

The third session was even more revealing than the first two as the result of a confrontation over the role of Congress between the Peronist Party Vice Chairman of the House Budget Committee, Diego Guelar, and the Radical Party Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Guelar began the discussion by observing that the powers of Congress were severely diminished because neither party has received adequate information from the Executive branch. Guelar claimed he "learns more from the newspapers than he learns from the Casa Rosada" (the Argentine White House).

He said that steps were being taken to deal with the debt problem that had never been discussed with the Congress and stated his view that Congress must approve the measures being employed to finance the foreign debt.

Guelar also rued the lack of quality in parliamentary debates because of the lack of information. At the same time, he was highly critical of the press for failing "to report fully and accurately" on congressional debate and for being "unaware of the importance of Congress."

Radical Party Deputy Frederico Storani disputed Guelar's characterization of the information flow from the Executive branch and criticized the Peronist tactics of boycotting key debates to prevent a quorum. He said that Peronists absented themselves to block votes on the Beagle Channel Treaty, the budget and President Alfonsin's economic program. Storani stated that the majority party in the House (the Radicals) had been more than fair to the opposition, saying that the ruling party had no obligation to produce Ministers of Government to answer questions but that they had been quite accommodating on this score. He summarized his view of the role of parties in Congress as follows: "The party which wins governs; the party that loses cooperates."

Guelar later rebutted Storani, arguing that the President sometimes attempts to exceed his powers and that it is up to Congress to rein him in. He feels that the Peronist tactics have lately forced the government to be more forthcoming "after having voted with our asses the first one-and-a-half years of Alfonsin's term, we are now making ourselves heard."

Jim Shannon presented his view of the proper relationship between Congress and the Executive in the American system by discussing his experiences as a member of the U. S. Congress. He said that although he was a member of the President's party, he had opposed many aspects of President Carter's tax policy. "the White House knew it would have to convince [him] on the substance of issues." He described this process as being less efficient but said that the mandates received by a President in this way are usually a better expression of the national will. Likewise, if a president, when using his ultimate power as chief executive -- the power of persuasion -- cannot prevail, then Congress acts as an important check.

Shannon cited three presidents in recent American history who received overwhelming election mandates from the people but who were thereafter checked by Congress. He described Roosevelt's Supreme Court "packing" plan after his 1936 landslide election, Nixon's Watergate problems after the 1972 election, and Reagan's failure to get his way on the budget after his 1984 landslide. He pointed out that in two of the three cases (Roosevelt and Reagan), the defeat was administered by Congress and that the President's popularity remained extremely high even after the defeat. This is the proper role for Congress, Shannon argued: to act as overseer, a mirror for public opinion, a forum for national debate and, ultimately, as the purveyor of a mandate for or as a check on the Executive's power.

Numerous questions followed the opening presentations and many were directed at the two party protagonists, but many also reflected great interest in the examples Jim Shannon used of the U. S. Congress' independence and authority. Many in the audience seemed to agree with Guelar when he said, "citizens have to find a way through the Congress to influence the 'content' of the formal democracy."

CONCLUSION

NDI was afforded a unique opportunity to participate in these fundamental discussions about Argentine democracy. The NDI team came away with some observations which should be more fully explored among Argentina's leaders and which are offered here to stimulate further discussion.

All of our Argentine interlocutors were committed to making the system work this time, and they were openly exploring better ways to achieve this through the strengthening of institutions such as the Congress which have not been traditionally strong. Argentines admire a strong executive and are reluctant to create or institutionalize forces which could diminish that power. Yet, most admit that no single person can carry the burden of the entire democracy.

The reforms that are possible within the Argentine Congress will in most cases depend on an enlightened president, since he now holds all the cards. The pressures that face President Alfonsin may place reform of the governmental system far down on his list of priorities. Nevertheless, it is because of these very pressures and the absence of adequate release valves that reform should be the top priority. The Argentine Congress as it is currently structured will either become an institution for obstruction or a rubber stamp. Either course will complicate the future of Argentine democracy.

If fundamental reform is not possible, immediate steps can be taken to shore up the Congress. One key reform relates to the availability of information, particularly to the opposition party. If the opposition is shut out, the national debate will be stifled and the opposition, as before, will take to the streets.

It is also clear that if the Congress is to be respected as an institution, it will have to be given independent authority. Party discipline is in most circumstances a positive element. In excess, however, it denies the people an opportunity to participate in open debate, and it denies the president mandates he would in most cases win as a result of his overwhelming power of persuasion.

Finally, Argentines should consider disclosing to the public the activities of interest groups in the Argentine system. Most of these groups work through their affiliations with the parties, but their activities should be disclosed -- and defended, if necessary -- in the open debate of the electoral process. In addition, other groups who have no party affiliation should also have a voice and a means for influencing the policy process.

Following the next congressional elections in November 1985, Argentina may have a unique opportunity to examine their system and bring about more fundamental reform. President Alfonsin has already met with representatives of the Peronist party to solicit support for a constitutional assembly to change the Presidential term of office from one six-year term to two four-year terms. Such a move would require a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress, thus requiring the support of the Peronist Deputies and Senators. Once convened, a constitutional assembly would be free to consider other reforms as well. Many members of the Peronist party, unhappy with their lack of power in Congress as it is currently constituted, may hold out on the presidential term issue to gain more sweeping reform of the governmental system.

One key member of the Peronist party told NDI that he preferred a system similar to that used by the French. This would be comprised of a strong presidency, a Prime Minister who would perform the role of "Chef du Cabinet," and a Parliament which would provide a role for the opposition, assuring their rights to information and to question government ministers. This system, he observed, would comport with Argentina's preference for a strong Presidency and disciplined political parties while assuring adequate and informed debate on national issues.

Based on the observations of the NDI team, this approach would appear to make a great deal of sense. In any case, it seems obvious that the current system is seriously flawed. The separate-but-equal Argentine Congress is neither separate nor equal; as such it is an anachronism which could undermine democracy as in the past. Reform is needed, not simply to strengthen Argentine democracy, but to preserve it.

NDI is pleased that it could play a small part in the reform debate. We are currently studying the possibility of conducting a follow-up seminar on this subject in Washington with key members of the Argentine House and Senate from both the Radical and Peronist parties. Such a meeting would give Argentine officials an opportunity to study the U. S. system and to consider alternative systems as well.

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

J. BRIAN ATWOOD

Mr. Atwood is currently the Executive Director and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. He has also served as Executive Director of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (1983-84); as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, U. S. Department of State (1979-81); as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (1977-79); and as Legislative Assistant for foreign policy and defense issues to Senator Thomas Eagleton (1971-77). Mr. Atwood received his B. A. from Boston University in 1964.

MARTIN D. FRANKS

Mr. Franks is currently the Executive Director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (1981 to present). He has also served as a Special Assistant to President Carter during the Carter-Reagan White House transition (1980-81); as National Research and Issues Director, Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (1979-80); and as Administrative Assistant to Senator Patrick Leahy (1977-79). Mr. Franks received his B. A. in Politics from Princeton University in 1972.

JAMES B. SHANNON

Mr. Shannon is currently a practicing attorney with the Boston-based law firm of Hale and Dorr, which also has offices in Washington, DC. Mr. Shannon also served as a Member of the U. S. House of Representatives, where he was the youngest person to serve on the House Ways and Means Committee in 200 years. He was narrowly defeated by John Kerry for the Massachusetts Democratic nomination in that state's U. S. Senate race in 1984. Mr. Shannon received his law degree from George Washington University and his B. A. from Johns Hopkins University.

BURTON D. SHEPPARD

Mr. Sheppard is currently a practicing attorney with the Boston-based law firm of Sullivan & Worcester, which also has offices in Washington, DC. He also serves as special counsel to Paul Kirk, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and recently completed a book on congressional reform entitled Rethinking Congressional Reform: The Reform Roots of the Special Interest Congress. Mr. Sheppard received his B. A. from Johns Hopkins University and, as a Rhodes Scholar, received his Ph.D from New College at Oxford University in 1977.

SEMINAR SCHEDULE AND PANELS

Monday, September 10: Congress and Political Parties

Representative Victorio Bisciotti - Secretary of the House
Radical Party Caucus

Representative Oscar Fappiano - Second Vice President of
the House

Representative Guillermo Sarquis - Member, House Committee
for Constitutional Affairs

Burton D. Sheppard - Attorney at Law, Sullivan & Worcester

Tuesday, September 11: Congress and Interest Groups

Representative Jorge Vanossi - President, House Committee
for Constitutional Affairs

Martin D. Franks - Executive Director, Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee

J. Brian Atwood - Executive Director, National Democratic
Institute

Wednesday, September 12: Congress and the Presidency

Dr. Ruben Blanco - former Senator and current Director,
School of National Defense

Representative Diego Guelar - Vice President of the House
Budget Committee

Mr. Atilio Marchini - former Director, Congressional
Liaison for Executive Branch

James B. Shannon - Attorney at Law, Hale & Dorr

MEETING SCHEDULE

Monday, September 10

Mr. Luis Stulman -- Secretary of Public Information for President Alfonsin. Mr. Stulman is responsible for the government's public campaign to support the President's economic policy and will soon become the Radical Party's public relations expert for the November campaign.

Mr. Angel Frederico Robledo -- A special advisor to President Alfonsin and a member of the Justicialista (Peronist) Party. He is a former Defense Minister.

Tuesday, September 11

Senator Adolfo Gass -- Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a senior member of the Union Civica Radical Party.

Mrs. Maria Rosa de Martini (and staff) -- the director of "Conciencia," a women's group involved in a nation-wide civic education program funded in part by the National Endowment for Democracy.

Mr. Italo Argentino Luder -- Presidential candidate for the Peronist Party in 1984.

The group also met with the full board of and various advisors to the Arturo Illia Foundation. Various possible projects for NDI were discussed as well as economic and trade issues.

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TO : Marty Franks
Jim Shannon
Bud Sheppard

FROM: J. Brian Atwood

RE : Preparation for Argentina Seminar

DATE: August 30, 1985

Following are some materials on the seminar in which we will participate in Buenos Aires. The focus will be on the U. S. system and the efforts we have made to reform our congressional and electoral processes. At the same time, we should be aware of Argentine attitudes and understand something about their system as we prepare our presentations. It is clear that what we say could influence their thinking as they consider reforming their own system.

GOVERNMENT OVERVIEW

Argentina's constitution, drawn up in 1853, is markedly similar to our own. The separation of powers doctrine delineates the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Unlike the U. S. system, however, the executive branch has consistently been the strongest branch of government -- a Latin American tradition. The executive branch is currently controlled by the Radical Civic Union Party of Raul Alfonsin, whose election in 1983 marked Argentina's rejection of a military dictatorship. After 8 years under the military government, democratic institutions in Argentina are weak, particularly the Congress.

The bicameral legislative branch is composed of a Chamber of Deputies (the equivalent of our House of Representatives) and a Senate. Representatives to the House are elected through a "plurinominal" process, whereby a voter selects candidates from a list of all the parties and their candidates in a particular province or state -- a system which corresponds to the European system more than to that of the US. Senators are elected by the provincial

legislatures (with the exception of Buenos Aires City, which elects its Senators directly). Deputies serve 4 year terms, while Senators serve for 9 years.

PARTIES

As mentioned above, the ruling party is Alfonsin's Radical Civic Union. Its strongest opposition is the Justicialista Party (Peronists), which is presently split into two rival factions. Currently it has offers no counterpart to Alfonsin for its party leadership, although former presidential candidate Italo Luder could become the party's compromise candidate. (We have an appointment to see him.)

In addition to retaining control over the executive branch, the Radical Party controls the Chamber of Deputies (total: 250 members) with 129 members to the Justicialistas' 111. In the Senate, the Justicialistas have a 21-18 majority over the Radical Party. Seven independent senators represent an important block of votes that does not vote consistently with either party.

Control of provincial parties sometimes has a significant impact at the federal level. In the Neuquen province (center Andean section of the country and rich with oil, agriculture and industry), the local party is controlled by a rich and powerful family. This party was able to elect one governor and two senators. The Corrientes province also elected a governor and two senators from an independent party. These senators can wield a considerable amount of power, as neither of the national parties can claim a working majority in the Senate.

LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURES

The structures of party leadership in each house of the legislature are similar to those in the US, with a president and minority leader for each chamber. In terms of voting, the Argentinian congress enjoys much more party discipline than its US counterpart. (Again, this makes the independents' role in the Senate significant.)

The legislature employs the use of permanent and standing committees. The leadership of each house appoints a majority chair and ranking minority member. The majority also appoints a "secretary" whose function is roughly comparable to staff director/chief of staff (the secretary is an elected member of the chamber). Committee sessions are closed, not due to regulation but rather as a matter of custom and lack of space. There are no subcommittees.

The committees have jurisdictions comparable to those in the US in terms of substance, but their oversight responsibilities often overlap and there is no mechanism for coordination among them. The leadership in both chambers do not have the strength to exert party discipline in this regard. This lack of coordination contributes to the weakness of the legislative branch as a whole, and the seminar organizers would like the US participants to suggest ways in which to strengthen the committee system.

Additionally, congressional staff is not institutionalized and is almost non-existent. Each member of the House and Senate will generally have no more than 3 people on their respective staffs. Members may employ as many individuals as they wish as long as they pay for them out of their private resources.

PROCESS

Legislation is initiated and pursued in the same manner as in the US Congress. There is, however, great difficulty here because the legislature does not operate by a permanent calendar. It is never clear how long Congress will be in session and there is no standard yearly agenda.

There is also a lack of coordination between the executive (the Pink House) and legislative branches, despite the fact that the ruling party controls one of the two legislative chambers. The Pink House does not have a strong congressional relations office, nor does the Congress offer a strong coordinating office to receive executive proposals or to determine their own legislative agenda.

Organized lobbies in Argentina have not yet attained the sophistication or power that they have in the US. The parties are the most dominant and powerful political force in the country.

CONCLUSION

This introduction outlines some of the primary issues this seminar hopes to address. Although the problems may not, in some ways, seem to be very different from those in the US, it is important to remember that this legislature is not yet 2 years old and its structural problems are fundamental.

Buenos Aires is also currently experiencing election fever. The first congressional elections since President Alfonsin took office will take place in November, when half of the House stands for reelection.

The Fundacion Arturo Illia, one of the three party foundations of the ruling Radical Party, will be our host. The Chairman of the Fundacion is Dante Giadone, a seasoned and sophisticated politician who is one of Alfonsin's closest friends. Giadone was a presidential assistant but was removed some months ago. Conservative sectors of Argentina considered him too far to the left; nevertheless, he continues to exert power due to his relationship with Alfonsin.

Roberto de Michele is Giadone's assistant and the person responsible for organizing the seminar. De Michele is a young politician with excellent contacts in the Radical Party.

De Michele has provided the following information:

-- The seminar format is an informal roundtable discussion. Each of the major speakers will be given 15 minutes to present their views.

-- The seminar is open to the public.

-- There will be a question and answer session with the other participants and the public.

-- Topics and speakers are:

September 9: Congress and Political Parties
(a) Role of Congress and Democratic Pluralism
(b) Role of Parties in Congress
(c) Congressional Reform and the Role of Committees -- Bud Sheppard

September 10: Lobbies and Political Action Committees -- Brian Atwood, Marty Franks

September 11: Congress and the Presidency
-- Jim Shannon

-- Appointments have been scheduled with:

1. Italo Luder, former presidential candidate for the Justicialista Party;

2. Maria Rose de Martini, President of Conciencia, an Argentine women's movement;

3. Adolfo Gass, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;

4. Luis Storani, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee;

5. Luis Stulman, Radical Party political analyst and high level staff member at the Ministry of Public Information.

-- The party foundation is seeking an appointment with President Alfonsin.

-- Interviews will be arranged with the media and press.

I would appreciate your preparing a brief outline of your remarks. We can then share the outlines and talk about the topics on the way down.

Thanks again for doing this.

JBA:kjc