



**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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# **CHILE'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY**

**The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite**

*Foreword by Adolfo Suarez*

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## *PREFACE*

This is the report of the 55-member international delegation that observed the October 5, 1988 Chilean presidential plebiscite. It is based on information gathered by teams that visited different Chilean regions, from the cities of Arica in the north to Punta Arenas in the south. The report presents a national perspective on the plebiscite process, including a review of the constitutional framework for the plebiscite, the campaign, and the balloting and counting processes.

Events in Chile continue to move at a rapid pace. This report, though, is limited to developments through October 11, 1988, when the last member of the delegation left the country.

The report was prepared under the auspices of the sponsoring organization, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), after consultations with members of the delegation and, in particular, with its leaders -- President Adolfo Suarez, President Misael Pastrana, Governor Bruce Babbitt, and Ambassador Peter Dailey. While these consultations indicate a consensus for the conclusions reached herein, NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the report. The Institute thanks all those who participated in the observer mission for their assistance in ensuring the expeditious publication of this report.

The report was written by NDI Senior Consultant Larry Garber and edited by NDI President Brian Atwood and Executive Vice President Kenneth Wollack. A foreword to the report was prepared by President Suarez. The team reports included as Appendix XII of the report were prepared by delegation members and by NDI staff.

This report adds to the growing body of literature seeking to explain the essential elements of achieving democratic self-rule. The Institute believes that the events surrounding the Chilean plebiscite process are of great significance to those who seek to promote peaceful democratic change.

The delegation thanks the many Chileans who took time from their busy schedules before and after the plebiscite to share with us their perspectives of the process. Finally, the delegation expresses its deep appreciation to the Chilean people whose demonstrated commitment to democratic processes should be the envy of citizens in all countries.

*December, 1988*

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## FOREWORD

*Adolfo Suarez*

The recent Chilean plebiscite, although formally an internal matter falling within the sovereign rights of Chile, also had an international dimension of major relevance. The old principle of classic international law regarding nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states is gradually receding in importance; consequently, the international community cannot be indifferent to the fight for freedom, human rights and the rule of law, and the interest of all humanity to construct a completely free world. Indeed, the lack of freedom and systematic human rights violations have become transgressions of international law that justify actions by the community of nations.

Within this framework fits the international delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) with great objectivity and pluralism, that went to Chile to be present for and to observe the plebiscite, with strict respect for Chilean law. For a Spaniard, so linked to Ibero-america, being a co-leader and spokesman for this delegation has been very gratifying.

But there is another reason my presence in Chile was an unforgettable experience. My term as president of Spain's transitional government to democracy -- an event not long ago -- allows me to evaluate the differences and similarities of the Chilean case. It is my hope that together -- Spain and Chile -- can one day write the most important chapter of contemporary history on the transition to democracy.

Chile is today one of the few countries in the Spanish-speaking world that lives in a dictatorship. But the process toward democracy will probably be unstoppable, for internal reasons -- democratic consciousness, active participation in a national reconciliation -- as well as because of vigorous and sustained international pressure. Ending the dictatorship, without a doubt, will not be easy, nor perhaps, unfortunately, quick. Nonetheless, despite resistance and obstacles, Chile will rediscover its traditional way of life among the countries that abide by the rule of law.

I believe that, in any case, the role of the international observers influenced very positively the fairness of the plebiscite and the electoral process. The dictatorship of General Pinochet could not, in effect, ignore or be insensitive to such an extraordinary demonstration as the presence in Chile of more than 1,000 journalists and hundreds of politicians of all political persuasions. The community of democratic countries has given great moral and political support to a people that desires peace and freedom, and the NDI delegation has done a great service to the Chilean people and for freedom in the whole world.

The October 5th Chilean plebiscite is already an historic date. The Chileans have chosen democracy and the current rulers will have to respect this decision. I am optimistic that Chile will soon enjoy freedom and in this case, optimism, realism and rationality coincide.

Finally, I would like to express my thanks to the members of the delegation and especially to my colleagues and friends Bruce Babbitt, Peter Dailey, Misael Pastrana, Osvaldo Hurtado, J. Brian Atwood and Kenneth Wollack, for the honor of being able to share with them an historic moment.



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## *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

A 55-member international delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, observed the October 5, 1988 Chilean presidential plebiscite. As provided for in the 1980 Chilean Constitution, the plebiscite afforded Chileans an opportunity to vote "yes" or "no" on an additional eight-year presidential term for General Augusto Pinochet, who was selected as the designated candidate on August 30 by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. The following are the delegation's conclusions concerning the plebiscite process:

1. The 92 percent voter registration figure, the active participation in the electoral process of Chile's many political parties, civic organizations and labor unions and the turnout by 97 percent of the registered voters ensured that the plebiscite would be viewed as a momentous event in Chile's modern, political history.
2. The September 5 to October 2 campaign period provided the proponents of the "yes" and "no" positions an opportunity to communicate, primarily through rallies and television, with the Chilean people. This helped minimize the advantages favoring the "yes" position inherent in the constitutional system, although the proponents of the "no" position still had to compete on unequal terms.
3. The plebiscite was conducted in an orderly and fair manner. Virtually all Chileans desiring to vote were afforded an opportunity to exercise their right of suffrage and to do so in secret. The National Electoral Service and its director, Juan Ignacio Garcia, the local polling officials,

the party pollwatchers and the security forces all deserve credit for ensuring the smooth operation of the balloting process.

4. Events on the night of the plebiscite demonstrated the importance of the independent vote counts. While the Ministry of Interior initially delayed the release of the results, the Committee for Free Elections and the coalition supporting the "no" position released credible and accurate results periodically. Ultimately, the government acknowledged the "no" victory at 2:30 a.m. on Thursday, October 6.

5. The results of the plebiscite, a 54.7 percent to 43.0 percent margin for the "no" position, reveal the strong desire of the Chilean people for free elections and democratic government. This desire must be translated into reality through a process of dialogue and national reconciliation leading to the establishment of a representative government, respect for individual rights and the existence of a peaceful and democratic system.

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## *INTRODUCTION*

On October 5, 1988, 7.2 million Chileans, constituting 97 percent of the registered voters, cast ballots in a plebiscite provided for by the 1980 Constitution. A majority of the voters, approximately 55 percent of the total, marked "no" on their ballots, thus requiring the scheduling of a multi-candidate presidential election by December 1989; General Augusto Pinochet, who has ruled Chile since 1973, can remain president during the interim and commander-in-chief of the armed forces until 1997. The 1980 Constitution also mandates the scheduling of elections for a newly established Congress no later than December 1989.

Chileans from across the political spectrum, including those who believe the 1980 Constitution lacks legitimacy, participated in the plebiscite process. As a result, the plebiscite was a pivotal event in Chile's modern history. At the same time, the plebiscite did not resolve all the political problems facing the country nor did it constitute an immediate transition to democracy.

The plebiscite and the ongoing political process in Chile have caught the attention of the international community. This is not surprising given the dramatic 15 year interruption of Chile's democratic tradition and the fact that other countries, including several of Chile's neighbors, have demonstrated recently that transitions toward democracy are possible.

For this reason, among others, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), an independent, political development institute headquartered in Washington,

D.C., sponsored a 55-member international delegation to observe the plebiscite. The delegation included former heads of state, political party leaders, parliamentarians, politicians and election experts from 22 countries in North and South America, Europe, Asia and Africa. NDI previously organized similar international delegations for elections in the Philippines and Haiti.

The delegation had to overcome the mixed signals sent by the Chilean government regarding their presence. In the weeks preceding the plebiscite, several government officials, including President Pinochet, charged that observers would be intervening in Chile's internal affairs. This message was reiterated by the foreign minister several days before the plebiscite. On the other hand, NDI had been assured by senior government officials that the delegation members would be free to watch the process anywhere in the country.

Ultimately, no restrictions were placed on who could visit Chile as observers nor on where observers could go or with whom they could meet once they were in the country. Indeed, some senior government officials informally acknowledged the presence of the delegation, and assisted its activities by informing military and provincial officials outside the capital that observer teams would be visiting their regions. Although government representatives declined to meet formally with the delegation, the delegation leaders met privately with foreign ministry officials.

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## *Chapter 1*

### *NDI ACTIVITIES IN CHILE*

NDI has been active in Chile since 1985. During the past three years, it sponsored conferences, seminars and visits to Chile by political consultants, and administered grants to assist various free election groups. These programs helped Chilean political leaders devise strategies to restore democracy in their country. The first part of this section reviews these efforts, while the second part describes the composition and activities of the international observer delegation.

#### **A. May 1985 - August 1988**

NDI involvement in promoting democratic development in Chile began in May 1985 when Chilean political party leaders and their Latin American counterparts met in Washington, D.C. at an NDI-sponsored conference, "Democracy in South America." According to several participants, the conference played a role in the development of the National Accord, an historic document calling for a transition to full democracy that was signed in August 1985 by a cross-section of political party leaders.

In May 1986, as the National Accord was threatened by differences over tactics, NDI and Venezuela's leading political parties, Accion Democratica and the Social Christian Party (COPEI), sponsored an international conference in Caracas, Venezuela on the transition to democracy in Chile. All 11 signers of the Accord were joined by colleagues from Argentina, the Philippines, Spain, Uruguay, the United States and Venezuela. The conference provided a unique opportunity for the

representatives of new democracies to share common experiences on the transition process with their Chilean counterparts. The conference also provided a setting for Chile's diverse parties to reaffirm their common purpose.

Following an April 1987 visit to Chile by NDI President Brian Atwood and consultant Curtis Cutter and the participation of four Chileans in an NDI-sponsored observer delegation to the Philippine legislative elections in May 1987, the Institute implemented a major effort in Chile for the period preceding the plebiscite. As a first step, a NDI mission visited Chile in July 1987 to analyze the voter registration procedures and the organizational capacities and needs of the newly-formed free election campaign.

In November 1987, NDI co-sponsored a three day seminar that assisted the free election campaign with its national voter registration drive. The seminar was attended by 300 national, provincial and local campaign leaders who were joined by political technicians from Canada, the Philippines, Spain, the United States, Venezuela and West Germany. The participants were briefed by the campaign leadership on the status of the registration drive and plans for advertising, publicity, polling, research, election monitoring and grassroots organizing. The international technicians then shared experiences from their respective countries. The final portion of the program was devoted to problem-solving workshops. According to Chilean participants, the seminar helped dispel the notion that the democratic opposition was unable to cooperate because of disagreements on policy issues and personality conflicts.

Unable to convince the government to replace the plebiscite with competitive elections, the political parties of the free election movement formed the Command for the No in early 1988. The Command sought to register prospective voters and urged Chileans to vote "no" in the plebiscite as a means of attaining the goal of free elections.

NDI sustained its efforts to promote democracy in Chile during 1988 through a series of technical assistance programs,<sup>1</sup> grants for research civic education and monitoring and the administration of the bulk of a special \$1 million U.S. Congressional appropriation. The grants were used to acquire computers for independent vote counting operations, to commission a national public opinion survey, and to produce the literature and advertisements necessary to publicize a civic education message and to compete with the government media campaign. The Institute, however, never assumed a position on the plebiscite; rather, it was the decision of Chile's democratic opposition to advocate a "no" vote as a peaceful means for achieving the goal, shared by NDI, of open, competitive elections.

From August 17-24, eight NDI representatives visited Chile to prepare for the international observer delegation. During this visit, the NDI team: informed the Chilean government of the Institute's plans to organize an observer mission for the plebiscite; informed various sectors of the Chilean population, including those outside the capital city of Santiago, of NDI's plans; obtained information regarding the electoral process; and prepared the logistics for the observer delegation. The NDI team met with government and election officials, political party leaders, representatives of the Committee for Free Elections (CEL), leaders of the "yes" and "no" campaigns, church leaders, journalists and others in nine cities throughout the country.

During the visit, the Committee for Free Elections (CEL), a nonpartisan, independent group of prominent Chileans that sought to monitor the plebiscite process, sent a letter to NDI Chairman Walter Mondale welcoming NDI's plan to sponsor an international delegation. The letter noted that the delegation

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<sup>1</sup> Political consultants Annie Burns, David Collenette, Glenn Cowan, Frank Greer, Peter Hart, Fred Hartwig and Jack Walsh worked with NDI to provide technical advice in polling, media, computerization and campaign organization.

would demonstrate "international support for a free and fair plebiscite."<sup>2</sup>

Also during the visit, *El Mercurio*, Chile's leading newspaper, interviewed NDI Executive Vice President Kenneth Wollack regarding the Institute's plans for observing the plebiscite,<sup>3</sup> while other members of the advance team were interviewed by the local media in the cities they visited. In these interviews, as well as in meetings with government officials and political party leaders, the NDI team stressed that the observer delegation would:

- refrain from taking a position on the plebiscite;
- refuse to associate with any partisan group;
- seek the views of all those participating in the process;
- be guided by impartial standards;<sup>4</sup>
- avoid interference in the electoral process; and
- abide by all laws pertaining to foreign visitors.

While acknowledging NDI's past association with the opposition, the team explained that the NDI-sponsored delegation would have a narrow and carefully defined mission, and emphasized the reputation and prestige of the participants in the delegation.

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<sup>2</sup> Appendix I contains a copy of the letter.

<sup>3</sup> *El Mercurio*, August 28, 1988. Appendix II contains a copy of the interview.

<sup>4</sup> In organizing observer delegations, NDI utilizes *Guidelines for International Election Observing*, prepared in 1984 for the International Human Rights Law Group by NDI Senior Consultant Larry Garber.



## B. The International Observer Delegation

Fifty-five individuals from 22 countries participated in the delegation.<sup>5</sup> Twenty-six of the delegates were from the United States, 15 were from Latin American countries, and the remainder were from Canada, Great Britain, Liberia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka and Switzerland. The leaders of the delegation were: **Adolfo Suarez**, former president of Spain; **Misael Pastrana**, former president of Colombia; **Bruce Babbitt**, former governor of Arizona and Democratic Party presidential candidate; and **Peter Dailey**, former ambassador to Ireland, special envoy to the NATO countries and media adviser to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan.

Delegates were selected because of their prestige, credibility and expertise; in some cases, delegates also were selected because it was thought important to expose them (and, through them, others in their home country) to democratic developments in Chile. The delegation represented all political ideologies within the democratic spectrum, from conservative to social democratic; the U.S. component was bipartisan.

Prior to their arrival in Chile, the delegates received a briefing book containing the terms of reference for the delegation,<sup>6</sup> a report prepared by the NDI staff detailing the plebiscite process and NDI's previous activities in Chile, articles pertaining to the current political and economic situation in Chile, and logistical information concerning their stay in Chile. The program for the delegation officially began on Sunday, October 2, although some members, including the two co-leaders from the United States, arrived several days earlier. The Sunday program included a briefing by the NDI staff and a presentation by Edgardo Boeninger, former president of the University of Chile and a Vice President of the Christian Democratic Party.

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<sup>5</sup> A list of the delegates, with their past or current positions, is included in the front of the report.

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix III.

On Monday, the delegation heard from leaders of the Committee for Free Elections (Sergio Molina and Jose Miguel Barros), Crusade for Civic Participation (CIVITAS) leader Monica Jimenez, former Chilean Foreign Minister Miguel Schweitzer, the director of the National Electoral Service (Juan Ignacio Garcia), proponents of the "yes" position (Andres Allamand, Herman Chadwick and Patricio Phillips) and proponents of the "no" position (Genaro Arriagada, Ricardo Lagos and Patricio Aylwyn).

Following the briefings, the delegation leaders met with the press to outline the purpose and agenda of the observer mission.<sup>7</sup> Over 250 journalists attended the press conference, and reports on the NDI delegation appeared in Chilean newspapers the following day. That evening the delegation had an opportunity to meet with other observer delegations and with diplomats based in Chile at a reception hosted by U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes.

On Tuesday, the delegation divided into teams. Ten teams left Santiago for provincial capitals throughout the country. Upon arrival, the teams met with representatives of CIVITAS, election officials, proponents of the "yes" and "no" positions, church leaders, armed forces personnel and others. The purposes of these meetings were to let the Chileans know that there were observers present, to obtain information about the local campaign and to identify the polling sites to be visited on plebiscite day. In some cases, members of the delegation met with the local media to explain the objectives of the team's visit to the region.

The teams remaining in Santiago, meanwhile, visited the headquarters for the "yes" and "no" campaigns and the quick-count operation centers, and met with representatives of the *Vicaria de la Solidaridad* and Church leaders, including the

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<sup>7</sup> Appendix IV contains the opening statement delivered by delegation co-leader Adolfo Suarez.

president of the Bishops Conference. The delegation leaders met privately with senior Foreign Ministry officials.

On Wednesday, delegation members observed the voting process in 13 cities and their surrounding areas.<sup>8</sup> Approximately 150 polling stations were visited during the course of the day, accounting for more than 12 percent of the polling stations in the country. In almost every region, delegation members were welcomed to observe the process without any hindrances. The delegation members also observed the counting of the ballots at the polling sites and visited several of the centers where the various unofficial counts were being conducted. That evening, delegation members in Santiago visited the CEL quick-count operation and the headquarters of the "yes" and "no" campaigns.

The delegation had planned on issuing its post-plebiscite statement on Friday morning. However, having observed a free and orderly process and with both sides acknowledging the outcome, it was decided to advance the press conference to 5 p.m. on Thursday. Prior to the press conference, the delegation met and the teams reported on their observations in the different regions of Chile.<sup>9</sup> The delegation leaders, meanwhile, prepared a consensus statement.

The statement, presented by President Suarez, congratulated the Chilean people for their civic participation and noted that the result of the plebiscite "demonstrates, more than anything else, a strong desire for free elections. . . . We have been greatly impressed by the leaders of the 'no' campaign prior to and following the plebiscite. They have acted responsibly in calling for a national dialogue and reconciliation". The statement also commended the government for "conducting a free and fair plebiscite" and supporters of the "yes" who "acted responsibly and patriotically in pursuing a different path". The statement concluded that the process and the results represent

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<sup>8</sup> Appendix V contains a form used by the delegation members to record their observations.

<sup>9</sup> Appendix XII contains the observations of the different teams.

an irreversible step toward "national reconciliation, free elections, and representative government".<sup>10</sup>

The statement was covered in the Chilean newspapers on Friday and Saturday.<sup>11</sup> Most of the delegation members left Friday evening; those that remained conducted follow-up interviews with representatives of the institutions that played key roles in the plebiscite process.

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<sup>10</sup> See Appendix VI for the delegation statement.

<sup>11</sup> Appendix VII contains a sampling of the press coverage of the delegation.

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## *Chapter 2*

### *PLEBISCITE FRAMEWORK*

Modern Chilean history provides the context in which the significance of the plebiscite must be understood. This chapter briefly describes that context.

#### **A. Chile's Democratic Tradition**

Until 1973, Chile had a proud tradition of democratic government. Elections had been held regularly since 1831 and, with two exceptions, the elected leaders completed their terms.

The 1925 Chilean Constitution guaranteed a pluralistic political system within which the left, center and right were represented. From 1929 to 1958, the centrist Radical Party dominated Chilean politics. By the mid-1950's, however, Radical Party power waned as a result of economic stagnation and chronic inflation.

The Christian Democratic Party, espousing social justice and economic equality, emerged as the centrist alternative to the Radical Party. The left moved further leftward as the Socialists and the pro-Soviet Communist Party formed an alliance. Meanwhile, the right unified in 1965 to form the National Party.

This division resulted in governments led by leaders of the three tendencies from 1958-1973: Jorge Alessandri of the right served as president from 1958-1964; he was followed by Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei from 1964-1970; and finally, Salvador Allende served as president from 1970-1973, having

been elected as the candidate of the socialist Popular Unity coalition.

In this political setting, the governing one-third faced the opposition of the other two-thirds. According to Edgardo Boeninger, a respected political analyst and Christian Democratic leader, "[t]he governing third never showed much inclination to form coalitions that would broaden its base and enable the formation of an effective government majority."<sup>12</sup> Thus, Boeninger argues, Frei's economic and social policies ("Revolution in Liberty") were opposed by both the right and the left. Allende's "transition to socialism" resulted in an even greater schism, ultimately resulting in mass demonstrations, strikes, rural unrest and public censure of the government by the Congress.

Initially, Allende sought to use the military, which had a strong professional and apolitical tradition, as a cushion between the government and the opposition. After a period of considerable unrest, however, the military staged a coup during which Allende died. Then as now, the military justified its action as necessary to prevent further chaos and because the political parties had proven themselves incapable of governing.

A military junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet, then head of the army, quickly consolidated power. Politics at all levels was proscribed; voter registration rolls were destroyed and all political parties were suspended. Meanwhile, cabinet ministers, governors, mayors, labor union leaders and university rectors all were appointed by the central government. The left, which the military blamed for Chile's ills, was brutally repressed, with thousands killed, imprisoned and exiled.

## **B. The 1980 Constitution**

In 1980, a new Constitution, providing for two consecutive legal regimes, was promulgated. The initial regime, outlined in 29 Transitory Provisions, assigns legislative and executive power

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<sup>12</sup> E. Boeninger, "The Chilean Road to Democracy" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1986.

to the military junta and to the designated President of the Republic, General Augusto Pinochet, until 1989. At that time, the second regime, which is designed to reflect the junta's interest in establishing a "protected democracy", becomes effective.

The Constitution, both in the Transitory Provisions and in the body, contains provisions that the opposition consider highly anti-democratic. These include: an autocratic presidential system; a legislature whose powers are limited; a Senate in which one-third of the members are appointed by the president; an explicit power of political veto granted to the armed forces; the granting of autonomy to the armed forces making it impossible to establish civilian control; rules making it nearly impossible to amend the constitution; and a provision (Article 8) proscribing organizations and political movements that propagate doctrines "antagonistic to the family" or that "advocate a concept of society based on class struggle."

In its Transitory Provisions, the 1980 Constitution provided for a plebiscite process by which Chileans would be afforded an opportunity to vote "yes" or "no" on a candidate designated by the commanders-in-chiefs of the armed forces. As stated above, if the designated candidate had received approval from a majority of the voters, he would have remained in power for eight more years. Since a majority of the voters rejected the designated candidate on October 5, open, competitive elections must be scheduled by December 1989.

According to the government, the new Constitution:

is based on the necessity to correct vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the previous juridical and constitutional system which were used by an anti-democratic minority to gain access to power. Constitutional provisions are being implemented step by step to assure gradual broadening of civil liberties and political rights in a process compatible with the profound transformations Chilean society has undergone, and in accordance

with the special circumstances affecting Chile since the sixties.

The new institutional order is committed to effective democracy, protected from destructive attacks which might take advantage of the opportunities and liberties it grants. It is an attempt to create a free environment which respects private property and free economic initiative, to construct a free, healthy, competitive economy independent of state largess or administration.<sup>13</sup>

The government also has argued that the Constitution has encouraged the modernization and liberalization of Chile's economy, setting the stage for the economic growth that has occurred in recent years.

Nonetheless, the restricted nature of the plebiscite has been much criticized. As stated by one human rights group:

Free, contested, pluralistic elections are essential prerequisites to the existence of a democracy. The upcoming plebiscite does not constitute such a free and genuine election because voters are not given a choice among more than one candidate, and they have no role in selecting the candidate.<sup>14</sup>

A July 1987 fact-finding mission sponsored by the conservative International Democratic Union (IDU) also questioned the democratic character of the 1980 Constitution; it concluded that "[t]he most expeditious route for rapid and full democratization in Chile is to move directly to free and competitive elections

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<sup>13</sup> Embassy of Chile, *Chilean Political Background Document*, Summer 1988 at 3-4, 5.

<sup>14</sup> See International Human Rights Law Group, *Report on the Chilean Electoral Process* iii (November 1987).



for the President."<sup>15</sup> Members of the NDI delegation shared these concerns, but also recognized that the occurrence of a fair plebiscite presented an opportunity to begin the restoration of a pluralistic and civil society in Chile.

The Constitution was placed before the population in a plebiscite on September 11, 1980, the seventh anniversary of the coup. According to the government, 67 percent of the voters cast ballots in favor of the Constitution. These figures, as well as the conditions under which the plebiscite was conducted, were challenged by the opposition and by various civic groups. The challenges were rejected by the National Scrutinizing College on the ground that it lacked the authority "to make pronouncements on political-electoral complaints such as those that have been filed".<sup>16</sup>

### C. Developments within the Chilean Political Opposition

In early 1983, political parties of the democratic center, still decreed by the government to be "in recess" and representing about 50 percent of the electorate, formed the Democratic Alliance (AD). The Alliance was spearheaded by the Christian Democratic Party, and was joined by the moderate Socialist parties that had broken with the extreme left and by the smaller centrist parties (Radicals, Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals). The Alliance, which represented the beginning of a unified political opposition to the regime, was based on peaceful mobilization and a return to democracy.

Newly appointed Interior Minister Sergio Jarpa, a civilian politician, opened a dialogue with the Alliance, but the talks quickly collapsed. Jarpa demanded the opposition's support for the 1980 Constitution and the opposition sought Pinochet's

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<sup>15</sup> International Democratic Union, *Chile: Report of a Fact Finding Mission* at 24 (November 1987)

<sup>16</sup> *El Mercurio*, October 15, 1980. For a detailed discussion of the 1980 plebiscite, see Organization of American States, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile* (September 1985)

resignation. In November 1984, Pinochet, reacting to mass protests against the regime, reimposed a "state of siege" that had been lifted in 1978. The siege was later lifted in July 1985, although Chile remained under other forms of states of emergency until August 1988.

According to Chilean analysts, the political stalemate strengthened the Communist Party (PCCh), which formed the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) with the left wing of the Socialist Party led by Clodomira Almeyda. The MDP advanced a two-track policy. On one hand, it pursued traditional political activity to attract those who were disillusioned by failure of the Alliance program. On the other hand, the military arm of the PCCh, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), directed a series of terrorist acts.

The democratic opposition, meanwhile, regrouped and emerged even stronger in 1985. Three factors, according to Boeninger, contributed to the formation of an even broader coalition that responded positively to a call for a democratic transition by the archbishop of Santiago, Juan Francisco Cardinal Fresno. First, a moderate, democratic, socialist left emerged within the Democratic Alliance. Second, the Christian Democrats became more willing to form broad-based alliances. Third, the presence of right-wing parties (e.g. the National Party and the National Union Party) independent of the military regime. With only the Independent Democratic Union (led by the former Interior Minister Jarpa and the regime's "ideological guru" Jaime Guzman) supporting Pinochet, a split between the democratic right and the authoritarian right mirrored the split that had developed between the radical and moderate left.

What emerged in August 1985 from Cardinal Fresno's initiative was the "National Accord on Transition to Full Democracy." The Accord included 11 parties from the Christian Left and moderate Socialist parties to the National and National Union parties. The document represented a platform for a negotiated transition to full democracy based on reform of the 1980 Constitution and free and open elections.

The Accord was rejected immediately by Pinochet. On the other extreme, the Communist leaders called for social mobilization to make the country "ungovernable". The democratic opposition was caught between the extreme left and Pinochet who declared that the people must choose "either the government or the Communists." These developments provided yet another illustration of what many observers describe as the "symbiotic relationship" between the regime and the extreme left, with both drawing strength from each other at the expense of the center.

In 1986, FPMR bombings and mass demonstrations were met with government force. In three days over 1,000 people were arrested and hundreds were injured. A newly formed National Civic Assembly -- a coalition of 18 civic groups, labor organizations, and business associations -- organized a general strike in July. The Assembly's nonviolent protests was joined by PCCh-supported street confrontations, and the government's tough response resulted in the killing of Rodrigo Rojas, a young photographer from the United States.

A month later, the government discovered sizeable FPMR arms caches. On September 7, Pinochet was the target of an assassination attempt in which six of his bodyguards were killed.

Several weeks later, the democratic opposition renewed its call for the National Accord. Pinochet, however, quickly moved to terminate negotiations between the Accord coordinator Sergio Molina and those junta members who had hinted their interest in an accommodation with the democratic opposition and the desirability of an open election or a civilian candidate for the plebiscite. On December 31, 1986, Pinochet lifted the state of siege that was imposed after the assassination attempt, announced a policy for the return of some 3,500 exiles, promulgated the recently passed electoral registration law and approved a proposal to legalize non-Marxist political parties.

#### **D. Deciding to Participate in the Plebiscite**

Given the nature of the plebiscite and the Constitution itself, the opposition debated long and hard concerning the propriety of participating in the plebiscite. Some in the opposition feared that participation would be construed as recognition of the 1980 Constitution and the regime's legitimacy; even if Pinochet were to lose the plebiscite, the Constitution stipulated that he could remain president until March 1990, commander-in-chief of the armed forces until 1997 and Senator for life. Others doubted that conditions would permit a free plebiscite.

Proponents of participation responded by asserting that the plebiscite provided, for the first time in many years, an opportunity for the people of Chile to achieve free and open elections, which would occur a year later if the "no" vote would win. Moreover, should Pinochet lose, they argued, the military might seek a dialogue with the opposition over constitutional reforms. "A 'no' vote would change the entire political dynamics," was a frequently heard argument.

As the plebiscite neared, National Accord leader Sergio Molina and other opposition leaders, without committing to participate in the plebiscite, refocused their effort toward a national civic education and voter registration drive under the banner of the Campaign for Free Elections. In March 1987, Molina announced the formation of the Committee for Free Elections (CEL). Commonly referred to as the "Committee of Personalities," the Molina group organized a nonpartisan registration campaign.

Two months later, the parties of the Democratic Alliance formed the Operational Committee of Parties for Free Elections (COPEL). Shortly thereafter, the moderate Nunez Socialists led by Ricardo Lagos established the Committee of the Left for Free Elections (CIEL). The three free election groups initially hoped that by registering millions of voters, the junta, fearing a loss at the polls, would agree to replace the plebiscite with open elections and to negotiate constitutional reform with the opposition.

The three Committees included most of the parties of the National Accord except the Christian Left (on the left) and the National Union Party (on the right). In early 1987, the National Union Party merged with the far right Independent Democratic Union (UDI) to form Renovacion Nacional (National Renewal Party); the latter initially advocated a "consensus" candidate to replace Pinochet on the plebiscite ballot, but subsequently endorsed a "yes" vote in the plebiscite. In the meantime, Pinochet established his own party, Avanzada Nacional (National Advance).

The free election campaign was originally hampered by the existence of three distinct committees each of which was mobilizing overlapping sectors of the population and using diverse messages. After weeks of negotiations, the three groups united in September 1987 to form the Coordinating Council for Free Elections led by Sergio Molina of CEL, Ricardo Lagos of CIEL and Andres Zaldivar of COPEL. Genaro Arriagada, president of Chile's most popular radio station, was selected National Secretary of the council.

In early 1988, when it became apparent that the junta would not replace the plebiscite with multi-candidate elections, the political parties of the Coordinating Council decided to urge a "no" vote in the plebiscite and formed the Command for the No. Sergio Molina's Committee for Free Elections decided not to join the new organization and instead sponsored a non-partisan effort to monitor the electoral process and to conduct an independent vote count on the night of the plebiscite.

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## *Chapter 3*

### *PREPARING FOR THE PLEBISCITE*

In 1986, the Chilean Government began promulgating the laws necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite. These laws include: Organic Law on the Election Registration System and the Election Service [Voter Registration Law] (effective October 1986); Constitutional Organic Law Concerning Political Parties [Political Parties Law] (effective March 1987); and Constitutional Organic Law on Popular Voting and Scrutiny [Electoral Law] (effective May 6, 1988 and amended August 2, 1988). The voter and the political parties registration processes are described below, as are the events leading to the designation of President Pinochet as the candidate in the plebiscite.

#### **A. Voter Registration**

Because voter rolls had been destroyed following the 1973 coup, new rolls had to be created before the plebiscite. The National Electoral Service, an autonomous government organ, was responsible for administering the voter registration process. The Service also was responsible for recognizing political parties and for ensuring that administrative arrangements for the plebiscite were in order. Juan Ignacio Garcia, a lawyer and well-regarded public servant who had worked with the Electoral Service since 1964, served as director of the Service, a position he had assumed in 1977. Operating under Garcia were regional directors responsible for ensuring that the registration system functioned.

The registration process, which began in March 1987, initially proceeded at a very slow pace. Several explanations

were offered. Some criticized provisions of the law that required citizens to obtain a new *carnet* (national identity card) before they registered. Others noted the populace's general apathy; without a decision from the political leadership regarding participation in the plebiscite many appeared unwilling to waste their energy on what they suspected could be a futile endeavor.

By the end of August 1987, only 2 million Chileans out of an estimated electorate of 8.2 million had registered. This was a period in which only the government had been urging its supporters to register. Several senior government officials acknowledged publicly at this time that a minimum of 5 million people would have to be registered for the plebiscite to have any credibility. Opposition leaders used a 6.5 million registered voter figure as the minimum necessary for a meaningful exercise.

Registration increased significantly in February and March 1988 as the free election movement and other groups began implementing their voter registration effort. By the end of June, registration had reached 6.4 million. There was another surge in July following the announcement that a candidate would be designated on August 30 since registration was to close two days after the candidate was designated.

Ultimately, slightly more than 7.4 million Chileans registered to vote; this constituted 92 percent of the voting age population, the highest percentage in Chile's history. While the opposition initially expressed concern about possible double registrations, particularly by military personnel, this was not a major concern by the time the delegation arrived in October. Nonetheless, there were isolated reports of alleged double registrations. The Electoral Service, meanwhile, deleted from the lists those persons who died, changed their addresses or became ineligible to vote because of a criminal conviction. According to Director Garcia, more than 200,000 names were removed from the registration rolls as a result of the Service's internal review.

## B. Political Parties

Political parties in Chile were proscribed soon after the coup, although many parties continued to exist *de facto*. In March 1987, the government enacted the Political Parties Law to provide for the legalization of political parties, except for those proscribed by Article 8 of the Constitution (see Chapter 2.B. *supra*).

Under the law, parties seeking national recognition were required, among other things, to submit a list to the Electoral Service containing the notarized signatures of at least 33,500 party members, all of whom were required to be registered voters. Recognition on a regional basis also was authorized for those parties unable to meet the requirements for national registration. The opposition criticized the law on two major grounds: first, the number of party registrants was viewed as excessive, particularly because many Chileans would be reluctant to identify publicly as an opposition party member; second, the law permitted only those parties recognized four months before the plebiscite to designate *apoderados* (pollwatchers) who could be present at the polling sites.

The importance of being recognized prior to June 5 was mitigated, in part, by a change in the electoral law in August that permitted independent groups to designate observers on the day of the plebiscite if they submitted 20,000 signatures to the Electoral Service within five days of the plebiscite's convocation. Despite the change in law, no independent group submitted the application necessary to obtain authorization to designate pollwatchers for the plebiscite.

### 1. Parties Supporting the "Yes"

One pro-government party, National Renewal, was recognized nationally prior to the June 5 deadline for designating pollwatchers. The party survived an internal party struggle that resulted from a split between those who favored Pinochet's candidacy in the plebiscite versus advocates of a civilian candidate; both factions, though, eventually supported the "yes" position. The National Advance Party, a strong pro-Pinochet



party, missed the deadline, although it ultimately also obtained national recognition.

The National Party, which was recognized on a regional basis, split over the plebiscite. A faction led by party Vice President German Riesco endorsed the "no," while the faction led by party President Patricio Phillips remained for the "yes". The Electoral Service recognized the Phillips faction.

## *2. Parties Supporting the "No"*

The issue of whether to seek recognition was debated among opposition parties for some time. The Humanist Party, a recent addition to the Chilean political scene and a party with an anti-establishment image, was the first opposition party to seek recognition, submitting its list to the Electoral Service in March 1988. It was followed by the Christian Democratic Party (considered Chile's largest party) and the Party for Democracy (PPD), a coalition of several moderate left parties dominated by the Nunez Socialists. These parties all were recognized by the end of May, guaranteeing their right to designate pollwatchers anywhere in the country.

The Electoral Service disqualified the Humanists in September for changing their party leadership without complying with the technical requirements necessary for such a change; however, an appeal by the party stayed the effect of the disqualification and the party was permitted to designate pollwatchers for the plebiscite. The Chilean Radical Party obtained national recognition on August 1. By August 15, the Radical Democratic Party, the Southern Party, the Greens, the Social Democratic Party and the Chilean Socialist Party were recognized as regional parties.

For the plebiscite, 16 opposition parties, including all those mentioned in the paragraph above, were aligned in the Command for the No coalition.<sup>17</sup> The Command was the umbrella organization responsible for overseeing and implementing the

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<sup>17</sup> Appendix VIII contains a list of the parties and their alignments before and during the plebiscite campaign.

campaign for a "no" vote in the plebiscite. As such, it organized publicity and rallies for the campaign, prepared the 15-minute television spots for each night of the official campaign period (see Chapter 4.B.2 *infra*) and established an independent vote counting operation (see Chapter 6.A.3 *infra*). Christian Democratic President Patricio Aylwyn served as the Command's official spokesman and Genaro Arriagada coordinated the group.

The position of the Communist Party, which historically has received about 15 percent of the vote in Chilean elections, in the present process is worth noting. Both it and the Almeyda Socialists<sup>18</sup> were covered by the Article 8 ban. While the latter participated in the Command for the No, the Communist Party continued its two track strategy. On the one hand, the party retained close links with such groups as the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which advocates insurrection and violence as the vehicles for removing Pinochet from office. On the other hand, in June, the party reversed its earlier stance and urged its supporters to participate in the plebiscite by voting "no". This decision was explained as part of an effort to fight the Pinochet regime on all fronts. While the Command for the No supported the rights of all Chileans to participate in the plebiscite, it rejected any association with the Communist Party so long as the latter maintained its commitment to the armed struggle.

### C. Nongovernmental Organizations

Chile has a plethora of nongovernmental organizations, including labor unions, professional groups, and human rights monitors. This section describes several organizations that played a direct and critical role in the plebiscite process.

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<sup>18</sup> The latter is led by Clodomira Almeyda, who served as Foreign Minister under Allende; Almeyda was sentenced to an 18-month prison term for being an "apologist" for those who propagate doctrines violative of Article 8. He was released before his prison term expired shortly after the plebiscite.

## *1. The Catholic Church*

As a result of the Church's efforts in supporting civil society in the aftermath of the 1973 coup, the Church, according to various public opinion polls, is Chile's most respected institution. Consequently, statements issued by the Church hierarchy regarding the plebiscite process carried considerable weight with the public.

In August 1987, the Bishops Conference of Chile set forth four basic conditions that would have to be met if the plebiscite were to have "moral authority". These conditions included: 1) an adequate number of registered voters; 2) equal access to television for all sectors of the population; 3) no pressure exerted on prospective voters; and 4) correct balloting and counting processes subject to public scrutiny.

In March 1988, the Bishops Conference met again to evaluate the progress made with respect to each of the criteria. Following their meeting, the Bishops issued a 12 page document, entitled "Report on Bishop's Criteria for an Open and Honest Plebiscite," that highlighted many of the problems existing at the time. In August, prior to the designation of Pinochet as candidate, the Bishops called publicly for a consensus candidate.

As part of the ceremonies associated with Chilean Independence Day, on September 19, Bishops throughout the country emphasized the significance of the plebiscite and urged that reconciliation be the order of the day. Cardinal Fresno, the Archbishop of Santiago, speaking that day before military authorities, including President Pinochet, urged that the results of the plebiscite be respected.

The Church also sponsored the Bethlehem Project (Proyecto Belen), a church affiliated civic education program that urged Chileans to "vote their conscience after considering the consequences of a 'yes' or 'no' vote". Also, the Church, particularly through the activities of the Conference of Bishops and the activities of individual dioceses, maintained support for activities organized by lay groups, including CIVITAS

(described below), working to educate the electorate and to ensure a fair plebiscite.

## 2. *The Committee for Free Elections (CEL)*

As described earlier, the origins of CEL can be traced to the National Convocation for Free Elections (also known as the Committee of Personalities), which was organized in March 1987 by Sergio Molina, coordinator of the National Accord and a minister in the government of Eduardo Frei. The original goal was to campaign for free elections (i.e. not a plebiscite system) and to develop a nonpartisan registration drive. Subsequently, CEL decided to focus on developing a nonpartisan organization to monitor the plebiscite process. To this end, CEL critiqued the electoral law and organized an independent "quick-count" effort for the night of the plebiscite. The significance of this latter effort is described in Chapter 6.A.2 *infra*.

## 3. *CIVITAS*

The Crusade for Civic Participation (*CIVITAS*) was formed in March 1988 under the leadership of Monica Jimenez as a private, nonpartisan foundation affiliated with the Catholic Church. Jimenez, also a member of CEL, is a prominent Church lay leader. *CIVITAS*' primary effort was in the area of voter registration and civic education. *CIVITAS* sought to publicize its activities through the national television stations, but was prevented from doing so on the grounds that the contemplated message ("your vote, your voice") was too political. Instead, *CIVITAS* reached out to Chileans living in the *poblaciones* (poor neighborhoods) and in rural areas through radio advertisements and by conducting mini-seminars and distributing handbooks on the plebiscite process. For the day of the plebiscite, the *CIVITAS* volunteer network assisted CEL in conducting its independent "quick count" operation.

## 4. *Labor Unions*

Two national labor confederations, the Democratic Central of workers (CDT) and the National Workers Command (CNT), and the powerful teachers union, *Colegio de Profesores*, joined the effort to register voters and to educate Chileans about the

significance of the plebiscite process. During the campaign period, the labor confederations coordinated with the Command for the No in urging a "no" vote. With 80,000 members, the teachers union, in particular, played a critical role not only during the campaign period, but also on plebiscite day. According to one estimate, 40 percent of the opposition pollwatchers belonged to the teachers union.

#### **D. The Role of the Public Opinion Polls**

One of the most interesting aspects of the Chilean plebiscite process was the role public opinion polls played for the government and the opposition in devising their political strategies before and during the campaign. The polls sought to gauge the degree of support for the two positions and to identify issues that would appeal to a cross-section of Chileans, particularly those voters assumed to be undecided.

Prior to 1988, opposition polls showed a 60 to 40 percent advantage for the "no" position. However, these polls were conducted in urban centers and did not present a national perspective. Thus many in the opposition were surprised when a spring 1988 nationwide survey of 2,700 Chileans by FLACSO, a public policy institute, showed that of the then registered voters 35 percent favored the "yes," 32 percent favored the "no" and 33 percent were undecided. The survey, developed with the assistance of Peter Hart, a prominent United States pollster and NDI consultant, provided a wealth of additional information that was used by the Command for the No in developing its campaign.

In July, the battle of the polls intensified. On July 16, the Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP), a center-right think tank, released a poll, funded by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, showing 30 percent favoring the "yes" position, 37 percent favoring the "no" position and 30 percent undecided. Five days later, the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporanea (CERC), a think tank identified with the Christian Democrats, released a poll showing 32.8 percent favoring the "yes" and 47 percent favoring the "no". Finally, on July 24, Skopus, a pro-government operation, released the

results of its poll showing a "yes" victory by a margin of 59.8 percent to 40.2 percent. Thus, as of July 1988, those polls considered most reliable (i.e. FLACSO, CEP and CERC) suggested a close race, with large numbers of Chileans still undecided.

In August, the polls began demonstrating increased support for the "no" position. CERC released a poll revealing the "no" ahead by a 40.6 percent to 30.8 percent margin, with 11 percent undecided. A FLACSO poll that divided the undecided responses equally between the "yes" and the "no" revealed a 55 percent to 45 percent margin for the "no".

#### **E. Announcement of the Candidate**

On July 9, President Pinochet announced that the commanders in chief of the armed services would meet on August 30 to designate a presidential candidate for the plebiscite. Although most Chileans expected Pinochet to be designated, some government supporters, including junta members, citing various polls showing Pinochet's unpopularity, had floated the idea of a civilian candidate. As noted earlier, the Church hierarchy suggested publicly that a "consensus" candidate, who would be acceptable to the military and the civilian opposition, should be designated. The conservative National Renewal party also advocated a consensus candidate, although it eventually supported the "yes" position.

On August 30, the commanders nominated Pinochet and set October 5 as the date for the plebiscite thus providing for an official campaign period of 27 days (September 5 to October 2). Despite appeals for calm by opposition leaders, the announcement of Pinochet's candidacy triggered protests throughout the country. According to the Vicariate of Solidarity, the Catholic Church human rights office, over 200 people were injured and over 800 people detained as a result of the protests. In Santiago, two persons were killed in shootings,

according to *The New York Times*, "attributed to unidentified men in civilian dress driving around poor neighborhoods."<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> S. Christian, "Opposition Calls for Stable Chile" *New York Times*, September 1, 1988.

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## *Chapter 4*

### *FAIRNESS OF THE CAMPAIGN*

In addition to the events on the day of the plebiscite, the delegation, in accordance with its Terms of Reference, inquired about the conduct of the campaign and the extent to which it afforded both sides an opportunity to communicate their respective messages to the Chilean people. Not surprisingly, given the government's general control of the electoral process in Chile, the majority of the complaints emanated from the opposition. In particular, the proponents of the "no" position alleged the existence of what was called in Chile "environmental fraud;" this term referred to a range of practices considered to be impediments to a fair plebiscite. While the opposition acknowledged some improvements during the month preceding the plebiscite, it argued that an incumbent government's traditional advantages were magnified by the existent conditions in Chile.

The first part of this section reviews the question of political freedom in Chile during the past year. The second part covers the more significant developments of the official campaign period. The final part describes key events that occurred during the four days preceding the plebiscite.

#### **A. Political Freedom in Chile**

From September 11, 1973 until August 26, 1988, Chileans lived under at least one form of a state of emergency. The states of emergency provided the legal basis for the suspension of certain fundamental rights and served to justify restrictions on freedom of assembly and other civil liberties. In particular, the state of emergency made it difficult to obtain permits for rallies,



a matter of vital importance to the opposition given its limited access to television.

Another matter for which Chile received considerable domestic and international criticism involved the use of exile, both internal and external, to punish political opponents of the regime. While many of those exiled since 1973 had been permitted to return in recent years, as of January 1988, 580 Chilean exiles still could not return to their native country. On September 1, the government lifted the decree banning these individuals from entering the country; thus, the campaign period saw the return of several notable exiles, including Hortensia Bussi, Allende's widow, Volodia Teitelbaum, the head of the Communist Party, and prominent musical groups.

Human rights abuses in Chile during the period of military rule have been well-documented by human rights groups in Chile (including the Church sponsored Vicariate of Solidarity and the Chilean Commission on Human Rights), international organizations (including the UN Special Rapporteur on Chile, currently former Costa Rican Foreign Minister Fernando Volio, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) and international nongovernmental organizations (for example, Amnesty International and Americas Watch). In recent years, there has been less overt repression than in the period immediately following the coup. Nonetheless, human rights groups continue to report violations of basic human rights.

The Chilean Bishops for example, in their March 1988 report, denounced several specific incidents that fostered a "fear-ridden and anti-democratic atmosphere that does not serve the interests of a free and open plebiscite".<sup>20</sup> Among the abuses cited were raids on poor neighborhoods, torture by security forces, unnecessary violence and continuing statements by government officials regarding the consequences of a "no" victory. These reports were corroborated by respected international organizations.

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<sup>20</sup> See *Report on Bishop's Criteria for an Open and Honest Plebiscite* at 8 (March 1988).

The opposition also claimed that the Chilean government sought to intimidate the public by its seemingly arbitrary actions against activists and journalists. For example, in August, two labor leaders, Manuel Bustos and Arturo Martinez, were sentenced to 541 days (18 months) of internal exile by the Supreme Court for calling a one-day work stoppage in October 1987; their initial conviction had been reversed on appeal, but their case was revived on the eve of an organizational meeting of a labor confederation that Bustos, a Christian Democrat, was elected to lead.

### *1. The Media*

Chile's Constitution guarantees freedom of the press. However, threats, violence, economic pressures and legal measures have been applied by the Government during the past 15 years. As a result, Chilean journalists have had to practice self-censorship. During the past year, at least 30 journalists were subjected to prosecutions on charges such as "insulting the armed forces". Most of these cases were pending in military courts.

Radio is the one medium where the opposition operates on relatively equal terms with the government. Although practicing self-censorship, the radio stations have not been hindered by formal censorship or denied access to large segments of the population. Indeed, Radio Cooperativa, whose president, Genaro Arriagada, served as the coordinator of the Command for the No, is regarded as the most popular station in the country. The radio medium ensured that information could be disseminated quickly throughout the entire country, a matter of considerable importance on the night of the plebiscite.

Chile has about 40 newspapers, ranging from those available nationally to small-town tabloids. Nine major newspapers with a combined circulation of some 500,000 are headquartered in the Santiago area. Total newspaper readership in Chile, which has a very high literacy rate, has been calculated at 2.7 million.

The two most widely-read newspapers, *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, are both considered pro-government. Thus, even when *El Mercurio* reported on developments within the opposition, it did so with a pro-government slant.

Since March 1987, two newspapers sympathetic to the opposition, *La Epoca* and *Fortin Mapocho*, have been publishing daily. Not only have these newspapers and other weekly magazines broadened the scope of news coverage, but they forced pro-government publications to report on the opposition as a means of competing for circulation. Opposition print media face financial difficulties and their editors and reporters have been subject to considerable pressures.

Perhaps no issue aroused more concern among opposition leaders than their inability to obtain fair access to television, considered the most influential medium in the country. Since 1973, the government controlled or influenced every television station, including those operated by the universities. Thus, despite the emergence of a lively and contentious print media and the existence of radio stations representing different political perspectives, those active in the opposition feared that they would be unable to counter the government's pro-Pinochet message as communicated to large numbers of Chileans through television.

The importance of television was revealed in the spring 1988 FLACSO poll. The survey showed that registered voters who received most of their information from television, constituting more than a quarter of the electorate, supported the "yes" position 51 percent to 17 percent. Registered voters who obtained most of their information from radio also constituted a little more than a quarter of the electorate and they supported the "no" position 45 percent to 22 percent. Finally, those who relied on newspapers, approximately 11 percent of the electorate, supported the "yes" position 41 percent to 33 percent.

During 1988, several new weekly television shows began providing a forum for debate between government supporters and opponents. Political figures who had not been seen on television for more than a decade appeared as guests on these

programs. These programs provided an opportunity for opposition leaders to raise matters not heard on television for many years.

The government, however, benefited from news coverage, which featured President Pinochet's daily activities, and the viewpoint of his government and supporters. Television stations rarely reported on the activities or positions of the opposition.

In addition, the government broadcast, during the pre-campaign period, a series of commercials on each television station encouraging voters, both obliquely and directly, to support the "yes" position in the plebiscite. The advertisements trumpeted Chile's economic progress with such slogans as "in peace and order -- Chile advances", "we are millions" and "Democracy, yes". The opposition claimed that the government spent the equivalent of about \$1 million per month for these political advertisements, which appeared as often as 27 times daily. The government responded by characterizing the advertisements as "publicity" designed to encourage participation in the plebiscite and therefore not covered by the law prohibiting the broadcast of "propaganda" prior to the 27-day campaign period preceding the plebiscite.

One example highlights the difficulty that nongovernmental groups had in obtaining access to television. CIVITAS sought to purchase time to publicize its civic education and voter registration programs. However, all national stations, including the popular Catholic University channel, rejected the advertisements on the ground that the CIVITAS message was too political.

To counter some of the complaints regarding television access, the new electoral law provided for a half hour each night of free television time to be divided equally between proponents of the "yes" and "no" campaigns during the official 27-day campaign period. The impact of these programs on the campaign is discussed in Section B *infra*.

## 2. *The Role of the Government and the Military*

Under the 1980 Constitution, executive and legislative powers reside, until 1989, with President Pinochet and with the four-member junta, which currently includes General Humberto Gordon of the Army,<sup>21</sup> Admiral Jose Toribio Merino of the Navy, General Fernando Matthei of the Air Force and General Rodolfo Stange of the Carabineros (national police). The junta was responsible for promulgating laws relating to the plebiscite and for ensuring, in a general manner, their enforcement. Equally significant, the "yes" campaign was directed by Minister of Interior Sergio Fernandez.

Prior to 1973, the Chilean military was highly professional and apolitical. In fact, the plebiscite was the first time in Chilean history that the entire armed forces were permitted to vote. The opposition bitterly complained about the partisan role played by the armed forces during the campaign. Senior government officials, including the defense minister, acknowledged publicly that the military was an integral part of the "yes" effort and that senior officers were staffing the headquarters of the "yes" campaign.

Not surprisingly given the constitutional system, the government had several additional advantages in campaigning for a "yes" vote. First, all local officials were appointed by the central government and thus were susceptible to government demands. In 1986, for example, the government circulated a document calling on mayors and other local officials to implement "a National Plan of Civic Action whose goal is to increase

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<sup>21</sup> President Pinochet remains commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but technically he is no longer a member of the junta. To ensure that Pinochet was included in the selection process for the Government's candidate in the plebiscite, the power to designate the candidate was given not to the junta, but to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces.

support for the regime."<sup>22</sup> Mayors who declined to support the plan reportedly were replaced by those loyal to Pinochet. In the month preceding the plebiscite, mayors were reported to be requesting teachers to collect forms from fellow-citizens indicating how they would vote in the plebiscite.

In addition, the government benefited from traditional advantages associated with incumbency. Thus, during the past year, President Pinochet, seeking to establish a populist image, inaugurated new public works and housing projects throughout the country, reduced the value added tax and sought to stimulate the economy in a variety of ways.

Given the disparity in financial resources available to the "yes" and "no" campaigns (estimated by the opposition at 30 to 1), and the implications this had for ensuring that the Chilean people adequately be informed by both sides competing in the plebiscite, the opposition decided to accept funds from foreign sources for certain limited purposes. In explaining this decision, Genaro Arriagada, the executive secretary of the Command for the No, said that "rejecting those dollars would mean that we would be creating the conditions for a triumph by Pinochet."<sup>23</sup>

Various foreign bodies provided support for the opposition campaign. For example, the United States Congress during 1988 approved a special \$1 million appropriation to the National Endowment for Democracy for "the promotion of democracy in Chile". As noted earlier, NDI administered the bulk of these funds which were used for civic education projects, voter registration drives, public opinion polls, and advertising by nonpartisan groups and the opposition movement. The European Parliament approved similar grants as did several

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<sup>22</sup> The plan was first reported in the Chilean newspaper *Fortin Mapocho* in August 1986. *The Miami Herald* reported on the plan on August 27, 1987. For a full description of the plan, see Americas Watch, *Chile: Human Rights and the Plebiscite* 160-66 (July 1988).

<sup>23</sup> See S. Christian, "Group is Channeling US Funds to Parties Opposing Pinochet" *The New York Times*, June 15, 1988 at 1.

European governments. The Chilean Government denounced this alleged "foreign intervention", claiming that the provision of these funds is "anti-democratic, corruptive and counter-productive".<sup>24</sup>

## **B. The Campaign**

The official campaign period began on September 5. Initially, the opposition feared that the time allotted for the campaign would be insufficient to counter the "yes" campaign's year-long media blitz. However, by developing a campaign strategy prior to the announcement of the official date of the plebiscite and by utilizing the free television time granted to the opposition, those favoring a "no" vote had the opportunity to communicate effectively their message to the Chilean people prior to the plebiscite. Indeed, some opposition strategists were grateful that the campaign period did not last longer because they feared that their momentum would have faded and that it would have become increasingly difficult to ensure a peaceful campaign.

### *1. General Campaign Themes*

The pro-Pinochet forces emphasized the economic successes of Chile during the past 15 years and the chaos that preceded the military coup. The campaign claimed that during the Pinochet era over a hundred thousand new jobs had been created, half a million new homes built and that consumer products, such as cars and televisions, were now available for purchase by large numbers of Chileans. A vote for the "no," according to the pro-Pinochet message, would return Chile to the bread lines and to the decaying economy that characterized the last year of Allende's reign. Finally, the "yes" campaign tried to project Pinochet as a compassionate and democratic leader who was committed to seeing the constitutional order maintained.

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<sup>24</sup> See Embassy of Chile, Chilean Political Background Document at 5n.1 (Summer 1988).

Prior to the campaign period, the opposition had debated the importance of designating an individual as the symbolic candidate of the opposition coalition. It was thought that naming such a candidate would reassure Chileans that a "no" victory would not result in the chaos predicted by the pro-Pinochet forces. In the end, however, no agreement could be reached among the 16 parties of the Command for the No on such a candidate. Also, again in large measure because of the broad coalition represented, the campaign was short on specific proposals, although it tried to appeal to those who had not benefited directly from Chile's recent economic successes.

The "no" campaign sought to convince Chileans that they had nothing to fear from a "no" triumph. The chorus of their popular campaign theme song, "happiness is coming" (*la alegría ya viene*), reflected the upbeat and positive tone of their campaign message which emphasized a democratic future. At the same time, the campaign immediately distanced itself from the statement of Communist party leader Volodia Teitelbaum who returned in September from 15 years exile, and promptly stated that a provisional government be established in the event of a "no" victory. The Command reacted by stating that although it too wanted Pinochet removed, it would accomplish that goal in an orderly fashion and with a smooth transition worked out in cooperation with the military.

## 2. *The Significance of Television*

Throughout the pre-campaign period, the opposition emphasized that a fair plebiscite required, at a minimum, that it be afforded free television time during the official campaign period.<sup>25</sup> As noted above, the Electoral Law, adopted in May 1988, granted this opposition demand by authorizing one half hour of free television time simultaneously on all television stations during each day of the campaign period to be divided equally among the "yes" and "no" campaigns.

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<sup>25</sup> The opposition also continued to seek permission to reply to President Pinochet's political addresses. However, the Chilean courts rejected the opposition demands on this matter.



In August, the government announced that the time slot set aside for broadcast of the two sides respective presentations would be 10:45 to 11:15 p.m. The opposition, fearing that the late hour would limit the size of the audience, sought to have the time changed to earlier in the evening when more people were likely to be watching television. The government, however, declined to change the time.

In the end, it appeared as if the time slot did not matter. Large numbers of Chileans watched the respective presentations each night and discussed them the following day. According to a September poll by the *Centro de Estudios Publicos* (CEP), both the "yes" and "no" campaigns achieved most of their voter contact through television, with 78 and 71 percent of prospective voters claiming to have seen the "yes" and "no" presentations respectively. For the opposition, whose leaders had not been seen on television except in a very limited format during the past year, the importance of this access from a psychological and political perspective can not be underestimated.

In presenting its 15-minute nightly segments, the opposition sought to maintain its future-oriented campaign theme with music and brief comic skits. They used a news format with a respected former television journalist as the anchorman. Particularly during the initial phase, there was little overt political discussion or presentations by party leaders. While there was a good deal of rather blunt criticism of the government, only once, on September 12, did the National Television Council, a government-dominated organ, censor a portion of an opposition program. The council objected to an interview with a judge who acknowledged that more than 30 cases of torture had been presented to him, claiming that judges were proscribed from participating in political campaigns. The opposition decided to cancel its entire 15-minute program that evening rather than delete the censored segment. To avoid charges of undue advantage, the "yes" campaign cancelled its 15-minute segment on September 14.

The pro-Pinochet campaign used its 15-minute time slot to reinforce its campaign themes. While the initial presenta-

tions were considered ineffective, the quality improved as the campaign continued. During the last week, an extended interview with President Pinochet was presented.

The September CEP poll showed that the effectiveness of the "no" media campaign far eclipsed that of the "yes." Chileans rated the "no" campaign highest in every category tested in the survey, including being "credible," "optimistic," "clearly understood," "dynamic," "motivating," and the "better choice," and in communicating its "capability in governing the country".

### 3. Problem Areas

The opposition claimed that the police authorities were not providing it with the same facilities for rallies that were being provided to the "yes" campaign. Thus, popular areas for staging rallies, such as O'Higgins Park or the main street in downtown Santiago, were rejected as sites for opposition rallies; instead the opposition was forced to use more remote sites not readily accessible by mass transportation. A similar pattern was reported in provincial capitals.

During the last week of the campaign, the opposition reported that the police were confiscating *carnets* (national identity card) from those identified as supporting the "no" position. The card was required for voting. Although the chief of the police, junta member General Rodolfo Stange, denied the reports, the opposition was sufficiently worried by this matter that it urged supporters not to carry their identity cards until the day of the plebiscite. The delegation, meanwhile, heard complaints of identity card confiscations in virtually all provinces of the country visited; it proved difficult, however, to meet the specific individuals whose identity cards had been confiscated. Given the size of the turnout on plebiscite day, the number of actual cases of confiscation could not have been that significant, although the reports of such confiscations undoubtedly increased the anxiety levels of some "no" supporters.

There were other reports of intimidation being directed at opposition supporters throughout the campaign including threatening telephone calls and detentions in several cities of

those participating in opposition rallies and distributing leaflets urging a "no" vote. In addition, opposition leaders Andres Zaldivar and Gabriel Valdes reported night time attacks on their respective residences; Zaldivar eventually obtained a court order requiring the police to provide protection to his house. There were also some reports of violence directed against government supporters; for example, at a rally in Temuco on September 5, Sergio Jarpa, former minister of interior and president of the National Renewal Party, was attacked by anti-government activists.

Finally, the opposition complained of "dirty tricks" committed by government supporters. In Valparaiso, for example, delegation members were given a flyer purported to be issued by the Command for the No advising the populace that the ballot might not be secret. The opposition claimed that the flyer was prepared by those supporting the "yes" in an "effort to create fears among the 'no' voters and to keep them from going to the polls."

In Concepcion, Chile's second largest city, the archbishop provided delegation members with a letter that had been sent to thousands of homes. The letter, which gave the impression that it had been prepared by the Command for the No, urged voters to mark their ballots with an ink pen, rather than the pencil provided at the polling site; a pen mark would invalidate the ballot.<sup>26</sup>

### **C. The Last Days of the Campaign**

On Saturday, October 1, the Command for the No organized a final Santiago rally at which an estimated one million people, with banners of parties representing the center through the far left, participated. The rally, which lasted approximately four hours, featured music by Chile's most popular groups, several of whom had returned only recently from exile, and a speech by Patricio Aylwyn, the president of the Christian

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<sup>26</sup> See Appendix IX.

Democratic Party and the official spokesman of the Command for the No.

The following day the "yes" campaign organized a car caravan through central Santiago. Given the nature of the event, it was difficult to estimate the number of participants, although 150,000 was considered a reliable figure. Unlike the "no" rally, which was entirely self-policed, the "yes" caravan was assisted by the police, who kept traffic clear of the caravan. Both events were peaceful.

On the Saturday night before the plebiscite, a blackout affected most of Santiago. The government claimed that terrorists had destroyed power lines, although many Chileans believed that the blackout was part of a government plan to intimidate the population or to set the stage for a cancellation of the plebiscite.

These fears were given further credence by a report on Monday, October 2, that the U.S. Acting Secretary of State John Whitehead had called in the Chilean Ambassador to the United States to express concern about a purported plan by the government to disrupt and cancel the plebiscite. Apparently, the United States, having received what it considered to be reliable information, sought, through a public demarche, to dissuade the Chileans from implementing such a plan. The Chilean Government responded by charging the United States with intervening in Chilean domestic affairs.

On the eve of the plebiscite, another blackout occurred affecting most of the central and southern portions of the country. Bombs also were reported being heard in various residential areas of Santiago, again arousing fears that the plebiscite would be cancelled.

Meanwhile, the results of the CEP poll, which had been conducted during the last two weeks of September, were published in *The New York Times* on the morning of October 5, after the government had succeeded in discouraging its publication in Chile. The poll revealed a substantial "no" advantage, by a margin of 52 percent to 32 percent.

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## Chapter 5

### THE BALLOTING PROCESS

In traveling to the different regions of Chile on plebiscite day, the delegation sought to observe the extent to which the procedures at the different polling sites complied with the procedures outlined by the electoral officials prior to the plebiscite. This section first describes the prescribed procedures; these, for the most part, were scrupulously followed. The second part of this section, relying on the observations of the NDI teams, comments on specific aspects of the balloting process. Finally, the reader is referred to Appendix XII for individual reports on the plebiscite process in the different regions of the country.

#### A. Plebiscite Procedures

Chileans are proud of their history of fraud-free elections, notwithstanding the debates surrounding the conduct of the 1978 and 1980 plebiscites administered by the junta. For this reason, even those in the opposition doubted that the government would attempt massive fraud in the balloting process. This attitude, in large measure, reflected the positive reputation for professionalism developed by the Electoral Service in its handling of the voter and party registrations.

The Electoral Service had primary responsibility for preparing the election paraphernalia, including the ballots and the requisite forms for use by election officials, and for ensuring their proper distribution. The three-person *juntas electorales* (electoral boards) established in each of Chile's provinces, meanwhile, were primarily responsible for ensuring that the

process operated smoothly on plebiscite day; the boards designated the polling sites, appointed a representative (electoral delegate) for every polling site, and selected the *vocales*, who administered the *mesas* (polling tables).

### 1. Organizing the Voting Tables

Chileans cast their ballots at one of 22,247 *mesas* located at 1,200 polling sites throughout the country. The polling sites generally were situated in schools or government buildings with large open areas. A given polling site, particularly in an urban area, could have between 10 and 150 *mesas*, each with no more than 350 voters.

In general, five *vocales* administered each *mesa*.<sup>27</sup> The *vocales* were selected in the following manner: initially, the three members of the electoral board each selected five persons from the registration books, which contained the names of the voters for each *mesa*.<sup>28</sup> The 15 names selected by the board from each registration book were placed on a list that was then posted in a public place. On September 16, the board, in public session, picked five numbers from a receptacle containing the numbers one to 15. The names on the lists corresponding to the numbers selected were designate as the *vocales*. The board then picked five additional numbers; the names corresponding to these numbers were designated as substitutes.

The procedures for selecting *vocales* had been a major source of contention between the government and the opposition during debates over the electoral law. The opposition feared that most of the *vocales* selected would be government supporters. However, there were few complaints reported with

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<sup>27</sup> A *mesa* could open so long as at least three *vocales* were present; if there were less than three *vocales* present, the electoral delegate could designate *vocales* from the line of voters. The delegation did not come across any *mesas* that did not have at least the minimum number of *vocales*.

<sup>28</sup> A registration book closed after 350 persons registered. Thus, people living at the same address would not necessarily have been registered in the same book or voted at the same polling site.

the procedure as implemented; for the most part, board members appeared to select the most capable individuals registered at a *mesa* to serve as the *vocales*.

The *vocales* met on Saturday, October 1 to elect a president, secretary and deputy for each *mesa*. At this session, the *vocales*, under the supervision of the board's designated representative, also reviewed the procedures for the balloting process.

On plebiscite day, October 5, each *mesa* was authorized to open anytime after 7 a.m. and was required to remain open for a minimum of nine consecutive hours, unless all those registered to vote had cast their ballots prior to the expiration of the nine hours. If voters were waiting on line at the end of nine hours, the *mesa* was required to remain open until all those waiting had voted or until midnight. While the *vocales* were generally present at 7 a.m., it took some time for them to prepare the election paraphernalia. Thus, in most cases, the polls actually opened sometime between 7:45 and 8:45 a.m. and remained open until between 5 and 6:30 p.m.

## 2. *The Casting of Ballots*

Upon arrival at the polling site, the voter was directed to his/her *mesa*; as in previous Chilean elections, men and women voted at separate *mesas* and in urban areas the polling sites were segregated by sex. When the voter reached the front of the line, he/she would present his/her National Identity Card to the *mesa* president. The number on the identity card was noted and the voter signed the line corresponding to his/her name in the registration book.

The voter was given a ballot and instructed to mark it in one of the two booths available at each *mesa*. The inside of the ballot had a heading stating "Plebiscite for President of the Republic," several lines below was Pinochet's name, and finally, below his name, were two horizontal lines under the words "si"

or "no".<sup>29</sup> To mark the ballot, a voter generally would draw a vertical line through one of the two horizontal lines, signifying the "yes" or "no" options. The ballot also contained a number identifying the ballot series; this number was written next to the voter's name in the registration book.

Voters generally spent 15 seconds in the booth marking, folding and sealing the ballot. The voter then returned the ballot to the president of the *mesa* who verified, by reference to the number on the outside of the ballot, that it was the one that had been handed to the voter.<sup>30</sup> This done, the number was detached from the ballot to ensure the secrecy of the vote and the ballot was placed in the ballot box. The voter then placed his/her right thumb in indelible ink and was given his/her identity card.

## B. Delegation Observations

As would be true in virtually any country, the plebiscite day observations of delegation members varied, although the similarities throughout the country far outnumbered the disparities. The following are some specific observations regarding the process based on reports from the different teams.

### 1. *Overcoming the Long Early Morning Delays*

In the morning, delegation members observed long lines at virtually all polling sites. As a result, at several polling sites, serious bottlenecks developed. These bottlenecks were the result of several factors: first, the *vocales*, as could be expected, initially were unfamiliar with the electoral procedures; second,

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<sup>29</sup> See Appendix X.

<sup>30</sup> The placing of numbers on the ballots was designed to prevent what is commonly known as "relay voting" whereby a voter is given a pre-marked ballot before entering the polling site. This ballot is deposited in the ballot box and the voter removes from the polling site an unmarked ballot which was provided by the election officials. The unmarked ballot is then handed over to those orchestrating the scheme, often in exchange for some money or other consideration.



Chileans responded to the entreaties of their political leaders who had urged that the population go to the polls early in the morning; third, the large numbers of *mesas* at many polling sites created a degree of human gridlock, further exacerbating the problem.

The morning delays raised concerns that many Chileans would be disenfranchised either because the polls would close before they had an opportunity to cast their ballots or because they would grow tired of waiting and would leave the polling site without casting their ballots. Chileans, however, assured the delegation members that they would wait on line for as long as necessary. "After all," more than one Chilean remarked, "we have waited to vote 15 years, what is a few more hours."

Nonetheless, the prospect of massive disenfranchisement was a matter of sufficient concern that the leaders of the delegation, who were observing the voting in Santiago, paid an impromptu visit on the director of the Electoral Service at 3:30 p.m. on plebiscite day.<sup>31</sup> The director assured the delegation leaders that the polling sites would remain open until everyone had voted. He promised to publicize this fact but suggested that the problems had already been resolved at most polling sites.

To confirm this point, the leaders, as well as most of the NDI teams, returned to the sites visited earlier in the day and observed that the lines indeed had vanished and that most people had voted. Thus, at most sites, the polls were able to close after nine hours of operations, the minimum period prescribed by Chilean law. Given the incredibly high turnout reported, it appears that few Chileans were denied their right to vote because of delays or because of other administrative problems.

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<sup>31</sup> Disenfranchisement was one of the mechanisms used by the Marcos regime in the 1986 presidential election in the Philippines. Several members of the Delegation had served as observers for that election; hence, they were conscious of the potential impact on the results of the election that could be caused by a concerted effort to disenfranchise segments of the population.

## *2. Providing for a Secret Ballot*

Many Chileans, according to polls conducted prior to the plebiscite, were skeptical that their vote would be secret. Rumors of hidden cameras in the polling booth and the tracing of votes by reference to the numbers on the ballots were cited as ways the government could detect how an individual cast his or her ballot.

To combat these fears, the Command for the No and other organizations sought to convince Chileans that their ballots in fact would be secret. They explained that the number on the ballots would be removed before the ballot was placed in the box and that the party pollwatchers would examine the voting booth for the presence of cameras. Their efforts appeared to have been successful as the delegation members did not encounter any complaints regarding the secrecy of the ballot.

## *3. Providing for a Free Ballot*

The issue of voter intimidation also was raised in discussions prior to the plebiscite. In particular, the opposition feared that the presence of soldiers and other security forces in the vicinity of the polling sites would contribute to the general level of intimidation felt by many Chileans. For this reason, the opposition emphasized the importance of ensuring that the security forces remained more than 20 meters from the polling sites as prescribed by the electoral law.

The delegation was impressed with the professionalism of the security forces and their willingness to assist in the process. Thus, even in those cases where the security forces were not outside the polling sites, the delegation members did not observe the security forces attempting to influence voters and did not hear any complaints from the party pollwatchers regarding the conduct of the security forces.

## *4. Monitoring the Process*

The pollwatchers designated by the nationally and regionally recognized political parties played a critical role in guaranteeing the fairness of the plebiscite. Each recognized party was

authorized to name one pollwatcher for each *mesa* and a general pollwatcher for each polling site. The pollwatchers could protest the actions of the *vocales*, and their protests would be noted in the minutes of the *mesa*. The pollwatchers also were authorized to obtain a certified copy of the results.

In most polling sites visited by the delegation, there were an adequate number of pollwatchers representing the "yes" and "no" campaigns present to ensure that problems would be noted; indeed, in many places, the pollwatchers from both campaigns assisted the *vocales* in the performance of their duties, contributing to the orderliness of the process.

### 5. Problem Areas

For the most part, the plebiscite was administered in a manner that deserves emulation. There were, however, a few isolated problems that warrant mention. Their existence should not detract from the overall very positive assessment of the process.

In Arica, the northernmost city in Chile, delegation members visited one *mesa* where they were told that approximately 50 ballots had marks on them. The pollwatchers complained and clean ballots were substituted. It was not clear who had marked the ballots.

In Los Muermos, a town in the south of Chile near Puerto Montt, delegation members observed a leader of the National Renewal Party ordering the presidents of the different *mesas* on what to do. The delegation members also were told that local businessmen had provided bus tickets only to those individuals who promised to vote "yes."

Finally, in Santa Juana, a small town 40 kilometers from Concepcion, the mayor of the town during the campaign had sought to use the teachers in the town to encourage voting for Pinochet.<sup>32</sup> A Christian Democrat pollwatcher reported that

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<sup>32</sup> See Concepcion team report, included in Appendix XII.

the mayor's deputy was inside the women's polling station reminding everyone how to vote.

### C. Summary

The administration of the plebiscite by the Electoral Service deserves considerable praise. The delegation leaders who met with the director of the Electoral Service on the day of the plebiscite appreciated his responsiveness to the concerns raised. Others who contributed to the administration of the plebiscite in a free and orderly manner include: the *vocales* who administered the actual balloting process; the party pollwatchers whose presence provided a sense of confidence to voters; and the security forces.

Since there will be presidential and congressional elections in 1989, the Electoral Service must begin preparing for these events in the near future. The director of the service has indicated an interest in making minor changes in the electoral procedures to reduce the lines and the resulting delays. Among the changes being considered are increasing the number of the polling sites, placing a maximum limit on the number of *mesas* at any given polling site and encouraging voters to stagger their visits to the polls.

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## Chapter 6

### THE COUNTING PROCESS

While there was relative confidence in the balloting process, the opposition, prior to the plebiscite, expressed concern about the counting process. Under Chilean law, the official results are not proclaimed until at least 10 days after the plebiscite. The National Electoral Service, meanwhile, would not announce the semi-official results it obtained from the *Colegios Escrutadores* (Scrutinizing Boards) until between three and six days after the plebiscite. Under these circumstances, the opposition feared that the Ministry of Interior, which historically had accurately reported the unofficial results on election night, might either manipulate the results or delay their announcement.

For this reason, the opposition organized its own comprehensive count that was available on the night of the plebiscite. The Committee for Free Elections also organized a quick-count effort based on a random selection of 2,221 *mesas* (approximately 10 percent of the total). Finally, the Command for the Yes also organized a quick count operation.

Given that four unofficial counts would be available on the night of the plebiscite, the delegation feared that discrepancies in these counts would raise serious concerns about the legitimacy of the process. The initial release of information exacerbated these concerns; while the Command for the No and the Committee for Free Elections released periodic information relating to the status of their counts beginning at 9 and 10:15 p.m. respectively, the Ministry of Interior seemed to be withholding information after their initial announcements early in the evening. Ultimately, at 2 a.m., the public counts converged,

showing a substantial "no" victory. At 2:30 a.m., the minister of interior held a press conference at which he confirmed that the "no" position had received a majority of the votes.

Because of the significant role the unofficial counts played in the Chilean plebiscite process and because of their importance generally in encouraging the forthright reporting of electoral results, the first part of this section reviews how the different plebiscite counts were conducted. The second part of the section provides a detailed account of events from the closing of the polls until the minister of interior's announcement at 2:30 a.m.<sup>33</sup>

### A. Counting the Ballots in Chile

Once the voting was completed at the polling site, the *vocales* began the process of counting the ballots. This process occurred in the presence of the pollwatchers and the general public. The former were entitled to a certified copy of the results.

The counting process involved the following steps. The *vocales* would count the number of signatures in the registration book, the number of stubs removed from the ballots, and the number of ballots in the box. They would then unfold, read aloud and tabulate the ballots. The delegation members did not observe any significant disputes regarding the counting of the ballots.

After all the ballots were tabulated, two copies of the tallies or "minutes of scrutiny" were prepared: one was delivered by the president of the *mesa* to the scrutinizing board on the day following the plebiscite; a second copy was mailed to the director of the Electoral Service in Santiago. The *vocales* also prepared a copy of the minutes containing the results and, together with the electoral paraphernalia, delivered them to the

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<sup>33</sup> Appendix XI contains copies of the results as reported by the National Electoral Service, the Committee for Free Elections and the Command for the No. It also includes a chart illustrating the time results were released by the different quick count operations.

Electoral Board delegate at the polling site. With the counting complete at the *mesa* level, the representatives of the unofficial counting operations sought to relay the information, according to a pre-arranged plan, to Santiago.

### 1. *The Ministry of Interior Count*

The Electoral Board delegate was responsible for collecting the results from the *mesas* at each polling site and delivering them to the provincial governor who transmitted the results to the Ministry of Interior in Santiago. Given the ministry's resources and the technical level of its communication network, this count was expected to be among the quickest available on the night of the plebiscite. The ministry counting operation was open to the media and diplomats; however, in keeping with the government's unwillingness to recognize officially the presence of international observers, requests by the delegation for access to the ministry's counting site were denied.

### 2. *CEL "Quick Count"*

The Committee for Free Election conducted a quick count based on the following system. Prior to the plebiscite, CEL designated 2,221 randomly selected *mesas* (approximately 10 percent of the total) for inclusion in its count. Volunteers, drawn primarily from CIVITAS, obtained the results from the designated *mesas* and then telephoned a volunteer in Santiago. Each volunteer in Santiago handled no more than 40 *mesas*.

Using this system, CEL expected to release the results from 500 *mesas* within three hours of the closing of polls. These early results would be accurate to within four points at a confidence level of 95 percent. By the time all 2,221 *mesas* were counted, the margin of error would be under three percentage points at a confidence level of 99 percent.

### 3. *Command for the No*

The Command for the No conducted a comprehensive count that sought to include results from nearly all the *mesas* in the country. Its plan worked as follows. An official poll-watcher designated by a recognized political party obtained a certified copy of the results from the *vocales*, as authorized by

the law. He/she then handed this copy to a designated messenger who delivered it to one of the Command's 40 counting centers located throughout the country. If the counting center was more than 30 kilometers from the polling site, the results were telephoned to a designated center.

At the counting center, the results were placed on accumulation sheets. When the results from a sufficient number of *mesas* had been incorporated on the sheets, the sheets were sent by facsimile machine to Santiago. Once the sheets were received in Santiago, each *mesa's* results were separately entered into computers operated by the Command.

Assuming there were no problems, the Command expected to have 70 percent of the count completed by midnight. Based on these figures, it would be able to predict accurately the outcome of the plebiscite. However, the Command also recognized that the system could be easily disrupted, a concern highlighted by the blackouts that affected much of the country on the eve of the plebiscite.

#### 4. *Command for the Yes*

The Command for the Yes also developed a quick count operation, apparently in response to the other counts being planned. Its system was based on obtaining results from the first five *mesas* to complete their count at each polling site. The Command statisticians claimed that this would provide a sufficiently random sample from which extrapolations could be made. The Command expected to announce preliminary results by 8 or 9 p.m.

#### 5. *The Official Count*

While the attention of the media and the observers was directed to the unofficial counts that would be available on the night of the plebiscite, it is worth reviewing how the official count was conducted. As mentioned above, the minutes of scrutiny were taken by the president of each *mesa* at 2 p.m. on the day following the plebiscite to the place designated for the meeting of the 194 scrutinizing boards. Each board included six members and a secretary; the members were elected by the



presidents of the *mesas* from among their ranks, while the secretary was designated by the director of the Electoral Service.

The board reviewed the results from each *mesa*; however, they were not authorized to hear challenges regarding the validity of the results. The minutes prepared by each board included a *cuadro* (chart) listing the results from each *mesa*. Three copies of the *cuadros* were prepared. One was incorporated into the book of minutes, one was dispatched by mail to the director of the Electoral Service in Santiago and a third was brought to the provincial Electoral Board. The director released the results obtained through the scrutiny of 162 boards on Tuesday, October 11.

The Electoral Qualifying Court (EQC), established by the 1980 Constitution, was the organ responsible for proclaiming the official results of the plebiscite. It was composed of four members: three former or current Supreme Court Justices and one lawyer selected by the Supreme Court. The EQC began meeting 10 days after the plebiscite and was authorized to review all claims challenging the conduct of the balloting and counting processes.

## **B. Reporting of the Plebiscite Results**

The first reports regarding the likely results of the plebiscite were issued by a respected French polling organization that had conducted exit polls. The results showed a victory for the "no" position with a 60 percent to 40 percent margin. However, given the limited amount of relevant electoral history data available, there was some skepticism as to the ultimate accuracy of the exit poll.

At 7:30 p.m., 90 minutes later than scheduled, Undersecretary of the Interior Alberto Cardemil announced that, with one percent of the vote counted, the "yes" position was leading. The Command for the No, meanwhile, had announced it would not release results until at least 500,000 votes had been tabulated both to avoid the charge that the Command was manipulating the release of the numbers and to ensure that the

numbers released had some statistical significance. However, at approximately 9 p.m., the Command leaders decided they could wait no longer and announced the results of the first 180,000 ballots tabulated; this showed the "no" ahead by a 61 percent to 39 percent margin.

From this point on, the Command updated its figures as more results were tabulated. By 11 p.m., when delegation members visited the No headquarters, almost 2.4 million ballots had been tabulated; although the "no" margin was now 59 to 41 percent, the numbers of votes tabulated were sufficient to be confident the "no" had won. An hour later, the police assigned to protect the Command headquarters were suddenly removed, causing considerable apprehension among those present.

Meanwhile, at approximately 10 p.m., Undersecretary Cardemil provided an update. Although the numbers still exhibited a lead for the "yes," to the surprise of many the total number of tabulated ballots was quite small. This was the last announcement from the ministry for four hours.

Soon after Cardemil's announcement, at 10:15 p.m., CEL released the results of its quick count; with 735 of the randomly selected *mesas* tabulated, the "no" was ahead by a 55.2 percent to 42.6 percent margin. CEL released a second set of figures at 12:00 a.m., showing, with 1600 of the *mesas* tabulated, the "no" was leading by a 55.0 percent to 42.7 percent margin.

The next major development was a comment on a television program by the leader of the National Renewal Party, Sergio Jarpa, indicating a "tendency" for the "no". The Command for the No had been sharing its results with Jarpa and his colleagues throughout the evening. The leaders of the National Renewal Party, relying on this information, urged the government to release accurate data and to accept the results.

At 12:30 a.m., Air Force Commander Fernando Matthei, entering the presidential palace for a meeting of the junta, stated to a Chilean radio reporter that "it appeared the 'no' had won", thus making it difficult for the junta to repudiate the process or the results. At 2 a.m., Undersecretary Cardemil,

appearing a third time, released figures showing the "no" ahead by a 53.3 percent to 44.3 percent margin with 71.73 percent of the vote tabulated. A half hour later, Minister of Interior Sergio Fernandez, who had directed the "yes" campaign, read a statement in which he officially acknowledged the "no" victory.

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## *Chapter 7*

### *THE RESULTS*

On Tuesday, October 11, the National Electoral Service released results from 162 of the 194 boards, comprising 88 percent of the 22,247 mesas. They showed that with 6.4 million ballots tabulated the "no" was ahead by 820,000 votes or by a 55.5 percent to 41.8 percent margin.<sup>34</sup> The figures project a total voter turnout of 7.2 million, constituting 97 percent of the registered voters and 85 percent of the total voting age population. These numbers are unprecedented in Chile's electoral history and compare favorably with the figures achieved in most democratic countries.

The Command for the No reported similar results on Monday, October 10. With 21,059 mesas tabulated, 3.76 million or 54.95 percent had voted for the "no," while 2.93 million or 42.76 percent had voted for the "yes."<sup>35</sup> The CEL projections, based on the random sample conducted, worked out as follows: 3.98 million votes for the "no" and 3.09 votes for the "yes", a 55 percent to 43 percent margin.<sup>36</sup>

The Command for the No results showed that the "no" position won in every region of Chile except for Region IX

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<sup>34</sup> See Appendix XI.

<sup>35</sup> See Appendix XI.

<sup>36</sup> See Appendix XI.

(Region de la Araucania).<sup>37</sup> Further, men provided significantly more support for the "no" position than did women; the "no" won by a margin of 58.6 percent to 39.33 percent among men, while the margin was only 51.5 percent to 46.0 percent among women.

The CEL projections contained a further breakdown of the figures. The "no" margin was greatest in large cities (58.7 to 39.2 percent); in medium cities the margin was smaller (54.4 to 43.2 percent), while in small towns and rural areas the "yes" position was more popular by a narrow margin (49.1 to 48.3 percent). The "yes" position also was more popular among those who voted in wealthy neighborhoods (56.4 to 42.2 percent), while the "no" position was the more popular choice in middle and lower class neighborhoods (59.2 to 38.9 percent and 63.2 to 34.4 percent respectively). Finally, the CEL figures confirmed that those Chileans who registered to vote early were more likely to support the "yes" position than those who registered later in the process; the former favored the "no" position by a 52.8 percent to 45.1 percent margin, while among the latter the "no" was favored by 59.6 to 38.1 percent.

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<sup>37</sup> The National Electoral Service numbers as of October 11 showed the "yes" winning also in Region VII; however, the total number of mesas included in the count was only 73.3 per cent of the total.

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## *Chapter 8*

### *THE PLEBISCITE AFTERMATH*

For those who supported the "no" position, the days following the plebiscite were a time for celebrations. There was a spontaneous rally on Thursday, October 6, in front of the presidential palace; the Command for the No worried that the rally would get out of hand and urged demonstrators to return home. On Friday, October 7, the opposition organized a massive rally in O'Higgins Park, which had been denied to the opposition as a rally site during the campaign. Similar celebrations occurred throughout the country.

There were also some unsettling developments on the days following the plebiscite. On October 6 and 7, scores of Chileans were attacked by water cannons and tear gas as they sought to celebrate the "no" victory on the main street of Santiago. In addition, at least 20 foreign journalists, particularly photographers, were beaten by the police. One of the journalists required hospitalization, while another, who was chased three blocks by the police, suffered a broken nose.

#### **A. Government Response**

Despite the government's acknowledgment of defeat on the night of the plebiscite, President Pinochet was not ready to enter into a dialogue with the opposition over Chile's political future. Instead, the president called for respect of the Constitution and vowed to maintain the policies of the past 15 years.

Minister of Interior Fernandez, who directed the "yes" campaign, appeared even more recalcitrant as he sought to



*Rallies in support of the "no" and "yes" campaigns prior to the plebiscite.*





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*(left to right) Osvaldo Hurtado, Bruce Babbitt and Misael Pastrana approach a polling station in downtown Santiago.*



*Lines of voters on election day.*



© Marcelo Montecino





*Delegation members watch voting at Santiago polling station. (left to right) Adolfo Suarez, Chilean election official, Brian Atwood, Peter Dailey, translator and Raul Morodo.*



*Counting the ballots at a Santiago polling station.*



© Marcelo Montecino

*Genaro Arriagada announcing results at Santiago press conference.*



*Flanked by members of the delegation (seated left to right) Osvaldo Hurtado; delegation co-leaders, Peter Dailey, Adolfo Suarez, Bruce Babbitt and Misael Pastrana; and NDI Executive Vice President Kenneth Wollack meet the press in Santiago.*

explain away the victory by the "no" forces. He claimed that support of Pinochet by 43 percent of the electorate was unprecedented for someone who has served as president for 15 years. He further suggested that the opposition figure of 55 percent should be divided among the 16 parties of the opposition coalition, implying that if Pinochet ran for President in a multi-candidate election he would likely emerge as the victor.

Others who supported the "yes" position appeared more conciliatory. Sergio Jarpa and Andres Allamand, president and secretary-general respectively of the National Renewal Party, both advocated that negotiations regarding constitutional changes might be appropriate. They were joined by Patricio Phillips, president of the National Party.

Perhaps most significant was the position of Air Force General Matthei whose comments on the night of the plebiscite acknowledging the "no" victory preceded the government's formal concession. Matthei was reported as supporting a dialogue with leaders of the opposition.


## **B. Opposition Position**

Having overcome tremendous odds in achieving a major victory, the leaders of the Command for the No did not have much time to celebrate. They quickly realized that the Government would not fall immediately and that unless the population was urged to exercise patience the situation could deteriorate beyond their control. Thus, by the beginning of the week following the plebiscite, opposition leaders were developing strategies that would demonstrate a commitment to national reconciliation and dialogue but that at the same time would build upon the momentum provided for by the plebiscite.

One important aspect of the process, according to opposition leaders, was to maintain the united coalition that had worked together in the plebiscite. Discussions were underway on ways to institutionalize the Command for the No structure, perhaps under a new name such as the "Command for Democracy," and to present a single candidate in the 1989 presidential election. At the same time, the coalition would have to develop

Por LUCIA SANTA CRUZ

Los visitantes observarán las urnas al igual que todo el proceso anterior al día del plebiscito.



—¿Con cuánta anticipación van a llegar?

—Unos días antes del plebiscito. Habrá reuniones informativas en Santiago con el Gobierno, con el Servicio Electoral, con los distintos actores del «Sí» y del «No» y un encuentro con la prensa para informar acerca de cuáles son los términos de referencia de este grupo. El día antes los distintos miembros viajarán a las regiones.

—¿Con qué criterios se eligen los lugares donde van a operar?

—Hay limitaciones logísticas porque dependemos de los lugares donde haya hoteles y transporte. Por ello estaremos basados principalmente en las grandes ciudades.

—Pero eso podría crear la primera distorsión, puesto que de acuerdo a las encuestas el Sí, por ejemplo, tiene mayoría en las ciudades más pequeñas y en las áreas rurales.

—Claro. Por supuesto que se visitarán las pequeñas localidades durante el día de la votación desde las ciudades.

—¿Cuándo se hará el primer informe?

—Probablemente habrá un pronunciamiento general de acuerdo a lo que se haya observado, pero el informe oficial se hará varias semanas después. Esa es nuestra ventaja sobre la prensa, la cual tiene que informar y dar juicios muy rápidos. Nosotros queremos asegurarnos que cualquier cosa que di-

gamos sea el resultado de una opinión de consenso.

—¿Habrá un pronunciamiento ese mismo día?

—Eso habrá que determinarlo en su momento si hay algo acerca de lo cual pronunciarse y será decidido por los líderes de la delegación de acuerdo a lo que hayan percibido.

### Objetividad: lo primero

—Me imagino que usted habrá examinado el sistema electoral, los registros, la ley de votaciones y escrutinios. ¿Cuál es su opinión al respecto?

—Prefiero no dar una opinión, porque podría ser interpretada como la visión de la delegación y ello no corresponde. Pero sí puedo decirle que los que hemos estado aquí estos días hemos quedado impresionados por los aspectos técnicos de los registros. Es un sistema (técnicamente muy impresionante).

—¿Hay quienes temen que la oposición intente negar a toda costa un posible triunfo del «Sí» y que podrían hacer alegaciones de fraude infundadas, pero que podrían ser avaladas por los observadores...?

—Mire: Ni aquí ni en ninguna parte estamos vinculados a un grupo específico. Por lo que ha sido nuestra ex-

periencia, por todos nuestros antecedentes, le puedo asegurar que mantendremos estándares muy estrictos para nuestra tarea. A nosotros nos interesa evaluar cómo se desarrolló la campaña, si las personas pudieron o no votar en secreto y sin presiones y si los escrutinios son seguros y correctos. De ninguna manera vamos a depender de la información de un solo lado. Las personas que integrarán esta misión son de gran prestigio y estatura y le aseguro que su reputación y la nuestra como Instituto no pueden ponerse en juego. No estamos dispuestos a ser usados por ningún sector.

—Ahora, un porcentaje de chilenos, con razón o sin ella, simplemente no cree que el gobierno de Estados Unidos sea imparcial respecto al próximo plebiscito; tampoco cree que lo sea el NED en la medida en que ha ayudado a financiar al comando por el No. ¿Qué garantías hay de que, siendo el Presidente Pinochet una figura que despierta hostilidad en el extranjero, su eventual triunfo tenga una posibilidad de ser reconocido internacionalmente?

—La única garantía que le puedo dar es que tenemos una reputación; pautas de trabajo estrictamente profesionales y puntos de referencia objetivos; que nuestras fuentes de información serán muy diversas y que el informe será el producto de una elaboración conjunta de un grupo de observadores de alto nivel, proveniente de un amplio espectro político. Nadie se jugará su reputación actuando arbitrariamente.

—¿Cómo podrán evaluar la campaña si sólo llegarán tres días antes de la votación? ¿De acuerdo a qué criterios se decide si la habido equidad?

—Bueno, no hay una forma científica de medir estas cosas, pero creo que personas de alto nivel, con vasta experiencia en estas materias, lo podrán evaluar en conjunto y llegar a una conclusión al respecto. Tenemos mucha información recopilada; este material será analizado por los delegados, todos los cuales tienen suficientes trayectoria en estas lides como para formarse un juicio.

### Los votos del extranjero

—Hay algunos problemas potenciales que me gustaría saber cómo van a resolver. Por ejemplo: Un líder de la oposición ha dicho que los chilenos residentes en el extranjero votarán, aunque la ley no lo contempla y que sus votos serán computados en los resultados de la oposición. Eso significa que de todas formas va a ver una discrepancia entre las cifras oficiales y las de la oposición.

—La verdad es que primera vez que digo esto. Lo que yo entiendo es que el recuento será el día de nuestro y si se computan los del extranjero deberán ir en informe aparte.

—¿Cree usted que un informe favorable respecto al proceso electoral contribuirá a la credibilidad internacional del plebiscito?

—Nosotros como instituto no organizamos observadores a la elección de Corea, pero le puedo asegurar que la presencia de observadores internacionales fue, en definitiva, muy positiva para el gobierno. Pero que quede claro. Nosotros no estamos aquí para juzgar el sistema político en sí mismo. Puede ser que haya gobiernos o dirigentes políticos que tengan reservas respecto al contexto político chileno. Pero no es nuestra tarea emitir juicios al respecto. Sólo nos concernen evaluar el acto electoral mismo en los tres niveles que le he dicho: la campaña, la votación y los escrutinios. Y si le hacemos de acuerdo a reglas muy concretas, especificadas en los libros, acerca de cómo se recolecta la información y cómo se analiza. Y, por cierto, respetando las restricciones legales y acatando las instrucciones que rigen los escrutinios locales de votación. Cualquiera que mirar el recuento, así es que creo que no tendremos problemas.

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## *Chapter 9*

### *REFLECTIONS ON OBSERVING THE PLEBISCITE*

In the aftermath of the plebiscite, Chileans were analyzing two seemingly paradoxical questions: first, why had Pinochet permitted the occurrence of a process in which he could be defeated? second, how had the opposition managed to overcome such tremendous odds in orchestrating a "no" victory?

With respect to the first question, some Chileans speculated that Pinochet until the very end could not fathom his personal unpopularity. Others suggested that Pinochet's decision to proceed with the plebiscite must be understood in the context of Chilean legalism and the desire for legitimacy. Once the Constitution was in place, Pinochet had no choice but to play by its rules.

As to the opposition's success, there are several key factors that are worth noting. First, there was the decision to use the electoral process as a mechanism for peacefully restoring democratic government, notwithstanding initial fears that participation would be construed as legitimizing the current constitutional regime. By focussing on this theme, the opposition was able to involve the Church, according to polls the most influential institution in Chilean society, and other traditionally nonpartisan organizations in its efforts.

Second, the opposition was able to overcome the major divisions in Chilean political society and to present a unified coalition. In this regard, the Chileans were aware of the contrast between the Philippines, where a united opposition had succeeded in toppling an incumbent president, and South Korea,

where a divided opposition was blamed for the victory by the ruling party candidate.

Third, the opposition recognized the importance of planning for the plebiscite campaign and utilized the information obtained by various polls conducted during the past year. These polls not only identified the extent of support for and opposition to Pinochet, but highlighted the importance for the opposition in obtaining access to television, Chile's most influential medium. The opposition then made excellent use of its access to television during the campaign by focussing its message in a manner that appealed to the aspirations of a majority of the Chilean people.

Fourth, the opposition, with the help of such nominally nonpartisan organizations as the Committee for Free Elections and the CIVITAS, sought to educate the population regarding the importance of monitoring the balloting and counting processes. The latter effort involved the design of two independent counting systems that worked to perfection.

Fifth, the opposition sought the assistance of the international community to counter the government's financial and other advantages and in monitoring the government's willingness to conduct a fair plebiscite. This monitoring effort began well in advance of the plebiscite campaign and culminated with the unprecedented number of observers that were present for the plebiscite. Consequently, the Chilean authorities knew the likely international repercussions from any attempt to manipulate the plebiscite process.

The observers, in performing their task in an objective and credible manner, had to overcome a bias -- inherent in their commitment to democratic forms of government -- regarding the nature of the electoral exercise. Their presence served to provide support for and reassurances to the Chilean people, many of whom had never voted or participated in the administration of an election. Further, as happened during the plebiscite day meeting with the director of the National Electoral Service, the observers were able to raise certain issues with election officials in a manner that assured their receiving prompt

attention. Finally, the fact that large numbers of observers were present for the plebiscite assures that there is now a cadre of political leaders from around the world who are committed to supporting the Chilean people as they continue their struggle for a democratic future.

## APPENDICES



## Appendix I

## COMITE POR ELECCIONES LIBRES

## CONVOCANTES

- Silvia Alessandri
- Nemesio Antúnez
- José Miguel Barros
- Edgardo Condeza
- Jorge Edwards
- Alfredo Elcheberry
- Eduardo Frei R.T.

- Oscar Godoy
- Mónica Jiménez
- Sergio Molina S.
- Moy Morales de Tola
- Anibal Pinto
- Alejandro Ríos Valdivia
- Igor Saavedra

The Honorable Walter F. Mondale  
Chairman  
National Democratic Institute for  
International Affairs  
1717 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.  
Suite 605  
Washington, DC 20036

Santiago, August 22nd, 1988.


Dear Vice President Mondale :

I understand that the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is planning to sponsor an international delegation to observe the upcoming presidential plebiscite in Chile. The Committee for Free Elections (CEL) welcomes the NDI delegation which we believe demonstrates international support for a free and fair plebiscite.

As you may know, the CEL -- a nonpartisan, independent Committee of prominent Chilean personalities -- is monitoring the electoral process to help ensure that the plebiscite reflects the will of the people of Chile. The NDI mission is consistent with these goals and objectives.

We appreciate your Institute's interest in this historic event and look forward to meeting with the NDI group during its visit.

Sincerely,



Sergio Molina S.  
CEL Representative

Vicuña Mackenna # 3, Of. 2102 - Santiago de Chile

# Testigos del Plebiscito

El Mercurio, August 28, 1988

**K**ENNETH Wolick es el hombre encargado de organizar una de las delegaciones más importantes de observadores al próximo plebiscito presidencial. Esto corresponde a una iniciativa del Instituto Nacional Demócrata sobre Asuntos Internacionales, organismo establecido en 1983 por el Congreso norteamericano para actuar como uno de los 4 cogarantes del Fondo Nacional para la Democracia (NED), junto a los institutos Republicano, Laboral y de la comunidad empresarial. Vinculado al partido Demócrata, recibe fondos del NED y del gobierno federal, opera bajo la presidencia de Walter Mondale, pero tiene autonomía de decisión para realizar sus actividades en la comunidad internacional.

Los objetivos del Instituto Nacional Demócrata son básicamente tres: apoyar a los partidos políticos de un espectro ideológico muy amplio en docenas de países; ayudar a consolidar las instituciones en las democracias emergentes, como Argentina, Brasil o Uruguay, en orden a "mejorar los mecanismos gubernamentales proveyendo asistencia técnica en diversas materias relacionadas con el proceso legislativo, la reforma constitucional o la elaboración de presupuestos", y, en tercer lugar, actuar en los procesos electorales en distintas partes del mundo, a veces respondiendo a la solicitud de partidos o de gobiernos para colaborar en la elaboración de leyes electorales y en el análisis del funcionamiento de los actos electorales mismos.

En este contexto se han propuesto, como iniciativa propia, organizar una delegación de entre 50 y 60 personas, ex jefes de estado, parlamentarios y expertos electorales de Estados Unidos, Latinoamérica, Europa, Asia y África, quienes harán de testigos en el plebiscito chileno. "Trabajamos sobre una base multinacional; no creemos que los Estados Unidos posean la autoridad universal sobre estas materias, así es que tratamos de usar expertos de varios países porque no todo lo que sirve en una situación es aplicable a otra; no estamos para imponer nada, sino que para compartir conocimiento".

Su reciente viaje a Chile, junto a otros 8 miembros del Instituto Demócrata para comenzar los preparativos iniciales de su próxima misión, no es su primer compromiso en Chile. En 1986 le tocó organizar una invitación a los miembros del Acuerdo Nacional para un seminario en Caracas destinado a discutir los procesos de transición en el mundo.

## Una práctica común

—¿Quién ha organizado su participación como "observadores" en el próximo plebiscito?

—Si bien creo que con esta iniciativa respondemos a los intereses de varios sectores de la sociedad chilena, nuestro interés por observar elecciones no se limita al caso chileno ni mucho menos. Para nosotros es una práctica común y para nuestras propias elecciones en Estados Unidos siempre invitamos observadores de todas partes del mundo. En este sentido venimos por iniciativa propia y a una actividad separada y distinta a cualquiera participación que haya podido tener el NED. Aunque no hemos sido invitados por el gobierno, se nos ha informado que si queremos venir a ver cómo se desarrolla la próxima elección seremos bienvenidos.

—¿Cuántos y quiénes serán estos "observadores"?

—La idea es que sean entre 50 y 60 personas: ex jefes de Estado, ministros, parlamentarios, líderes políticos y expertos electorales de variados países. La delegación norteamericana incluirá por partes iguales a demócratas y republicanos y entre ellos esperamos cubrir el más amplio espectro político, desde socialdemócratas hasta conservadores.

—¿Ya tiene algunos nombres comprometidos?



- "La reputación, el prestigio, la experiencia y la diversidad ideológica de los miembros de nuestra delegación son la garantía de nuestra imparcialidad, porque no venimos a tomar partido a favor de nadie".
- "Queremos información de todos los lados. Nuestro papel no es 'garantizar' la limpieza del proceso electoral, porque eso les corresponde exclusivamente a los chilenos".
- "Los observadores internacionales en las elecciones son una práctica común en todas partes del mundo".
- "Trabajamos de acuerdo a pautas objetivas, profesionales y de acuerdo a prácticas universalmente reconocidas: observamos e informamos, pero nunca rumores sino que hechos debidamente fundamentados".

—Prefiero no dar nombres todavía, porque no la nómina final confirmada. Dentro de 3 semanas posiblemente podremos informar al respecto.

—La percepción de algunos sectores chilenos es que la venida de observadores ofende nuestra "dignidad nacional" y pretende poner en cuestión la credibilidad de las Fuerzas Armadas como garantes de la limpieza del acto electoral.

—Me interesa mucho desmitificar todo este asunto. Le repito: para nosotros es una práctica común. No estamos aquí para intervenir en los asuntos internos de Chile. No vendremos a "interferir" que el proceso sea correcto ni mucho menos. Nuestro papel es "observar" cerca del de los periodistas. Vendremos a mirar, a observar y sólo seremos una suerte de testigos, como dice el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Hay un gran interés internacional por este plebiscito y nosotros respondemos a ese interés. Luego, haremos un informe para nuestros respectivos gobiernos y para la comunidad internacional.

El tema de la garantía de la limpieza del proceso es algo que corresponde a los chilenos. Y ciertamente, no vendremos para tomar partido por ningún bando. Seremos escrupulosos respecto a con quienes nos entrevistamos. Durante nuestra estadía hemos tenido conversaciones con personeros de go-

bierno no sólo en Santiago, sino en regiones; con organizaciones de la campaña del Sí y del No, con militantes, autoridades locales, sectores eclesidásticos, representantes de los partidos etc.


## "No habrá manipulación"

—Uno de los temores que se han expresado es que los observadores sean manipulados por la oposición, en el supuesto de que quienes vienen serán parciales a sus posiciones...

—Nuestra delegación será políticamente muy diversa. El informe que se elabore se basará sobre las observaciones individuales del grupo. Creemos que la reputación de las personas que participarán hablará por sí mismas. Es difícil que haya manipulación. Existen estándares internacionales para este proceso de observación electoral. La información se recoge entre todos los sectores de la sociedad: Gobierno, partidos, el Servicio Electoral, el Tribunal Calificador, las diversas fuerzas en competencia. Hay instrucciones muy precisas acerca del cómo se informa respecto a lo observado; no se da cuenta de rumores; todo debe basarse en hechos comprobados y si se dan discrepancias, que son usuales en este género de contienda, lo que se hace es informar los dos lados de la disputa.

Por LUCIA SANTA CRUZ

Los visitantes observarán las urnas al igual que todo el proceso anterior al día del plebiscito.



—¿Con cuánta anticipación van a llegar?

—Unos días antes del plebiscito. Habrá reuniones informativas en Santiago con el Gobierno, con el Servicio Electoral, con los distintos actores del «Sí» y del «No» y un encuentro con la prensa para informar acerca de cuáles son los términos de referencia de este grupo. El día antes los distintos miembros viajarán a las regiones.

—¿Con qué criterios se eligen los lugares donde van a operar?

—Hay limitaciones logísticas porque dependemos de los lugares donde haya hoteles y transporte. Por ello estaremos basados principalmente en las grandes ciudades.

—Pero eso podría crear la primera distorsión, puesto que de acuerdo a las encuestas el Sí, por ejemplo, tiene mayoría en las ciudades más pequeñas y en las áreas rurales.

—Claro. Por supuesto que se visitarán las pequeñas localidades durante el día de la votación desde las ciudades.

—¿Cuándo se hará el primer informe?

—Probablemente habrá un pronunciamiento general de acuerdo a lo que se haya observado, pero el informe oficial se hará varias semanas después. Esa es nuestra ventaja sobre la prensa, la cual tiene que informar y dar juicios muy rápidos. Nosotros queremos asegurarnos que cualquier cosa que di-

gamos sea el resultado de una opinión de consenso.

—¿Habrá un pronunciamiento ese mismo día?

—Eso habrá que determinarlo en su momento si hay algo acerca de lo cual pronunciarse y será decidido por los líderes de la delegación de acuerdo a lo que hayan percibido.

### Objetividad: lo primero

—Me imagino que usted habrá examinado el sistema electoral, los registros, la ley de votaciones y escrutinios. ¿Cuál es su opinión al respecto?

—Prefiero no dar una opinión, porque podría ser interpretada como la visión de la delegación y ello no corresponde. Pero sí puedo decirle que los que hemos estado aquí estos días hemos quedado impresionados por los aspectos técnicos de los registros. Es un sistema (técnicamente muy impresionante).

—¿Hay quienes temen que la oposición intente negar a toda costa un posible triunfo del «Sí» y que podrían hacer alegaciones de fraude infundadas, pero que podrían ser avaladas por los observadores...?

—Mire: Ni aquí ni en ninguna parte estamos vinculados a un grupo específico. Por lo que ha sido nuestra ex-

periencia, por todos nuestros antecedentes, le puedo asegurar que mantendremos estándares muy estrictos para nuestra tarea. A nosotros nos interesa evaluar cómo se desarrolló la campaña, si las personas pudieron o no votar en secreto y sin presiones y si los escrutinios son seguros y correctos. De ninguna manera vamos a depender de la información de un solo lado. Las personas que integrarán esta misión son de gran prestigio y estatura y le aseguro que su reputación y la nuestra como Instituto no pueden ponerse en juego. No estamos dispuestos a ser usados por ningún sector.

—Ahora, un porcentaje de chilenos, con razón o sin ella, simplemente no cree que el gobierno de Estados Unidos sea imparcial respecto al próximo plebiscito; tampoco cree que lo sea el NED en la medida en que ha ayudado a financiar al comando por el No. ¿Qué garantías hay de que, siendo el Presidente Pinochet una figura que despierta hostilidad en el extranjero, su eventual triunfo tenga una posibilidad de ser reconocido internacionalmente?

—La única garantía que le puedo dar es que tenemos una reputación; pautas de trabajo estrictamente profesionales y puntos de referencia objetivos; que nuestras fuentes de información serán muy diversas y que el informe será el producto de una elaboración conjunta de un grupo de observadores de alto nivel, proveniente de un amplio espectro político. Nadie se jugará su reputación actuando arbitrariamente.

—¿Cómo podrán evaluar la campaña si sólo llegarán tres días antes de la votación? ¿De acuerdo a qué criterios se decide si la habido equidad?

—Bueno, no hay una forma científica de medir estas cosas, pero creo que personas de alto nivel, con vasta experiencia en estas materias, lo podrán evaluar en conjunto y llegar a una conclusión al respecto. Tenemos mucha información recopilada; este material será analizado por los delegados, todos los cuales tienen suficiente trayectoria en estas lides como para formarse un juicio.

### Los votos del extranjero

—Hay algunos problemas potenciales que me gustaría saber cómo van a resolver. Por ejemplo: Un líder de la oposición ha dicho que los chilenos residentes en el extranjero votarán, aunque la ley no lo contempla y que sus votos serán computados en los resultados de la oposición. Eso significa que de todas formas va a ver una discrepancia entre las cifras oficiales y las de la oposición.

—La verdad es que primera vez que digo esto. Lo que yo entiendo es que el recuento será el día de nuestro y si se computan los del extranjero deberán ir en informe aparte.

—¿Cree usted que un informe favorable respecto al proceso electoral contribuirá a la credibilidad internacional del plebiscito?

—Nosotros como instituto no organizamos observadores a la elección de Corea, pero le puedo asegurar que la presencia de observadores internacionales fue, en definitiva, muy positiva para el gobierno. Pero que quede claro. Nosotros no estamos aquí para juzgar el sistema político en sí mismo. Puede ser que haya gobiernos o dirigentes políticos que tengan reservas respecto al contexto político chileno. Pero no es nuestra tarea emitir juicios al respecto. Sólo nos concernen evaluar el acto electoral mismo en los tres niveles que le he dicho: la campaña, la votación y los escrutinios. Así lo haremos de acuerdo a reglas muy concretas, especificadas en los libros, acerca de cómo se recolecta la información y cómo se analiza. Y, por cierto, respetando las restricciones legales y acatando las instrucciones que rijan los escrutinios locales de votación. Cualquiera que mirar el recuento, así es que creo que no tendremos problemas.

To: International Observer Delegation  
Fr: Brian Atwood, NDI President  
Kenneth Wollack, NDI Executive Vice President  
Re: Terms of Reference  
Dt: September 20, 1988

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The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is organizing a fifty person international delegation to observe the October 5, 1988 plebiscite in Chile. The delegation includes former heads of state, parliamentarians, political party leaders and election experts from across the democratic political spectrum.

In organizing this delegation, NDI does not presume to supervise the plebiscite or to interfere in Chilean affairs. Further, NDI recognizes that the ultimate judgment about the plebiscite process will be made by the Chilean people. Based on their assessment, Chileans will decide whether the plebiscite has legitimacy or moral authority which can be earned only through a fair electoral process.

This delegation's modest role is to reflect the consensus of the Chilean people as they assess the plebiscite process. The delegation's report will bear witness to that evaluation and will inform the international community about the nature of the electoral process in Chile.

The observations of this delegation and other credible sources will form the basis for our conclusions regarding the October 5 plebiscite in Chile. The delegation, therefore, must attempt to document observations and in all instances to distinguish factual from subjective judgments. To accomplish this task, the delegation will meet with government and election officials, those active in the campaigns for both the "yes" and the "no", and representatives of other institutions which are playing a role in monitoring the process.

Based on observations in the different regions of Chile, the delegation will attempt to offer a national perspective in a statement which NDI hopes to issue Friday morning, October 7, in Santiago. NDI requests that the delegates not make any comments to the media regarding their personal observations of the plebiscite until after the delegation statement has been presented.

NDI would like each team of observers to prepare a short report based of their observations that can be included in the report NDI will publish following the plebiscite.

Based on NDI's work in Chile during the past two years, the following are among the issues that appear most relevant for consideration by the delegation.

#### **I. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN**

A. Were there any restrictions, *de facto* or *de jure*, that prevented the competing sides from conducting their respective campaigns in any region of the country?

B. Were there any arrests, detentions or killings of party leaders or other individuals during the campaign that appear politically motivated?

C. During the campaign, were candidates or voters intimidated into voting "yes" or "no" by security forces, political parties or governmental officials? What was the response to such actions?

D. Was there evidence of illegal campaign practices by any of the participants? How did the authorities respond to these charges?

#### **II. ROLE OF THE MEDIA**

A. Did the competing parties obtain adequate and relatively equal access to the media?

B. Did the government controlled media provide adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?

C. Was the media censored during the campaign? Were journalists intimidated through arrests, detentions or the filing of charges during the campaign?

### III. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ELECTIONS

A. Did the Electoral Service and the local electoral officials act in a nonpartisan manner?

B. Were there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process? Were voters able to cast a secret ballot? Was there any intimidation of voters by security forces, local leaders or political parties on election day?

C. Were disputes in the counting process resolved in a nonpartisan manner? Were there suspicious delays in the preparation or release of election returns?

D. Were the pollwatchers (*apoderados*) designated by the accredited parties permitted access to all polling sites and to the counting centers?

### IV. THE RESULTS

A. Were the official results reported in accordance with the Electoral Law?

B. Did the various Chilean institutions recognize the results? If not, were challenges filed in accordance with the Electoral Law?

## OPENING STATEMENT OF OBSERVER DELEGATION

## PRESIDENT ADOLFO SUAREZ

October 3, 1988

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my privilege to introduce the international observer delegation to the Chilean plebiscite.

Our delegation includes 55 individuals from 22 countries spanning six of the world's continents. Members of the delegation serve or have served as heads of state, members of parliament, leaders of political parties, election officials and diplomats in their respective countries. I understand a complete list of the delegation members has been made available to you.

Before explaining the purpose for our presence in Chile, I will introduce the co-leaders of the delegation. Misael Pastrana was president of Colombia from 1970 to 1974; he was co-leader of the 1986 international observer delegation in the Philippines. Bruce Babbitt was governor of the state of Arizona from 1978 to 1986 and was a candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for president in 1988. Peter Dailey was U.S. ambassador to Ireland and served as President Reagan's special envoy to NATO in 1983.

It is with considerable humility that this delegation is in Chile -- to observe, in accordance with Chilean law, the final developments of the plebiscite process. In two days, Chileans will have an opportunity to cast their ballots in a presidential plebiscite provided for by the 1980 Constitution. While in the past there has been much debate within Chile about the legitimacy of this process, at present virtually all sectors of Chilean society are committed to participating in the plebiscite. Indeed, a record number of Chileans, more than 7.4 million, have registered to vote during the past 18 months.

Given the historic nature of the plebiscite and its significance for the future of Chile, it is not surprising it has attracted considerable international attention. Chileans have welcomed

this attention and have expressed appreciation that international observers will be present for the plebiscite.

It should be emphasized we are here as observers and that our role is a very modest one. We have no official status and, of course, we are obliged to respect the laws of this country.

The role that we are going to play here is in accordance with the usual practice of having international observers present at elections in other countries. This practice is widely accepted in the world community.

To fulfill the objectives set for the delegation by the sponsors, we heard today from Chilean government officials, representatives of the "yes" and "no" campaigns and leaders of the Committee for Free Elections. Tomorrow the delegation will divide into small teams that will visit 11 cities from Arica in the north to Punta Arenas in the south. We will speak with Chileans involved in the plebiscite process in each of these cities and, on Wednesday, we will observe the balloting and counting processes, including the various unofficial counts that we expect will be announced on Wednesday night.

The delegation will regroup in Santiago on Thursday for a debriefing session. The leaders of the delegation will also consult with other groups observing the plebiscite. We will include in our report information from a variety of sources as long as it is possible to verify this information. On Friday morning, we will report our observations to the international community at a 10 a.m. press conference in the Gala room in this hotel. Our observations of this process, we expect, will reflect those of the Chilean people themselves.

We desire for Chile the institutionalization of the rule of law, a return to civilian rule and respect for human rights, political pluralism and individual and collective liberties.



Appendix V

FORM FOR USE BY OBSERVERS  
Chilean Presidential Plebiscite  
October 5, 1988

Name of Observer: \_\_\_\_\_  
City: \_\_\_\_\_  
Polling Site: \_\_\_\_\_

I. General

- A. How many mesas at polling site?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- B. When did mesas open?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- C. Name of Electoral Service delegate?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- D. Were all vocales present?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- E. Which parties represented by apoderados? \_\_\_\_\_
- F. Were individuals present to assist voters? \_\_\_\_\_
- G. Identify any sources of intimidation..... \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

II. Polling Process

- A. Were voters identified in accordance with the law? \_\_\_\_\_
- B. Was ballot secret?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- C. Was voter marked with indelible ink?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- D. Was polling process challenged in any way? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 1. Who made challenge?..... \_\_\_\_\_
  - 2. How was challenge handled?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- E. Additional comments..... \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

III. Counting Process

- A. What time did mesas close?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- B. Who was present at closing? (vocales, apoderados, general public?)  
\_\_\_\_\_
- C. Was process in accordance with prescribed procedures? \_\_\_\_\_
- D. Were there any challenges to the counting process? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 1. Who made challenge?..... \_\_\_\_\_
  - 2. How were they handled?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- E. At what time was counting complete?..... \_\_\_\_\_
- F. Did apoderados receive certified copies of results? \_\_\_\_\_

Observer Form  
Page 2

IV. Results

	<u>Mesa Number</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Invalid</u>
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

V. Comments

Summary of specific problems (for example: late opening of polling site; long lines; people prevented from voting; administrative confusion; intimidation, etc.)

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Recommendations for improving the voting process:

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Describe any unusual occurrences seen or statements heard during the course of the day:

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STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL  
OBSERVER DELEGATION

PRESIDENT ADOLFO SUAREZ

October 6, 1988

I am pleased to offer a statement on behalf of the international delegation that yesterday witnessed the Chilean plebiscite. This delegation, sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, includes 55 individuals from 22 countries and represents all political ideologies within the democratic spectrum.

Our delegation was present in more than 15 Chilean cities, from Punta Arenas in the south to Arica in the north. We were able to visit and observe the electoral process at 10 percent of the polling sites in the country. We will prepare a detailed report on our observations and issue it publicly in the near future.

Today, we would like to offer a consensus view of the leaders of our delegation as to what we have seen here in the past few days. For we realize we have witnessed an historic event and one that has captured the imagination and attention of the democratic peoples of the world.

The long and proud democratic tradition of Chile was reawakened yesterday by Chileans of all political persuasions. We congratulate the Chilean people. We want especially to congratulate those who played a key role in the conduct and administration of the plebiscite: the government, the supporters of the two positions, the electoral service and law enforcement officials.

It was our delegation's belief that the Chilean people have been heard. The expression of the people's will is a triumph for all Chileans and for democracy in the world.

We have been greatly impressed by the leaders of the "no" campaign, before and after the plebiscite. They have acted responsibly in calling for a national dialogue and reconciliation. Their objective was not a negative one; they sought not to defeat a president, but bring about free elections. Now they have the support of the Chilean people.

The government, in conducting a free and fair plebiscite, and acknowledging the result, has taken the first important step at reconciliation. Supporters of the "yes" also acted responsibly and patriotically in pursuing a different path.

This is the spirit in which democracy can thrive.

The international community, well-represented by this delegation, offers its strong support to the people of Chile as they begin the transition process. There can be no turning back in the effort to rekindle the democratic spirit that has made this a great nation.

Our view is that the result of this plebiscite demonstrates, more than anything else, a strong desire for free elections. We expect that the dialogue that will now begin will be influenced by that very positive aspiration. While matters of law must be reconciled, all should be motivated by a desire to satisfy the express wish of the Chilean people for democratically conducted elections.

The process and the results make this delegation believe that Chile has taken an irreversible step toward democracy. That is to say, toward national reconciliation, the establishment of representative government, respect for individual rights and toward a peaceful coexistence with freedom and development.

The delegation believes that from today onward, the Chilean people have begun a journey down a road which, through a necessary dialogue, with free elections, with full participation by all Chileans, will result in a consensus for change that will institutionalize peace, liberty and democracy.

## Las Ultimas Noticias

Martes 4 de Octubre de 1988



Adolfo Suárez y Bruce Bobbit.

## Observadores: "objetividad" y "sin interferir" en lo interno

Dirigentes de la National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (Ndiia), que preside el ex Presidente español Adolfo Suárez y cuyos integrantes vinieron a Chile como observadores en el plebiscito, aseguraron ayer que cumplirán su misión "con objetividad" y expresaron su propósito de "no interferir" en la consulta popular.

En rueda de prensa, acompañaron a Suárez el ex presidente colombiano Misael Pastrana, Peter Bailey, Bruce Babbitt, Kenneth Wollack y Brian Catwood.

Suárez señaló que el organismo es pluripartidista, ya que lo integran, entre otros, delegados de las internacionales Socialista, Democrática y Liberal Progresista. "Queremos presentar un testimonio ante el mundo de que el proceso se ha cumplido de acuerdo a las normas dictadas por el gobierno y que han sido aceptadas por todos los partidos", añadió.

Luego, el español explicó que Ndiia se hizo presente anteriormente en Corea y Filipinas, y que "nuestra presencia como observadores produjo allí un efecto positivo" como un impulso demócrata. Añadió: "Es parte de un movimiento que se desarrolla en todo el mundo".

Respecto de las críticas del Ministro del Interior, Sergio Fernández —quien calificó la actuación de los observadores como intromisión—, Suárez dijo: "No estoy de acuerdo. Estamos aquí sólo como testigos".

Dijo Suárez que ayer (él y la directiva del Ndiia) se reunieron con cuatro dirigentes del «si», cuatro del «no» y tres del Comité de Elecciones Libres. Adelantó que hoy y mañana harían lo propio "para formarnos un criterio".

A la pregunta de si consideraba que el gobierno aceptará o no los resultados del plebiscito, indicó Suárez: "Ese fue el compromiso que adquirió al convocar al plebiscito. Y los partidos también acordaron lo mismo. En el plebiscito se apreciará la libre voluntad del pueblo chileno".

Y acerca de los incidentes ocurridos a su llegada al aeropuerto Arturo Merino Benítez, donde simpatizantes del «si» le insultaron y gritaron "¡Kerenski!", comentó Suárez: "Entiendo, comprendo y acepto que haya gente que piense así. Pero eso no llegó a más, y yo no habría tolerado que llegara a más. No creo que el pueblo chileno odie a los extranjeros. La población no se puede identificar con grupos radicalizados".

El Mercurio, October 4, 1988

ADOLFO SUAREZ:

## "No Creo que Haya Violencia en Chile"

- El ex Primer Ministro español formuló estos planteamientos tras reunirse con representantes del "Sí" y del "No" en el próximo plebiscito. Destacó también el alto número de inscritos para participar en el acto electoral.

El ex Primer Ministro español, Adolfo Suárez, planteó ayer que luego de reunirse tanto con representantes del "Sí" como del "No", le resulta difícil aceptar intelectualmente la posibilidad de que haya violencia en el país, a raíz del acto electoral.

Dijo a "El Mercurio" que no puede hacer juicios absolutos tras haber permanecido sólo 24 horas en el país, pero advirtió en torno al peligro de que sea justamente el temor a la violencia el que genere estas situaciones.

El personero ofreció ayer una conferencia de prensa en el Hotel Carrera, acompañado de otros integrantes de la delegación del National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, y que concitó la asistencia de numerosos reporteros, predominando la asistencia de corresponsales extranjeros.

Ayer, Suárez sostuvo encuentros con Sergio Molina, del Comité de Elecciones Libres; Mónica Jiménez, directora de la Cruzada por la Participación Ciudadana; el ex Canciller Miguel Schweitzer; el Director del Servicio Electoral, Juan Ignacio García; el vicepresidente de Renovación Nacional, Andrés Allamand; el presidente del Partido Nacional, Patricio Phillips; el dirigente de la UDI, Herman Chadwick; el secretario del Comando del No, Genaro Arriagada; y el dirigente socialista Ricardo Lagos.

En la reunión con los reporteros, dijo que la delegación, como entidad observadora, tiene "la esperanza de que el proceso hacia la democracia es irreversible" y afirmó que "una vez que se abre la posibilidad de votar a los electores, el camino es ya imparable".

"El camino a la plena democracia en Chile creo que ha comenzado", enfatizó.

Consultado en torno al plebiscito como mecanismo para elegir un Presidente, dijo que "lo normal es la elección competitiva" pero reiteró que "lo importante es el número impresionantemente de chilenos que se han inscrito para votar y las posibilidades que tengan para votar en libertad lo que ellos desean".

Sobre las declaraciones del Canciller Ricardo García, quien criticó la intervención en política interna de algunos visitantes extranjeros, señaló que "estamos aquí no decidiendo ni haciendo ninguna injerencia en política interna, sino practicando una política que es aceptada en la comunidad de naciones y en la mayor parte de los países, que aceptan observadores que van a presenciar algunos eventos determinados".

Recordó que el mismo secretario de Estado garantizó que los extranjeros no tendrán dificultades para observar el desarrollo del acto electoral, comentando que "eso vamos a hacer, sin ningún tipo de restricciones".

En cuanto a si cree que el Gobierno chileno respetará los resultados del plebiscito, expresó que ese compromiso lo adquirió desde el momento mismo que convocó al acto electoral y que así debe hacerlo "porque sería la expresión del veredicto popular del pueblo chileno".

Redujo la importancia de las actitudes agresivas que algunas personas le manifestaron al llegar, señalando que "yo, personalmente, he recibido insultos más fuertes en otros sitios, también en mi propia patria y en otros países del mundo".

La Prensa Austral, October 5, 1988



*Los integrantes de la delegación internacional observadora. Son: David Collette, de Canadá; Neelam Tiruchelvan, de Sri Lanka; Ed Long, de Estados Unidos; Curtis Cutter, Estados Unidos y Urs Schoettli de Suiza.*

## Llegaron observadores demócratas

Invitados por el ministerio del Interior de nuestro país llegaron a Punta Arenas cinco integrantes de una delegación internacional que viajó a Chile para observar el acto plebiscitario.

El grupo vino al país encabezado por Adolfo Suárez, ex Presidente del gobierno español y Misael Pastrana, ex Presidente de Colombia.

Los observadores que desarrollarán diversas actividades durante el día de hoy, son: Curtis C. Cutter, ex oficial del servicio exterior de Estados Unidos y presidente del Interworld Consultants, Inc.; David Collette, vicepresidente ejecutivo de Administración y Consultoría Mandrake, y ex secretario de Estado de Canadá; Ed Long, asistente legislativo, oficina del senador Harkin, Estados Unidos; Urs Schoettli, vicepresidente de la Internacional Liberal y Neelam Tiruchelvan, ex miembro del parlamento, y director del Centro Internacional para Estudios Etnicos, Sri Lanka.

En conferencia de prensa, Curtis Cutter, que hace de vocero de la delegación, precisó que se trata de una delegación de observadores independientes, por lo que sus integrantes no quisieron emitir opiniones o juicios sobre la situación del país.

Subrayaron que su intención es observar el desarrollo del plebiscito, para lo cual recorrerán los lugares de votación, conversarán con los votantes y observarán por sí mismos el desarrollo de los aconte-

cimientos.

Durante el día de ayer, los visitantes extranjeros se reunieron con directivos de la Fundación para el Desarrollo de Magallanes -Fide XII-, sostuvieron encuentros con los partidos políticos de la oposición, y visitaron al obispo, entre otras actividades.

Los miembros de la delegación pertenecen al Instituto Nacional Demócrata.

Cutter explicó que el principal interés del Instituto Democrático, es la democracia, por lo que cuando hay elecciones en alguna parte del mundo, "normalmente va un grupo para presenciar la elección".

Consultado en cuanto a si la presencia de ellos en Chile no es una intromisión en asuntos internos de nuestro país, Cutter manifestó que traen consigo una carta de invitación del ministro del Interior. "Por lo tanto no creo que sea una intromisión".

El personero norteamericano puntualizó que el grupo está aquí solamente para observar el acto, por lo que no quiso hacer otros comentarios sobre los comicios.

"Vamos a circular por la ciudad en el día de hoy y conversaremos con la gente, si está dispuesta a hablar con nosotros", dijo Curtis Cutter.

El grupo regresa mañana a Santiago y el viernes abandona el país, luego de una conferencia de prensa.

# Suárez no cree que salida sea violenta

**XIMENA MARIN**  
 "Lo difícil, quizás, no es montarse en el tigre (hacia la democracia), sino bajarse de él y una vez que se den las facilidades para votar a los electores, el camino ya está dirigido; en Chile ya ha comenzado el camino a la plena democracia", dijo ayer el ex primer ministro de España, Adolfo Suárez.

Respecto a la posibilidad de que no se respetaran los resultados de un eventual triunfo del No o ante una probable suspensión del plebiscito, puntualizó: "el régimen del general Pinochet adquirió un compromiso desde el mismo momento en que las fuerzas políticas partidarias del Si y las del Comando del No han manifestado públicamente que están dispuestas a aceptar los resultados del referéndum; éste será la expresión de la libre

voluntad del pueblo chileno".  
 En caso contrario, informó que los observadores internacionales darían un informe lo "contundentemente necesario".  
 Aseguró haber detectado entre los partidarios del Si y del No con los cuales conversó "una coincidencia de fondo importante: todos buscan recuperar las libertades y un estado de derecho".

En cuanto a la probabilidad de una salida violenta, contestó: "Después de haber conversado con dirigentes del Si y del No me resultaría difícil aceptar intelectualmente la posibilidad de una salida violenta".  
 Con respecto a las observaciones del ministro del Interior de que los extranjeros intentaban interferir en el plebiscito, Suárez dijo que es evidente que estamos aquí practicando una po-

lítica que es admitida en la comunidad de naciones y en la mayoría de los países del mundo se acepta la presencia de riesgos que observan una votación en democracia.

## Lo importante

Al referirse al plebiscito como sistema para elegir al Presidente, indicó "no es un procedimiento habitual ni usual en las naciones occidentales, donde son usuales las elecciones consultivas".

—No obstante, la importancia en Chile es el número de ciudadanos que se han inscrito para votar.

Ante una pregunta sobre los insultos que defensores del Si le hicieron en el aeropuerto, recalcó que ha recibido insultos más

fuerzas en otros sitios y también en su propia patria.

—Ayer fue un grupo de chicos jóvenes, a quienes evidentemente me mi presencia no les gustaba en los más mínimo. Lo comprendo, lo entiendo, lo justifico. Y punto. No llegó más allá ni tampoco yo lo hubiese tolerado.

Los periodistas le preguntaron si no consideraba que las opiniones de los observadores eran demasiado suaves en torno a la situación chilena. Suárez contestó que no era así, porque todavía no conocían la situación en profundidad.

Agregó que una cosa es que un acto sea legal y otro es que sea legítimo, "pero eso ya está en otro campo de juego, puesto que todas las fuerzas políticas han aceptado el plebiscito".



Adolfo Suárez.



El Mercurio, October 7, 1988

## Observadores Admirados Por "Ejemplo Cívico"

- Adolfo Suárez, ex jefe del gobierno español, alabó la forma en que se llevó a cabo el referéndum y señaló que no se atrevería a decirle nada al pueblo chileno sobre la forma de llevar sus asuntos.

Como un ejemplo de civismo calificó ayer el "National Democratic Institute for International Affairs" el evento plebiscitario efectuado el miércoles, subrayando su admiración por el comportamiento del pueblo chileno en la consulta.

Así lo dio a conocer el organismo, compuesto por más de 60 observadores extranjeros que acudieron al evento electoral, y que fue representado ante los periodistas por su presidente, el español Adolfo Suárez, entre otros integrantes.

En la oportunidad, Adolfo Suárez, conductor de la transición democrática de España, alabó la forma en que se llevó la consulta señalando que no se atrevería a decirle nada al pueblo chileno, sobre cómo llevar sus asuntos. "Nadie está capacitado para aconsejar a este país, después de ver como se comportó el pueblo de Chile ayer", explicó.

Expresó también que el proceso que vive Chile beneficia a todo el mundo, en tanto se amplían las libertades

de su pueblo, porque significa ampliar o desarrollar las de todo el orbe.

Respecto al papel de las Fuerzas Armadas dentro de esta fase, manifestó: "Espero y deseo profundamente que en este diálogo que tiene que abrirse en la reconciliación de todos los chilenos, naturalmente, las Fuerzas Armadas estén presentes y asuman lo que significa vivir —como han vivido durante 150 años en Chile— en un sistema en el que prima la sociedad civil".

Consultado sobre si creía haber asistido a un cambio en el juego de poderes que después puede perder su efectividad, Adolfo Suárez indicó que, basándose en lo de ayer y en el comportamiento de ambos bandos, "el proceso democrático en Chile es irreversible".

En cuanto a las críticas que han recibido los periodistas extranjeros por inmiscuirse en asuntos que pueden ser considerados internos, el ex presidente español aseguró que "asumimos tales críticas, pero no las compartimos".

La Nación, October 7, 1988

Destacan observadores internacionales

## Chile: Ejemplo de corrección y limpieza para el mundo entero

Como "un ejemplo para el mundo entero", calificaron ayer los ex gobernantes de diferentes naciones, el proceso plebiscitario realizado en Chile, destacando la "limpieza y corrección con que actuaron todas las instancias que en él participaron".

Así lo dieron a conocer ayer los integrantes de la delegación de observadores internacionales del Instituto Democrático para Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados Unidos, entre los que destacan Adolfo Suárez, ex presidente del gobierno español; Misael Pastrana, ex presidente de Colombia; Ovaldo Hurtado, ex presidente de Ecuador y los norteamericanos Peter Dailey, ex embajador en Irlanda y enviado especial de Ronald Reagan a los países de la OTAN y Bruce Babbit, ex gobernador de Arizona y ex candidato presidencial.

Sus apreciaciones están contenidas en una declaración y fueron ampliadas en una conferencia de prensa en la cual expresaron su "admiración por la demostración de civilidad del pueblo chileno, como asimismo, por el comportamiento de las fuerzas políticas del Sí y el No y la limpieza con que se efectuó el plebiscito," según lo señaló Adolfo Suárez.

"El sentimiento general de los miembros de esta delegación —continuó— es que este acto electoral fue óptimo". Destacó, asimismo "el comportamiento de las Fuerzas de Orden que hicieron posible que los chilenos participaran en este plebiscito expresando libremente lo que querían para caminar hacia la democracia".

Expresó que los integrantes

del grupo observaron el recuento de votos en diferentes mesas ubicadas de Arica a Punta Arenas, hasta donde cada uno de ellos se trasladó y "vimos el comportamiento rigurosísimo de todos los presidentes de mesa, vocales y apoderados".

"Creemos, señaló, "que el pueblo chileno ha dado una lección al mundo con su comportamiento de ayer".

Adolfo Suárez destacó también el llamado del Comando del No a la reconciliación nacional y a la participación de todos los chilenos en la construcción de la futura democracia, como asimismo las palabras del Ministro del Interior y el reconocimiento que el Gobierno hizo del triunfo del No.

También destacaron la "extraordinaria manifestación de democracia y el meticuloso proceso realizado en los locales de votación", los observadores estadounidenses, señalando que en conjunto conforman un "testimonio" para todo el mundo de lo que se ha vivido en Chile.

Expresaron, asimismo, que la reacción en Estados Unidos "será muy positiva", poniendo "especial interés en el proceso de reconciliación, concordia y democracia plena".

En cuanto a la proyección de Chile en el contexto mundial se señaló que "el proceso de recuperación de las libertades beneficia a todos los demás países del mundo".

Respecto de la actitud de los militares chilenos, Adolfo Suárez expresó que "las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile han vivido 150 años de democracia supeditados al poder civil. Creo, espero y deseo que en ese diálogo que tiene que abrirse, en la reconciliación de todos los chilenos, las Fuerzas Armadas estaran presentes".

En la oportunidad y consultados respecto de si en su opinión se mantendrían las inversiones extranjeras en nuestro país tras el triunfo del No, el grupo señaló que estaban convencidos que así sería, enfatizando que en la declaración suscrita, solicitaban expresamente que así ocurriera.

Las Ultimas Noticias

Viernes 7 de Octubre de 1988

**Irreprochable comportamiento según los observadores**

Miembros prominentes de la delegación de observadores internacionales al plebiscito se mostraron complacidos por la madurez cívica del pueblo chileno y no formularon objeciones al comportamiento de las fuerzas armadas y de orden durante el proceso de votación.

Encabezados por el ex presidente del gobierno español y uno de los líderes de la delegación, el español Adolfo Suárez, veinte observadores participaron ayer en una conferencia de prensa que se efectuó en el hotel Carrera, ante nutrida concurrencia de periodistas nacionales y extranjeros.

Además de Suárez, estuvieron presentes Brian Atwood, Osvaldo Hurtado, Peter H. Dailey, Bruce Babbit, Kenneth D. Wollack y el ex presidente de Colombia, Misael Pastrana Borrero.

De acuerdo con las declaraciones de los enviados, el plebiscito no mereció reparos de ningún tipo, salvo "pequeños problemas, insignificantes".

Suárez expresó que "el sentimiento general de esta delegación es que nos sentimos profundamente impresionados por el comportamiento del pueblo y de los servicios de orden, que han permitido que los chilenos pudieran dar libremente su opinión para caminar hacia la normalidad. Expresamos nuestro sentimiento de admiración por la lección que han dado al mundo".

Interrogado acerca de las críticas dirigidas a los observadores, en el sentido de que se entrometieron en la política nacional, previno que las asumen pero no las comparten: "Carecen de fundamento, porque esto de los observadores es una práctica habitual en la comunidad internacional. Hemos percibido las expresiones gratificantes de los chilenos que esperaban en las colas para votar y nuestra presencia contribuyó a que el plebiscito se desarrollara en un clima de menor tensión. Estamos muy orgullosos de haber contribuido con un poquito a la tranquilidad del proceso".

Suárez asumió la presidencia del gobierno español, en la etapa de transición, con posterioridad al retiro del general Francisco Franco. "Tengo la experiencia de haber dirigido esa etapa democrática, pero las circunstancias de Chile son distintas a las de España. El caso nuestro no se puede trasladar a este país. Chile ya tenía una experiencia democrática muy rica en ciento cincuenta años, salvo algunos periodos. Espero que aquí, con el diálogo y la reconciliación nacional, estén presentes las fuerzas armadas".

Calificó de "paso irreversible" hacia la democracia el que se adoptó el miércoles. "Me baso en datos reales que hemos obtenido ayer: el comportamiento de los apoderados, de las fuerzas armadas, del gobierno reconociendo el triunfo del «no» y el «no» llamando a la reconciliación. El pueblo chileno se ha manifestado con suficientemente fuerza y rotundidad. Nos sentimos legítimamente satisfechos de este acontecimiento histórico".

Se le preguntó a Suárez qué le habría expresado al General Pinochet en caso de haber tenido la oportunidad de conversar con él. "¡Se trata de escribir el guión de una película, de ciencia ficción!... Con Pinochet tuvimos algún intercambio epistolar en modo alguno amistoso cuando yo iniciaba mi mandato. Pero no me atrevería decirle nada al señor Pinochet... ¡Ya lo ha dicho el pueblo de Chile!..."

En cuanto a la posibilidad de que el triunfo de la opción opositora podría originar una desestabilización económica, Suárez advirtió que no le asiste duda de que la estabilidad política permitirá su normal desarrollo como nación.

Fortín Mapocho, October 8, 1988

Adolfo Suárez, ex presidente del gobierno español:

# "El pueblo de Chile ya le dio su mensaje muy claro a Pinochet"

El único mensaje que se le puede decir al general Pinochet "lo ha dicho el pueblo de Chile", dijo a Fortín el ex presidente del gobierno español, Adolfo Suárez, quien, como se sabe, encabezaba una delegación de observadores internacionales de alto nivel. El alto personero, junto a otros importantes representantes extranjeros, tales como Misael Pastrana, Bruce Babbitt y Peter Dailey, de Colombia y Estados Unidos, respectivamente, ofreció una conferencia de prensa, donde se evaluó el trabajo que tuvieron en el país como observadores del plebiscito.

Los representantes eligieron al pueblo chileno por la civilidad demostrada, así como también la estructura nombrada por el gobierno para su desarrollo.

**Nadie puede decirte a los chilenos lo que deben hacer, dijo el representante, añadiendo que todo lo que había que decir lo había manifestado el 5 de octubre el propio pueblo chileno**

Adolfo Suárez, ante una consulta de Fortín relativa a si le hubiera gustado reunirse con el general Pinochet y de ser así que le hubiera dicho, el alto representante español dijo que eso era "escribir un guión de una película que no se ha realizado", agregando que había tenido contactos con el general Pinochet en su etapa de presidente de gobierno, "y no fue un contacto epistolar de modo muy amistoso".

"Yo no me atrevería a decirle nada al general Pinochet, lo ha dicho todo el pue-



Adolfo Suárez, ex presidente del gobierno español, que se lució en Chile, junto a otros 80 observadores extranjeros en el plebiscito

## LIST OF POLITICAL GROUPS IN CHILE

**I. Democratic Alliance (AD)** - formed in 1983 as an outgrowth of the opposition's first efforts to unify.

- Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
- Liberal Party/Republican Party (PL & P. Repub.)
- Social Democratic Party (PSD)
- Popular Socialist Union (USOPO)
- Social Democrats (SD)
- Radical Party (PR)

**II. National Accord (AN)** - a proclamation signed in 1985 calling for free elections and a return to democracy; was signed by parties from a wider range of the ideological spectrum than the AD.

- PDC
- Christian Left (IC)
- Liberal Party/ Republican Party
- National Party (PN)
- Radical Party (PR)
- PSD
- Socialist Party of Chile (Briones--now Nuñez) (PS/B or PS/N)
- Socialist Party/ Mandujano (PS/Mandujano)
- Historic Socialist Party (PS/Historico)
- National Unity Movement (MUN or UN)

**III. United Left (IU)** - amalgamation of left-wing parties, formed in 1987 in response to the fractionalization of the left's first alliance, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP)

- Communist Party (PC)
- Christian Left
- Socialist Party/Almeyda (PS/A)
- Historic Socialist Party

- Democratic Radical Socialist Party (PRSD or PR/Luengo)
- Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR "Renovado")

**IV. Revolutionary Coordination** - coalition of extreme left-wing groups -- mostly radicalized factions -- which support armed revolution

- MIR
- MAPU/Lautaro
- Socialist Party/ Collective Directive (PS/Direccion Colectiva)
- Unitary Socialist Party (PS/Unitario)

**V. Party for Democracy (PPD)** - created in 1987 to enable many of the democratic left-wing parties too small to obtain the 35,000 signatures required for party registration to participate in the electoral process; most of these parties are signatories to the Command for the No in their own right -- see below)

- PS/N
- MAPU
- Liberals/Republicans
- National Action Party (PADENA)
- PS Mandujano
- SD
- USOPO

**VI. Command for the No** - "the 16 parties for the No" initiated in late 1987 with 13 signatories, the Command spearheaded the opposition's campaign against Pinochet

- PDC
- PS/A
- USOPO
- MAPU
- MAPU Obrero Campesino (MAPU OC)
- PR/Silva Cimma

- PR/L
- IC
- PSD/Velasco
- PS/N
- PS/Historico
- PADENA (Prieur)
- Humanist Party (PH)
- Green Party
- PS/Mandujano
- Liberal Republican Union (ULR)

**VII. Socialist Command for the No** - composed of four left-wing parties that sponsored their own activities in addition to participating in the "no" campaign.

- IC
- MAPU
- PS/A
- PR/L

**VIII. Parties and Organizations for the Yes**

- National Vanguard Party (Avanzada Nacional)
- National Renewal Party (comprised of the MUN and the National Worker's Front, FNT)
- Social Democratic Party/Venegas
- National Party/Phillips
- Independent Command for the Yes
- Teachers Command for the Yes
- Independent Democratic Union (UDI) for the Yes
- Businessmen's Command for the Yes
- Independent Club of Providencia [a sector of Santiago] for the Yes

AV. LIB. BERNARDO O'HIGGINS 3156  
DEPTO. A - SANTIAGO

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Santiago, 5 de Septiembre de 1988

Compañero:

El principal motivo de la presente es alertarlo acerca de la trampa pinochetista del VOTO SECRETO.

Por su vida y la de su grupo familiar desde las trincheras populares queremos decirle ¡CUIDADO! el VOTO NO ES SECRETO.

En este nuevo engaño a la clase trabajadora los representantes de la burguesía explotadora, se ha unido alrededor de los Aylwin, los Jarpa, los Fresno, los Fernandez y los Guszmán.

El ex-pinochetista Patricio Bañados, ex funcionario del Canal 7 en los siniestros tiempos de la DINA también aporta lo suyo, mintiendo descaradamente al "asegurar" que el voto es SECRETO.

Pero lo que ocultan gobiernistas y opositores entreguistas es que el papel del voto está impregnado con la tinta unsichtbar producida por la Química Hoechst de Alemania. La misma tinta que usó el gobierno demócrata cristiano de Napoleón Duarte, para masacrar - con apoyo yanqui - al heroico pueblo salvadoreño después de las elecciones presidenciales.

A usted que con conciencia de clase dira NO A LA DICTADURA, le damos los siguientes consejos prácticos para evitar que el tirano tome represalias contra Ud. y su familia:

1. Lleve oculto un lápiz de pasta y con ese lápiz marque el NO, pues de lo contrario, si usa el lapiz de mina que le pasará el funcionario de gobierno a cargo de su mesa electoral, después borrarán su NO y cambiarán su voto por el SI.
2. En sus dedos pulgares (dedo gordo), los que mas marcan el papel, pongase cinta adhesiva para evitar que sus huellas dactilares queden impresas en su voto NO.



3. No responda a las provocaciones de los sapos del SI.
4. En caso de ser detenido sus familiares deben avisar de inmediato a la Iglesia más cercana o a los teléfonos 6963275 - 6964952 - 724909 - 724921 - 724855 - 712042 - 6963504.

COMPAÑERO EL VOTO SECRETO ES UNA MENTIRA PINOCHETISTA SIGA NUESTROS CONSEJOS AL PIE DE LA LETRA Y ASI EVITARA CAER EN LA TRAMPA QUE LOS EXPLOTADORES INTENTAN TENDER AL PUEBLO.

NO TOTAL  
COMANDO POPULAR POBLACIONAL  
"VENCEREMOS"

# Appendix X

## SAMPLE BALLOTS

BALLOT MARKED "SI"

		Engomado	
	PLEBISCITO	PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA	Serie 000
Cuarto doblez			00000
	AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE		
	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <math>\perp</math> SI                 </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <math>\text{—}</math> NO                 </div> </div>		
Tercer doblez			
	Primer doblez	Segundo doblez	

BALLOT MARKED "NO"

		Engomado	
	PLEBISCITO	PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA	Serie 000
Cuarto doblez			00000
	AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE		
	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <math>\text{—}</math> SI                 </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <math>\perp</math> NO                 </div> </div>		
Tercer doblez			
	Primer doblez	Segundo doblez	

The traditional way to mark a ballot is to draw a vertical line, as shown, although Chilean electoral law permits any mark that clearly indicates a voter's preference.

# Appendix XI

REPUBLICA DE CHILE  
SERVICIO ELECTORAL

National Electoral Service Vote Count by Region, October 11, 1988

R E G I O N	PESAS A ESCRUTAR	PESAS INFORMAS	SI		NO		NULOS		BLANCOS		T O T A L							
			VOTES	MIESES	TOTAL	VOTES	MUJERES	TOTAL	VOTES	MIESES	TOTAL	VOTES	MUJERES	TOTAL				
I REGION DE TARAPACA	558	554 (99.62)	36,095	39,649	75,744	49,668	43,907	93,575	1,121	2,064	3,185	907	1,267	2,174	87,791	86,887	76,678	
II REGION DE ANTOFAGASTA	688	606 (88.23)	33,933	38,786	73,719	61,016	54,944	115,960	1,301	2,311	3,612	968	1,313	2,289	97,236	98,354	195,550	
III REGION DE ATACAMA	364	291 (79.92)	18,773	22,848	41,621	26,846	21,938	48,784	574	748	1,322	674	825	1,459	46,867	46,359	93,226	
IV REGION DE COQUIMBO	793	556 (70.12)	35,183	45,993	81,176	50,289	41,240	91,538	1,281	1,818	3,099	1,561	1,425	2,929	88,218	90,526	178,742	
V REGION DE VALPARAISO	2,392	2,242 (93.72)	146,782	192,579	339,291	240,134	231,843	471,977	4,433	7,390	11,823	3,622	4,175	7,847	395,001	435,337	837,508	
VI REGION DEL LIBERTADOR GRAL. BOM. EDO. O'HIGGINS	1,283	905 (70.62)	40,878	46,917	87,795	58,046	45,241	103,285	1,120	1,326	2,446	1,143	921	2,064	101,189	94,911	196,100	
VII REGION DEL MAULE	1,412	1,035 (73.32)	77,647	89,372	167,019	89,192	74,517	163,709	1,777	2,132	3,909	1,597	1,512	3,109	170,213	167,533	337,746	
VIII REGION DEL B10 B10	2,866	2,879 (99.78)	183,388	225,183	408,571	268,517	238,188	504,705	4,992	6,907	11,899	4,822	5,275	10,197	458,819	475,553	935,372	
IX REGION DE LA ARUCAYUA	1,312	1,308 (99.72)	102,539	116,917	219,456	100,921	85,599	186,500	2,293	3,375	5,618	2,043	2,565	4,808	207,795	208,406	416,202	
X REGION DE LOS LAGOS	1,563	381 (23.12)	44,291	32,190	76,481	54,989	33,004	87,993	1,030	913	1,943	887	641	1,528	101,197	66,748	167,945	
XI REGION DE ASEN DEL GRU C. IBANEZ DEL CAJON	136	sin informacin	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
XII REGION DE MAGALLANES Y ANTARCTICA CHILENA	283	281 (99.32)	19,092	16,305	35,397	25,206	22,473	48,179	377	553	930	413	398	811	45,888	39,279	85,317	
REGION METROPOLITANA	8,201	8,553 (96.32)	472,347	648,802	1,121,149	811,505	824,208	1,635,713	12,554	21,280	33,864	9,992	12,785	22,277	306,988	307,112	2,814,110	
<b>TOTAL PAIS</b>	<b>22,247</b>	<b>19,571 (88.2)</b>	<b>1,217,977</b>	<b>1,528,247</b>	<b>2,746,224</b>	<b>1,860,227</b>	<b>1,721,444</b>	<b>3,581,666</b>	<b>32,567</b>	<b>50,913</b>	<b>83,880</b>	<b>28,650</b>	<b>33,277</b>	<b>62,127</b>	<b>3,320,014</b>	<b>3,329,506</b>	<b>6,648,822</b>	

PROJECTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR FREE ELECTIONS (CEL)

The No will win by 886,454 votes, with a standard deviation of 30,350.

Projection of National Percentages

Yes	42.75%
No	54.98%
Blank	1.31%
Null	.96%
Standard Deviation	.21%

Projection of National Percentages, by order of arrival

	First	Last
Yes	42.75%	42.75%
No	54.97%	54.99%
Blank	1.34%	1.27%
Null	.94%	.98%
Standard Deviation	.31%	.29%

Command for the No count as of October 10, 1988

Comando por el NO - [Pag 001]      Lunes 10 de Octubre 19:55:37 - 1988 (CHILE)

RESULTADOS DE CHILE:


RESULTADOS TOTALES

	SI	NO	NULOS	BLANCOS	TOT. VOT.	TOT. INS.	MES. ESC.
VARONES	1311402	1955283	35996	31460	3334141	3645950	10417
MUJERES	1622275	1814467	53833	35617	3526192	3724700	10642
TOTALES	2933677	3769750	89829	67077	6860333	7370650	21059

RESULTADOS PORCENTUALES

o/o	SI	NO	NULOS	BLANCOS	PARTICIPA.
VARONES	39.33	58.64	1.08	0.94	91.45
MUJERES	46.01	51.46	1.53	1.01	94.67
TOTALES	42.76	54.95	1.31	0.98	93.08





*REPORTS OF NDI TEAMS*

## REPORTS OF NDI TEAMS

The delegation divided into teams to observe the plebiscite process in the different regions of Chile. This Appendix includes an edited version of the reports prepared by 13 of the teams. Each team report includes background on the region visited, a description of the process and a summary of the complaints presented to the teams by representatives of the various institutions with whom the teams met.

### PUNTA ARENAS

#### *Team Members*

David Collenette

Curtis Cutter

Ed Long

Urs Schoettli

Neelan Tiruchelvam

The day before the plebiscite, the team met with Bishop Tomas Gonzalez Morales and opposition party representatives. Bishop Gonzalez said the first open manifestation of disrespect to President Pinochet was displayed in Punta Arenas when a crowd whistled and catcalled during his speech. He said that since the tension with Argentina over the Beagle Islands, the army had maintained a heavy troop concentration in the area; active military and their dependents equalled about 30 percent of the population. He said young recruits have been taken en masse to register and that the heavy military presence would bolster the "yes" vote.

The opposition parties were enthusiastic about the presence of the observers and they encouraged the team to be vigilant, especially about the role of the military during the plebiscite.

The day of the plebiscite dawned bright and sunny, but soon deteriorated into rain, wind and snow. The team visited four polling sites before the polls opened at 8 a.m. The team noted that military personnel were violating the law requiring they be at least 20 meters from the *mesa*. A *delegado* said the crowded conditions in the school made it impossible for the military to remain so far from the *mesas* but that they were remaining out of the rooms where the *mesas* were located.



The team split into two groups and collectively visited every polling site in Punta Arenas. There were 11 polling places within the city with an average of 20 tables per polling place. As voters arrived at the polling places, the military were no longer so conspicuous. In fact, they were extremely helpful in guiding voters to the proper *mesa*, helping elderly voters and generally keeping order in the crowded voting places. During the course of the day, the team saw no examples of military misconduct. Voters said the Navy and Air Force were expected to do a neutral job implying that the Army was another matter. The Navy and Air Force were dressed in formal attire and did not carry weapons inside the buildings. The Army was dressed in combat fatigues and, in a number of places, carried weapons.

The most impressive aspect of the voting process in the morning was the formation of long lines outside each polling place. Many voters waited in line more than three hours. Their patience and dedication were especially impressive because of the driving wind and rain and sleet that soaked them as they waited in line. Grumbling about the wait was good-natured. By mid-afternoon the lines had vanished. The vast majority of the *mesas* closed at 5 p.m., and the counting of the ballots was generally over by 8 p.m.

In the afternoon the team visited Rio Verde, a tiny community dedicated to sheep farming. The appearance of observers in this remote area caused some consternation for the military and election officials, but the observers were admitted to the polling place. The feudal structure of the community seemed to be somewhat intact with the descendant of the old family who owned the land marching around the polling place as if he owned it too. The polling place, now a school, had been his house. It was predictable from the time the team walked in that the environment would probably produce a strong "yes" vote. The team waited for the counting to be finished and that was, in fact, the case. One *vocal*, for example said 70 voters who were eligible to vote in that area had instead registered in Punta Arenas to be free from community pressure.

The team watched the vote count in Punta Arenas. This process was carried out efficiently and correctly. Representatives from the various political groups were allowed full access to and signed off on the final results.

While all had gone normally in Punta Arenas, rumors spread during the evening of illegalities in other areas. There was concern the government would rig the election. But by the following morning, when it was apparent the government would recognize the "no" victory, Punta Arenas was quiet as people went about their business, ignoring the blizzard that had descended during the night.

-- Prepared by Curtis Cutter

## *PUERTO MONTT*

### *Team Members*

Martin Andersen  
Juan Felix Bogado Gondra  
Miguel Angel Gonzales Casabianca  
Jennifer Windsor

### **Introduction**

Puerto Montt is the capital of Llanquihue Province. With 114,000 people, it is the most populous city in the Lake Region. Regional economic activities include farming, tourism, and forestry, while the city of Puerto Montt relies on shipping and fishing.

The region has historically supported conservative candidates. In the 1970 presidential election, the National Party candidate, Jorge Alessandri, prevailed in the region with 39.9 percent of the votes, while Salvador Allende received 29.8 percent. In the 1973 congressional elections, 61.7 percent voted for the Democratic Confederation, a coalition of center and rightist political parties opposed to the government of Salvador Allende, while 37 percent supported the leftist Popular Unity coalition.

### **Observations of Pre-plebiscite Conditions**

On October 4, the team met with the regional director of the Electoral Service, representatives of the "no" and "yes" campaigns, the regional head of the Crusade for Civic Participation (CIVITAS), and the Archbishop of Puerto Montt.

The CIVITAS effort in the region was well-organized and far-reaching. Leaflets urging people to vote and instructing them how to do so were distributed at church services, soccer games and other social meetings.

The registration rate for the region was over 91 percent. The regional director of the electoral service thought the rate to be especially high considering the isolation and dispersion of the population.

The opposition representatives expressed concern about their lack of access to television, but said many people in the region watched the 15-minute opposition campaign advertisements, despite their being aired late at night.

Opposition leaders cited numerous incidents of environmental fraud. Local officials, they claimed, had threatened government workers and others that a "no" vote would result in the loss of their jobs. The opposition was particularly concerned about outlying areas where many people relied on official transportation and feared that their livelihood would be threatened if they voted "no."

Opposition figures also said identification cards had been confiscated and destroyed by the police. They showed the team a card they said had been found with all but the photograph burned away.

### **Observations of the Voting Process**

The balloting and counting processes were orderly the day of the plebiscite. The polling stations the team visited opened on time. A majority of the stations had a representative from the electoral service present to assist voters. At other sites, the armed forces helped voters. The armed forces did not remain

the required 20 meters from the *mesas*, but voters did not appear to be intimidated by their presence.

Every *mesa* had at least three *vocales*. However, an *apoderado* from the Party for Democracy (PPD) in the town of Los Muermos said a president of a *mesa* where only two *vocales* showed up selected someone he knew as a replacement rather than choosing the first voter in line as required by law.

Every *mesa* also had *apoderados* from the Christian Democratic Party, the Party for Democracy and the National Renewal Party and a personal representative of President Pinochet.

The only irregularity the team observed occurred in Los Muermos where the head of the National Renewal Party told the presidents of the *mesas* what to do. He also questioned why international observers were allowed in the polling places.

A PPD representative claimed that businessmen had only provided bus tickets in the outlying areas to voters who promised to vote "yes."

-- Prepared by Jennifer Windsor

## TEMUCO

### Team Members

Hattie Babbitt

Sean Carroll

Andres Hernandez

Loren Smith

Sue Wood

Temuco, situated 675 km south of Santiago, is the capital of the IXth Region of Chile, known as the Araucania Region. Temuco, population 195,000, is Chile's fifth largest city and the only large city in the region. Principal economic activities are agriculture, livestock and forestry.

### Political Environment

In the days leading up to the plebiscite, a large sense of insecurity existed in this largely rural and heavily militarized area. Opposition leaders had been concerned about environ-

mental fraud and government harassment. They complained that the government/military apparatus was at the disposal of the "yes" campaign. For example, the governor, regional military commander, and mayor all took part in the inauguration of the "si" headquarters in Temuco. Government supporters did not need to receive permission to hold rallies, whereas the opposition was required to ask 15 days in advance. According to the opposition, arrests and beatings of supporters of the "no" were not infrequent.

The team heard other complaints by the opposition: many people were told that ballots would have watermarks, enabling voters to be identified; municipal day care centers told parents that if they voted "no" they would lose the right to send their children to day care; farmers were told that their credit would dry up if the "no" wins.

As plebiscite day approached, however, fear of fraud, violence, and recriminations against those who voted "no" decreased. On the day before the plebiscite, the team met with local officials, party, church and civic leaders. All had grown more confident that the plebiscite would proceed as planned with little or no election fraud, with high voter participation, and in a mostly calm and orderly manner.

A local Bishop, citing a massive civic education effort, was optimistic that people would vote peacefully and in large numbers, and that participation was more important than results. Party leaders in the "yes" campaign stated that a "no" victory would slow but not stop the move towards full democracy.

### **Plebiscite Day**

The team witnessed heavy voter turnout as the polls opened in the center of the city. Polling sites opened on time, but there were some delays at individual voting tables as some *vocales* took a long time to sign in party *apoderados* and count the blank ballots. Also, some *vocales* and *apoderados* arrived late. Throughout the day, the team observed, without exception,

the presence of the required number of *vocales* and of the appropriate number of *apoderados*.

The team was initially prevented from entering a site by an Army sergeant who said that observers were not allowed inside. He told that team that this was a national policy. After showing him an official book of regulations for the plebiscite, which said that "tourists" would be allowed access, the team asked if they would be allowed in as "tourists" rather than as "observers." He replied that, yes, that was a different story. The team went away to consider the options, and decided to return and declare themselves tourists. The sergeant waved the team in.

This was an isolated case, as the team later experienced very helpful police and military personnel. The heavy military and police presence appeared somewhat intimidating to the observers but no complaints were received from voters, who were often assisted with directions from the officers.

Voting was slow for the first few hours and the team observed lengthy lines of voters who waited for hours to cast their ballots. However, the voting process progressed smoothly and picked up speed eventually, with no irregularities observed.

The five-person team split into two teams about midday and traveled in different directions outside of the city. One team went south to Villarca, a town about one and one half hours away. The other headed west, stopping in Nueva Imperial on the way to the coastal town of Puerto Saavedra, also one and one half hours from the city. Similar heavy turnouts and long lines were observed at these polling sites. Balloting was also orderly and efficient. In Nueva Imperial, there was a line more than five blocks long containing voters who had waited three to four hours. But spirits were high and voters were willing to wait. An hour later, when the team returned on its way back to Temuco, the line was gone - everyone had voted.

In Puerto Saavedra, the arrival of international observers seemed to be an unwelcome surprise to the polling site *delegado*, but after consultation with the military officers present, the team was received warmly and escorted inside by an officer.

The team returned to Santiago before the counting began and there reviewed the results that showed that the IXth Region was the only region in the country to vote clearly in favor of the "yes."

-- Prepared by Sean Carroll

## CONCEPCION

### *Team Members*

Esteban Caballero  
Bob Carter  
Kate Kauffman  
Lewis Manilow

Dan Murray  
Barbara Sigmund  
Haydee Yorac

Concepcion, capital of Chile's eighth region -- Region del Bio-Bio -- is on the coast some 800 kilometers south of Santiago. The region has about 1.6 million residents and an electoral pool of just over one million. Registration in the region reached 96.6 percent of the potential electorate.

### **Delegation Activities**

On the day before the plebiscite, the delegation met with the archbishop and representatives of the electoral service, the *carabineros* (police force), the mayor's office, and the "yes" and "no" campaigns.

The archbishop shared a letter he said had been sent to thousands of homes throughout the Concepcion area in the weeks before the plebiscite. The letter, which purported to be written by the Command for the No, instructed "no" supporters to carry a pen in their pockets to mark their ballots in indelible ink rather than with the pencil that would be provided at the voting site. The electoral law stipulates the vote must be marked in pencil; marks of any other sort void the ballot. To counteract what the archbishop called "this blatant attempt by the 'yes' people to trick 'no' supporters into invalidating their votes," the Concepcion "no" campaign published ads in local newspapers refuting the authenticity of the letters and urging people to vote only in pencil. The team was also told that

*carabineros* had confiscated national identification cards, but this charge could not be verified.

On election day, the team divided into three groups. One group went south along the Bio-Bio River toward Santa Juana where irregularities were expected, a second headed south along the coast to the towns of Lota and Coronel, and the third stayed in the Concepcion-Talcahuano metropolitan area. In all, the team visited some 10 localities and about 15 polling stations. Only in Santa Juana were the observers repeatedly denied access to the polling stations.

The team found the following areas worthy of comment:

A) In most areas the military sought to maintain order and serve as independent guarantors of the process. But in poor and outlying areas, the team noted that the military was heavily armed.

B) Delays occurred at many of the tables the team visited as a result of cramped conditions, high voter turnout in the early morning and lack of organizational experience on the part of the armed forces controlling the flow of voters into the voting stations.

C) At every voting place the team visited, the secrecy of the ballot was assured. Every table had at least one opposition poll-watcher. The Electoral Service representatives were generally careful to maintain their impartiality and completed their duties in accordance with the letter and spirit of the law.

D) Santa Juana is a small town some 40 kilometers southwest of Concepcion. Following a visit to this coal mining town some months ago, the mayor allegedly circulated 10 copies of a "poll" to the town's teachers, indicating that each was responsible for distributing their copies among voting-age acquaintances. The text of the "poll" was "I, (name, national I.D. card number, address), do hereby declare that I (do, do not) support the policies of President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, and do swear that I will vote (yes, no) in the upcoming plebiscite."

On October 5, the military stationed at both of Santa Juana's polling places denied access to the observer team and



prohibited the observers from speaking with the Electoral Service representatives. One Christian Democrat *apoderado* who had free access to the women's polling station reported that the town's social worker (and the mayor's deputy) was inside the polling station reminding women "you know how to vote." He also said the opposition was not represented at all the women's tables.

-- Prepared by Kate Kauffman

## TALCA

### Team Members

Aurelio Barria

Juan Manuel Benitez

### Day Before the Plebiscite

There was a high level of tension the night before the plebiscite, especially among "no" supporters fearful of military repression. Pro-government figures were reluctant to hold meetings with the observers, perceiving them as "no" partisans.

The team met informally with an export farmer, his family and employees on his farm. He and his wife were for the "yes" and concerned that a "no" victory would bring chaos and social reforms similar to those implemented by the Allende government. The workers said they felt economically secure and were therefore in favor of the "yes." They feared a political change might lead to loss of their jobs if farmers felt threatened by a new government's economic policies.

### Day of the Plebiscite

Voters were gratified to see observers in remote areas. They were proud to demonstrate their civic responsibility by arriving to vote early. At every site the team visited, it introduced itself to the chief *delegado* and requested permission to observe the balloting and/or counting.

There were delays early in the morning due to lack of experience, but the process ran smoothly as the day progressed.

Most people stayed at home the night of the election, listening to the radio and watching television to find out the results. Some people feared the government was trying to steal the election as it delayed releasing the results.

### **Day after the Election**

Moderate groups from both sides in Talca said they are willing to negotiate over the political future of the country. They agreed on the importance of maintaining the economic achievements of recent years and improving income distribution. They said it was important for the opposition and armed forces to negotiate and establish a mechanism to transfer power smoothly from military to civilian authorities.

The moderate groups from the "yes" camp said they would try to avoid the positions of the extreme right. But they said that would depend upon how the "no" groups dealt with the extreme left's demands for radical political changes.

-- Prepared by Aurelio Barria

## **SANTIAGO -- I**

### *Team Members*

J. Brian Atwood  
Peter Dailey  
Tom Eagleton

Raul Morodo  
Michael Stoddard  
Adolfo Suarez

On the day of the plebiscite, the team proceeded west out of the city on San Pablo Street. The first stop was at the polling site at the intersection of San Pablo and Sta. Genoveva, the eastern most edge of the Quinta Normal quarter of the city. The neighborhood is an old, traditional section of the city, composed of working class Chileans.

The military guards at the gate, dressed in fatigues, were extremely cooperative with the voters and observers. The team was told that voters were not intimidated by the military's presence because, "they've always been around for these kind of events; the people are used to it." The military answered questions and directed people to the nearby information booth.

The group was immediately approached by two *apoderados* from different parties and the Election Council delegate. They explained that while some *mesas* were not yet fully constituted, most had gotten off to a timely and smooth start. This was borne out by long, orderly lines of men waiting patiently to vote.

The second stop was in the Jardin lo Prado neighborhood, a much poorer community, at a women's polling station. By 9:30 a.m., the several thousand women still in line were growing irritable about the tedious wait. In the school yard, the voting was moving along slowly but smoothly. The *vocales* at the site were extremely helpful to the voters, particularly when several elderly women needed much instruction and numerous tries before marking and folding the ballot properly.

Even at this relatively early hour, many women were complaining they had work to do at home and were tired of waiting. One of the electoral officials, spotting an observer badge, approached and said, "So, you're the people who think we don't know how to do anything by ourselves. As you can see, we are doing just fine, and we've been doing fine for many years now."

The third site was the group's farthest point out, in the Florentina neighborhood at the city's western limits. Around 10:15 a.m., the crowd of women and men was a tangled mass of at least 5,000 voters. Men at the front of the line were chanting and pushing (in a good natured way), while the military guards at the gate restricted the flow of voters to a few at a time.

The group's last morning stop was in Cerro Navia at a women's locale. By this hour (around 11 a.m.), the voters were getting extremely restless and tired of standing. Some reported being there since 7:30 a.m. and still they were not inside the gates of the voting station. As in other places, the group found the process to be going smoothly, *vocales* and *apoderados* present at each *mesa* and the Electoral Council delegate eager to answer questions (if rather insistent all was going as planned).

At this voting site, some *mesas* had no voters, despite the lines of several thousand still outside the gates. Also, upon

leaving the locale, a young man who identified himself as a member of the Christian Democratic Party showed the group his blank thumb as proof of how easy it was for him to wash the "indelible" ink off after voting.

The team (joined by President Osvaldo Hurtado) returned to La Florentina at about 5:30 p.m. To its considerable surprise, where earlier there had been lines of 5,000 voters, the team found nobody in the streets save a few pedestrians and stray dogs. Inside, a few stragglers were casting the final votes. Several *mesas* had already closed and *vocales* were preparing to conduct the vote count. At one *mesa*, *vocales*, before closing the *mesa*, were calling out the names of those who had not voted.

Later in the evening, a small group of observers visited the "yes" headquarters to observe their quick-count operation. The group arrived around 9:30 p.m., at which time they were still forecasting a "yes" victory. But it was obvious they were uneasy about the results coming in.

-- Prepared by Michael Stoddard

## SANTIAGO - TEAM II

### Team Members

Bruce Babbitt

Augusto Lagman

Ken Wollack

Osvaldo Hurtado

Misael Pastrana

Amy Conroy

The team proceeded to Pedro A Corda Norte, a 20-*mesa* outdoor polling site for women in a middle class neighborhood. Air force officers were guarding the site and checking ID cards. They were extremely helpful and informative to the voters and cordial to the observer team. The major parties were represented at the site. At 8:45 a.m., the *vocales* were still organizing the *mesas* and voting did not begin until approximately 9 a.m. By this time lines were forming at each *mesa*. Although the system was organized, voting took a long time. It was a very peaceful situation and no one seemed concerned about waiting in line or the length of time it took to vote. There was little

socializing while waiting, and the team was struck by how quiet and orderly the voters were.

The team next proceeded to San Miguel, another middle class neighborhood. This was a 27-*mesa* outdoor polling site for men. Although the site did not open until 9 a.m., all *mesas* were functioning at the time we were there. The major parties were represented. The voting process was organized and proceeded without any problems. Again, the military personnel were extremely helpful to the voters. The team witnessed one officer pushing an elderly voter in a wheel chair to his *mesa*.

Driving to the next polling site, the team passed a 10-block long line of women waiting to vote. We stopped and spoke to a few of the women. No one was concerned about waiting in line to get into the polling site. The line was a result of one small entrance into the site and checking ID cards took a long time.

The team drove to San Ramon, a very poor suburb. At the first polling place (Esauela), there were extremely long lines to get into the polling site. People were complaining that they had to wait in line several hours before they were allowed into the site. They would rather wait inside the site, they said. Some expressed concern that they would not get to vote. Inside the polling place, some *mesas* had lines and others did not. Air Force officers were guarding the entrance to the polling site and checking ID cards. Only a limited number of people were allowed into the site at a time for crowd control. The polling place opened at 7 a.m., but voting did not begin until 8 a.m. Shortly after beginning, it was necessary to suspend voting because the official "opening" document had not been signed. After signing the document, the *mesas* were reopened. Although the major parties were represented, the government representatives arrived late. One pollwatcher said there had been some confusion at first, but everything was running smoothly now. At 10:30 a.m., approximately 75 percent of the people had voted. It was estimated that *mesas* would begin closing at 5:30 or 6 p.m.

The situation at the next polling site in San Ramon that the team visited was similar to the first. There was no sign identifying the polling site. By 11 a.m., approximately half had already voted. One pollwatcher with whom we spoke was not very informative and would not indicate which party he represented. This was a small polling site, only 16 *mesas*.

In the afternoon, team members returned to the last polling site visited in San Ramon. To everyone's surprise, there were no lines with only a few people voting. Approximately 90-95 percent had voted and several *mesas* were starting to close. The *vocales* at one *mesa* stated that the whole voting process had gone smoothly and there were no problems. The *delegado* escorted team members from *mesa* to *mesa*, expressing pride in the orderliness of the process.

The team proceeded next to the national stadium (the largest polling site in Santiago -- 100 *mesas*). The military ringed the circular stadium, but remained approximately 20 meters from the *mesas*. The *mesas* were beginning to close and the counting process was beginning. People gathered around the individual *mesas* as they counted the votes. The *vocales* would shout out the results as the ballots were unfolded. The process was very orderly. The lower-numbered *mesas* were either won by the "si" or showed a narrow "no" victory. The team was told that this reflected early registration by proponents of the government. The announcement of a "no" win at each *mesa* was greeted by applause and celebration by the "no" supporters watching the counting process.

On the whole, the team was impressed by the patience and seriousness of the voters. People cast their votes and then went home to await the results.

-- Prepared by Amy Conroy

**SANTIAGO - TEAM III****Team Members**

Gerald Austin  
Carol Schwartz  
Patricia Keefer

**Independencia, near Hippodrome (suburb of Santiago)**

The team arrived at 7:15 a.m. Most workers were already there preparing ballots and voters were lined up outside. Police and military were present on the street, but congenial exchanges were evident. The polls opened at 8 a.m.

**Tiltit (small community at foot of mountains about 45 minutes north of Santiago)**

Because a bridge was inoperable, all voters -- of all ages and classes -- had to walk several blocks to the 10 *mesas* for women and ten *mesas* for men. By 9 a.m., huge numbers of people had gathered outside the polling site. When the president of one *mesa* told the Air Force command that he had to keep moving, the team driver remarked that he had never witnessed a civilian bossing a military officer around.

**Llailay (small community about an hour and 15 minutes north of Santiago)**

There were 17 *mesas* for women in one school and 17 *mesas* for men at another school several blocks away. The Christian Democrats were well represented as *apoderados*. The team visited the "no" headquarters, where it was estimated that 75 percent of community was voting "no."

**San Felipe (city of 50,000 people about two hours north of Santiago)**

Voting for men (40 *mesas*) took place at a large school. Women voted at another school six blocks away. The team was impressed by the quietness as people waited three to four hours. At many tables, approximately 270 of 350 people had voted by noon.

**Los Andes (lovely town with beautiful parks near mountains that lead to Argentina)**

Voting for women was in large school with 48 *mesas*. Lines were very long but orderly. The military was present but unobtrusive.

**Malpu (large suburb located southwest of Santiago)**

At the poll, the team observed its driver vote for the first time in his 41 years. Voting took place for men at a large exposition park. By 3:30 p.m. most people had already voted.

**General Observations**

At all *mesas* visited, there were at least three people from "the government" (which is how they described themselves regardless of "yes" parties they represented) while there were one to three people from the "no" campaign.

Team was touched by the huge numbers of people who waited patiently for hours to vote.

-- Prepared by Carol Schwartz

**VALPARAISO**

*Team Members*

Mary Burstin

Abel Holtz

Dale Loy

Frank Loy

Leticia Martinez

Gildas Molgat

Christopher "Kip" O'Neill

Richard Stone

Jack Walsh

Before the plebiscite, the team met with: Sergio Hurtado Urrea, the provincial coordinator of the Crusade for Civic Participation (CIVITAS); Bishop Francisco de Borja Valenzuela Rios; Jaime Luhrs, the head of the Regional Electoral Service; and representatives of the "yes" and "no" campaigns.

The "no" campaign officials alleged several cases of improper conduct by the "yes" forces, or the government, in the campaign period:



They showed the team a flyer that purported to be issued by the "no" campaign advising the populace that the ballot was not, or might not be, secret. It was, they said, issued by the "yes" camp to create fear among the "no" voters and to intimidate them into voting "yes." But they did not provide any evidence to support the allegation.

They told of numerous cases in which police on the streets took away the identification cards of young people wearing "no" buttons. The team was shown identification cards that had allegedly been confiscated and given to children by the police to play with. The team was told the police had also mutilated some cards.

The team did not have enough evidence to evaluate these charges. The team members were inclined to believe that some I.D. cards were confiscated or mutilated but that the practice did not seem to be widespread.

The day of the plebiscite, the team divided into three groups of three observers each. The three groups arrived at polling sites after they opened but before they were ready to process voters. Most polls did not begin operating until between 8:30 and 9:20 a.m. During this time substantial lines developed in the school buildings used. The delay appeared to be due to the inexperience of many *vocales* and their desire to follow instructions meticulously. There were no cases noted of inadequate supplies at the voting places.

At each *mesa* the team visited, the *apoderados* appeared to have full access to the polling site. The team witnessed no disputes between *apoderados* and *vocales*. The team also was welcomed at all polling sites and given free access with insignificant localized exceptions.

When the first voters finally stepped up to be processed, the pace proved very slow. One reason was simply the complexity of the process itself. It appeared that at a number of *mesas* only 20-25 people voted per hour. One voting site with

48 *mesas* had a line perhaps three quarters of a mile long in the morning. The team was concerned that many voters would give up in disgust, or that some voters would not actually be able to vote by midnight, when the polls had to be closed. Neither happened. All lines seemed somewhat magically to disappear by around 4 p.m., and most polls were able to close at the earliest hour permitted by law, nine hours after they opened.

In the late morning and afternoon, the team visited polling sites in more remote areas, including sites in Comuna de Puchuncavi, Casablanca, Alemana and Playa Ancha.

At the end of the day, the team returned to more nearby sites to observe the counting of the ballots. The process was very carefully done, and seemed to be free of fraud. The observers saw no evidence of any miscount, any invalidation of a valid ballot or other misconduct. The vote on each ballot was read aloud by the president of the *vocales* who showed the ballot to other *vocales* and the *apoderados* before placing the ballot in one of two piles where they were counted. There were relatively few voided ballots because of mismarking, and no significant disputes.

-- Prepared by Frank Loy

### **VALPARAISO: Individual Report of Christopher "Kip" O'Neill**

Upon arriving and settling in Vina Del Mar (Valparaiso) our nine-person team was met and briefed by the provincial leaders of:

- CIVITAS;
- the Electoral Service;
- the coordinator for the "yes" campaign;
- the representatives of the "no" Command; and
- the Bishop of Valparaiso.

I was impressed by the confidence of these individuals as to their expectations of a smoothly run plebiscite. Without exception, they seemed to appreciate and respect the presence of our delegation but I, for one, sensed that our presence

amused them and at the same time gave them an opportunity to show the world their dignity and pride in themselves.

The representatives of the "no" Command raised several incidents of attempts to deny voting rights to people sympathetic to the "no" by destroying or taking forcefully their *carnets*. They declined to provide further documentation of the alleged violations and portrayed them really as incidental to and not representative of the process.

*October 5, 1988*

In order to cover as much provincial territory as possible, we divided into three teams of three. My team observed the workings of several *mesas* in each of the 10 polling places visited. They were equally divided between men's and women's facilities.

The poll at which we started (Circunscripcion Sausalito: Men) opened a few minutes prior to 8:00 a.m. and was quite busy and backed up immediately. Each *mesa* commenced and proceeded at its own pace, but they were all operating within 20 minutes. Our driver speculated that when the men returned home from voting that would free up and enable women to vote in greater numbers.

The next polls visited were at Circunscripcion Miraflores, also in Vina Del Mar at about 9:15 a.m. Both the men's and women's facilities were opened and operating smoothly with no disruptions, but each *mesa* had what appeared to be a five to 15 minute wait. The wait seemed due solely to slow deliberate processing. At this time of day, the men seemed still to be voting in numbers greater than the women.

As prearranged, the three teams reconnoitered at 10:30 a.m. in order to be sure of everyone's safety and to briefly share our initial observations and experiences. Everyone seemed to be witnessing similar events. There were no reports of troubling episodes, but a strong impression of a calm and incredibly orderly and peaceful plebiscite.

My team then set out for Comuna De Casablanca to observe the polls in a small, secluded, poor rural community in

the furthestmost region of the province. These polling places were much smaller than their urban counterparts containing only 15 *mesas*. As a consequence there was no large bottleneck to enter the facility, but each *mesa* still had its own waiting period to vote. Again, voters waited quietly, patiently and without any evidence of frustration.

At the women's facility in Casablanca, we were informed by the Delegado that we were not welcome and that our presence was a disruption and an interference in the process. This was the only site at which we were asked to leave, at all the other polls we were either welcomed or treated curiously. In any event, the voting process at the facility did not seem to differ from the others. These facilities both opened and commenced according to the charts in the *mesas* in the 8 a.m. range.

At none of the polls was there any politicking or electioneering, at least overtly. Also, there was no noticeable class distinction at the urban sites between the voters and the *vocales* and *apoderados*, while there was an apparent distinction in Casablanca, especially at the women's facility. I was left with a strong sense of employers influencing, by their presence, the votes of their employees.

After meeting the other teams at the hotel, my team visited a women's facility in downtown Vina Del Mar (Circunscripcion Forestal) which had a waiting line of about 3/4 mile and approximately 5,000 to 7,500 women waiting to vote. We inspected this facility and learned that the back-up was due to a bottleneck from one narrow stairway which acted as the only access and egress to the building. Beyond the stairway, it opened up nicely and each *mesa* had the same modest waits of five to 15 minutes.

It was at this facility where the enormity and drama of what we were observing truly hit home. The women of all ages, like the voters at all the other polls were, dressed in their finest of clothes and were proudly waiting to reclaim a right. They had to climb a very steep, winding hill in order to get to the rear of the line. Halfway down the hill, after a two hour wait, the collective will, determination and dignity did not flag. At the

bottom of the hill nearing the entrance, we asked one woman how long she had waited and she quite proudly and firmly said "15 years and four hours."

Our team returned to a Casablanca men's site to observe the closing of the *mesas* and the counting of the votes. I observed one mesa (#2) from start to finish of the tabulation. It was slow but an incredibly open process where the president of the *vocales* opened each of the 319 ballots and held it up for all the *vocales* and *apoderados* to see and to challenge if appropriate. There was absolutely no manifestation by these individuals as to winning or losing, no gloating or visible disappointment.

I did learn from one *apoderado* for the "yes" that they expected to win this polling site by greater margins than they did. By these results, he concluded dispassionately that the "no" would ultimately prevail. His passion was reserved for the way the process worked.

On our return to Vina Del Mar, we went past both the men's site in downtown Valparaiso and the women's in downtown Vina Del Mar which had the huge lines that we had witnessed earlier in the day. By 7 p.m. these polling facilities had processed all the voters.

## *LA SERENA & COQUIMBO*

### *Team Members*

Keith Geiger  
Tim Manatt  
Rene Recalde

The team met the day before the plebiscite with Monseignor Cox who reported that Pinochet supporters had utilized pressure tactics in outlying areas. Such tactics, he said, included the confiscation of national identification cards by the police; calls from mayors to public school teachers to find out how students' parents intended to vote; and cash payments to buy "yes" votes. In addition, he said, seasonal workers in the

grape-growing region of Vicuna were threatened with the loss of their jobs in the event of a "no" victory.

The balloting was characterized by organizational confusion due to the large voter turnout in the morning hours. But despite voting lines of up to six hours, voters remained patient throughout the day.

In Vicuna, a town of about 15,000 people 60 kilometers from the coast, the ratio of military officials to voters was significantly higher than in Coquimbo. The arrival of the team to such an isolated town startled the president of the first *mesa* visited. He initially requested the team step outside the room, but ultimately allowed an observer to examine the electoral register.

In La Serena, the team visited two sites, where the attention to detail and compliance with voting procedures was complete from start to finish. There were minor controversies about whether particular ballots were correctly marked. The few overt signs of partiality were displayed at the end of the day when *apoderados* applauded the final results at their *mesas*.

-- Prepared by Tim Manatt

## ANTOFAGASTA

### *Team Members*

Manuel Dias Loureiro  
Mark Feierstein  
Jane Harman

Susan Johnson  
Jose Jorge  
Alberto Zumaran

### **Introduction**

Antofagasta is the capital of the Second Region. With about 200,000 inhabitants, it is Chile's fourth largest city and the most populated city in the north.

The city of Antofagasta is an important center for the ministries of defense and interior. The headquarters of various divisions of the armed forces are located in the city.

Electoral registration in Antofagasta was impressive, reaching almost 100 percent of eligible voters. Before 1973, the left had done well electorally there, as indicated by Allende's strong showings in the three presidential elections he contested.

### Team Briefings

On the day before the plebiscite, the NDI team met with: Maria Ines Morales of the Crusade for Civic Participation (CIVITAS); Cecilia Garcia of the Vicariate of Solidarity; Hector Luis Garcia, regional president of *Renovacion Nacional* party; Gerardo Claps Gallo, president of the regional human rights commission; officials from the "yes" command; and about a dozen opposition party officials.

Opposition activists told the team that their presence reassured government opponents that the eyes of the world were on Chile at a critical period and that the government would risk international condemnation if it cancelled the plebiscite or nullified the results.

Nearly everyone predicted that, because of the cordial relations between government partisans and opposition activists, there would be few disturbances the night of the plebiscite in Antofagasta. Government partisans were confident the voting and counting would go smoothly, while opposition figures and human rights activists were concerned about possible irregularities. Human rights workers and opposition leaders also charged that the police had been confiscating the identification cards of "no" supporters to prevent them from voting, but this could not be corroborated.

### Plebiscite Day Observations

The NDI team split into two groups of three and visited 10 voting sites in Antofagasta and Mejillones, a town about 40 minutes by car from downtown Antofagasta. At each site, the observers spoke with *vocales*, *apoderados de mesa*, *delegados* and voters.

The Christian Democratic Party and the Party for Democracy had *apoderados* at nearly every *mesa*, while the Humanist party was represented at very few *mesas*. Some sites had less

than a handful of *apoderados* representing President Pinochet and the *Renovacion Nacional*.

There were few irregularities in the voting and counting processes. The voting sites opened on time (7-8:30 a.m.), and balloting was completed about 5-6 p.m. as expected. During the busiest period of the day, voters waited in line for more than two hours. Aside from disputes over the difference between null and blank votes, the counting of the ballots at the *mesas* was conducted without incident.

The NDI team heard no complaints but witnessed the following relatively inconsequential irregularities:

\* Some *vocales* were unfamiliar with the details of the counting process (e.g. that every ballot at a *mesa* had to be initialed and unfolded before any were counted.) There was also confusion regarding the difference between null and blank votes and whether a ballot was invalidated if a voter indicated his preference in a manner other than drawing a vertical line through one of the horizontal lines below each option on the ballot.

\* Only *apoderados* had the right to protest a *vocales'* action, but the public that gathered around the *mesas* during the counting became involved verbally in the disputes noted above.

\* One *apoderado* from the Party for Democracy told an observer after the balloting had ended that she had voted but had washed the ink, which was supposed to be indelible, off her finger.

-- Prepared by Mark Feierstein



## *IQUIQUE*

### *Team Members*

Patricia de Chea  
Weslie Weissberg  
Andres Van der Horst

The centerpiece of the Iquique economy is the large duty-free zone established by President Pinochet. Pinochet did his military service in Iquique and, apparently as a result, he has favored the community with such services as ample drinking and gardening water, extensive electricity lines, good roads and the free zone.

Before the plebiscite, the team met with political, religious and labor leaders. Max Barerra, a lawyer and a strong proponent of the "yes," believed the government would respect the outcome whatever it might be. He was apprehensive, however, that if the "yes" won, the communists would not accept the results and would incite violence or demonstrate, forcing the military to respond.

Representatives from the fishing and trucking unions said they were prepared to accept a "yes" victory if there was no fraud. But if the electoral process proved fraudulent, their 30,000 members were prepared to "take to the streets." If the "no" won, they expected negotiations with the military to reduce Pinochet's term in office and would fight politically until the Communists regained their political rights.

Father Sanchez, who has lived in Iquique since before the coup and who worked with prisoners in a concentration camp in Pisagua in 1982 and 1983, said he expected the balloting and counting to run smoothly. But he feared the government would delay the release of the results, leading people to "take to the streets."

The local leader of the Christian Democrats said the local "yes" campaign had distributed vouchers that enabled people to receive community services, such as plumbing or electrical repairs. When they picked up these vouchers, they were presumably encouraged to vote for "the candidate."

On election day the team visited seven voting sites, five in town -- two men's and three women's -- and two outside of town. Both of the men's voting sites were well ordered. The lines formed outside and an armed officer stood at the gate to the building, admitting voters in groups of 30. Once inside, *apoderados* and clearly marked signs helped people find their *mesas*. In one location, two armed military officers were stationed in the courtyard. At the other men's voting site, the military did not congregate in the courtyard. No one waited on line more than 30 minutes.

In contrast, at all three women's voting sites, the organization was somewhat intimidating and unsympathetic to the voter. The sites were at the edge of town and many voters arrived in taxis. Women stood on line for two hours, often with infants in their arms. Although the team was told that women accompanied by infants could go directly into the voting center, the military officers that patrolled the long line failed to inform them of this right. (In contrast no military patrolled the men's lines.) The entrance to the voting site was patrolled by three guards per entrance; at one entrance there were more than 10. At one locale the gate was very narrow, forcing women to pass through a small battalion to get to their *mesa*.

The team was denied entrance to one voting site and had difficulty entering another. At one, the *delegado* was absent and his deputy deferred to the army officer when the team asked permission to enter. The officer denied the request. At another site, the military personnel at the door would not let the team in nor send anyone to ask the *delegado* his permission. It was not until an *apoderado* from the Party for Democracy went inside and found the *delegado* that we were able to enter.

At the women's voting sites, the military presence seemed large. It should be emphasized, however, that the team did not see any military personnel within 20 meters of any *mesa*.

At the town of Pozo Almonte, 46 kilometers outside town, the atmosphere was pleasant, almost festive. At both voting stations, one for each sex, the military personnel -- Air Force

men -- carried no guns. At the women's site a nurse administered aid. Rock music on the radio could be heard at every *mesa*.

At every *mesa* the team visited in Iquique to watch the vote count, no one was present other than the designated *apoderados* and *vocales*. The team again had difficulties entering the women's locations, but the counting process was carried out in accordance with the law.

--Prepared by Weslie Weissberg

## ARICA

### Team Members

Enrique Sanchez

Jorge Lawton

Marco Antonio Castro of CIVITAS had prearranged several initial meetings. These included meetings with the majority of representatives comprising the Command for the No, with Roman Catholic Bishop Salas, with the President and members of the Electoral Board, as well as with representatives of individual parties.

Registration in Arica was extremely high, reaching approximately 98,722 of an eligible universe of 108,000. Antonio Castro and others described the two week period previous to the plebiscite as being an atmosphere of fear and more ostentatious movement by the 20-25,000 troops based in Arica.

The team was given journalists' estimates of two pre-plebiscite march turnouts. On Friday, September 30th, the "yes" march was estimated at approximately 1,000 persons. On Saturday, October 1, the journalists' estimates of the "no" march were 12,000, a figure which they said surpassed any previous marches in Arica.

We were informed by journalists that they had received complaints during the "no" march of confiscation of *carnets* and that in the case of one busload of "no" supporters the military

had clipped off the part of the *carnet* and the photo to make it invalid. They estimated that this did not exceed 50 cases, but that it had frightened many others.

The representative at the Command for the No stressed the heavy concentration of military troops in Arica because of the close proximity of the Peruvian border. They stated that there were seven bases in Arica, and at least six bases in the nearby countryside. They estimated that up to 25 percent of the economy was linked to the military presence. They claimed that conscripts or draftees who had previously registered elsewhere were being required to register again in Arica. Before the team could request evidence and methods allegedly used for any multiple registrations, the meeting was interrupted by an unexpected visit from the military.

General Hector Marquez, Jefe de la Plaza, accompanied by a Lt. Colonel from the Army, a major from the Carabineros and the Juez de Crimen for Arica entered the hall and announced that the briefing would have to be suspended immediately because all political activity was banned for the 72 hours preceding the plebiscite. There was no violence and the "no" negotiated with the military for a 15 minute wrap-up of the meeting before breaking.

On the day of the plebiscite, the team had full access to the polling sites and received cooperation from military and civilian authorities. It witnessed a massive turnout of voters. Other than complaints about police dogs in the women's polling place, very long lines, and an impromptu tour by an Army general, the process proceeded slowly but normally.

At the Liceo A-5 Juan Noe, where the lines extended for several blocks outside of the school (between 11-12 noon), there were some complaints. The *apoderado general* of the locale informed the team of two *mesas* where there were complaints of ballots being pre-marked. At these voting tables (#121 and #124), the team was told by the pollwatchers that one woman's vote had been "objetado" but allowed to be deposited in the urn after she mentioned that it had been premarked. When the same objection arose from another woman, the pollwatchers

demanded that the stack of blank ballots be examined. They stated that approximately 50 ballots of the 350 were found to have marks on them already. Clean ones were substituted and the second woman who had complained was allowed to begin her voting process over again.

In the evening the streets were completely deserted except for some military patrols. The team was told that 11 members of the PDC were arrested in the late afternoon in a retail store of one of their members, taken to the local judge and arraigned in his chambers. They were charged with an "illicit political meeting," but when their lawyers denied the charge, the charge was changed to "attempted bribery" of voters. Their lawyers posted bond and the 11 were released several hours after their arrest pending trial.

-- Prepared by Jorge Lawton

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