



**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

# **THE 1989 PARAGUAYAN ELECTIONS: A FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE**

*Foreword by Rep. Bruce Morrison*

**INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION REPORT**

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## *ACKNOWLEDGMENTS*

This is the report of the 19-member international delegation that observed the May 1, 1989 Paraguayan national elections. It is based on information gathered by teams that visited five regions of the country, covering an area where more than 70 percent of Paraguayans live. The report presents a national perspective on the election process, including an analysis of the legal framework and political context in which the voting was held. A review of the results is also included.

The report was prepared under the auspices of the sponsoring organization, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), after consultations with members of the delegation. While these consultations indicate a consensus for the conclusions reached herein, NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the report.

The report was written by NDI Director for Latin American Programs Martin Edwin Andersen, NDI Senior Consultant Larry Garber and Program Assistant Michael Stoddard. Rep. Bruce Morrison prepared the report foreword. The team reports included in Chapter 6 were prepared by delegation members and by NDI staff. The report was edited by NDI Executive Vice President Kenneth Wollack and NDI Public Information Director Sue Grabowski. NDI Program Secretary Tom Williford assisted in the report's production.

NDI thanks the participants in this observer delegation and others who have visited Paraguay on behalf of the Institute to assist in promoting the transition process. NDI also thanks the many Paraguayans who took time from their busy schedules before and after the elections to share their perspectives on the process.



This report adds to the growing body of literature seeking to explain the essential elements of achieving democratic self-rule. The Institute believes that the events surrounding the Paraguayan elections, particularly its character as a guided transition in a country that has never known true democracy, are of great consequence for those seeking to promote democratic change. Until May 1, 1989, one could only speak of the liberalization of a regime. Since then, there is reason to believe that the elections will provide a foundation for further reforms.

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## FOREWORD

*Bruce Morrison*

I was honored to act as co-chair of the National Democratic Institute observer team for the May 1 elections in Paraguay. It presented an opportunity for all of the members of the team to share strong solidarity with the Paraguayan people as they embraced their long-awaited chance to move toward democratic rule.

The elections were a special challenge to a people who have never lived in a true democracy, and whose leaders for too long seemed either unwilling or unable to bring them any closer to such a worthy goal. A preliminary canvass of the results shows that Paraguayans have made real strides since the February 3 coup, which overthrew the decades-old dictatorship of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner.

Democracy in Paraguay, and the sorry record of human rights violations under Stroessner, have long been a special interest to me. I first visited Asunción right after the coup in February. This led me to join the international observer delegation to witness the May election. For me, there have been few more poignant, more impressive scenes than watching a nation once in the clutches of a brutal regime march self-confidently toward representative government. Today, I remain impressed and moved by what I saw.

This report highlights the weaknesses, as well as the strengths, of Paraguay's transition to democracy. Yet I believe I can speak for the delegation as a whole when I say that each of us returned from Paraguay with a new sense of optimism

about what is underway there. We were especially touched by the countless examples of Paraguayan youth, whatever their party, working together to affirm a common dream of their nation's future.

I want to thank my co-chairmen -- Eduardo Frei of Chile and Alisdair Graham of Canada -- for their prodigious contributions of grace, wit, and hard work in Paraguay. Their efforts, and those of the other members of the delegation, succeeded in making the international observer delegation a huge success. I also want to thank U.S. Ambassador Timothy Towell and his able staff at the U.S. Embassy for their help in gaining access to Paraguayan government representatives and in making my visit to Paraguay both pleasant and productive. And, lastly I want to thank the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, whose efforts in Paraguay before, during, and after the elections will likely serve as a model of effective democratic solidarity for years to come.

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## *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

A 19-member international delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, observed the May 1 presidential and legislative elections in Paraguay. The elections were held only three months after Paraguay's long-reigning dictator, General Alfredo Stroessner, had been deposed in a bloody coup. Further, the elections occurred in a country that lacks a democratic tradition and that experienced considerable repression during the Stroessner era.

The following are the delegation's summary conclusions concerning certain aspects of the elections process:

1. Despite irregularities and instances of outright fraud in the balloting process, Paraguayans from across the political spectrum acknowledged that the May 1 elections marked a significant step forward in the effort to establish democratic government. The victories of General Andres Rodriguez and the Colorado Party, in the presidential and legislative contests, respectively, also were accepted by Paraguayans as representing the will of the people.

2. Scheduling the elections 90 days after the coup provided a tremendous advantage to the Colorado Party, which dominated the government during the Stroessner era, and proved particularly disadvantageous to those parties that were officially recognized only after the coup. The participation of all parties in the elections, nonetheless, exposed the population to varied personalities and perspectives, and considerably expanded the range of options available to voters.

3. The election campaign was marked by a degree of openness that had not been previously experienced in Paraguay. Political parties held rallies throughout the country, media operated without constraints and human rights abuses decreased dramatically.

4. The election law and procedures reflect the interests of a system favoring one dominant political party; they restrict, rather than promote political competition. The conduct of the campaign and the elections highlighted the need for significant reforms in the election process and for effective civic education programs. These reforms have been promised by Colorado Party officials, including the newly-elected president.

The long-term significance of the May 1 elections will depend, in large measure, on the degree to which the reforms take into account and reflect the interests of all sectors of Paraguayan society. Given its dominant role in Paraguayan society, the Colorado Party will continue to be scrutinized for efforts to reform itself from within.

5. Election day in Paraguay was marred by registration lists that were seriously flawed, irregularities stemming from inexperience with election procedures, and attempts by Colorado party officials in certain regions to ensure that their candidates achieved overwhelming victories. Despite the problems, election officials, representatives of the various political parties and voters worked together administering the balloting and counting processes in a manner that bodes well for an eventual transition to democracy.

6. The international community should support efforts to strengthen democratic institutions in Paraguay and should continue to monitor the human rights situation there.

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## *Chapter 1*

### *INTRODUCTION*

On May 1, 1989, Paraguayans participated for the first time in national elections in which they could vote for candidates of their choice. The level of international interest was reflected by the more than 200 representatives of political, human rights and other organizations who visited the country to observe the elections.

As expected, the provisional president, General Andres Rodriguez, won a landslide victory, garnering 74 percent of the vote. His nearest rival, Authentic Radical Liberal (PLRA) leader Domingo Laino, trailed with 20 percent. In the parliamentary elections, the ruling Colorado Party outpolled the seven opposition parties by a margin of more than two to one.

While opposition figures charged, and government officials admitted, that the process was flawed, no one doubted that the elections represented a watershed in Paraguayan history. The elections occurred barely three months after a bloody coup in which Rodriguez overthrew General Alfredo Stroessner, who, second only to North Korea's Kim Il Sung, had been the world's longest reigning dictator. Given that Paraguay had never enjoyed democratic rule, and that several of its neighbors had recently undergone transitions to democracy, considerable international attention was directed to Paraguay as the May 1 elections approached. Following the elections, there was widespread optimism that democratic ideals expressed during the election campaign would help promote

democratic institutions, despite the recognition that a single election could not solve all the nation's problems.

For these historic elections, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), an independent, political development institute, sponsored a 19-member international observer delegation. The delegation included parliamentarians, politicians and election experts from seven countries in North and South America, and Europe. NDI previously organized similar delegations in Chile, Haiti, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Reflecting the new government's policy of openness, the regime officially welcomed the delegation's observation of the electoral process.

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## Chapter 2

### *NDI ACTIVITIES IN PARAGUAY*

#### **A. February 1988 - April 1989**

In February 1988, an NDI survey mission visited Paraguay at the time of the country's regularly scheduled national elections. The primary purpose of the visit by consultant Jo Marie Griesgraber and NDI Latin American Program Director Martin Edwin Andersen was to explore possible democratic development programs. The mission members also informally observed the elections, visiting polling sites in Asunción and nearby towns. Given the authoritarian nature of Paraguayan politics -- reflected in the past by massive electoral fraud -- political and civic leaders asked NDI to support the establishment of a nonpartisan institute that would promote civic education and political development.

The following month, NDI invited to Washington Aldo Zuccolillo, the publisher of *ABC Color*, a prestigious daily newspaper closed four years earlier by the Stroessner regime. Zuccolillo discussed with NDI staff specific programs for the new Paraguayan institute.

In August, the *Centro de Estudios Democraticos* (CED - Democratic Study Center) was formed, with a founding board of directors representative of Paraguay's democratic community. The board included leaders of the most important opposition parties, as well as democratic opponents of Stroessner within the ruling Colorado Party. René Recalde, the respected executive secretary of the *Equipo Nacional de Laicos*, the Catholic lay association, was elected president of



CED. Esteban Caballero, a political scientist trained in Mexico and Great Britain, was named executive director. By September, the CED established its by-laws and began working with political parties and civic institutions in the area of democratic development.

Coincidental with CED's formation, world attention focussed on Chile, where that country's democratic opposition was seeking to initiate a transition process through participation in a government-sponsored presidential plebiscite. In September 1988, CED and NDI sponsored the visit of four Paraguayan youth leaders for a workshop-seminar that examined the successful Chilean civic education programs developed for the October 5th plebiscite. NDI also included six Paraguayan political leaders in the international delegation that observed the plebiscite.

By early 1989, CED implemented youth leadership training programs and organized nationwide forums, which debated election law reform and possible opposition participation in the 1990 municipal elections. The February coup, however, dramatically altered the political landscape. Responding quickly to the new environment, NDI, at the request of CED, sponsored the visit to Paraguay of two Chileans who played leading roles in the plebiscite campaign of the previous year: Genaro Arriagada, director of the "No" campaign; and election specialist Edgardo Mimicca. Arriagada and Mimicca, accompanied by NDI staff member Martin Andersen, helped CED develop comprehensive programs for civic education and election monitoring. Ultimately, CED, in support of the election process, organized a massive voter education campaign, trained 8,000 poll watchers from all the major parties, helped coordinate a public opinion poll that was released a week before the elections and, with several other organizations, conducted a parallel vote count on election day.

## **B. The International Observer Delegation**

Nineteen individuals from seven countries -- Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Sweden, the United States and Uruguay -- participated in the delegation. Serving as delegation

co-leaders were Chilean political party leader Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Canadian Senator Alisdair Graham and U.S. Congressman Bruce Morrison (D-CT). The international delegates represented all political ideologies within the democratic political spectrum; the U.S. component was bipartisan.

Prior to their arrival in Paraguay, the delegates received a briefing book that contained the terms of reference for the delegation (see Appendix I), a background paper on Paraguay, and other materials describing laws and procedures relating to the elections. An NDI staff member arrived in Paraguay two weeks before the elections to make logistical arrangements and to monitor developments in different regions of the country during the closing weeks of the campaign.

The majority of the delegation arrived in Asunción on Friday, April 28. That afternoon, NDI staff briefed the delegation on current political developments and on Paraguayan election procedures. After addressing the group, CED director Esteban Caballero screened four television spots that instructed citizens how to register and vote, and that sought to assure voters their vote would be free and secret. Caballero concluded his remarks with a sentiment echoed by Paraguayans throughout the week: "We have agreed to participate in this election -- that we acknowledge to be somewhat distorted -- in the hope that we can thereby change the system and improve the social, economic and political situation in Paraguay."

On Saturday morning, the delegation heard perspectives on the current situation from three Paraguayan social scientists, and a representative of the Catholic Church. In a meeting with the delegation, Expedito Rojas, president of the Central Electoral Council (JEC), acknowledged that there existed several flaws in the electoral process, but added that fraud would not reach "unacceptable" levels.

After these meetings, the delegation held a press conference at which co-leader Eduardo Frei read an opening statement, introducing the delegation and explaining the

purpose of its visit (see Appendix II). In the afternoon, the delegation met with representatives from the Febrerista, Authentic Liberal Radical and Christian Democratic parties. A representative of the Colorado Party was invited, but failed to appear.

On Sunday morning, the delegation divided into teams in preparation for election day. Three teams departed for the cities of Concepción, Ciudad del Este, and Encarnación. (See Appendix III for team assignments. The reports of each team are included in Chapter 6.) The co-leaders, meanwhile, met briefly with General Rodriguez; delegates remaining in Asunción later met with Foreign Minister Luis Argaña. Sunday afternoon, the Asunción-based observers met with opposition presidential candidate Domingo Laino, who enumerated many of the complaints previously heard about the process. In particular, he criticized the 90-day campaign period as unfairly brief for newly-recognized parties.

At 7 a.m. on Monday morning, election day, the delegation's six teams observed the opening of the polls. In addition to monitoring the voting process, the teams also observed the ballot counting at selected polling sites, and visited the headquarters of the different parties and local centers of the election council where the regional results were tabulated.

Following the elections, the teams reassembled in Asunción for a debriefing. The delegation then presented its consensus statement to the press. In it, the delegation noted the many irregularities in the process and the institutionalized biases in favor of the ruling party. At the same time, the delegation pointed to the significant political opening experienced in Paraguay since the overthrow of Stroessner. The statement concluded: "The significance of the May 1 elections ultimately will be based on where they lead. If the elections are to represent a serious move toward democracy, then further reforms must inevitably and shortly follow." (See Appendix IV for complete delegation statement). The

delegation statement was reported in the local and international media (see Appendix V).

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## *Chapter 3*

### *ELECTION FRAMEWORK*

#### **A. Paraguay's Political History**

Since its independence in 1811, Paraguay has been ruled by a series of dictatorships. One of the country's founding fathers effectively isolated the nation from the outside world for more than three decades. Another president involved Paraguay in a war with three of its neighbors in which nearly all the country's able-bodied men were killed. In the four decades previous to Stroessner's rule, Paraguay experienced three dozen coups and 39 presidents.

During the 34-year Stroessner reign, Asunción came to be known as the "contraband capital of Latin America." Half the cars on the road were reported stolen from neighboring countries. Corruption and narcotics trafficking were believed to reach the highest echelons of the Stroessner government.

The contraband also had a human face. German war criminal Josef Mengele found refuge in Paraguay, as did dozens of other Nazis. So too did "French Connection" heroin kingpin August Ricord, former Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza, and Italian narco-terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie. Several Argentine security officers accused of human rights crimes during the 1970's and early 1980's made their homes in Asunción after the Argentine military relinquished power.

Paraguay's two most important parties, the Liberals and the Colorados, emerged a century ago. Although there is little ideological difference between them, Paraguay's political life

has been thoroughly partisan, and often bloody. Party affiliation has always played an important role in the life of the citizenry. The recent record of excesses by the Colorado regime came after a similarly despotic period of Liberal governments.

### **B. The Stroessner Era**

General Stroessner gained power in 1954, after a protracted period of civil strife. He ruled Paraguay with an elaborate system of *pyragües* (spies), patronage, corruption and iron-fisted repression. During his reign tens of thousands of Paraguayans were imprisoned, many were tortured and several thousand died.

Successfully playing on memories of the bloody conflict of the 1940's and early 1950's, Stroessner promised "peace through order." The formula rested on three pillars: the Colorado party, the military and the government bureaucracy. Cities, airports and schools bore Stroessner's name. The Colorado party became the "Stronista" party. Generals and Supreme Court justices alike wore the red neckerchief of the Colorado party, and appointments to government jobs depended on party affiliation. Distinctions among the party, the military and the government either were blurred or ceased to exist.

For more than two decades, Stroessner presided over a country experiencing relative economic growth. In the mid-1970's, the country enjoyed an economic boom based on the joint construction, with Brazil, of the mammoth Itaipú hydroelectric complex. By the mid-1980's, however, the economy began to stagnate as work on Itaipú ended and world prices for soya beans and cotton, which constitute 60 percent of Paraguay's legal exports, plummeted.

As the economy deteriorated, the regime reportedly relied even more heavily on illegal means to maintain its position. Evidence mounted about official support for narcotics traffickers. In January 1988, the U.S. reopened its Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in Asunción.

### C. Stroessner's Demise

By 1987, reports of Stroessner's ill health had become an increasingly contentious political issue. The previously loyal Colorado leadership began debating the succession question.

In August 1987, the Colorado Party held a convention to nominate its candidate for president in the February 1988 elections. The meeting illustrated deep divisions within the party. On one side stood the *militantes*, the ardent supporters of Stroessner backed by the police; many of the *militantes* were recent converts to the party. This faction was challenged by the so-called *eticos* and *tradicionalistas*. The former challenged Stroessner's personalist rule, while the latter were party members who opposed Stroessner's continuing supremacy. Despite the internal dissension, the Colorados nominated Stroessner as their candidate for another five-year term, with the *tradicionalistas* ultimately being thrown out of the convention.

At the same time, the factionalized opposition began working more closely together. The National Accord, formed in 1979 by four leading opposition parties -- the Authentic Radical-Liberals (PLRA), the social democratic Febreristas, the Christian Democrats, and the long-time anti-Stroessner Popular Colorado Movement (MOPOCO)-- was the locus of attempts to challenge Stroessner from outside the Colorado party. By late 1987, the *Coordinadora*, an ad hoc committee of the National Accord and several civic organizations, agreed to encourage abstention and/or blank voting in the February 1988 elections in an effort to denounce what they called an "electoral farce." During the campaign period, the *Coordinadora* organized "lightening" demonstrations, lasting only until the police arrived and dispersed the crowds. On election day, the opposition sought to show its strength by organizing rallies in different cities and towns.

The February elections marked the seventh time Stroessner offered his name for the presidency. As was the custom, only token opposition was allowed from a few small

parties. It was no surprise when Stroessner won 90 percent of the votes, amidst a campaign marred by intimidation and violence. Systematic irregularities in the voting were self-evident -- the lack of impartial poll watchers, a ban on the participation of the most popular opposition candidates and parties, and the intimidation of voters by the security forces. However, since an effective, broad-based monitoring effort had not been organized, the opposition was reduced to presenting mere anecdotes to buttress its charges of fraud.

There were other developments that reflected a new social ferment in the country. The Catholic Church initiated a national program of adult education addressing issues of social justice and emphasizing local problems. A grassroots effort, coordinated by a lay group, the *Equipo Nacional de Laicos*, supported the Catholic Bishops' call for a national dialogue. Labor groups also increased job actions, both to advance their sectorial interests and to aid the democratization effort.

The democratic opposition who also drew strength from the May 1988 visit by Pope John Paul II. Although the Stroessner regime sought to control the visit, both the preparations for the event and the huge open-air rallies became forums for the opposition. The Pontiff repeatedly, and pointedly, reiterated his concern for human rights, and visited areas of the country from which the regime had tried to steer him.

As the succession crisis continued within the Colorado Party, resentment grew in the armed forces over massive forced retirements. The retirements were reportedly designed so that one of Stroessner's sons -- an air force colonel -- could be rapidly promoted and groomed for the presidency. Nonetheless, Stroessner was in sufficient control of the military to repress, in a brutal manner, opposition demonstrations that took place in late 1988.

Sensing potential trouble within the military, in January 1989 Stroessner moved against General Andres Rodriguez, second-in-command of the armed forces and father-in-law to



one of Stroessner's sons. Stroessner ordered that Rodriguez relinquish command of the elite First Army Corps stationed in Asunción and retire or accept the post of defense minister. Although a long time supporter of the regime, Rodriguez had increasingly identified with the "traditionalist" faction of the Colorado Party.

Rodriguez responded on February 3 by leading a coup against Stroessner. After hours of heavy fighting between rebellious soldiers and Stroessner loyalists, the 65-year-old Rodriguez addressed the nation by radio. Order had been restored, he said, "and with it all the human values of our entire Constitution will be respected." Stroessner was briefly detained at the First Army Corps headquarters, then quickly exiled to Brazil.

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## Chapter 4

### PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS

#### A. The Electoral Players

Elections in Paraguay are administered by a *Central Electoral Junta* (JEC) composed of nine members nominated by parties in the Chamber of Deputies. The majority party nominates six members, the first opposition party selects two members and the second opposition party chooses one member. For the May 1 elections, Dr. Expedito Rojas Benitez served as president of the Junta.

Subsidiary to the Central Electoral Junta are the 225 sectional electoral juntas. A sectional electoral junta comprises six members, four from the majority party and one each from the minority parties. A judge or justice of the peace serves as the president of these regional juntas, which maintain voter registration lists, designate polling sites, ensure the availability of necessary materials at polling sites, resolve challenges that arise before and on election day, and collect the tally sheets from the voting tables.

At the polling site level, the elections are administered by three officials: a president, a secretary and a *vocal*. The president and *vocal* are designated by the majority party, while the secretary is designated by the second leading party in the legislature.

Political parties play a key role in administering Paraguayan elections. As described above, parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies designate election officials at the

national, sectional and local levels. The parties also designate *apoderados* and *veedores*. The former are poll watchers responsible for an entire polling site, while the latter are assigned to specific voting tables (*mesas*). The *apoderados* and *veedores* are responsible for ensuring that their party's ballots are available at each voting table.

Until the February coup, Paraguay had four legal parties: Colorado; Liberal; Radical Liberal; and Febrerista. Following the coup, the factionalized Colorado Party reunified, and the party also was supported by several notable independents.

By 1988, the Liberal Party had sustained 25 years of division within its ranks. At the time of the elections, three parties sought recognition as the true heir of the historic Liberal Party.

In 1962, the government recognized a group of Liberals, who agreed to participate in elections, but not to contest for power. Another faction of the original Liberal Party participated in the drafting of the 1967 Constitution. This faction subsequently was authorized to participate in elections as the Radical Liberal Party. Both the Liberal and Radical Liberal parties were known as the "rented opposition" because of their willingness to accept Colorado Party domination.

The Authentic Radical Liberal Party formed in 1977 when dissident members left the Radical Liberal Party out of dissatisfaction with the party's refusal to challenge Stroessner and his personalist rule. The *autenticos* became the leading party in the National Accord.

The Febrerista Party, although recognized as a legal party by the regime, had refused to participate in elections since 1973. Instead, it formed an extra-parliamentary opposition and participated in the National Accord. The Christian Democratic Party, founded in 1960, also was part of the National Accord.

## **B. Deciding to Participate**

Immediately following the coup, Rodriquez installed himself as provisional president, and proclaimed that elections

would be held within the 90 days required by the Constitution. He later announced May 1 as election day. Opposition parties immediately protested that 90 days did not allow sufficient time to organize.

On February 13, the National Accord called for the postponement of elections, threatening not to participate if they were held as scheduled. The major demands presented by the National Accord parties to Rodriguez included a four-month postponement of the elections and a minimum 60 days more for additional voter registration. The opposition argued that such time would permit the "cleaning up" of voter lists, and would allow the opposition parties to organize in a more liberal environment. The National Accord parties also sought membership on the JEC.

The opposition parties made other demands concerning the electoral process, including: recognition of previously banned political parties; permission to form coalitions; proportional representation in Congress; use of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting; and official authorization for foreign observers.

The provisional government's response was mixed. It refused to postpone the elections or allow the formation of coalitions. In addition, the government would not agree to changes in the law that would provide for greater "proportional representation" for the legislature (the system in place gives the party that obtains a plurality, two-thirds of the seats in both houses).

Some concessions were granted, however. The period for voter registration was extended from March 2 to April 8; all opposition parties were recognized; the use of indelible ink was authorized; the opposition was granted access to government radio; and international observers were welcomed for the elections.

The opposition -- particularly Laino and his PLRA -- debated whether to participate in the electoral process until the very last moment, hoping to win maximum concessions.

Some argued that failure to participate would allow the Colorados an open and uncontested field. Others maintained that participation could serve to legitimize continued military rule, and dominance by the Colorado Party. The opposition leaders ultimately concluded that if they wanted to establish their role in promoting change, participation in the elections was a necessity.

### C. Voter Registration

A prospective Paraguayan voter registers by presenting the requisite identification material to a sectional election junta or to a designated political party representative. The individual's name is placed on the registration list compiled by each junta. In addition to appearing on the list, an individual must present to the election officials a *libreta civica* (voter registration card) or, for this election only, their certificate of registration. Because the *libreta civica* is distributed only between September 1 and 15, the regime allowed a voter to use the certificate of registration to prevent disenfranchisement of those who had lost their *libreta civica* or who registered after the September deadline.

The Election Commission reported that 786,000 people registered to vote during the extended registration period, bringing the total electorate to 2.2 million people. The opposition claimed many more could have registered if the rolls had remained open for a longer period.

The most troubling administrative problem presented to the delegation before the elections involved the voter registration lists. The government's decision to use the old lists -- plagued as they were with fraudulent inscriptions -- caused considerable concern among opposition party leaders and independent observers, notwithstanding the government's decision to extend the voter registration period.

Some critics pointed out that, when compared to the 1982 census, the registration numbers exceeded numerical possibilities. According to the opposition newspaper *Ultima Hora*, "The facts are eloquent: if all citizens who are at least 18

years old would have registered, including those who are over 86 years old, without missing a single one, according to the 1982 census the total number of people eligible to vote should be 2,017,000." The real number of eligible voters, the paper said, was closer to 1,993,000 people; this even before taking into account considerations of mortality and international migration.

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## Chapter 5

### *THE PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT*

Soon after taking office, Rodriguez promised to make political liberalization a reality. In a February 6 press conference, the provisional president said:

I can assure you that under no circumstances will there be any fraud. It is not necessary to commit any fraud here. I am sure that the elections will be observed by overseers and by the people who will be invited from the most democratic countries.

Several parties, including the Authentic Radical-Liberal (PLRA) and the Christian Democratic, were legalized soon after the coup. The Colorado Party, meanwhile, launched an aggressive campaign to woo back its democratic dissidents, promising to serve as the vehicle for continued liberalization of the country. With a now-unified Colorado Party backing his candidacy, the tradition of voting for the party in power, and the machinery of government at his disposal, Rodriguez was the early frontrunner.

Meanwhile, Paraguay's media were unshackled. The crusading, independent newspaper *ABC Color* reopened exactly five years after it was shut down by the Stroessner regime. The independent *Radio Nanduti* and the Febrerista party weekly *El Pueblo* renewed operations. Freedom of assembly also was fully respected. The large crowds at rallies held by opposition leader Domingo Laino testified to the new political climate.

Seeking international support, the government welcomed foreign observers and initiated a dialogue over issues of social justice with the Catholic Church. Political exiles, including those most vilified by the former regime, such as Paraguayan novelist Augusto Roa Bastos, were welcomed home.

During the period preceding the elections, more than 40 criminal suits were lodged against police officials in Paraguayan courts. The interior minister pledged to abolish notorious torture centers and to prosecute members of the security forces accused of human rights abuses. In one eastern province, a bathtub -- known in Spanish as *la pileta* -- used for torture sessions was ordered destroyed by Rodriguez. In a symbolic act, a Catholic bishop, former political prisoners and a local official all lifted a sledgehammer to strike the first blow.

Some political leaders worried, however, that the dramatic changes in areas such as human rights would not last unless they were reinforced by significant changes in Paraguayan institutions. They also called for an end to the pressures placed on military personnel to join the Colorado Party.

Despite some reservations, Paraguayans who embraced the political process not only wanted to vote, but were enthusiastic about participating in politics. Some opposition leaders conceded that Rodriguez had stolen their message of change. The opposition claim that Rodriguez offered "Stroessnerism without Stroessner" appeared to fall wide of the mark, particularly given the public's receptivity to the Colorados' positive campaign message that promised a modern and democratic Paraguay. As *The New York Times* noted on the eve of the elections: "The coup and 90-day campaign saw a remarkable metamorphosis of the remote commander of Paraguay's armed forces into a jolly figure who kissed babies, met with dissident church leaders and waded virtually unprotected through crowds of market women, promising to build day-care centers."



A poll released on the eve of the elections showed Rodriguez leading with 72 percent of the vote. Rodriguez's lead was based, in large measure, on the "good" or "very good" opinion rating of him by 91 percent of those polled. The poll also showed that almost 50 percent of the population believed that the elections would not be conducted honestly.



*Members of NDI observer delegation meet with Paraguayan election official, Expedito Rojas (back to camera), in Asunción on day before May 1 elections.*



*Delegation co-leader Bruce Morrison (right) and Gen. Andres Rodriguez on eve of presidential contest.*



*CED Executive Director Esteban Caballero (center) and President Rene Recalde (second from right) meet with leaders of non-governmental organizations to discuss plans for the independent vote count on election day.*



*A flatbed truck transports party activists to a campaign rally.*




*Authentic Radical Liberal Party presidential candidate Domingo Laino in campaign parade prior to election day.*



*Delegation members Lovida Coleman, Edwin Eisendrath (far left) and Tim Manatt (right) are interviewed by press outside polling station in Concepción.*



*Delegation member Elaine Baxter talks with election workers at polling station in Encarnación.*



*NDI delegation co-leaders (center) Al Graham, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle and Bruce Morrison meet the press. They are flanked by NDI Latin American Program Director Martin Andersen (far left) and NDI Senior Consultant Larry Garber (far right).*

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## Chapter 6

### THE BALLOTING PROCESS

#### A. Operation

Paraguayans voted at one of more than 10,000 preassigned voting tables (*mesas*), with no more than 200 voters per *mesa*. In general, there were several *mesas* per polling site, which were located in schools, churches and municipal buildings.

Three election officials (a president, secretary and *vocal*) administered each *mesa*. In many cases, the Liberal or the Liberal Radical parties, which were responsible for designating one of the officials, were unable to find individuals who could serve. Thus, in some areas, the third official was a Colorado Party member, while in other regions one of the newly-recognized parties was allowed to designate the third official.

At virtually all polling sites, the Colorado Party and PLRA had the requisite number of *apoderados* and *veedores* present. However, the presence of representatives of other parties was spotty and depended on the party's organizational capacity in the particular region. At most polling sites, several military or police officers stood near the entrance of the location, although their presence was not obtrusive.

The polls opened at 7 a.m. Thirty minutes before opening time, *mesa* officials and the party poll watchers arrived to prepare for the voting. They were the first to vote.

Upon arrival at the polling site, a voter would be directed to his or her *mesa*. The line at the tables were relatively short.

When the voter reached the front of the line, he or she would hand the elections officials a *libreta civica* or certificate of registration. The officials would then review the registration lists to determine whether it contained the voter's name. If the name appeared, the secretary signed the registry beside the voter's name, the president signed the envelope, and the *vocal* checked off the voter's name in a duplicate registration book that was kept at the sectional electoral junta.

In many cases, names were not on the registration list despite the fact that the voter possessed a seemingly valid registration certificate. Often, the officials would permit the voter to cast a ballot at the *mesa* where the voter's registration form indicated he or she should vote, and would enter the voter's name at the end of the list. In many instances, however, prospective voters were denied the opportunity to vote because their names were inexplicably missing from the registration list.

Once the voter had been approved by the election officials, he or she would be directed to a private voting area, or so-called "dark room" (*cuarto oscuro*), that theoretically provided the voter an opportunity to cast his or her ballot in secret. However, at many polling sites, several *mesas* shared the same dark room. At other sites, officials were able to observe what was happening inside the dark room. What effect this had on voters was impossible to determine.

Inside the dark room, there should have been 14 ballots -- one with the name of the presidential candidate for each of the seven parties and a second with the names of the candidates for Senate and Congress for each of the seven parties. Each party printed its own ballots and was responsible for their distribution to the electoral juntas in each of the regions it wished to compete. The law provided that the electoral juntas would then distribute the ballots to each *mesa*, but in most instances the parties assumed this responsibility. Indeed, the most important task for the party *apoderados* and *veedores* was to make sure that their party's ballots were available inside the dark room. At polling sites where party

representatives were not present, there often were no ballots or an insufficient number of ballots for that party located in the dark room.

Once inside the darkroom, the voter selected one ballot for president and one for legislature and placed it in an envelope. Although the voter was free to select ballots for different parties for president and Congress, several parties, most notably the Colorados, sought to discourage ticket-splitting by stapling together the party's presidential and legislative ballots.

After completing the ballot selection process, the voter would emerge from the dark room, place the ballot in a sealed box, have his or her certificate of registration or *libreta civica* stamped by the president of the *mesa*, and have his or her index finger marked with indelible ink. A serious complaint involved the indelibility of the ink. Voters in many polling places demonstrated the ease with which the ink could be removed, raising questions as to whether it had been diluted.

The balloting process continued until 4 p.m. when the polls closed. If voters were still in line at closing time, they were allowed to cast their ballots. Once it was determined that there were no last-minute voters, the ballot box was opened and the envelopes placed on the table and counted. The president of the *mesa*, with the help of the other officials, then opened each envelope and placed the ballots in stacks according to party, separating the presidential and legislative ballots. Each stack was then counted and recounted in the presence of the poll watchers, and the results, comments and any objections were marked on the tally sheet (*acta*). The party poll watchers maintained unofficial tally sheets on which they marked the results for each party and each contest.

When the count was completed, the *mesa* officials and the party poll watchers signed the *acta* and the duplicate record. The *acta* was then transported to the sectional electoral junta, along with the ballots and the ballot boxes. According to law, the ballots were burned or otherwise destroyed.



From the sectional headquarters, the official records were transported to the Justice of the Peace in the capital of each department, who in turn sent them to Asunción. The duplicate records were kept at the sectional level. Unofficial results were reported by telephone along the same channels as the official results. Where a poll watcher or *mesa* official refused to sign an *acta*, the dispute was presented to the Justice of the Peace, who resolved the dispute and reported it to the Central Electoral Junta.

## **B. Delegation Observations**

Not surprisingly, given Paraguay's electoral history, there were many administrative problems that developed on election day. More serious than the general administrative problems were the deliberate attempts by Colorado Party officials to manipulate the process, most obviously by distributing I.D. cards to party loyalists on election day. These cards, whose distribution on election day was not authorized by law, permitted those who obtained them to vote or to cast multiple votes.

The problems varied by region, and it is difficult to generalize about them. To some degree, the level of fraud reflected the extent to which Colorado Party members played according to the old rules. Where former Colorado Party officials had been replaced after the coup, the elections seemed to have been conducted in a more free and fair manner.

The following subsections are based on the reports prepared by the six teams that visited different regions of Paraguay on election day. By reflecting the differences in how the elections were administered, the reports underscore the reforms and educational efforts that are necessary to ensure that future elections are conducted more smoothly, and with greater procedural consistency.

### **1. Ciudad del Este and Environs**

Two members of the delegation were assigned to Ciudad del Este (formerly Ciudad Presidente Stroessner), the second

largest city in Paraguay, with a population of approximately 100,000. It is situated on the Brazilian border, 280 kilometers from Asunción, and just a few kilometers south of the Itaipú hydroelectric project. Settlement of this zone began in earnest in the 1960's, and Ciudad del Este has existed for only 25 years.

As a frontier zone, the area's population is highly mobile and includes a significant proportion of foreigners. According to some estimates, Brazilian immigrant farmers compose over half the rural population of the department of Alto Parana, in which Ciudad del Este is located.

Prior to the elections, the team met with representatives of the PLRA and the PRF. They commented that the campaign in the area had been conducted without harassment or intimidation. In April, for example, the PLRA held a major rally in Ciudad del Este, drawing a crowd of more than 30,000 without incident. When asked about relations with the local authorities, an official of the PRF replied, "This is a new community. Here we are all pioneers. Our relationship is more of friendship than of politics."

The PLRA seems to have benefited less from this pioneer spirit. PLRA officials reported that the local Justice of the Peace had been uncooperative during the voter registration period, delaying delivery of registration forms to the PLRA, and then providing an insufficient number of forms. The PLRA filed a complaint, and was granted an additional period of ten days in which to register voters.

The opposition parties raised two major concerns during the meetings. First, the PRF had received reports that local Colorado officials in outlying areas were registering Brazilian nationals living in the region to vote. Second, the PLRA feared that election officials might challenge and reject their *vedores* (poll watchers) on specious grounds.

On election day, the team arrived at the polling place in Ciudad del Este at 6:30 a.m. All the *mesas* were situated in the Regional Education Center, a compound of several

classroom buildings and an assembly hall. While there were no instances where *veedores* were rejected by the *mesa* presidents, there was a great deal of confusion. Quarters were extremely cramped, with six or more *mesas* sharing a single dark room.

Though ballots were available for all parties, the indelible ink was not distributed until shortly after 7 a.m. There was a noticeable lack of consistency in procedure. A few election officials allowed voters to begin voting before the indelible ink arrived; others made voters stand in line and wait. As the balloting began, voters mobbed anyone with a list of voter registration numbers and their corresponding *mesa* assignments.

The team also visited three polling places in Colonia 16 (also known as Colonia Minga Guazu and, formerly, Colonia Stroessner). This is one of the "official" colonies created by the Stroessner regime during the late 1960's. Because it bears Stroessner's name and has reaped rewards of its namesake's largess, Colonia Stroessner is relatively settled and enjoys an unusually well-developed infrastructure. Also due to its status as an official colony, the Colorado Party has been very powerful in local affairs.

The voting here appeared to be progressing more smoothly, with only a few incidents. One involved a challenge by a PRF *apoderado* of two Brazilians waiting in line to vote; their identification cards were clearly marked *extranjero* (foreigner). Also, several members of the PRF had been challenged by local officials when they tried to explain to voters on the street that ballots stapled together could be separated.

The team then visited two polling places in the town of Hernandarias, to the north of Ciudad del Este. Though all residents of the Supercarretera zone (encompassing many of the rural settlements in northern Alto Parana) were to vote in Hernandarias, there were no reports of Brazilians attempting to vote.

In a number of the dark rooms, however, ballots were placed in a manner favorable to the Colorado Party. Ballots of the ruling party were arranged neatly on a chair. Behind the chair, on a small table, the ballots of all other parties were tossed in complete disarray, posing a challenge to anyone wishing to vote for one of the opposition parties. A number of poll watchers also demonstrated how quickly and easily the indelible ink could be removed.

In the afternoon, the team visited the town of Presidente Franco. The PRF *apoderado* had encountered some problems with the *mesa* presidents. One of the *veedores*, who arrived at the polling place a few minutes after 7 a.m., was being rejected by each of the *mesa* presidents. Finally, he appealed to the Justice of the Peace, who intervened on his behalf, and the *veedor* was allowed to assume his post. In addition, officials found approximately 50 ballots in which the presidential ballot of Rodriguez, that of Laino, and the Colorado deputy slate had been stapled together, although it was unclear what this was intended to accomplish.

In the evening, the team returned to Ciudad del Este to observe the poll closing and ballot counting. Though there were variations in the strategies used by the *mesa* officials in counting, there were no apparent irregularities. During the final tabulations of the votes, several ballot boxes were rechecked by election officials in the presence of the *apoderados* of the PRF and the Humanista Party, observers and several members of the press.

Throughout the day, the team was received warmly and openly by election officials and opposition party members. The team was impressed by the enthusiasm and dedication displayed by the majority of those involved in the process.

Not surprisingly, there were several recurrent problems in all locations, the most common with voter registration lists. There were numerous complaints about names and numbers on registration forms that did not correspond to those on the official voter lists. Secrecy was also an issue; the dark rooms in many, if not most, cases offered little secrecy. Finally, the

ballots were frequently arranged in a less than systematic manner, and in a number of instances were organized in a blatantly partisan fashion.

## 2. Concepción and Environs

A four-member team spent two days in Concepción, a city that suffered an official policy of abandonment during the Stroessner era. To this day, Concepción is isolated from the capital by a 70-mile dirt road that takes a full day to travel. The major cities to the south and west, ranging from 50 to 175 miles from Asunción, are linked by paved highways. Intentional neglect of this region was punishment against Concepción's Liberals and their role in instigating the 1947 civil war against the ruling Colorado Party.

On the day before the elections, members of the Febrerista Party warned that, despite the changing political climate, intimidation was still an accepted practice. Nonetheless, tolerance of political expression had improved enough to permit an anti-torture demonstration that drew 2,000 marchers, including the local bishop.

In the late afternoon, representatives of the various political parties convened to resolve a dispute concerning the shortage of indelible ink. Opposition parties objected to the unilateral decision by the Colorados to remove half of the ink from one central vial and divide it among a number of containers, thus facilitating wider distribution of the ink. This matter was resolved when additional supplies arrived. However, members of the opposition stressed their concern for the purity of the ink and the cavalier approach of the Colorado Party in making unilateral decisions.

The polls in Concepción opened on time. At the Santa Terecita Elementary School, four lightly-armed military officials kept watch from the courtyard. The team observed certain Colorado *veedores* using a special credential for "arbiters," "roving poll watchers," and absentee voters. The Mayor, in explaining this previously unheard of credential, stated that special *veedor* cards and duplicate voter registration

cards were in fact being distributed with his approval and signature. His attitude suggested that this was a common practice.

Throughout the morning, the team noted a predominance of Colorado *apoderados*. One, in the town of Belen, thought it perfectly natural that voters in need of guidance would turn to him for advice and instruction. "After all," he said, "we have the [election] experience." In these cases, Colorado *apoderados* applied their own rather partisan criterion when resolving disputes.

Another *apoderado* at the Escuela Normal polling station stated that, in his opinion, the citizen's duty to vote took precedence over an election official's obligation to verify voters' registration and identity. The team understood this to mean that when in doubt officials would follow the *apoderados* instruction and allow people to vote.

In the afternoon, the team visited neighboring towns. In Horqueta, opposition party *veedores* walked out in protest at 1 p.m. They objected to a ruling by election officials that required *veedores* to remain at least two meters from the *mesa*, severely inhibiting effective pollwatching. At the same location, the team reviewed one roll where 180 of the 200 registered voters supposedly had already voted. Upon closer examination, the team found that only 50 voters had actually checked in. Outside, the team was approached by a Colorado supporter who expressed his displeasure with the party's management of the election process, given the expectation of an overwhelming victory.

Elsewhere, the team found various irregularities, such as *mesas* with no private voting rooms, *mesas* closing a half-hour before the proscribed time, and *mesa* presidents refusing to co-sign complaints lodged by opposition *veedores*. The team observed widespread indifference by Colorado Party electoral officials in the face of glaring violations. Febrerista Party officials told the team that the channels of protest were apparently useless and that the entire electoral system needed an overhaul. Nonetheless, these officials expressed enthusiasm

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for the opportunity to participate in the process, despite its obvious flaws.

### 3. Encarnación and Environs

A four-member team observed the elections in Encarnación, the capital of Itapúa, Paraguay's southern-most province. Itapúa lies on the Parana River, across from Argentina. Upon arrival the day before the elections, the delegation met with the bishop, Justice of the Peace and representatives of the political parties.

In these meetings, the team discovered that the Liberal Party had requested the Colorado Party to fill the post of secretary at each of the *mesas* in the region. As the official minority party, the Liberal Party should have filled these positions with their own election workers, but the party opted instead to use their limited manpower as *veedores*. In effect, the Colorado Party staffed all three *mesa* posts (president, secretary, and *vocal*), giving it complete control of the balloting process.

Since the February coup, Itapúa's Colorado Party had experienced a major shake-up. The team was told that there were four presidents of the party -- one representing each faction from the pre-coup power struggle. In separate meetings, two of these presidents explained that the most important development for the future of Paraguayan democracy was consolidation of the Colorado Party and continued civic education. They also sought to impress the team with Paraguay's progress toward democracy, pointing to constitutional reform negotiations, the planned municipal elections, and the 1993 presidential elections.

Despite repeated assurances from the Colorados that observers would witness a free election, they were careful to warn of possible mistakes and small-scale fraud. These irregularities, they claimed, would be the work of fanatic or incompetent party workers in isolated villages of the interior who refused to give up the old way of stealing elections.



The local president of the PLRA and an Asunción-based PLRA *apoderado* expressed a pessimistic outlook in pre-election meetings with the team. Indeed, at 10 p.m. on election eve, the PLRA considered boycotting the vote based on conditions they considered incompatible with a free and fair process.

The PLRA had several complaints. First, they claimed that the indelible ink had not yet been distributed in the outlying villages of the region. Second, the integrity of the registration list remained a concern. The PLRA representatives showed the team an official list of registered voters in the 31 precincts of the Itapua department from before and after the most recent registration period. In 19 of the 31 precincts, the increase in registered voters -- the difference between the old total and the new total -- was divisible by exactly 100, a statistical oddity. (In other words, if precinct "X" originally had 12,345 registered voters, the rolls now showed a total of 16,545, a difference of 4,200.) Tampering with the numbers was suspected.

At the same time, PLRA spokesmen acknowledged that the Colorado Party had been responsive to some of their concerns during an emergency meeting called to address potential election day problems. Colorado Party vehicles were made available to transport voters from all parties to the polls. This was critical given the muddy conditions of the dirt roads. Also, extra bottles of ink were provided by the Colorado Party to meet the needs of interior villages. Although the ink was controlled by Colorado partisans, the PLRA appreciated this apparent gesture of good will.

At the opening of the polls on election day, the team visited *mesas* at two schools -- the Escuela Alemana and the Escuela Argentina. All *mesas* were fully constituted by 7 a.m., and the voters began voting in an orderly manner. At a few *mesas*, ballots from one or more parties were missing. The team observed that the lines were relatively short, and that voters appeared to know how to vote and for whom they wanted to vote. There was at least one PLRA *veedor* at every

*mesa*, and often one or two from the smaller opposition parties.

The team next went to the Justice of the Peace offices, where more than 100 people were waiting to see the official, whose job it was to settle election day disputes. The Justice later informed the team that more than 2,000 voters -- nearly 10 percent of the 21,000 who voted in Encarnación -- had visited him with problems during the day.

From Encarnación, the team drove north along the Parana River, visiting the small towns of Capitan Miranda, Bella Vista and Obligado. In the car on the way to Obligado, the team heard a radio report of fraud at the Club Alemania voting station. The report claimed that a Colorado official inside a voting booth was instructing people "how to vote." Upon arrival at the Club Alemania, the team asked each of the *veedores* if there were any problems. The only "complaint" came from a PLRA *veedor* who said that her Colorado colleagues had refused to share their bag lunch.

The team next visited the remote village of Jesus. Here, as in other towns, the observers saw an orderly process at the Escuela Nacional 614. But, similar to the scene in Capitan Miranda, there was tension. The mostly young PLRA and other opposition poll watchers were seemingly intimidated by the number of Colorado Party officials, local police, and senior leaders of the local community present at the polling site.

After a warm welcome and a tour of the voting stations, a PLRA *veedor* presented complaints of numerous irregularities. She noted that many PLRA voters had arrived only to find that others had voted using their name or registration number. Further, the PLRA *apoderado* from Encarnación had never arrived. As a result, she and the other opposition representatives felt exposed. At this point in the conversation she declined to continue, claiming she was jeopardizing her security and that of other opposition party workers and voters. Before leaving, the previously gracious, U.S.-educated Colorado *apoderado*, accompanied by the chief

of police and an armed soldier, asked for the names and observer identification numbers of each team member.

At the small town of Trinidad, the team investigated allegations that Colorado propaganda was located inside the voting booths. Although the allegations were unfounded, there were missing ballots for certain parties. The team also encountered a PLRA *veedor* who was too frightened to give his name, let alone discuss the day's proceedings.

Back in Encarnación, the team observed the closing of the polls and vote counting. At the Encarnación Municipal Building, one team observed a generally orderly procedure. At one table, however, an opposition *veedor* wished to lodge a complaint that requisite procedural instructions were not available at the *mesa*, but the president refused to sign the complaint. The team observed no other irregularities in the vote counting procedures.

#### 4. Villarica

A three-member team bound for Villarica left Asunción early in the morning on election day. Villarica, located in the heart of the most-developed region of the country, lies an hour and a half southeast of Asunción. Rich in agriculture, this region has historically been a Liberal Party stronghold.

The team concentrated its monitoring efforts in the towns of Villarica and Colonia Independencia where the electoral process suffered numerous and serious irregularities. The team saw confusion on the part of election officials and partisanship in resolving disputes. In two different cases, *mesa* presidents refused to sign disputed voting sheets because, they claimed, this function was not addressed in their official instructions.

The team noted extensive Colorado Party abuses. Specifically, they observed posters and other propaganda supporting Rodriguez in and around the voting areas. The team found duplicates and even triplicates of certificates of registration, and observed what appeared to be the fraudulent

distribution of the certificates at the Colorado Party headquarters in Villarica.

Other irregularities observed by the team included missing ballots, insufficiently private voting booths, two people voting in one booth at a time, and fewer voting booths than *mesas*. While these irregularities could have reflected inexperience or disorganization, instances of destroyed PLRA ballots and falsified registration documents indicated a more disturbing, intentional pattern.

The team was welcomed by officials from all parties throughout the region. Also, in light of an extremely brief preparation period, the team was impressed by the level of civic awareness and sophistication on the part of the voters and the opposition party workers.

## 5. Asunción I

A four-member team focused its efforts on the Asunción metropolitan area, visiting 10 polling sites during the course of the day. In most places, the process operated in a relatively smooth manner, with several of the parties represented by *veedores* for most of the *mesas*. In some places, the team heard complaints by opposition party representatives, the most serious involving the quality of the registration lists.

At one polling site, a PLRA activist complained that the Colorado *apoderado* was wearing a party pin on his lapel in contravention of the electoral law. The *apoderado* responded that he did not realize he was wearing the pin when he left home in the morning. After further discussion, the *apoderado* reluctantly agreed to remove the pin as a demonstration of his commitment to the system.

In response to questions posed concerning the transmission of the *actas* (tally sheets) following the counting of the ballots, the team received conflicting answers from election officials at different sites. Some suggested that the sheets would be taken to the local Colorado Party club, while others indicated that it would be brought to the municipal office. The team was concerned that there would develop

disputes over the disposition of the *actas* and this would lead to allegations of fraud, although this did not happen.

The team observed the counting at several sites in the Asunción area. The operation proceeded in an orderly manner and was completed generally within two hours. The team also visited the headquarters of the Election Commission and the independent vote counting operations organized by the Centro de Estudios Democraticos (CED) and other organizations. In both places, results were being tabulated and distributed to the media in an expeditious manner.

## 6. Asunción II.

A four-member team visited nearly a dozen polling stations in Asunción, Ypacaré and points in between. The polling stations visited in Asunción opened with some brief delays, generally due to the inexperience of election officials. At one voting place, election officials waited 30 minutes for their materials to arrive, only to discover they had been stored in the ballot boxes.

In Ypacaré, a stronghold of anti-Stroessner Colorado Party members, the team heard several complaints by PLRA representatives, particularly concerning the registration lists. The group also witnessed a confrontation between a local PLRA leader and a Justice of the Peace, in which the former accused the government of "cooking" the lists so as to disqualify voters for her party. Also, voters protested that the ink washed off easily, although upon inspection most voters showed some tell-tale stain around their cuticles. There were several complaints about Colorado Party malfeasance lodged by an angry group against local leader Luis Becker. These complaints were refuted by Becker in a public meeting with his accusers.

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## *Chapter 7*

### *RESULTS*

More than 1,282,000 people, or 54 percent of those eligible, voted on May 1. As expected, President Andres Rodriguez won the presidential election, with more than 74 percent of the vote. His nearest competitor, PLRA leader Domingo Laino, was second with 20 percent (see Appendix VI for complete election results).

In the legislative elections, the Colorado Party received 73.86 percent of the vote, running slightly behind Rodriguez. Under the existing proportional representation system, the Colorados received 48 of the 72 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 24 of the 36 Senate seats.

The PLRA established their claim as the primary party of the opposition. Laino received slightly more votes than his party's parliamentary slate, but unlike Rodriguez, Laino did significantly better outside the capital. The PLRA won 11 Senate seats and 21 positions in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Febrerista Party won just two percent of the vote, coming in a distant third. The Febreristas received support primarily in the capital region. They obtained two seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one in the Senate.

The Liberal Radical Party, part of the so-called "rented opposition" that was allowed to participate in the Stroessner-era elections, garnered only one percent of the vote and one seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The Christian Democratic Party, the Humanist Party, the Unified Liberal

Radical Party, and the Liberal Party did not draw enough votes to win representation in the parliament.

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## *Chapter 8*

### *REACTIONS TO THE PROCESS*

Throughout election day, leaders of the Colorado Party and the opposition parties traded charges regarding alleged fraud. While Colorado Party leaders ceased to comment upon this matter once the polls closed and the results became available, for the opposition the allegations of fraud raised serious questions as to whether the election results should be accepted.

On the day following the elections, PLRA leader Laino, speaking on behalf of the opposition, stated:

The democratic opposition parties of Paraguay, aware of the protest made by youths and the citizenry, hereby charge that right from the beginning of the elections serious difficulties and acts of fraud have been noted. These acts offend our civic culture and reach the limit of our tolerance. They call into question the reliability of the commitments made by the provisional government and the Colorado Party before the national and international public.

We therefore declare ourselves in permanent state of assembly in order to evaluate the magnitude of these irregularities by comparing the reliable direct information we obtain and the official information.

With this assessment, and taking into account all pertinent political matters, the opposition parties will



adopt a responsible attitude in keeping with the great objective of bringing democracy to the nation.

The democratic opposition parties reserve the right and moral obligation to take whatever administrative, judicial, and political actions are appropriate to deal with these shameful irregularities.

Thereafter, the opposition decided to accept the election of Rodriguez, but to challenge the results in a few districts, hoping to obtain additional seats in the legislature. On May 9, after lengthy discussions within the PLRA leadership, the party decided to participate in the legislature, after reaching agreement with the Colorado Party over the distribution of seats. Laino subsequently was elected second vice president of the Senate.

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## *Chapter 9*

### *REFLECTIONS ON THE PARAGUAYAN ELECTIONS*

For international observer delegations, every election has its unique aspects. Paraguay was no exception. What was there to observe, one wondered, in a country where everyone agreed that the administrative structure was flawed, opposition parties had been legalized only recently and the expected results would allow the ruling party to remain in power? A surprisingly large international contingent of more than 200 observers from the Americas and Europe sought an answer.

Observers visited Paraguay to support the democratic aspirations of the Paraguayan people and to witness for themselves whether a democratic transition had indeed begun in a country that had suffered for so long under a repressive dictatorship. The observers focused much of their attention on the positive changes that had occurred since the February coup and on the promise of further democratic reform. They asked whether the new leaders of Paraguay were committed to a new approach or whether they were merely paying lip service to the democratization process in an attempt to foster a better international image. An answer to this question cannot be provided at this time, although it was evident that many Paraguayans sought change, whether they voted for Rodriguez or his opponents.

Notwithstanding the predictable outcome, the delegation observed the elections in a manner consistent with previous observer missions organized by NDI. Thus, observers were

sent to different regions of the country, enabling the delegation to collectively obtain a national perspective on the process. This comprehensive approach proved critical for the delegation's overall evaluation because, as has been described in this report, the quality and fairness of the elections were uneven. In many regions, the administration of the process was flawed primarily by the lack of experience with meaningful electoral exercises. In other regions, there were deliberate attempts to commit fraud so as to ensure the overwhelming victory of the ruling party candidates.

Both the positive and negative aspects of the elections should be carefully assessed. Focusing only on the fraud and administrative irregularities would be a disservice to the many Paraguayans who, for the first time, were energized by an election and worked together to ensure that their fellow citizens were provided an opportunity to vote. However, the delegation recognized that had the contest been close, the irregularities and deliberate manipulation of the process observed by members of the delegation would have served as a valid basis for challenging the legitimacy of these elections. Indeed, it was only the positive attitude the Paraguayan people and the political leadership that convinced many of the international observers that the elections represented a positive step forward.

Two Paraguayan initiatives also merit mention. The first involved the use of public opinion surveys. A poll released during the week before the elections that showed Rodriquez and Colorado Party with overwhelming leads served to reinforce the credibility of the results, notwithstanding the problems observed on election day.

The second initiative involved the organization of an independent vote counting operation. Despite a very late start, the organizers developed a system that provided accurate results to the public on the night of the elections. In future elections, such a parallel vote count conducted by nonpartisan organizations could help detect any attempted manipulation of the results.

The pre-election campaign and the election day procedures highlighted the need for reforms if future elections are to be meaningful. These reforms require, but should not be limited to, changes in the election law to make it more responsive to a multi-party system. Another obvious need is institutional reform of the judicial system and the bureaucracy. These changes should be reached through a process of dialogue among all sectors of Paraguayan society.

Civic education is also an obvious need. Only if citizens are aware of the roles they can play in the electoral process -- as election officials, party workers and voters -- will the conditions be created for the conduct of freer and fairer elections. The civic education effort should not be limited to the electoral process, but should include other aspects of the citizen's role in a democratic society.

The role of political parties in Paraguayan society also should be examined. For decades, the Colorado Party has been virtually the only vehicle through which an individual could advance in Paraguayan society. If Paraguay is to build a democratic system, such disadvantages inherent in supporting parties other than the Colorado Party must be eliminated. Reforms should be instituted to make the Colorado Party itself more democratic. And the effective separation between the military and the party is essential for the transition process to succeed. Finally, building on the environment that existed during the recent electoral campaign, political parties must be encouraged to develop without *de facto* or *de jure* restrictions placed on their activities.

The delegation was heartened by the promises made by government representatives, including the foreign minister. These include ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights (including acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights), adoption of a new electoral law prior to the municipal elections scheduled for 1990, and improvement in the system of public accountability. The international community can play a significant role in supporting this effort by providing

appropriate financial and technical assistance during this transition period.



## APPENDICES



## NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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• FAX (202) 328-3144 • Telex 5106015008 NDIH

To: International Observer Delegation  
Fr: Brian Atwood, NDI President  
Re: Terms of Reference  
Dt: April 17, 1989

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is organizing a 20 person international delegation to observe the May 1, 1989 presidential and legislative elections in Paraguay. The delegation includes a former head of state, legislators, political leaders from across the democratic political spectrum, and election experts.

NDI has been invited to organize this observer delegation by both the government of Paraguay and the directors of the Center for Democratic Studies (CED). The CED, a nonpartisan civic education institute, was established in 1988 with the help of NDI. CED's objectives are to promote civic education and reform of the electoral law. As part of its mandate, the CED will help NDI coordinate the international delegation.

The unexpected coup that removed General Stroessner from office and the scheduling of elections for May 1 has thrust the CED into its agenda of programs much more quickly than planned. An objective of the delegation will be to report on the civic education efforts as they relate to Paraguayans' understanding of the political campaign and electoral process, and their willingness to participate actively in the process as campaign workers, pollwatchers, and voters.

In organizing this observer delegation, NDI does not presume to interfere in Paraguayan affairs. Further, NDI recognizes that the ultimate judgment of the electoral process will be made by the Paraguayan people. Based on their assessment, Paraguayans will decide whether the election has legitimacy or moral authority which can be earned only through a fair electoral process in a free and open atmosphere.

This delegation's modest role is to reflect the consensus of the Paraguayan's assessment of the electoral process. The delegation's report will bear witness to that evaluation, and transmit it to the international community.



International Observation Delegation  
Terms of Reference  
page 2

The observations of this delegation and other credible sources will form the basis for our conclusions regarding the May 1 elections and the atmosphere in which it was held. The delegation, therefore, must attempt to document observations and in all instances to distinguish factual from subjective judgments. To accomplish this task, the delegation will meet with government and election officials, those active in the campaigns of the major parties, and representatives of other institutions that are playing a role in the voter registration and monitoring processes.

Based on observations in the different regions of Paraguay, the delegation will attempt to offer a national perspective in a statement NDI hopes to issue Tuesday, May 2, in Asuncion. NDI requests that the delegations not make any comments to the media regarding their personal observations of the election until after the delegation statement has been presented.

NDI requests each team of observers to prepare a short report based on their observations. This report will be included in the final report that will be published following the election.

Based on NDI's work in Paraguay in the past year, the following are among the issues that appear most relevant for consideration by the delegation.

I. PREPARATION FOR THE ELECTIONS

- A. Were eligible voters adequately informed as to the importance of these elections and how they may differ from previous elections? Were they adequately informed of the technical aspects of how to register and cast their ballots?
- B. Were the voters informed as to the identities, ideologies and platforms of the different candidates?
- C. Was there sufficient time and assistance for unregistered, eligible voters to register? Who was responsible for promoting and facilitating voter registration?
- D. Was the electoral code modified before the elections? Did these modifications adequately address deficiencies in the old code to assure free and fair elections?

International Observer Delegation  
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## II. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

- A. Were there any restrictions, de facto or de jure, that prevented the competing parties from conducting their respective campaigns in any region of the country?
- B. During the campaign, were party leaders or other individuals arrested, detained, physically attacked in incidents that appear politically motivated?
- C. During the campaign, were there incidents of intimidation by the security forces, political parties or government officials designed to affect the elections? If yes, what was the response to such actions?
- D. Were there charges of illegal campaign practices by any of the participants? How did the authorities respond to these charges? Was there evidence to support these charges?

## III. ROLE OF THE MEDIA

- A. Did the competing parties obtain adequate and relatively equal access to the media?
- B. Did the government controlled media provide adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?
- C. Was the media censored during the campaign? Were journalists intimidated through arrests, detentions or the filing of charges during the campaign?

## IV. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ELECTIONS

- A. Was the composition and organization of the Electoral Junta essentially nonpartisan? Did the Electoral Junta and the local electoral officials act in a nonpartisan manner?
- B. Were there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process? Were voters able to cast a secret ballot? Was there any intimidation of voters by security forces, local leaders or political parties on election day?
- C. Were there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the vote counting process? Were disputes in the counting process resolved in a nonpartisan manner? Were there suspicious delays in the preparation or release of election returns?

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- D. Were the pollwatchers designated by the accredited parties permitted access to all polling sites and to the counting centers? Were election observers permitted access to all polling sites and counting centers?
  
- V. THE RESULTS

  - A. Were the official results reported in accordance with the electoral law?
  
  - B. Did the various Paraguayan institutions recognize the final election results? If not, were challenges filed in accordance with the electoral law?
  
  - C. How is the distribution system of legislative seats viewed by the parties and voters?

# News Release



National Democratic Institute  
For International Affairs

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## Opening Statement

Ladies and gentleman, it is my privilege to introduce the international delegation that is present in Paraguay to observe the May 1 Paraguayan elections. This delegation is being organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which is based in Washington, D.C. and which conducts political development projects in different countries on a nonpartisan basis. Many members of this delegation are familiar with NDI's valuable efforts supporting democratic institutions around the world. The Institute previously organized international observer delegations similar to this one in the Philippines, Haiti, Chile and Pakistan.

The 18 delegates -- who are legislators, leaders of political parties, election experts and representatives of public policy institutes -- come from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Spain, Uruguay and United States; the U.S. delegates represent the Republican and Democratic parties. [A complete list of the delegation members is available from NDI.]

Before explaining the purpose of our presence in Paraguay, I will introduce the co-leaders of the delegation. Al Graham is a Senator in the Canadian Parliament; he was a member of the 1986 international observer delegation in the Philippines and was the leader of a 1987 international observer delegation to the Philippines. Bruce Morrison is a member of the United States Congress, who has long been interested in the Paraguayan political and human rights situation. I would also like to introduce Martin Edward Andersen, NDI's director of programs for Latin America and the Caribbean, and Larry Garber, NDI's Senior Consultant for Electoral Processes.

It is with considerable humility that any delegation undertakes to observe an election in another country. Yet this is a historic moment for Paraguay. The February 2, 1989 coup, which resulted in the removal of General Stroessner, set in motion a series of events that, with considerable effort, may lead to the development and consolidation of a democratic polity in Paraguay.

While there continues to be considerable debate in Paraguay about certain aspects of the Constitution and the electoral law, virtually all sectors of Paraguayan society are participating in the elections. They view the elections, at a minimum, as providing an opportunity to demonstrate that a new political era -- one offering the prospect of democratic government and respect for human rights -- has begun in Paraguay.

Given the historic nature of these elections and their significance for the future of Paraguay, it is not surprising that the elections have attracted considerable international attention. Paraguayans from across the political spectrum have welcomed this attention and have expressed appreciation that this (and other) international observer delegations will be present for the elections.

As observers we have taken no position regarding the outcome of the elections. Our purpose is to learn from Paraguayans regarding the nature of the process and its implications for Paraguay's future as a democratic country. This perspective is consistent with the practice of international observers for elections in other countries, a practice that is now widely accepted within the democratic community of nations, particularly here in Latin America. The current governments's attitude toward this delegation reflects this trend as it has encouraged our presence and provided official recognition of our effort.

To fulfill the objectives set for the delegation by the sponsors, we will be meeting today with a broad spectrum of Paraguayans. Tomorrow the delegation will divide into small teams that will visit five cities in different regions of the country. We will speak with Paraguayans involved in the electoral process in each of these cities and, on Monday, we will observe the balloting and counting processes. The delegates will be particularly interested in the observations of Paraguayans, as they assess the campaign, the procedures on election day and the results.

The delegation will regroup in Asuncion on Tuesday for a debriefing session. We expect to report our observations to the international community at a press conference on Tuesday, 2:30 p.m. Our judgement of the process, we expect, will reflect that of the Paraguayan people.

*Appendix III*INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION TO  
PARAGUAYAN PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

May 1, 1989

TeamsAsunción IGeoffrey Allen (Staff)  
Janet Brown  
Esteban Caballero  
Larry Garber  
Alisdair Graham  
Bruce MorrisonAsunción IIMartin Edwin Andersen  
Alexandre Barros  
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle  
Hector MuzzopappaCiudad del EsteLarry Harrington  
Beverly NagelConcepciónLoida Coleman  
Edwin Eisendrath  
David Graham  
Timothy Manatt (Staff)EncarnaciónElaine Baxter  
Mariano Berro  
Hector Perez de Castillo  
Michael Stoddard (Staff)VillaricaJuan Gabriel Valdes S.  
Ingemund Hagg  
Brian Thomson

# News Release



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May 2, 1989

I am pleased to offer the statement of an international delegation that observed the Paraguayan elections. This delegation, sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, includes 19 individuals from seven countries. We observed the elections in Asuncion, Concepcion, Ciudad del Este, Encarnacion, Villarica and their environs. Based on these observations, we will prepare a detailed report that will be published in the near future.

The present statement offers some preliminary conclusions. Before beginning, we note that our observations are offered in a spirit of friendship and respect, and are intended to assist in promoting Paraguay's democratic development.

Paraguay's lack of a democratic tradition, 35 years of brutal and repressive dictatorship, and the interrelation between the military and the ruling party provided the context in which these elections occurred. The three-month period since the February 2 coup was simply too brief for the creation of the pre-conditions necessary for fair elections. The democratic opposition parties faced the new circumstances without ever having had the opportunity or the experience of real participation in the past.

At the same time, the delegation acknowledges the significant political opening that has occurred since the coup. Paraguay, which just three months ago lived outside the community of democratic nations, has taken several major -- if tentative -- steps towards meeting its international human rights obligations and ensuring respect for the rule of law.

These steps were reflected in the openness of the campaign that preceded the elections. Persecutions of persons and other serious human rights violations diminished significantly during this period. Restrictions on the press were lifted, permitting several newspapers to resume publication and to operate freely and with vigor. Political parties that existed underground were recognized and campaigned throughout the country.

Given these circumstances, the opposition parties, despite not having achieved all their demands for changes in the electoral process, decided to participate in the elections, hoping to use them as a vehicle for furthering an on-going transition process. Leaders of the democratic opposition should be congratulated for their willingness to compete under such conditions; theirs has been a contribution made in the highest tradition of patriotism and love of country.

*conducting nonpartisan international programs to help maintain and strengthen democratic institutions*



Despite the existence of a generally tranquil and peaceful environment yesterday, the conduct of the elections was far from perfect. Our delegation observed many irregularities and instances where the election law was violated. Electoral lists were inaccurate, where the election law was violated. Electoral lists were inaccurate, there was a lack of uniformity in procedures at different mesas, and polling places did not assure the vote would be secret. Members of the delegation also observed the distribution of inscription forms on election day by some Colorado Party workers, evidencing a clear intent to commit fraud.

Many of the irregularities were the result of an election law designed to ensure that the Colorado Party maintained power. It is hoped that these matters will be addressed prior to the scheduling of any further elections. In addition, many Paraguayans, both from the Colorado party and from the opposition, told the delegation that a key requisite for expanding the democratic process will be reforms to allow for the direct election of mayors.

As for the more serious election law violations, these relate to the political culture in which undemocratic sectors of the Colorado Party dominated all aspects of Paraguayan society for many years. Changing this culture poses a major challenge for Paraguayans, both for those within the Colorado Party and for those who have challenged the Colorado Party's political domination through electoral competition. It will require maintaining the political space that now exists in the country as well as educating the citizenry regarding the responsibilities and rights of living in a democratic society. The elections, however, marked a beginning in the effort to change the political culture, as our delegation observed many instances where representatives of different parties worked together in a spirit of cooperation.

With enthusiasm, the government, which will be led by President Andres Rodriguez and dominated by members of his Colorado Party, has committed itself to change. The mandate given to President Rodriguez was in recognition of his commitment to this end, and a vote that Paraguay's democratic institutions and practices will be strengthened and fortified. Specifically, commitments have been made by the President and other leading Colorado party officials to reform the electoral law and the constitutional framework.

In our view, to accomplish the goal of creating a democratic Paraguay, changes should occur as the result of dialogue and negotiations between the various Paraguayan political sectors. Responsible political opposition, whether organized in parties or expressed in the media, should be encouraged. True democracy requires the spirited and conflictive exchange of ideas, and an unerring predisposition to compromise and to resolve all conflicts peacefully.

In this connection, we believe that any conclusion about the significance of the May 1 elections ultimately will be based on where they lead. If the elections are to represent a serious move toward democracy, then further reforms must inevitably and shortly follow. The international community will be monitoring future developments in Paraguay, and we will urge our governments and organizations to support the nascent democratic institutions. In the final analysis, though, the future of democracy in Paraguay is in the hands of the Paraguayan people.



Asunción, domingo 30 de abril de 1989

# Observadores internacionales no saben si serán bien recibidos

"Es difícil poder saber si seremos bien recibidos en los lugares donde actuaremos de observadores", señalaron miembros del Instituto Nacional Democrático para Asuntos Internacionales, en una conferencia de prensa realizada ayer.

"Nuestro propósito es aprender de los paraguayos y evaluar qué significa esta elección en función al futuro de la democracia en el país", indicaron.

Los observadores afirmaron que no se mostraban sorprendidos que el acontecimiento haya atraído tanto a la opinión pública internacional, debido a "la importancia histórica de estas



Miembros de la delegación del IND que actuarán de observadores en los comicios de mañana, durante una conferencia de prensa.

elecciones y su significado para los paraguayos".

"Como observadores no podemos tomar una postura política respecto al probable resultado de las elecciones", manifestaron.

Los miembros del IND hoy se dividirán en grupos para visitar cinco ciudades del interior. En esos lugares habla-

rán con paraguayos involucrados en el proceso electoral y mañana estarán observando los comicios; desde la instalación de mesas hasta el escrutinio y cómputo.

"La delegación -según indicaron- está particularmente interesada en compenetrarse con las evaluaciones que los propios paraguayos van a hacer del proceso electoral y de los resultados finales".

Remarcaron que miembros de la Junta Electoral Central ofrecieron las garantías necesarias para el libre desempeño de sus actividades. "Tenemos credenciales otorgadas por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y en diferentes reuniones se nos ha dado garantías para realizar tranquilamente nuestras labores", destacaron.

## "PRESENTAMOS PREOCUPACIONES A LA JEC"

"Asimismo hemos presentado una serie de preocupaciones al presidente de la JEC, con respecto a los fraudes que podrían ocurrir", consignaron.

"Nos preocupa la posibilidad que las personas voten más de una vez, que los boletines de votos en las mesas no sean iguales en cantidad para todos los partidos, que la tinta no se reparta en todas las mesas", afirmaron los observadores.

"Igualmente planteamos al doctor Roias la posibilidad de presenciar el momento del conteo de los votos y nos respondió afirmativamente", remarcaron.

Los miembros de la delegación por el IND aclararon que nadie sabe de antemano los lugares dónde participarán de observadores.

Estuvieron presentes en la conferencia de prensa Al Graham, senador del Parlamento canadiense y miembro de la delegación de observadores internacionales en las Filipinas; Bruce Morrison, diputado de la Cámara Baja de los Estados Unidos; Martín Edwin Andersen, director del programa para América Latina y el Caribe del IND; Eduardo Frei, chileno, y Larry Garber, consultor del Instituto para asuntos electorales.

Todos ellos ya han participado anteriormente en experiencias similares, integrando delegaciones a Filipinas, Haití, Chile y Pakistán.

# 'Las cifras no son confiables'

## Observadores democratas explicaron que no asumirán postura política

Los observadores del Instituto Nacional Democrata con sede en Washington, Estados Unidos de América, ofrecieron una conferencia de prensa en el salón Carlos Pellegrini del Consulado argentino. Entre los vendedores políticos se encuentran Martín Edwin Andersen (director de los programas de Latinoamérica y el Caribe, Bruce Morrison, parlamentario norteamericano, Larry Carber, Eduardo Frei, entre otros.

Frei explicó que los observadores democratas vienen al Paraguay a ser vendedores imparciales para el uno de mayo, siempre con el compromiso de considerar un enfoque no partidario. Asimismo, recordó que el instituto ya ha tenido experiencias similares a la que está viviendo el Paraguay, ya que se había enviado observadores internacionales en Filipinas, Chile, Haití y Pakistán.

Además, manifestó que Abadio que el momento que está viviendo el Paraguay es histórico. El golpe de Estado que derrocó al Cral. Siro, de acontecimientos que con mucho esfuerzo puede sembrar en la consolidación de la democracia en el Paraguay.

Además, manifestó que ellos —refiriéndose a su grupo— no pueden tomar una postura política en referencia al resultado de que se pudiera dar el uno de mayo. Nuestro propósito es aprender de los paraguayos y evaluar qué significa esta elección en función al futuro de la democracia en el Paraguay.

Los observadores igualmente sostuvieron que tienen muchas dudas en torno al proceso electoral no sabiendo realmente si los números son exactos o no. Preguntado los visitantes si aún persisten ese tipo de dudas, como se puede creer que las elecciones serán limpias y libres, señalaron que estos hechos acontecen siempre en los países que están por adoptar un modelo democrático y agregaron además, que las elecciones por esos motivos, no podemos anticipar que serán libres y limpias, pero se observará el comportamiento de los paraguayos.

Consultado si creían en la cantidad de electorado habilitados para los comicios generales indicaron que los números no son confiables para las violaciones y que continuaremos para ver qué números de cifras estaremos manejando, entre otras cosas.



Momento en que los observadores políticos dialogan con la prensa, en el salón Carlos del Consulado Nacional Democrata, Patrofrú del Consulado argentino.

P.14.4 POLITICA

Una sesión, lunes 1 de mayo de 1989

abc

UN APORTE SOLIDARIO

# Más de cien observadores extranjeros

Una activa y experta legión de observadores internacionales manifestará hoy su solidaridad con el proceso de apertura política paraguayo, aportando su testimonio y su crítica a la jornada electoral. De diferentes organizaciones, partidos políticos y países del mundo democrático han llegado intelectuales,

políticos, juristas que, sin otro interés que sus respectivos compromisos con la causa por la democracia y la libertad para todos los hombres, colaboran con esta responsabilidad que hemos asumido los paraguayos, con voluntad y esperanza.



Senadora Elena Flores (SCD), integrante a delegación de la Internacional Socialista



Senador Amador Ortega González, miembro del Partido Nacionalista



Congreso Bruno Morúa (RER), de la delegación NDI



Juan Pablo Letour (CHURU) de la delegación de ALDH

No es esta la primera vez que los comicios paraguayos atraen la atención de comisiones internacionales. Cuando en año pasado Stroessner buscó una vez más en la legitimación de su poder en la manipulación del proceso electoral, fueron muchas las comisiones del mundo democrático que enviaron a sus representantes para intentar desenlazar con su presencia y testimonio la intención del dictador de frenar de hecho permitiendo la expresión de la voluntad popular. No tiene sentido considerar aquí la gratitud que su gestión le ha merecido por ser en la caprichosa voluntad del general Stroessner y su cortejo.

Hay, sin embargo, de más que puede verse en sus antecedentes la evidencia del futuro histórico paraguayos más de un centenar de países internacionales y una gran cantidad de partidos y organizaciones de universo democrático eran, además de varias otras, los primeros en ser invitados al presente procedimiento para cuyo su experiencia se solicitaba su ayuda y se esperaba que su admirable voluntad no temiese esta vez con la in-



D. Eduardo Rosen (Riquelme), delegado de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Derechos Humanos

ferencia de los representantes que mañana, 1 de mayo, en los diferentes centros que se elevarán a la consideración pública nacional e internacional, se reunirá que la ciudadanía ha depositado su voto en voluntad democrática y las autoridades han perdido su función con respecto que esa voluntad demanda.

LOS OBSERVADORES

Más de un centenar de observadores integran las diversas delegaciones que representan a instituciones como el National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Latinoamericano, United Association, Comunidad Económica Europea, Parlamento Europeo, Asociación Latinoamericana de Derechos Humanos, Sociedad Internacional de Juristas por la Amnistía y la Democracia en el Paraguay, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos, Federación Americana del Trabajo,

Internacional Socialista, Centro Interamericano de Apoyo y Promoción Electoral y la Organización de Mujeres por la Democracia y la Integración Latinoamericana y del Caribe y diversas partidos políticos.

Las diferentes delegaciones se componen de reconocidos senadores juristas de prestigio y reconocida experiencia en la tarea específica que aquí se refieren a desarrollarse, así como la observación de próximos elecciones.

OPINIONES DIVERGENTES

Muchos de estas delegaciones ofrecieron conferencias de prensa anteriores a la fecha electoral, otras visitaron las instalaciones y se entrevistaron con personas individuales. En todos los casos se manifestó por parte de los observadores respeto a una gran expectativa en referencia a los comicios de hoy. Los líderes de la delegación del National Democratic Institute manifestaron que si bien habían sido de credenciales oficiales, como observadores, no podían saber a ciencia cierta si serían bien recibidos en las diferentes mesas a las que deberían ser previo aviso. El factor sorpresa en uno de los elementos que permite al observador detectar con mayor eficiencia las irregularidades, según su opinión.

El senador Graham (NDI, Canadá) explicó que hay una serie de intenciones que permite a un observador tener expectativas mutuamente probables de referir a sus propias experiencias como observador de las elecciones siguientes del año y el otro para dar ejemplo de cómo el sistema puede ser advertido si observador ve que las condiciones que se desarrollan los comicios, lo bien admira que la situación paraguaya despierta esperanzas, también apuntó que determinadas cuestiones concretas como el sistema de representación no proporcional, la irregularidad de los padrones, y la falta de una autoridad electoral independiente, así como el acto constitucional de democracia. Así también, destacó que el hecho de que los boletines de voto son destruidos inmediatamente después del

recuento imposibilita cualquier verificación.

El congresista Bruce Morúa (NDI-USA) cuestionó la posibilidad de que la emboscada de su país hubiera tenido alguna información previa al caso de Estado del 2 de febrero, considerando que si mismo ha sido de factura sura, y si bien su Gobierno ha visto lo sucedido en el Paraguay con agrado, no cree que haya tenido experiencia ni noticia anterior sobre el mismo punto. Martín Audebert, director del programa para Latinoamérica del NDI, se limitó a responder "no comentarios".

El congreso Eduardo Frei (NDI) se refirió a la experiencia como a una visita en país en ocasión del referéndum, aseguró que el triunfo del Stroessner a que la nominación se unió naturalmente, con una campaña clara y sencilla, y con un alto grado de profesionalidad e imparcialidad que se pudo de mantener a toda la campaña.

IMPLICENCIA, FANCIAS

Las senadoras Elena Flores (E-España), quien también había integrado la delegación de la Internacional Socialista que en el año 1987 viajó a la oposición paraguaya la necesidad de enfrentar en elecciones al sistema, manifestó su preocupación por la decisión actual de participar en estos comicios. Siempre que están dadas las mínimas condiciones, participar es la opción. Apuntó al momento que existe en América Latina respecto a la necesidad de superar las barreras ideológicas para salir a la integración, y manifestó su sorpresa en referencia a las declaraciones del presidente Andrés Rodríguez, en materia de superación.

El diputado Roberto Assau se refirió al momento que existe en América Latina respecto a la necesidad de superar las barreras ideológicas para salir a la integración, y manifestó su sorpresa en referencia a las declaraciones del presidente Andrés Rodríguez, en materia de superación.

El congreso Juan Pablo Letour (ALDH) dijo del carácter apresurado puntualizó que si bien toda apertura puede tomarse con algún optimismo, es importante entender que los procesos pueden ser más o menos democráticos, pero que la soberanía popular o la tutela militar, lo cual hace difícil predecir el futuro paraguayo.

El congreso Dos Santos (SUADPE) Brasil afirmó que la suerte del carácter apresurado puntualizó que si bien toda apertura puede tomarse con algún optimismo, es importante entender que los procesos pueden ser más o menos democráticos, pero que la soberanía popular o la tutela militar, lo cual hace difícil predecir el futuro paraguayo.



Eduardo Frei (Chile), líder de la delegación NDI



Roberto Dos Santos (Brasil), integrante de SUADPE


abc

Asunción, miércoles 3 de mayo de 1989

VEEDORES INTERNACIONALES EMITIERON COMUNICADOS

# Comprobamos fraude, dicen observadores

## "Líderes de oposición deben ser felicitados"



Observadores del Instituto Nacional Democracia (INDI), en el momento de presentar su informe sobre las elecciones.

Los observadores del Instituto Nacional Democracia para Asuntos Internacionales realizaron ayer una conferencia de prensa en el auditorio del Banco Nación Argentina. En la misma, entregaron un documento con los resultados de sus observaciones realizadas durante los comicios del 1.º de mayo.

Los delegados observaron las elecciones en Asunción, Concepción, Encarnación, Villarica y localidades vecinas.

Según el documento, "la carencia de una tradición democrática en el Paraguay, sus 30 años de una dictadura brutal y represiva, y la interrelación entre las fuerzas armadas y el partido de gobierno, proporcionaron el contexto dentro del cual estas elecciones tuvieron lugar. El período de tres meses desde el golpe del 2 de febrero, fue sencillamente muy breve para la creación de las condiciones previas necesarias para elecciones libres y equitativas. Los partidos de la oposición democrática enfrentaron las nuevas circunstancias sin jamás haber tenido la oportunidad o experiencia de participar verdaderamente en el pasado", expresó el documento.

Igualmente la declaración indica: "La significativa apertura política que ha tenido lugar desde el golpe. El Paraguay, ha tomado varios pasos importantes hacia el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones internacionales en el campo de los derechos humanos, y para asegurar el respeto hacia un estado de derecho".

"Estos pasos", dice el documento, "se vieron reflejados en el carácter abierto de la campaña que precedió a las elecciones. La persecución de personas y otras violaciones severas de los derechos humanos disminuyeron durante ese período".

Agrega que: "Las restricciones a la prensa fueron levantadas. En este período la reapertura de varios periódicos clausurados anteriormente. Partidos políticos que estaban en la clandestinidad han sido reconocidos y montaron campañas a lo largo y ancho del país", señala el informe.

"Dadas estas circunstancias, los partidos de oposición demócrata participaron en las elecciones con la esperanza de poder adelantar un proceso continuo de transición", consigna el manifiesto.

"Los líderes de la oposición democrática deben ser felicitados por su voluntad de competir, bajo tales condiciones, esta fue una contribución hecha en la más ele-

vada tradición de patriotismo y amor a su patria", afirma.

Además, a pesar de un entorno tranquilo y pacífico, la conducción de las elecciones estuvo lejana de ser perfecta", dice el documento.

**"OBSERVAMOS CASOS DE VIOLACION DE LA LEY ELECTORAL."**

"Nuestra delegación - prosigue el informe - observó varias irregularidades y algunos casos en que la ley electoral fue violada. Padrones electorales eran incorrectos, listas listas de uniformados en los procedimientos en distintas mesas, y algunos cuartos oscuros no aseguraban el secreto del voto".

"También observamos la distribución de registros de inscripción en el día de las elecciones por parte de algunos colaboradores del Partido Colorado, evidenciando un claro intento de fraude, agrega.

El documento del INDI asegura que, "varias de las irregularidades fueron el resultado de una ley electoral estructurada para que el Partido Colorado mantuviese el poder".

"En cuanto a las violaciones más serias de la ley electoral, las mismas se refieren a la cultura política en que se vive no democrática del Partido Colorado habían dominado todas las facetas de la sociedad paraguaya por muchos años. Cambiar esta cultura supone un desafío para los paraguayos", expresa.

"Esto requerirá el mantenimiento del espíritu político que abarca nuestra y la formación de la ciudadanía con respecto a las responsabilidades y los derechos que se exige para vivir en una sociedad democrática", indica la declaración.

Según los observadores del INDI, "los cambios deben tener lugar como resultado de diálogo y negociaciones entre los actores involucrados en el proceso".

"La oposición política responsable, organizada a través de partidos o agrupación en los medios de comunicación, de ser fomentada, consigan los delegados.

"Una verdadera democracia exige intercambio y confrontación vigorosa de ideas. Y una participación constructiva al acuerdo y al ánimo de resolver los conflictos en forma pacífica", afirma el comunicado.

"En el análisis final la futura democracia en el Paraguay se encuentra en las manos del pueblo paraguayo", concluye el informe.

## PARAGUAY GENERAL WINS CONCLUSIVELY

Irregularities, Though Many,  
Were Too Few to Change  
Result, Observers Say

By JAMES BROOKE  
Special to The New York Times

ASUNCION, Paraguay, May 2 — "Many irregularities" flawed Paraguay's presidential elections, but fraud was not widespread enough to change the outcome, a group of international observers concluded today.

Noting Paraguay's "lack of democratic traditions," the observers said the three-month period since the overthrow of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner in February "simply could not provide the preconditions necessary for fair elections."

Gen. Andres Rodriguez, who was overwhelmingly elected President on Monday, had welcomed the 19 international observers, who were sponsored by the United States-financed National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

In contrast, Gen. Manuel Noriega of Panama has made it clear that he will not welcome a similar group sponsored by the institute that is to attend Panama's presidential elections on Sunday.

### Opponents Concede Defeat

After an election day without violence, life in this capital returned to normal today. Most of the five opposition presidential candidates conceded defeat and said they planned to work in Congress to build democracy in this landlocked nation long ruled by dictators.

"Whoever thought that the electoral process would unfold normally was not living in our country," said Carlos Gu-



Gen. Andres Rodriguez, who was overwhelmingly elected President of Paraguay on Monday.

tavo Callizo, a congressional candidate of the opposition Humanist Party. "The irregularities show that we have to keep working to strengthen the democratic system."

In what appeared to be an endorsement of General Rodriguez's vow to make Paraguay a democracy, partial election returns showed that he is more popular than his party, the Colorado. According to these returns, General Rodriguez won 74 percent of the vote while his congressional ticket lagged behind with 68 percent. Domingo Laino, the runner-up for President, received 19 percent.

The coup and 90-day campaign saw a remarkable metamorphosis of the former commander of Paraguay's armed forces into a jolly figure who kissed babies, met with dissident church leaders and waded virtually unprotected through crowds of market women promising to build day-care centers. "Rodriguez likes to be liked," an American diplomat here said.

Indeed, during his long career as an army commander, he had a paternalist image. He built schools, clinics and basketball courts for his soldiers. In recent weeks he has promised to build houses for widows of soldiers killed in the Feb. 3 coup. Officially, 17 died, although unofficial estimates put the toll at 200.

One inconvenient sequel to the coup disappeared last week when a Paraguayan Airlines jet lifted off from President Stroessner International Airport here carrying the last members of the Stroessner clan. Alfredo Stroessner Mora, a son of the deposed President, and his wife, Marta Rodriguez Reig, a daughter of General Rodriguez, flew to Miami with two of their children. In Miami, they joined General Stroessner's wife, Eligia, and daughter, Maria Eugenia. General Stroessner and another son, Gustavo, are lodged in a hotel in San Paulo, Brazil.

### 'Level Playing Field' Promised

Looking to Paraguay's political future, General Rodriguez has promised to create "a level playing field" by separating the Colorado Party from military and civil service. Currently, all officers and government employees are required to join the party.

"What worries me is that we are seeing the creation of the Paraguayan PRI," Humberto Rubin, the owner of an independent radio station, said, referring to the party that has dominated Mexico's politics for most of this century.

"There will be political freedom, but every five years the Colorados will name a successor, and the results will continue to be 7 to 3 for a long time," Mr. Rubin predicted. His radio station, closed by General Stroessner, returned to the air after the coup.

Other Paraguayans say they feel that the general will find it hard to keep his promise to give up power to an elected civilian successor in 1993.

"I am afraid that a group of mafiosos and delinquents will form around Rodriguez the way they did around Stroessner," said Aldo Zuccoillo, editor and publisher of ABC Color, a news paper that resumed publication in March, five years after General Stroessner closed it.

J U N T A E L E C T O R A L C E N T R A L  
E L E C C I O N E S G E N E R A L E S 1989

TOTAL GENERAL EN TODOS EL PAIS

FECHA: 09/05/19

VOZES POR :	ASN	PL	PRF	PLP	PLR	PLC	PH	PLRU	SIANCOS	RULOS	TOTAL
PRESENTE:	544,374	5,631	11,643	14,846	246,466	6,116	1,828	3,545	12,792	11,430	1,282,626
	74,363	0,423	0,923	1,233	20,063	6,673	0,693	0,293	1,663	0,933	
FALTANTE :	843,636	5,534	23,815	15,683	229,329	11,674	1,669	3,476	15,257	6,714	1,357,781
	72,843	0,483	2,663	1,383	19,613	1,613	0,893	0,363	1,323	0,583	

TOTAL DE MESAS: 16,978      ACTAS PROCESUALES: 11,125

TOTAL DE INSCRIPCIOS : 2,224,661

TOTAL DE VOTANTES : 1,204,626      54,033

TOTAL DE NO VOTANTES : 1,020,035      43,973

JUNTA ELECTORAL CENTRAL  
ELECCIONES GENERALES 1989

TOTAL GENERAL EN EL INTERIOR

FECHA: 09/05/89

VOTOS POR :	AMR	PL	PRF	PLR	PLRA	PDC	PH	PERU	BLANCOS	VULOS	TOTAL
PRESIDENTE:	726,675 74.48%	4,151 0.16%	6,271 0.64%	3,566 1.39%	199,632 28.46%	5,122 0.52%	384 0.04%	3,154 0.32%	8,268 0.85%	1,194 1.04%	975,717
CAMARA :	698,717 74.83%	4,148 0.18%	9,292 1.08%	3,214 1.42%	185,015 19.81%	5,307 0.57%	321 0.03%	3,018 0.32%	18,027 1.87%	4,447 1.48%	933,798

TOTAL 1E MESAS: 9418 ACTAS PROCESADAS: 9534

TOTAL DE INSCRITOS : 1,918,038

TOTAL DE VOTANTES : 975,717 51.08%

TOTAL DE NO VOTANTES : 934,321 48.92%

J U N T A E L E C T O R A L C E N T R A L  
E L E C C I O N E S G E N E R A L E S 1989

TOTAL GENERAL EN LA CAPITAL

FECHA: 04/05/89

VOTOS POR	ANR	PL	PRF	PLP	FLR2	PDC	PH	PLRU	ELANCOS	RULOS	TOTAL
RESIDENTE:	167,699	688	4,770	1,283	48,968	2,994	644	391	4,524	3,236	227,189
	73,64X	0.26X	2.10X	0.56X	18.04X	1.32X	0.28X	0.17X	1.99X	1.42X	
URRUBA :	147,183	1,184	14,523	1,869	44,314	6,367	748	458	5,238	2,267	223,983
	65,68X	0.49X	6.48X	0.83X	19.78X	2.84X	0.33X	0.28X	2.33X	1.01X	
TOTAL DE MESAS:	1568	MESAS PROCESADAS:	1568	MESAS FALTANTES:	0						

TOTAL DE INSCRIPTOS : 316,823

TOTAL DE VOTANTES : 227,189 71.86X

TOTAL DE NO VOTANTES : 88,914 28.14X



PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA  
Total por Departamentos

DEPARTAMENTOS	(1) ANR	(2) PL	(3) PRF	(4) PLR	(5) PDC	(6) PLRA	(7) FR	(8) PLSU	(9) PLANCO	TOTAL VOTANTES
ASUNCION	1123410	550	3210	641	2036	30024	477	288	2824	2153
CONCEPCION	15564	62	335	235	194	5809	0	30	22	330
SAN PEDRO	35785	69	91	381	25	9337	0	605	111	2881
CORDILLERA	44988	115	224	124	201	18598	12	25	380	573
BUIRA	26058	42	346	652	29	7789	0	0	0	57
CARGUZZU	54506	641	421	1949	144	17763	42	33	400	311
CAZAPA	12827	59	0	312	31	2201	0	0	35	83
ITAPIA	58768	550	969	604	814	14022	0	51	731	835
MISIONES	15071	5	269	245	144	5662	34	53	139	84
PARAGUARI	37147	277	166	119	187	12309	10	95	239	235
ALTO PARANA	41684	119	293	31	486	10775	99	267	306	127
CENTRAL	1151171	933	1825	1571	1504	47570	231	649	1513	1533
NEERUCU	18075	47	212	47	54	4771	0	1	139	148
AMAMBAY	11474	53	408	142	105	4575	0	0	10	9
CANINDEYU	5436	0	177	296	0	1215	0	0	38	11
REGION OCCIDENTAL	10786	106	50	123	104	2149	0	0	91	154
TOTAL	162750	3628	8986	7672	5995	195577	307	2107	6975	9420

COMPUTO ELECCIONES 1987: CPES-CEREA-CEG-CIFRE-EMISORAS PARAGUAY

# Appendix VI

## CAMARA DE SENADORES Y DIPUTADOS Total por Departamentos

DEPARTAMENTOS	(1) ANR	(2) PL	(3) PRF	(4) PLR	(5) PCD	(6) FLESA	(7) FR	(8) FLEGO	(9) RUMCO	NULO VOTANTES	TOTAL
ASUNCION	110626	738	9208	1336	4103	22148	517	314	3384	1559	157521
CONCEPCION	13220	71	378	359	159	4733	1	41	16	10	18725
SAN PEDRO	33379	43	14	312	28	9575	7	502	62	77	48205
CORDILLERA	43655	110	194	133	163	17223	22	24	229	365	63195
GUIAFA	25074	42	387	594	26	7497	7	0	0	57	23677
CAAGUAYU	53014	673	411	1553	128	15754	24	22	298	75	73250
CAAZAPA	12312	45	0	239	39	1354	1	0	25	62	14527
ITAPUA	56686	473	1051	544	512	11404	1	23	357	135	71176
MISIONES	14678	5	293	227	367	5273	13	52	246	193	21113
PARAGUARI	36294	269	130	1521	105	955	7	51	203	57	47257
ALTO PARANA	40486	147	393	38	378	9731	33	224	248	42	51894
CENTRAL	141055	1124	3897	1931	2135	45743	213	757	2514	751	200120
MERQUEZU	17647	50	357	42	77	4733	1	112	33	23531	
AMAMBAY	10705	33	557	152	112	4722	0	105	141	16132	
CANINDIYU	5499	0	170	293	1	1547	0	0	65	0	7575
REGION OCCIDENTAL	10813	1	107	123	32	2613	0	0	174	72	13389
TOTAL	627146	3954	17562	9533	9141	182923	673	2059	9142	2740	937639

COMPUTO ELECCIONES 1999: PSES-GEREPA-GER-GERE-EMISORES PARAGUAY  
OBSERVACION: Corresponde al 28/09/99 y del total de Inscripciones

PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA  
Total por Departamentos  
DISTRIBUCION PORCENTUAL

DEPARTAMENTOS	(1) AMR	(2) PL	(3) PRF	(4) PLR	(5) PEC	(6) FLRA	(7) FR	(8) FELS	(9) BLANCO	(10) NULO	TOTAL VOTANTES
ASUNCION	74.4	0.3	1.9	0.5	1.2	15.1	0.3	0.2	1.7	1.3	100.0
CONCEPCION	68.9	0.3	1.5	1.0	0.7	25.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.5	100.0
SAN PEDRO	71.7	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.1	19.9	0.0	1.2	0.2	5.8	100.0
CORDILLERA	69.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	28.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	100.0
GUAIRA	74.5	0.1	1.0	1.9	0.1	22.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	100.0
CANGAZU	71.5	0.8	0.6	2.6	0.2	23.3	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.4	100.0
CAZAZAPA	82.5	0.4	0.0	2.0	0.2	14.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	100.0
ITAPUK	76.2	0.7	1.3	0.8	1.1	18.2	0.0	0.1	0.9	0.9	100.0
MISIONES	69.4	0.0	1.2	1.1	0.7	26.1	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	100.0
PARAGUARI	73.1	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.4	24.2	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.5	100.0
ALTO PARANA	77.0	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.7	19.9	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.2	100.0
CENTRAL	72.5	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.7	22.8	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.8	100.0
NEEMBUCU	76.9	0.2	0.9	0.2	0.3	20.3	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	100.0
AMAMBAY	68.4	0.3	2.4	0.8	0.6	27.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	100.0
CANINDYU	71.8	0.0	2.3	3.9	0.0	21.3	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	100.0
REGION OCCIDENTAL	79.7	0.9	0.4	0.9	0.3	15.9	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.7	100.0
TOTAL	73.3	0.4	1.0	0.8	0.7	21.6	0.1	0.2	0.8	1.0	100.0

COMPUTO ELECCIONES 1989: CPES-CERPA-CED-CIPE-EMISORAS PARAGUAY

## Appendix VI

CAMARA DE SENADORES Y DIPUTADOS  
Total por Departamentos  
DISTRIBUCION PORCENTUAL

DEPARTAMENTOS	(1) ANR	(2) PL	(3) PRF	(4) PLR	(5) PCC	(6) PLRA	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	TOTAL
ASUNCION	67.5	0.5	5.6	0.5	2.5	19.6	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100.0
CONCEPCION	69.6	0.4	2.0	1.9	0.8	24.7	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100.0
SAN PEDRO	76.9	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.0	20.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
CORDILLERA	70.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	27.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100.0
GUIRAPÉ	74.5	0.1	1.1	1.9	0.1	22.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
CAAGUAY	72.4	0.9	0.6	2.3	0.2	23.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
CAZABA	84.2	0.3	0.0	2.0	0.2	12.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
ITAPUK	79.6	0.7	1.5	0.3	0.7	16.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
MISIONES	69.5	0.0	1.4	1.1	0.5	25.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100.0
PARAGUARI	76.8	0.6	0.3	3.2	0.2	19.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
ALTO PARANE	79.3	0.3	0.9	0.1	0.6	19.8	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0
CENTRAL	70.5	0.5	1.9	0.9	1.1	22.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0
NEEMBUCU	77.9	0.2	1.5	0.2	0.2	19.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
AMANSAY	66.5	0.4	3.5	1.0	0.2	25.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100.0
CANINDYU	72.5	0.0	2.2	3.9	0.0	20.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
REGION OCCIDENTAL	80.8	0.0	0.8	0.2	0.5	15.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
TOTAL	72.6	0.4	2.0	1.1	0.5	21.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100.0

COMPUTO ELECCIONES 1989: CPES-CERPA-CEP-CIPAF-CONSEJOS CAMARAS  
OBSERVACION: Corresponde al 23.775 % del total de Inscripciones