

*National Democratic  
Institute for  
International  
Affairs*

**DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
IN JORDAN  
1995 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS**

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# National Democratic Institute For International Affairs



conducting nonpartisan international programs to help promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions

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## NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was established in 1983. By working with political parties, civic organizations, parliaments, and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. The Institute is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has a staff of 175 with field offices in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report on the July 11, 1995 municipal elections in Jordan is based on the observations of two NDI visits to Jordan: one before the elections and one during the elections. NDI staff conducted interviews in Jordan in May 1995 during the voter registration process about seven weeks before election day. Then from July 8 to 13, NDI organized a nine-person study mission to observe the official campaign period and election day activities. Although information from the study mission's post-election debriefing and from the participants' individual reports to NDI are incorporated in the body of the report, the Institute assumes full responsibility for this account.

This report reflects the contributions of several people, although it was written principally by NDI Program Officer Olga Milosavljevic and Program Assistant Khaled Elgindy. Senior Associate Thomas O. Melia provided substantial input and Senior Program Officer Michael Oreste and Program Assistants David Nassar and Brian Katulis contributed valuable comments to drafts of the report. Freelance editor Kathy Schalch provided final editorial comments. NDI Field Representatives Margaret Zaknoen (West Bank and Gaza Strip) and Wallace Rogers (Estonia) were instrumental in facilitating in-country programming and also contributed to this report.

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Most importantly, we want to express our appreciation to the many Jordanians that took time from busy schedules to meet with the NDI delegation to share their views of political developments in Jordan. The Institute appreciates the assistance it received from the Center for Strategic Studies and the New Jordan Research Center.

Kenneth D. Wollack  
President  
National Democratic Institute  
October, 1995

## I. OVERVIEW

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has become one of the leaders in democratic development in the Arab world, though it is important to note that clear limits exist. Over the last six years, King Hussein has initiated a measured opening of the Jordanian political system which has resulted in two parliamentary elections (in 1989 and 1993), the lifting of martial law in 1991, the preparation and adoption of the National Charter in 1991, and the legalization of political parties in 1992. On October 26, 1994, King Hussein once again led Jordan into a new era when Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty paving the way for normalizing relations between the two states.

The municipal elections held on July 11, 1995 represent yet another step forward in the liberalization of Jordan's political system. The Jordanian parliament revised the 1955 municipal election law in July 1994. The revisions, while partial, had the potential to improve the quality of the electoral exercise and to render local governance more accountable to the public. The revised law contained four significant changes: 1) mayors were directly elected in all municipalities except for Amman; 2) political parties were allowed to present candidates; 3) elections for all 260 municipal councils were held on the same day; and 4) half of the 40-member Amman Council was elected for the first time.

Because of the region's great interest in Jordan's liberalization, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), turned to the July 11 municipal elections to examine the contribution these elections would make to furthering the pluralization of Jordanian political life. This was a natural extension of NDI's continuing effort to support Jordan's democratic development. (See Appendix A.) To this end, NDI organized a nine-person delegation of Lebanese, Palestinians and Yemenis to study the municipal elections. An elected mayor from Bulgaria and a former elected local government official from the United States also joined the study mission. (See Appendix B.) Another purpose of studying these elections was to bring decision-makers from the region, who are considering local government and local election issues themselves, to witness a neighboring country's experience. (See Appendix C.)

After three days of briefings with Jordanian journalists, academics, political party representatives, government officials and representatives from the non-governmental sector, the study mission participants divided into three groups to observe elections in the cities of Amman, Madaba and Zarqa and their environs. (See Appendix D.) Having studied just a portion of the local elections process, NDI is not in a position to offer comprehensive comments on the significance of all dimensions of the electoral process for a short period of time. Nevertheless, the study mission was able to note several interesting aspects of the process -- both positive and problematic. On this basis, NDI and its delegation offer several recommendations that could facilitate a cleaner and more meaningful process in future municipal elections and enhance the quality of the emerging democratic system.

On the one hand, the delegation noted the orderly administration of the elections, an important accomplishment when these elections were being held simultaneously around the country for the first time. On the other hand, it heard several complaints and noted several points of concern. The complaints and concerns include: irregularities in the registration

process; the omnipresence of military and security forces on election day; a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the voters and parties; compromised secrecy of the ballot; inadequate provisions for illiterate voters; an overly brief campaign period; and some official harassment of Islamic Action Front (IAF) candidates and activists.

Although the government's anxiety over these elections, low voter turnout, and lackluster performance by the parties, all served to diminish the meaningfulness of this particular electoral exercise, the willingness of the government to call municipal elections under a revised election law at this difficult time is noteworthy. These elections were announced in a polarized political environment. They were significant because they introduced substantive changes to the municipal election code which, in turn, provide the possibility for more meaningful local governance. However, refinements to the law, a cleaner implementation of the law, and a widespread voter education campaign, are needed to allow Jordan to more fully realize the potential contained within the revised law.

## II. POLITICAL CONTEXT

The 1995 municipal elections came at a difficult period in Jordan's six-year political liberalization process. The 10 month old peace treaty with Israel had significantly polarized political discourse in Jordan. In fact, Islamists and secular leftists in parliament formed informal coalitions to oppose the treaty and its implementation.

Since the November 1993 parliamentary elections, the concerns about normalization with Israel and improving the economy have further complicated democratization. Many Jordanians who expected the peace treaty to bring both economic growth and further political liberalization have been disappointed. The economy continues to languish and political liberalization has been delayed. Over the last 18 months, human rights activists and parliamentarians have noted gradual constraints on freedom of expression. In early May, the government denied an opposition request to hold a conference against normalization of relations with Israel. At the same time, several newspaper journalists expressing pro-government views that support normalization have been expelled from the Jordanian Journalists' Association and Writers' Association, which opposes normalization. The entrenchment of the pro- and anti-normalization voices has further polarized political discourse in Jordan.

### *The 1989 Parliamentary Elections*

After riots in April 1989 protesting government price increases, King Hussein announced that Jordan's first parliamentary elections to the Chamber of Deputies since 1967 would be held in November. Before the elections, the King lifted several martial law restrictions that had been in place since 1967.

Political parties were not allowed to participate; all candidates were technically independents. However, some candidates who were strongly identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has existed in Jordan since the 1950's, won 20 of the Chamber's 80 seats. Independent Islamist candidates won 14 more seats; leftist opposition and Arab nationalist candidates won 11; and conservative tribal and clan groups won 15. The remaining 20 seats are reserved for significant Jordanian minorities. Although these elections raised several significant concerns, they did represent an important step toward reviving the parliamentary politics that had characterized Jordan's early years as an independent country

### *The National Charter*

In April 1990, King Hussein named a 60-member commission to draft a national charter, which, among other things, led to the legalization of political parties. The Charter is a political compact between the major elements of society and, in practical terms, appears to possess authority comparable to that of the Constitution. The first chapter of the Charter states that the document's aims are to "lay the foundation and define the methods of national public activity" and to "point out the way for the future, establishing general guidelines on the exercise of political pluralism..."



Although the Charter's support of political parties has received the most attention, the eight-chapter document addresses all aspects of Jordanian statehood and society. The Charter frequently affirms the importance of democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights. It also asserts the equality of women. The King and leading political figures endorsed the National Charter in June 1991. Shortly thereafter King Hussein lifted the remaining martial law restrictions.

### *Legalization of Political Parties*

As called for by the Charter, the National Assembly adopted a draft law legalizing political parties in July 1992. The King promulgated the law by royal decree in August 1992, giving parties time to organize for the legislative elections scheduled for November 1993.

Currently, Jordan has a total of 22 legally registered political parties. Most of the political parties, however, are small, disorganized, and attractive largely to Jordan's middle class elite and/or intelligentsia. The parties revolve more around their individual leaders than on political platforms or ideologies. The Muslim Brotherhood, which is officially registered as a charitable and social organization, has not formed a political party, but joined the umbrella organization called the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The IAF's general council (*Majlis Al-Shura*) is composed of both independent Islamists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan. Since late 1993, the coalition between the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood has been strained due to the warming of Jordanian-Israeli relations, which culminated in a peace treaty in October 1994 and the establishment of full diplomatic relations in mid-1995.

The only other significant organized political force is the *Al-Ahd* (Pledge) party which is led by Abdul-Hadi Al-Majali -- a leading member of the prominent Majali family. The *Al-Ahd* party is pro-government, pro-peace and pro-monarchy yet is relatively insignificant electorally with only one member in parliament. Likewise, no significant leftist force exists in Jordan today. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the various leftist parties in Jordan have been unsuccessful in restructuring themselves and developing a new strategy to appeal to a significant portion of the Jordanian electorate. They remain a small group of elite intellectuals with little mass appeal, though a small leftist alliance is said to be in the making.

### *The 1993 Parliamentary Elections*

A royal decree revised the Jordanian parliamentary electoral law to include provisions for a "one-person one-vote" formula for the November 1993 contests. Both the substance of the change and the manner by which it was achieved generated intense controversy.

In May 1993, King Hussein called for a "national dialogue" centered around the electoral system. At the end of June, he appointed a caretaker government led by Prime Minister Abdul-Salam Al-Majali to administer the elections and to evaluate the electoral system. The government was said to be chiefly concerned that the 1989 system had provided an advantage to the IAF and its disciplined voters. However, Jordanian officials stated that the system's major flaw was that it gave some constituencies more votes than others. Voters

in a district electing three deputies could vote for three; voters in a district electing seven could vote for seven. Some analysts suggested that IAF voters would more reliably vote on ideological grounds, and that others would cast a vote for the IAF only after voting for their preferred tribal candidate.

Members of Parliament insisted the National Assembly approve any changes to the electoral system, and leaders of political parties asserted that they should have a voice in the decision. However, in a move that averted parliamentary deliberation, King Hussein dissolved the National Assembly on August 3, 1993. Then, in an August 17 speech to the nation, he announced that the electoral system would be changed by royal decree to a one-person, one-vote formula. The King stated that the Cabinet had ratified his decision. Both political parties and members of Parliament expressed anger at the King's announcement, asserting that his unilateral revision of the electoral system, while constitutionally permissible, was undemocratic.

While this revision, in the absence of redistricting, did not remedy the discrepancy between the number of representatives in each district, it did ensure that each Jordanian could vote for only one representative.

Pressure to reform the electoral system has continued since the 1993 election but the political instability described above has complicated further reforms. During NDI's 1994 conference on electoral trends worldwide, Taher Al-Masri, then Speaker of the National Assembly, opened the conference saying:

The general structure of the Jordanian Election Law is acceptable and agreed upon, however there are some flaws and deficiencies that must be addressed, including: the division of electoral districts and determination of the number of representatives in each is not subject to any logical or democratic standard; and the supervisory function of the electoral process requires review.

In addition to the commotion occasioned by the electoral revision, two other events threatened to disrupt the process on the eve of elections. One was the PLO-Israel Declaration of Principles signed on September 13, 1993, which was controversial among Jordanians. The regime was afraid that the November elections might become a referendum on the peace process and might galvanize opposition to Hussein's own plans to formalize the peace with Israel. Controversy also arose when the government rejected the IAF's application to hold election rallies. The ban was overturned by the courts -- but only 10 days before voting day.

Two notable results of the elections were the reduction by nearly a third of the number of seats held by Islamists, and the election of the first woman member of parliament. Toujan Faisal, an outspoken feminist, was elected to one of the seats set aside for Circassian Muslims.

Unfortunately, in Jordan's first multi-party elections, political parties played almost no role. The vast majority of candidates won seats as independents. Only six non-IAF party

candidates won seats, no party, other than the IAF, gained more than a single seat, and their candidates clearly won more on the basis of personal reputation and tribal affiliation than party identification. At a post-election press conference on November 9, King Hussein expressed his hope that the number of parties will decline over the next few years and that they will offer stronger programs to the voters.

### III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN

Jordan is divided into twelve governorates, each of which consists of several provinces or districts. Elected municipal councils are established for towns of over 2,500 inhabitants and appointed village councils are established for towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants. On July 11, 259 municipalities held elections for council members and mayors. The councils vary in size from six to eleven members depending on the population of the municipality<sup>1</sup>.

The mayor is a full-time position while council members serve on a part-time basis. Council members receive five Jordanian Dinars (JD) [about \$6.75 U.S.] for each council meeting they attend. Council members of governorate capitals receive 10 JD [\$13.50 U.S.] per council meeting. All elected positions are for four-year terms.

Local councils have the power to raise revenue through local taxes on property and businesses. Additionally, except for Amman which generates its own entire budget, councils receive a portion of their budget from the national government. Moreover, most towns run a permanent debt with the state's Bank of Towns and Development.

The principal role of the local council is to recommend a set of local development priorities to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment<sup>2</sup> in Amman. The Local Council Department of the Ministry reviews and approves all council decisions in Amman, including such things as: municipal hiring; municipal employee salaries; building of roads; and constructing stop signs and speed bumps. The newly elected councils and mayors will assume the same powers as the formerly appointed ones.

In April, just three months before the elections, the Cabinet decided to appoint city managers for Jordan's major cities -- the governorate capitals of Salt, Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun, Mafraq, Ma'an, Kerak, Tafileh, 'Aqaba and Madaba as well as the district centers of Ramtha, Sama Rousan, Deir Abi-Saeed, Deir Alla, Northern Shuneh and Southern Shuneh. This decision activated an inactive provision of the 1983 law on municipalities which called for the appointment of professional local administrators to implement Council decisions. These city managers implement the priorities set by the Council and approved by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. They are appointed jointly by the mayor, deputy mayor and the administrative governor, who is appointed by the Minister of Interior. Their appointment must also be approved by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. The recently appointed city managers have remained in their positions after the July elections.

The decision to appoint city managers under a 1983 law just two months before the 1995 municipal elections drew some criticism. Critics argued that the city manager should

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<sup>1</sup> Some analysts of the Jordanian local elections suggested that the size of the councils was determined by the number of and size of significant tribes in a municipality and not based solely on size of the population. NDI has not been able to obtain the detailed information necessary in order to confirm or discount this suggestion.

<sup>2</sup> Hereafter referred to as the Ministry of Municipal Affairs.

have been appointed by the newly *elected* mayor, deputy mayor and administrative governor after the July 11 elections and not by the *appointed* caretaker municipal mayors then in office. Others contended that the appointments were intended to weaken the powers of the newly elected mayors. According to officials in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, however, the role of the city manager is to “reduce the workload of the mayors.” In particular, the city managers, who are typically members of the career civil service that reports to the Ministry, are responsible for implementing Council decisions and preparing municipal budgets. The city managers can attend Council meetings but do not have the right to vote in the Council. Additionally, they are responsible for supervising municipal revenue collection.

Shortly after these elections, on September 30, 1995, 27 new municipalities were created by decree of the Council of Ministers, and officials in the ministry reported that other communities would also soon be elevated to municipality status. Mayors and councils are to be appointed on an interim basis until elections can be organized in mid-1996.

## IV. JULY 11, 1995 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

### *Election Preparations*

In July 1994, Parliament revised the 1955 municipal election law introducing several significant changes in preparation for local elections. (See Appendix E.) Under the 1955 law, local councils were elected irregularly (at different times) throughout the country and parties were not allowed to field candidates. Under the old system, mayors were elected from among the elected council members, by the members themselves. Additionally, the Amman council was entirely appointed, as was the Amman mayor, by the Prime Minister. The revised law provides for four significant changes: 1) mayors are now directly elected (except in Amman); 2) political parties are allowed to present candidates; 3) elections for all 260 councils are held on the same day; and 4) half of the 40-member Amman Council is elected directly by 20 wards.

There was some parliamentary debate over these reforms. Most significantly, opposition MP Toujan Faisal along with several like minded MPs pushed to make two-thirds of the Amman council directly elected and only one-third appointed. This arrangement, she argued, would reflect a degree of popular will but provide some government oversight, similar to the arrangement between the elected lower house of parliament and the appointed upper house of parliament. Parliament did not act on this suggestion.

These revisions to the municipal election law reflect Jordan's continuing efforts to strengthen political liberalization, particularly the role of political parties. As the political process has become more open in recent years, political parties have not necessarily become stronger. The natural training ground for political parties is obviously at the local level. By allowing mayors to be directly elected, holding the elections on the same day and allowing political parties to participate, the government effectively gave political parties an event around which to organize.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1994, elected councils across the country were dissolved and caretaker municipal councils were appointed to oversee preparations for municipal elections. It was understood that the appointed councils would help implement the elections in a nonpartisan manner and would not use their position on the local council and access to media and patronage for campaigning purposes. However, this arrangement also diminished the ability of formerly elected council members to campaign on past achievements. In fact several articles in the main dailies reported on the strong performance of these *appointed* councils in the weeks preceding the elections. Some opposition candidates, and particularly the IAF, interpreted this as a direct critique of "representative government." The IAF noted articles that singled out the Zarqa appointed council for particular praise and interpreted this as an attempt to discredit the previously elected council which was dominated by the IAF and had been largely credited with cleaning up local government in Zarqa and pulling it out of debt.

### *Women's Participation*

In an interesting effort to encourage women's participation at the local council level, Princess Basma, patron of the Queen Alia Foundation, secured the appointment of 99 women to

the caretaker councils across Jordan. Her purpose was to provide a core group of women with experience in local government, in the hope that this would provide these women with more credibility should they choose to run for the municipal elections. The presence of women in the councils would also enable Jordanians to become accustomed seeing women in public life. The aim was to increase the chances that women would be elected in the July 11 elections, and thereafter.

### ***Legal and Administrative Framework for the Municipal Elections***

The election law is vague in outlining election procedures that led to some avoidable confusion surrounding the implementation of the elections. Jordan's municipal election law does not specify campaign rules or outline in any detail the role of the military or the Ministry of Interior. As a result of this ambiguity, implementation of the law varied from place to place. Many candidates campaigned throughout election day, handing out pamphlets and voting cards with their pictures and names in and around the polling stations. In many cases these materials contained the names of the entire informal slate of council candidates that supported a given mayoral candidate, encouraging voters to vote for the entire slate *en bloc*.

### ***Electoral System***

The electoral system for the 1995 municipal elections permits each voter to vote for as many candidates as there are council seats. Those candidates with the most votes were elected to the council. The mayoral races were conducted on a "first pass the post" system in which each voter cast one ballot for a mayoral candidate of his or her choice and the candidate with the largest number of votes won. Some candidates won unopposed while some won by very narrow margins. For example, in Zarqa the newly elected mayor won with only 12 percent of all votes cast, while the following ten candidates won with between 11 percent and 5 percent of the vote.

The capital city of Amman, with a third of all voters in the county, is divided into 20 single member constituencies. Voters in each constituency voted to send one person to the council. Thus, 20 out of the 40 council seats were elected while the remaining 20 and the mayor were filled by government appointment.

### ***Election Administration***

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs supervises all 259 elections through 12 governorate offices. Thus the Minister himself is effectively the "chairman of the election" referred to in the election law. The NDI delegation learned that the Ministry also hires one person to represent it in each municipality. This person, in cooperation with the Governor and his assistants, oversees the day to day preparations for municipal elections. This position is not described in the election law. Often this Ministry employee holds more than one post in the municipality. For example, in Irbid, the Ministry employee was also the appointed interim deputy mayor.

Again, Amman proved to be a special case. Amman's council elections were not administered by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs but rather by the Governor of Amman under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Once again the role of the Ministry of Interior is not mentioned in the law itself. Furthermore, in Amman, it was the prime minister who appointed the head of the election committee.

Each district or municipality had an election committee, comprised of mid-level civil servants appointed by the governor. Amman, however, had only one election committee which oversaw all 20 single-member constituency elections.

The governor appointed the head of the election committee in each municipality. In turn, the head appointed the rest of the committee as well as the registration committee. All the committees' members were required to reside in the city in which they were asked to serve. Additionally, NDI was told that the governor informally pays attention to tribal balance when appointing the head of the election committee, who in turn does the same when appointing the rest of the committee and the registration committee. The municipal election committees appointed individual polling station committees. Most of the appointees were local civil servants.

### ***Voter Registration***

Jordanians register separately for local elections and for parliamentary elections. According to Article 12 of the election law, an individual must be at least 19 years old and prove that he or she has been a resident of the municipality for the previous 12 months to register in that municipality. For these local elections, citizens could demonstrate "residency" in either the district in which they live or the district in which they work. "Residency" may be demonstrated by showing a receipt from a local utility bill or a property tax receipt. Eligible Jordanians registered by appearing before the Registration Committee with proof of residency and their "family book" as identification. Because one person could then register an entire family, the registration lists were inevitably somewhat inflated, as any persons living or working outside of their home town (or those who were not interested in voting) could be added to the registry by a single family member.

Registration took place over a five-week period from April 11 to May 15. From May 21 to 27, the lists were made public for voters to review and to submit corrections. The final list was published on June 24.

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs, the Secretary General Rashdan Al-Rashdan and other ministry officials pointed to high voter registration figures as an indication of the efficiency and fairness of the registration process. Official figures indicate that 798,274 of those eligible to vote (excluding Amman) registered to vote for the upcoming local elections - approximately 76 percent of all eligible voters. In Amman, 78 percent of eligible voters registered to vote. Additionally, they pointed to the registration review process outlined in Article 13 of the election law which allowed each voter to review and confirm the lists and file an appeal to the Registration Committee if anyone's name did not belong on the list or was incorrectly listed.



Nevertheless, newspapers reported recurrent complaints that registration committees complicated the process unnecessarily and acted in an arbitrary manner. The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist deputies filed complaints that religious conservatives were singled out and hampered in the registration process. (See Appendix F.) In particular, Islamists alleged that registration officials required their supporters to produce varied types of identification to register. Sometimes citizens had to return to the registration office several times before being allowed to register. It was largely understood, however not written in the law, that only the family book was required to register to vote. This vagueness in the law allowed for an arbitrary process. Other parties suggested that irregularities in the registration process reflected the vagueness of the laws and a lack of adequate training of election officials more than any attempt to manipulate the results in favor of one party over another. They noted that their supporters also complained about arbitrary requests made by registration committees in order to register. Additional complaints referred to citizens who registered their names in areas where they did not live or work and registered twice.

### ***Candidate Registration***

Candidates for the 259 municipalities registered with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs or its representative in their district. Candidates for the Amman elections registered directly with the Governor of Amman's office. The candidate registration period ran from July 4 to 6 for the Amman elections and July 3 to 5 for all other municipalities. Candidates had to fulfill the same requirements as eligible voters plus submit an application with proof of financial solvency, a clean criminal record, a diploma/degree, proof of residency in the district, and verify that they were not currently a government or municipal employee and that they had paid all their taxes. In addition, candidates were required to pay a 50 JD fee. Interestingly, candidates for municipal councils had to fulfill educational requirements that do not exist for parliamentary candidates: council members and mayors must have at least a high school diploma and, in the case of governorate capitals, candidates were required to have a university degree. In contrast, parliamentarians, who have significant policy making power, are not required to fulfill any educational criteria.

Notably, at the end of the registration process, 28 mayoral races were decided without contest and 45 council seats were elected without contest -- they won their seats by "acclamation" according to the law.

While campaigning began in the weeks prior to the official registration of candidates, the late filing date did make it practically impossible for ballots to be printed with candidates' names. This, in turn, caused problems for illiterate voters and more generally compromised the secrecy of the ballot.

### ***Balloting Procedures***

The legal framework for election-day activities and procedures are contained in Articles 20 to 26 of the 1955 municipal election law (revised 1994). The following is a brief outline of the main election day procedures as witnessed by the NDI study mission.

By law, polling stations were required to remain open for a minimum of 10 hours. Actual polling hours were determined by the Election Chairman, the Minister of Municipal Affairs. On July 11, Jordanians voted between 7:00 and 17:00. During that time, at least 50 percent plus one of all registered voters for that district must have voted for the election to be valid. If less than 50 percent plus one of all registered voters voted by 17:00, the chairman of the polling station committee extended voting for up to four additional hours until 21:00 (Article 21). If by 21:00 50 percent plus one still had not voted, the polling station would reopen the next day, July 12, at 7:00.

The law is ambiguous regarding extended voting hours. Extensions were often arbitrarily determined -- whether for an additional two hours on the 11th and reopen on 12th, or for four more hours on 11th to determine if it was necessary to reopen on 12th. When asked how or why it was decided to extend the voting period on the 11th for an additional hour and then an additional day in the Nazzal Al-Badr constituency of Amman, the polling station officer noted "security" reasons but did not (or was unable to) elaborate on the security issue.

The election law is also vague regarding overnight ballot box security. It states that following the voting process, "boxes would be closed, sealed and kept under guard until the next morning and voting continues for another ten hours." In practice, Mr. Faris Al-Juneidi, head of the Local Council Department of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, assured us (and the delegation later witnessed) that the ballot boxes were guarded by the policemen, polling station committee members and party poll-watchers. Amman Governor Talaat Nawayseh was quoted by the Jordan News Agency, Petra, as saying that ballot boxes will be kept in their places overnight and candidates' representatives have the right to stay in the election centers.

Before voting began, the chairman of the polling committee was required to open the ballot box in front of the polling committee, party poll-watchers and the police to demonstrate that it was empty. The chairman then closed and sealed the ballot box in front of all those present. Study mission delegates who were permitted to observe confirmed that this procedure was utilized.

Once entering the polling room, the voter had to present his or her photo identity card to the presiding officer who checked the name against the voter registry. After checking the voter's identity, a polling officer placed a mark on the registry roll next to the voter's name and handed him or her two blank ballots signed by the chairman, one for mayor and one for council members. No names of candidates (or symbols or photos) were printed on the ballots; all voters were obliged to write the names of their preferred candidates. In Amman, voters were only given one blank ballot for council elections.

Polling committees generally sat at tables at the front of the room. Since many of the polling stations were in schools, the poll-watchers sat at desks and chairs randomly strewn around the room. Male and female voting took place in separate rooms although they were often in the same building. Since only a few women sat on polling committees, the identities of women who wore the face veil (*niqab*) were checked in a corner of the room or behind a curtain by any woman in the room, often a party pollwatcher.

The voting took place on exposed tables, devoid of any type of screen or barrier to protect the secrecy of the ballot. Voters stood at the tables and wrote in the names of the candidates they wished to elect to the council and as mayor on separate ballots. Voters could refer to alphabetical lists of candidates that were posted near the voting tables or to informal candidate lists printed on cards they brought into the polling center with them. These cards were often provided by candidates and listed their names as well that of their informal tribal or party blocs.

In several cases the NDI delegation noted that candidate lists were not posted though this was promptly rectified when brought to the polling chairman's attention. In other instances, names of candidates had been crossed out. In these instances the NDI delegation was told that those candidates had withdrawn from the race, despite the fact that from one polling room to another in the same location, *different* names had been stricken.

Illiterate voters chose a member of the polling station committee and stated, out loud, who they wished to vote for so that all could hear. The selected committee member then wrote in the name of the candidate(s) and displayed the ballot to the other committee members and/or to the relevant poll-watchers to assure that the names mentioned were indeed written correctly. There was, however, no standard way of handling illiterate voters. Delegates observed many irregularities in this regard. For example, often times the candidate poll-watchers were asked to assist the illiterate voter rather than a member of the election committee. In other instances, illiterate voters who tried the patience of the committee were simply asked to leave without casting a vote. Furthermore, votes by illiterates cast by indicating the name of the mayoral candidate plus "his group" (informal party, tribal or candidate slates) for council members were accepted by some polling committees and not by others. This vagueness in the law contributed to uneven opportunities for voters to express their will. The tendency to vote for an informal slate, not all of whose names the voter could recite, also indicates that many voters may not have been casting well informed votes.

Whether illiterate or literate, NDI delegates often witnessed voters stride in the polling room with their candidate card or pamphlet making clear to all present who they voted for. Particularly in the case of women and in more rural areas, voters would often say out loud who they voted for as they placed their ballot in the ballot box. In some cases, the polling station committee members would scold them for doing so. Or alternatively, the delegation witnessed several literate voters, particularly women, vote as if they were illiterate. This was apparently done in order to make clear to all those interested, whether members of the polling committee, security personnel, candidate pollwatchers or spouses, for whom the ballots were cast.

### ***Transportation and Election Day Campaigning***

Since the polling stations were frequently located quite a distance from the voters' homes, party workers often provided transportation to the polls. Or, alternatively, brothers or fathers provided transportation for women. Several voters complained to study mission

delegates that the party workers who drove them to the polling station had abandoned them afterward, leaving them with no way to return home.

Voters often arrived to the polling station with pamphlets or business card-sized campaign advertisements which specified the voters' polling station location and polling booth number. While voters did not have to vote for the candidate who provided him or her transportation to the polls or whose card they held, NDI study mission participants noted that voters often did simply copy onto the ballot the names from the card they held.

In many instances, the policemen who milled around the room watched over the voter's shoulder as he or she marked his or her ballot. Likewise, husbands, brothers or fathers were often seen hovering over women as they voted. Generally, no real protests were made to these infringements on ballot secrecy. There appeared to be no effort to establish the maximum distance possible between the exposed voting tables and the polling committee table, police personnel or poll-watchers.

The greatest enthusiasm witnessed by the participants occurred outside the polling stations on election day. Large numbers of party workers and roving candidates wore banners and handed out additional information on the candidates. Cars or small vans decorated with candidate paraphernalia would often pull up to a polling site and deliver voter. (See Appendix G.)

### *Security*

In Amman, Madaba and Zarqa, the NDI delegation noticed a substantial security presence outside polling stations as well as inside polling station premises -- uniformed and plain-clothed. Delegates encountered plain-clothed security personnel inside the polling rooms on several occasions, who were often very helpful and willing to answer questions. In Amman, when asked which party they represented they unabashedly responded that they were not poll-watchers but that they were with the "Ministry of Interior." After the elections, the Governor of Amman, Talaat Nawayseh, praised the "security apparatus and its hard-working unknown soldiers...and their availability throughout the electoral and counting period." At the polling station located in the Latin Monastery in Madaba, the NDI delegation was approached by a person who invited them to his home. Several voters waiting in line indicated to the delegates that he was with the *mukhabarat* (state security apparatus).

In Madaba and even more so in Zarqa, the delegation noted the unsettling presence of military and security personnel in the streets outside the polling stations in addition to whatever presence they had inside the actual polling stations. In the streets, military trucks and security personnel with tear gas, guns and plastic shields were prevalent. In the afternoon in Amman, after the IAF withdrew its candidates from several races around the country and tensions mounted, an armed military jeep appeared in front of the Municipal Affairs Ministry building. In Zarqa, in particular, the overall atmosphere was extremely tense. When asked, numerous voters justified the security and military presence as "necessary to preserve order" without being able to identify what threat to order existed.

### *Counting Process*

Upon the closing of the polls, the poll-watchers remained in the polling station to monitor the polling committee's activities. The chairman of the polling committee sealed the ballot box and all the members of the committee signed the boxes in front of the poll-watchers and policeman. The committee prepared a report which showed the number of registered voters on the registry, the number of people who voted, and that the voting process was conducted according to the law. The reports also noted any violations of the law and how they were addressed. A marked copy of the voter registry was also attached to the report.

According to Jordan's electoral law, at the end of the voting period ballot boxes are transported to a district counting center where the ballots are counted. Although the law does not specify whether poll-watchers are permitted to accompany the chairperson and secretary as they transport the sealed ballot box and reports to the counting center, Mr. Faris Al-Juneidi noted that they could. In the instances witnessed by the delegation, this proved to be true.

## V. ASSESSMENT

As with the 1993 parliamentary elections, there was some fear that the 1995 municipal elections might serve as a referendum on the regional peace process. It was also anticipated that the introduction of political parties into the municipal election process might serve to bolster the role of parties in Jordanian politics. Neither of these predictions proved to be accurate. Normalization of relations with Israel played virtually no role in the campaign period as candidates focused more on the equitable provision of social services. Mayoral and council winners with any sort of expressed party affiliation were rare. In fact, political parties, in most instances, did not publicly release the names of their affiliated candidates until after the elections.

Nevertheless, these elections set several important precedents for Jordan's democratization process. The new law harmonized elections so that local elections throughout the Kingdom were held on the same day and introduced the direct election of mayors for the first time. That the elections occurred peaceably is itself a noteworthy accomplishment -- though it is unclear whether this success is due to the calm of Jordan's voters or the conspicuous display of security personnel and armaments. However, several points of concern emerged. The overall lack of enthusiasm by voters, the low profile maintained by political parties, the apparently widespread inattention to (or misunderstanding of) ballot secrecy and the government's nervousness throughout the process, reflect the lack of confidence in the electoral process and underscore the problematic nature of the top-down and incremental liberalization process introduced by King Hussein.

### *Voter Apathy*

The government took a variety of steps to encourage Jordanians to vote -- such as declaring July 11 a national holiday, placing advertisements in the national press and providing separate voting stations for men and women. Though the news media reported that official support government sources variously placed voter turnout between 60 percent and 7 percent, opposition parties and newspapers claimed turnout was much lower. Enthusiasm throughout the pre-election period could only be described as low. While a low turnout can to some extent be attributed to the inflated registration figures, it is noteworthy that so few voters exercised this franchise just a few weeks after registration.

Many Jordanians the delegation met with before the elections expressed complete apathy about them. This was particularly true of residents of Amman, many of whom felt that local government plays no tangible role in their daily lives and that their vote was meaningless and could effect no real change in the status quo. Sixty of the 231 municipalities with contested races were obliged to extend voting hours due to low turnout; these extensions ranged from one half-hour to an additional day. In the Amman elections, 13 out of 20 of the constituencies required a second day of voting because 50 percent of registered voters did not appear on election day.

In an interview in *Al-Dustur*, the Governor of Amman, Talaat Nawayseh, attributed the low voter turnout in Amman to the fact that city people were relatively unfamiliar with the

candidates, whereas people living in small communities such as villages and suburbs tend to know all the people in their community. Other newspapers also noted that the newly introduced educational requirements prevented many well-established community leaders from running. Alternatively, qualified and well known individuals were not interested in a low paid position with no real powers -- especially in Amman. Apathy was also attributed to the extremely short campaign period of seven to eight days.

Several Jordanian analysts attributed low voter turnout to the lack of qualified and respected candidates. One NDI delegate suggested lowering the effective costs associated with being a candidate in order to enhance the quality of the candidates and the number of women who run. Rather than requiring that all government employees who wish to run for the municipal elections resign from their jobs, the law could allow them to simply take a leave of absence for a specified period of time prior to the elections. This type of revision in the law, she argued, would reduce the cost of standing as a candidate and therefore increase the likelihood that more qualified people would run.

The timing of these elections was significant in that it demonstrated the Jordanian government's willingness to move ahead with proposed reforms despite the controversy surrounding the Arab-Israeli peace process. Earlier fears that municipal elections might be interpreted as a referendum on the government's effort to normalize relations with Israel did not materialize. Normalization issues did not seem to dominate the campaign period except in the indirect sense that those opposed to the treaty were considered by all concerned to constitute the opposition to the government. However, once a centrist victory was secured, the state-run media exploited this opportunity and ran headlines such as, "Voters Support Pragmatism and Peace." (See Appendix H.)

### *Tribal Nature of Elections and Lack of Party Role*

Another striking observation in these municipal elections was the absence of any meaningful role for political parties. Most voters indicated that they were voting on the basis of familial or tribal affiliation. Even in those cases where some younger voters indicated to members of the NDI delegation that they were voting for "the best candidate," the delegates sensed that party affiliation did not play a major role in their candidate selection. Indeed, some campaign materials listed informal slates of candidates whose members had the same last name. (See Appendix I.) In addition, the campaign period was not, on the whole, issue-oriented though some candidate banners and placards did make cursory references to broad issues such as the environment.

Tribal or familial affiliation is recognized by many observers as the most prominent and enduring feature of Jordanian political culture. (See Appendix J.) It remains unclear how this tribalism relates to democratic development -- whether it will permanently retard the development of political parties based on programs, or constitutes a basis for party development. The evidence thus far suggests that tribal considerations preclude many in the political arena from building permanent political structures -- the notable exception being the Islamic Action Front which has developed quite a sophisticated and transparent organizational structure that appears to be stronger than any individual personality or family.

Not surprisingly, based on conversations with voters and observing them as they voted, there seemed to be a greater interest in the mayoral races than in the council races. This may reflect a formal or informal attempt to transpose, via elections, traditional community leaders into the elected governing structures. This may also provide a partial explanation for the comparatively low voter turn-out in Amman where the mayor was not being elected.

The make up of the informal candidate slates that emerged in the brief campaign period demonstrated the lack of party or ideological underpinnings to the campaigns. In fact, in the days leading up to the elections the major daily newspapers ran stories on the Zarqa race touting the diversity of the two main slates competing for council seats and the post of mayor. Each bloc contained both leftists and Islamists. The main difference seems to have been that one bloc appeared also to have a few royalists, while the other contained IAF candidates -- including a nationally prominent IAF member as candidate for mayor. This led to their respective characterization as the pro-government centrist slate versus the anti-government IAF bloc.

The NDI study mission was repeatedly told by journalists and other analysts that there is only one political party in Jordan -- the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The IAF, while advocating a distinct ideology and commanding a large grassroots following, nevertheless was unable to articulate a general political formula to address local issues. Furthermore, in several instances the IAF felt compelled to compose tribal slates similar to most other candidates, parties and independents.

One of the more curious consequences of the weakness of political parties in Jordan is the phenomenon of "stealth candidacies": secret endorsements of candidates by parties. In fact, the process may actually be an endorsement of parties by candidates. Mayoral and council candidates overwhelmingly shield away from away from stating any party affiliation during the campaign period. Likewise, the parties themselves do not publicly announce the identities of the candidates they support until **after** elections. When NDI met with political parties prior to the elections, both the IAF and *Al-Ahd* parties forcefully stated that they would not announce the names of their candidates until after the July 11 elections. Only in a few large cities were candidates' party affiliation noted during the campaign period -- in particular in Aqaba, Irbid and Zarqa. It is noteworthy that the IAF's most celebrated victories were in Irbid, Kerak and Madaba -- in the latter two cases the candidates won based on tribal affiliation and not IAF affiliation.

After the elections, several parties and coalition blocs announced how many seats their party won. For example, the *Al-Ahd* party announced that 79 out of 100 of their candidates won seats, the Jordanian National Coalition Party (JNCP) claimed that its candidates won 49 seats, the Progressive and Justice Party announced that 69 of its candidates were victorious. All three of these parties noted without elaboration or explanation that they did not present candidates before election day. The General Secretary of the JNCP attributed the victory of their candidates to the trust that citizens had for the individuals. In an article in the *Jordan Times*, the Secretary General of *Al-Ahd* said that they did not announce their candidates before the elections because



“[they] were afraid that [they] would lose 15 percent of the votes if [they] announced the names of [their] candidates before the elections.” However, he also said that “next time, [they] will announce the names a month earlier.”

This tactic of announcing names of candidates only after elections also drew some criticism. Mr. Talal Al-Ramahi of the Unionist Party accused other parties of inverting the political equation by announcing candidates only after the elections. Mr. Abu Hassan of the Future Party called this tactic “cheap propaganda” and warned of an impending credibility problem when parties take credit for the victory of candidates who won based on their own individual programs and personalities rather than the party’s program. Finally, the leader of the *Al-Yakydha* party announced that his party had no candidates and those of their members who won, “they won by their personal efforts.”

Despite the notable awkwardness that characterized candidates’ party identification, it may be that these elections nevertheless did constitute a step forward in the development of a role for parties in the politics of Jordan. It will likely take several election cycles for the structural reforms introduced to affect voter and candidate behavior, and thus the party system in general. Now that at least some of the elected officials have aligned themselves with parties, voters will be able to assess the work of those parties in councils and as mayors. Over time, perhaps the party system will adapt to encompass the underlying tribal arrangement, and elected actors will increasingly seize opportunities to strengthen the role of local government and citizens’ confidence in it.

### ***Reaction of the Jordanian Government to the Study Mission***

Skittishness on the part of the government at the presence of the NDI study mission was interesting. None of the Ministers with whom NDI staff met six weeks earlier would meet informally or formally with the delegation once it arrived in Jordan. This probably served to heighten the group’s attention to irregularities witnessed -- which might have otherwise been noted only in passing, or could have been explained by appropriate officials. The Arab members of the delegates, in particular, took note of the reluctance of Jordanian officials to discuss the elections with them and their enthusiasm for Jordanian political development was accordingly diminished.

The delegation encountered considerable difficulty in securing permission to enter polling sites on election day, and never did succeed in arranging meetings with the Ministers of Interior and Municipal Affairs. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs delayed granting the delegation permission until the eve of the elections. Moreover, the individualized letters that were finally provided to delegation members erroneously referred to the delegates as journalists and restricted their visits to 15 minutes in each polling station. Several of the delegates resented the reference to journalists, as the delegation consisted entirely of municipal council members, legislators and ministry officials. (See Appendix K.) The delegation that traveled to Zarqa was denied entry to observe the opening procedures at several polling sites despite the fact that they held individualized permission slips signed by the Minister of Municipal Affairs. The Zarqa election committee chairman insisted that the delegation obtain separate permission from the Governor of Zarqa. The Madaba group encountered no such difficulties and were

allowed entry in every instance, sometimes without even showing their permission slips. The Amman group entered polling stations with permission supplied by the Governor of Amman and encountered no difficulties in observing the election.

Several requests for meetings with both Ministers were unavailing in the week leading up to election day. Moreover, high level officials at the Ministry of the Interior became defensive and insisted that they played no role whatsoever in administering the elections process and therefore assumed a principled stand in refusing to meet with NDI. Instead, they showed great deference to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Governor of Amman. The division of responsibility between the Ministries of Interior and Municipal Affairs was somewhat clearer than that between the Interior Ministry and the Governor of Amman. The Governor of Amman stated quite clearly that he would not meet with NDI's study mission to discuss preparations for Amman elections without written instructions from the Interior Minister. Aides to the Minister of Interior, in turn, insisted that the Governor and his office were in charge of the elections.

This type of back and forth only served to heighten the delegation's cynicism about the management of the election process. It is not unusual for Interior Ministries to administer elections, as they do so in many countries. Nevertheless, the Jordanian government's interest in *appearing* to move away from this pattern demonstrates a measure of sophistication on the part of some officials, while the nervousness of the various ministries about acknowledging their responsibilities illustrates that genuine delegation of authority to the relevant ministries was incomplete.

Although government officials refused to meet with NDI, the government and the state media did not hesitate to try to use the presence of the NDI delegation to legitimize the elections. Though he did not meet with any members of the study mission delegation, before, during or after the elections, and so had no way to know of the team's various views on the process, at a televised press conference immediately following the election, Municipal Affairs Minister Nader Thuheirat cited the presence of the NDI delegation as having confirmed "the democratic character and the impartiality" of the elections. (See Appendix L.) This statement was widely reported by the Jordanian press.

## ***Concluding Observations***

### **Amman**

Overall there was a qualitative as well as quantitative difference between the Amman municipal elections and those in the rest of the country. Amman residents were denied full representation by only allowing them to elect half of their council. Their representation was further attenuated by the provisions allowing the Prime Minister to continue to appoint the mayor. Nevertheless, most of the journalists and candidates, both independents and pro-government, as well as Amman residents with whom the delegation met, verbally supported the Amman council election arrangement. Since the Amman council would make decisions for the most significant political and economic center in Jordan, ordinary Amman residents could not be entrusted to elect appropriately qualified representatives. Interestingly, they seemed to lack trust in their own ability to elect qualified people for the positions while they placed greater faith in

the government's ability to appoint honest and qualified council members. Only a few leftist politicians and IAF leaders, with whom the delegation met criticized the structure of the Amman elections.

## **Women**

A positive development in Jordan's municipal elections was the number of women who voted and were elected. According to figures released by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 49 percent of all voters were women. Furthermore, of the 25 female candidates who ran in municipalities around the country, ten were elected to municipal councils and one woman was elected mayor for the first time in Jordanian history. The mayor was elected in Wahadneh in the Ajloun governorate. (See Appendix M.) Notably, four of the elected women had been appointed by Princess Basma and the Jordanian National Committee for Women. Six of the elected women were members of the Women's Committees in their governorate. These Committees are non-governmental executing bodies that implement plans of action for women such as the National Strategy for Women in Jordan. Nevertheless, the absence of women at all levels of the administrative apparatus implementing the election was conspicuous. For example, only a handful of polling station committees had women members at all.

## **IAF Withdrawal from Election Process**

Allegations of intimidation and lack of fairness in registering IAF supporters led to an IAF boycott of elections in Sweileh, Salt and Ein Al-Basha. In the Islamist strongholds of Zarqa and nearby Russeifeh, NDI's team and news reports described the atmosphere as extremely tense. Prior to elections, allegations of intimidation of IAF supporters and the pre-mature campaigning conducted by the centrist pro-government bloc prior to July 3, served to aggravate the IAF to the point of filing a formal complaint. The IAF alleged that authorities harassed shop owners in Zarqa displaying IAF posters and banners by citing them for "health violations," in some instances even closing down stores. When the IAF bloc filed a complaint with the Zarqa governor, he refused to respond. Finally, they filed a complaint with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs in Amman, who ordered the governor to uphold the law. Again, the governor failed to act. Shortly thereafter, the official campaign period began. Neither the governor nor the parties that comprised the informal bloc were ever reprimanded. As of July 14, the IAF was still contemplating whether to file legal proceedings.

At 11:00 on election day, the IAF withdrew its candidates from the elections in Zarqa and Russeifeh in protest, accusing election officials of bussing in voters from a nearby military base to vote for the Government-backed National Bloc and of unduly stopping and delaying buses carrying IAF supporters to the polls. The IAF also claimed that police had been arresting supporters of the Islamic Bloc since the early morning and that their headquarter's telephone lines were cut off. The governor of Zarqa declared their withdrawal illegal since the law notes that candidate may only withdraw prior to election day. He announced that the elections would proceed and the IAF bloc's votes counted according to

procedure. Ultimately, the National Bloc's mayoral candidate in Zarqa received twice as many votes as the Islamic Bloc's mayoral candidate.

## VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Jordanians, through their elected representatives, are the best qualified and most appropriate persons to determine how to further the process of democratization initiated by His Majesty King Hussein. It may be useful to Jordanian decision-makers to consider the views of disinterested experts who bring a comparative perspective to the discussion of electoral democracy. With this in mind, NDI offers the following recommendations in hope of drawing Jordanian attention to a few noteworthy observations.

- (1) The Municipal Election law should be clarified at several points, particularly those sections dealing with extension of voting hours and the provision of security, so that they may be more uniformly applied.
- (2) Better, more uniform training of election officials is needed, both for the registration process and voting day.
- (3) Candidates and political parties should provide poll-watchers with more rigorous training of what voters' rights are and what is expected of them.
- (4) The government should reconsider the requirement that all government officials who wish to run for office must first resign permanently from their posts. This would allow educated individuals and those with administrative experience to take part in the electoral process. Perhaps it may be stipulated, as is the case in some other countries, that potential candidates step aside from official duties only temporarily, and that only those elected must forfeit their positions.
- (5) More attention needs to be paid to the secrecy of the ballot by (a) providing some sort of physical barrier to separate the voter from others in the room; (b) requiring that officials and poll-watchers at the voting site respect ballot secrecy; and (c) educating the public, through the mass media, about the importance of secret voting.
- (6) The issue of illiterate voters should be addressed while assuring secrecy of the ballot, perhaps by providing ballots with pre-printed names, photographs, symbols or colors.
- (7) The entire electoral process, including announcement of candidates and the campaign period, should be extended. This would not only provide voters with a reasonable amount of time to consider their alternatives; it would facilitate production of printed ballots.
- (8) A more effective and transparent adjudicating body (perhaps made up of judges) should be established to investigate complaints in campaigning and election procedure.
- (9) Subtle obstacles to women's free and uninhibited participation should be addressed, perhaps by prohibiting male members from entering polling places for women, by employing more women as election committee members, and by improving ballot secrecy for illiterate voters (as noted above).

- (10) Public confidence in the electoral process could be enhanced by electoral administrators more assiduously reaching out to the various political actors engaged in the process in order to satisfy them that the election is free and more transparent. While an independent electoral commission is generally considered to be preferable than to have a government department wholly responsible, it is possible that other less far-reaching confidence-building measures could be instituted.

## **APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**

**NDI Activities in Jordan 1993-1995**



## NDI ACTIVITIES IN JORDAN 1993-1995

NDI first visited Jordan in December 1993, after the government discouraged an NDI attempt to organize a study mission prior to the November parliamentary elections. The December 1993 survey team assessed the aftermath of the November 8, 1993 parliamentary elections and the prospects for democratic development. Despite peculiarities in the election law and irregularities in its implementation, the legalization of political parties a year earlier had rendered these elections more meaningful than the 1989 elections. Still there was a general consensus for a variety of reasons, that the electoral system ought to be re-examined. A number of party leaders and politicians expressed to NDI their hope that the law be refined before the next legislative elections, scheduled for 1997. Political researchers and journalists also indicated to the NDI team that they hoped to examine and distribute publications about the current electoral system and options for reform, and requested NDI's help in doing so.

In September 1994, NDI co-sponsored a conference on electoral trends worldwide with an independent thinktank, the New Jordan Research Center in Amman. This conference introduced a broad group of Jordanian academics, parliamentarians, journalists and government officials to NDI and its international network of experts. On April 10, 1995, the Minister of Interior, Salameh Hammad, announced to the press that a new parliamentary election law had been drafted -- although at this writing (September 1995) it has still not been made public or introduced in parliament yet. If the opportunity arises and interest remains, NDI is prepared to return to address parliamentary election issues when appropriate. In the meantime, NDI has continued to broaden its contacts in Jordan and seek new opportunities to support the process of democratization in Jordan.

In March 1995, senior NDI officials met with visiting Jordanian Foreign Minister Kabariti in Washington and discussed the regional importance of Jordan's democratic experiment. He noted that there were interesting lessons to learn from Jordan's inclusive electoral and parliamentary systems. In late March, the government announced municipal elections were to be held under a revised local election law on July 11.

NDI staff conducted a survey to Jordan in May 1995 to gather information on the preparations for the upcoming municipal elections and to assess the feasibility of organizing a small study mission to the elections. The Minister of Municipal Affairs, Nader Thuheirat, the Minister of the Interior, Salameh Hammad, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Karim Kabariti, as well as opposition members of parliament, academics, journalists, political party leaders and election administrators with whom NDI met, *all* encouraged NDI to return for the elections with a multi-national study mission. It was on the basis of this broad encouragement that it was decided to organize the small study mission to the municipal elections on July 11.

**APPENDIX B**

**List of Study Mission Participants**

**List of Participants**  
**Jordan Municipal Elections Study Mission**  
**July 7-13, 1995**

**Delegates**

Dr. Yahya Al-Ahdal  
Member of House of Representatives  
**YEMEN**

Mr. Khaled Al-Ali  
Secretary General  
Jenin Municipality  
**WEST BANK**

Mr. Ahmad Arqoub  
Member of Municipal Council  
El-Bireh  
**WEST BANK**

Mr. Nabil Al-Shergabi  
Public Relations  
Yemeni Institute for Democratic  
Development  
**YEMEN**

Ms. Ginka Kapitanova  
Mayor of Zlatograd  
**BULGARIA**

Ms. Amal Khreisha  
Director  
Palestinian Working Women's Union  
**WEST BANK**

Mr. Ahmad Al-Mughanni  
Member of Gaza Municipal Council  
**GAZA**

Mr. Hussein Mozannar  
Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs  
**LEBANON**

Mr. Ishaq Al-Natsheh  
Member of Hebron Municipal Council  
Hebron  
**WEST BANK**

**NDI Staff**

Mr. Khaled Elgindy  
Program Assistant  
**UNITED STATES**

Ms. Olga Milosavljevic  
Program Officer  
**UNITED STATES**

Mr. Wallace Rogers  
Field Representative  
**ESTONIA**

Ms. Margaret Zaknoen  
Field Representative  
**WEST BANK**

**APPENDIX C**

**Study Mission Terms of Reference**

## MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Yahia Al-Ahdal, Khaled Al-Ali, Ahmad Arqoub, Ginka Kapitanova, Amal Khreisha, Hussein Mozannar, Ishaq Al-Natshah, Ahmad Al-Mughanni and Nabil Al-Shergabi  
**FROM:** Olga Milosavljevic, Program Officer  
**DATE:** June 29, 1995  
**RE:** Terms of Reference: Jordanian Local Elections Study Mission

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### I. INTRODUCTION

Thank you for agreeing to participate in NDI's municipal elections study mission to Jordan, July 8 to 12, 1995. We are confident that your experience and perspective will add greatly to our program and we look forward to working with you in Jordan as well as in your own countries in the future.

This memorandum provides information about NDI's plans and objectives for this mission. Additionally, the briefing paper following this terms of reference provides you with an historical overview of Jordan and the remaining portions of the briefing book provide supplementary information on Jordan's economy, politics, political parties and constitution. The specific election related information is not complete as the candidate registration process and the campaign period has not yet begun. We will provide you will updated information upon your arrival.

NDI's objective in Jordan is to encourage the democratic opening initiated by King Hussein and support it by providing key decision-makers and independent think-tanks with information on reform issues. In this light, NDI co-sponsored a conference on electoral trends worldwide with the New Jordan Research Center(NJRC) in Amman last September. Electoral code experts from Britain, Egypt, France, Lebanon, Morocco and South Africa shared information regarding changing trends in their respective countries. It is with this background that NDI now turns its attention to Jordan's municipal elections with great interest.

### II. OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION

The purpose of this mission is threefold: 1) to observe the general electoral process [and the role of the political party pollwatchers]; 2) to share your experiences with the pollwatchers or other Jordanians on any questions they might raise; and 3) to produce a report describing what you observed and what you learned to NDI and your colleagues at home.

We hope that studying Jordan's municipal elections may provide you with information that will be useful in the political development of your own country. This mission will also better inform us about Jordanian politics and electoral administration in general. With your insights and our background work, NDI expects to produce a brief report describing the Jordanian municipal election process and assessing its contribution to the continued democratization of Jordanian political life.

Program Assistant Khaled Elgindy, who works on Middle East programs in Washington, will accompany us on this mission and facilitate our program. NDI Representative in Estonia, Wallace Rogers, will also join us. In Estonia, he is implementing a local government program and has served as both an elected and appointed local government official in the United States.

We will meet with representatives of the major government political parties, the Elections Commission, human rights groups, women's groups and the press, and others. These meetings, including those with journalists, are intended to help you gather information and different perspectives on the political process. You will receive a complete schedule of meetings when you arrive in Amman on July 7th.

After briefings in Amman, the delegation will be divided into teams and deployed to different municipalities in Jordan on July 10. Before the elections, each team will meet with local officials and community leaders. On election day, the teams will visit polling stations and counting centers in their respective municipalities. Following the counting and tabulation of results, the teams will reassemble in Amman to discuss what each team observed in their respective municipalities and to monitor press reports from around the country. That afternoon each delegate will be asked to write a 3-5 page report to NDI describing what he or she would do differently and why, what he or she thought was particularly successful in the process, and what they learned from the process.

In general, the program agenda and topics of discussion for specific meetings will be somewhat open-ended and flexible. Since the campaign period is from July 5 to 10, we will also have an opportunity to observe campaign activities such as rallies or candidate debates.

The Jordanians understand that we are visiting Jordan to learn about their electoral process and to study the Jordanian model - not to judge or criticize the Jordanian municipal election process and its institutions. The Foreign Minister (Abdul Karim Kabariti), the Interior Minister (Salameh Hammad) and the Minister of Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs (Nader Thuheirat) have all welcomed our study mission.

The small size of our delegation and the limited period of our visit in the country will prevent us from arriving at a comprehensive judgement about the elections. So, we will not issue a statement after the elections. Although you will likely be asked to pass judgement (especially by journalists) on the municipal elections, we would ask you to refrain. We hope that you agree with us that it would be inappropriate to do so and that you avoid making judgmental statements to Jordanian political actors and journalists.

### **III. BACKGROUND**

#### **A. Background to the Mission**

NDI first visited Jordan in December 1993, after the government discouraged an NDI attempt to organize a study mission to the November parliamentary elections. In September 1994, NDI co-sponsored a conference on electoral trends worldwide with an independent think-tank, the New Jordan Research Institute in Amman. This conference allowed NDI to further expand our contacts in Jordan and introduce a broad group of Jordanian academics, parliamentarians, journalists and government officials to NDI and its international network of political development experts. At the end of the conference, NDI was invited to return to conduct a similar discussion about the Jordanian election law which NDI agreed to do. A new parliamentary election law was just announced on April 10th by the Ministry of Interior, Salameh Hammad, but has not been made public or introduced in parliament yet. If the opportunity arises and interest remains, NDI may return to address parliamentary election issues when appropriate.

In late March, the government announced that municipal elections will be held on July 11. This will be the first time that elections for all of Jordan's municipal councils will be held on the same day, political parties will be allowed to present candidates and mayors will be directly elected.

#### **B. Current Political Situation in Jordan**

Since the November 1993 parliamentary elections, the dual concerns of normalization with Israel and improving the economy have complicated further democratization. The King has made several statements that indicate that democratization is not a priority at the moment. During the first half of 1995, there has been an increase in human rights violations and further infringements, direct or indirect, on freedom of expression.

Many Jordanians expected the peace treaty with Israel to bring both economic growth and further political liberalization. In fact, its effects have not yet been as dramatic or positive as many people anticipated. The economy continues to languish and political liberalization has been delayed. Over the last 18 months, human rights activists and parliamentarians have noted gradual constraints on freedom of expression. In 1995, rallies by Islamists and leftist opposition groups have been banned and their members arrested and held without charge. Government-controlled media have blacked out dissenting views. In early May, the government denied permission to an opposition request to hold a conference against normalization of relations with Israel. At the same time, several newspaper journalists expressing pro-government views that support normalization have been expelled from the Jordanian Journalists' Association and Writers' Association which oppose the normalization policy. The entrenchment of the pro and anti-normalization voices has further polarized political discourse in Jordan.

However, in this still highly polarized atmosphere, the government and King Hussein made a hopeful gesture in this increasingly difficult political landscape. In late March the government announced municipal elections on July 11 under a revised local election law that contains several notable changes.

### **C. Local Elections**

The upcoming local elections will be administered under the 1955 local election law which was revised by parliament earlier this year. Under the 1955 law, local councils were elected irregularly and at different times and parties were not allowed to field candidates. Under the old system, mayors were elected from among the council members, by the members themselves. Additionally, under the 1955 law the Amman council was appointed by the Prime Minister. The revised law provides for four significant changes: 1) mayors will be directly elected in all municipalities except for Amman; 2) political parties will be allowed to present candidates for the first time; 3) elections for all 260 municipal councils will be held on the same day; and 4) half of the 40-member Amman Council will be elected for the first time.

In September 1994, the government dissolved the local councils and replaced them with government appointed committees -- caretaker councils of sorts. In an interesting effort to encourage women's participation at the local council level, Princess Basma lobbied for and was able to secure the appointment of 79 women to the caretaker councils. The purpose of this effort is to provide a core group of women with exposure to and experience in local government. It is expected that this will increase their chances to be elected in the July 11 municipal elections.

While several journalists have printed articles that argue the upcoming elections will serve as a key popularity test for Islamists and leftists who are expected to exploit discontent among some parts of the electorate over the Kingdom's October 26 peace treaty with Israel, NDI's May mission to Jordan found little evidence of this. During NDI's visit, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) seemed to de-emphasize these elections to keep expectations low. Furthermore, academics, journalists and political party representatives told NDI's team that the campaigns would focus on the distribution of local services and refuted claims that this election would serve as a referendum on the peace treaty.

Also during NDI's May visit, NDI learned that the new directly elected mayor post will be vigorously contested in almost all the cities while there is some expectation that in numerous cities there may not be enough candidates for the Council seats. This may cause an interesting situation where a race that consists of four or five mayoral candidates results in a winning mayor that receive less than 50 percent of the vote because the vote is divided into four or five. At the same time, many cities may not be able to fill their council seats through the elections in which case NDI was told that the Minister for Municipal Affairs would appoint the remaining seats.



## D. Local Government

Jordan is divided into 12 governorates each of which consists of several provinces or districts. Elected municipal councils are established for towns of over 2,500 inhabitants and appointed village councils are established for towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants. On July 11, 259 municipalities will hold elections for council members and mayors. The councils vary in size from six to eleven members depending on the population of the municipality.

The mayor is a full-time position while the council members serve on a part-time basis. Council members receive five Jordanian Dinar (JD) for each council meeting they attend. Council members of governorate capitals receive 10 JD per council meeting. All elected positions are for four year terms.

As mentioned above, the local councils have the power to raise revenue via local taxes on property and businesses. Additionally, councils receive a portion of their budget from the national government. The NDI team also learned that most towns run a debt with the Bank of Towns and Development.

The role of the local council is to recommend a set of priorities to the Ministry of Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs in Amman. The Local Council Department of the Ministry reviews and approves all Council decisions in Amman, such as: municipal hiring; municipal employee salaries; building of roads; and constructing stop signs and speed bumps. NDI's team was unable to learn whether the newly elected councils and mayors will assume the same powers as the formerly appointed ones had or whether a new local government law is being or will be drafted.

In April, the Cabinet decided to appoint City Managers for Jordan's major cities -- the governorate capitals of Salt, Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun, Mafraq, Ma'an, Karak, Tafileh, Aqaba and Madaba as well as the district centers of Ramtha, Sama Rousan, Deir Abi Saeed, Deir Alla, Northern Shuneh and Southern Shuneh. This decision simply activated an inactive provision of the 1983 law on municipalities which called for the appointment of professional local administrators to implement Council decisions. These City Managers implement the priorities set by the Council and approved by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. They are appointed by the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and administrative governor. This appointment must be approved by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. As administrators who function above the political fray, the recently appointed City Managers will remain in their positions after the elections.

The decision to appoint City Managers under a 1983 law just two months prior to municipal elections drew some criticism. Critics argued that the city manager should be appointed by the newly *elected* Mayor, Deputy Mayor and administrative governor after the July 11 elections and not by the *appointed* care taker municipal mayors currently in power. Others contended that the appointments were intended to weaken the powers of the elected mayors. According to the Ministry of Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs, however,

the role of the City Manager is to reduce the workload of the mayors. In particular, the city managers are responsible for implementing Council decisions and preparing municipal budgets. The city managers can attend Council meetings but do not have the right to vote in the Council. Additionally, they are responsible for supervising municipal revenue collection.

#### **IV. JULY 11, 1995 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS**

The following section draws on information contained in the municipal election law as well as information gathered by an NDI team that visited Jordan in the middle of May. The team met with the Ministers of Municipal Affairs, Interior and Foreign Affairs as well as academics, journalists, political parties and election administrators. For more detail, please review the excerpts of the 1955 municipal election law (revised 1995) located in Tab 4 of this briefing book.

The Ministry of Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs supervises all 259 municipal elections. It is assisted by one Ministry employee in each of the 12 governorates who oversees the day to day preparations for all the municipal elections in the their governorate and reports to the Ministry in Amman. This governorate representative is assisted by the governor's office. The Amman office has an Operations Room which follows registration progress, tracks complaints and coordinates election administration throughout Jordan.

In the 259 council races, voters will elect council members on a simple majority basis. For example, in an eight person council, the top eight candidates receiving the most votes are elected to the council. Mayors will also be elected on a simple majority basis.

The Amman Council elections are unique and will be held under slightly different procedures than the other 259 council elections. Unlike the other municipal elections, the Amman Council elections are organized and supervised by the Prime Minister's office with the assistance of the Ministry of Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs. Additionally, Amman residents will only elect half of their 40-member council in 20 single member constituencies on a simple majority basis. The remaining half will be filled by government appointment. Amman residents will also not directly elect their mayor. He will also be appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by King Hussein.

##### **A. Registration Process**

Jordanians must register separately for local elections and for parliamentary elections. For the local elections Jordanians can register to vote in the district where they reside or in the district where they work. According to Article 12 of the election law, an individual must be at least 19 years old and prove that he or she has been a resident of the municipality for the last 12 months to register in that municipality. Residency may be demonstrated by showing a receipt from a local utility bill or a property tax receipt. To register voters show the election

officials their "family registration book." The book indicates the names of all the family's members who are eligible to vote. After each eligible voter registers, the family book is marked by the registration official.

Registration took place over a five week period from April 11 to May 15. From May 21 to 27, the lists were made public for voters to review and to submit corrections. The final list was published on June 24.

While some complaints have been filed with the Ministry of Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs, the Deputy Minister Rashdan Al-Rashdan and other ministry officials have consistently denied suggestions of irregularities and mismanagement. They point to the strong voter registration as a demonstration of the efficiency and fairness of the registration process. 780,623 of those eligible to vote (excluding Amman) registered to vote for the upcoming local elections. This is approximately 76% of all eligible voters. In Amman, 78% of eligible voters registered to vote. Additionally, they point to the registration review process outlined in Article 13 which allows each voter to review and confirm the lists and file an appeal to the Registration Committee if anyone's name does not belong on the list.

Newspapers have reported recurrent complaints that registration committees complicated the process unnecessarily and acted in an arbitrary manner. The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist deputies have filed complaints that religious conservatives were particularly singled out and hampered in the registration process. Some other complaints referred to citizens who registered their names in areas where they do not live and in other cases some people registered twice.

## **B. Candidates**

Candidates must register their candidacy between July 3 and 5 by submitting an application to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and paying a deposit of 50 JD. According to Articles 17 and 18, candidates may not be municipal employees, cannot have a criminal record and must be financially solvent. All candidates must be residents in the municipality in which they wish to serve.

There are two sets of criteria for candidacy -- one set for governorate capitals (big cities) and one for all other municipalities. To be a candidate for the municipal council or mayor of a governorate capital, one must have at least a university degree and be 25 years old. For all other municipalities, one must have at least a secondary school diploma and be 25 years old.

## **C. Campaign**

The official campaign period is from July 6 to 10. In May, the NDI team learned that candidates will predominately rely on word of mouth, party papers, candidate pamphlets and.

in a few instances, candidate debates, as a means of getting their message out to the voters. There will be no radio or television campaigning. The brief, five day, campaign period is likely to favor candidates from well-established parties or with a great deal of name recognition over new comers and independents.

Although councilors will be elected on a simple majority basis, many candidates will campaign as part of informal non-binding list. Even independent candidates told NDI's May mission that they would seek to join lists in order to increase their chances of winning. Tribal affiliation will play a large role in determining which list to appear on -- this tribal "star appeal" is a serious consideration. Nevertheless, voters may choose vote for any combination of candidates they wish and are not obligated to vote according to any given list.

Even though candidates will not formally announce their candidacy until early July and the campaign period does not begin until July 6, evidence of campaigning by some would-be candidates have already become apparent. As of mid June, signs of informal campaigns have emerged. Several potential candidates have sponsored "Get-Out-The-Vote" advertisements in national newspapers encouraging voters to go to the polls and vote on July 11. Their names/signatures appear prominently on the advertisements -- informally announcing their candidacy prior to the official campaign period.

#### **D. Election Day**

Most of the election day activities and procedures are described in Articles 20 to 26 of the municipal election law. On July 11, voters will elect council members as well as directly elect mayors for the first time. Each registered voter will vote for as many candidates as there are council seats in his or her council. For example, if a council has eight seats, a voter will vote for up to eight candidates. He or she may, however, also choose to vote for less than eight candidates.

Residents in Amman will vote in 20 single-member constituencies where each resident will vote to send one candidate from his or her constituency to the Council and the remaining 20 council seats will be filled by government appointment.

Articles 22 and 23 outline the voting process. On election day, each polling station will have a voting committee of three people respected within their community and one government official which will oversee the entire voting process. Additionally, parties and candidates are permitted to send pollwatchers to observe polling and a policeman must be present to keep order at the polling station. The voting committee chairman has the power to dismiss any party agent from the polling station if he or she behaves in a manner that may hinder the electoral process.

Article 22 stipulates that before the polling station opens, the chairman of the voting committee will open the ballot box in front of the rest of the committee and the pollwatchers

to assure all those present that the box is empty. He then closes and seals the box in front of all those present.

Each voting committee chairman receives one ballot box and an appropriate number of blank ballots. When a voter arrives at the polling station, he or she presents his or her identification card to the voting committee and then their name is checked against the registration list. Once their name is marked on the registration list, they are given one green and one white blank ballot that has been signed by the chairman of the polling station committee -- one ballot for mayoral races and one ballot for the council races. In each polling booth an alphabetical list of candidates will be posted. Each voter will write the name(s) of the candidate(s) he or she wishes to elect on their two blank ballots. (No names are printed on the ballot.) Illiterate voters may request that a member of the voting committee member assist him or her in casting his or her ballot (Article 23).

The Minister of Municipal Affairs announced that polling stations will be open from 8:00 to 18:00. Article 26 stipulates that at least 50% plus one of all registered voters for that district must have voted for the election to be valid. If less than 50% plus one all registered voters have voted by 18:00, the chairman of the voting committee will extend voting for four additional hours until 22:00 (Article 21). If by 22:00 50% plus one have still not voted he will reopen the station the next day, July 12, from 8:00 to 18:00. In this situation, the ballot boxes remain in the polling station overnight and are guarded by the polling station security personnel.

According to Article 23, when the polling station closes, the pollwatchers may remain in the polling station to monitor the voting committee's activities. The chairman of the committee along with the secretary prepare a tally sheet which documents the number of registered voters, the number of voters who voted, the number of ballots received by the polling station and the number of ballots left over and bring these tally sheets, along with the ballot box, to the district counting center where the ballots will be counted. Pollwatchers may accompany the chairman and the secretary as they transport the sealed ballot box to the counting center. At the counting center, the chairman and secretary receive a receipt which verifies that they delivered the ballot box to the counting center.

#### **E. Counting of the Ballots**

A counting committee of at least three people appointed by the "head of the elections" waits at the counting center to receive ballot boxes and must verify that the ballot box seal has not been broken and that tally sheets have been completed. The voting committee chairman and secretary obtain a voucher verifying the counting center's receipt of the ballot box and remaining materials. Party pollwatchers are permitted to remain in the counting center and observe the entire counting process.

According to Article 24, the counting committee prepares protocols documenting the

number of ballots in each box, the number of votes for each candidate and the number of spoiled ballots accompanied by explanations for how the ballots were spoiled. If, when counting the ballots, the committee finds a ballot in which the number of candidates listed exceeds the number of council seats for the council, the names will be counted in the order they are written. All those names listed beyond the number allowed will be disregarded.

After the results are announced, the ballot boxes and ballots are stored for six months during which period all election related disputes must be resolved.

#### **F. Amman -- a unique case**

As already described, council elections for Amman are being held under unique conditions. Only half of the council will be elected and residents will vote in 20 single-member constituencies. The candidate winning the most votes -- a plurality - will be awarded the seat. Furthermore, the residents of Amman will not directly elect their mayor, instead he will be appointed by the government and approved by King Hussein. Finally, the Prime Minister's office and the Governor of Amman will co-supervise the elections along with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs.

#### **G. Complaints Procedure**

According to Article 31, all complaints against the election outcome or administration should be filed with the local district court. After it investigates the charges filed, the court submits its verdict. The court's decision is final. If a court decides that some or all of an election is invalid then the Minister of Municipal Affairs announces a new election for that municipality.

### **V. IN JORDAN**

During your first few days in Jordan we will meet with political party representatives, election administrators, government officials, human rights activists, women's organizations, journalists and academics in order to gain a broad perspective of the political environment in Jordan in general and vis a vis these elections in particular. Since you will arrive during the campaign period which officially ends on July 10, we may also have an opportunity to attend candidate forums, debates or rallies prior to election day. On election day we will divide into two to three groups and spend the day visiting two to three different districts and polling stations within those districts. We will inform you of your deployment when you arrive in Amman.

Each group will meet with political party representatives, local election administrators and various other non-governmental groups in the district to which they travel. From these meetings we will gather information regarding the registration process, the campaign environment and learn about the candidates and the issues debated during the campaign. From

our own observations at the polling stations we will gain some knowledge regarding preparations for the elections and the training of the polling station committee people.

## **Your Role**

While we appreciate that you may not have yet held local elections in your own countries, we understand that each of you is engaged in considering issues of local government and local elections seriously and are contributing to your national debates regarding these issues. We hope that, based on your knowledge of municipal governing structures, you will enlarge the scope of our inquiry and help us gather information about the Jordanian local elections and Jordanian local government structures. We trust that what you observe in Jordan will help you in your deliberations at home in developing local government structures and conducting local elections.

Throughout your visit we ask you to note questions that arise and how they are answered. We would also ask you to consider elements of the Jordanian system that you feel are particularly positive and elements that you would change in your own national context and why you would change them. At the end of your visit we would like you to prepare a *three to five page report* to NDI describing your observations during your visit. We would also encourage you to share your observations with your communities and colleagues once you return to your countries.

During your visit we encourage you to ask questions about the local election law, local election procedures and campaigns as well as about local government structures in Jordan. Please do not hesitate to ask for clarification of any issues you do not understand. Attached you will find several suggestions of issues to think about and questions to resolve during our visit.

## ISSUES TO CONSIDER

### ELECTION PROCEDURE and ATMOSPHERE

- what motivates somebody to seek election to the Municipal Council?
- what is the relationship between the public, council representatives and mayors? (from the voter's perspective, from the candidate's perspective, from the appointed official's perspective)
- are candidates allowed inside the polling station during the elections?
- is campaigning allowed on July 10th, the day before the elections?
- who appoints the polling station committee members?
- under what circumstances may the polling station committee chairman dismiss a pollwatcher?
- is a voter's identification card marked when he or she receives a ballot to vote?
- how is the Ministry of Municipal Affairs in Amman notified of the results tabulated at each counting center? who transports the protocols and ballot boxes to Amman and how?
- what happens when two candidates for mayor or for the council receive the same number of votes?
- is the policeman assigned to the polling station permitted inside the polling booth? under what circumstances?
- are non-partisan or international pollwatchers permitted in the polling station?
- are party pollwatchers permitted to obtain a signed copy of the protocols?

### LOCAL GOVERNMENT POWERS

- what law governs local government? when was it written and by whom?
- what is the working relationship between council members, mayors and city managers?
- how are municipal budgets developed? by whom?
- how does the municipal assembly finance itself?
- what are the municipal council's responsibilities? trash collection, education, infrastructure maintenance, licensing, tax collection, zoning, playgrounds, etc.
- is the municipal assembly autonomous or semi-autonomous in its decision-making? is it required to obtain approval of its decisions from the governor or Ministry of Municipal Affairs?
- can cities develop their own charters (local government constitutions)?
- how does the municipality relate to the governorate? parliament? how can it influence policies in parliament?
- how does the municipality relate to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs?
- are new members provided with any type of manual or introduction to local government when elected?
- what is the significance of administering Amman's municipal elections under a different code?
- what impact did the short campaign period have? did some parties/candidates benefit over others?



**APPENDIX D**

**Schedule of Study Mission Meetings**

**Schedule of Meetings**  
**Jordan Municipal Elections Study Mission**  
**July 7-12, 1995**

**FRIDAY, JULY 7**

All Day Delegates arrive

18:30 - 20:30 Briefing in hotel: **Olga Milosavljevic, Khaled Elgindy, and Margaret Zaknoen**: Overview of study mission

**SATURDAY, JULY 8**

9:00 - 9:30 Briefing in hotel

9:30 - 10:30 **Hamadeh Faraneh**, *Al-Dustour* columnist and Amman municipal council candidate, at hotel

11:00 **Faris Juneidi**, Head of Local Council Department of Ministry of Municipal, Village and Environmental Affairs: Overview of local elections process

13:00 **Hamzeh Mansour, Bassam Al-Omoush and Muhammad Oweidah**, Islamic Action Front, party headquarters: Party preparations for elections

16:30 **Hani Hourani**, New Jordan Research Center: Overview of Jordanian politics and electoral process

19:00 **Musa Keilani**, Editor-in-Chief, *Al-Dustour*, at hotel

**SUNDAY, JULY 9**

10:00 Briefing with **Wallace Rogers**, NDI at hotel: Overview of Local Government Structures in the United States

11:00 **Tal'at Nawayseh**, Governor of Amman at Governor's office: Preparations for Amman elections

13:00 **Mamdouh Al-Abadi**, Mayor of Amman at Mayor's office

16:00 **Rami Khouri and Muhammad Masharqa**: Journalist roundtable at hotel

19:00 **Abdel-Hadi Al-Majali** and Al-'Ahd Party Political Committee: Party preparations for elections

20:30 Dinner with **Mayor Mamdouh Al-Abadi** at Kan Zaman

### **MONDAY, JULY 10**

10:00 **Hiam Kalimat**, Jordanian National Committee for Women, at Queen Alia Fund: Role of women in local elections

12:00 **Rashdan Rashdan**, Secretary General, Ministry of Municipal, Village and Environmental Affairs

16:00 **Jordanian Women's Union**, 88 Nablus Street, Jabal Al-Hussein: Role of women in local elections

### **TUESDAY, JULY 11**

#### **ELECTION DAY**

6:00 Deployment to **Amman, Madaba and Zarqa**

**AMMAN:** Olga Milosavljevic and Vera Nofal

**MADABA:** Nabil Al-Shergabi, Khaled Elgindy, Amal Khreisha, Hussein Mozannar, Ahmad Al-Mughanni, Ishaq Al-Natsheh, Wallace Rogers

**ZARQA:** Yahya Al-Ahdal, Khaled Al-Ali, Ahmad Arqoub, Ginka Kapitanova, Margaret Zaknoen

7:30 **Abdel-Saqour**, Governor of Amman's Office

8:30 Governor of Zarqa **Musleh Tarawneh**

13:00 **Rashdan Rashdan**, Secretary General, Ministry of Municipal Rural and Environmental Affairs in Amman

14:30 Governor of Madaba: **Abdel-Qader Al-Habahbah**

### **WEDNESDAY, JULY 12**

10:00 Post-Election Summary: Delegates discuss election day and study mission in general

12:00 **Toujan Faisal**, MP, at the Parliament Building

**APPENDIX E**

**Excerpts from the 1955 (Revised July 1994) Municipal Election Law**

Excerpts

From

**THE**  
**MUNICIPAL ELECTION LAW**  
**NO. 29**  
*1955 (Revised July 1994)*

**JORDAN**

T R A N S L A T I O N

**PART I**  
**RULES AND GENERAL DEFINITIONS**

**Name of Law and Effective Date**

**Article (1)**

The name of this law is The Municipal Law of 1955, and it is effective upon publication in the Official Gazette.

**Definition of Terms**

**Article (2)**

The following terms and sentences, which are written in this law, have their specified meanings unless the context indicates otherwise:

- 1) **The Minister:** The Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment Affairs, with regard to municipalities -- the exception being Greater Amman<sup>1</sup> whose Minister is the Prime Minister.
- 2) **The Administrative Officer (Prefect):** The District Administrative Officer, the Governor, or the county Manager of the Municipality within his/her jurisdiction except Greater Amman where the Prime Minister is the administration office.<sup>2</sup>
- 3) **The Council:** The Council refers to the Municipal Council, the Greater Amman City Council, or the Jerusalem City Council.<sup>3</sup> Each consists of a Mayor, and elected and appointed council members.
- 4) **The Mayor:** The mayor of the municipality, the mayor of Greater Amman, and the mayor of Jerusalem<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Literally the Trust of Greater Amman (*amanat 'amman al-kubra*).

<sup>2</sup>In the amendment of 1961, reference to the Trust of Jerusalem (*amanat al-quds*) was omitted and the Minister of Interior was changed to the Prime Minister in this sentence.

<sup>3</sup>Amended 1959.

<sup>4</sup>Amended 1959

- 5) **The Taxpayer:** A taxpayer is a person who pays taxes/fees to the Municipality under this or any other law.
- 6) **The Resident:**
- (a) A person is considered a resident of a house in which he boards, even if residency ceases temporarily and/or if the individual maintains a second residence. No person is considered to have terminated residency at a location due to a period of absence, as long as the individual has the freedom to return at any time and he/she can frequent the location whenever he/she desires.
  - (b) Residency may also be defined as the Municipality where a person's permanent place of employment is located, even if he/she boards outside the Municipality. An individual cannot exercise his/her right to vote in more than one Municipality.<sup>5</sup>

### **Definition of the Municipality**

#### **Article (3)**

- 2) . . . .
- (c) . . . The Cabinet determines the number of members to be seated on the Council of the Municipality of Greater Amman. Half of the Council's members are directly elected according to the rules [set out] by this law. The Cabinet divides the Greater Amman into electoral districts and determines the number of representatives to be elected in each. The second half of the Council is also appointed by the Cabinet, upon the recommendation of the [Prime] Minister.
  - (d) The Cabinet of Ministers is to appoint one of the Council members as Mayor of Greater Amman upon the recommendation of the [Prime] Minister.

#### **Article (4)**

- 4) . . . .
- (c) All Municipal Councils are elected in one day during the first half of July 1995, and after that every four years. If, in accordance with this law, the Municipal Council is dissolved before the end of its term, a caretaker committee is appointed for the remainder of the term if [this takes place] less than one year from the election. However, if more than one year is left before the new elections, the caretaker committee is then appointed for a period of three months during which it will be in

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<sup>5</sup>As amended in 1994

charge of organizing the election of a new council that would complete the mandate of the previous one.

- (d) Despite paragraph (c) and in order to guarantee the public interest and the integrity of the elections, it is the right of the Minister to postpone elections in one or more Municipalities for a period not to exceed six month ( . . . . ).

## **Districting**

### **Article (6)**

- 1) In accordance with paragraph (5) of this article, there will be a council called the Council of Greater Amman which will include the Council of the Capital, the municipalities and surrounding towns. Its borders and responsibilities will be [the same as those of] the Council of the Capital as well as the surrounding Municipalities and towns assigned to it  
.....
- 4) In accordance with paragraph (5) of this article, the Cabinet will determine the number of council members for Greater Amman. The Cabinet will also appoint a Caretaker Committee for a period of time to be determined by it and that should not exceed four years. If it is deemed impossible to elect a council during this period, the Cabinet will decide on prolonging the term of the caretaker committee until a new council is elected. This new term should not exceed four years. It is the responsibility of the Cabinet to appoint, from among the members of the caretaker committee, a chairman; and that of the Minister to agree on the appointment of one or more deputy-chairmen to be elected from among and by the committee. One or more of these representatives should fulfill the requirements of their position. Their pay and other remuneration will be decided by the committee [or council]. The committee is to set its own meeting agenda.
- 5) Based on the recommendations of the Prime Minister, The Cabinet determines the date and modalities for the creation of the Municipality of Greater Amman. The decision and procedure should also be communicated to the Municipalities and villages that will be incorporated [into Greater Amman]. The Cabinet is [responsible for] re-districting, according to the public interest, and for determining which Municipalities and villages will be incorporated [in the Municipality of Greater Amman].



**PART II**  
**COUNCIL ELECTIONS**

**Electoral Constituencies**

**Article (9)**

A Municipality is considered one electoral constituency, but the Minister is allowed, by publishing a decree in the Official Gazette, to combine electoral constituencies as he specifies. He determines the number of council members that will be elected in each of these districts.

**Municipal Elections Chairman**

**Article (10)**

- 1) Three months before the end of the council's term, the Minister is to begin to make the necessary arrangements for the election of the next council by appointing one chairman of the elections in each Municipality.
- 2) Each municipal elections chairman should appoint a registration committee(s) for the Municipality or any constituency in that area in order to register voters' names. Each committee should have at least three members. The municipal elections chairman shall designate one of the committee members or one governmental employee to be the registration committee chairman and one municipal employee to be the clerk. The municipal elections chairman authorizes the registration committee to prepare or assess the voter registry. The municipal elections chairman shall assign the date and venue for the registration committee to begin work, announcing this information in a clearly visible place in the City Hall building and in one of the local newspapers.
- 3) All expenditures for the election of council members should be paid for out of the Municipality's budget.

**Preparing the Voter Registry**

**Article (11)**

- 1) Each registration committee undertakes to prepare an alphabetically sorted voter registry which shall contain the names of the qualified voters (according to this law), and shall list the full name, age and residency of each voter. Only the "family book," which is issued from the Civil Affairs Office, should be used in registering eligible voters. The "family book" should be marked to indicate that the voter has already registered in the area or the constituency where the voter is a resident.

- 2) If the Municipality is divided into electoral constituencies, the registry should be arranged in alphabetical order by constituency.
- 3) If a constituent is listed in the registry in any way that enables voting in more than one constituency, he/she shall choose one constituency and inform the committee of his/her choice to delete his/her name from the registry.
- 4) After preparing or revising the voter registry, it shall be posted in an easily accessible public place and it shall be published in the Official Gazette.

### **Voter Qualifications**

#### **Article (12)**

- 1) Every person has the right to list his/her name in the voter registry if he/she meets the following qualifications and conditions:
  - (a) He/she should be Jordanian (male or female), at least 19 years old;
  - (b) He/she must be a regular resident of the Municipality for at least twelve months prior to date of preparation and revision of the voter registry;
  - (c) He/she should have paid real estate tax, education tax, manual labor license fee, waste collecting fee or any other Municipal taxes or fees in his/her Municipality that do not equal less than one Dinar yearly (if he/she is a tax payer); and,
  - (d) He/she is not insane or declared legally incompetent.
- 2) If any person who is listed in the voter registry ceases to meet any of the above mentioned conditions or qualifications before the voting day, his/her name should be removed from the voter registry.

### **Provisions for Objections to the Voter Registry**

#### **Article (13)**

- 1) Any person may contest the voter registry within seven days from the date of its publication, by asking to list his/her name or to cross out the name of others, through a written objection submitted to the registration committee chairman.
- 2) The registration committee should come to a decision regarding the objection within a week from the date of the last day of the objection period, either in the presence or absence of the objector and the objected against. This is after they are notified by the committee about the place and the date of the hearing of the objection. This notification should be at the same place where the voter registry was posted and announced, twenty four hours prior to the day of the hearing.

- 3) The decision of the registration committee is to be made by a simple majority vote. In case of a tie, the chairman's vote is the decisive vote.
- 4) If the name of a person is included in the voter registry as a result of his/her objection, any other voter, who is listed in that registry, has the right to object to this registration within forty eight hours from the last day of the objection hearing period.

### **Appealing the Committee's Decision**

#### **Article (14)**

- 1) The objector or the objected against may appeal the decision of the registration committee to the Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the Municipality, within a week of the date that the registration committee issued its decision. The appellee will be in the Appeals List of the voter registration committee if the appellant is asked to put his/her name in the registry, or if the objected against was asked to remove his/her name from the registry, or if the objected against if the appellant was objecting against him/her.
- 2) The appellee should be given a copy of the Appeal List within three days from the date of submitting the appeal, either by delivering it to him/her personally or to his/her last known residence. Informing the committee will be done by informing its chairman or his/her official office.
- 3) The Court's Chief Judge considers the appeal briefs and comes to a decision within a week from the date of filing the appeal. The decision of the court is final and the voter registration committee should be informed. The voter registry remains as is or is amended according to court's decision.

### **Signing the Voter Registry**

#### **Article (15)**

- 1) Following the application of the procedures mentioned in the previous two articles, the registration committee chairman signs every page of the registry, making it final.
- 2) After the application of all the procedures mentioned in the previous paragraph, if the registry is not signed by the registration committee chairman for any reason, the municipal elections chairman is permitted to sign in his stead.
- 3) When the registry is final, the municipal elections chairman informs the Minister.

## **Nomination Period And Voting Date**

### **Article (16)**

The Minister specifies a period for registering one's candidacy and a date for voting, and informs the Prefect who should, five days prior to the period of candidate registration, announce them to the public at the City Hall building or any other place, or by any other mean.

## **Registering to Be a Candidate**

### **Article (17)**

- 1) Candidacy for Mayor and Council is filed by submitting the candidacy application form, (which the Minister assigns to the municipal elections chairman), within the period mentioned in Article 16 of this Law, signed according to the rules and attached with receipts which prove that the candidate has paid the municipal accountant a deposit of 50 Dinar.
- 2) The candidate is allowed to withdraw from running before the appointed day for voting by informing the municipal elections chairman in writing.
- 3) The mayor's duties and rights, including his/her salary, bonus, rewards, annual leave, procedures, penalties, and prohibited affairs, should be subject to a regulation that will be issued for this matter.

## **Qualifications for Candidacy**

### **Article (18)**

- 1) Every person who is a registered voter is entitled to run and be elected mayor or a member of a Municipal Council subject to the following qualifications:
  - (a) That he/she be at least 25 years old;
  - (b) That he/she be able to read and write;
  - (c) A candidate for mayor for the governorate capital should have at least an undergraduate degree, a high school diploma (or its equivalent) for [a candidate for] the district capital, or [simply] be literate for the other municipalities in the Kingdom;
  - (d) He/she should not be a governmental, or municipal employee, or a lawyer for the Municipality unless he/she resigns ten days prior to the day of running;
  - (e) He/she has not been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor that calls into question his/her honesty;
  - (f) He/she should not be bankrupt by fraud;

- (g) He/she should not be a mayor or a member of another municipal council or a candidate in another electoral constituency;
  - (h) He/she should reside within the municipal boundaries and have paid all the municipality's required taxes and fees; and,
  - (i) He/she must comply to all the procedures mentioned in Article (17) of this Law.
- 2) If the mayor or any member of the municipal council fails to meet or ceases to meet one of the qualifications mentioned in Section (1) of this Article after the elections, the Minister should issue a decree that he/she has lost his/her position in the council.

### **Refund of Deposit**

#### **Article (19)**

- 1) The candidate's deposit, paid according to Section (1) of Article (17), will be refunded if he/she is elected as council member or mayor.
- 2) If a candidate dies before the election day, the deposit should be returned to the inheritance trustee or to the inheritors.

### **Winning Unopposed**

#### **Article (20)**

If the candidate registration period has ended and the number of the candidates did not exceed the number of the members that is required for the council, the municipal elections chairman announces that they won unopposed. The municipal elections chairman should send a written report to the Minister showing their names and addresses. The results should be published in the Official Gazette. (These rules apply also for mayoral elections).

### **Declaring Candidates' Names, Locations of Polling Center, and Duration of Voting Period**

#### **Article (21)**

- 1) If after the end of the candidate registration period, the number of candidates for mayor and council exceeds the number of seats, the municipal elections chairman determines the location(s) of the polling stations, the time polling begins and ends (the period is not to be less than ten hours) and the time of closing the ballot boxes.
- 2) The municipal elections chairman is allowed, in exceptional cases, to extend the voting period by not more than four hours, if he/she thinks it is necessary.

## **The Polling Station Committee**

### **Article (22)**

- 1) The municipal elections chairman appoints a polling committee for every polling station: comprised of one government employee, and at least three voters. He appoints one of them chairman, and one clerk. This committee will supervise and administer the voting process, after taking a public oath of honesty and confidentiality. This oath is made by every member of the committee and should take place before the municipal elections chairman and in the presence of all or some of the candidates.
- 2) If there was between the candidate and the polling station committee chairman a known enmity, family relationship, or political affiliation that might have an influence on their work, or if the polling station committee chairman has been convicted of a counterfeit crime by a court, then any candidate has the right to object to the appointment of the polling station committee chairman or to request his/her replacement before taking the oath. The decision of the municipal elections chairman of whether to accept or reject the objection is final.
- 3) The polling station committee chairman should be provided with one or more polling boxes (the Minister approved model), two copies of the voter registry, and a sufficient number of ballots. (the Minister approved forms).

## **The Voting Process**

### **Article (23)**

- 1) Only the polling station committee, the candidate or one representative with a written proxy, a number of policemen to maintain order in the polling station, and [any] person the municipal elections chairman delegates to supervise the voting process are allowed to remain in the polling station. The polling station committee chairman has the right to dismiss from the polling station any candidate or candidate's representative if he/she finds that the candidate or the candidate's representative hinders the voting process or the order.
- 2) Before voting begins, the polling station committee chairman opens the ballot boxes and shows them to everyone in the polling station to assure that they are empty, then closes them and seals them in front of all those present. He/she should sign on the boxes with the members of the polling committee. This process should make it impossible to open the boxes without breaking the seal and tearing the signatures.
- 3) The mayor and the council members are elected at the same time, on separate ballots. The voting is performed as follows: the voter enters the polling station, then his/her name is

marked on the voter registry after presenting identification, and he/she receives two ballots that are signed by the polling station committee chairman. The voter writes the names of persons that he/she wants to elect to be mayor and council members, then in front of those who are present, puts the two ballots, separately, in the box that is prepared for each ballot, in the presence of the other voters and election officials.

- 4) If the voter is illiterate or unable to write for any other reason, the voter has the right to choose one of the polling committee members to write the names that the voter dictates in the presence of the polling station committee chairman.
- 5) When voting is over, the polling station committee chairman closes the ballot boxes, and seals their slots. The chairman and the other committee members should sign the ballot boxes in the presence of all those who are present in the polling station. Then the polling station committee chairman delivers them to the municipal elections chairman with a report. This report should be prepared by the chairman and the members of the polling station committee and should show: the number of registered voters on the registry, the number of people who voted, that the voting process was performed according to the Law -- with the mention of any violation (if one occurred during voting and how it was dealt with). A marked copy of the voter registry should also be attached to the report.

### **Ballot Counting**

#### **Article (24)**

- 1) The municipal elections chairman appoints a counting committee(s) of not less than three people including its chairman, to count the ballots and determine how many votes each candidate received. The counting committee receives one or more of the boxes that were filled with ballots. The members of counting committee, in front of the municipal elections chairman, swear to their honesty in carrying out this task.
- 2) The counting committee carries out its work at the place assigned by the municipal elections chairman. This committee shows the people present every box before opening it to assure the seals were not broken. The candidates or their representatives are allowed to observe the counting process.
- 3) The counting committee opens the box(es) and removes the ballots, then the counting committee chairman announces them publicly, and registers them under the names of the candidates. The word "publicly" means that every candidate has the right to look at the ballots during the tally.
- 4) A ballot should be disregarded if it was not signed by the polling station committee chairman, if the names were illegible, or if the voter's signature or any [other] identifying mark appears on the ballot.

- 5) If the names of candidates written on the ballot exceed the required number, only the required number should be counted starting from the first name according to the order shown on the ballot. The remaining names should be disregarded as should duplicate names.
- 6) The decision of the municipal elections chairman concerning any ballot is final.
- 7) The counting committee should prepare a report that shows the number of ballots in each box that the committee has opened, the numbers of votes that every candidate won and the number of disregarded ballots with the reasons for disregard. This report along with all ballots, should be delivered to the municipal elections chairman.

### **Announcing Election Results**

#### **Article (25)**

- 1) The municipal elections chairman announces the name of the candidate who won the mayoral race and the names of candidates who won seats on the council (by winning more votes than the other candidates). He should inform the Minister by a report that also shows the number of voters who participated in the election, the number of votes that every candidate won and the numbers of disregarded ballots with the reasons they were disregarded. The result of the elections should be published in the Official Gazette, and the Minister should give the winners certificates.
- 2) In the case of a tie, the candidates or their representatives, under the supervision of the municipal elections chairman, should draw (cast) lots by any means agreed upon between them.
- 3) Filing Election Papers: All ballots, committee minutes, and marked voter registries should be packed and sealed in a way that makes it impossible to open them without breaking the seal. Then all these election papers should be kept at the Administrative Officer's Office until the end of the legal period for appeal and the finalization of any appeal. Then the election papers can be disposed off.

### **Voting Quorum**

#### **Article (26)**

For an election to be valid, 50 percent plus one of all registered voters must have voted. If this does not happen during the set voting period, then boxes should be closed, sealed, and kept under guard until the next morning and voting continues for another ten hours. At this point, the results of the election are final irrespective of the number of voters who voted.



## **Article (27)**

With cabinet approval, the Minister has the right to appoint two additional members to every Municipal council. These two members shall have the same rights as the elected members.

## **Election Violations**

### **Article (28)**

Any person who has committed any of the following acts shall be punished, upon conviction, by either a fine of an amount not exceeding twenty Dinar; and/or incarceration for a period not exceeding three months:

- 1) Intentionally made a false statement in any document he/she submitted in regard to the voter registry. Intended to enter or omit a name to or from this registry by any means that breaks this Law.
- 2) Falsified, altered, mangled, hid, ruined or stole the voter registry, a ballot or any other document, which relates to the election process with the intention to change the result of the election or to cause a re-election.
- 3) Put in the ballot box or submitted to the polling station committee chairman a falsified or destroyed ballot or candidacy paper.
- 4) Disturbed the freedom of the elections or its procedural order by using force or threat.
- 5) Interfered with the election officials or its committee members or stole, destroyed or opened a ballot box without being legally authorized to do so.
- 6) Participated in voting knowing that his/her name is not listed or illegally listed in the voter registry.
- 7) Used his/her right to vote more than once or impersonated another or a fictitious personality in order to vote.
- 8) Used force, violence, fraud, or threat of material or emotional harm, kidnaping, detaining (directly or by complicity) in order to force a voter to participate in or abstain from the election or compel an individual to vote or abstain from voting for any person(s). No individual may avenge a voter because he/she has committed one of these acts.
- 9) Used any means of compelling or enticing a person to commit any crime punishable by this Law.

- 10) Gave, lent, donated, or presented money of any kind to a voter (directly or by accomplice, before or during the election), promised employment or salary to a voter, or compelled or enticed a voter with any kind of service. Helped or promised a voter to obtain any of the above mentioned things.
- 11) Accepted or agreed to accept any offer, promise, bribe, or reward listed in the previous paragraph, directly or via an accomplice in exchange for a vote or withholding a vote in exchange for inciting any other person to do so.
- 12) Revealed the secrecy of the vote after having taken an oath.
- 13) Published or announced before or during the election false declarations about the behavior or morals of a candidate with the intention of effecting the results of the election.
- 14) Entered a voting station or counting station or the municipal elections chairman's office carrying a weapon and acting belligerent, against the orders of the municipal elections chairman or the polling station committee chairman or the counting committee chairman.
- 15) Printed or published in any media, aiming to publicize the election without publishing the title, and names of the printer and publisher on the first page.

### **Denial of the Right to Vote**

#### **Article (29)**

Any person convicted of any of the crimes mentioned in Article (28) of this law does not have the right to list his/her name in the voter registry for the period that the court assigns in the verdict. This period should not be less than four years and not more than eight years. If the convicted is a mayor or a member of the municipal council, he/she remains in position, as needed, effective from the date that the court decision is final.

### **Filing Claims**

#### **Article (30)**

Any claim regarding the crimes mentioned in Article 28 of this Law should be raised either by the prosecuting authority or by a complaint from one of the voters of the candidates within fifteen days from the date of publishing the election result in the Official Gazette.

## **Contesting the Election**

### **Article (31)**

- 1) Every voter, within fifteen days from announcing the result of the election has the right to file a claim in the trial court located within the Municipality's jurisdiction. The claim may be of the following:
  - (a) To contest the legitimacy of the election of the mayor or any member of the municipal council, and confirm the election of someone else to be the mayor or a member, as needed. The court is authorized to order recounting of the ballots through a committee appointed by the court to investigate the legitimacy of the election; or,
  - (b) To annul some or all the election process due to a violation to this Law that may influence the election result.
- 2) A mayor or member whose election is being contested, is considered an adversary in litigation, in accordance with section (1) of this Article.
- 3) The court investigates the contested claim after informing the parties and hears evidence and witnesses that are submitted to the court or requested by the court. The court takes all the procedures that it feels are necessary to be satisfied with the reason of the claim. The court decides either to reject or accept the claim. The court may cancel the election of the contested party and confirm someone else's mayoral or council election. The court is authorized to annul all or some of the election results in any constituency. The court's decision, according to this section, is final. The Minister should be informed, and the decision should be published in the Official Gazette.
- 4) If the court's decision, that is made according to section (3) of this Article, annuls some or all the election process, the Minister should assign a date for a re-election, according to this Law. The voter registry that has been used in the first election should also be used in the re-election.

## **Rendering Duties to the New Council**

### **Article (32)**

- 1) The mayor and the council members receive their positions and start their work immediately after the end of the former council session.
- 2) Any new member who replaces another member for any reason, assumes membership when the mayor receives notification from the Minister.

**Article (33)**

In case of annulment of the election of the mayor or of a council member for any reason, all the municipal council's actions taken before such annulment are [still] considered legal and valid.

**APPENDIX F**

**Formal Complaint Letter Filed by the IAF to the Government on July 8, 1995  
(Original and English Translation)**

سيادة الشريف زيد بن شاكر رئيس الوزراء المكرم  
معالي نائب رئيس الوزراء وزير التربية والتعليم المحترم  
معالي رئيس مجلس النواب المحترم  
معالي وزير الشؤون البلدية والقروية والبيئة المحترم  
معالي وزير الداخلية المحترم  
سعادة رئيس لجنة الحريات العامة المحترم

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته وبعد ...

فان كثيرا من اصحاب المحلات التجارية في الزرقاء يتعرضون لضغوط كبيرة من قبل المسؤولين بسبب تعليقهم صورا ومنشورات الدعاية الانتخابية لكتلة العمل الاسلامي حيث تم اغلاق بعض المحلات بحجة عدم استيفاء الشروط الصحية وتم توجيه مخالفات صحية للبعض الآخر وتم تهديد آخرين مما دفعهم لانزال تلك الصور وذلك لتلافي العقوبات غير القانونية التي يتم ايقاعها عليهم لصالح الكتلة الوطنية التي اصبحت على كل لسان انها كتلة مدعومة من قبل الحكومة (!!)

اتنا اذ نؤمن بالتنافس الشريف فاتنا ندعوكم لاجراءات سريعة لايقاف كل من يتجاوز على القانون ويستغل سلطته ويسئ استخدام المسؤولية . بانتظار ردكم واجراءاتكم .

واقبلوا الاحترام

كتلة نواب جبهة العمل الاسلامي



In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

10 Safar, 1416 A.H.

8 July, 1995

Mr. Zayd Bin Shaker, the Honorable Prime Minister  
His Excellency, the Respectable Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education  
His Excellency, the Respectable Speaker of the Parliament  
His Excellency, the Respectable Minister of Municipal and Village Affairs and the Environment  
His Excellency, the Respectable Minister of the Interior  
The Respectable, President of the Committee on General Freedoms

Peace be unto you. . .

Many business owners in Zarqa are exposed to massive pressures by [government] authorities for hanging campaign posters and placards of the Islamic Action Bloc. Some [of these] stores were closed under the allegation of not meeting health standards. Some others were given health violations, while others still were threatened to remove these posters in order to avoid the illegal punishments which [will] fall upon them. This is [done] in the interests of the National Bloc which everyone [knows] is a bloc supported by the government (!!).

Whereas we believe in honest competition, we call on you to undertake speedy actions to stop the encroachment upon the law, and that which exploits its authority and misuses its responsibility. In anticipation of your response and action.

Respectfully,

The Islamic Action Front Parliamentary Bloc

## **APPENDIX G**

### **Examples of Campaign Materials**



Al-Dustour  
July 8, 1995  
(Campaign Ad)

"The best I can offer you.  
At your service  
Your Candidate, Mahmoud Al-'Assaf  
For Amman City Council..."

أجمل ما يمكن أن أقدمه لك؟



التزم بخدعتك

المهندس محمود الحساف

مرشحكم لمجلس أمانة عمان الكبرى

منطقة تلاح العلي وأم السماق وخلفه

"O ye who believe! Believe in God and be with those who are truthful." [Qur'an]  
Islamic Action Front - Zarqa'



( يا أيها الذين آمنوا اتقوا الله  
ومجاهدوا مع الصادقين )

كتبة



العمل الإسلامي

لانتخابات بلدية الزرقاء ١٩٩٥



الشيخ ياسر العمري  
رئيساً



الأستاذ ممدوح الحسين



السيد عبد الجباري الزواهره



الشيخ صالح مطيع الشيشاني



المهندس عبدالله عبيات



الحامي عايش العفراوي



المهندس نسيب سليمان الطراوي



المهندس جمال عوده مصطفى



السيد محمد عثله الغوييري



المهندس طارق ابو محفوظ

والله ولي التوفيق

Al-Sabil  
 July 10, 1995  
 (Electoral Announcement)

Islamic Action Bloc  
 Amman City Council Elections

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

ان اريد الا اصلاح و ما استطعت  
 ■■■ البيان الانتخابي ■■■  
 كتلة العمل الاسلامي



الانتخابات لمجلس امانة عمان الكبرى

وبل جثاويه من خلال تعيين الجهاز الانتخابي  
 ٩- العمل على ايجاد مكتب موجه لخدمة المواطنين  
 خدمات الامة لتسهيل الحاجات مساندة المواطنين  
 ١٠- ايجاد مقاعد اجتماعية في المناطق والمجلس نور  
 الخدمات القائمة  
 ١١- تخصيص جداول خاصة بالنساء والاطفال  
 وتجهيزها بالخدمات المناسبة والمراسم  
 ١٢- التمسك بالمشقة الاولى داخل عمان وساطحة  
 الجان ووضع اى اى الف العامة للسيارات  
 ١٣- استكمال شعبة المعلومات نقل واستقبال البيانات  
 من المناطق والامانة وتابعة القضاة الجروحة  
 ١٤- ايجاد مطبخ في مناطق محافظة عمان لحل  
 مشقة الانتخابات في مطيرة سكان  
 ١٥- توزيع المستندات بحسب الدوائر الانتخابية

الخطيرة من حياة امتنا موجهة الاستجابة اليهودي  
 والتخريب مع العدو القاسم لقد ارتكبا جرمين هذه  
 الانتخابات التوتوت في وجه هذه الامة عبر هذا التوتوت  
 العبر عن ضمير اهل عمان الكرام الذين لم يتلقوا في اجابهم  
 بعد، وتبين ان شبه الله التي اعمال الجرائد جثاويه  
 عمان السابقة التي قدمت مشورة بهذه البنية البرزخية  
 العنبر عن القضاة، وتبين ان الله على تحقيق ما  
 عليه


الا وهو العظيم الكرام  
 السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته  
 لقد استقبلنا المواطنين الذين تقدموا بطلبات الترشح  
 واجراءه ضمن الضمانات عليه، الا ان القضاة كانت في  
 استجابة الجرائد امانة عمان الكبرى من هذا القانون  
 وتعيين جثاويه خاصة لتتولى تعيين نصف اعضاء  
 المجلس والذين، وكان من المصلحة ان يتقدموا مستجوبين  
 الوافدين في طية من المصلحة وتكاتف مجلس كامل بيزر  
 حول منتهم  
 وما زاد الطين بلة ان الاعضاء المنتخبين قد تم  
 فوزهم على مشيرون منطقة الانتخابية تتخلف كل منها  
 عسما واصفا للقطعة من خلال تخصيص غير عادل لم برامج  
 منير القضاة السابقة في هذه المناطق  
 ولم هذا القانون الجان الذي بات في هذه الامة



الشيخ محمد خالد الشاوي




الاستاذ ايوب مصطفى طهيس



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى




الاستاذ موسى اوحيى



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى



الاستاذ موسى اوحيى

مجلس عمان الكبرى  
 ١٩٩٥  
 بيان الانتخابي  
 كتلة العمل الاسلامي

Al-Dustour  
July 8, 1995  
(Campaign Ad)

“YES! ... to Dr. Muhammad Abdallah Abu-Hudaib for Amman City Council...  
(Signed) Your friend: Sha'lan Al-'Awwad”

نعم...؟



الدكتور  
محمد عبدالله أبو هديب

مجلس أمانة عمان الكبرى  
منطقة تلاع العلي وأم السماق وخذدا

الله  
و .. على بركة

صديقك المهندس شعلان العواد

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
« واعتصموا بحبل الله جميعاً ولا تفرقوا » صدق الله العظيم  
انتخبوا كتلة الوحدة الوطنية/لب  
عبدالقادر الهروط (رئيساً)  
الاعضاء  
١. عطاالله سليمان القطيش  
٢. خلف عبدالله الهروط  
٣. عبدالرحيم سليمان ابوقعاود  
٤. محمد حسين القطيش  
٥. طارق حمدي الحديثات  
٦. عبدالرحمن سلامه الهروط

(Front)

(Back)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
كتلة التضامن  
الرئيس : نايف ابوناب  
الاعضاء  
١. برجس حدادين  
٢. عدنان التهمري  
٣. صالح المهدود  
٤. تيممدير التميمي  
٥. حسين ابوزرعي  
٦. نوفل ابوجوده

اسم المناخب خليفة سليمان التميمي  
الرقم الانتخابي ١٧  
مركز الاقتراع المنطقة  
رقم الصفحة ١  
هاتف رقم ٢٢

Samples of Candidate Slates Given out on Election Day

**APPENDIX H**

**“Municipal Elections Demonstrate People’s Support for Peace Agreement”**

*Al-Dustur*

**July 13, 1995**

“Municipal Elections Demonstrate People’s Support for Peace Agreement”  
“The Opposition Lost... and the Direction [is] Toward Moderation and Pragmatism”

## قراءات وكالات الأنباء العالمية بنتائج الانتخابات الانتخابات البلدية أظهرت تأييد الشعب لمعاهدة السلام المعارضة خسرت.. والتوجه نحو الاعتدال والواقعية

يتزعمها المسلمون والتي تعهدت بمواصلة العمل ضد اتفاقية السلام وتطبيع العلاقات مع إسرائيل. وجاء في التحليل أيضا ان ايا من الاحزاب الاحدى والعشرين التي اسست قبل ثلاث سنوات لم تحقق اي نجاح في الانتخابات البلدية. أما وكالة انباء فرانس برس فقالت ان المسلمين تعرضوا لضربة قاسية في الانتخابات البلدية العامة اذ لم يفوزوا الا بخمسة في المئة من المجالس الـ ٢٥٩ مجلسا بلديا في كافة أنحاء البلاد. وفي المحافظات الاحدى عشرة الكبرى باستثناء عمان لم يحظ المسلمون الا بثلاثة مقاعد. وتضيف ان المسلمين كانوا يتوقعون الفوز بعشرين بالمئة من اصل مجموع البلديات في المملكة، بعد ان وضعت كامل ثقلها في الانتخابات وخاصة في الزرقاء التي كانت تعتبر معقلها الرئيسي. وقالت فرانس برس انه على الرغم من انتقاد جبهة العمل الإسلامي للحكومة، فان مرشحها الفائز بمنصب رئيس بلدية الكرك اشاد في تصريحات للمتلفزيون الأردني مساء الثلاثاء بفزائه الانتخابات البلدية. وأشارت وسائل الاعلام وكالات الأنباء العالمية الى فوز اول امرأة أردنية برئاسة برناسة مجلس بلدي وانتخاب عدد من النساء عضوات في البلديات، ورأت في ذلك مؤشرا على تحول في النظرة الاجتماعية لدى الشعب الأردني، وانجازا كبيرا للمرأة الأردنية، التي تسعى لتعزيز دورها ومشاركتها في بنساء الأردن الحديث، وفي المرحلة الحالية من التحول الاقليمي في المنطقة كلها.

عمان - الدستور: ابدت وسائل الاعلام العالمية اهتماما كبيرا بنتائج الانتخابات البلدية الشاملة التي جرت في المملكة امس الاول واوردت تحليلات لنتائجها على كل المستويات السياسية والاجتماعية.

ورأت وكالة رويتر في تقرير لها حول الانتخابات ان النتائج اظهرت ان جبهة العمل الإسلامي الواسعة النفوذ في الأردن والمعارضة للسلام فقدت الكثير من نفوذها في المدن الرئيسية، ومنيت بعد ان التقت بثقلها وراء الانتخابات المحلية الاولى منذ توقيع الاردن على معاهدة السلام مع اسرائيل بهزيمة كبيرة في معقلها التقليدي في الزرقاء لصالح كتلة وطنية كانت منافسهم الوحيد. وتضيف رويتر ان الجبهة انسحبت من انتخابات الزرقاء قبل ساعة من اغلاق صناديق الاقتراع ووجهت اللوم الى الحكومة لما وصفته بالتدخل لمساندة الكتلة الوطنية. غير ان الحكومة رفضت مزاعم الجبهة واتهمتها بمحاولة تشويه التجربة الديمقراطية في الأردن، وأوضحت ان باستطاعة الجبهة اللجوء الى القضاء اذا كان لديها ما تشكو منه.

وحسب نتائج الفرز الاولى فان مرشحي الجبهة فازوا بمناصب رؤساء المجالس المحلية في الكرك ومادبا واربد واربع بلدات صغيرة اخرى.

وتضيف رويتر في تحليلها ان النتائج اظهرت تأييد الشعب للسلام مع اسرائيل وتوجهاته نحو الاعتدال والواقعية في الانتخابات التي تعتبر مقياسا لمدى قدرة المعارضة التي

**APPENDIX I**

**Campaign Ad Illustrating Members of the Same Family on a Candidate List**



Al-Sabil  
July 10, 1995  
(Campaign Ad)

Unity and Brotherhood Bloc  
Municipal Elections - 'Ain Al-Basha

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ  
﴿ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَكُونُوا مَعَ الصَّادِقِينَ ﴾

تم بعون الله تشكبل  
**كتلة الوحدة والأخاء**  
لانتخابات بلدية عين الباشا  
على النحو التالي:

**جمال الواكد الفاعوري / رئيساً**

				
هاني يوسف الفاعوري	صالح عقيلان الباز	جعفر قاسم الفاعوري	الحامي رائق محمد الحموري	
				
المهندس أحمد اسماعيل الوحيدي	حيران محمود حمادة	عبد العزيز ابورواع	علي زيدان الفاعوري	محمد اسماعيل الجاغوب

Members of Candidate Slate

Mayoral Candidate (upper left): Jamal Al-Fa'uri  
(top row - l to r): Hani Al-Fa'uri, Saleh Al-Baz, Jafar Al-Fa'uri, Raaq Al-Hamuri  
(2nd row - l to r): Ahmed Al-Wahidi, Hairan Hamada, Abdel-Aziz Abu-Rawa,  
Ali Al-Fa'uri, Mohamed Al-Jaqhoub

**APPENDIX J**

**“Jordan’s Tribalist Triumph and 15th Century Spain”**

*Al-Dustur*

**July 25, 1995**

The View from Fourth Circle

By Rami G. Khouri

# Jordan's tribalist triumph and 15th century Spain

THE CONVINCING victory by tribalist political forces in the municipal elections earlier this month was not particularly surprising, but it is very important. The ongoing tribalisation of our political system raises profound yet sensitive questions about the character of Jordanian individual and national identity, and the manner in which Jordan will deal with its key national challenges in the immediate future.

The municipal elections, though portrayed as a triumph of democratic modernisation, were almost exactly the opposite: They were a particularly dramatic example of how the essentially Anglo-Saxon, secular concepts of democratic modernisation were soundly absorbed into the more powerful, indigenous Jordanian/Arab/Islamic/Semitic political governance traditions that are defined primarily by tribalism, but also by religion, monarchy, in a cultural and political clash between the old world and the new, the new world took a particularly brutal beating.

I believe it is unfair to judge this process in a qualitative manner, to label tribalism as something politically good, bad or neutral. Tribalism is the dominant fact of our human and social environment, in the same manner that semiaridity is a fact of our climate and hospitality is a fact of our social culture. The important need is to understand what tribalism means for our political and national future, to manage the tribalisation of Jordanian national political culture in a manner that serves the best interests of Jordan and the majority of Jordanians, and to attempt to build on the strengths of tribal identity in a manner that can lead us to those national and individual goals that we all know and work for.

The reasons for the neo-tribalist triumph are pretty obvious, in Jordan and elsewhere in this region, and they include: the slow deterioration of the capacity of the modern state to assure the basic human needs of all its citizens; the general political failure of Islamist politics and other modern, urban, mass ideologies; the need to feel secure in a proven, indigenous identity system in order to make the transition to a new Middle East in which Israeli-American interests are — at least in the short term — among the most critical criteria of public decision-making; and the need to reassert our authentic cultural values as the most — perhaps the only — credible antidote to the powerful stream of political, commercial, social and strategic predatory forces coming at us from the West.

Tribalism offers pride, dignity, and — when linked to public power — it also offers jobs, telephones, and university seats. Tribalism never vanished from Jordan, but in the past half a century it has been temporarily hidden underneath a series of forces that tried to capture the imagination of the Jordanian individual and of society as a whole — forces such as pan-Arabism, Islamism, Jordanian nationalism, Palestinian radicalism, consumerism, materialistic urbanism, and others. All of these forces remain valid, but none has been able single-handedly to replace tribalism as the primary identity of most Jordanians.

In this respect, we should heed the words of one of our leading political figures, Mr. Abdul Hadi Majali, who commented with his usual frankness and clarity after the municipal elections: "There is nothing wrong with tribalism. This is Jordan and not Switzerland."

I agree with Mr. Majali's descriptive affirmation of our tribal soul, but I would like to hear him and others of his stature and leadership qualities address the deeper, longer term implications of our Jordanian rather than Swiss attributes. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with tribalism. But, I would argue, the question is not about whether tribalism is right or wrong (see paragraphs three through five above); the question is: Does tribalism offer a satisfactory, effective governance system for Jordanians in the closing years of the 20th century?

My answer to that is: perhaps, but only if we summon the composure, truth and diligence required to modernise political tribalism in order for it to meet the needs of a society that suffers relatively high rates of poverty, unemployment and underemployment, that is nearly 65 per cent urban, that still relies heavily on external financial support, and which — in the very same week that the municipal elections were held — saw more than half of all its secondary school students fail their examinations.

Tribalism has defined our culture and lands for approximately the past 12,000 years, ever since people started living in small seasonal camps or hamlets some 10,000 BC. The compelling need to assure the physical, social and mental well-being of settled communities, especially in a semi-arid environment, saw tribalism emerge as the most appropriate form of social organisation, which in turn gave rise to patriarchal forms of communal governance, decision-making and political responsibility. The fact that tribalism has endured for so long is testament to its continued relevance to the majority of people in our region. The reassertion of tribalism is not a sign of Jordanian stupidity, but rather a sign of Jordanian gut intelligence about the best way to survive — in the short term, at least.

It is not clear that tribalism in its present form can endure as the predominant social and political attribute of our culture for a few more millennia, given the pressures of meeting basic human needs in an urbanised, consumer, cash and wage labour economy. Tribalism was very effective or decades after the 1920s, for example, when the population of Jordan did not exceed several hundred thousand people. Can it continue to work well in Jordan in, say, ten years' time, when our population will be around seven million people, and pressures on our water, employment, agriculture and other key sectors are likely to have increased proportionately. Probably not, I suspect, therefore, that tribalism, like Islamism and our experiment years ago with the National Consultative Council, should be seen as natural, indigenous yet purely transitional political phenomenon.

The interaction between the modern state and tribalism

is highly complex, as we can recall from, say, 13th century England, 6th century Spain, late 18th century France and 19th century America. Our experience in political transformation and modernisation in Jordan is an important case to watch because — unlike those examples just mentioned — we seem to be trying to replace our indigenous, ancient and very deeply rooted tribal traditions with modern, superficial and imported concepts of Western-style political modernism.

England, Spain, France and the United States largely succeeded in their national endeavours because they took the time required to formulate their own brands of modern political governance systems, based on their own cultures and social traditions. I suspect that the neo-tribalist municipal electoral triumph in Jordan is a signal from the soul and the grassroots of Jordan that most people would like to see a slightly slower pace of political change, and that new, modern Jordanian forms of political organisation should be more carefully tailored to indigenous cultural traits.

The signs are rather clear, if we care to see them. Between them, the tribalists and the Islamists probably accounted for over 90 per cent of all votes. Most political parties stayed away from the elections, fielded only a few candidates, or — most amazing of all, including Mr. Majali's powerful Al Abd Party — ran their candidates in the elections but did not identify them as party candidates. I find the latter rather intriguing.

What is this creature we are witnessing, is it democracy, or is it tribalism? Or is it a new form of political culture that we are developing, in which the apparent public attributes of democratic pluralism are actually secondary to the real power of hidden tribal affiliation and credibility?

It will be important not only to identify this new phenomenon, but also to track it as it moves along into the next millennium and attempts to address those many human and national needs on a nationwide scale that its many predecessors have not successfully met. Given our urban demographic deployment and our many economic needs, tribalism will be deeply challenged now to meet the test of incumbency that the Islamists have so far failed to provide all the people with telephones, clean water, jobs, education, quality health care and affordable food, among other things.

Tribalists have always been done it on a local tribal scale, and they have also done it on a national scale when population size and needs were both relatively manageable, and external financial support was strong. They have never faced a test such as this: to govern nationally and locally, and to respond to people's needs in a relatively tight domestic economic and social needs situation, coupled with external fiscal flows and social needs situation, coupled with external fiscal flows that are firm for now but are likely to decline in the years to come.

This is tribalism's greatest triumph, but also its greatest political test.

**APPENDIX K**

**Permission Letters to Enter Polling Centers  
(Originals and English Translations)**

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM  
OF JORDAN  
Ministry of Municipal & Rural  
Affairs & The Environment  
AMMAN



المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية  
وزارة الشؤون البلدية والقروية والبيئة  
عمان


الرقم ..... ١٥٦٥٩ / ١٨١٠  
التاريخ .....  
الموافق ..... ١٩٩٥ / ٧ / ١٠

السادة رؤساء الانتخاب لمناطق البلديات

ارجو اتخاذ الاجراء اللازم كل ضمن منطقته الانتخابية بالسماح للصحفي السيد .. هاله ..! الجبيري..... بدخول مركز الاقتراع الذي تحدونه له للاطلاع على سير عملية الاقتراع على ان لا يتجاوز بقاؤه في المركز المعين مدة تزيد على خمسة عشرة دقيقة الا اذا رأيتم خلاف ذلك واذا تبين لرئيس لجنة الاقتراع ان المذكور اعلاه يعرقل الانتخاب او يخل بالنظام ان يصدر امرا باخراجه من مركز الاقتراع فورا على ان يقتصر هذا السماح لدخول مركز الاقتراع.

واقبلوا الاحترام،،

ناصر الظهيريات  
وزير الشؤون البلدية والقروية والبيئة



In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan**  
**Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, and the Environment**  
**Amman**

No.: A/18/15659

Date: 7/10/1995

To the chairmen of elections committees in the municipalities

I request to make the required procedure, within everyone's electoral region, to allow the journalist Mr..... to enter the polling center that you assign to watch the electoral process for not more than 15 minutes, unless you otherwise see fit. If he interferes with the election process or disrupts order, the chairman of the elections committee, has the right to issue an order to remove him from the center immediately. This permission is [to be used] solely for entering the balloting center.

Respectfully,

Nader Al-Thuheirat  
Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment

[Official Stamp]

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM  
OF JORDAN

Ministry of Interior

Capital Governorate  
AMMAN



المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية

وزارة الداخلية

محافظة العاصمة

عمان

f. No.: .....

ate: .....

الرقم: ١٢/٣ / ٤٦٤٦

التاريخ: ١٩٩٥/٧/١٦

الموافق: .....

السيد مدير قضاء

السيد

ارفق طيا صوره عن كتاب معالي وزير الشؤون البلديه والقرويه والبيئه رقم

أ/١٨/١٥٦٥٩ تاريخ ١٠/٧/٩٩٥ والمتضمن السماح للصحفي السيده اولفا ميلوس -

سافليفيش دخول مركز الاقتراع

ارجو العمل بمضمونه .

واقبلوا الاحترام

محافظة العاصمة  
طلعت النوايسه

ري

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan**  
**Ministry of the Interior**  
**Governorate of the Capital**  
**Amman**

No.: 3/12/21646  
Date: 7/11/1995

To the District Director:

Enclosed is a copy of the Document of His Excellency the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment number A/18/15659 on the date of 7/10/1995 and includes permission for the journalist Olga Milosavljevic entry into the polling center.

Please refer to it.

Respectfully,

[signature]

Governor of the Capital  
Talaat Nawayseh

ry



**APPENDIX L**

**Thuheirat: Municipal Council Elections**

*Al-Dustur*

**July 14, 1995**

**(Original and English Excerpt)**



**Al-Dustour**  
July 14, 1995

**“Thuheirat: Municipal Council Elections are a Continuation on the Path of the Hashemites and Their Firm Belief in the Principle of *Shura*”**

“Jordan On Its Democratic Path, As Set Forth By The Leader Of The Nation Has Become a Unique Example of Responsible Freedom”

...

[Excerpt: Last two paragraphs]

Mr. Thuheirat said that the percentage of the Islamic Movement's success in the election is 3.8%: 33 persons won membership in councils and 3 won mayoral seats in Irbid, Madaba, and Karak. The Islamic movement's success in winning 1.8% of the mayoral positions proves the integrity of the election process beyond question. Mr. Thuheirat indicated that the delegation of National Democratic Institute, Washington, and the delegation of the Palestinian Authority both attested to the integrity of the elections and praised the Jordanian efforts.

Mr. Thuheirat said, regarding the low voter percentage in the capital, that people who refrained from voting may have their own opinions, but voting is a national duty and citizens should vote.

**APPENDIX M**

**Articles on First Woman to be Elected Mayor in Jordan**

*Jordan Times*

**July 13-14, 1995 and July 30, 1995**

# 'Iman Futeimat victory marks another first in women's struggle for political representation'

By Rana Hussein  
Special to the Jordan Times

KHIRBET AL WAHADNEH - Iman Futeimat's victory in Ajloun Tuesday, followed by Hayat Farhan Maqboul's victory in Hashimiyeh town of Maan after the final vote counting on Wednesday, brought two women to mayoral seats for the first time in the Kingdom's history.

Ms. Futeimat's victory in Khirbet Al Wahadneh, a municipality in Ajloun, has put an end to male monopoly over the mayoralty and demonstrated the women voters' determination, especially in the predominantly conservative areas, to represent themselves on the political and social levels.

Her Royal Highness Princess Basma, contacted Ms. Futeimat to congratulate her on becoming the first woman to be declared a mayor, the Jordan News Agency, Petra, reported Tuesday.

Princess Basma said that Ms. Futeimat's success reflected the Jordanian citizen's trust in women and added that the win will further encourage Ms. Futeimat's efforts to better serve the country.

Coming from the town of Khirbet Al Wahadneh (population 5,000) in Ajloun, Ms. Futeimat's sweeping victory over five other candidates, was seen by many, including herself, as the start of a new phase of events in Jordan.

Ms. Futeimat dominated the other five candidates by almost 200 votes, obtaining 514 and topping candidate Mahmoud, Shuqairat who netted 370 votes.

Other candidates Zaki Basma won 361 votes, Radwan Gazouh 244, and Mohammad Tournab received only 50 votes.

"It is a great feeling which I cannot quite describe. It is wonderful to have won the elections and to be able to work for the people," Ms. Futeimat told the Jordan Times Wednesday.

Ms. Futeimat is 27-years-old, holds a degree in physical education from Ajloun Community College, and has taught at a school in Ajloun. She is from the predominantly conservative village where she was elected, and was fully supported by her family during the campaign.

Ms. Futeimat's mother, Karma, said she was proud of what her daughter had accomplished.

"I appreciate the hard work and consistency which led my daughter to her success," said the 56-year-old woman.

Mohammad Futeimat, Ms. Futeimat's uncle and campaign manager said, "I am an open-minded person, and I encouraged Iman to run for the position because I believed that she should do it."

"I was hoping to break with certain conventions in my bid for the seat, Ms. Futeimat said."

She stressed, however, that this victory was no retribution against tribalism or traditions value, but rather a response to the need for fresh ideas which was starting to assert itself strongly. "The rules of religion and tradition will continue to apply in harmony with our views for the benefit of our community in general," Ms. Futeimat said.

"I was intent on applying the rules of democracy which provides women with a role in the society, and I was fortunate to receive the full support of my family and the majority of the people in my town," she said.

Ms. Futeimat denied it was easy all the way, pointing

out that there were some objections to her running by conservative thinkers. But she said she felt she had been able to prove her abilities and had gathered even the support of those who opposed her candidacy towards the end of the campaign.

In addition, Ms. Futeimat said she sensed a powerful show of support from women in her village "because of their ever-growing awareness in the rural community."

"We have a large group of educated and conscientious women who supported me all the way and their turn-out was very visible, Ms. Futeimat stated.

Ms Futeimat, one of nine siblings, cited women's lack of participation in public work as one of the main issues she and other women were hoping to address.

"In most municipalities, doors are always closed to women, and they are not given the same opportunities as men," she said, stressing that she will concentrate on involving more women in public service.

One area she hopes to ameliorate is the public service sector in her areas. Ms. Futeimat said health and social services in Khirbet Al-Wahadneh were deteriorating partly because of the increasing population.

Ms. Futeimat's position will be further enhanced, when she begins serving her four-year term, by her team of six council members who were elected unanimously by acclamation.

Radwan Gazouh, one of the six members to serve in the municipality, said that one of the main reasons Ms. Futeimat won the mayoral seat was because of the support of women and the youth in their area.

"We supported her from



Iman Futeimat

the beginning and dedicated our efforts to changing common perceptions on women running for elections," Mr. Gazouh said.

The number of registered voters in Khirbet Al-Wahadneh was 1,639, out of which 64 per cent actually voted. Registered female voters outnumbered the registered men voters. Fifty-nine per cent of the vote for Ms. Futeimat was cast by female voters.

Zuleikha Abu Risbeh, a well-known writer and women's activist, reacted to the victories of Ms. Futeimat and Ms. Maqboul saying: "The Jordanian society has begun to change towards women. There is an internal move which is going hand in

had with an international move concerning women's issues and the victory of two women in Jordan's municipal elections is a notable change in the eyes of the society. In my opinion, such a victory is more important than a woman winning a seat in parliament because winning a popular election in one of Jordan's municipalities establishes a solid base of support for that candidate and will reflect in the continuum of the democratic march in the country."

Ms. Futeimat said: "My victory is not for me but for all women in this society. I may have started on this new road, but other women are certain to follow."

## Election result in Wahadneh proves success of women's movement, says Princess Basma

WAHADNEH (Petra) — Her Royal Highness Princess Basma Saturday said that the July 11 municipal elections were the embodiment of democracy, and the election of the first woman mayor in Jordan opens a new page in the country's history by highlighting Jordanian women's successes.

Addressing a public rally attended by Iman Futeimat, the first woman mayor of Wahadneh, and deputies from the Irbid Governorate, the Princess said she was proud of the men and women of that town for electing the first woman mayor in the country, and she urged them to unite in their efforts to improve municipal services, construction and development.

For her part Ms. Futeimat pledged that the municipal council members will exert their utmost efforts towards serving the town's residents and announced that the main street in the town will be named after Princess Basma in recognition of her efforts to promote the status of Jordanian women and for opening the local communi-

ty centre.


Later Princess Basma attended a meeting by the municipal council which discussed several projects to be carried out. She pointed out the need for cooperation with the local community and the concerned government departments to ensure the success of these endeavours.

The Princess laid the foundation stone for the youth club which is being built by the Ministry of Youth and announced a donation of JD 5,000 to the project from the Queen Alia Fund for Social Development (QAF).

Princess Basma formally inaugurated the community centre, the 45th to be set up by QAF in Jordan.

The centre will offer social services to the local community, mainly benefiting women and children, with a special wing accommodating 80 children and sections for training women in typing and dress-making.

The Princess examined the centre's various activities and met with the governing council to discuss plans and programmes.



Her Royal Highness Princess Basma Saturday lays the foundation stone for the youth club in Wahadneh, which is being built by the Ministry of Youth (Petra photo)