

COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoy Federatsii*

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is the main successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Still, the KPRF should be viewed as a new and separate organization from the one that ruled the Soviet Union for more than 70 years, if only because many of the circumstances under which the CPSU ruled the Soviet Union cannot be recreated. At the same time, the KPRF should also be understood as more traditionally communist than its East European and Baltic counterparts. In sharp distinction to these parties, the KPRF was formed from the conservative wing of the CPSU. More reformist elements of the CPSU left the party to form other political parties and were never members of the KPRF.

After the Soviet Union collapsed and the CPSU was banned, Russian communists dispersed among dozens of new organizations and fronts. Leaders of the KPRF began to focus on establishing their party as the single successor to the CPSU in Russia. By the time the KPRF held its first Soviet congress in March 1993, most analysts proclaimed it to be the largest and best organized communist party in Russia. At this congress, Gennadii Zyuganov was elected party chairman.

After the "October events" of 1993 in which the KPRF opposed President Yeltsin in his standoff with the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin banned the KPRF. Weeks before the registration deadline for the 1993 December parliamentary elections, Yeltsin revoked his ban. The KPRF was the only communist group to participate in 1993 elections. Drawing on its organizational strength, the KPRF won 12.4 percent of the vote.

In the State Duma, the KPRF formed a faction of about 47 deputies (32 of which were gained though the party list). The KPRF has emerged as one of the most disciplined, most organized factions in the State Duma. In alliance with the Agrarian Party of Russia, and Vladimir Zhrinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the KPRF could usually block reformist legislation and could often pass its own legislative initiatives.

Through 1994 and 1995, the KPRF has strengthened its regional organizations and managed to elect many of its candidates to regional and local Dumas. Most recently, the KPRF won 90 percent of the seats in local elections in Volgograd in early October. Many have interpreted this victory as a preliminary sign of KPRF strength going into the upcoming elections.

Program

The KPRF does not want simply to slow or stop reforms, it urges the restitution of many features of Russia's communist past. The party has attempted to exhibit a continuity with the CPSU both in its slogans, which call for a return to socialism, and in its symbol of the hammer and sickle. It has also included two of the major August 1991 coup plotters on its party list.

However, the KPRF is not the re-incarnation of the pre-Gorbachev CPSU. According to its leadership, two major points distinguish the Communist Party of the Russian Federation from its Brezhnev-era predecessor. The party accepts the concept of constitutionally based pluralism and acknowledges the right of other parties to compete for power. The Russian Communist Party seeks to achieve power through elections, and not through revolution. In rejecting the idea of a one-party state, however, KPRF leaders do hint at the prospect that their party may become the "vanguard" party among many -- a first among equals. The KPRF has also advocated the return of the Soviet system of government. Additionally, the party's program allows for radical change, and it calls for altering the Russian constitution so that it is more in accord "with the national interests of Russia"

The KPRF's acceptance of private property represents the second point. The party emphasizes that private property can co-exist with communal and state property. Still, the KPRF is adamantly opposed to the government's current course of privatization. The party vows to stop privatization altogether, and then undo "illegal" privatization upon coming to power. Recently, the KPRF faction in the State Duma unsuccessfully promoted legislation to nationalize some enterprises.

The KPRF advocates greater state support for enterprise production, higher minimum wages and pensions, a comprehensive state welfare system, and stronger state regulation of the market.

The KPRF stands firmly for the re-creation of the USSR, and polls show that voters believe that the KPRF is the party most likely to achieve this goal. Under Zyuganov's leadership, the KPRF has become increasingly nationalistic, dedicated to restoring Russia as a "great power." With these goals, KPRF leaders hope to divert votes from Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Campaign

Polls indicate that the KPRF enjoys one of the most stable and loyal electoral bases of any party in Russia. This support comprises frustrated, impoverished and nostalgic pensioners. Recent polls reveal that voters over age 55 constitute more than 50 percent of the KPRF's typical supporters. Since 30 to 35 million of Russia's population are pensioners, two-thirds of which are expected to vote, the KPRF is expected to clear the five percent threshold on their support alone. Also, of those who voted for the Communist Party in 1993, 66 percent state that they plan to vote for the Communist Party again.

The KPRF has reached out to other groups as well. They have reactivated the Komsomol (the communist youth wing); tried to strengthen their ties with women's groups; and even courted businessmen who might benefit from a "stable" future under KPRF leadership. The party has purposely tried to represent all walks of life (from astronauts to teachers to bankers) on its 270-candidate federal list.

The KPRF views the parliamentary elections as the first part of a two-step process to assume power. The second step is winning the presidency in 1996. KPRF leaders hope the

parliamentary elections will place the Communist Party at the head of an opposition coalition and position Zyuganov as the communist opposition's main presidential candidate. To do this, the KPRF must fare better than both Nikolai Ryzhkov's bloc, Power to the People, and Aleksandr Lebed's bloc, Congress of Russian Communities.

To get out the vote in December, the KPRF will rely mainly on its highly developed network of regional party organizations rather than high-production television commercials. With an estimated membership of 500,000, the KPRF is a nationwide political party. Zyuganov has emphasized the importance of door-to-door canvassing as a major campaign technique. As such, the KPRF campaign may be less visible to the Moscow-based observer than other more centralized campaigns undertaken by other parties.

The party's organizational strength is already evident. In late September, the KPRF became the first electoral bloc to gather the necessary 200,000 signatures to put its name on the ballot and to officially begin its canvassing campaign. Most other blocs were unable to collect the requisite number signatures until mid-October. Also, unlike most other blocs, the KPRF did not have to rely on paying for signature collection.

Throughout the campaign Zyuganov has spoken about negotiations with the bloc Congress of Russian Communities. KPRF and the Congress of Russian Communities have reportedly already informally agreed to coordinate single-mandate candidacies in the regions. More serious cooperation between the two blocs is likely to occur in the form of a loose coalition in the next Duma. Cooperation is also possible, depending on the election results, in selecting a single presidential candidate.

Entering the campaign period, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is viewed as the clear front-runner -- consistently placing first in public opinion polls throughout the fall. Many polls have even predicted that the KPRF and their rural allies, the Agrarian Party, will be able to control a majority of seats in the State Duma. KPRF leaders have stated that they will "improve their position dramatically" and receive at least 20 percent of the vote. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation registered 163 single-mandate candidates with the CEC in September.

Leaders

Gennadii Zyuganov: State Duma Deputy; leader of parliamentary faction and chairman of the KPRF; former leader of the National Salvation Front; former Central Committee member of the CPSU.

Svetlana Goryacheva: Deputy Chair of the KPRF; Deputy Procurator of Vladivostok; former Deputy Chair of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies; leader of the Communist women's movement.

Amangeldy Tuleev: Deputy to the Soviet of the Federation; chairman of Kemerovo Oblast's Legislative Assembly; candidate for president of Russia in June 1991 (placed fourth with 6.8 percent of the vote); RSFSR People's Deputy (1990-1993).

Other federal list candidates include: **Valentin Chikin** (Chief Editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*); **Yurii Masliukov** (economist); **Valentin Kuptsov** (Chief of Staff of KPRF Parliamentary faction); **Anatolii Leonov** (State Duma Deputy); **Valerii Tarasov** (painter); **Yurii Ivanov** (State Duma Deputy); **Aleksei Podberezkin** (Chairman of the "Spiritual Legacy" Movement); **Nikolai Saveliev** (consultant to the KPRF parliamentary faction) and **Valerii Vorotnikov** (head of the Agency of Economic Security "VZOR").

Agrarian Party of Russia ***Avgrarnaya Partiya Rossii***

The Agrarian Party of Russia was formed in 1993 from the "Agrarian Union," a faction in the Russian Supreme Soviet. The Agrarian Union, which represents the interests of the heads of former collective and state farms, and the Agrarian trade union later joined the party with a number of other agricultural organizations. After October 1993, when it was unclear whether the Communist Party would be able to run candidates in the December elections, the Agrarian Party also served as a more moderate vehicle for communist candidates.

The Agrarian Party performed surprisingly well in the December 1993 elections. The party collected more than 500,000 signatures during the registration period -- more than any other party. The party received 7.99 percent of the party list vote (21 deputies) and won 38 single-mandate contests -- more than any other group.

As a representative of its constituents' interests, the Agrarian Party has been one of the most effective factions in the State Duma. First, Agrarian faction member Ivan Rybkin was elected Speaker of the State Duma. (Rybkin was eventually expelled from the leadership of the party). The faction's legislative agenda consisted of blocking real land privatization and increasing government subsidies to the agricultural sector. The faction achieved its first objective by joining forces with the Communist Party to block the government's agricultural reform plans. The Agrarians have also negotiated additional backing for state and collective farms in return for its support of the 1994 and 1995 budgets. Despite having two of its leaders serving in the government, the faction firmly opposes most government initiatives.

Program

The Agrarian Party's campaign program mirrors its legislative agenda -- government support for collective and state-run agriculture and rejection of the free trade of land. More generally, the party strongly supports government intervention in the economy. On political and foreign policy issues, the party's program closely resembles that of its ally, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Campaign

The Agrarian Party's base of voters is well defined: the administrators and workers employed in the agro-industrial complex. Geographically, these voters live in Russia's rural regions. The party will rely on the collective farm directors, upon whom agricultural workers are economically dependent, to get out the vote in December. (In 1993, entire collective farms voted for the Agrarian Party.)

As in 1993, the Agrarian Party will run roughly 167 single-mandate candidates in rural districts. They have reportedly coordinated their candidates with those of the Communist Party so that Agrarian Party candidates run in rural districts and Communist Party candidates compete in urban districts.

As the only major electoral bloc appealing solely to rural voters, the Agrarian party has a good chance of again crossing the 5 percent threshold. It will have to compete mainly against rural-based candidates of Our Home Is Russia and Democratic Choice of Russia.

Leaders

Mikhail Lapshin: Leader of the parliamentary faction "Agrarian Party" in the State Duma; former chairman of a collective farm.

Aleksandr Nazarchuk: Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation.

Vasilii Starodubtsev. Deputy of the Federation Council from Tula; chairman of the Agrarian Union of Russia; chairman of a collective farm in the Tula region; former member of the Extraordinary State Committee in August 1991 (leaders of the coup against Gorbachev).

The party's federal list also includes: **Aleksandr Davydov**, **Aleksandr Zaveryukha** (Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government), **Vladimir Akatyev**, **Aleksandr Belashov**, **Nikolai Sukhoi**, **Anatolii Vorontsov**, **Andrei Popov**, **Mikhail Trunov** and **Vladimir Isakov**.

Congress of Russian Communities *Kongress Russkikh Obshchin*

The Congress of Russian Communities was founded in March 1993 and has recently emerged as a major political bloc under the leadership of Yurii Skokov, chairman of the Federation of Commodity Manufacturers; Aleksandr Lebed, general and former commander of the Fourteenth Army in Moldova; and Sergei Glazyev, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia. Originally formed as a coalition of organizations representing Russian communities living outside of the Russian Federation, its initial mandate was to pressure the Russian government into defending the interests of the some 25 million Russians in the "near abroad." Under the leadership of its founder, Dmitrii Rogozin, the Congress gradually widened its platform to become a more moderate nationalist group.

The Congress of Russian Communities grew considerably more influential when Yurii Skokov joined and became chairman. Skokov, an ambitious and influential insider in Russian politics, immediately sought to make the Congress a political vehicle of nationwide significance. He achieved this new status when he convinced General Aleksandr Lebed to join.

Sergei Glazyev joined the Congress more as an individual than as the former chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia. Glazyev's major contribution to the bloc is his reputation as one of the most respected and professional economists among the opposition.

The bloc's greatest electoral asset, however, is General Aleksandr Lebed, arguably the most popular political figure in Russia today. Lebed gained initial public notoriety by bringing peace to the war-torn Transdneistr Republic in Moldova. Among his troops, Lebed achieved legendary status, endowed, in their view, with "the brain of Albert Einstein and the physique of Arnold Schwarzenegger." Lebed's fame only grew after Defense Minister Pavel Grachov dismissed him as the commander of the Fourteenth Army in the spring of 1995. Lebed then moved to Moscow to start his political career. Lebed has a reputation as an honest, no-nonsense, patriotic outsider who is willing to take severe measures to fight crime, corruption, and the degradation of the military. Although generally known to be taciturn, Lebed's direct manner and booming voice make him a captivating public speaker. Lebed is currently considered a major contender in the presidential election next June.

Program

The Congress of Russian Communities is considered a nationalist organization with a centrist to socialist economic orientation. Its highest priorities are strengthening the Russian state and defending the 25 million Russians living in the former Soviet Republics. Since Skokov joined the group, the bloc has decreased its anti-communist rhetoric, and rumors have circulated about a possible alliance with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

The Congress of Russian Communities blames President Yeltsin for the collapse of the USSR, the violence at the White House in October 1993, economic chaos, drastic privatization, and a flawed Chechnya policy. In addition, Skokov is known to have a personal rivalry with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Because the bloc is new, many Congress positions on specific issues are still relatively unknown.

The Congress' most important campaign themes stress issues of law and order and strong leadership. The Congress proposes an outright war on crime and corruption, and Lebed has previously touted Pinochet's experience in Chile as holding lessons for Russia. The Congress program calls for support of the family as the backbone of society and greater social support for pensioners and veterans. The bloc supports Russian traditions and culture, including the Russian Orthodox Church.

Glazyev's economic plan generally backs market reforms, but advocates a more protected market and greater support for Russia's ailing manufacturing sector. The Congress also advocates increasing wages in order to stimulate demand for domestically produced goods. The bloc

supports all forms of property: private, state and collective. Still, Glazyev has recently advocated a freeze on all privatization, the reversal of all "illegal" privatization, and a reconsideration of all privatization contradictory to Russia's national interests.

Congress statements have been generally anti-Western and imperialist in tone. They call for the reintegration of the USSR, but are vague on strategies for accomplishing this task. Lebed has denounced NATO's eastward expansion, warning that such an act may precipitate a third world war.

Campaign

Early polls indicate that the Congress of Russian Communities is likely to do well among provincial, conservative voters of the working class. Because of Lebed's presence, the bloc may also receive significant support from the military. Polls also indicate that the Congress has the potential to capture votes both from nationalist and communist groups.

While it was expected that the Congress would feature Aleksandr Lebed over Skokov and Glazyev because of Lebed's charismatic appeal and popularity, the bloc has chosen to highlight all three of its leaders in television advertisements and press conferences. Printed materials primarily accent Lebed and Skokov. The Congress of Russian Communities was one of the first blocs to air its series of television advertisements. These expensively produced commercials are heavy on Russian cultural symbolism and spotlight the bloc's three leaders.

During the campaign period, the Congress of Russian Communities' leaders held press conferences supporting the formation of a new Russian Orthodox organization. Reaching out to the military, Lebed has recently formed an organization to defend its interests called "Honor and Motherland." In early November, the bloc held a congress to ratify its platform and to prepare for the final stage of the campaign.

The Congress of Russian Communities is considered to have a good chance of surpassing the 5 percent threshold, mostly on the strength of Aleksandr Lebed's popularity. The bloc has already established itself as one of the major groups in the race, and has achieved heavy media exposure early in the campaign. If the Congress can attract as many votes as Zyuganov's KPRF, some observers contend that Lebed could become the presidential candidate they support. The bloc submitted a list of 140 single-mandate candidates to the CEC.

Leaders

Yurii Skokov: Leader of the Congress; chairman of the Federation of Commodity Manufacturers; former Secretary of the Security Council under Boris Yeltsin.

Aleksandr Lebed: General and former commander of the Fourteenth Army in the Transdneistr Republic in Moldova; deputy chairman of the Congress of Russian Communities; Ran on the Ecological Movement of Russia list in 1993; considered a strong presidential contender for June 1996.

Sergei Glazyev: State Duma Deputy; chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia; chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy; minister of Foreign Trade of the Russian Government (1992-1993); author of economic plan to revitalize Russian manufacturing and to slow the pace of privatization.

The Congress of Russian Communities' federal list also includes: **Lyudmila Vartazarova** (leader of the Socialist Party of Workers), **Dmitrii Rogozin** (Congress of Russian Communities founder and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress), **Yurii Kalmykov** (leader of Union of Peoples of Russia), **Vasili Romanov**, **Mikhail Kolchev**, **Oleg Denisov**, **Nanyana Malutina**, **Sergei Goncharov**, and **Sergei Burkov** (Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Property and Privatization).

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)
Liberalno-demokraticeskaya Partiya Rossii

Though virtually unknown before the 1991 presidential election campaign, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia was the only party besides the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to field a candidate in that race. LDPR's candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, placed third out of six candidates, behind President Yeltsin and former Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov. Despite Zhirinovskiy's success, few took him or his party seriously at the time; his party did not organize nationally after the election and Zhirinovskiy held no significant political post.

Zhirinovskiy then splashed onto center stage of Russian politics with his party's electoral success in December 1993 when LDPR garnered 22.9 percent of the party list vote, a full 8 percentage points ahead of Russia's Choice, and much more than polls had predicted. LDPR was the only ultra-nationalist party in the race. Zhirinovskiy's brand of ultra-nationalism constituted an option for voters tired of "democracy" but unwilling to return to communism.

Zhirinovskiy ran a modern electoral campaign. He mastered the populist sound bite and understood the importance of delivering it on television. Moreover, he addressed issues that concerned voters: housing for military officers, "unfair" prices at farmers markets, and crime. He identified scapegoats for Russia's woes -- Caucasians, Jews, neighboring countries, and the West. He pledged to "lift Russia from its knees."

The impact of Zhirinovskiy's personality driven campaign was amplified by the proportional representation dimension of the electoral law. Zhirinovskiy's appeal helped LDPR gain 59 seats in the State Duma from its party list. LDPR won only five seats from single-mandate contests.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's performance in the State Duma has been a contradictory one. During the last two years, Zhirinovskiy has delivered some of his most vitriolic speeches ever, complete with racial slurs, imperialist bravado, conspiracy theories, and threats aimed at the West. At the same time, LDPR has supported the government on crucial votes, including the 1994 and 1995 budgets. LDPR was the only major parliamentary faction to support President Yeltsin's intervention in Chechnya.

Zhirinovsky has maintained strict discipline within his parliamentary faction and party. During last year's party congress, he was elected chairman for an unlimited period and was essentially given total control over LDPR. The party machine reportedly has one primary objective -- the election of Zhirinovsky as president in 1996. To this end, LDPR has devoted considerable resources to establishing regional party structures and newspapers.

Program

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia espouses militant, populist ultra-nationalism. Zhirinovsky has backed away from his earlier calls for the invasion of Alaska and the construction of giant fans on the Baltic borders to blow radioactive waste over Russia's neighbors in the event of disobedience. However, he still champions Russian imperialism and the restoration of Russia as a world power. Zhirinovsky continues to push for the extension of Russia's borders into Kazakhstan, Belarus, and, eventually, Ukraine.

Zhirinovsky advocates a stronger state to establish law and order to Russia at home. Zhirinovsky has recently proposed the creation of an internal security force of no less than one million members to protect Russian citizens from internal and external enemies. He has also pledged to use the military and intelligence services to fight organized crime.

Zhirinovsky continues to demonstrate a deep mistrust for the United States and the U.S.-sponsored "Zionist conspiracy" aimed at destroying Russia. He has repeatedly stated that the eastward expansion of NATO would mean the beginning of World War III.

Zhirinovsky has been critical of both the communist command system and a market economy. He promotes a populist attack on the current economic reform process and advocates state interventionism to enlarge industrial production, provide special assistance to high-tech industries, work to open up international markets, assume control of raw material exports and provide greater support for science and culture. Zhirinovsky warns that Russia must not allow its riches to be raided by "Western bandits."

Campaign

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's voters are usually working class residents of provincial cities who have gained little from reforms. In 1993, Zhirinovsky voters were angry, anti-establishment, and very much against the *status quo*. LDPR's main challenge this year will be to retain the votes of this electorate while competing against a field of blocs that will be borrowing from Zhirinovsky's 1993 campaign in both style and in substance. Summer polls indicate that the Communist Party will divert voters who still oppose the current regime but have become disillusioned with Zhirinovsky's antics. As for the nationalist vote, LDPR will face competitors, including the Congress of Russian Communities, Derzhava, Power to the People, and even possibly Forward Russia.

To remain a step ahead of its competition, LDPR's campaign will again feature a marathon speaking tour for Zhirinovsky in its regional strongholds as well as paid time on the mass media.

As one of the most riveting orators in Russian politics, Zhirinovsky's speeches form the centerpiece of the campaign. Zhirinovsky is expected to participate in various press-attracting events throughout the pre-election period. He has already met with an Italian pornography star and physically assaulted a female Duma Deputy. Zhirinovsky has occasionally attempted to add a more statesman-like persona to his mercurial image, but during its allotted television time, LDPR featured one of Zhirinovsky's most bombastic, anti-Western speeches in the State Duma.

The LDPR also hopes to run more competitive campaigns for single-mandate seats in 1995. Most LDPR candidates will try to establish a strong party identification, as the party does not have a pool of well-known candidates who could win on their own.

In 1995, the LDPR is considered to have very little chance of achieving its past level of success because of the crowded political field and new competition from other nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups. In current polls, LDPR appears to be near the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Vladimir Zhirinovsky: State Duma Deputy; chairman and faction leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; presidential candidate in June 1991 -- placed third among six candidates with 7.8 percent of the popular vote.

Sergei Abeltsyev: State Duma Deputy; deputy chairman and Shadow Security Minister of the LDPR.

Aleksandr Vengerovskii: State Duma Deputy; one of five deputy chairmen of the State Duma.

Other federal list candidates include: **Stanislav Zhebrovskii, Aleksei Mitrofanov, Mikhail Gutseriev, Mikhail Monastyrskii, Mikhail Musatov, Vladimir Gusev, Natalya Narycheva, Oleg Finko** and **Sergei Kalashnikov**.

"Great Power" Movement

Derzhava

The ultra-nationalist Derzhava movement centers around the personality of its leader, Aleksandr Rutskoi. Although the movement was formed in 1992, Rutskoi has a long political history. He led a faction in the Soviet Union's Congress of People's Deputies, and formed the People's Party of Free Russia on its base. In 1991, he served as President Yeltsin's running mate and became vice president. Soon after August 1991, Rutskoi drifted to the opposition, first as leader of the Civic Union and then the more radical National Salvation Front. After March 1993, President Yeltsin stripped Rutskoi of most of his governmental responsibilities. When President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament in September 1993, Rutskoi declared the act illegal and proclaimed himself president. In October, Rutskoi was the major leader of the defense of the White House. After his eventual surrender, Rutskoi was arrested and served six months in prison before release under the State Duma's amnesty law.

Rutskoi resumed his political career soon after his release from prison. He immediately began traveling throughout Russia to organize regional chapters of his nationalist political movement, Derzhava. In Moscow, Rutskoi attracted several prominent nationalists to his organization. Closer to the elections, Derzhava's future became more uncertain, as several of these same nationalist leaders quit the bloc, protesting that too many places on the party list had been reserved for allegedly shady businessmen. More problematic was the formation of new ultra-nationalist groups, which complicated Rutskoi's campaign strategy.

Program

Most of all, Derzhava laments the collapse of the USSR and vows to rebuild it. Derzhava focuses on the lack of law and order, promising to rid Russia of mafia domination and foreign criminal elements. Derzhava's program calls the current market reform process "parasitic capitalism," which serves government bureaucrats, the new rich, and the West, but not Russia's common people. Rutskoi vehemently denounces the West for exploiting Russia and supporting President Yeltsin. Perhaps the bloc's most distinctive characteristic is the extreme level of contempt that Rutskoi expresses for the current regime.

Campaign

Derzhava will be competing with the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia for the more radical sector of the nationalist electorate -- uneducated and unskilled workers living in medium-sized provincial cities who have grown poorer because of reforms. To win over these voters, Rutskoi has adopted a populist, bombastic rhetorical style very similar to that of Zhirinovskiy. Rutskoi has also traveled extensively during the last year to develop his organization. The campaign is expected to maximize Rutskoi's public exposure and will emphasize party list rather than single-mandate candidates.

The bloc's campaign slogans include "Law is our motto. EVERYBODY should follow it," "Stop the awful reforms!" and "Stop the influence of the West!"

The Central Election Commission (CEC) initially denied Derzhava's registration, which delayed the official start of the bloc's campaign. The CEC refused to register the bloc after Derzhava dropped about 60 of its original candidates from its list without proper documentation. The Supreme Court overturned the CEC's decision and ordered the CEC to register Derzhava.

The Derzhava campaign effort received a boost when the Union of Patriots threw its support behind Rutskoi in early November after the CEC refused to register the bloc. While the CEC claimed that the bloc had not collected enough signatures, the Union of Patriots claimed that they themselves refused to register in order to preserve "the unity of ultra-nationalistic forces." The Union of Patriots is led by Vladislav Achalov, Aleksandr Sterligov (head of the Natsionalnii Sobor) and Aleksandr Tizyakov (one of the August 1991 coup plotters). This bloc is distinguished by a brand of Russian nationalism that, rather than identifying with all people living in Russia, expresses support only for ethnic Russians.

Rutskoi's electoral prospects are complicated by the crowded field of nationalist and ultra-nationalist blocs. Derzhava is not expected by most observers to clear the 5 percent threshold. Derzhava registered 115 single-mandate candidates.

Leaders

Aleksandr Rutskoi; Former Vice-President of the Russian Federation under President Yeltsin (1991-1993); former leader of the People's Party for Free Russia; with Ruslan Khasbulatov, leader of the defense of the White House (then Supreme Soviet) in October 1993; retired general who served in Afghanistan.

Viktor Kobelyov: State Duma Deputy; one of the main organizers of the LDPR election campaign in 1993.

Konstantin Dushenov: former press secretary to Ioann, the recently deceased Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga.

The list also includes: **Aleksandr Kazintsev, Rinat Mukhamadiev, Vladimir Novikov, Dzhangir Kerimov, Mikhail Kuzovkov, Ashot Sarkisyan, Aleksandr Stepanov, Musa Idigov and Vladimir Taranenko.**

Power to the People

Vlast' – Narodu!

This bloc was formed recently on the base of Sergei Baburin's Russian All-People's Union. The Union stemmed from the "Rossiya" parliamentary faction in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. In the Congress, Baburin served as one of the most articulate and harsh critics of President Yeltsin's regime, and the Union was a key defender of the White House in October 1993. The Russian All-People's Union attempted to participate in the December 1993 elections, but its signatures were declared invalid by the Central Election Commission. Baburin entered the State Duma by virtue of his victory in a single-mandate district and formed a grouping of about 13 deputies called "Russian Way."

After discussions with several other nationalist organizations, Baburin persuaded Gorbachev's former prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, to join his electoral bloc. Ryzhkov had reportedly been looking for an appropriate vehicle from which to launch his potential presidential candidacy.

Program

The bloc vows to "prevent national catastrophe" and "to revive the Fatherland by stopping the destructive consequences of the government's 'reforms.'" Power to the People proposes a review of past privatizations, and a reversal of "illegal" ones. The bloc calls for a return to traditional Russian economic features, including a paternalistic role for the state and a strengthened social security system.

The bloc's program urges the re-creation of the Soviet Union on a new economic and political basis. After closer economic and political relations have been established throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States, bloc leaders then want to conduct an international referendum on the creation of a new union. Bloc leaders are suspicious of the West's role in Russia's future development.

Campaign

Power to the People hopes to win support from the communist and the ultra-nationalist electorate. Polls indicate that Ryzhkov is still popular among pensioners (especially women) nostalgic for the Soviet era. Given the fact that the bloc is new, unknown, boasts few resources and exhibits virtually no regional structures, Power to the People's bloc will likely rely on media exposure. However, the bloc has been frustrated in achieving success with this media-oriented strategy. Citing a survey of television exposure of electoral blocs, Ryzhkov complained about receiving a disproportionate share of media exposure, and has accused the media of bias in favor of liberal and centrist blocs.

Given the long list of blocs competing for the same electorate and Power to the People's inability to attract significant media exposure, Power to the People is not expected to meet the five percent threshold.

Leaders

Nikolai Ryzhkov: Prime Minister of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) and CPSU Politburo member; ran for president of Russia against Boris Yeltsin in 1991, placing second and receiving 16.85 percent of the vote; possible presidential candidate in election to be held in June 1996.

Sergei Barburin: State Duma Deputy from Omsk; leader of the nationalist "Russian Way" deputy grouping in the State Duma; leader of Russian All-People's Union; dean of the law department of Omsk University.

Yelena Shuvalova: Chairperson of the movement "Mothers for Social Justice."

The list also includes: **Valerii Ganichev**, **Stanislav Terekhov**, (chairman of the "Union of Officers"), **Anatolii Karpov** (former world chess champion), **Vladimir Kartashov**, **Vladimir Lebedev**, **Andrei Semenetsky**, **Zigmund Stankevich**, **Yulii Kvitsinsky** and **Georgii Tikhonov**.

Communists -- Working Russia -- For the Soviet Union
Kommunisti -- Trudovaya Rossiya -- Za Sovyetskii Soyuz

The nucleus of this bloc is the Russian Communist Labor Party and its affiliate, Working Russia. Together with a number of smaller groups, they constitute Russia's extremist communists. Under the charismatic leadership of Viktor Anpilov, these groups organized anti-Yeltsin street demonstrations throughout 1992 and 1993, including the violent May Day march in 1993 and the

defense of the White House in October. Anpilov was one of a handful of political leaders arrested after the October 1993 events, and was released from prison only after the State Duma passed an amnesty resolution the following year.

This bloc is the main communist rival to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) headed by Gennadii Zyuganov. The Russian Communist Labor Party's leaders accuse Zyuganov of "revisionism and opportunism" and his party of nationalist and social democratic tendencies. Anpilov supports world revolution and the restoration of the pre-Gorbachev USSR. While the second largest communist organization in Russia, the Russian Communist Labor Party is still dwarfed in size and influence by the KPRF.

By uniting several small communist organizations, this bloc promotes itself as the united communist bloc with the KPRF representing the only non-participant. While the KPRF attempted to reach agreement with these smaller groups on the formation of one, united communist bloc, these negotiations broke down because of major ideological differences.

Program

Russian Communist Labor Party and "Working Russia" programs call for the restoration of every aspect of the USSR, including the reintegration of all the former Soviet republics, the restoration of the Soviet political system, and the recreation of the central command economy. Their program is distinctly Leninist in orientation, calling for the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the formation of a "classless society" and violent world revolution. The bloc's leaders openly state that they are prepared to abolish the State Duma in order to recreate the Soviet system. Regarding tactics, the RCLP and Working Russia openly espouse violent, confrontational methods, including general strikes, street demonstrations, and eventually the armed seizure of the state.

Campaign

The bloc's electorate is similar to the more radical portion of the KPRF's electorate, including disaffected pensioners and radical youth. As a result, the bloc will be competing directly with the KPRF for votes. Cognizant of this competition, the bloc deliberately included the words "Soviet Union" in its name to attract those looking for the return of the CPSU. Because the bloc has little money and only one well-known leader, Viktor Anpilov, it relies on public events such as demonstrations, pickets, and rallies to deliver its campaign message.

The bloc is considered to have little chance of winning 5 percent of the party list vote, as the significantly larger and stronger KPRF will most likely attract the great majority of the communist electorate. However, the bloc may be able to garner a portion of the communist electorate: some observers argue that voters may confuse the two communist blocs on the ballot, and accidentally vote for this bloc instead of the KPRF.

Leaders

Viktor Tyulkin: First Secretary and one of the organizers of the Russian Communist Labor Party; chief editor of *Trudovaya Rossiya* (Working Russia), a militant communist newspaper.

Anatolii Kryuchkov: Leader of the Russian Party of Communists; one of the organizers of Marxist Platform in the CPSU; chief editor of *Mysl* (Thought).

Viktor Anpilov: Leader of the "Working Russia" Movement; secretary of the Russian Communist Labor Party; charismatic leader and street orator of the radical communist movement.

List also includes: **Aleksei Prigarin, Vladimir Zapolskikh, Sergei Novikov, Aleksei Sergeyev, Boris Kurashvili, Frol Ananin, Elena Zaitseva, Viktor Gamov, and Oleg Shein.**