



*National Democratic  
Institute for  
International  
Affairs*

**Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH):  
Strengthening Political Parties**

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*On the airport road approach to Sarajevo, hardly a building was left undamaged by the ferocious artillery bombardment; major highways are unpassable and the rail and telephone networks unusable. On the drive from Sarajevo to Tuzla, some 60 miles that takes more than five and half hours on tortuous roads, the route is lined with yellow ribbons that mark the location of some of the millions of landmines that litter the countryside. It is hard to imagine when the 2.5 million refugees, who constitute more than half of the pre-war population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be prepared psychologically to return to live again next to neighbors from another ethnic group or determine how they would survive economically. The political and economic reconstruction of the country is indeed a daunting task....*

*A five-member NDI assessment team, which visited Bosnia in February, met with the major political parties, civic groups and media representatives in Sarajevo before dividing into two groups to travel to Tuzla and Banja Luka. The team found that voters in the forthcoming elections, still wary of renewed conflict once NATO troops withdraw in December, may prefer the perceived "protection" offered by the three nationalist parties—the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)—that currently dominate the political landscape. However, the delegation concluded that multi-ethnic groups must also be provided an opportunity to compete if the political environment is to become more tolerant.*

**NDI Reports**  
Spring 1996

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## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

This report summarizes the work undertaken by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) to support the development of political parties in Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) prior to the historic September 14, 1996 elections.

The report was written by NDI Resident Representative Tracy Vilella Gartenmann. It was edited by NDI President Kenneth D. Wollack, NDI Regional Director for Central and Eastern Europe Susan Atwood, NDI BiH Resident Director Leslie Campbell, and NDI Director of Publications Sue Grabowski.

The program was made possible by grants from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

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## NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was established in 1983. By working with political parties, legislatures, civic organizations and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. The Institute is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and maintains field offices in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

NDI has supported the development of democratic institutions in more than 60 countries. Programs focus on six major areas:

***Political Party Training:*** NDI conducts multipartisan training seminars in political development with a broad spectrum of democratic parties. NDI draws international experts to forums where party members learn first-hand the techniques of organization, communication and constituent contact.

***Election Processes:*** NDI provides technical assistance for political parties, nonpartisan associations and election authorities to conduct voter and civic education campaigns and to organize election monitoring programs. The Institute has also organized more than 30 major international observer delegations.

***Strengthening Legislatures:*** NDI organizes seminars focusing on legislative procedures, staffing, research information, constituent services, committee structures and the function and role of party caucuses. NDI programs also seek to promote access to the legislative process by citizen groups and the public at large.

***Local Government:*** NDI provides technical assistance on a range of topics related to the processes of local governance, including division of responsibility between mayors and municipal councils, and between local and national authorities. NDI programs also promote enhanced communication between local officials and their constituents.

***Civic Organization:*** NDI supports and advises nonpartisan groups and political parties engaged in civic and voter education programs. NDI programs work with civic organizations to enhance their organizational capabilities.

***Civil-Military Relations:*** NDI brings together military and political leaders to promote dialogue and establish mechanisms for improving civil-military relations.

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## **Strengthening Political Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) June - September, 1996**

### **I INTRODUCTION**

While the results of Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) first post-war nationwide elections<sup>1</sup> confirmed the primacy of nationalist forces, leading multi-ethnic opposition parties made significant inroads that will directly affect the establishment of nascent democratic institutions and greater political pluralism in the country. Administered by the international community under extremely difficult logistical and time constraints, the September elections marked the first time that citizens voted throughout an independent BiH. After four years of war, the country faces the complex task of rebuilding a state with institutions that protect and balance the interests of three ethnic groups — Muslims, Croats and Serbs. During this difficult transition, new political parties are seeking to strengthen their organizational structures and develop policy alternatives that address citizen concerns and build public confidence in a united, democratic country.

The signing of the December 1995 Dayton Accord created a political framework that enabled the country to move from a state of war — through a peaceful transition process — toward the replacement of traditional, communist power structures with representative governmental bodies. Halting four years of war that followed the splintering of Yugoslavia, the election represented the cornerstone of this blueprint for political reconciliation. Before the elections, Western analysts linked hopes for the country's future with the success of opposition parties to gain a presence in the national and regional parliaments. "If they can become a check on the crazy nationalism that brought war to Bosnia, then the elections are a success," one senior Western diplomat told the *Washington Post*. "If they are smashed completely by the nationalists, then we really have failed."<sup>2</sup> (See Appendix A.)

Despite progress, the political climate in early 1996 was characterized by Bosnian alienation from an electoral process in which they perceived little ownership and the risk that leading political parties would withdraw altogether. Both politically and financially, ethnically based nationalist parties dominated a sectarian political environment in which indicted war criminals continued to exert considerable influence. The lack of equitable media access and freedom of association exacerbated the possibility that parties favoring a unified, peaceful process would have no voice in BiH's future political system. With voters permitted little access to opposition party platforms and motivated

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<sup>1</sup> September 14, 1996 elections comprised: parliamentary and presidential seats in the Republica Srpska and in the Republic of BiH, parliamentary seats in the Muslim Croat Federation, and cantonal seats. Municipal elections, originally scheduled for September 14, are likely to be held in November 1996.

"Bosnian Opposition Woos War-Weary Voters," *Washington Post*, September 12, 1996.

by the perceived security offered by the ruling nationalist parties,<sup>3</sup> it was anticipated that they would cast their ballots accordingly, thereby ceding the electoral playing field exclusively to these nationalist, ethnically based forces.

The need to create political space in which democratic opposition parties could present their messages to voters and to build meaningful Bosnian participation in the electoral process was therefore particularly critical. To redress these existing inequities and provide genuine multi-ethnic parties with political skills with which to compete more effectively, NDI conducted an intensive political party development program during the run-up to the September elections. The program was carried out in selected cantons in the Republic's two entities, the Muslim Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska. As a result of close cooperation between NDI and the parties, the objectives of the effort were achieved.

NDI recognizes that serious problems affected the democratic character of the election process. These include: the inability to repatriate and reintegrate refugees, the political influence of indicted war criminals, restricted freedom of movement and voter registration violations. Perhaps the most pernicious activity was the pressure exerted, particularly by the Serb authorities, on displaced persons to register and vote in strategic municipalities. This campaign would have resulted in ethnic cleansing via the ballot box; however, the postponement of municipal elections diffused the most severe effects of this manipulation. Opposition multiethnic parties also complained about intimidation and violence against party activists, and concerted efforts to undermine their ability to compete, such as lack of access to the media. At the same time, these parties were encouraged by progress that was made during the immediate run-up to the elections and by the election results:

- A) The election was characterized by the presence of several sophisticated, well-organized parties that articulated differing conceptions of the country's future. For example, in the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Unified List (UL) brought together ethnically and ideologically diverse parties under a common umbrella. The UL articulated a clear program: a unified, multiethnic, non-nationalist future with a moderate leftist orientation. Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina (SzaBiH), while lacking the UL's organizational capacity, capitalized on the personal appeal of the former prime minister. The SzaBiH advanced a vision of a united BiH and a free enterprise-oriented economic platform. Voters in the Federation were therefore able to select parties other than the ethnically based SDA and HDZ.

While party orientations were significantly more leftist-oriented in the Republica Srpska, there were clear differences among parties. The Socialist Party-

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<sup>3</sup> Nationalist parties include: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA); the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

sponsored Union for Peace and Progress offered a program of cooperation with the Croat Muslim Federation and an economic platform that mixed government and private initiatives. Predrag Radic, the mayor of Banja Luka founded the Democratic Patriotic Front coalition, a moderately nationalist, private enterprise-orientated group with strong ties to existing state-run industry. In contrast, the ruling Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) offered a radical nationalist program, but

emphasized future privatization and promoted the establishment of free economic zones, envisaging BiH as the "Hong Kong of Europe."

- B)** While not overcoming the ruling parties' overwhelming advantages, opposition parties and independent candidates gained greater access to political party financing and media coverage during the final weeks of the electoral campaign. By August, opposition parties were able to compete more rigorously thanks to an infusion of funds from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the increasing number of free and paid media opportunities. The OSCE-sponsored party financing program allocated between \$100,000 - \$400,000 to all registered parties based on the number of candidates fielded and the number of parties in a coalition. Parties were finally able to put into practice well-developed campaign ideas, and the level of professionalism in political advertising increased dramatically.

State-run TV BiH, the principal source of news in the Federation, gave the election blanket — and according to most observers — reasonably fair coverage. In addition to TV BiH's nightly issue-based candidate debates, nongovernmental, local television stations such as Hyat, TV Tuzla, TV Zetel and others, also provided thorough coverage of election rallies and events, interviews with key political figures, and provided time for leading independent candidates.

The international community established additional independent television and radio stations such as IN-TV and the Swiss-sponsored Free Elections Radio Network. As with the multitude of local radio and TV stations, dozens of fairly independent print outlets also fostered alternative viewpoints. Although coverage was far from even-handed in the Republica Srpska, several high quality opposition-oriented newspapers were available, nongovernmental radio and TV outlets existed in Banja Luka, and state-run "Pale TV" sponsored multiparty candidate debates.

- C)** Through increased funding, skills-building and media opportunities, opposition parties were able to better reach their target voters. As with parties in elections elsewhere, parties in a multiparty system do not compete to win the support of 100 percent of the voting population, but instead focus time and resources in areas in which core supporters are likely to reside. Bosnian political parties were no different in their strategic planning. For example, Bosnian Serb parties abstained from organizing efforts in traditionally Croat dominated areas, just as



multi-ethnic parties avoided any efforts with radicalized displaced populations. Because of the reality of modern campaigning, many of the problems in BiH, such as the lack of inter-entity freedom of movement, did not significantly affect the ability of parties to communicate with target voters.

- D)** After four years of war and destruction, the ratio of ballots cast for non-nationalist parties was surprisingly comparable to pre-war (1990) election results. In the Republic of BiH parliament, multi-ethnic opposition parties garnered 14 percent of the seats in the Muslim Croat Federation and 35 percent of the seats in the Republica Srpska. The election results also underscored existing urban/rural divisions in the country. In key cities such as Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica, multi-ethnic opposition forces fared almost as well as they had in 1990, capturing between 30 percent and 40 percent of the vote in Tuzla and Sarajevo. Notably, inroads were made into the perceived Bosnian Serb lock on the race for the Serb seat on the Bosnian presidency with more than 300,000 voters (33 percent) supporting moderate Serb Mladen Ivanic.

The September 14 election results demonstrate that despite the difficult pre-election environment, opposition parties were able to wage campaigns that reached their target voters, particularly in central Bosnia. As a result, these parties were able to secure a position in the country's post-election political system. As John Pomfret of the *Washington Post* noted, "...the moderate opposition forces in Bosnia's nationwide elections succeeded in their most important goal: They guaranteed themselves a place in Bosnia's halls of power."<sup>4</sup> NDI's training was cited by the parties, and representatives of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as having significantly increased their ability to secure sufficient representation — in the 1996 national and cantonal elections — to provide them a base from which to prepare for Spring 1997 municipal, and 1998 parliamentary and presidential elections. (See Appendix B.)

## **II NDI POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM**

### **A) Program Aims**

Using the September 14 elections as an organizing focus, the key objectives of NDI's program were to provide training to:

- promote a more pluralistic political environment;
- augment Bosnian ownership of the electoral process through political party pollwatcher training;

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<sup>4</sup> "Bosnia's Opposition Wins A Seat At The Table," *Washington Post*, September 16, 1996.

- enhance the organizing capacities of the multi-ethnic political parties to allow them to compete more effectively in the elections; and
- develop the long-term skills of multi-ethnic political parties to ensure their ability to remain engaged in the political process in the future.

## **B) Program Overview**

Based on findings from a February 1996 NDI assessment mission and requests from key multi-ethnic opposition parties, NDI designed a skills-building program to support the organizing efforts of their parties in advance of September 14 elections and beyond. Throughout May and June, a two-member NDI training team worked primarily with opposition parties in the Tuzla region in the Muslim Croat Federation and in the Banja Luka region in the Republica Srpska. This effort was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). A second NDI team, funded by the Agency for International Development (AID), arrived in Sarajevo in mid-June to implement training in the rest of the country.

Until mid-August, training was focused on: implementing public opinion research; formulating strategic planning; organizing volunteers and events; creating internal communication systems; designing and distributing posters and leaflets; designing radio and television advertising; promoting effective media relations; and conducting candidate training. Based on requests from the OSCE, additional training sessions on campaign budgeting and political advertising were also undertaken.

In cooperation with Greenberg Research, a Washington, DC-based public opinion research firm, and three indigenous companies (TALDI/Tuzla, Medium/Belgrade and PULS/Split), NDI conducted focus groups with Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats in early July 1996. The focus groups explored citizen opinions and election concerns, the findings of which would provide political parties with information to help shape their message development capabilities.

To increase the meaningful participation of political party representatives in the electoral process, the Institute conducted two additional, multi-partisan programs in the month before elections. NDI offered multiparty pollwatching training to all registered parties. The training was organized throughout the country.

The Institute also co-sponsored, with World Learning, an AID-funded program that allowed 41 political party representatives to observe Bosnian refugee voting in 15 countries.

## **C) Program Activities**

### ***Focus Groups***

To gain first-hand information on voter attitudes toward political parties and the political situation in general, NDI conducted 15 focus groups in Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Tuzla. The findings of these focus groups assisted multi-ethnic political parties to better communicate with the electorate, specifically with their message development, targeting, and political advertising. Information gleaned from the focus groups also enabled the Institute and representatives of the international community to increase their awareness of citizen perceptions of the electoral process.

### ***Party Building Consultations***

The Institute conducted more than 60 tailored political skills-building sessions with the following parties:

**In the Muslim Croat Federation** — the Unified List coalition (Social Democratic Party (SDP), Union of Bosnian Social Democrats (UBSD), Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS), Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO), Republican Party), the Party for BiH (SzaBiH), the Liberal Party (LP), the Citizens' Democratic Party (GDS), the Liberal Bosniak Organization (LBO) and the Party for Economic Prosperity (SPP);

**In the Republica Srpska** — the Alliance for Peace and Progress, a coalition led by the Socialist Party of the Republica Srpska, which includes the Social Liberal Party; the Independent Social Democrats; and the Yugoslav United Left coalition.

NDI developed a level of trust with party organizers and independent candidates of all political affiliations that enabled the Institute to conduct ongoing *ad-hoc* consultations and serve as a resource center. Working with national, cantonal and municipal leaders, NDI conducted training at all levels of party structures. In the Muslim Croat Federation, NDI achieved a high level of geographical coverage by organizing 75 percent of its seminars outside of Sarajevo and Tuzla. In the Muslim Croat Federation, training was conducted in Bihac, Breza, Konjic, Jablanica, Mostar, Travnik and Zenica. In the Tuzla region and Republica Srpska, the Institute concentrated on Banja Luka, East Dobo, Gracanica, Gradac, Lukovac and Srebrenik.

In addition to NDI's field representatives based in Sarajevo and Tuzla, the following political experts participated in the training programs: Michael Balagus, New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada; Bob Dewar, NDP, Canada; Brian Feeney, Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), Northern Ireland; Steve Schneider, Democratic Party, USA; Walter Van der Poel, Christian Democratic Party, The Netherlands; and Tibor Vidos, Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), Hungary.

### ***Training Materials***

Twelve training manuals on communication, direct mail, events and planning, running campaigns on low budgets, rural and regional organizing, get-out-the-vote, and media were adapted for the Bosnian context, translated and distributed. More than 4,000 copies of training manuals were dispersed throughout national headquarters and local party branches in the Federation alone. Parties made and distributed an estimated additional 2,000 copies through internal party structures.

NDI also developed a pollwatching manual based on OSCE election regulations that described the rules concerning party pollwatchers and the electoral code of conduct, and included a declaration of secrecy form, a party pollwatcher checklist and relevant portions of the election law. More than 2,000 manuals were printed and distributed to parties.

### ***Political Party Pollwatching and Bosnian Monitoring of Refugee Voting Abroad***

NDI sponsored multiparty pollwatching training programs with all registered parties throughout the Muslim Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska. Through this project, the Institute provided advice on specific internal party deployment plans as well as information on the electoral code and party agent observation rules and responsibilities. NDI developed, translated and distributed a 50-page manual based on OSCE election guidelines.

In conjunction with World Learning and the OSCE, the Institute organized a program to enable party pollwatchers to observe the electoral process in countries with a significant Bosnian refugee population. The program was designed to increase confidence in, and meaningful Bosnian oversight of the electoral administration process. Bosnian party pollwatching initiatives were particularly critical following the Croat refusal to participate in the newly elected Mostar local council due to their questions about the administration of the refugee vote in Bonn, Germany. In total, 41 party representatives observed the refugee vote in 15 countries. Following the observation missions, teams of party representatives submitted observation reports to the OSCE, the findings of which helped with final preparation for in-country elections.

### **III PROGRAM RESULTS**

Moderate Croat Ivo Komsic, who represented the Unified List coalition in the race for the Croat seat on the BiH presidency stated that "We contended all along that if we got more than 7 percent, we would be satisfied ... we see 10 percent as almost a victory..." While the parties themselves are responsible for having waged professional campaigns, NDI's training supported their efforts, specifically:

***NDI conducted tailored political training that helped parties increase their message development capabilities.*** By conducting focus groups, the Institute was

able to: a) provide parties with timely information on public opinion, and b) acquaint parties with focus group methodology for future election-related efforts. Parties immediately used focus group findings for strategic planning and communications purposes. One party founded an in-house polling company to begin collecting citizen/voter information on a regular basis. Findings influenced the leaders of another party to change the party name, and helped parties from across the spectrum to allocate resources only in areas in which they were likely to reach target voters.

***NDI media training notably affected the level of professionalism in party political broadcasts and candidate debates.*** When NDI initially started working with opposition party leaders and candidates, they effectively accessed few media outlets, relied on old-fashioned outreach techniques, and demonstrated uncertainty with the level of their communication skills. NDI familiarized the top candidates from the Unified List, Party of BiH, Liberal Party and GDS with debate preparation, public speaking and message development techniques that increased their skills and confidence needed to compete.

Daily contact with party organizers responsible for political advertising enabled the multi-ethnic opposition parties to capitalize on media opportunities and professionalize their written materials. By the end of July, candidates with whom the NDI teams had worked delivered concise, consistent messages, raised issues of concern with their target voters, and used visual aids to complement their presentations. Additional television training, conducted at the request of the OSCE, enabled candidates to take advantage of increasing media opportunities in the month before elections.

***NDI skills-building sessions helped parties improve their grassroots organizing plans and prompted parties to begin creating internal training programs for long-term organizational development.*** In towns in which the level of intimidation was low, such as most of central Bosnia, local activists from across the political spectrum tried to adapt and use NDI voter contact strategies. Some parties used techniques for the first time, when canvassing potential voters at bus stops and markets, conducting outreach in residential neighborhoods, and distributing doorknob hangers with party information.

Specific NDI recommendations used by parties included: a) personalizing the party message to connect with local concerns in promotional hand-outs; b) creating literature specifically for specialized groups such as youth, pensioners and women; c) maintaining an informal database on volunteers; and d) using popular national party leaders to increase interest and support at local events and rallies.

NDI staff worked with national party organizers to complement their internal party development plans. Local branch and regional organizers often used the presence of NDI field representatives to reinforce their particular organizing plans. NDI's skills-training took hold at the grassroots level as local organizers used the field representatives to legitimize their efforts in transmitting knowledge and skills adapted from NDI political organizing seminars.

In the difficult environment of Bihac, candidates from a leading opposition party organized follow-on training on voter contact techniques using information from an NDI Sarajevo-based seminar. During the Bihac training, NDI staff and experts shared an array of techniques and conducted interactive workshops, while candidates offered practical advice on how to implement these ideas in an area characterized by high levels of intimidation. Through such supplementary training, in which key local leaders served as co-trainers, NDI immediately helped to enhance the internal party training capacities of many of the leading opposition parties. In the long-term, strengthening the local organizational structure and public outreach capabilities of the parties creates more broad-based and transparent party operations, and provides citizens with a better understanding of each party's identity.

***Through pollwatching training and observation of refugee voting abroad, and by providing a link between parties and the international community, NDI helped enhance Bosnian ownership of the election process.*** Through the multiparty and subsequent regional pollwatching seminars, NDI trained more than 1,000 party activists directly, many of whom subsequently trained their colleagues. Examples include: a) a regional party representative who contacted his party's national leadership to offer to serve as the party agent pollwatcher coordinator after attending specialized NDI training; b) a major opposition party that organized a follow-on training program for its 140 Sarajevo city-based pollwatchers; and c) the coordinating committee of a party that requested strategic advice on the role of a party pollwatcher during the counting process. Election observers noted that opposition parties' pollwatchers were well represented in many Republika Srpska polling stations, and in the majority of polling stations in the Muslim Croat Federation. Numerous NDI pollwatching manuals were in evidence throughout the Tuzla canton as well. The Bosnian Monitoring Mission Abroad, a program that enabled 41 party representatives to observe refugee out-of-country voting in 15 countries, further enhanced the Bosnian role in the elections.

Through its close contact with party leaders of all affiliations, NDI also served as a bridge between parties and international election administrators in the months preceding elections. The Institute was publicly credited by members of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) for having provided critical guidance to parties regarding electoral guideline and complaint mechanisms. Similarly, the Institute shared with relevant election officials the concerns of party representatives, and possible means to address specific training, institutional development and information needs.

***NDI's daily ad-hoc assistance to parties at the local level was a necessary confidence-building measure.*** Local organizers were energized by the opportunity to test ideas with their peers from Western Europe, Canada and the United States. National political leaders used NDI trainers strategically to refine initiatives of strong party branches and galvanize less organized, weaker branches. National party leaders frequently cited the benefits of having NDI experts confirm the validity of organizational initiatives developed in party headquarters and reinforce the belief that local branches could organize effectively with limited financial resources.

#### IV FUTURE PLANS

***Sustained party building activities are crucial to prepare parties for upcoming elections.*** In advance of upcoming municipal elections, and 1998 parliamentary, presidential and cantonal elections, party building activities should continue working in areas where initial political space exists for opposition parties, such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Banja Luka. Party building activities should also target new areas in the Republica Srpska such as Bijelina, Brcko, Doboj, Prijedor and north of Banja Luka. Of the Muslim-Croat Federation-based parties, the Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina (SzaBiH) and the United List (UL) should receive emphasis, establishing a strong training of trainers component with local party branches.

With these parties, training should emphasize building strong internal communications structures and improving relationships between the national headquarters and local party branches. With the SzaBiH, the Institute should support initiatives by key party organizers to increase the membership base and strengthen the party's nationwide apparatus.

***Intensive party pollwatching training is necessary to increase confidence among parties in the election process.*** In advance of municipal elections, NDI staff and organizers designated by individual parties to act as co-trainers should conduct party pollwatching training seminars throughout the Srpska Republica and western Hercegovina, particularly in Mostar and other areas when confidence in the election administration process is low. Local party structures and local OSCE offices should continue to distribute party pollwatching manuals.

***Political party development materials should be distributed widely and new materials should be created.*** In order to meet the high demand for tailored training materials, additional copies of existing materials should be distributed systematically throughout Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska. In response to specific party requests, new materials on developing a comprehensive campaign plan and campaign budgeting should be created and distributed beginning in mid-1997.

#### Appendices

A) News Articles

B) What the Bosnian Parties Say  
About the NDI Program

**APPENDIX A:**

**News Articles**



The following newspaper clippings were attached to this document as originally published. However, due to copyright restrictions, we are unable to reproduce them for the web.

Pomfret, John "Factional Face-Off Permeates Bosnian Vote: Division of Electorate Shape Expectations for Outcome of First Independent balloting"

*The Washington Post* September 8, 1996, A26

O'Connor, Mike "For Bosnian Serbs, Room for Dissent Appears to be Opening Up"

*The New York Times* (?) 1996 (?)

Pomfret, John "Bosnian Opposition Woos War Weary Voters"

*The Washington Post* September 12, 1996, A17

Pomfret, John "Bosnia's Opposition Wins Seat at Table: Pro Unity Parties to be Hard in Parliament"

*The Washington Post* (?) 1996 (?)

Bonner, Raymond "With Shouting Over, Bosnians get ready to Vote"

*The New York Times World Report* September 13, 1996

**APPENDIX B:**

**What the Bosnian Parties Say About the NDI Program**

## **Appendix B**

### **What the Bosnian Parties Say About the NDI Program**

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"...On behalf of the SzaBiH, I would like to thank NDI for training members of our election headquarters on message development and party activists on election day pollwatching... and would like to express our great satisfaction with our cooperation thus far"

**Safet Halilovic, General Secretary**  
**Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina (SzaBiH)**

"...Although significant election results were not expected in these first, post-war elections, the experience we had working with NDI over the last few months was very important. We recognize that the criteria for political organizing in the US is very different from that which can be applied in a country that has survived physical, spiritual and moral destruction. However, led by the slogan that the first step is very important...we in the Liberal Party dedicated special attention to NDI's seminars. NDI's activities was extremely important and will prove particularly useful when political values are more closely watched in BiH..."

**Hasib Salkic, General Secretary**  
**Liberal Party (LP)**

"With the pre-electoral campaign and elections behind us, we would like to express our gratitude for NDI's help and cooperation...and for the time and effort that you invested in the campaign process. Through our discussions together and your advice, we were able to successfully complete our job. Given the controversial nature of the recent elections, I feels obliged to run again in the 1998 elections...because I believe that civic democracy is important for the future of BiH. We hope to continue our close cooperation to prepare for these elections..."

**Vladimir Srebrov**  
**Independent candidate for BiH parliament**

"We would like to express our most sincere thanks for the help that you provided during the election campaign and our satisfaction with what has been accomplished through our cooperation with your Institute...we believe that with our political program we can increase our results for upcoming elections through improved contact with voters. For this reason, we would like to continue our cooperation and ask for additional NDI advice and training materials."

**Ibrahim Spahic, President**  
**Citizens' Democratic Party (GDS)**