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***APPENDICES***

**PRE-ELECTION SURVEY MISSION TO PAKISTAN**

September 9-16, 1990

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**COLLAGE OF PRESS CLIPPINGS COVERING  
SEPTEMBER 1990 NDI SURVEY MISSION**

The Frontier Post 9 Sept 1990

**Americans  
watching  
election  
process**



...elections survey team of National Democratic Institute, USA led by Mr. Aiwani-Sadr, in Islamabad on Saturday.

**U.S. team in Islamabad**

**F.P. Report**  
The United States has put an open eye on the forthcoming general elections in the country. An official delegation has been sent to Pakistan by Washington to monitor the election process till the transfer of power.

The delegation met the president on Saturday and discussed with him the opposition parties' apprehensions about the forthcoming polls. The delegation also took up with the president the process of the accountability against the opposition leaders.

It is learnt that more delegations from United States would visit Pakistan soon. They will also meet the prominent leaders and watch the process of polling in the country.

**Jam assures  
NDI team  
of fair poll**

Dawn 13 Sept 1990

KARACHI, Sept 12: A five-member delegation of National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington, led by Mr Kenneth Melley, now on the way...

The Muslim 10 Sept 1990

**US team calls  
on Abida**

ISLAMABAD, Sept. 9: A 4-member delegation of Washington based National

president at Aiwani-Sadr.

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The Pakistan Times 9 Sept 1990

ISLAMABAD, Sept. 8. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has said nothing including the process of accountability shall come in the way in October 24 elections.

He was talking to a five-member survey team of National Democratic Institute (NDI) of USA at the Aiwani-Sadr Saturday. The team led by Mr. E. Mark Traegen is currently visiting Pakistan to carry out a pre-election survey.

The President categorically made it clear that there was no possibility whatsoever of changing

**US observers welcomed**

**No possibility of  
changing election  
schedule: Ishaq**

mission to Pakistan to review the forthcoming elections.

Our reporter adds: President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has ruled out the possibility of the postponement of the elections.

Talking to newsmen informally at the marriage ceremony of the daughter of Mr. Justice Syed Nasim Hassan Shah of the Supreme Court of Pakistan Lahore, Friday night, President said there should be no musings about the holding of general elections after

Dawn 13 Sept 1990

**NDI team  
calls on**

Governor

...member pre-election team National Democratic Instn USA led by Mr Kenneth Melley, led on the Governor of Sindh

**No change in polls schedule**

By TA

**Accountability process  
even-handed: Ishaq**

ISLAMABAD, Sept. 8: President Ghulam Ishaq Khan said Saturday the special courts were looking into specific "known misdoings and crimes" committed by former legislators.

"The process of accountability

member of the delegation reportedly said. The President remarked that the accountability process was even-handed and the question of any discrimination did not arise, an informed source told The Muslim.

that their Institut confine its findin election arrangen also come here t pened and how i was run after th The meeting

named Acting Prime Minister. As required by the Constitution, new national and provincial elections were scheduled -- for October 24 and October 27 1990 respectively.

It is in this political context that NDI organized a five-member survey mission to Pakistan. The survey mission included: Mr. Kenneth Melley, a Member of the Board of NDI and Assistant Executive Director of the National Education Association; Mr. Mark Braden, former counsel to the Republican National Committee and a member of the 1988 Pakistan observer delegation; Dr. Ersin Kalaycioglu, a founder-member of the Turkish Democracy Foundation and a political scientist in Istanbul; Mr. Verne Newton, a former special assistant to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development and a participant in the 1988 pre-election fact-finding mission; and Dr. Mahnaz Ispahani, NDI's Director of Research and a respected scholar of South Asian politics. The mission evaluated the pre-election political environment, the laws and procedures for the elections, and the feasibility of organizing an international observer delegation.

The members of the survey mission met with a wide range of politicians including President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Acting Prime Minister Jatoi, former Prime Minister and PPP Co-Chairman, Benazir Bhutto, and leaders of the IJI, MQM, JUP, JI and other parties. The mission also met with election officials, academics, journalists and representatives of the military in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. The mission's visit received wide coverage in the print and electronic media.

There was ambivalence in Pakistan regarding the propriety of welcoming an international observer delegation for the October elections. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Acting Prime Minister Jatoi and other officials of the caretaker government welcomed the presence of an observer delegation, as did Benazir Bhutto, and officials of the caretaker government noted the international delegation's "positive and fair" report on the 1988 elections. Yet some members of the Pakistani government have expressed concern that an observer delegation would infringe upon the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Taking into account NDI's institutional commitment to the strengthening of democratic practices around the world, the fact that key Pakistani leaders welcomed an observer delegation, and NDI's commitment to consider other democratic development programs in Pakistan -- as President Ghulam Ishaq Khan suggested -- NDI plans to organize an international observer delegation to the scheduled Pakistani elections. The mission will be funded by a grant from A.I.D..

This week, the chairman of NDI, former Vice President Walter F. Mondale, is sending a letter to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan indicating that NDI plans to organize a 40-member international delegation to observe the October 24 National Assembly elections. The delegation would include parliamentarians, political party leaders and election experts from approximately 15 countries; the U.S. component would include Republicans and Democrats. A smaller team will remain in Pakistan for the October 27 Provincial Assembly elections. The letter further expresses the hope that the delegation will be received in the same positive manner as it was in 1988.

Before turning to the question of how the delegation would observe the elections, I would like to outline the principal conclusions of the survey mission regarding the current political climate.

## **The Campaign Environment**

### *Dismissal of the Government*

The election campaign is taking place in a highly charged political environment. There remains substantial legal and political controversy over the President's dismissal of the government. This is apparent even among the judiciary, as evidenced by the recent ruling of the Peshawar High Court ordering the restoration of the North West Frontier Province Assembly, and the stay order issued by the Supreme Court. In this respect, too, the campaign environment mirrors that of 1988, when there was also debate about the constitutionality of Prime Minister Junejo's ouster.

In his August 6 address, the President of Pakistan dissolved the government stating that he was exercising "the powers conferred on me by clause (2)(b) of Article 58 of the Constitution." He based his

decision on a variety of factors including, in his words, "political horse-trading, . . . violations of the Constitution in respect of Centre-Province relations, encroachment on provincial autonomy, role and status of the Senate, respect for the higher judiciary, use of official machinery and resources . . . large-scale plunder of national wealth, the scandalous incidence of corruption, and the sad law and order situation in Sind." All these factors led the President to conclude that "the Government of the Federation was not being and cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate has become necessary."

The PPP argues that the ouster of its government is unconstitutional, and the party has challenged the President's action in the courts. PPP leaders argue that the President is not constitutionally empowered to dismiss a government for perceived inefficiency, incompetence or other political reasons. According to this view, only "a complete paralysis of the government" would even arguably permit the President to dismiss the government using such constitutional authority. PPP officials refer to the 1988 ruling by the Supreme Court of Pakistan which found that the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo had been improperly removed by President Zia. In that case, the Court did not order the restoration of the Junejo government because it stated that the holding of the scheduled elections was in the national interest. The PPP further argues that the higher judiciary or the speakers of the Assembly, rather than opponents of the PPP, should have been invited to lead the caretaker government.

PPP leaders also argue that one of the President's professed main reasons for ousting Benazir Bhutto, i.e. the corruption of her government, has not been proved. Members of the caretaker government, meanwhile, expressed the view to the NDI survey team that the President has the constitutional power to dismiss a government. There does appear to be general agreement, however, that the President's actions cannot be constitutional in the absence of new elections being held within three months.

*Tribunals*

After dismissing the government, the President established special courts to hear the references submitted by the caretaker government regarding the alleged corruption of former PPP officials. In his meeting with the NDI survey team, the President stressed the importance of ensuring the accountability of public servants to the future of democracy in Pakistan.

The President also told the team that he wanted to make accountability a permanent, institutionalized process in Pakistan. He stated that special tribunals were required since the regular Pakistani courts do not provide for the disbarment of corrupt candidates seeking election and are too slow.

The laws governing these tribunals have legal precedents. In January 1949 the Constituent Assembly passed the Public and Representative Officers (Disqualification) Act (PRODA). It was used to debar many politicians from holding public office. In August 1959 the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, (EBDO) was instituted, which broadened the interpretation of corruption and misuse of power. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto resurrected the accountability proceedings in 1977. Shortly before the elections, he enacted two laws, the Holders of Representative Office (Prevention of Misconduct) Act and the Parliament and Provincial assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Act. Charges under the Misconduct Act could only be brought by the Prime Minister who was himself exempted from being tried under the Act. On November 25, 1977, when General Zia ul-Haq instituted Martial Law he modified these acts by executive order, through P.O. 16 and 17, under which the Prime Minister, the Chief Ministers and other senior officials were no longer exempt from facing charges. Subsequently, these orders underwent further modification. Today, acting under one law, the special tribunals are empowered to impose criminal sanctions; acting on cases referred under another law, the tribunals have the power to disqualify individuals from holding public office.

A caretaker government official explained the initiation of "accountability proceedings" thus: the government minister responsible



for overseeing the accountability process submits cases to the Law Division of the government which, after making its own determination as to the validity of the charges, submits a case to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, whose advice is binding, finally decides whether or not to advise the President to pursue a case. The President is the referring authority; he submits a reference to the courts instead of filing a suit or making an indictment. The survey team was told that the manner in which the tribunals affect Benazir Bhutto's electoral chances are "immaterial" to the process.

PPP representatives have challenged the fairness and the constitutionality of the special tribunals. Originally, former Prime Minister Bhutto stated that she does not recognize the tribunals' jurisdiction, describing them as "kangaroo courts." She has agreed, however, to appear before the tribunals. PPP officials argue that the tribunals are designed to fulfill a political purpose, namely, to discredit the former Prime Minister, her husband, relatives and government.

PPP officials see the establishment of a quasi-judicial process to deal with alleged government corruption as part of a strategy to prevent PPP leaders from contesting the October elections or, if they win, from forming a government. (The accountability process is intended to continue after the elections are held. Thus, candidates who have won election but are found guilty of corruption, could lose their seats in the assemblies.) The accountability process was described by PPP representatives as "a sword" hanging over their heads.

Thus far, several cases have been referred to the tribunals. The tribunal judges appear to be acting independently. They have agreed to hear certain cases; challenged the government's evidence in others; and dismissed one case. The integrity of the judges chosen to serve on these tribunals has not been questioned.

Thus far, four references have been filed against Bhutto. PPP representatives contend that once references are filed, a candidate cannot focus on his or her campaign. Less than a month before the elections, Benazir Bhutto continues to campaign, but she is also appearing in court. The PPP argues that her campaign schedule must

be arranged around tribunal appearances. No PPP candidates have yet been barred from seeking election.

The caretaker government argues that the accountability tribunals are legal and not political proceedings. Its representatives insist that the careful, drawn-out procedures of the tribunals include numerous safeguards, and that rapid disqualification is unlikely. Officials of the caretaker government stress that while the process of electoral accountability is of paramount importance, the people also have a right to know the ethical performance of those who have held public office. Defendants are represented by counsel and have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Serving judges of Pakistan's High Courts have been selected by the President, in consultation with Pakistan's Chief Justices, to conduct the proceedings of the tribunals.

Critics of the tribunals, however, argue that the tribunals' rules of procedure may not ensure certain defendants' rights of due process. The proceedings are to be continuous, without any possibility of adjournment, which, they contend, could put accused officials at a serious disadvantage in preparing their defenses.

The survey mission was told by many politicians and analysts that political corruption was a systemic problem in Pakistan. It did not seem to be confined to any particular party. A number of officials and journalists assert that corruption had become extensive in the previous government, and even in the Bhutto-Zardari family. Benazir Bhutto and her husband, however, absolutely deny all charges against her family and government. Members of the present caretaker government have also been criticized by the press and the PPP for corrupt acts.

To date, only cases against PPP members have been brought before the tribunals. Some officials of the caretaker government argue that this is due to the fact that it was the PPP that controlled the previous government. Other members of the caretaker government suggest that inquiries are being made regarding non-PPP politicians as well. Yet this has not yet led to a single case being brought against them. Officials of the caretaker government told NDI

that the delays were being caused because, among other reasons, files recording the alleged corruption were burned by departing PPP officials, and because the caretaker government wants to present "foolproof" cases.

#### *Neutrality of the Caretaker Government*

As in 1988, serious concerns have been raised about the neutrality of the caretaker government of Prime Minister Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi. Strictly speaking, some members of the 1988 caretaker government were also not politically neutral. It became quickly evident to the survey team of 1990, that today, Pakistanis are polarized between those who support the Bhutto family and those who oppose it.

As noted earlier, PPP officials argue that members of the judiciary or the speakers of the assemblies would have been more appropriate leaders of a caretaker government. In turn, when questioned on the neutrality issue, officials of the caretaker government asked whether anyone could be perceived to be neutral in Pakistan today. Judge us, they said, by our actions.

While PPP representatives and other Pakistanis question whether Benazir Bhutto will be permitted to form a government if the PPP wins the election, officials in the caretaker government and the military told the survey team that Bhutto would not be prevented from forming a government.

#### *Administration of the Elections*

The Pakistani election code and the procedures promulgated by the national election commission are virtually unchanged from the 1988 elections. These codes and procedures provided a good framework for the balloting and the tabulation of the 1988 election results. They compare favorably to procedures found in other democratic nations. The combination of registration rolls, picture identification cards and indelible ink would seem to make multiple voting by individuals extremely difficult to organize on a large scale without detection.

The Chief Election Commissioner is Justice Naimuddin, a judge

of the Supreme Court. According to him, most of the personnel for the 1990 elections will be the same as those deployed during the 1988 elections. Outside Baluchistan (where the required number of officers is unavailable), 99 percent of the returning officers are judicial officers. Deputy Commissioners will prepare the election plan (including the location of polling stations and which personnel to hire). This will then be scrutinized by returning officers. According to the Election Commissioner, complaints regarding such matters as the distances between polling sites, will be addressed and their numbers will be increased.

The election code provides that all candidates and parties are entitled to poll watchers who may be present in all polling stations before and during the casting of ballots and during all stages of the tabulation process. Each representative is entitled to record the individual polling station's results and can transmit them to their candidate or party leadership. The ballot boxes will be opened in the presence of candidates or their representatives. This system of observation at each stage of tabulation would also appear to make any systematic fraud detectable.

The actual implementation of the written legal and administrative procedures will be key in assessing the elections. In 1988 there were allegations of significant ballot fraud, but the observer delegation found little evidence to support the allegations. Given the identical procedural circumstances, an observer delegation and party poll-watchers which are permitted a level of access similar to that of 1988 should be able to determine whether the election balloting process is conducted fairly or whether widespread fraud and abuse occurs.

Many political leaders appear to have confidence in the integrity and professionalism of the Election Commission. PPP leaders, however, repeatedly expressed their concern that the executive would bring pressure to bear on the Election Commission. (These concerns were also expressed in 1988). During the past month, press reports have also noted that the administrative machinery for the elections in Punjab may be improperly used during the campaign period. A PPP leader in Punjab stated that while the Election Commission would issue orders, the polling agents themselves would be under the control

of the caretaker provincial administrations. Allegations have also been made regarding recent transfers of a number of assistant commissioners and deputy commissioners in the province of Sind.

There have been two minor changes in election procedures since 1988. One involves a change in the manner in which candidacies may be challenged. In 1988, candidacies could be challenged only by opposing candidates. The 1990 change permits any qualified elector in the district to challenge any candidacy. The period for such challenges has been expanded from two days to four. PPP representatives expressed concern that these changes would enable their opponents to harass PPP candidates. While these provisions are subject to abuse, the former procedures themselves could have been misused. There also remains an expedited appeal process to the judges of the High Court, in whom the PPP has expressed some faith. Moreover, in most democracies and in most states in the United States, any qualified elector can challenge a candidacy. Thus, this is a process that will have to be observed in order to determine whether or not it is used as an democratic device.

The other change, according to the Chief Election Commissioner, involves the redrawing of the lines of four National Assembly districts. PPP candidates alleged that these lines have been redrawn in a manner which benefits the incumbent caretaker regime. These charges were specifically denied by the Election Commission. All other districts remain the same as in 1988.

The registration rolls close on the date that an election is announced. To a limited degree, this procedure keeps political parties from padding the rolls for a particular election. The survey team did hear a PPP allegation that approximately 16,000 names of new registrants were added to the rolls in a Sind district in which Prime Minister Jatoi will be seeking election. Further investigation would be required to determine whether or not this charge is true. This was the only allegation of such a nature that was heard.

A number of politicians raised the possibility of heightened, intra-party, election-related violence in the province of Sind. In 1990, Sind has witnessed an escalation of murders, kidnappings and

robberies (in which associates of political parties are also reportedly implicated). According to military officials, prior to August 6, the army had been called out to restore order every second day in 1990. The security environment will be carefully observed in the coming weeks, not only for its potential impact on the election campaign but also as it affects the security of the members of the international observer delegation.

The survey team was also told about the exorbitant costs of contesting for a National Assembly seat in Pakistan's elections and the possibilities for illegal campaign-related activities. The observer delegation will further examine the possible abuses of campaign expenditures, e.g. bribery.

#### *Other Concerns*

As in 1988, the team heard other allegations. PPP representatives claim, for example, that government officials are unfairly using their position of incumbency. A senior PPP leader in Punjab maintained that government resources were being used by the caretaker regime to influence voters, and all projects launched by the previous PPP government had been halted.

PPP officials also complain about the media. The Bhutto government permitted a high degree of freedom for the print media. Ironically, it was the newspapers that used that freedom to print numerous stories of government corruption, helping to create a widespread impression that the PPP government was corrupt. Today, as during the tenure of the previous government and prior to the 1988 elections, the state-controlled broadcast media -- which reaches many millions more people than the print media -- continues to provide little access to opposition politicians.

Allegations of harassment, arrest and torture of PPP workers and associates of the Bhutto-Zardari family were also heard. PPP leaders in Sind complained about large-scale arrests or detentions of their party workers and provided the survey team with lists of names. They also claimed that PPP workers were being tortured in order to obtain false statements about PPP corruption. It was alleged that the homes of PPP workers have been raided and persons have been

taken to unknown places without access to counsel. These charges of human rights abuses should be further investigated.

Other political groups, particularly the MQM, a Sind-based party, maintained that during its tenure in government as well as today, the PPP has been associated with political harassment and violence against party workers. The MQM itself has been accused by its opponents, of committing violence in the major urban centers of Sind. The IJI further argues that, during its tenure in government, the PPP misused its federal authority by trying to control funds for provincial development programs.

International observers to Pakistan's elections must be aware of the complexity of the political situation in Pakistan today. Constitutional issues remain to be resolved. There is a high level of political polarization as well as fear of electoral manipulation.

There is also uncertainty surrounding the actual occurrence of the elections as scheduled. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Prime Minister Jatoi told the survey team that no postponement of the elections would be tolerated. The President pointed out that similar misgivings and doubts had been voiced prior to the 1988 elections. Some politicians and journalists informed the NDI team of various scenarios in which elections might be postponed, including increased tensions in Kashmir and instability in Sind.

Finally, there is a widespread perception among politicians, journalists, academics and others in Pakistan that the army leadership will play a major role in determining whether or not elections will be held as scheduled, as well as the composition of any future civilian government. The delegation heard arguments that the situation today differs from that of 1988, when the army lost many of its leaders in the airplane crash that killed President Zia, and the generals ensured the transition to civilian rule through an electoral process. According to many Pakistanis, the army has found little to recommend civilian government in the last 20 months. Thus, speculation about the army's future role in politics is rife.

For democracy to proceed in Pakistan, the leadership shown by the Chief of Army Staff and the President of Pakistan in ensuring

free and fair elections in 1988 will be important once more.

NDI has prior experience working in Pakistan and has organized many international delegations to elections conducted under difficult circumstances in other countries. We are confident that an observer delegation can impartially and effectively observe and evaluate the technical aspects of the electoral process in October 1990.

Despite the problems and uncertainties, Pakistanis from across the political spectrum are actively participating in the elections. This fact alone merits international support for a free and fair process.

It would be premature to make definitive judgements now about how many of the above-mentioned issues might affect the elections. To do so, would prejudice the findings of the international observer delegation. Moreover, for impartial observers, the pre-election environment is a critical aspect of the entire process but one that must be weighed after the tabulation of results.

In countries such as Chile, Panama, Nicaragua, Bulgaria, and South Korea, there were those who were prepared in advance to dismiss the possibility of free and fair elections because of pre-election irregularities. While these irregularities cannot be condoned, when assessed at the end of the process, they were not of a magnitude that would have altered the electoral outcome. On the other hand, the pre-election period in the May 1990 Rumanian elections and the January 1988 Haitian elections became prime factors in assessing the entire election process.

NDI will carefully evaluate unfolding events during the next three weeks and the international delegation will make its final assessment, examining the impact of all the issues on the voting and counting process.

There are several aspects of the proposed observation effort that I would like to highlight for the subcommittee:

- *The international observer delegation will review all aspects of the electoral process.* In assessing the campaign, all restrictions on political participation will be considered, but the primary focus of the observer delegation will be on the extent to which political parties and candidates are able to communicate their



messages to the Pakistani public through rallies, media and other means permitted by Pakistani law.

- *The observer delegation will be multi-national with the U.S. component including Republicans and Democrats.* This national and political diversity will provide the delegation with a broad political and cultural perspective with which to observe the electoral process in Pakistan. The delegation will have technical experts who have observed elections elsewhere, including members of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems.
- *The delegation members will abide by all Pakistan's laws.* They will not seek to arbitrate disputes. Delegates will attempt to document their observations, and in all instances distinguish facts from subjective judgements. The delegation will meet with government and election officials, leaders of various political parties, and representatives of other institutions that are playing a role in the electoral process.
- *On election day, delegation members will be present at polling sites across the country, with special emphasis on those areas identified as important.* This coverage, together with the presence of representatives of the competing political parties, will help permit detection of any attempt to manipulate the process in a significant manner.
- *As it did in 1988, the delegation will carefully review statistical data from past Pakistan elections.* This will provide an additional tool in evaluating allegations of electoral manipulation.
- *Because of the importance of the Provincial Assembly elections, some members of the delegation will remain in Pakistan through October 27.* The observations of this group will form a part of the delegation's overall assessment of the process.
- *A presence will also be maintained in Pakistan throughout the period required for a new government to be formed.* This will permit a review of complaints filed and an evaluation of how such complaints are handled by the authorities. If warranted, NDI will organize a visit to Pakistan by a small group of delegates to present the findings of the international delegation

to the government of Pakistan.

Having explained the methodology that will be used, let me add that the international delegation does not presume to supervise the elections. The judgement regarding the elections will be made by Pakistan's people. Similarly, the multinational observer delegation will report on the election process. It will not advocate policy towards Pakistan, in this country or elsewhere.

In this sense, the role of election observers is a limited one. They can contribute to the fairness of the process in small but important ways: by inspiring confidence in the process, helping to deter possible misconduct on election day, and by providing an objective report to the international community.

Let me close with a few final comments. As the international delegation noted in 1988, an election is just the beginning of a democratic process. It is not an end unto itself. We do not underestimate the difficulties in Pakistan. Genuine democratization in Pakistan will take many years. Political parties and parliaments require strengthening, and the civilian sphere of politics requires expansion. Long-term and large-scale programs to increase literacy, improve health, and raise the economic and social status of Pakistan's women, are also critical to the success of democratization efforts.

NDI believes that the commitment to observe the electoral process is part of its larger commitment to democratization in Pakistan. NDI would respond to requests for future programs to help make multi-party parliamentary government effective and responsive to the demands of civil society and to develop standards for good government. There is strong sentiment for democracy among Pakistan's people. In response to that sentiment, the international community should stand ready to assist all efforts to promote and sustain democratic institutions.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE****INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION  
TO THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS****MEMORANDUM**

**TO: International Delegation Members**  
**FROM: NDI**  
**DATE: October 11, 1990**  
**RE: Terms of Reference**

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is organizing a 40-member international observer delegation for the October 1990 elections in Pakistan. The delegation has been welcomed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and leaders of the major political parties. The delegation includes parliamentarians, political party leaders, democratic activists, jurists, regional specialists and election experts from some 20 countries; the United States contingent includes both the Republicans and the Democrats. While the delegation's primary focus will be on the October 24 elections for the National Assembly, several members of the delegation will remain in Pakistan for the October 27 provincial assembly elections.

NDI has considerable experience organizing international election observer missions in a number of countries, including Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Namibia, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Romania, and Taiwan. In November 1988, NDI organized a 25-member international delegation to the national and provincial elections in Pakistan.

The 1988 delegation to Pakistan judged the elections to have been generally free and fair and concluded that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, General Mirza Aslam Beg, and Chief Election Commissioner Syed Nusrat Ali contributed to and ensured the integrity of the constitutional and electoral processes. The 1988 delegation also concluded that the laws and procedures compared favorably with those used in other democratic countries, provided the

necessary public confidence to ensure the participation of all prospective candidates, and secured broad respect for the results among the contestants and the Pakistani people. The delegation further found that the campaign was conducted in a peaceful manner with no significant restrictions on the ability of parties and candidates to communicate their messages to the voters. Apart from some candidates who were government officials, none of the 1988 contesting parties was allowed access to the government-controlled television and radio. There were few observed irregularities in the balloting and counting processes, and the political parties played a critical monitoring role.

In observing the 1990 elections, the delegation does not presume to supervise the elections or to interfere in Pakistani affairs. The delegation will observe the elections in accordance with internationally recognized standards for the monitoring of electoral processes. It is the Pakistani people who will make the final judgment about the significance of these elections.

The delegation's presence will demonstrate the international community's continued interest in and support for free and fair elections and democratization in Pakistan. It will provide the international community with an objective assessment of Pakistan's electoral process. In addition, members of the delegation will have an opportunity to learn more about the development of democracy in Pakistan and to reflect on how this relates to the issue of political development in their respective countries.

The delegation's observations and other credible sources of information will form the basis for conclusions about the elections. Therefore, the delegation must attempt to document its observations and in all instances to distinguish objective from subjective judgments. To accomplish this task, the delegation will meet with government and election officials, leaders of the various political parties, and representatives of other institutions that are playing a role in the electoral process.

The delegation will arrive in Islamabad, the federal capital, on October 21 and depart from Pakistan on October 27. On October 21

and 22, NDI staff members will brief the delegation and provide a detailed itinerary. The delegation will meet with members of the Federal Election Commission, political analysts, political party representatives and others involved in the electoral process. To obtain a national perspective on the political environment and the electoral process, the delegation will then divide into seven teams that will disperse across Pakistan's four provinces – Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province – as well as Islamabad. Upon arrival in the provinces, the teams will be briefed on local political conditions and will meet with election officials and leaders of the contesting parties.

On election day, October 24, the teams will visit polling places and counting centers, observing the general conduct of the elections. Special attention will be paid to those areas identified by political party representatives. The delegation will carefully review statistical data from Pakistan's past elections, using this information as a means by which to evaluate allegations of electoral misconduct.

The entire delegation will reassemble in Karachi on October 25 for a debriefing, preparation of the delegation statement, and a press conference. Several members of the delegation will remain in Pakistan to report on the October 27 provincial elections. A technical team, comprised of one or more members, will stay in Pakistan for approximately one month to gather post-election data, evaluate the handling of complaints regarding the elections, and assess the process of forming a new government.

Drawing upon the information gathered in Islamabad, the four provincial capitals, and surrounding areas, the delegation will publish a comprehensive report after the elections. It will be widely distributed in Pakistan and throughout the world. The report will include the delegation's observations and an assessment of the issues listed below. NDI expects the report to be ready by the end of the year.

Because of the possibility that casual statements may be taken out of context, delegates should not make any comments to the media regarding their personal observations of the elections until after the

delegation has reconvened in Karachi, all the teams have provided their briefings, and the delegation has issued its formal statement. [See "Press Guidelines" in the briefing book.] Only then will delegation members have a national perspective on the electoral process. The delegation statement issued following the October 24 elections should avoid any comment that could influence the outcome of the October 27 provincial assembly elections.

Based on NDI's work in Pakistan during the last four years and, in particular, the report of a five-member survey mission that visited Pakistan from September 2 to 16, 1990, the following are among the issues that the delegation will explore:

**A. Political Campaign**

1. Was the Election Commission able to conduct the elections in a politically neutral manner? Were election authorities independent of political direction?
2. Did the identification card requirement disenfranchise a significant number of voters? Were there allegations that identification cards were misused?
3. Were there any restrictions that prevented political parties or candidates from conducting their campaigns in any region of the country?
4. Were candidates or voters subjected to intimidation during the campaign as part of an attempt to influence their votes? What was the response of the authorities to allegations of such intimidation?
5. Was there evidence of illegal campaign practices by any of the participants? How did the authorities respond to these charges?
6. Were government resources used to give an advantage to any party or candidate? What effect did this have on the campaign?
7. What effect did the existence of a state of emergency have on the campaign?
8. In light of the change in the election law to allow anyone to challenge a candidate's eligibility for the ballot, were there challenges to candidates? Were these challenges handled in an

expeditious and fair manner? Were any candidates disqualified? Were there any legal appeals in connection with such challenges?

**B. Media**

1. What was the role of the media in the elections? Did candidates have access to broadcast media in order to communicate their messages? How did the print media cover the campaign?
2. Did the government-controlled broadcast media demonstrate bias in covering the campaign? Was there news coverage of government officials who were also candidates? Did that news coverage give such candidates a notable political advantage?
3. How did the media cover allegations of corruption against former government officials? How did the media cover the proceedings of the tribunals looking into such charges?

**C. Tribunals**

1. What effect did the establishment of special tribunals have on the campaign and the electoral process? Did the cases hamper the ability of candidates to campaign?
2. Were the tribunal proceedings instituted in a non-partisan manner?
3. Was the existence of the tribunal process consistent with Pakistan's constitution and Pakistani law? Did the tribunals act in a manner consistent with Pakistan's law?
4. How were tribunal judges selected and appointed?
5. Did the tribunals conduct themselves in an impartial and fair manner? Did the tribunals' rules of procedure, including the rule against adjournments, hinder the ability of defendants to prepare a defense and to campaign?
6. Was there any effort to influence politically the actions of the tribunals? Did the tribunals act independently?
7. Were any candidates disqualified by the accountability tribunals?

**D. Administration of Elections**

1. Did the national and provincial election commissions and the local election officials act in a nonpartisan manner?
2. Did the safeguards included in the law prove adequate to prevent significant fraud in the balloting process?
3. Were voters identified in accordance with the procedures established by the Election Commission? Were large numbers of Pakistanis unable to vote because they lacked national identity cards?
4. Were voters able to cast a secret ballot? Was there any intimidation of voters by security forces, local leaders, or political parties on election day?
5. Were the poll watchers designated by the political parties permitted access to polling sites and to the counting centers?
6. Were ballots counted in the manner established by the election law? Were there suspicious delays in the preparation or release of election returns?
7. Were there any challenges to the balloting or counting processes?

**E. The Results**

1. Were the official results reported in accordance with the election law?
2. Did the various Pakistani political parties recognize the results? If not, were challenges filed in accordance with the election law?
3. Was a new government formed in accordance with the prescribed procedures?



**INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION BRIEFINGS  
ISLAMABAD**

**OCTOBER 21, 1990**

*NDI Briefing*

Welcome Remarks and NDI  
Activities in Pakistan  
Kenneth Wollack

Pakistan's Politics and Society  
Mahnaz Ispahani

Overview of Election  
Observation  
Larry Garber

Pakistan's Election Law  
Patricia Keefer

Delegates attend political rallies  
in Islamabad and Rawalpindi

**OCTOBER 22, 1991**

*Central Election Commission  
Briefing*

Justice Naimuddin Ahmed  
Chief Election Commissioner

Chaudhry Shauqat Ali  
Secretary, Central Election  
Commission

Humayun Khan  
Additional Secretary, Central  
Election Commission

*Peoples Democratic Alliance  
(PDA) Briefing*

Shahnaz Wazir Ali  
former Minister of State for  
Education

Amna Piracha  
Central Secretariat, Pakistan  
Peoples Party

Kamran Shafi  
Former Press Secretary to  
Benzir Bhutto

Afzal Siddiqui  
Advocate

*Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI)  
Briefing*

Hussain Haqqani  
Press Secretary to Acting Prime  
Minister

Appendix VII comprises three parts: 1) 1990 General Election Team Deployment; 2) Pre-Election Delegation Team Meetings; and 3) Special Functional Teams

**1990 GENERAL ELECTION TEAM DEPLOYMENT**

**PUNJAB**

*Lahore:*

Balasubramaniam  
Coleman  
Giere  
Hatch  
Hertzberg  
Katjavivi  
Ispahani  
Mitropoulos  
Makram Ebeid  
Oldaker  
Ozbudun

*Islamabad/Rawalpindi:*

J. Baran  
K. Baran  
Brandenburg  
Dembinski  
Feldman  
Halefoglu  
Hennessey  
McAvoy  
Steiner  
Vulkova  
Wollack

*Multan:*

Bjornlund  
McInturff  
Ooko-Ombaka

**SIND**

*Karachi:*

Andrews  
Garber  
Heins  
Heper  
Huffman  
Jones  
Leissner  
Nakano

*Faisalabad:*

Fox  
Quesada  
Shocas

*Sukkur:*

Toure

Rubin

*Nawabshah:*

Manikas

Nkwinti

**BALUCHISTAN***Quetta:*

Wilson

Richter

**NORTH WEST FRONTIER***Peshawar:*

Gabal

Griffin

Keefer

Saunders

Sock

Wood

PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION TEAM MEETINGS

**ISLAMABAD**  
**(Leadership Team)**

*October 22, 1990*

Ghulam Ishaq Khan  
President, Islamic Republic of  
Pakistan

Sartaj Aziz  
Minister for Finance, Planning  
and Economic Affairs

Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Wasim Sajjad  
Chairman of the Senate

Syed Ijlal Haider Zaidi  
Defense Advisor to the Prime  
Minister

**ISLAMABAD**

*October 23, 1990*

Ijaz Gilani  
Gallup Pakistan

Salim Gilani  
Director General, Pakistan  
Broadcasting Corporation

Amanullah Khan  
Bureau Chief, Daily *Musawaat*

Darius Minwalla  
Advisor to former Prime  
Minister Benazir Bhutto

Sheikh Mansoor  
PDA, Islamabad Secretariat

Agha Nasir  
Managing Director, Pakistan  
Television Corporation

Zaheer Bhatti  
Director of Programming,  
Pakistan Television

**FAISALABAD**

*October 23, 1990*

Mohamed Hussein Bhatti  
Chief Election Official,  
Faisalabad District

Mohammed Asif Khan  
Assistant Commissioner, City of  
Faisalabad

Syed Tahir Raza  
Additional Deputy  
Commissioner, Faisalabad  
District

Zahid Sarfaraz  
Minister of Interior

Syed Mahmood Alam Shah  
Faisalabad Chamber of  
Commerce & Industry

Badar Chaudhary  
President, PDA  
Faisalabad Division

Fazal Hussain Rahi  
Candidate, NA 64, PDA

Col. Nisar Akbar  
PDA

## LAHORE

*October 23, 1990*

Khalilur Rehman Khan  
Election Commissioner  
Punjab Province

Mian Nawaz Sharif  
Former Chief Minister, Punjab  
Province

Mian Mohammad Azhar  
Governor, Punjab Province

Khurshid Kasuri  
Secretary-General, PDA

Fakhar Zaman  
President, Provincial Secretariat,  
PDA, Punjab Province

Asaf F. Wardag  
Member, Senate of Pakistan  
Additional Secretary General  
Central Secretariat, IJI

Asma Jahangir  
Advocate, Human Rights  
Commission of Pakistan

Shahid Kardar  
Economist, Human Rights  
Commission of Pakistan

I.A. Rehman  
Director, Human Rights  
Commission of Pakistan

Ahmed Rashid  
Journalist

## MULTAN

*October 23, 1990*

Tariq Farooq  
Commissioner, Multan Division

Sheikh Jalil Ahmad  
Election Officer, Multan  
Division

**KARACHI\***

*October 23, 1990*

Shareef Malik  
Additional Deputy  
Commissioner, Multan Division

M.H. Zaidi  
Election Commissioner, Sind  
Province

S.M. Tariq Qadri  
Election Officer, Multan  
Division

Jam Sadiq Ali  
Chief Minister of Sind

Malik Mukhtar Awan  
Candidate, NA 116, PDA  
Former Minister of Manpower

Altaf Hussain  
MQM Chief, Karachi

Professor Ghafoor Ahmed  
Jamaat-e-Islami

Hamid Raza Gilani  
Candidate NA 114, IJI

Justice Dorab Patel  
Human Rights Commission

Khalid Hassan  
Journalist, *The Frontier Post*

Iqbal Haider  
PDA

Syed Ishtiaq Hussain Jaffrey  
Chairman, Small Landowners &  
Farmers Association of Pakistan

**PESHAWAR**

*October 23, 1990*

Syed Zaman Jaffrey  
President, Saraiki Quami  
Movement  
Secretary General, Saraiki  
National Alliance

Gulistan Janjua  
Governor, North West Frontier  
Province (NWFP)

\* The Karachi, Sukkur and Nawabshah teams all attended briefings in Karachi on October 23 before deploying on election day to their respective regions. The teams also held meetings with local election and party officials on October 24.

Taqi S. Hashmi  
Director of Public Relations,  
Ministry of Information  
Government of the North West  
Frontier Province (NWFP)

Qaiser Khan  
PDA

Wali Khan  
Awami National Party

Aftab Sherpao  
Former Chief Minister, PDA

QUETTA

*October 23, 1990*

Sardar Fateh Hassani  
Member of the National  
Assembly

Abbas Ali Shah  
Managing Director, Bannu  
Sugar Mills, Ltd.

**FUNCTIONAL TEAMS**

**CHALLENGES AND  
COMPLAINTS**

J. Baran  
Garber  
Griffin  
Katjavivi  
Quesada  
Shocas

**MEDIA**

K. Baran  
Hertzberg  
McAvoy  
McInturff  
Toure

**STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

Brandenburg  
Feldman  
Gabal  
Hatch  
Nakano  
Garber

**TRIBUNALS**

Coleman  
Heins  
Manikas  
Oldaker  
Sock  
Bjornlund



**ARRIVAL STATEMENT****INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION  
TO PAKISTAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS**

October 23, 1990

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am Vahit Halefoglu from Turkey, and I am pleased to introduce the international delegation that is in Pakistan to observe the October 24 and 27 National and Provincial elections. This delegation is being organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which has gained an international reputation for professionalism in organizing such efforts.

Before we explain the nature of our visit, allow me to introduce the co-leader of this delegation Senator Stanislaw Dembinski of Poland, to my left. Senator Dembinski is a prominent figure in the Solidarity movement, which courageously and successfully spearheaded the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe. To my right is Ken Wollack, Executive Vice President of the National Democratic Institute.

I would also like to note that this 40-member delegation includes prominent parliamentarians, political party leaders, regional specialists and election experts from 17 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Many of the delegation members have participated in the previous observer missions, including the mission that observed the 1988 National and Provincial Assembly elections.

Given the significance of these elections for the democratic future of Pakistan, it is not surprising that the elections have attracted international attention. This delegation has been welcomed by leaders of the caretaker government as well as leaders of major political parties. Many other Pakistanis also have expressed appreciation that this and other groups are present for the elections.

I wish to emphasize that this delegation is here as observers. We do not come as supervisors or arbiters. We have taken no

### *Appendix VIII*

position on the outcome of these elections. Ultimately, it will be the Pakistani people who will judge the fairness of the electoral process.

The purposes of the delegation are to demonstrate the international community's continued support for free and fair elections, and for the democratization process in Pakistan. We also are here to learn from the people of Pakistan about the nature of the electoral process and its implications for Pakistan's political future. Let me emphasize though that the members of the delegation are not serving as representatives of governments, and therefore, we will not make policy recommendations as to bilateral issues among our respective countries. Our role is strictly limited to providing the international community with an assessment of Pakistan's electoral process.

This role is consistent with the practice of international election observer missions, a practice that is now widely accepted in the international community. The attitude of political party representatives and members of the caretaker government toward this delegation reflects this trend.

Two years ago, our predecessor delegation, also organized by NDI reported that the elections were conducted in a generally fair manner. It concluded that the laws and procedures compared favorably with those used in other peaceful democratic countries and that the pre-election campaign was, by and large, peaceful and fair.

While there has been serious debate in Pakistan about several aspects of these elections, all sectors of the population appear to be participating actively in the process. We have already met with a wide spectrum of Pakistanis to obtain their views on the electoral process and the delegation has already divided into teams, most of which have departed Islamabad to visit all four provinces of the country. Delegation members will meet with Pakistanis involved in the electoral process in each of the provinces and, on Wednesday, will observe the balloting and counting processes at hundreds of polling sites around the country.

The delegation has reviewed carefully the report of a election international team that visited Pakistan several weeks ago

*Appendix VIII*

assess the pre-election environment and preparations for the elections. Throughout our stay, members of the delegation will be obtaining assessments of Pakistanis regarding three distinct elements of the electoral process – the campaign period, election day procedures, and the tabulation of results.

The delegation reassembles in Karachi on Thursday to share our experiences and plans to issue a preliminary statement on Friday. Our observations of this process will, we expect, reflect those of the Pakistani people.

In addition to the delegation's observations of the National elections, a smaller group will remain in Pakistan to report on the Provincial elections. NDI representatives will also stay in Pakistan in order to gather post-election data. The delegation will then prepare a comprehensive report that will be published next month.

We wish to reiterate our support for the people of Pakistan in their efforts to consolidate democratic government in which political pluralism flourishes, individual rights are protected and the rule of law is institutionalized.

Thank you. We will be pleased to answer any questions.

**PRELIMINARY STATEMENT****INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION  
TO THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS**

October 26, 1990

This is the preliminary statement of a 40-member international delegation that observed Pakistan's national elections on October 24, 1990. The delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), includes parliamentarians, political party leaders, election experts and regional specialists from 17 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America.

Given the significance of these elections for the democratic future of Pakistan, it is not surprising that the elections have attracted international attention. This delegation was officially welcomed by leaders of the caretaker government as well as leaders of major political parties.

The purposes of this delegation were to demonstrate the international community's support for free and fair elections and for the democratization process in Pakistan. The delegation's mandate included the examination of three aspects of the election process; the campaign, the balloting and the tabulation of results. Our statement presents a preliminary assessment of these matters. A more detailed report, which will include a review of election complaints and how they were handled by the Election Commission and the courts, will be issued at a later date.

The delegation arrived in Pakistan on Saturday, October 21. During its stay, the delegates met with government and election officials, leaders of the major political parties, journalists and others involved in the electoral process in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Faisalabad, Multan, Sukkur and Nawabshah. On election day, members of the delegation visited polling stations in approximately 30 constituencies and observed both the balloting and counting processes. The delegation also carefully examined several

critical aspects of the electoral environment, including the media, the accountability tribunals and the handling of election-related complaints by the election commission.

The elections, as we observed them at the local level, were generally open, orderly and well-administered. The procedures used for the balloting process were in accordance with the applicable election law. In addition, the electoral system affords opportunities for the candidates and parties to check for abuse.

The election personnel involved in administering the process were usually well-versed in the system. They appeared to be impartial and effective. Generally, the police present at polling stations maintained law and order and provided a calming influence. At most polling sites, at least two party representatives were present. The delegation was impressed by the cooperation between the polling agents representing opposing parties.

The delegation reviewed the processing by the election commission of several complaints. Generally, the election commission communicated with federal and provincial officials to obtain information regarding the exact nature of the allegations. In some cases, the election commission's exclusive reliance on such information made it difficult for the commission to fully ascertain the credibility of the allegations presented.

Before the election, the contesting political parties and alliances had an opportunity to communicate with prospective voters through large rallies, processions, posters, billboards and other campaign activities.

Despite these positive conditions, the election process was not without problems. The delegation members recognize that the election campaign was conducted in a highly polarized political environment, due in part to the August 6 dissolution of the government and the establishment of accountability tribunals. While rendering a judgement on these actions is beyond the mandate of this delegation, the delegation believes that the ongoing tribunal process during the campaign and the selective filing of references before these special courts complicated the pre-election atmosphere. In the same

vein, the caretaker government's use of the perquisites of incumbency was controversial and seems to have given an advantage to one of the contesting parties.

On election day, in certain constituencies throughout the country, and particularly in Sind, delegation members heard credible reports of several specific and serious problems. Examples of these problems are:

- the killing of candidates, party workers and other civilians;
- attacks by armed men on polling officials, polling agents and voters; and
- the kidnapping and arrest of party workers.

Cultural, social and religious realities make it difficult for a number of women to effectively participate in the electoral process. The large number of women that turned out to vote shows their desire to participate in the process. The administrative procedures as applied in polling stations for women, however, made it difficult for polling agents to verify the eligibility of women to vote. These problems allow the opportunity for abuse and manipulation in certain areas.

The independent, English-language print media actively covered the election campaign in Pakistan and played a positive and constructive role in the election process. Given the low literacy rate, however, it is unclear how significant an impact print media have in influencing political opinion.

The delegation heard several complaints about bias in the electronic media. The delegation concludes that Pakistan Television's news coverage of the campaign was not balanced. The coverage of Pakistan Radio was somewhat more balanced, especially on election day. The delegation notes that this is the first time that PTV has covered a general election, and hopes that there will be better coverage in the future.

Yesterday, the delegation heard allegations about tampering with the vote count by switching ballots boxes and by expelling polling agents. Our delegation saw no evidence on election night to support these allegations. It is our opinion that the safeguards in the system

would make tampering on a scale sufficient to affect the overall nationwide results difficult, but not impossible.

Delegation members did receive some information that an election "cell" in a provincial chief minister's secretariat had requested progressive reports of election results in apparent violation of published election rules.

The delegation does not believe that the above-mentioned problems significantly altered the outcome of the elections.

As of today, the delegation has received no evidence that would allow us to substantiate allegations concerning irregular vote totals. Given that this is a preliminary assessment, however, the delegation will closely monitor the situation, including the use of statistical analysis, to examine further this matter. The statistical analysis, relying on data obtained from the election commission and the political parties, will permit a comparison of the results of this election with results in the two previous elections. In addition, we urge the election commission and other authorities to act on all allegations tendered to them.

As a final comment, we hope that the level of cooperation between local party agents that we witnessed on election day leads to the peaceful evolution of democracy in Pakistan. The development of democracy in Pakistan could only benefit from a spirit of tolerance, dialogue and cooperation among the political parties. The delegation hopes that the decision of the major political parties to participate in the October 27 Provincial Assembly elections is indicative of this spirit.

**STATEMENT OF KENNETH WOLLACK  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS  
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE**

November 2, 1990

Thank you Mr. Chairman. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) appreciates this opportunity to present its views and those of the 40-member international delegation that observed the recent elections in Pakistan. The delegation, which included nationals of 17 countries, was led by former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Vahit Halefoglu and Polish Senator Stanislaw Dembinski.

The delegation issued a preliminary statement on Friday, October 26. This was done after several days of briefings, meetings with government officials and political party leaders, visits to more than 600 polling sites in 30 National Assembly constituencies, review of the counting process, a lengthy debriefing session following the elections, and an initial statistical analysis of the announced results. I am submitting a full copy of the preliminary statement for the record; for now, I wish to highlight several key points included in the assessment.

First, the delegation reported that it had seen a generally open, orderly, well-administered balloting process, with well-trained polling officials and agents for at least two parties present at almost every polling site visited.

The delegation noted several areas where the election was marred by violence, arrests of party representatives, other acts of intimidation and failure to comply with the prescribed procedures. The latter failure increased the possibility that the safeguards included in a well-designed election system could be undermined.



The delegation reviewed some of the problems that affected the campaign. In certain areas, the pre-election political environment did not provide a level playing field for all the contesting parties. While political parties were allowed to campaign freely, hold rallies and use posters and music to communicate their messages, other factors complicated the pre-election period. These factors included the selective use of accountability tribunals and the perquisites of incumbency by the caretaker governments, which benefitted one of the contesting parties. The delegation believed that the existence of the above-mentioned problems did not significantly affect the overall results, which showed the Islamic Democratic Alliance (known by its Urdu initials as the IJI) scoring a major victory.

Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), however, was contending, and still contends, that the results were attributable to massive rigging. Other parties also claim that fraud affected their candidates' results. In these circumstances, as a final point, the delegation emphasized the preliminary nature of its statement and indicated that it would continue to monitor the situation, would view the complaints presented by the different parties and would complete a statistical analysis of the results. The preliminary assessment was not intended as a certification of the elections, and the delegation was quite careful in avoiding statements that could be seen as suggesting such a conclusion. This point has been reiterated in a letter sent earlier this week by NDI president Brian Atwood to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

The delegation fulfilled its responsibility by reporting in a credible and objective manner on the entire electoral process. The preliminary statement included election day observations and noted the misgivings of the delegation regarding certain aspects of the election environment and campaign. The delegation's statement contributed to the international community's understanding of what happened in Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, for the past five years, NDI has been following political developments in Pakistan closely. In 1988, NDI organized a pre-election mission and an 18-member international observer

delegation, thus providing the Institute with a comprehensive understanding of the legal framework and administrative procedures used in Pakistan's elections. Consequently, NDI appreciated the challenges involved in organizing an observer delegation for the 1990 elections, particularly given the highly polarized nature of Pakistan society today.

Recognizing these factors and the possibility that the electoral outcome might be challenged by one of the contesting parties, NDI organized the observer delegation with considerable care. The size of the delegation was more than doubled as compared to 1988. On election day, the delegation covered 11 cities and their environs, as compared to five in 1988.

However, having organized observer delegations in varied and difficult circumstances, NDI is well aware that it is not only the size of the delegation and its election day coverage that are important in observing elections. Thus in structuring the observer delegation for this election, NDI established functional teams comprised of experts from different countries to examine the accountability tribunals, the role of the media and the complaints process, and to conduct a statistical analysis of the results. These teams met with government officials, political party leaders, jurists, and journalists, and reviewed carefully the contents of the references filed against Ms. Bhutto and her colleagues, complaints filed with the election commission and tapes of news programs.

On election day, the delegation remained in contact with the political parties. Delegation members sought to verify complaints by visiting the polling sites where there were potential or reported problems. In some cases the reports proved accurate, while in the majority of cases delegation members established that no problems existed.

In addition, more than 10 hours were reserved for debriefing sessions in which the reports of the functional and election day teams were drafted and presented to the entire delegation. In their reports, delegates emphasized different aspects of the process based on what they saw and heard in their assigned regions. The delegation

statement, however, reflected a consensus view based on a nationwide perspective.

Finally, NDI was aware that the responsibilities of the delegation did not end with the issuance of a preliminary assessment. Thus, the mission included observation of the Provincial Assembly elections and a continuous on-the-ground presence to review the complaints process. It is to these matters that I would like to now turn.

A 15-member team remained in Pakistan for the Provincial Assembly elections on Saturday, October 27. Even more than the National Assembly elections, these elections were marred by violence. Forty-one people were reported killed and scores were injured; casualties included supporter of all major parties. Many of the deaths and injuries were the result of local rivalries, but this does not mitigate the responsibility of government officials and political party leaders to create an environment in which human rights are protected.

In addition to observing the Provincial Assembly elections, the delegation also met with political party representatives to obtain further information regarding allegations of massive fraud in the National Assembly elections. There were many allegations presented by all parties, but particularly the PPP, some with very specific details. However, hard and fast evidence regarding massive fraud has yet to be documented and presented, but the process of collecting data that would form the basis for such claims is now underway.

An NDI representative continues to meet with the political parties and to follow the complaints process as prescribed by Pakistani law. During this past week, the election commission has held hearings regarding the most serious complaints presented by the different parties. The commission has the authority to take appropriate action, including the voiding of election results and the scheduling of new elections in particular constituencies.

According to information current as of Thursday, October 31, the Commission had scheduled hearings in eight cases involving National Assembly constituencies. One of these cases was dismissed following a hearing and the winning candidate officially proclaimed;

in the remaining cases, the commission has not yet reached a decision and the winning candidate has not yet been officially proclaimed. In addition, with respect to at least one Provincial Assembly election the Commission has ordered a repolling in approximately 21 polling stations.

Following the announcement of the official results, a second, more formal, complaints process is available. This involves the formation of election tribunals, which hear petitions filed within 45 days of the declaration of the official results. These petitions must include list of witnesses and supporting documents, and must be accompanied by a deposit. On Thursday, the Commission named the justices for seven election tribunals (three in Punjab, two in Sind, one each in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan). The PPP has indicated that it plans on pursuing claims of fraud through the petition process, although this process may take anywhere from several months to one or two years.

In addition to monitoring the proceedings before these tribunals, the NDI representative is reviewing the tally sheets prepared by the returning officers for selected constituencies. The data on these tally sheets can then be compared to the results obtained by the party agents. However, the PPP acknowledges that it does not have tally sheets for many of the polling stations, thus making such comparisons difficult.

I would now like to report on the statistical analysis that we are conducting. By way of background, NDI's election observing experience has demonstrated the importance of focussing particular attention on the process of counting, tabulating and announcing the vote count. It is during this phase that wholesale fraud affecting the overall results can be committed. For this reason, NDI, in other countries where it has worked, encourages the use of parallel vote tabulations as a basis for verifying the official results of the election. However, as we discovered in 1988, no party or independent group in Pakistan was able to conduct an effective operation on a nationwide basis.

Recognizing this deficiency, in 1988 NDI relied on a statistical

analysis performed by Lee Feldman, president of Global Analysis, Inc., to evaluate the results. That analysis proved critical in refuting the allegation that requiring the presentation of identification cards at the polling site systematically disenfranchised large number of voters, thus depriving the PPP of an absolute majority in the National Assembly. The analysis showed that whatever disenfranchisement may have occurred did not have a disproportionate affect on any one party.

For the 1990 elections, NDI sought to use statistical analysis as a tool for identifying possible anomalies in the reported results. The statistical analysis developed once again by Mr. Feldman was meant to supplement the observations in the field and the qualitative analysis of issues relating to the campaign.

In brief, the following areas were reviewed: 1) an analysis of registration figures and voter turnout in 1990 by constituency as compared to 1988; and 2) a comparison of 1990 and 1988 voting results by constituency.

The data thus far shows the following (where we have complete data):

1. The number of registered voters in 1990 was 47,246,379, an increase of 1,040,334 from 1988;
2. The voter turnout in 1990 was 46.2 percent, an increase of 3.12 percent from 1988;
3. The range of turnout by constituency was considerably more varied in 1990 than in 1988 (i.e., in 1990, the standard deviation in turnout was 22.2 – the comparable figure for 1988 was 12.6);
4. In the 104 constituencies where the IJI won the elections, the average turnout was 48.9 percent;
5. In the 44 constituencies where the PPP won the elections, the average turnout was 41 percent;
6. In the 50 constituencies with the lowest margin of victory in 1988 (i.e., a margin of victory of less than 2,700 votes), the IJI won 17 seats, the PPP won two seats, and the remainder were won by candidates representing other parties or independents;

7. In the 10 percent of constituencies with the highest increase in registration, the IJI won four seats and the PPP won one seat;
8. In the 10 percent of constituencies with the highest increase in turnout, the IJI won eight seats and the PPP won six seats;
9. In the 10 percent of constituencies with the largest decrease in turnout, the IJI won 11 seats, the PPP won seven seats and the MQM won 11 seats.
10. In the 46 constituencies where the PPP won in 1988 and the IJI won in 1990, registration increased by an average of .5 percent (1,139 votes per constituency), turnout increased by an average of 9 percent, and the percentage of votes received by other candidates decreased by an average of 11.3 percent.

There are several hypotheses to explain this data. Some are consistent with a relatively fair election in which a major political shift occurred, while others could be used to support claims that fraud occurred. The statistical analysis alone does not support such a conclusion, but must be analyzed together with evidence presented by the political parties regarding specific constituencies. Through its on-site monitoring, the delegation is continuing to explore these matters. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

**ELECTION COMMISSION ALLOCATION OF SYMBOLS  
TO POLITICAL PARTIES  
1990 GENERAL ELECTIONS**

*MUSLIM POLITICAL PARTIES*

	<b>Name of Party/Group</b>	<b>Election Symbol</b>
1)	Awami National Party	Lantern
2)	Islami Jamhoori Ittihad	Bicycle
3)	Pakistan Democratic Party	Umbrella
4)	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam (Fazalur Rehman Group)	Book
5)	Pakistan National Party	Axe
6)	Haq Parast Group	Kite
7)	Baluchistan National Movement	Saw
8)	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani Group)	Ladder
9)	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Niazi Group)	Tractor
10)	Sind National Front	Car
11)	Sind National Alliance (Hamida Khuhro Group)	Sewing Machine
12)	Jamhoori Wattan Party	Wheel

- |     |   |               |
|-----|---|---------------|
| 13) | Peoples Democratic Alliance                       | Arrow         |
| 14) | Pakistan Awami Tehreek                            | Clock         |
| 15) | Pukhtun Khawa Milli Awami Party                   | Tree          |
| 16) | Punjabi Pukhtun Ittehad<br>(Sarwar Awan Group)    | Spectacles    |
| 17) | Punjabi Pukhtun Ittehad<br>(Mir Hazar Khan Group) | Hockey        |
| 18) | Hazara Front                                      | Walking Stick |
| 19) | Pakistan Muslim League<br>(Qayyum Group)          | Scooter       |
| 20) | Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party<br>(Fatehyab Group) | Mountain      |
| 21) | Jamiat ahl-e-Hadis                                | Telephone     |
| 22) | Progressive Peoples Party Pakistan                | Knife         |
| 23) | Awami Tehreek (Palejo Group)                      | Bus           |
| 24) | National Democratic Party                         | Flower Vase   |
| 25) | Qaumi Inqilabi Party                              | Bulb          |
| 26) | Jamiat ahl-e-Sunnat                               | Turban        |
| 27) | Pakistan Muslim League<br>(Sh. Liaquat Group)     | Lota          |
| 28) | Baluch Ittehad Party                              | Suitcase      |



29)	Pakistan Saraiki Party	Takhti
30)	Sind National Alliance (Hamid Jatoi Group)	Table
31)	Muhajir Punjabi Pathan Ittehad	Lock
32)	Saraiki Quami Ittehad	Ghulail

*NON-MUSLIM POLITICAL PARTIES*

	<b>Name of Party/Group</b>	<b>Election Symbol</b>
1)	Pakistan Christian National Party (Samson Manoa Group)	Chair
2)	Pakistan Christian National Party (Joseph Francis Group)	Spade
3)	Pakistan Masihi Ittehad	Ladder
4)	Pakistan Masihi League (Ajmal Group)	Umbrella
5)	Pakistan Masihi League (Hayat Group)	Scooter
6)	Pakistan Masihi Party	Car
7)	Pakistan United Christians Front	Bicycle
8)	Pakistan Iqiliati Rabata Party	Candle
9)	All Pakistan Christian Movement	Arrow

- |     |                                  |                |
|-----|----------------------------------|----------------|
| 10) | Pakistan Christian Association   | Saw            |
| 11) | Pakistan Minority Ittehad        | Tractor        |
| 12) | Pakistan Christian Congress      | Railway Engine |
| 13) | Pakistan Minority Inqilabi Group | Axe            |
| 14) | Pakistan Hindu Party             | Wheel          |
| 15) | Masihi Awami Party               | Well           |
| 16) | Azad Masihi League               | Turban         |
-

## IJI POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT



Date: Oct. 19, 1990

RAWALPINDI

Page:

پاکستان کو امریکی فوجی امداد منسوخ، پاکستانی میڈیا کی طرف سے شوق و شہادتوں میں تقاسیم کے جالے کوئی نہیں

نصرت بھٹو نے آہم کردار ادا کیا

امریکی ہیڈیوں کو نصرت بھٹو کی پیش کش!

**کہوٹہ لے لو۔ کرسی دے دو**

**ہمارا اعلان**

جان دے دیں گے۔ کہوٹہ پر آپ سب کو نہیں آنے دیں گے

پاکستان کے ایٹمی پروگرام کی مفاہمت یعنی اسلامی جمہوری اتحاد کو ووٹ دیجئے

پاکستان کے ایٹمی پروگرام کا منظر

اسلامی جمہوری اتحاد

اپنی قسمت آپ بنائیں

سائیکل پیرمر لگائیں

**SECTION 574(b) OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS,  
EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS  
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1991  
(THE MIKULSKI AMENDMENT)**

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated by this Act under the headings "Economic Support Fund," "Foreign Military Financing Program," and "International Military Education and Training" may be available for Pakistan unless the President certifies, and so reports to the Congress, that

- 1) the state of emergency in Pakistan did not interfere in the fair conduct of National Assembly elections;
- 2) the Government of Pakistan held timely, free, fair, and internationally monitored National Assembly elections, open to the full participation of all legal parties and all legal candidates of those parties;
- 3) the proceedings of the Special Courts established on August 8 and August 21, 1990, did not interfere with the conduct of free and fair elections; and
- 4) the process of convening the National Assembly is progressing without interference.

**LETTER ALLEGEDLY WRITTEN BY PRIME MINISTER  
BENAZIR BHUTTO TO PETER GALBRAITH**

MRS. BENAZIR BHUTTO  
BILAWAL HOUSE  
KARACHI.

Dear Peter Galbraith,

I don't know how to thank you, for your so many favours to me and my family.

As you know that the orders of my dismissal were drafted in the JAG branch of the CIO, as it was not possible for me to pull along with the army and they subverted my Government.

I have already communicated to various friends in the congress and especially Stephen Solarza; to use their good offices with President Bush, so as to put maximum pressure on President Ishaq, and the army in Pakistan, that they do not disqualify me from the elections, as it will be unjust and negation of all democratic principles for which we have struggled.

It would be most appropriate if military as well as economic assistance to Pakistan is stopped, and all the international agencies like the World Bank, IMF are told to squeeze the Government of Pakistan, and if possible all supply to Pakistan should be disrupted, so that normal life in Pakistan comes to stand still.

As long as I was the Prime Minister, I kept a check on the nuclear device, but now I do not know what are the plans of the Government.

The suspension of F-16 and its spares will bring the army to its senses.

Dear Peter, please use your influence on V.P. Singh the Indian Prime Minister, to engage the Pakistan army on the borders, so that they do not impede my way.

I wish Rajiv Gandhi had been the Prime Minister of India, things would have been easier.

Thanking you and with warm regards.

Sincerely yours,

*Benazir Bhutto*

Dated: 24-09-1990

PDA POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT



Date: 11/18

RAWALPINDI

Page:

پاپلز پارٹی اور جے سندھ کے کارکنوں میں تصادم، متعدد زخمی

پشاور میں پاپلز پارٹی کے احتجاجی جلسے پر بموں سے حملہ، متعدد افراد زخمی

وفاق پاکستان کا بٹوارہ نہیں ہونے دینگے

نہیں ہونے دینگے، نہیں ہونے دینگے

سندھ عوام کا ہے۔ بلوچستان عوام کا ہے۔ سرحد عوام کا ہے۔  
پنجاب عوام کا ہے۔

کئی جی ایم پی کے نواب کسی خان اور کسی میاں کی جاگیر نہیں

وفاق پاکستان زندہ باد  
عوام پاکستان زندہ باد

پاپلز ڈیموکریٹک الائنمنٹ




Midas

## SAMPLE VOTER ID CARD

حکومت پاکستان  
شناختی کارڈ

BD 834849

دستخط یا نشان اجہو۔

PHOTO OFFICE NO. 25-5-58

شناختی نمبر 267-55-319057

نام \_\_\_\_\_ رقیہ بی بی

والد یا خاوند کا نام \_\_\_\_\_ رحمت علی

موجودہ پتہ \_\_\_\_\_ کمری کھڑکی لہرا

مستقل پتہ \_\_\_\_\_ کورٹ فور اے سیسہ باغ تھان لہور













شناختی علامت \_\_\_\_\_ دلہن ہاؤس بزرگ خان

تاریخ پیدائش \_\_\_\_\_ 1955

Assistant Director  
LAHORE.

۱- کارڈ گم ہونے کی صورت میں قریبی کسی رہبر میں دستخط و ملاحظہ کروائیں۔  
۲- گم شدہ کارڈ ملنے پر قریبی رہبر جس میں ڈال دیں۔

## SAMPLE BALLOT

NA-81 GUJRAT-II	
 شہزاد انور	 پیر محمد افضل قادری
 عابد حسین سندھو	 چوہدری احمد مختار
 گلزار احمد	 چوہدری شجاعت حسین
 محمد عارف محمود	 چوہدری صادق حسین
 مختار انور	 خادم حسین قیصر
 مس ارشاد چوہدری	 حفصہ جیات



## SUKKUR AND GUJRANWALLA TEAM REPORTS

*Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the delegation teams based on reports filed by delegation members. The following two reports were also prepared by delegation members and are included to provide two kinds of information: additional information on the election process and an account of the methodology used by observers on election day. While these reports differ in style and content, both provide insight into the techniques used by election observers and the positive and negative events that characterized these elections.*

### REPORT OF SUKKUR TEAM

Members of team: Barnett R. Rubin (rapporteur) and Babacar Toure

Background: The team travelled to Sukkur district, which is a part of Sukkur division, which also includes Nawabshah district. Sukkur district includes three National Assembly constituencies. These are NA 151, including Sukkur town, on the right bank (west) of the Indus, and NA 152 and 153, both on the left bank (east) of Indus. Sukkur borders on the Bhuttos' home district of Larkhana and is generally considered to be part of the Bhutto-PPP stronghold in rural Sind.

The races were as follows: In NA 151 Islamuddin Shaikh, the relatively popular IJI mayor of Sukkur town (who has some support from the *muhajerin* in the town) was running against Khurshid Shah of the PPP. The MQM had withdrawn its candidate in favor of Islamuddin Shaikh. In NA 152, Sardar Ghulam Mohammad Meher, one of the largest landlords in Sind, was running as an IJI-type independent against Jam Saifullah, a young, relatively weak PPP candidate. In NA 153 Sadruddin Shah, the son of Pir Pagara, a local religious leader, was running against the PPP's candidate, Sardar Nur Mohammad Khan Lund.

The "caretaker" administration of Sind had originally ordered the transfer of the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Sukkur district, Kamran Lashari. This transfer order was rescinded, however, and Lashari was still in place.

The team arrived at Sukkur airport at about 8:30 a.m. The team was met there by our four-member police escort. Soon thereafter the team was also greeted by Imdad Ali Awan, chairman of the PPP Sukkur district. We had arranged this with the PPP in Karachi the day before. We did not receive any escort from the Ministry of Information.

While we were waiting for our car and driver (who arrived shortly) Awan informed us of "rigging" that was taking place. He said (as reconstructed from notes):

Last night the IJI people attacked the polling stations. The official staff was made hostage. They snagged all the ballot papers and stamped all the ballot paper for the IJI candidate Ghulam Mohammad Khan Meher in NA 152. This took place in Ghotki taluqa. The polling officers have lodged a complaint and an FIR has been lodged with the police. In NA 153, where the son of Pir Pagara is running against Sadar Nu Mohammad Khan Lund of the PPP, there are five polling stations where in the late hours of the night they made hostages of the staff and got the ballot papers. An FIR has been lodged and complaint made to the District Returning Officer [DRO] to be forwarded to the Election Commission. Also an FIR has been lodged at *thana* (police station) Mirpur Mathelo. In NA 152 6 polling stations were attacked. At least that is the sum of the complaints we have so far received. The FIR for Mithari polling station has been lodged with thana Ghotki. This information has been confirmed by the DC and DRO. The DRO is a district and sessions judge. The DRO has sent a report to the Election Commission.

In response to our questions, he noted that NA 151 has 172 polling stations and the other two constituencies about the same.

We next paid a call on the DC, Kamran Lashari. He informed us of the following, as reconstructed from notes:

At about 11-12 p.m., last night we got a message that polling

station number 48 in taluqa Ghotki had been pounced upon by armed people and the presiding officer and polling staff had been taken away. By sunset the night before the elections we had made them all be there. A skeleton security staff was also stationed there, but there were just one or two policemen and one or two auxiliary forces, about an average of three per polling station, and they were not armed properly.

The message came from the Assistant Commissioner of Ghotki. He was informed by the *thapedar* (revenue officer), who was there at the polling station. He slipped off and reached the sub-district magistrate. He informed him that armed people had come and forced the polling staff to stuff the ballot box. Then they blindfolded them and took them away.

I told him [the AC] to verify the report. So he went there with the police accompanied by the assistant returning officer, a civil judge. When they got there, they found the staff back. After the kidnappers had stuffed the ballot box, they dropped the staff back there. The AC took the staff to Ghotki and took their report. The FIR was registered with the local police station.

[As we were talking a telephone message arrived saying that four or five people had been killed in a clash in Adilpur, a town in Ghotki *taluka*, but this later turned out to be a false rumor, based on a traffic accident in which two people were injured.]

Kamran Lashari continued:

In Ubauro taluqa of NA 153 at Rajenpur polling station and Sain Dino Malik polling station the same kind of thing happened. At Rajenpur – this was also last night, they kidnapped the staff, took the ballot boxes, and stuffed them. In the second case, they have not brought back the polling staff. In the first case they brought them back.

What is strange is that this kind of thing is happening in the areas where IJI is more powerful. You could infer that they do not trust their own voters. Sardar Meher is maybe the biggest landlord of Sind, but in previous years even his own tribe didn't support him.

Actually the Sardar spoke to me last night. He called after

these incidents occurred and apologized. He said he was sorry, he was sleeping, and some of these young people got out of hand.<sup>1</sup>

Other attacks have been reported but not yet verified.

We then decided to follow-up on these comments by visiting the DRO. He said:

There were no attacks on the polling stations actually, but the polling staff was overpowered. The ballot papers were spoiled. They put the rubber stamp in favor of a candidate. I cannot say which candidate won. We ordered that these ballots should be sealed at once and not used for purpose of election. We have taken cognizance of both incidents and sent fresh ballot papers. These incidents occurred at polling station 48 to 40 in Ghotki. The cases are registered with the police and FIRs have been lodged. They have also been reported to the Provincial Election Commission in Karachi. They are being kept informed.

The team proceeded to Ghotki to inspect the polling stations that had been attacked (and also to see if there had in fact been a clash in which 4-5 people had been killed).

After about an hour's drive we arrived in the headquarter of the administration of Ghotki *taluka*. Just before getting there we were met on the road by Jam Saifullah, the PPP candidate of NA 152, who wanted to direct us to the polling stations in question. He waited as we entered the office of the administration.

There we found the AC together with the ARO. Both tried assiduously to minimized the importance of what happened. They said:

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<sup>1</sup> The next day, when I raised this incident with Jam Sadiq Ali, he said it was unfortunate, these thing had been done by Sardar Meher's son-in-law. It would be interesting to learn if the culprit identified with such certainty by the Chief Minister of Sindh has been arrested. – BRR.

No one has died at any polling station. All polling stations are operating normally. At Mithari (or Mithali)<sup>2</sup> polling station (number 48) the presiding officer of the polling station has put an FIR that he and two assistant presiding officers were kidnapped. Later they came back and they are conducting the election. We have arranged for new ballot papers. Also at polling station number 40 the presiding officer of the polling station has lodged an FIR that he and four APOs were kidnapped. They have returned and are conducting the election. In Adilpur there was some problem between parties and a speeding vehicle that caused minor injuries. But they exaggerate. One person was injured due to the speeding vehicle of a candidate and one due to retaliation with blows. [We never got further details of what finally seemed to be rather minor incident.]

The AC then drew us a map of how to get to some of the affected polling stations, and the PPP candidate lent us one of his followers as a guide. We proceeded to Mithari polling station, #48. To do so we proceeded down the main road through Adilpur, where things were calm, until we reached a *kachha* (unpaved) road branching off to the right. We followed this road between some dusty fields showing the stubble of the harvest, until we had to swerve off to the right in order to allow two vehicles of the Pakistan army, including a field unit of about 30 men with helmets on and rifles at the ready, who were returning from the polling station.

The polling station was building (apparently a schoolhouse) in the middle of an open space to the side of a small village. As we pulled into the space and got out of our vehicles a crowd of well over a hundred men surrounded us. They began shouting very angrily in Sindhi and showing identity cards which had apparently not been punched. This seemed to indicate that they wanted to vote but could not.

Then the polling staff led by the presiding officer came out of the building. The presiding officer was Jamil-ur-Rahman, an officer

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<sup>2</sup> My aural impression is that the third consonant in "Mithari" is a retroflex liquid midway between r and l.

of the Habib Bank. The crowd became incensed when he arrived, and told me not to speak to him. One of them shouted, "Khalafi hai," meaning "He is an opponent," or "He is against us." Jamil-ur-Rahman said that this was not so. We quieted the crowd and assured them (in Urdu) that we were going to interview first the polling staff and then them. We asked them to cooperate by being orderly and quiet so that we could collect the facts, and they subsequently did so, more or less.

The presiding officer said that in the morning the men of Sardar Meher had come to the polling station. There were no polling agents present because they had been "hijacked" before the time of polling. He gave the names of the hijacked polling agents as: Mushtaq Ahmad, Amanullah Qabol, and Ali Abbas Nunari. He said that the army had been there about a half an hour before. It had conducted searches of some of the nearby houses, had found a rifle and a gun and made some arrests.

We then went inside the polling station, where we interviewed several members of the staff. They said that the night before they had been blindfolded and kidnapped by men commanded by a certain Ali Gul and his uncle. They came at 9:30 p.m., put all the polling materials and equipment in water and bound the eyes of the PO and APO. They then took them to an unknown house where they "put 700 votes out of the law." Afterwards they came back to the polling station after three hours. When they reached the polling station, they found that the SDM and others were present with the forces. They talked to them and promised to remove all problems. All the polling materials were gone.

One of the APOs or polling officers gave a long and somewhat disjointed account of the day's events. This official said that Hazar Khan Gozdar, a "helper" of Ghulam Meher, had hit him in the mouth. Meher's "helper," that polling official claimed, had said that the polling staff should put false votes into the ballot boxes or "we will kill you." One person put the stamp for Meher on the ballot papers. The official complained the government did not give weapons to the staff to defend themselves. The official also said that Ghulam Meher had come to the polling station with his helpers. When Meher and

his supporters saw the People Party polling agent Imam Bakhsh Qabol, they fired on him and kidnapped him. The official said that turnout was very low and that following the kidnapping of the PPP polling agent, PPP supporters had refused to vote.

The team then went back outside and found a couple of people who spoke Urdu, who explained about what had happened. They said that at 7:30 in the morning the men of Sardar Meher fired on the polling agents and wounded and kidnapped four people. They claimed that fake votes were being cast. The people (PPP supporters) were afraid to vote as long as there were no polling agent present. They feared the armed men of Sardar Meher would return. They were waiting outside the polling station in the hopes that they would eventually be able to vote. They said they would vote only if the army returned and guarded the polling station all day.

As these accounts were somewhat confusing, we asked for someone in the crowd who could write Urdu. When one man presented himself, we asked him to write an account of what had happened for later reference. At our request, he then read it aloud to the crowd for their comments, which led to his adding something at the end. A translation of what he wrote follows:

In the morning when the People's Party agents arrived at the polling station, they were fired on and kidnapped, and the People's Party supporters were not permitted to cast their votes. Until now the People's Party agent still has not come, and they have not been allowed to cast their votes. From the morning until now fake votes have been cast. If the fake votes are stopped, then we will cast our votes, and if not, we will not.

We promised to report what happened and asked advice from our guides and from the local people about which of the four or five nearby troubled polling stations marked on our map was the closest. They suggested one that was not on the map that was even closer, which was in a village called either Sher Meher or Khero Meher (perhaps these are just dialectical variants of the same name). In any case, we returned to the main road and turned right until we came to

a very large irrigation canal (about 10 meters across). We turned left off the road following a *kachha* road along the canal. Our police escort (who was a PPP sympathizer) told us that the entire canal and all the land we could see was the property of Sardar Ghulam Mohammad Khan Meher.

After a little while we reached a bridge crossing the canal that led to a narrower, muddy *kachha* road through some cane fields to the village. At the foot of the bridge, however, was gathered a crowd of peasants similar to the one we had just left. Furthermore, as we arrived, the same army unit we had seen earlier crossed the bridge toward us. It was composed of two jeeps and a vehicle drawing a large open wagon. Helmeted soldiers with rifles in guard position were seated around the edges. The floor of the wagon was covered with straw on which were the still, prone figures of about six men, who were covering their faces.

The conjunction of our two vehicles (our car and police jeep) with a white American, a Senegalese, and four policemen from Sukkur, a field unit of the Pakistan army, and a crowd of angry peasants created what was initially a rather confusing scene. We got out of the car and introduced ourselves to the commanding officer. Then we interviewed both some of the peasants and the officer.

The peasants were PPP supporters who were registered at the polling station up the road. They all took out their identity cards to show that they had not been punched, that they had not been able to vote. They said that three polling agents of the PPP had been kidnapped at Sher Meher polling station.

According to the officer, there were men with Kalashnikovs in the cane fields who were firing on the voters, preventing them from going to the polling station.

The six men in the wagon had been captured with Kalashnikovs in the cane fields by the army. Everyone present apparently believed that they were the agents of Sardar Meher. However, the would-be voters believed that there were many such left in the fields, and they were still afraid to vote.

As we were interviewing some of the peasants about these



incidents, an NCO with an artillery uniform became quite angry at them for telling us these things and started threatening one man, shouting at him. "Who are you? Why are you talking?"

Our police escort assured us that the remaining gunmen would not fire at us but only at PPP voters, so we climbed into the jeep and crossed the bridge.

When we arrived in the village, we found the polling station set up in the schoolhouse on the village square. There was a small crowd standing there, but the atmosphere was quite unsettled, as the army had just come through. People were very reluctant to talk to us and not too happy to see us. Our police escort explained to us that this was the home village of Sardar Meher or at least of a major part of his tribe. He also told us (later) that the village police had threatened him (in Sindhi), saying (as he translated into Urdu), "If you keep telling these things, we will attack you."

In the polling station we found a quite unsettled atmosphere. The ballot box was sitting in the middle of the floor, rather than in the polling booth. According to the presiding officer, "The army officers were angry with us. They asked us why we did not keep the ballot box in the proper place. I explained that the ballot box was being kept by somebody, in his custody. I was engaged with the forms, which is lengthy work." We were unable to figure out exactly where the ballot box had been kept, but we saw that there was a window right in the polling booth through which tampering might have occurred. In this tense atmosphere it proved impossible for us to get a clear answer about what was happening. We noted that the outside walls of the polling station were covered with election posters for Sardar Meher.

We asked about the polling agents. The polling agent of Sardar Meher was present, but not of the PPP. We were told that a PPP polling agent had come on a motorcycle and then left.

We then returned by the same route by which we had come and found the crowd of PPP supporters still gathered around our car. They urged us to report the *bara zulm* (great oppression) that was taking place.

We then returned toward Ghotki. We had passed what looked like a peaceful functioning polling station on the main road, so we returned to it. This was polling station 49 in the government high school, Adilpur.

In the men's polling booth we found all the polling agents present and apparently cooperating. We also visited two women's polling booths, where the staff was male. Women polling agents were present, but they kept their faces partially covered not only from us but apparently from the male polling staff, and did not appear to be involved very much with the process. They seemed quite withdrawn. In any case, there were few or no voters in the women's polling booths. We were told that there were no challenged votes and no tendered votes. We did not observe any conflicts or disputes.

Outside at the PPP camp we met the brother of Jam Saifullah, the PPP candidate, who told us that there were 18 polling stations where "bogus" votes were being cast and where there were no PPP polling agents. But Adilpur was Jam Saifullah's home town and Sardar Meher could not do this there. He told us that some of the kidnapped and subsequently released PPP polling agents were nearby, in Jam Saifullah's house. He led us there through the streets of Adilpur. In the house there was a crowd of people. We were introduced to a number of people alleged to be previously kidnapped PPP polling agents. Others with gunshot wounds or other serious injuries, we were told, were in the hospital in Ghotki. One present was Mohammad Hayat. Another was Imam Bakhsh Qabol, the man whose name had been given to us at Mithari. He had a large gash under his right eye which they said was from a Kalashnikov.

It was now about 2:30, and we decided to return to Sukkur town and NA 151, to see what was going on there. Our first stop was in the old city of Sukkur, polling station number 19 in the Office of the Deputy Director of Fisheries. We had been told by a PPP official we had met when we came back to Sukkur that there was "massive rigging" going on here, but all the polling agents were present, and they had no complaints. There were no tendered or challenged votes. In the men's polling booth, there were 1,839 registered voters of

whom about 1,000 had voted. In the women's booth there were female staff at work and women polling agents from all the parties, including two factions of the IJI. There were 1,450 registered voters in this booth. No polling was going on while we were there, and we failed to get turnout figures. Here too there were no complaints.

At this point our driver complained that it was getting toward closing time of the polls, and he had not yet been able to vote. So we asked him to take us to his polling station, which was in the new city of Sukkur. After crossing the city, we arrived at a large complex of government buildings. These included five polling stations, numbers 39, 40 and 41 for men and numbers 42 and 43 for women. In all there were 6,304 voters registered at these polling stations.

On our way into the polling station, followed by a growing crowd, a Baluch man came up to me and asked in Persian if I was Iranian. While I said that I was American, but that I did speak some Persian, he began telling me a complicated story in Persian about how someone was giving money to someone else in order to corrupt the electoral process. I couldn't make out exactly what the gist of his claim was, and this was one story I decided not to take the time to follow up.

One IJI outside the polling station. (In NA 152 there was no IJI candidate, and we had hardly spoken to them all day.) We spoke to an elderly man who said:

In this polling station the PPP-PDA is casting many bogus votes and mistaken votes. There is army interference. There are bogus ID cards. They have used them and they also try to start quarrels between locals and refugees. They tried to stop the polling by making clashes.

He also had a complaint about police on duty at polling station 52 and 52. We were unable to understand precisely what the complaint was. He said they had informed Col. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, who is in charge. He had intervened and stopped it.

Inside the polling station we spoke to another IJI polling agent. He said that there were 900 (registered) voters in his booth, but that

the turnout had been very low. Only 252 votes have been cast. When they did come to vote, he complained that 75 percent had name differences between the ID card and the electoral roll.

Then the APO became agitated and tried to stop the polling agent from talking. He said, "He is not telling the truth. We have accepted all voters. In my view the polling has been fair in all means. All the agents of parties are satisfied, and there are no tendered or challenged vote." We noticed, however that this APO was not accepting such votes. We saw at least one man coming with an ID card that did not match the roll who was more or less summarily shoved out the door.

And we spoke to the PPP polling agent who said:

There is pressure from the caretaker government on the polling officers. This seat is a tough seat. The MQM has withdrawn their candidate in favor of the IJI because these parties are both opposed to PPP. They have polling lists with many wrong names. If one letter is missing from a name, the vote will be rejected. We were provided with an incomplete list of voters. They have got two people in this polling station working for the MQM. One person has voted three times – he is a worker of the MQM. The PPP polling agent challenged the ballot, but the presiding officer did not accept challenged ballots.

While this was going on, one of the polling officers was trying to get him to stop speaking to us.

We then witnessed the counting of three ballot boxes, which appeared to take place normally, in the presence of all polling agents. The results of the three boxes were: IJI (Islamuddin Shaikh) – 406; PPP (Khurshid Shah) – 320. Plus some votes for JUI (Fazlur Rahman), and some others, and five votes for Hindu and Scheduled Caste candidate Walter Herbert. These were all male polling booths.

Back in our hotel we telephoned Imdad Ali Awan of the PPP to thank him for his assistance in the morning. We told him what we had seen. According to him, there had been more "rigging" of the

type we had seen in NA 152 (Ghotki - Pano Akin) in NA 153, where Pir Pagara's son was running against Sardar Lund of the PPP. He also said that there was rigging going on in Larkhana 3, Shikarpur 2, and in Sanghar, where Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali's son was running. He emphasized that in latter there was "a lot" of rigging. The day in our meeting with him in Karachi, Jam Sadiq Ali claimed that there was a lot of PPP-initiated violence in Sanghar, including a firing on his son.

Around 11:30 that night we went to try to find the DC and see what happened elsewhere. Our car was unavailable, so we went out in the street and more or less stood there until a passing motorist picked us up. He took us to the home of the commissioner of Sukkur division, where we found the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner Kamran Lashari, and a commander of the police rangers.

Lashari asked us how our day had gone. We told him what we had seen, and he appeared to be surprised. He was under the impression that order had been restored in Ghotki, and he did not realize that the polling agents had been kidnapped. We gave him the written Urdu statement to read.<sup>3</sup>

The three officers present were receiving telephone calls giving them information on the law and order situation (which was now generally calm) and on the election returns. They told us what they were hearing. While we unfortunately did not take notes on these results (which we imagined were definitive), we later compared our recollection of these events, and we are in agreement that we remember hearing the following two statements:

1. The PPP had carried all three seats in Sukkur district. This

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<sup>3</sup> The next morning when we called on him to offer our thanks and take leave, he said that he was concerned over the provincial elections, as Ghotki was a separate constituency there, and the rigging might affect the outcome. He said he was thinking about moving the polling station closer to the main road so that they would be more accessible to police. We have no information on what happened in the provincial elections.

includes NA 153, where the son of Pir Pagara, Sadruddin Shah, was running against the PPP.

2. Asif Ali Zardari had defeated Murtaza Jatoi in Nawabshah.

The next day in Karachi we were surprised to read in the newspapers that Murtaza Jatoi had been declared the winner in Nawabshah by the Election Commission in Islamabad. We were also surprised to hear from Jam Sadiq Ali that the son of Pir Pagara had won in NA 153.

### **REPORT OF GUJRANWALLA TEAM**

Team Members: Peter Katjavivi, Gina Giere and Peter Hatch (rapporteur)

Having observed the opening of the Poll at Francis High School in constituency NA 96 in Lahore we travelled approximately 70km toward Gujranwala. In and around Gujranwala, we visited polling stations in NA 74, NA 75, NA 76 and NA 81.

The road to Gujranwala was busy with traffic including numerous vehicles conveying electors to and from the polling stations. We passed a number of polling stations on the way and observed that there was a lot of activity outside the premises. The activity was particularly heavy in the vicinity of the party agents tables, which had been set up at the roadside.

At these tables, we could see party workers issuing voting slips in what appeared to be an orderly manner. The atmosphere seemed relaxed and carefree; it had the feeling of a holiday. People appeared to be enjoying themselves and making the most of the occasion. There was military/police presence, but had it been intrusive it seems likely that the atmosphere would have been quite different.

At most polling stations visited, the presiding officers and assistant presiding officers were following the stipulated election procedures. Electors also were generally familiar with these procedures. In addition, we observed that the ballot boxes were properly sealed and that despite the somewhat makeshift polling compartments (i.e., a table or chair behind a curtain in a corner of the polling room) the secrecy of voting was maintained. The ID card

system seemed to work well. The team saw examples of ID cards used in previous elections that had been punched and spoke with women who were able to vote even though their cards still carried their maiden names. With only one exception, voting at both male and female polling stations was orderly and regular. This exception was at the women's polling station number 100, in constituency NA 76, where the situation was chaotic. The female presiding officer did not appear able to exercise her authority. She did not control admittance to the polling station room and was unable to quiet the crowd of women within the room who appeared eager to cast their votes. The unwillingness of the police officer present to intervene did not improve the situation.

The team noted that without exception the election officials, party agents inside the polling stations and party workers at the tables outside the stations were courteous, helpful and willing to answer questions. The team found the voters curious, friendly and on no occasion threatening.

Turnout was difficult to estimate given the small number of sites visited. At some polling stations turnout seemed quite low. At two polling stations in NA 74, which had 500 and 424 registered voters, for example, only 70 and 40 votes respectively had been cast by 12:30 p.m. The presiding officer reported that the voters had to travel some distance and he expected many more voters later in the afternoon. At polling station number 110 in NA 81, however, the presiding officer reported that there had been a large turnout between 10 a.m. and midday with over 50 percent having voted by early afternoon.

The team is very cognizant of the limitations of its observations. Based on the sites visited, however, the team concluded that the election was being conducted in accordance with the election rules and in a generally open and orderly manner. The team received no complaints concerning the polling arrangements and most voters interviewed seemed to believe that the arrangements were better than in 1988.

## REPORT OF "ELECTION CELL" ACTIVITIES

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY TO CHIEF MINISTER OF BALUCHISTAN QUETTA BEGINS. ELECTION CELL HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN CHIEF MINISTER SECRETARIATE(.) FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN BY YOUR CONCERNED STAFF(.) (1) REPORTS OF ALL POLLING STAFF AND LAW ENFORCING AGENCIES TAKING THEIR POSITION TO BE COMMUNICATED BY A.N OF 23RD OCTOBER 1990.(. (2) COMMENCEMENT OF POLLING ON ALL STATIONS ON THE ELECTIONS DAY I.E. 24 24TH OCTOBER TO BE REPORTED PROMPTLY.(. (3) TWO HOURLY SITUATION REPORTS ON LAW AND ORDER SITUATION TO BE COMMUNICATED TILL FINALIZATION OF POLLING.(. (4) PROGRESSIVE UN-OFFICIAL RESULTS ALSO TO BE PROMPTLY COMMUNICATED AS THE SAME ARE RECEIVED.(. (5) NAME OF DUTY OFFICERS WITH TELEPHONE NUMBERS MAY BE IMMEDIATELY INTIMATED.(. (6) COMM TO BE MADE ON FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBER.(. (A) QUETTA AND LORALAI DIVISION 7317.(. (B) SIBI AND NASIR ABAD DIVISION 73155.(. (C) KHUZDAR/MEHRAN DIVISION 73107.(. KINDLY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS WIRELESS MESSAGE AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE.(. ENDS.(. PLEASE ENSURE SUBMISSION OF TWO HOURLY REPORT ON LAW AND ORDER SITUATION AND PROGRESSIVE UN OFFICIALS REPORTS AFTER THE ENDS OF POLLS TO THIS OFFICE FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO QUARTER CONCERNED.(.)

LETTER GIVEN TO NDI QUETTA TEAM  
24 OCTOBER 1990 (Retyped verbatim)

Following from Secretary to Chief Minister of Baluchistan Quetta begins. Election Cell has been established in Chief Ministry Secretariate(.) Following actions are to be taken by your concerned staff(.) (1) Reports of all polling staff and law enforcing agencies taking their position to be communicated by A.N of 23rd October 1990.(. (2) Commencement of Polling on all stations on the elections day i.e. 24th October to be reported promptly.(. (3) Two hourly situation reports on law and order situation to be communicated till finalization of polling.(. (4) Progressive un-official results also to be promptly communicated as the same are received.(. (5) Name of duty officers with telephone numbers may be immediately intimated.(. (6) Communication to be made on following telephone number.(. (A) Quetta and Loralai division 731 (illegible) (B) Sibi and Nasir Abad division 73155.(. (c) Khuzdar/Mekran division 73107.(. Kindly acknowledge receipt of this wireless message and ensure compliance.(. Ends(.) Please ensure submission of two hourly reports on law and order situation and progressive un official reports after the ends of polls to this office for onward transmission to quarter concerned.(.)



**RESULTS OF 1990 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS  
BY PARTY AND REGION**

	PPP	IJI	MQM	ANP	JUI/F	IND	Others	TOTAL
Punjab	14	92	--	--	--	6	3	115
NWFP	5	8	--	6	4	3	--	26
Sind	24	3	15	--	--	4	--	46
Baluchistan	2	2	--	--	2	--	5	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>198</b>

Source: *HERALD*, 1990

**RESULTS OF 1990 PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS  
BY PARTY AND REGION**

	IJI	PDA	PDP	MQM	ANP	JUI	JWP	PNP	BNM	PKMAP	IND	TOTAL
Punjab	216	10	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	240
NWFP	29	8	--	--	22	2	--	--	--	--	17	78
Sind	6	46	--	28	--	--	--	--	--	--	20	100
Baluchistan	7	1	--	--	--	6	9	5	2	2	--	32
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>450</b>

Source: *HERALD*, 1990

## METHODOLOGY FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

### Introduction

The vote casting and counting processes are critical elements of a free and fair election. With this in mind, the statistical analysis sought to determine the extent to which "unusual" activity in these processes indicated an attempt to alter outcomes through manipulation and thus create a situation wherein the spirit, if not the substance, of a free and fair election was violated. However, the results of the statistical analysis were not, in and of themselves, sufficient to provide more than an indication of irregularities.

The statistical analysis evaluated patterns of behavior, and permitted vote totals to be investigated for internal consistency. The analysis was designed to permit identification of several possible types of fraud, including: disenfranchisement of voters; gross ballot box stuffing; systematic additions of votes through targeted polling stations and subtle stuffing (for example at the use of fraudulent ID cards); and other irregularities.

The statistical analysis also enabled a categorization of constituencies. This categorization provided a presumptive indication of the fairness of the *vote casting* and *counting* component of the election.

### Preparation for Analysis

During the two weeks prior to the elections, a template for the analysis process was created. This included review of the 1985 election results, data entry of 1988 election results into a spreadsheet, and development of a specialized database program, which provides a facility for various statistical measures, clustering and graphing of the election results.

Prior to the elections, the statistical team interviewed Election Commission officials, party officials and others to ascertain the mechanisms of the election and anticipated problems. On election night, one member of the team stayed at the Election Commission control room and, working directly off the Urdu documents, received

results contemporaneous with the Election Commission. As they became available, results were entered into the computer systems used by the statistical team.

The team also investigated several "back rooms" at the Election Commission where tallying was taking place to ascertain the time lag between results being called in from returning officers and summed tally sheets being presented to the Election Commissioners. There was nothing particularly unusual about the count as compared to our experience of 1988 and the delays experienced in collecting the information were, for the most part, similar to the delays encountered in 1988.

### **Data Collection**

The statistical team collected data from the 206 single-member muslim constituencies contested on October 24 and compared the data with corresponding data from the 1988 elections. Specifically, the team investigated changes from 1988 with respect to the following factors:

- Registered voters;
- Votes cast and voter turnout;
- Increases (decreases) in votes by the winning, runner-up and third-party candidates;
- Number of votes garnered by the winning candidate from third-party and runner-up candidates;
- PDA votes cast as a function of a predicted apportionment of increased voter turnout;
- PDA votes cast and, where relevant, the decrease in predicted PDA votes cast (this is referred to as PDA vote erosion);
- A cluster analysis of voter turnout, votes cast for major parties, third-party phenomena and rejected votes; and
- A comparison between constituencies for turnout, victory margins and other factors.

**Basis for Analysis**

Several factors and analytical techniques were used to determine the appropriate classification for each constituency. Because of the sensitivity of the undertaking, the criteria used are fairly conservative and include the following:

- Constituencies where the 1990 turnout was 15 percent greater than the 1988 turnout
- Constituencies where the erosion of the 1988 PPP vote was greater than 15 percent, but less than 25 percent
- Constituencies where the erosion of the 1988 PPP vote was greater than 25 percent and less than 40 percent
- Constituencies where the erosion of the 1988 PPP vote was greater than 40 percent
- Constituencies where the winning party may have secured 100 percent of the increased voter turnout plus decreased PDA vote (accounting for changes in third-party vote).

These factors were evaluated in combination. Thus, a constituency that had an increased turnout in excess of 15 percent AND an erosion of the PDA base of 24 percent would be rated as more unusual than a constituency with only a PDA erosion of 24 percent. A direct analysis of the erosion of the PDA base from 1988, however, was complicated by the fact that the PPP was not in a coalition in 1988 as it was in 1990.

In those constituencies where there was an increase in voter turnout, two methods for evaluating the erosion of the PDA base were established: (i) erosion assuming that none of the increased vote turnout went to the PDA candidate; and (ii) erosion assuming that a portion of the new vote turnout equal to the ratio of the PDA share of all votes (in constituency) went to the PDA candidate.

Finally, the following criteria were applied to assign the specific classification types for each constituency:

- A decline in the PDA base of more than 25 percent was considered highly unusual and indicated that there may have been irregularities;

- A decline in the PDA base of less than 25 percent but greater than 15 percent, *where* the winner appeared to have secured all of the available new votes – i.e., a) increased voter turnout, b) lost third-party votes and c) lost PDA votes – was considered to be an indication of possible irregularities, while recognizing that such a combination of events could also be the result of coordinated political activities; and
- A decline in the PDA vote of less than 25 percent where the factors listed above were not present was considered a constituency where the statistical analysis did not demonstrate possible irregularities, although there may have been manipulation that was not identifiable through the statistical analysis.

It is important to note that even in those constituencies where there are reasons to question the electoral process, it is not possible to assume that the runner-up party would have been the victor. In these constituencies, the statistical analysis simply cannot be used to determine which candidate would have been the winner. Therefore, only in a conjectural manner, can the statistical analysis be used to ascertain the extent to which the existence of election irregularities might have affected the number of seats held by any given party.

### **Analytical Premises**

The basic premise of the analysis is that useful information can be extracted from a comparison of the behavior of constituencies in 1990 to the behavior of constituencies in the 1988 elections. While this is fundamentally true, several phenomena introduce an element of uncertainty into the analysis:

- In any given 1988 constituency, undetected fraud could have occurred which would diminish the value of a comparison to 1990 as (i) the fraud might be repeated and therefore no significant change in behavior would be noticed or (ii) the 1990 results might artificially look unusual despite the fact that they more honestly reflect a fair result.

In light of the above statement, it is useful to note that if the 1990 election results were used as the base year, and then compared with the 1988 election results, there would be many constituencies with reduced turnout and increased PPP vote totals. Thus, in 1988 the PPP might appear to have won many constituencies by a margin that was suspiciously large, and IJI might look like the victim of systematic disenfranchisement. While most analysts would agree that the PPP's 1988 victory was attributable to political causes rather than rigging, there is a degree of speciousness to the premise that 1988 is the only baseline for comparison (many analyses have made this assumption).

- In 1988 the PPP, for valid political reasons, may have secured votes from a large number of "swing" voters. For this purpose, swing voters are defined as voters who vote for a party, but are not necessarily party loyalists and thus are more likely to change party affiliations.

For example, one might assume that the Pakistan electorate consists of 40 percent loyal IJI supporters, 40 percent loyal PPP supports and 20 percent swing voters. The 1988 results might then reflect the PPP obtaining, in any given constituency, a portion of the 20 percent swing voters (e.g., 50 percent). This would give the appearance of a PPP loyalist base that is larger than it is in fact. When, in 1990, these PPP swing voters changed affiliation to the IJI, it would appear that a portion of the loyal PPP partisans had (i) changed affiliation or (ii) been somehow disenfranchised. To account for this problem, the decline of PPP vote is not considered significant unless the decline is "dramatic" (this being a less than scientific concept).

- The statistical analysis was conducted, for the most part, without the benefit of qualitative substantiation that effective detection mechanisms would have provided. This significantly altered the tenor of the analysis: fraud or manipulation could only be suspected, but could not be conclusively proved. In order to make more definitive statements regarding the 1990 elections, much more data would have to be collected (including individual

polling station data) and processed to ascertain, with more definition, what occurred in the problem constituencies.

- Different kinds of fraud require different levels of sophistication and coordination. No quantitative system, for example, would detect a sophisticated election cell which, upon completion of the vote tally, decided to add only enough votes to affect a change in the outcome.

In Pakistan, there are systems (theoretically) in place to deter such manipulation provided that the safeguards (in this case polling agents and tally sheets) are in place and are unfettered. Unfortunately, it may be the case that the party organizations (upon whom the onus of detecting and demonstrating fraud falls most heavily) may not be capable of meeting the challenge of demonstrating gross fraud.

## OBSERVATIONS ON STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

### **Voter Turnout**

Voter turnout was analyzed at several points in time. Initially, with only a few of the constituencies reporting in during the night of the election, an estimate of turnout projected national turnout of 38 percent. Subsequently, by midday the following day, with more constituencies reporting, national turnout was estimated at 44 percent. This apparent discrepancy is likely the result of legitimate aspect of the vote tabulation and data collection process. Nonetheless, it is possible that this could have resulted from certain irregularities, but we have no corroborating information to this effect.

### **Third-party Phenomena**

The statistical analysis demonstrates that the IJI was, for the most part, successful in consolidating its support by eliminating or coopting powerful third-party candidates. Consequently, the IJI was able to garner a substantial portion of the votes that previously went to strong third-party candidates in 1988. The table on page 99 shows, for all constituencies, the difference in 1990 IJI votes (from 1988) compared to the difference in votes garnered by third-party



candidates. As can be seen, in most constituencies won by the IJI, the increase in IJI votes was mirrored by a corresponding decrease in third-party votes.

### **Problem Constituencies**

There were also constituencies where the IJI vote was not the result of reduced third-party votes. In some of these constituencies, the results can be explained politically (e.g., a weak PDA candidate or a switch in party affiliation of a popular candidate). However, there are those constituencies that, based on a surface analysis of the numbers, suggest some "interesting" phenomena. The following example demonstrates how an unusual phenomenon could possibly be indicative of irregularities, but is not necessarily the result of irregularities.

In NA 1 (Peshawar), where the 1988 winner (PPP) flipped to the 1988 runner-up (ANP), the following data provided the basis for analysis:

- There were 96,516 votes cast (10,280 more votes from 1988 cast for an 11.92 percent change);
- The ANP received 15,286 more votes than it did in 1988 (a 42.5 percent change);
- Given the ratio of votes won by ANP to the votes won by PDA, the PDA should have (and may have) garnered 4,149 of the new votes cast (i.e., as a result of increased turnout);
- The PDA lost 5,707 votes as compared to 1988, representing a loss of 13 percent of their 1988 vote; and
- Third parties gained 701 votes.

There are two possible scenarios:

1. The ANP managed to secure 100 percent of the new votes cast (10,280) plus 13 percent of the PDA base (5,707), except for 701 votes that went to third parties; or
2. The ANP garnered 59 percent of the new votes cast (6,131) plus 22 percent of the PDA base (9,856), except for 701 votes that went to third parties.

Scenario 2 is more realistic, although scenario 1 is also possible. Thus, this constituency is categorized as one where irregularities may have occurred thus resulting in uncertainty about the results, notwithstanding that there may be a legitimate political explanation for these numbers.

### **Voter Registration and Political Organization**

In light of the dramatically increased voter registration rolls (especially in the Sind), one might draw the conclusion that this election was characterized by significantly more organization by the IJI than was the case in 1988. The post-election "confusion" and the PDA's inability to effectively substantiate claims of widespread irregularities provides a further basis of support for the theory that the PDA simply encountered well-organized political opponents. Of course, this high level of organization also could have expressed itself through sophisticated and subtle rigging, but, except as noted, this does not appear to be the case.

### **Conclusions**

The statistical analysis of the 1990 elections is far from definitive. However, after some initial problems with inaccurate or incomplete data were corrected, the analyses revealed no significant underlying trend which was indicative of massive, centrally organized fraud.

Since Pakistan uses a parliamentary system, aggregate analysis of nationwide turnout, victory margins or other factors are not of great significance. It is more important that the analysis accurately reflect the behavior of individual constituencies. Nonetheless, the overall analysis of the 1990 election results supports the conclusion that, for the most part, the election appears to accurately reflect the will of significant portion of the electorate.

The most significant pattern that emerged was the reduction in votes for third-party candidates votes in constituencies where either the IJI or PDA candidate was the winner. In 15 percent of the constituencies, the PDA vote erosion was sufficiently significant, either by itself or in conjunction with other factors, to raise questions regarding the integrity of the results. However, even in these 15

percent of the constituencies, the results could be explained by coordinated political activity.

It is evident from these elections that the mechanisms currently in place in Pakistan that are designed to detect irregularities are far from perfect. While there are procedures in place to deter vote fraud, the mechanisms designed to detect fraud are far less robust. Furthermore, the onus to present evidence of irregularities rests entirely with a complaining party. The Election Commission has no system, nor any apparent interest in establishing an independent capability, to detect irregularities contemporaneously with the vote casting and counting process. If such a system existed, it would act as a significant additional deterrent to fraud. The absence of adequate concurrent detection is a major deficiency in the process and needs to be addressed.

Without the infrastructure of a coordinated policing of the process, the evidence collected by observer missions and the allegations lodged by aggrieved, but inefficient, party organizations is inadequate to characterize this, or future, elections. The fact data from these elections suggests that irregularities may have occurred in more than a few constituencies is evidence that extant safeguards are not adequate. The consequences of these systemic inadequacies could, in the future, erode the foundation of trust necessary for free and fair elections.

**STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

*Note: Pages 208-218 provide a district-by-district review of the 1988 and 1990 winners and the 1990 results. Pages 219-229 provide a district-by-district analysis of the vote erosion phenomenon.*

DISTRICT NAME	1990		1988		1980		1990		1990		1990 3RD	
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER	VOTES	2nd VOTES	VOTES	2nd VOTES	VOTES	(TOTAL)	PARTY VOTES
1 PESHAWAR 1	ANP	PDA	PPP	ANP	ANP	51,233	38,951					6,332
2 PESHAWAR 2	ANP	PDA	PPP	ANP	ANP	31,222	19,137					14,935
3 PESHAWAR 3	ANP	PDA	PPP	ANP	ANP	38,730	19,977					24,142
4 PESHAWAR 4	ANP	PDA	PPP	ANP	ANP	38,389	25,722					18,642
5 CHARSDDA	JUI (F)	ANP	ANP	JUI	JUI	66,452	52,929					4,586
6 MARDAN 1 (RESULT CHANGED)	ANP	PDA	PPP	ANP	ANP	35,880	28,616					23,007
7 MARDAN 2	JUI	IND	JUI (F)	PPP	PPP	37,452	24,813					22,595
8 SWABI	ANP	PDA	ANP	JUI	JUI	51,909	28,750					35,025
9 KOHAT	PDA	JUI	JUI	PPP	PPP	28,015	26,576					34,565
10 KARAK	IND	JUI	JUI (D)	JUI	JUI	27,866	14,684					13,784
11 ABBOTTABAD 1	JUI	IND	IND	JUI	JUI	64,541	31,754					3,176
12 ABBOTTABAD 2	JUI	IND	JUI	IND	IND	43,764	29,247					14,269
13 ABBOTTABAD 3	JUI	PDA	JUI	PPP	PPP	52,923	30,970					13,656
14 MANSEHRA 1	IND	JUI	IND	IND	IND	34,787	31,457					25,380
15 MANSEHRA 2	JUI	IND	IND	IND	IND	19,109	16,115					23,716
16 MANSEHRA 3	JUI (F)	IND	CANC	CANC	CANC	13,556	10,684					12,458
17 KOHISTAN	JUI (F)	IND	JUI	ANP	ANP	7,752	4,607					13,274
18 D. I. KHAN	PDA	JUI (F)	JUI (F)	JUI	JUI	64,533	52,890					41,245
19 BANNU 1	JUI (F)	PDA	JUI (F)	JUI	JUI	28,471	12,519					17,201

DISTRICT NAME	1990		1988		1990		1990		1990		1990-3RD
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)
20 BANNU 2	IJI	JUI (F)	IJI	JUI (F)	38,877	34,322	38,877	34,322			3,769
21 SWAT 1	IJI	JUI (F)	CANC	CANC	24,891	17,480	24,891	17,480			32,037
22 SWAT 2	IND	IJI	IJI	ANP	18,972	18,716	18,972	18,716			32,275
23 SWAT 3	PDA	IJI	PPP	ANP	32,515	28,080	32,515	28,080			28,813
24 CHITRAL	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	35,269	20,628	35,269	20,628			9,557
25 DIR	PDA	IJI	IJI	PPP	28,533	27,147	28,533	27,147			13,085
26 MALAKMD P.A.	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	30,920	29,037	30,920	29,037			31,801
27 TRIBAL AREA 1	IND	NONE	IND	IND							0
28 TRIBAL AREA 2	IND	IND	IND	IND	607	548	607	548			109
29 TRIBAL AREA 3	IND	IND	IND	IND	967	966	967	966			0
30 TRIBAL AREA 4	IND	IND	IND	IND	494	281	494	281			249
31 TRIBAL AREA 5	IND	IND	IND	IND	536	396	536	396			58
32 TRIBAL AREA 6	IND	IND	IND	IND	842	639	842	639			1,912
33 TRIBAL AREA 7	IND	IND	IND	IND	2,080	794	2,080	794			221
34 TRIBAL AREA 8	IND	IND	IND	IND							0
35 FEDERAL CAPITAL	IJI	PDA	PPP	PPP	56,795	43,467	56,795	43,467			8,588
36 RAWALPINDI 1	IJI	PDA	IND	IJI	80,305	54,011	80,305	54,011			1,924
37 RAWALPINDI 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	IND	75,784	54,753	75,784	54,753			11,796
38 RAWALPINDI 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	78,107	54,701	78,107	54,701			8,358



DISTRICT NAME	1990	1990	1988	1988	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES
58 FAISALABAD 2	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	42,857	40,273						18,329
59 FAISALABAD 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	46,624	40,722						17,116
60 FAISALABAD 4	IJI	PDA	PPP	PAI	56,307	30,275						27,758
61 FAISALABAD 5	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	72,351	61,967						1,771
62 FAISALABAD 6	IJI	PDA	CANC	CANC	57,208	34,925						8,774
63 FAISALABAD 7	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	60,983	50,008						5,612
64 FAISALABAD 8	IJI	PDA	PPP	IND	62,536	52,165						5,460
65 FAISALABAD 9	IJI	PDA	PPP	IND	67,086	63,396						4,977
66 JHANG 1	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	40,124	39,850						27,361
67 JHANG 2	IJI	PDA	IND	IJI	57,263	47,378						13,072
68 JHANG 3	IJI	PDA	IND	JUI (F)	62,486	33,031						24,651
69 JHANG 4	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	63,642	48,048						11,962
70 JHANG 5	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	58,855	58,690						3,668
71 TOBA TEK SINGH 1	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	65,540	57,791						5,148
72 TOBA TEK SINGH 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	76,372	44,752						2,359
73 TOBA TEK SINGH 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	69,499	50,194						1,094
74 GLURANWALA 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	89,326	54,095						5,146
75 GLURANWALA 2	IND	IJI	PPP	IJI	49,406	47,101						33,930
76 GLURANWALA 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	67,697	57,897						6,731



DISTRICT NAME	1990		1988		1990		1990		1990		1990 3RD
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)
77 GUJRANWALA 4	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	59,225	50,328					15,433
78 GUJRANWALA 5	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	65,836	59,139					1,072
79 GUJRANWALA 6	PDA	IJI	IJI	PPP	65,262	62,051					4,597
80 GUJRAT 1	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	94,688	63,247					8,779
81 GUJRAT 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	80,861	74,621					11,789
82 GUJRAT 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	80,621	65,252					19,724
83 GUJRAT 4	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	62,788	52,881					17,449
84 GUJRAT 5	PDA	IJI	IJI	PPP	41,086	28,884					25,927
85 SIALKOT 1	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	59,515	38,333					9,217
86 SIALKOT 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	67,731	58,596					11,490
87 SIALKOT 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	81,137	50,320					9,324
88 SIALKOT 4	IJI	PDA	IJI	PDP	72,764	47,602					3,988
89 SIALKOT 5	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	67,966	39,995					3,447
90 SIALKOT 6	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	60,982	34,253					6,717
91 SIALKOT 7	CANC	CANC	IJI	PPP							
92 LAHORE 1	IJI	PDA	PAJ	PPP	57,886	44,384					6,564
93 LAHORE 2	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	65,624	52,697					8,526
94 LAHORE 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IND	53,352	51,953					4,987
95 LAHORE 4	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	59,944	39,585					3,793

DISTRICT NAME	1990		1988		1990		1990		1990 3RD	
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	1990 3RD PARTY VOTES	1990 3RD PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)
96 LAHORE 5	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	54,506	41,902				2,187
97 LAHORE 6	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	68,943	51,058				7,783
98 LAHORE 7	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	60,220	48,686				5,839
99 LAHORE 8	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	42,549	32,962				4,284
100 LAHORE 9	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	46,842	34,289				5,330
101 SHEIKUPURA 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	60,175	56,429				8,086
102 SHEIKUPURA 2	IJI	PAT	PPP	IJI	39,430	38,377				42,849
103 SHEIKUPURA 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IND	49,701	32,570				19,775
104 SHEIKUPURA 4	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	59,036	44,803				17,012
105 SHEIKUPURA 5	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	43,708	37,098				9,326
106 KASUR 1	IND	JUI (N)	IND	PPP	46,590	29,032				33,588
107 KASUR 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	43,657	35,883				10,970
108 KASUR 3	IND	IJI	IJI	PPP	51,189	41,554				16,617
109 KASUR 4	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	56,859	45,856				6,868
110 OKARA 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	54,096	45,184				5,718
111 OKARA 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	50,728	48,895				5,911
112 OKARA 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	66,753	39,998				4,802
113 OKARA 4	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	71,129	46,473				3,897
114 MULTAN 1	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	60,076	54,781				4,580

DISTRICT NAME	1990		1988		1988		1990		1990		1990 3RD	
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd PARTY VOTES
115 MULTAN 2	IJI	PDA	PPP	PAI	62,637	42,288						2,808
116 MULTAN 3	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	50,066	39,852						5,428
117 MULTAN 4	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	64,567	56,382						6,455
118 MULTAN 5	IJI	PDA	PPP	PAI	60,954	40,558						16,494
119 MULTAN 6	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	66,900	52,084						3,125
120 MUL cum KHANEWAL	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	70,025	52,881						1,796
121 KHANEWAL 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	58,479	45,523						13,633
122 KHANEWAL 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	63,998	44,784						3,407
123 KHANEWAL 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	76,045	54,856						5,740
124 SAHIWAL 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	63,655	55,677						4,830
125 SAHIWAL 2	PDA	IJI	IJI	PPP	54,982	50,529						15,427
126 SAHIWAL 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	69,338	65,810						6,234
127 SAHIWAL 4	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	61,831	43,101						3,350
128 PAKPATTAN	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	60,593	45,960						7,964
129 VEHARI 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	87,427	55,922						3,948
130 VEHARI 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	50,719	44,088						39,093
131 VEHARI 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	72,159	60,747						34,236
132 D.G. KHAN	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	78,360	55,711						6,986
133 D.G. KHAN cum RAJANPUR	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	76,378	56,342						7,884

DISTRICT NAME	1990		1988		1990		1988		1990		1990 3RD	
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	1990 3RD PARTY VOTES	1990 3RD PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)
134 RAJANPUR	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	76,446	57,765						3,200
135 MUZAFFARGARH 1	JUI (N)	PDA	IND	PPP	54,039	51,338						9,692
136 MUZAFFARGARH 2	JUI (N)	PDA	PDP	IJI	54,424	46,638						9,867
137 MUZAFFARGARH 3	IND	PDA	NPP K	IJI	43,435	30,438						27,726
138 MUZAFFARGARH 4	IND	IJI	IND	PPP	51,755	39,741						14,013
139 LAYYAH 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	PAI	59,848	43,180						6,377
140 LAYYAH 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	52,446	44,694						1,277
141 BAHAWALPUR 1	IJI	IND	IND	PPP	68,838	59,175						5,771
142 BAHAWALPUR 2	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	71,825	47,515						7,440
143 BAHAWALPUR 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	IND	65,321	65,052						21,839
144 BAHAWALNAGAR 1	IND	PDA	PPP	IJI	50,555	42,897						36,748
145 BAHAWALNAGAR 2	IJI	PDA	IJI	PML (MQ)	81,088	60,521						6,969
146 BAHAWALNAGAR 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	74,872	66,076						5,072
147 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 1	PDA	IJI	IJI	PPP	66,205	57,432						2,200
148 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 2	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	59,181	57,740						2,165
149 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 3	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	80,304	51,454						5,595
150 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 4	IJI	PDA	IJI	PPP	52,816	45,144						37,849
151 SUKKUR 1	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	60,733	43,618						7,214
152 SUKKUR 2	PDA	IND	PPP	IJI	48,938	39,985						3,724

DISTRICT	1990		1988		1990		1990		1990	
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	1990 PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)	
153 SUKKUR 3	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	49,399	34,978	4,359			
154 SHIKARPUR 1	PDA	SNA	PPP	IJI	38,301	20,128	12,023			
155 SHIKARPUR 2	PDA	SNF	PPP	IND	43,193	10,333	8,722			
156 JACOBABAD 1	PDA	IND	PPP	IJI	54,554	52,555	2,971			
157 JACOBABAD 2	IND	PDA	PPP	IND	81,610	35,818	2,949			
158 FERROZE 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	88,166	21,829	2,441			
159 FERROZE 2	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	57,029	51,520	4,481			
160 NAWABSHAH 1	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI	48,588	44,964	3,257			
161 NAWABSHAH 2	PDA	IJI	PPP	IJI	57,801	13,656	1,157			
162 KHAIKUR 1	PDA	IND	PPP	IND	74,358	46,073	9,740			
163 KHAIKUR 2	PDA	IJI	PPP	IND	79,080	39,391	2,836			
164 LARKA1	PDA	IND	PPP	PNP	79,901	9,203	746			
165 LARKA2	PDA	SNF	PPP	IJI	59,464	16,198	5,714			
166 LARKA3	PDA	IND	PPP	JUI (F)	94,462	718	1,032			
167 HYDERABAD 1	PDA	PNP	PPP	IND	50,154	14,733	1,790			
168 HYDERABAD 2	MQM	JUP (N)	IND	IND	76,578	13,949	13,652			
169 HYDERABAD 3	MQM	PDA	IND	PPP	91,373	24,259	6,397			
170 HYDERABAD 4	PDA	IND	PPP	IND	56,902	16,563	1,002			
171 HYDERABAD 5	PDA	IND	PPP	IJI	59,209	22,878	2,183			



DISTRICT NAME	1990		1990		1988		1990		1990		1990		1990 3RD	
	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	WINNER VOTES	2nd VOTES	PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)	PARTY VOTES (TOTAL)
191 KARACHI (SOUTH) 3	MQM	IJI	IND	PPIS			40,573	20,019					21,047	
192 KARACHI (EAST) 1	MQM	IND	IND	PPP			61,938	10,654					9,571	
193 KARACHI (EAST) 2	MQM	IJI	IND	IJI			72,272	21,329					8,473	
194 KARACHI (EAST) 3	MQM	PDA	IND	PPP			72,892	15,178					5,119	
195 KARACHI (EAST) 4	MQM	PDA	IND	PPP			71,265	33,495					9,762	
196 KARACHI (EAST) 5	MQM	PDA	IND	PPP			90,337	40,983					3,245	
197 QUETTA/CHAGAI	PDA	JUI (F)	JUI (F)	IJI			37,874	34,207					43,300	
198 PISHIN	PMAP	JUI (F)	JUI (F)	PMAL			34,003	28,825					16,047	
199 LORALAI	IJI	PDA	PPP	IJI			15,864	13,016					27,681	
200 ZHOB	JUI (F)	PKMAP	JUI (F)	JUI (D)			15,965	10,038					10,597	
201 KACHHI	IJI	BNM	IND	BNA			42,586	12,738					12,081	
202 SIBIKOHLU/ZIARAT/BUGTI	IJI	PDA	IND	IND			57,094	6,764					14,481	
203 JAFFARABAD/TAMBOO	PDA	IJI	IJI	IND			24,131	19,645					7,754	
204 KALAT/KHARAN	JUI (F)	PDA	JUI (F)	PNP			18,647	14,828					22,577	
205 KHUZDAR	PDA	IJI	BNA	PNP			21,294	15,053					11,441	
206 LASBELA/GWADAR	IJI	PDA	IJI	PNP			20,487	19,828					25,375	
207 TURBAT/PANJGUR	PNP	BNA	BNA	PNP			26,166	23,782					8,628	

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1980 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
1 PESHAWAR 1	10,280	15,286	42.52%	-5,707	-12.78%	701	-5,707	4,149	-9,856	-22.07%	1	
2 PESHAWAR 2	6,409	11,820	60.82%	-5,207	-21.71%	-104	-5,207	1,876	-7,185	-29.40%	1	
3 PESHAWAR 3	3,549	14,003	56.83%	-8,431	-29.68%	-2023	-8,431	856	-9,287	-32.65%	1	
4 PESHAWAR 4	7,701	10,572	38.01%	-2,180	-7.81%	-681	-2,180	2,384	-4,574	-16.33%	1	
5 CHARSDDA	19,912	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-10,266	-16.24%	-1843	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
6 MARDAN 1 (RESULT CHANGED)	7,846	3,742	11.64%	-17,875	-37.91%	21,579	-17,475	2,566	-20,041	-43.48%	1	
7 MARDAN 2	1,817	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-14312	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
8 SWABI	-3,031	11,652	28.94%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-6474	0	-753	0	0.00%	1	
9 KOHAT	4,440	8,965	47.07%	-3,978	-13.02%	-548	8,866	1,395	7,571	38.74%	1	
10 KARAK	3,682	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-5,083	-25.71%	7310	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
11 ABBOTTABAD 1	7,844	43,306	203.82%	-4,051	-11.31%	-31410	0	0	0	0.00%	1	
12 ABBOTTABAD 2	4,079	12,109	38.25%	4,816	18.75%	-12848	0	0	0	0.00%	1	
13 ABBOTTABAD 3	-1,433	-7,205	-11.96%	5,904	23.55%	-132	5,904	-455	6,359	0.00%	0	
14 MANSEHRA 1	10,139	424	1.23%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	4900	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
15 MANSEHRA 2	554	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-4,753	-22.78%	773	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
16 MANSEHRA 3	0	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
17 KOHATAN	7,681	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	4681	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
18 D. I. KHAN	5,641	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-9,982	-15.34%	-13940	0	2,284	0	0.00%	0	
19 BANNU 1	853	9,377	49.11%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-8396	0	186	0	0.00%	1	

TABLE 2.1. FALSE ± 0





DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNS FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1988 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE EROSION OR GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 5RD PARTY LOSSES
	TURNOUT	WINNING PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	2nd PARTY	3RD PARTIES	PDA	PDA SHARE OF 1988 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE EROSION OR GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 5RD PARTY LOSSES
39 RAWALPINDI 4	4,135	43,110	96.40%	-3,571	-5.88%	-35,404	-3,571	1,561	-5,132	-8.45%	1
40 RAWALPINDI 5	8,563	14,344	22.35%	5,143	8.89%	-1,0924	5,143	3,768	1,375	2.39%	1
41 ATTOCK 1	-1,829	35,076	97.28%	244	0.51%	-37,146	244	-704	946	0.00%	1
42 ATTOCK 2	-512	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-12,555	-18.54%	-6509	-12,555	-174	-12,381	0.00%	0
43 CHAKWAL 1	6,596	19,232	29.62%	7,905	14.92%	-19,558	7,905	2,673	5,232	9.87%	1
44 CHAKWAL 2	12,734	3,311	4.35%	8,631	14.19%	792	8,631	5,831	2,800	4.59%	1
45 JHELUM 1	4,351	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	9,414	19.20%	-27,219	0	2,048	0	0.00%	0
46 JHELUM 2	13,817	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-13,802	0	6,340	0	0.00%	0
47 SARGODHA 1	56	261	0.47%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	1135	261	27	234	0.42%	0
48 SARGODHA 2	8,321	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	623	1.40%	-29,766	623	3,212	-2,569	-5.80%	0
49 SARGODHA 3	-1,912	-5,634	-8.64%	-2,220	-3.87%	5942	-2,220	-842	-1,576	0.00%	0
50 SARGODHA 4	-468	5,869	8.15%	5,616	12.71%	-12,128	5,616	-195	6,013	0.00%	1
51 SARG...KHUSAB	11,957	3,396	4.15%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-5327	0	0	0	0.00%	0
52 KHUSAB	8,741	24,782	66.76%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-10,540	0	3,455	0	0.00%	1
53 MIANWALI 1	7,846	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-9766	0	2,444	0	0.00%	0
54 MIANWALI 2	-2,659	29,030	71.73%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-23,020	0	-656	0	0.00%	1
55 BHAKKAR 1	-9,369	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-13,891	-28.25%	-23,815	0	0	0	0.00%	0
56 BHAKKAR 2	4,719	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-10,536	-21.40%	-13,228	0	0	0	0.00%	0
57 FAISALABAD 1	9,942	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-243	-0.41%	-4,613	-243	4,159	-4,402	-7.46%	0

TABLE-3.1, FALSE-2-B

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PDA SHARE OF 1990	PREDICTED VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE GAIN FROM 1988	POSSIBLE LOSS FROM 1988	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
	FROM 1988	WINNING PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	2nd PARTY	3RD PARTIES	PDA	OF 1990	FROM 1988	FROM 1988	FROM 1988	WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
56 FAISALABAD 2	-206	-12,011	-21.89%	-1,279	-3.06%	13,082	-12,011	-88	-11,922	0.00%	0	0
59 FAISALABAD 3	8,603	8,621	23.33%	-8,682	-19.22%	8474	-8,682	3,354	-13,046	-25.88%	1	1
60 FAISALABAD 4	7,308	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	2,282	8.07%	-27071	2,282	1,935	327	1.17%	0	0
61 FAISALABAD 5	4,406	569	0.79%	7,156	13.96%	-3319	7,156	2,006	5,150	9.40%	1	1
62 FAISALABAD 6	0	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0	0
63 FAISALABAD 7	3,954	15,021	32.68%	-4,243	-7.82%	-6824	-4,243	1,696	-5,939	-10.95%	1	1
64 FAISALABAD 8	3,870	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-2,273	-4.18%	-6648	-2,273	1,680	-3,953	-7.28%	0	0
65 FAISALABAD 9	2,174	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-6,208	-8.92%	-1083	-6,208	1,017	-7,225	-10.38%	0	0
66 JHANG 1	7,111	4,963	12.50%	8,654	21.14%	-4208	4,963	2,658	1,705	4.77%	1	1
67 JHANG 2	10,818	15,156	35.89%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	9131	0	4,354	0	0.00%	1	1
68 JHANG 3	-297	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-9435	0	-79	0	0.00%	0	0
69 JHANG 4	14,929	9,374	17.27%	14,243	42.13%	-8686	9,374	7,584	1,680	3.11%	1	1
70 JHANG 5	7,297	-2,685	-4.88%	8,505	16.95%	1467	-2,685	3,543	-6,218	-10.13%	0	0
71 TOBA TEK SINGH 1	3,237	110	0.17%	6,860	13.74%	-9853	6,860	1,468	5,394	10.87%	1	1
72 TOBA TEK SINGH 2	1,753	9,536	14.27%	-6,758	-13.12%	-1026	-6,758	635	-7,393	-14.35%	1	1
73 TOBA TEK SINGH 3	994	17,362	33.30%	-5,277	-9.51%	-11101	-5,277	408	-5,686	-10.25%	1	1
74 GLURANWALA 1	7,967	231,88	35.05%	-18,145	-25.12%	2627	-18,145	2,801	-21,046	-29.13%	1	1
75 GLURANWALA 2	8,514	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-5,599	-10.62%	29020	0	0	0	0.00%	0	0
76 GLURANWALA 3	1,630	7,679	12.79%	-5,756	-8.04%	-591	-5,756	713	-6,469	-10.16%	1	1

TABLE 3.3. PAGES 8-9

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PDA SHARE OF 1980 TURNOUT	PREDICTED VOTES OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED	POSSIBLE EROSION OR GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF VOTES
	TURNOUT FROM 1988	WINNING PARTY	WINNING PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	2nd PARTY	3RD PARTIES	3RD PARTIES	PDA	PDA SHARE OF 1980 TURNOUT	PDA VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	PDA VOTES LOST OR GAINED	PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES	WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF VOTES
77 GUJRANWALA 4	4,633	6,678	12.71%	-12,890	-20.52%	10,945	-12,890	1,856	-14,856	23.46%	1			
78 GUJRANWALA 5	13,266	10,817	19.65%	20,754	94.63%	-26,305	26,754	6,224	22,530	74.15%	1			
79 GUJRANWALA 6	11,197	31,372	92.57%	21,084	51.47%	-41,319	31,372	5,510	25,862	76.31%	1			
80 GUJRAT 1	12,900	19,836	26.50%	-8,165	-11.43%	12,321	-8,165	4,895	-13,060	-18.29%	1			
81 GUJRAT 2	14,701	2,836	3.63%	5,184	7.47%	6,681	5,184	6,556	-1,374	-1.89%	1			
82 GUJRAT 3	7,359	16,951	26.62%	-11,088	-14.53%	14,071	-11,088	2,980	-13,988	-18.32%	1			
83 GUJRAT 4	5,325	21,849	53.75%	2,361	4.67%	-1,896	2,361	2,115	246	0.49%	1			
84 GUJRAT 5	8,042	9,961	32.00%	-3,943	-12.01%	20,224	9,961	3,446	6,515	20.89%	1			
85 SJALKOT 1	-1,332	-337	-0.65%	-2,517	-6.16%	1,572	-2,517	-477	-2,040	0.00%	0			
86 SJALKOT 2	11,616	9,186	15.69%	3,433	6.22%	-1,003	3,433	4,989	-1,506	-2.71%	1			
87 SJALKOT 3	12,371	29,400	56.83%	-2,556	-4.47%	-1,673	-2,556	4,622	-6,778	-12.87%	1			
88 SJALKOT 4	23,175	27,493	60.73%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-20,995	0	8,671	0	0.00%	0			
89 SJALKOT 5	8,480	35,959	112.21%	7,794	24.20%	-35,253	7,794	3,044	4,750	14.75%	1			
90 SJALKOT 6	12,969	17,081	38.91%	9,176	36.60%	-19,880	9,176	4,156	5,022	20.03%	1			
91 SJALKOT 7	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0			
92 LAHORE 1	10,220	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-333	-0.74%	-12,642	-333	4,168	-4,501	-10.07%	0			
93 LAHORE 2	2,606	-6,236	-8.68%	11,516	27.96%	-26,721	-6,236	1,349	-7,585	-10.56%	0			
94 LAHORE 3	6,177	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-1,472	-2.76%	-19,701	-1,472	2,910	-4,362	-8.20%	0			
95 LAHORE 4	14,468	10,636	21.55%	3,820	9.76%	323	3,820	5,543	-2,023	-5.61%	1			

TABLE 1. FALSE #2

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988		CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)		CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)		CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)		CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)		PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1980 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)		POSSIBLE ERSON OR GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 10% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
	TURNOUT	WINNING PARTY	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	2nd PARTY	3RD PARTIES	PDA VOTES	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST	POSSIBLE VOTES GAINED						
96 LAHORE 5	12,827	15,812	40.86%	-1,466	-3.38%	-1719	-1,466	5,366	-6,832	-15.75%	1				
97 LAHORE 6	8,454	13,288	23.88%	-5,845	-10.27%	1011	-5,845	3,378	-8,223	-18.21%	1				
98 LAHORE 7	5,577	8,456	16.34%	778	1.62%	-3657	778	2,366	-1,588	-3.32%	1				
99 LAHORE 8	3,310	17,528	70.06%	1,679	5.37%	-15888	1,679	1,367	312	1.00%	1				
100 LAHORE 9	6,043	16,377	53.76%	386	1.14%	-10720	386	2,397	-2,011	-5.80%	1				
101 SHEIKUPURA 1	9,152	17,274	40.25%	-10,430	-15.60%	2206	-10,430	4,142	-14,572	-21.79%	1				
102 SHEIKUPURA 2	2,341	7,425	23.20%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	898	0	0	0	0.00%	1				
103 SHEIKUPURA 3	3,318	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-5,810	-15.14%	-8942	-5,810	1,059	-6,869	-17.90%	0				
104 SHEIKUPURA 4	7,225	9,406	18.95%	-17,377	-27.95%	15196	-17,377	2,678	-20,056	-32.25%	1				
105 SHEIKUPURA 5	7,702	14,970	52.13%	-3,633	-8.82%	-3843	-3,633	3,170	-8,803	-16.70%	1				
106 KASUR 1	430	-17,400	-27.20%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	28269	0	0	0	0.00%	0				
107 KASUR 2	2,379	2,860	7.27%	15,381	75.02%	-15882	15,381	943	14,438	70.42%	1				
108 KASUR 3	10,907	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-12,925	-20.72%	11244	0	0	0	0.00%	0				
109 KASUR 4	3,729	6,965	13.96%	-8,555	-15.72%	5319	-8,555	1,660	-10,115	-18.59%	1				
110 OKARA 1	472	8,164	17.77%	-11,046	-19.64%	3354	-11,046	203	-11,248	-20.01%	1				
111 OKARA 2	7,560	5,860	11.15%	7,817	19.03%	-5338	7,817	3,506	4,311	10.48%	1				
112 OKARA 3	10,432	19,571	41.46%	-9,344	-18.94%	265	-9,344	3,740	-13,084	-26.52%	1				
113 OKARA 4	24,582	22,030	44.87%	1,330	2.95%	1222	1,330	9,403	-8,073	-17.88%	1				
114 MULTAN 1	14,987	1,776	3.05%	12,824	30.56%	387	1,776	7,543	-5,767	-9.88%	1				

TABLE 1: PAGES 2-3

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988		CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)		CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)		CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)		CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)		PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1990 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE ERSION OR GAIN FROM 1988	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
	TURNOUT	DATA N/A	WINNING PARTY	2nd PARTY	2nd PARTY	3RD PARTIES	PDA	PDA	ON POSSIBLE VOTES	LOST OR GAINED				
115 MULTAN 2	3,585	DATA N/A	22%	0.54%	22%	0.54%	22%	1,407	-1,178	-2.80%	0			
116 MULTAN 3	5,421	9,217	22.56%	-12.41%	18.66	-5,645	2,266	-7,911	-17.9%	1				
117 MULTAN 4	21,552	14,161	28.09%	12.79%	978	6,393	9,526	-3,136	-6.27%	1				
118 MULTAN 5	23,181	DATA N/A	9.812	31.91%	-19,720	8,912	7,971	1,841	5.89%	0				
119 MULTAN 6	17,225	20,537	44.30%	-2.60%	-1,391	-1,391	7,390	-8,781	-16.42%	1				
120 MUL cum KHANEWAL	22,513	21,958	45.89%	1.834	-1,380	1,834	9,547	-7,613	-14.94%	1				
121 KHANEWAL 1	13,708	9,957	20.52%	-7.755	11,507	-7,755	5,305	-13,060	-24.51%	1				
122 KHANEWAL 2	10,229	13,200	25.99%	15.474	52.79%	-16,345	15,474	4,123	11,251	38.73%	1			
123 KHANEWAL 3	16,577	18,730	32.68%	-5.63	-1,900	-5.63	6,655	-7,218	-13.02%	1				
124 SAHIVAL 1	4,458	15,690	32.71%	-6.030	-9.77%	-5,202	-6,030	1,866	-8,029	-13.01%	1			
125 SAHIVAL 2	5,732	6,701	13.86%	-5.578	-9.94%	4,609	6,701	2,606	4,095	8.48%	1			
126 SAHIVAL 3	9,936	10,261	17.37%	11.885	22.04%	-12,610	11,885	4,438	7,446	13.81%	1			
127 SAHIVAL 4	-5,982	7,566	13.95%	-6.592	-19.25%	-6,666	-6,592	-2,391	-4,201	0.00%	1			
128 PAKPATTAN	3,730	41	0.07%	-2.657	-5.67%	63.6	-2,657	1,497	-4,154	-8.54%	1			
129 VEHARI 1	15,036	24,875	39.77%	-9.891	-15.03%	52	-9,891	5,708	-15,598	-29.70%	1			
130 VEHARI 2	9,943	-14,306	-22.00%	-7.459	-14.44%	31,687	-7,459	3,274	-10,713	-20.79%	0			
131 VEHARI 3	39,200	3,935	5.77%	2,635	4.52%	32,626	2,635	14,247	-11,612	-18.98%	1			
132 D.G. KHAN	19,069	18,063	29.96%	10,121	22.20%	-9,115	10,121	7,531	2,590	5.68%	1			
133 D.G. KHAN cum RAJANPUR	23,780	279	0.37%	20,936	56.74%	3106	279	12,918	-12,639	-16.61%	1			

TABLE - 3. F.M.S.E. - 8

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PREDICTED PDA S-48RE OF 1990 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE ERROR OR GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
134 RAJANPUR	18,652	23,904	45.50%	4,829	9.12%	-1,001	4,829	7,941	-3,012	-5.68%	1
135 MUZAFFARGARH 1	18,043	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	25,506	98.74%	-35,048	25,506	8,050	17,456	67.36%	0
136 MUZAFFARGARH 2	15,755	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-5842	0	6,824	0	0.00%	0
137 MUZAFFARGARH 3	13,600	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	6102	0	4,074	0	0.00%	0
138 MUZAFFARGARH 4	25,731	-9,190	-15.08%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	7224	0	0	0	0.00%	0
139 LAYYAH 1	10,608	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	124	0.23%	-14394	124	4,187	-4,063	-9.44%	0
140 LAYYAH 2	8,501	21,033	66.96%	16,760	60.00%	-29292	16,760	3,961	12,889	46.18%	1
141 BAHAWALPUR 1	11,346	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-11,143	-15.85%	1016	0	0	0	0.00%	0
142 BAHAWALPUR 2	7,977	36,976	118.65%	-6,702	-12.36%	-24297	-6,702	2,900	-9,692	-17.85%	1
143 BAHAWALPUR 3	14,896	13,713	26.57%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-24635	0	6,348	0	0.00%	0
144 BAHAWALNAGAR 1	15,121	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	4,638	12.12%	-3153	4,638	4,982	-344	-0.80%	0
145 BAHAWALNAGAR 2	16,748	18,148	29.83%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-8666	0	6,622	0	0.00%	0
146 BAHAWALNAGAR 3	11,656	16,107	27.41%	8,187	14.14%	-12638	8,187	5,274	2,913	5.01%	1
147 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 1	16,846	30,257	84.17%	5,569	10.74%	-18980	30,257	8,663	21,394	59.51%	1
148 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 2	11,852	16,071	37.26%	19,154	49.64%	-23973	16,071	5,960	10,181	28.62%	1
149 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 3	-223	19,457	31.99%	-4,291	-7.70%	-15386	-4,291	-84	-4,207	0.00%	1
150 RAHIMAYAR KHAN 4	8,395	6,032	12.89%	-903	-1.96%	3266	-903	2,791	-3,694	-8.02%	1
151 SUKKUR 1	7,499	2,982	5.16%	12,946	42.21%	-8519	2,982	4,033	-1,051	-1.62%	1
152 SUKKUR 2	6,108	-4,706	-8.76%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-3973	-4,706	3,226	-7,934	-14.79%	0

TRUE ± 1, FALSE ± 2

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1980 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE ERSION OF GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
	FROM 1988	WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PDA SHARE OF 1980 TURNOUT	THE PDA (FROM 1988)	WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES	
153 SUKKUR 3	4,734	-3,163	-6.02%	6,996	25.00%	801	-3,163	2,635	-5,798	-11.03%	0
154 SHIKARPUR 1	3,084	-2,843	-7.14%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	3298	-2,843	1,682	-4,625	-11.21%	0
155 SHIKARPUR 2	9,834	2,572	6.33%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	2846	2,572	6,883	-4,321	-10.64%	0
156 JACOBABAD 1	28,855	-14,668	-21.19%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-706	-14,668	14,156	-28,824	-41.64%	0
157 JACOBABAD 2	58,168	57,670	240.89%	3,286	10.10%	-2788	3,286	17,308	-14,022	-43.10%	1
158 FEROEZE 1	7,146	57,676	188.16%	-50,021	-69.62%	-506	-50,021	1,387	-51,408	-71.55%	1
159 FEROEZE 2	32,015	10,886	29.59%	20,410	65.61%	719	10,886	16,153	-5,267	-11.41%	1
160 NAWABSHAH 1	10,588	30,066	162.33%	9,373	26.34%	-28851	9,373	4,918	4,455	12.52%	1
161 NAWABSHAH 2	4,610	5,828	11.22%	431	3.29%	-1650	5,828	3,670	2,159	4.15%	1
162 KHAIRPUR 1	4,820	-13,783	-15.65%	11,710	34.08%	7000	-13,783	2,810	-16,600	-18.84%	0
163 KHAIRPUR 2	848	-8,239	-9.44%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-186	-8,238	583	-8,792	-10.07%	0
164 LARKA1	-1,493	-3,546	-4.25%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-2624	-3,546	-1,328	-2,220	0.00%	0
165 LARKA2	-1,272	-3,547	-3.63%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	2018	-3,547	-929	-2,616	0.00%	0
166 LARKA3	10,688	12,233	14.88%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-304	12,233	10,474	1,759	2.14%	1
167 HYDERABAD 1	-3,708	-2,308	-4.40%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	941	-2,308	-2,789	481	0.00%	0
168 HYDERABAD 2	-7,760	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-1935	0	0	0	0.00%	0
169 HYDERABAD 3	15,119	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	3,151	14.93%	-7090	3,151	3,006	145	0.69%	0
170 HYDERABAD 4	3,214	6,033	11.86%	1,276	8.35%	-4095	6,033	2,456	3,577	7.03%	1
171 HYDERABAD 5	-1,662	-2,628	-4.25%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	470	-2,628	-1,168	-1,461	0.00%	0

TRUE = 1, FALSE = 0



DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1990 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
172 BADIN 1	2,216	3,543	8.09%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-7,297	3,543	1,583	1,980	5.06%	0
173 BADIN 2	2,690	754	2.19%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-9,822	754	1,803	-1,048	-2.86%	0
174 THARPARKAR 1	1,551	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	5,022	12.72%	-17,621	5,022	694	4,328	10.96%	0
175 THARPARKAR 2	2,708	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-5,393	-15.71%	-9,500	-5,398	1,073	-6,466	-18.84%	0
176 THARPARKAR 3	4,700	8,691	21.05%	-531	-1.39%	-9430	-531	2,022	-2,553	-6.64%	1
177 DADU 1	3,302	-8,020	-13.05%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-124	-8,020	2,286	-10,310	-16.77%	0
178 DADU 2	1,170	-7,391	-11.88%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-552	-7,581	838	-8,419	-13.19%	0
179 DADU 3	1,336	-10,200	-16.14%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-2514	-10,200	813	-11,013	-17.43%	0
180 SANGHAR 1	16,513	24,128	45.76%	-6,808	-22.83%	-677	-6,808	3,793	-10,731	-35.47%	1
181 SANGHAR 2	16,573	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-2,990	-5.99%	-21,900	-2,990	6,248	-8,236	-18.52%	0
182 THATTA 1	-1,978	-5,919	-11.11%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	1739	-5,919	-1,458	-4,461	0.00%	0
183 THATTA 2	11,294	-3,558	-9.53%	17,861	212.46%	-2525	-3,558	6,110	-9,668	-25.90%	0
184 KARACHI (WEST) 1	-2,762	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	11,398	33.82%	-30,798	11,398	-1,042	12,440	0.00%	0
185 KARACHI (WEST) 2	4,108	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-2,982	-16.08%	-10,483	-2,982	503	-3,485	-18.79%	0
186 KARACHI (CENTRAL) 1	-7,394	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-1,251	-6.80%	-8421	0	0	0	0.00%	0
187 KARACHI (CENTRAL) 2	1,678	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-7325	0	56	0	0.00%	0
188 KARACHI (CENTRAL) 3	-518	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-118,022	-90.53%	-8250	0	0	0	0.00%	0
189 KARACHI (SOUTH) 1	-18,458	-7,736	-12.47%	1,884	17.59%	-12605	-7,738	-13,720	5,982	0.00%	0
190 KARACHI (SOUTH) 2	-10,292	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-35185	0	0	0	0.00%	0

TABLE # 1, PAGES # 0

DISTRICT NAME	CHANGE IN TURNOUT FROM 1988	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 2nd PARTY (% OF 1988)	CHANGE IN VOTES FOR 3RD PARTIES (FROM 1988)	CHANGE IN PDA VOTES (FROM 1988)	PREDICTED PDA SHARE OF 1990 TURNOUT	POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED BY THE PDA (FROM 1988)	POSSIBLE ERSION OR GAIN FROM 1988 PDA BASE (BASED ON POSSIBLE VOTES LOST OR GAINED)	CONSTITUENCIES WHERE WINNER MAY HAVE SECURED AS MUCH AS 100% OF LOST PDA VOTES PLUS 3RD PARTY LOSSES
191 KARACHI (SOUTH) 3	-5,888	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-1,400	0	0	0	0.00%	0
192 KARACHI (EAST) 1	-9,076	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-46,955	-81.51%	-11,068	0	0	0	0.00%	0
193 KARACHI (EAST) 2	2,364	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	3,230	18.24%	-11,140	0	0	0	0.00%	0
194 KARACHI (EAST) 3	251	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	1,602	11.80%	-13,761	1,802	41	1,561	11.50%	0
195 KARACHI (EAST) 4	3,648	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	9,342	38.68%	-18,347	9,342	1,067	8,275	34.28%	0
196 KARACHI (EAST) 5	10,704	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	8,860	27.68%	-1,485	8,860	3,260	5,620	17.51%	0
197 QUETTA/CHAGAI	1,674	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-25,883	0	615	0	0.00%	0
198 PISHIN	11,601	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	3,966	15.49%	-6,825	0	0	0	0.00%	0
199 LORALAI	11,627	DATA N/A	44.18%	1,532	13.34%	5234	1,532	2,676	-1,144	-9.95%	1
200 ZHOB	6,603	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-869	0	0	0	0.00%	0
201 KACCHI	22,071	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	1156	0	0	0	0.00%	0
202 SIBIKOHLU/ZIARAT/BUGTI	42,611	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	3060	0	3,679	0	0.00%	0
203 JAFFARABAD/TAMBOO	-22,977	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-31,208	-61.37%	1286	0	-10,760	0	0.00%	0
204 KALAT/KHARAN	3,746	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-22,86	0	981	0	0.00%	0
205 KHUZDAR	3,165	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	-6171	0	1,410	0	0.00%	0
206 LASBELGWADAR	8,819	3,064	17.56%	DATA N/A	DATA N/A	2677	0	2,662	0	0.00%	0
207 TURBAT/PANJGUR	13,175	14,083	116.55%	7,688	47.77%	-6,866	0	0	0	0.00%	1

TABLE 3: PAGES 3-9

COLLAGE OF PRESS CLIPPINGS
COVERING NDI INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
OBSERVATION DELEGATION

Observers Accept Pakistani Vote

Group Found No Evidence of Enough Fraud to Swing Outcome

By Steve Coll
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 26—A U.S.-based multinational observer team said today that it had so far found no evidence of rigging in Pakistan's election that would have significantly altered Wednesday's landslide defeat of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. The co-leader of the delegation, former Turkish foreign minister Yuhut Halefoglu, said the team's election observations would continue to conduct statistical analyses to probe questions raised about oddities in voter turnout numbers and election results. But so far, Halefoglu said, "The delegation has received no evidence that would allow us to substantiate allegations concerning irregular vote totals."

The 40-member international team to monitor polls

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 20: Advance News, is included in the delegation, although Pakistan has no party of a forty-member international team to monitor the process. The team prescribes the election process. The team observes the process. The team prescribes the election process. The team observes the process.

NDI to inform world about elections

Dawn 24 Oct 1990 Bureau Report
International teams call on CEC
The Muslim 23 Oct 1990
ISLAMABAD, Oct. 22: Three international delegations called on partial polls, the methodology followed in granting party symbols, Chief Election Commissioner, Justice Naimuddin, Monday at Islamabad to have an overview of complaints and finally in the order to ensure free, fair and impartial elections.

Observers informed of pre-poll rigging

The Frontier Post, 24 Oct 1990
ISLAMABAD — Members of the National Democratic Institute's (NDI) delegation called on some PPP leaders at the party's central secretariat here on Tuesday. They remained in the secretariat for about one hour and expressed themselves of the apprehensions which the PPP leadership harbours about fairness of the polls. The PPP leaders informed the delegates that the caretakers had already initiated "selective

Explaining their point further, they said that the caretakers, both at the centre and the provinces, have changed the venue of polling stations in major cities like Rawalpindi, Lahore and Faisalabad for campaign purposes on the eve of the election. Moreover, they said that the caretakers had already initiated "selective" rigging of the polls. Finally, a malicious propaganda with personal overtones, has been unleashed by these caretakers. Publishing "theses" in almost all the newspapers and in almost all the radio stations out of the country. It might be the team of for formally briefs Punjab, Mian Mohammad Asrar, ex Wafa, Punjab, Monday at Islamabad. The Independent 27 Oct, 1990

Pakistan's election is deemed 'orderly'

World keeps open eyes on polls

The Pakistan Times 24 Oct 1990
40 observers arrive in Islamabad

From SIKANDER HAYAT
ISLAMABAD — Advance News of the 40-member international election observation delegation arrived in Islamabad on Tuesday. The Pakistan Times 24 Oct 1990
'Observers team calls on president, Senate Chairman'

NDI team hears PPP complaints
KARACHI, Oct. 24: An eight-member delegation of National Democratic Institute (NDI) was met by MQM Chief Altaf Husain about the aims and objectives of NDI at his residence on Wednesday. The delegation about her past apprehensions regarding the forthcoming polls. With re

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 23: Three leaders of the Election Observer team of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for International Democracy Assistance (IDA) arrived in Islamabad on Tuesday. The delegation to observe the process of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for International Democracy Assistance (IDA) arrived in Islamabad on Tuesday. The delegation to observe the process of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for International Democracy Assistance (IDA) arrived in Islamabad on Tuesday.

LETTER FROM NDI PRESIDENT BRIAN ATWOOD TO  
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE  
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October 30, 1990

The Honorable James A. Baker, III  
Secretary of State  
U.S. Department of State  
2201 C Street, N.W., 7th Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, the National Democratic Institute recently sponsored a 40-member international delegation that observed the October 24 elections in Pakistan. Vice President Walter Mondale, NDI's Chairman, has asked that I forward you a copy of the preliminary statement the delegation issued on October 26 in Pakistan. This statement, which was carefully drafted and represented the delegation's consensus view, is enclosed.

The Institute, on behalf of the delegation, is continuing to conduct a statistical analysis of the parliamentary districts to determine the existence of any discernable patterns indicating possible fraud. We are also seeking tangible evidence to support a number of serious allegations put forward by parties in Pakistan, particularly by the Pakistan People's Party. The delegation will not issue a final report on this election until this process is completed.

Our Institute can take no position on the issues the Administration must address with respect to the certification required under the Mikulski amendment for the continuation of foreign assistance. However, we have been advised by your Department that our assessment of the electoral process in Pakistan will be one of the factors under consideration. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the Administration may base a certification on the NDI delegation's October 26 preliminary statement. I am sure you would agree that this would be inappropriate. We would hope that any final determination with respect to the Mikulski amendment would await the completion of our delegation's work.

Sincerely,

J. Brian Atwood

Enclosure  
JBA/gt

**STATEMENTS BY OTHER OBSERVER GROUPS  
ON THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL  
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS**

**INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS**

The conclusion of Mrs. Nathalie Muller, Barrister, Miss Carine Jacoby, Barrister, Mr. Justice Olivier de Baynast and Mr. Justice Serge Petit, sent by the International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR), to observe the general election for National and Provincial Assemblies, held in Pakistan on October 24 and 27, 1990, is as follow:

- 1) The election campaign was held in an atmosphere of great tension against Mrs. Bhutto.
- 2) The electoral proceedings were held with great care, giving the impression of regularity.
- 3) However, serious irregularities were noticed by the observers at the local level:
  - Two identical identity cards (i.e. in the Lahore constituency NA 95 where Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Asghar Kahn were candidates).
  - Refusal to give the October 24 elections' results to the observers (i.e., in the Lahore constituency NA 96, where Mr. Shahbaz Sharif and Mr. Jehangir Badar were candidates).
  - Hindrance of the representatives of the parties in the vote counting process (i.e., at polling stations F 7/2 - F 7/3 in Islamabad).
  - Presence of armed policemen during the vote counting process (i.e., at polling station 145 in Kasur 1 for the provincial elections; at polling station E 8 Islamabad and polling station 82/83 in South Karachi 3 constituency NA 191 for October 24 elections).
  - Voters being prevented from casting their votes, their names having already been used for this purpose (Lahore).

- Number of votes exceeding voter's number (i.e., PP 128 Mian Khalid Saed constituency). And on the whole, general harassment against PDA representatives.
- 4) From explanations provided by PDA, and without the complete official figures more than five days after the General Election – the chief Election Commissioner having stated that the computer was out of order and that there was a lack of personnel to explain this – it seems that the results giving a very large majority to IJI, against deposed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, can be partly explained by a mechanism of highly sophisticated rigging which would have occurred between the polling stations and the offices responsible for collecting results at the constituency level.

FDA states that some presiding officers were devoted to IJI before the elections. While they should have forwarded the results immediately to the returning officers, some of the presiding officers may have stopped in intermediary places held by civil servants and may have replaced some envelopes, adding more IJI voting paper.

IFHR delegation gives some credence to these explanations as follows:

- All observers had noticed, on election days a small turnout which did not add up in the final results.
- Only the figures of the first two candidates have been announced.
- The polling stations were closed at 5 p.m., the vote counting ended around 6:30 p.m.; but the results coming from the polling stations only reached the returning officers around midnight instead of 9:30 p.m. as was the case in previous elections.
- No official record was given to the presiding officers and the party representatives as had been done in previous elections.

Moreover, it is unfortunate that the day after the first election an observer team from NDI deemed it right to hold a press

conference stating that, apart from a few incidents, the proceedings were "regular" and the results "not at all affected". This statement had a considerable impact, on the eve of the second elections, being on the front page of the newspapers and destabilizing the balance of forces.

In conclusion:

- Official figures have still not been published, which causes some doubts on the electoral proceedings, but the rigging allegations submitted by the PDA will be difficult for them to establish in the absence of proper post vote counting records.
- Unofficial figures show that PPP, with regards to 1988 elections, has not totally collapsed although it has sustained serious losses.

Therefore, it is really surprising that IJI got such a considerable lead, which would tend to demonstrate that many new votes have gone exclusively to this party, while all observers had noticed a small turnout on election days.

# SAARC NON-GOVERNMENTAL OBSERVER MISSION

## PAKISTAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS OCTOBER 1990

### MEMBERS

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Ambassador K.G. Mustafa

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Justice K.M. Subhan

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Dr. Frank Jayasinghe

Ambassador Neville Kanakarathne

Justice Siva Sellish

Justice J.F.A. Soza

Dr. Neelan Thiruchivam

Mr. Jeevan Thiagarajah

### INTERIM STATEMENT

A non-governmental Observer Mission of 16 persons--jurists, academics, journalists and diplomats--from four SAARC countries visited Pakistan to observe the National Assembly elections of October 24 1990. The members of the Mission were drawn from Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka. They came in their individual capacities on the invitation of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. The visit was facilitated by the Government of Pakistan. This was the third mission of its kind. During the last two years, SAARC non-governmental teams have observed the Pakistan National Assembly elections in 1988, the Sri Lanka Presidential election in 1988, and the Bangladesh local elections in 1990.

The Mission assembled in Karachi on 20 October 1990. After discussions and briefings, it divided itself into groups and visited the four provinces of Pakistan and the federal capital of Islamabad. In all, 129 polling stations in 46 constituencies were visited. In addition to the observation of the actual election process, members of the Mission met representatives from the federal and provincial governments, the federal and provincial Election Commissions, the two main political alliances, non-governmental organizations, professional bodies and the media. The Mission then reconvened in Lahore on 25 October 1990.

The Mission will release a comprehensive report on the Pakistan National Assembly elections covering three aspects of the electoral process: the political and legal background, the electoral machinery, and the actual polling.



## SAARC

The conclusions of the Mission are as follows: In the events leading up to the elections, the appointment of an opposition leader as the head of the caretaker government militated against accepted norms of electoral fairplay. The judicial proceedings against some of the leaders of the previous government also hindered a fair election campaign. Further, the partisan use of the electronic media by the caretaker government was not conducive to a free and fair election. The Mission, given the limitations of its terms of reference, leaves these issues to be resolved according to the wishes of the people of Pakistan.

The actual process of polling appeared to be free, fair and orderly in a majority of the polling stations visited by the Mission. In a minority of the polling stations visited, there were serious improprieties and violent incidents. The Mission received other complaints and allegations about electoral malpractices that it was not in a position to verify. In the interest of strengthening the democratic process in Pakistan, the Mission hopes that procedures and practices will be evolved to minimize such allegations and complaints.

The Mission acknowledges the assistance of the Election Commission and officials of the federal and provincial governments of Pakistan. Logistic arrangements for the Mission were coordinated by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Sri Lanka.

The Mission is an expression of the spirit of SAARC and of the commitment of its members to democratic processes and values in the region. Coming from countries with similar histories and socio-political structures, the members of the Mission are aware of the particular problems that the region faces in protecting democratic institutions and human rights. The members feel that it is through a sharing of experiences that the democratic process in the region can be enriched.

The Mission wishes the people of Pakistan well.