


(more on these below). It would be simple to permit union members to vote directly for their representatives, and relatively simple to classify those unions in a manner that would provide three seats representing three types of industry-related unions. (Civil service/public service related unions, manufacturing industry unions, and services/trade unions, for example.) As to professions, Chart/Table 15 shows that approximately 19 percent of the sample indicated their livelihood required a qualification or license of some kind.

**Chart/Table 15 Does your employer require a government-recognized certificate, professional degree or qualification, or other professional or legal registration in order for you to practice your occupation? (For example, are you a registered nurse, electrician, plumber or engineer, listed doctor, licensed insurance or real estate agent, commercially licensed driver, academy trained police officer, or the like?)**



**Table 15**

Group	Count	%
Yes	230	19
No	417	35
Non-workforce	557	46

About half this 19 percent already have FC votes. The remainder are those whose jobs require them to have some sort of government required qualification or registration that the research team proposes could be added to the current FC franchises for the elections of 2012. Government maintains lists of these professionals and registrant or certificate holders in various department databases. (See below for specifications of type of registration and certification). This addition would significantly increase the number of FCs registrants, could be easily done at low cost compared to new forms of

FC enfranchisement, and would not change the nature of FCs, as these people are members of the skilled, educated, and professional groups included in the original FCs. Their professions and certifications have been largely developed since 1985, when the original FCs began. Their inclusion as FC voters would be form of updating the FCs rather than drastically changing them. *So while the number of FC voters overall and in each franchise will significantly increase, the type of voter and the type of representative will not radically change.*

For example, government has developed new requirements over the years for licensed plumbers and electricians to be registered and required any construction work involving plumbing or electrical work be approved by a licensed person. Government has also imposed requirements for insurance agents and real estate agents to be certified to sell insurance or real estate. Registered insurance agents could be added to the current Insurance FC seat, while the plumbing, electrical and real estate agents could be added to Real Estate and Construction FC seat, permitting full abolition of corporate voting. Adding these new professionals and new registrants to the current FC voting list would be an updating of the Cold War era FC structure existing now. This would add in 2012 approximately 500,000 new “professional” persons as voters to the current 230,000 FC voters, raising the enfranchisement of the FCs closer to the amount of the GC voter roles of 3.4 million.<sup>16</sup>

An additional number could be added to FC rolls by abolishing corporate voting and permitting all listed corporate officers and trustees to vote. (See below for additional detail). This would comprise a significant, but not disruptive, step forward in 2012 toward full direct elections in 2020. It would begin to substantially close the gap in numbers between the current tiny franchise FCs and the large franchise GCs.

*But how to make the next step in 2016 of moving from the enlarged FCs to still larger FC just prior to their 2020 abolition? And how might that step be an enlargement that also comprises “gradual” change? If, in 2016 for the next step toward full direct elections, all members of the workforce were enfranchised according to the nature of their employment and classified in the appropriate FC according to the type of business registration of their employer, then approximately 55-58 percent of the adult population who make up the workforce would be eligible to vote in the FCs, raising the FC voter rolls to about 2.5 million permanent residents who are registered to vote who also work, or two thirds the number of the GC voter role.<sup>17</sup> The FCs were clearly designed primarily to protect the interests of the working sector as there are only two seats, the Heung Yee Kuk and District Council, that have substantial numbers of retirees and housewives as voters, and those are both indirect votes. So including all working*

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<sup>16</sup> The 500,000 figure is approximately 10 percent of the approximately 5 million adult permanent identity holders qualified to vote out of Hong Kong’s 7 million population. This is extrapolating the approximately 10 percent of the sample out to the whole population. The government could fairly easily comb its own lists of such persons holding certification/license/listing requirements not presently included in FCs and provide a more accurate figure.

<sup>17</sup> Many firms already require staff to carry employee identification cards. These ID cards could be confirmed with the firms and cross-checked according to GC voter registration rolls to confirm registration and eligibility to vote, and with all firms classified by type, FCs could be set for one election according to type of firm at relatively low cost. The Inland Revenue Department requires all businesses to state the “description and nature of business” while the Trade and Industry Department and Census and Statistics Department maintain massive amounts of data classifying types of businesses.

persons in expanded FCs seems a natural expansion of the original intent of the FC structure.

The remaining gap between the FC franchises and the GC franchises is of perhaps a million more voters, which divided among 30 seats is about an additional 33,000 more voters per seat. This is the number to be added above the average of 83,000 FC voters per seat in 2016 and 40,000 FC voters per seat in 2012 (See Table 16), a gradual increase by steps as the NPC stipulates. This would avoid the necessity of any FC having to vote itself out of existence prior to any other FC, but gradually move the FCs from being highly restrictive to being largely inclusive. It has been the problem of “who goes first” that has largely driven resistance by FC Legco representatives to reform proposals that abolished FC seats gradually.

*This approach of expanding by updating the professional FCs, including union voters in the 3 labor seats, and abolishing corporate voting by adding listed officers and trustees of business firms and charitable/cultural organizations in 2012 and then further expanding voting to all employees already registered as GC voters and with firm-related identification would also make the final abolition of FCs smooth and non-controversial when those employment-related FCs were discontinued in 2020, to be replaced by all GC registered voters having a vote. It would also conform to the “gradual and orderly” progress stipulated by the December 2007 NPC ruling, and make the final step of abolition in 2020 a relatively small one of moving from 2.5 million working voters to 3.5 million universal suffrage voters, with the full equality of citizen’s right to vote as stipulated by the United Nations.*

**Table 16 Abolition by Franchise Expansion\***

<b>Election (Year)</b>	<b>FC Franchise</b>	<b>Franchise per seat (average)</b>	<b>Total increase</b>
2008	230,000	7,600	--
2012	1,200,000	40,000	1,000,000**
2016	2,500,000	83,300	1,370,000
2020	3,500,000***	116,600	1,000,000

\*number of voters is approximate due to uncertain number of duplicate voters in corporate and charitable boards (see below) The 2012 figure may be closer to 1.5 million FC voters.

\*\*Approximately 30,000 of the current FC votes are cast by corporate voters, not individual voters, so the FC franchise is actually around 200,000 persons.

\*\*registered voter numbers should be expected to rise from the slightly over 3.4 million registered voters in 2008 due to elimination of sense of unfairness and powerlessness that currently depresses voter registration and turnout. A more inclusive representative system could see as many as 4 million registered voters by 2020.

Questions arising from this possible solution are what are the characteristics and attitudes of the New Professionals/Registrants (NPR) potential voters in particular? Union members and business and charitable board members are largely unproblematic as extending the vote to them in public elections is little different than what they do now in private voting on the boards or in the union halls. Any board members who do not qualify to vote by right of holding Hong Kong permanent residency would be disqualified from voting in the FC elections, and there may need to be some reorganization or choice of FC franchise in which to vote by the FC seats dominated by

chambers of commerce, as many of their voters will be enfranchised in other FCs. Partners and proprietary owners who are not permanent residents would not have the vote. If all corporate voting is abolished, as it surely should be, and voting is restricted to residency qualified individuals, many of the problems of multiple votes and foreign interference will be resolved. The new professionals, however, are largely unexamined as to attitudes and characteristics. How might they react to possible inclusion in the FCs? And how do their attitudes and characteristics compare to other voters?

Table 17 describes the characteristics of all government registered or certified persons interviewed, whether or not they are registered FC voters.

**Table 17 Professionals and New Registrants**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>
Registered nurse	8
Listed physician/medical profession	13
Licensed pharmacist	1
Registered real estate agent	3
Registered insurance agent	16
Licensed commercial goods driver	6
Licensed commercial public transport driver	5
Police/other academy trained officer	1
Registered security officer or guard	4
Licensed plumber	4
Licensed electrician	11
Licensed engineer	11
Construction/civil engineer	2
Mechanical engineer	7
Electrical engineer	2
Certified teacher/trainer	40
Certified Public Accountant	15
Registered social worker	8
Certified lawyer	11
Registered optometrist	4
Surveyor	12
Licensed construction worker	13
Licensed financial planner	14
Designer	5
Other registered	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>230</b>

Table 18 begins to separate out those professionals and license holders who can vote in the current FC structure and those who cannot. The excluded “new professionals and registrants” (NPR) are nearly equal in number to the current professionals and registrants included in the FCs. The NPRs, if registered security guards were included, would amount to approximately some 500,000-600,000 new voters to add to the current FCs.<sup>18</sup> The balance of FC franchise expansion to 1 million or 1.5 million in 2012 would come from the addition of all listed officer and trustee members of corporate boards, and all listed officers and trustees of registered social and charitable entities who have a right to vote in Hong Kong. The government also maintains lists of all such persons in such entities. Union members having the vote for the 3 labor seats will also swell the rolls.

<sup>18</sup> Further in-depth research on the new professionals and other certified persons (excluding registered security guards) is in process, with a report expected in September 2009.

Going to officer and trustee voting instead of corporate voting will add fewer voters than might first appear. There are over 733,000 registered firms and over 8,000 social and charitable entities. There will be considerable overlap of membership since business and professional people routinely serve on a number of business and charitable boards, and many of the listed firms are officered by foreign passport holders not qualified by residency to vote in Hong Kong.

**FINDING:** *Board members holding multiple seats on boards would need to indicate their choice of entity to vote in. They should not be given multiple votes due to this making the unfairness perception of the FCs worse instead of better, and making the voter power distinctions larger instead of smaller.*

So that 733,000 figure for businesses times an average number of board members is quite inaccurate. There will not be 5 million corporate/board voters. The figure is actually considerably smaller due to multiple memberships. Trying to establish exact numbers of voters who could be added from lists and registers of firms and social entities is difficult in the extreme, especially given the reluctance of government to make public such listings of officers and trustees of such organizations. So all the numbers in Table 15 above need to be taken as indicative and not definitive.

Given the amount of time and effort expended on reform, and the frequent calls to end corporate voting, it is surprising such research on expanding voting to corporate officers and trustees is not already available to the government and public. Such information has not, however, been released to the public domain and access to private company registers of officers and trustees is limited. Some progress of tracking corporate officers and affairs has been achieved by David Webb of Webb-site.com.

**FINDING:** *The approach taken of abolition of FCs by dilution via expansion of voter numbers in the FCs according to present characteristics of the FCs, rather than attempting to eliminate a portion of FCs outright by abolishing firms, unions, or professions right to vote, is more likely to be acceptable or at least palatable to the current FC Legco members and their voters than other options. See below for further evidential analysis of survey results supporting these statements.*

Table 18 provides the approximate proportions of professions and certificate holders or registrants with the right to vote in FCs now from those who do not.

**Table 18 Does your occupation currently have an FC seat and can you vote in it?**

Group	Count	%
My occupation/profession has a seat and I can vote	128*	11
My occupation/profession does not have a seat and I cannot vote	110	9
All others	966	80

\*Includes 8 respondents not classified in Table 16

Table 19 indicates the occupations of persons who say they are professionals or certified/registered with the government in order to practice their livelihood, but who do not have right to vote in an FC currently. Some of these occupations, such as

registered nurse, do have FC seats. There are apparently classes of nurses, physicians, and engineers who are not currently permitted to vote in the present FCs. Or these respondents do not realize they have an FC seat assigned to them in which to vote. In either case, with expanded right to vote in the FCs and greater equity in voter power between FCs and GCs, we should see an expansion of interest in registering to vote. Many NPRs lack a sense of group interest or professional consciousness, but gaining a vote in the FCs should result in strengthening of consciousness and of the interaction of government policy on their livelihood.


Others below are NPRs with no current FC to vote in, such as insurance and real estate agents, licensed plumbers and electricians. These new professions could be appropriately categorized into currently existing FC seats that do not presently include such voters. While the disparity between franchise sizes of FC seats could not be completely overcome by these steps, there would be a considerable reduction in the gross disproportions among FC seats, and between the FC franchise and the GC franchise shown in the first Chart of this report.

**Table 19 New Registrants without FC seat or cannot vote in current FC seat**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>
Registered nurse	2
Listed physician/medical profession	5
Licensed pharmacist	0
Registered real estate agent	2
Registered insurance agent	7
Licensed commercial goods driver	6
Licensed commercial public transport driver	4
Police/other academy trained officer	0
Registered security officer or guard	2
Licensed plumber	4
Licensed electrician	9
Licensed engineer	4
Construction/civil engineer	0
Mechanical engineer	4
Electrical engineer	0
Certified teacher/trainer	5
Certified Public Accountant	0
Registered social worker	3
Certified lawyer	0
Registered optometrist	2
Surveyor	1
Licensed construction worker	13
Licensed financial planner	14
Designer	5
Other registered	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>110</b>

**FINDING:** *Do the potential NPR voters above support or oppose the possibility of gaining an FC vote? Chart/Table 20 indicates that a majority would support such a move while a significant number are unsure. Only about one in five opposes such a change.*

**Chart/Table 20 Would you support or oppose your profession or licensed/certified occupation to vote in FC elections?**




**Table 20**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	12	11
Support	52	47
Oppose	18	16
Strongly oppose	4	4
Don't Know	24	22

While due to time limitations the survey conducted in April/May 2009 did not ask the general population about increasing the franchise for FCs, surveys of May and September 2008 did. Chart/Table 21 shows the results from those surveys. A majority of about two to one of both GC and FC voters supported increasing who has a right to vote in FC elections.

**Chart/Table 21 Do you support/oppose increasing who has a right to vote in FC elections? (From NDI survey in May & Hong Kong Transition Project survey September 2008)**



**Table 21**

	GC May 08	FC May 08	GC Sept 08	FC Sept 08
Strongly support	6	8	9	10
Support	52	48	47	50
Oppose	20	20	20	23
Strongly oppose	4	7	6	6
Don't Know	17	17	18	11

**FINDING:** *There is broad agreement by those surveyed on expanding FC franchises. This can be taken as one alternative way to meet the the stipulation of the NPC that between now and 2020 there must be "gradual and orderly progress" from the present system to the fully direct elections of all members.*

While the proposals above address the expansion of 28 of the 30 FC seats, two FC seats remain problematic. These two FC seats, the Heung Yee Kuk seat returned by vote of indigenous village heads and the District Council Legco seat, returned by vote of elected and appointed members of the 18 District Councils, are in composition different from other FCs. Other groups represent professions, types of businesses and charitable/cultural organizations, and unions whereas the Heung Yee Kuk and District Council seats are indirectly representative of broader populations. And in the case of these two seats, populations with differential and over-lapping voting powers. The village voters of the Heung Yee Kuk also may vote in the District Council elections, so the two populations are not exclusive to each other, and the Heung Yee Kuk voters breach the equal suffrage provisions even more since they can also vote in other FC seats. So for example, teachers who are village property owners can vote for the Education FC seat, for the village head who votes for the Heung Yee Kuk seat, and for the District Council member who votes for the District Council Legco seat, as well as cast a ballot like everyone else in the GC elections. Business owners from villages can vote corporately in several FCs according to the type of business they own as well as all the above, so the two seats, while nominally closer to direct elections than other FC seats, actually contribute even more to voter inequalities. It is these voter inequities that FC reforms should address.

**FINDING:** *Ideally, all multiple voting beyond having an FC vote and a GC vote should be ended to promote equity and improve perceptions of fairness and transparency. The reforms examined above would substantially correct these abuses and inequities in 28 FC seats. These leaves the two government-related FCs to consider.*

How then, can these two seats be amended to achieve progress toward full, equal suffrage elections in 2020? Of course, the Heung Yee Kuk Legco FC seat could be made directly elective by the approximately 200,000 village voters. This would only partially address the inequities of power between these voters and others, though direct voting in a franchise of this size would expand the progress to be made in 2012 if done then. If not in 2012 it is a natural step to take in 2016 as the franchise for all FC seats increases. Whenever done, direct election by all village voters would also make the Heung Yee Kuk franchise larger than a GC Legco franchise now (proportionate GC voting in 2008 among the five GC districts allotted out to about 116,000 registered voters, or 175,000 eligible to vote by age and residency, if registered, per Legco GC seat.) Thus making the move to full direct election in terms of franchise size nearly seamless.



The District Council seat is more problematic since enfranchising all its voters directly and enabling every person in Hong Kong to vote on the single legislator who would represent them in the District Council seat in Legco would make this one seat a virtual Hong Kong-wide vote on a single person. That is as near a leadership referendum as could be imagined, and might erect a leader with a voter mandate dwarfing or challenging a Chief Executive. It would also likely dramatically change the nature of District Councils. There was some concern, indeed, that the 2005 proposal adding 6 FC seats for District Councils in Legco breached Article 97 of the Basic Law, which states:

“District organizations which are not organs of political power may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to be consulted by the government of the Region on district administration and other affairs, or to be responsible for providing services in such fields as culture, recreation and environmental sanitation.”

Legco is considered an organ of political power, so adding to Legco representatives who are directly representatives of the District Councils (DC) may constitute a breach, as it makes the DCs into an organ of power in that its representative can vote on budgets. Further, if, as now, such Legco representatives are returned by vote of both elected and appointed members of the District Councils, it would constitute a retrograde step from direct elections by retaining a form of government appointee influence on Legco.

There are several ways the District Council seat could be amended, but this issue also raises the problem of the relationship of the District Councils to Legco and the issue of the present effectiveness and legitimacy of the overall governance structure of Hong Kong. This, in turn, means that the final form of governance to be arrived at in 2020 needs to be explored.

Research on the reform process to 2020 needs, therefore, to probe survey evidence for support for governance structures that meet the NPC decisions that Hong Kong’s democratic system must be built on its unique circumstances and history, and not just adopted wholesale from democratic models elsewhere. They also have the structural problem of fairness in policy making to consider. Would simply abolishing all FCs and replacing all such seats by GC seats elected proportionately according to the same way we do now solve structural, efficiency, legitimacy and fairness problems in the present governance system? Would the simple expansion of the present elective system meet the NPC’s proviso that the final form of universal suffrage elected government be built on Hong Kong’s circumstances and history? And how might voters react to alternative elective and governance structures?

## VI Imagining governance structures built on Hong Kong’s unique heritage


One way to deal with the problem of the District Council Legco seat is to simply replace it with another group more like the other FCs. Groups mentioned as suitable for inclusion have been retirees, housewives, students, or a seat reserved for women. This latter restriction on the gender of candidacy and/or on voting right is observed in several countries. Some states even set proportions by gender of candidates that parties can nominate to run. Other entities reserve a set number of seats for women

candidates. It would likely be better in 2012 for the District Council seat to be replaced with one such group large enough to broadly reflect public opinion, but too small or homogenous in character to form a Hong Kong wide mandate for its representative, as direct voting in all DCs for one representative would do.

The best such group from the list above is probably students. They have interests, but those interests change at graduation, unlike those of retirees, housewives and women which tend to be long term. Accordingly, they would likely be less opposed to surrender the right to vote in FCs in 2020 than these other groups.

**FINDING:** *This survey tested reactions of full time students to an FC seat. There was nearly two to one support. If full time university/post highschool students were granted an FC seat, this would make eligible to enroll an additional 500,000 or so voters in the FCs. This move also has the advantage of tutoring entering voters into electoral affairs. It should boost turnout among younger voters, and once a habit of voting is established, it tends to persist a lifetime. This effect might be a positive legacy of the FCs, a gift to increase participation in voting and thus an increase in legitimacy of government after so long damaging it.*

**Chart/Table 22** Would you support or oppose an FC seat for students, in which all full time students registered to vote could elect a representative? (asked of students only)



**Table 22**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	12	9
Support	74	54
Oppose	39	29
Strongly oppose	5	4
Don't Know	6	4

But the issue of what to do with the District Council Legco seat in 2012 or 2016 on the way to full direct elections in 2020 raises the broader issue of what it was invented for

in the first place, and why in the failed 2005 reform package representation of the District Councils was proposed to increase so substantially, from 1 seat to 6 seats. It also raises the question of the final governance structure in 2020, for clearly, the present structure is widely seen to produce unfair policy decisions. The reform proposal to increase DC seats was argued as addressing that inequity as well as to improve governmental efficiency and communication with the grassroots at the neighborhood level. So should there be a role for the DCs in the final governance structure of 2020?

### Examining end-point legislative structures

In terms of ending points of reform, about two thirds of respondents have consistently preferred direct election of all legislators. Most suppose that means direct elections of all legislators would take place as they do now for the half of Legco elected proportionately from one of five GCs. But, there is no specific reason direct election of all Legco members must take place like they have since 1998, nor any reason against introducing multiple forms of direct elections for Legco members. Indeed, there are many good reasons to use a balance of methods to choose legislators, not the least of which is to fulfill the requirement of the 2007 NPC ruling that Hong Kong's direct election systems build on its historic legacies.

*Clearly, the present governance system has rejected what have turned out to be critical portions of our historic legacy of governance.*

**FINDING:** *There is the unique problem in Hong Kong that our lower organs of representation, the District Councils, now have almost no connection with either representative legislatures or policy-making executive institutions at higher levels. This was not the case prior to 1999. This is not the case in most other states, and stands in stark contrast to most states where lower level governments routinely exercise policy making, tax and administrative supervisory powers over civil services, and where it is an assumption that politicians will start out at lower levels and as they gain experience and exposure, move up the ladder of representative government until they reach state-wide or province-wide, then nation-wide, office. Hong Kong wholly lacks such a stepped structure, and it shows in constant problems of legitimacy and coordination as well as the problem of how to develop political expertise on the one hand and administrative skills on the other.*

These problems have clearly deepened since 1999's abolition of the Regional and Urban Councils, the immediate cause of the creation of the DC and Heung Yee Kuk Legco FC seats. The introduction in 2002 of the Principal Officials Accountability System, the 2005 reform of the Executive Council composition and civil service administrative responsibilities, and the 2008 introduction of "political" assistants to Principal Officials are symptoms of these frequent and recurrent problems which repeated "reforms" have failed to fix. *These reforms have failed because they cut themselves off both from our past and from comparison with other systems of governance abroad.* These failures need to be addressed in the reforms leading to the "roadmap" destination of wholly elective government in 2020.

Prior to the abolition of the Regional Council and the Urban Council in 1999, these two bodies had policy making powers which even Legco did not have. When they were abolished, all policy-making at all levels was left to the unelected civil service and the one, narrowly elected executive in Hong Kong, the Chief Executive. *This concentrated political blame even while diluting political responsibility.*

The Urban and Regional Councils also had FC seats on Legco, and many Regional and Urban Councilors also were District Council members. Often, Urban Council and Regional Council election led to Legco election, since the Urban Council and Regional Council elections covered much larger geographic areas than the District Councils. They made a natural stepping stone from District level to Legco level, and a natural level of coordinating policy and debate between the neighborhoods covered by the District Councils and the Hong Kong wide concerns of Legco. The 1999 abolition cut the backbone out of the structure of political governance, and there have been repeated, and repeatedly failed, attempts to recreate the effects of the stepped, inter-locked colonial governance system without fully grasping its structures and functions.

Is there a way to restore some of these historic legacies or build on these historic legacies, and/or adapt means to solve the problems of developing representative and policy making skills shown to work elsewhere?

The government might simply suggest the “reform” of restoring the Urban and Regional Councils, inclusive of their old policy-making powers. But restoring the FC seats to these revived entities would be a retrograde step unless the seats were directly elected by the respective districts. The current Heung Yee Kuk seat would then be elected by the two New Territories Legco districts formerly under the Regional Council, the current District Council seat could then be elected by the two Kowloon and Hong Kong Island legislative districts which comprised the Urban Council. Then moving to all GC seats in 2020 would be simple as well. *While this solves the problem of the two divergent FC seats, it does not fully solve the problems of creating an integrated system of stepping stones from lower level office to higher level office.* If restored, the Urban and Regional Councils would provide a partial solution to gaining policy making experience and a limited step between tiny District Council constituencies and the giant Legco GCs.

However, another approach would be to look at the current problems, look elsewhere for good models, and look back on our historic legacy to see what can be made of it all to directly solve the problems which have appeared in governance since direct elections began in 1982 and which have worsened since 1999. One such means might be borrowing from the German experience (and several other states as well) that mix geographic constituencies elections by proportional or first past the post means with state-level list system elections. In our case, in 2020 the 30 FC seats might be replaced by awarding those seats according to the overall percentage of votes a party gets across all of Hong Kong.

**FINDING:** *We tested this option with respondents. The results of Table 23 show that while nearly a fourth had not heard of it, that it was favored by nearly two to one by those who had a view, and that a near majority favored it outright indicates that Hong Kongers are open to consider alternatives, even in times of crisis, as long as they improve government accountability and performance.*

**Table 23** In light of the global economic crisis, how much support or opposition would you have to the following reforms to improve accountability and performance: Replace FCs by awarding half of Legco seats to party list candidates according to the percent of votes a party receives in the Geographic Constituencies (German style system)?

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	42	3
Support	563	47
Oppose	282	23
Strongly oppose	36	3
Don't Know	281	23

Another way of achieving a similar effect without requiring party lists would be to have “at large” elections. For example, voters vote for their top choice from a list of candidates from all of Hong Kong. The 30 candidates who got the most votes would be returned. This type of election would award bloc votes, arranged either by their profession or party endorsement. All party supporters on Hong Kong Island vote for one candidate, elsewhere they vote for a different candidate, for example. Or you could have all professionals, such as teachers, vote for a teacher candidate on the list. This system would award organized entities like parties, unions and professional associations who can organize and motivate their members to vote alike to return a member to Legco. It would be a fully direct election system, but with an effect similar, but more competitive and far more open, to today’s FC system. *This would retain some of the historic composition of Legco while entirely changing the dynamic of election and thus improve considerably the perception of unfairness the present restrictive, highly uncompetitive election system creates.*

A Hong Kong wide list system of “at large” voting like this, however, still fails to integrate the lower level representative bodies of the DCs into the governance system. It would spur party development since coordination and motivation of voters would be crucial to the list voting system. But, a mix of an “at large” or list voting system and a District Council based system would have both the effect of spurring party development and the effect of integrating the DCs with other representative bodies. It would conform to the Basic Law as long as the DCs were not turned into organs of power, which appears to be forbidden by Article 97 of the Basic Law.

*A way of avoiding breach of Article 97 but still linking the DCs with Legco would be to use the 18 District Council districts as voting constituencies only. So, for example each DC might have a seat in Legco, elected by first past the post elections by all voters of each district. The advantage is that currently the DCs do not have a recognized DC wide leader elected by all residents of a DC. The leader of each DC is elected by members of the Council, including votes of government appointees, not by all voters. So really the head of the DC has little political clout, with either voters of the District or with other DC members, and certainly not with Legco or the executive or civil servants. But suppose a DC member runs for the DC Legco seat. His or her status within that DC would certainly rise, and they would form a link between DC members and Legco members which would increase influence and usefulness of DCs in governance and communication between the people and government. Since the member’s DC membership is coincidental instead of formal to their running for Legco, Article 97 is not breached, but the effect of such an election would be to put greater power into connection to representatives at lower*

*levels. The 18 DCs would also naturally form a stepping stone to contesting Legco seats in the 5 larger Legco election districts or to running in the “at large” seats. There would be pressure on parties to coordinate campaigning and candidature across proportional elections, the DC first past the post elections, and the at large list elections. This would also require a stronger party policy profile and leadership profile, building precisely the sort of political structures needed for strong, executive led, fully elective governance.*

The remaining 12 seats (18 DC elected) of the present 30 FC seats could be returned by preference “at large” voting with the top 12 vote getters taking office, or by a party list voting method. Either method would be a test for Hong Kong wide electoral power and thus a good measure of how a candidate might do in a Chief Executive election. So under this method, 18 DC Legco seats elected first past the post from each District Council geographic constituency, 12 seats returned by an “at large” election of some type, the connection from the low level grassroots neighborhoods to Legco, and the connection of Legco to Hong Kong wide representation and thus precursor experience at campaigning for Chief Executive would be made. The problem of disconnected governance unable to work across levels of representation would be addressed.

And so we put the question to respondents. (The “at large” preference vote was not posed in this survey. Instead we asked the party list question. But both are types of list, at large voting.) The Don’t Know responses were the highest yet to any question asked, so this is an unfamiliar idea that would need some explanation, but the advantages to such a solution, in terms of addressing our governance problems by building on both historical and international experience, are considerable.

**Table 24 In light of the global economic crisis, how much support or opposition would you have to the following reforms to improve accountability and performance: Replace current 30 FCs with 18 elected by voters from District Council constituencies and 12 from a party list of candidates?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	36	3
Support	436	36
Oppose	364	30
Strongly oppose	42	3
Don't Know	326	27

Given that most members of DCs would benefit from such a system, if it were explained to DC members, they in turn could be expected to affect grass roots sentiments in its favor rather rapidly. Rather than a party list, if an open list were used with the 12 top vote getters returned, support would likely rise and opposition diminish as well.

**FINDING:** *While technically this combined 12/18 format to replace the 30 FCs in 2020 might be closest to a format erected on our history as well as based on successful practice elsewhere, it would need a strong campaign to explain its benefits over alternatives. If the outcome of the roadmap is fully agreed this far ahead of 2020, having an executive who can see the benefits of such an integrated structure and mount a persuasive campaign for it is likely lacking. But the scheduling of the Chief Executive to be returned by full direct election in 2017 prior to the 2020 end point may provide an opportunity for the final structure to be reconsidered. The first directly elected Chief Executive should enter office*


with considerably enhanced legitimacy, and they will have even more reason to solve Hong Kong's governance problem in the more competitive environment for Chief Executive which will arrive in 2017. If the expand until abolition approach is taken toward the FCs, there may be an advantage to waiting until the 2016 election to decide the final Legco structure in 2020.

And as the next section shows, support for direct election of the Chief Executive has been and continues to be strong across all categories.

### Examining end-point executive structures

Compared to Legco, achieving full direct election of the Chief Executive in 2017 is almost non-controversial, as Chart/Table 25 shows.

**Chart/Table 25 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?**




**Table 25**

	Strongly support	Support	Neutral/DK	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Nov 2003	33	48	6	11	2
Dec 2004	20	54	10	13	3
May 2005	33	42	11	11	3
Nov 2005	22	47	19	10	2
Nov 2006	23	50	7	17	3
Nov 06 FC voters	28	50	4	16	2
May 2007	25	51	6	16	2
May 2008 GC	23	53	8	14	3
May 2008 FC	25	54	6	14	--
Sept 2008 GC	30	47	4	17	1
Sept 2008 FC	26	53	5	15	2
May 2009*	17	52	10	19	3

The phrasing of the May 2009 question was deliberately set to test strength of support for direct election of the CE in times of crisis. Phrasing of the May 2009 survey is in Chart/Table 26 below. There is no statistically significant difference among voters, though conservative FC voters are more inclined to oppose direct CE election. Still, two thirds even of conservative FC voters support direct CE election.

**Chart/Table 26 In light of the global economic crisis, how much support or opposition would you have to the following reforms to improve accountability and performance: Directly elect the Chief Executive?**



**Table 26**

Group	Conservative FCs	Liberal FCs	All others
Strongly support	17	19	17
Support	48	53	52
Oppose	22	19	19
Strongly oppose	7	2	2
Don't Know	5	8	10


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 6.628 with 8 df p = 0.5772 NO SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION

Occupation showed some association of support by category, but mainly among unemployed and service workers. There is no real political significance in this distribution, just a minor statistical significance of association.



**Chart/Table 27 Directly elect CE BY Occupation**



**Table 27**


	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't Know	total
Managers & Admin	16	52	17	6	9	100
Professionals & Assoc Profession	17	54	17	1	10	100
Clerks	11	58	24	1	7	100
Service	24	39	22	1	14	100
Ag & Fish, Craft, Mach Op, Elementary	25	53	13	3	6	100
Housewife	17	50	16	3	14	100
Retired	17	52	19	2	10	100
Unemployed	14	39	25	2	20	100
Student	13	56	21	2	8	100
total	17	52	19	3	10	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 49.22 with 32 df p = 0.0264

One in five men feel very strongly the CE should be directly elected, but the overall level of support and opposition differs little by gender.

**Chart/Table 28 Directly elect CE BY Sex**



**Table 28**

	Men	Women	total
Strongly support	21	14	17
Support	48	55	52
Oppose	19	19	19
Strongly oppose	3	2	3
Don't Know	9	11	10
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 15.19 with 4 df p = 0.0043

**FINDING:** *There is little substantial difference by various demographic factors such as gender, age, occupation and so on toward directly electing the CE. Nearly all aspects show significant support above a majority for direct CE election.*

The most controversial aspect of direct election of the Chief Executive lies in the candidate nomination process. Since the Basic Law makes the Chief Executive office both an elective office by Hong Kong voters and an appointive office by Beijing officials, there has been considerable discussion of coordinating processes so that only candidates Beijing officials would appoint would get to run in the first place. Since Beijing officials may and likely will change views in years ahead, such concerns may fade away with liberalization, or may increase with conservative ascendancy in China. Given the nature of Hong Kong voters to support democracy and value their freedoms, but also vote their economic interests, a process that permits a limited number of candidates to pass vetting by a representative nomination committee appears likeliest to gain support.

Alternative arrangements such as nomination achieved by gaining a minimum of elector signatures have been ruled out the July 2007 “Green Paper on Constitutional Reform” as not conforming to the Basic Law. However, threshold qualifications per se are not excluded as long as they apply to members of the nominating committee. They are used in many parliaments and legislatures to exclude fringe parties and candidates. The

same standard appears uncontroversial in Hong Kong for the Chief Executive candidates.

Currently, mainly FC voters compose the nomination committee. FC voters elect 600 of the 800 Chief Executive nomination/election committee representatives. The balance are made up of ex officio members including the 60 Legco members. Phasing out the FC seats and voters then could complicate the CE nomination process even as it simplifies the Legco election process.

One simple way of comprising a CE nominating committee that is “broadly representative” is to put all directly elected DC members and all Legco members on the committee, plus the Hong Kong delegates to the National Peoples Congress. That would mean a committee of about 500 persons. A threshold of nomination by 100 persons would produce a theoretical maximum of 5 candidates from such a committee. There have also been suggestions of having a cap or maximum number of nominations to ensure a competitive election, and this too appears relatively uncontroversial.

Another way of forming the CE Nomination Committee would be to retain the 30 FCs in their 2012 or 2016 expanded and reformed states (see above for details) and, since the reformed FCs would have more equal numbers of voters then, run equal numbers of candidates for election in an FC (20 or more per FC), plus add to the committee the ex officio members to make up the requisite number of nominators for a committee of whatever size desired. *Perhaps the most desirable and acceptable outcome would be to combine all the directly elected DC members, all Legco members, all NPC members, and a number of members returned by the reformed, expanded, and more broadly representative FCs. If so, reforming the FCs by expanding their voter numbers and ending corporate and duplicate votes is vital for the legitimacy of the CE election process.*


The crucial issue for the CE nomination and election process is that it produce an outcome that is accepted as fair, legitimate and authoritative, for one of the major problems facing both CEs and legislators is how to properly check each other’s powers while ensuring a process of interaction and coordination, if not cooperation, can develop. This issue was researched and options tested in the survey, and to this critical aspect we turn.

### Examining interactions of Legislative and Executive

In order to test the effect of and support for direct elections as a means to affect the quality of governance, particularly in stressful times, we added questions to those above on directly electing the CE and all Legco members. We also asked if voters should directly elect the Chief Secretary for Administration, the Financial Secretary, and whether Legco should be required to vote on all CE appointments by majority vote. The purpose of these questions was to identify flaws in the executive system and in the executive-legislative system. The results were surprising.

While not at the high levels of support for directly electing the CE, a clear majority supported directly electing the Chief Secretary for Administration.

**Chart/Table 29** In light of the global economic crisis, how much support or opposition would you have to the following reforms to improve accountability and performance:  
**Directly elect the Chief Secretary for Administration**




**Table 29**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	122	10
Support	572	48
Oppose	316	26
Strongly oppose	34	3
Don't Know	160	13

Unlike for the CE, there were significant differences by several of the demographic characteristics, such as work sector, occupation and income. Chart 30 for example, shows that while the public, private and non-work sectors about equally support directly electing the Chief Secretary for Administration, the public sector shows significantly fewer saying Don't Know and more in opposition.

**Chart/Table 30** Directly elect the Chief Secretary for Administration BY Work Sector



**Table 30**


	Public	Private	Non-work	total
Strongly support	9	11	9	10
Support	46	46	49	48
Oppose	35	28	23	26
Strongly oppose	4	3	3	3
Don't Know	7	12	16	13
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 15.96 with 8 df p = 0.0430

Chart/Table 31 shows that Managers and Administrators and the unemployed are least supportive of directly electing the Chief Secretary of Administration and are the only categories where support falls under a majority, though in terms of strong support, clerks and students show lower levels than Managers and Administrators.

**Chart/Table 31 Directly elect the Chief Secretary for Administration BY Occupation**



**Table 31**


	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't Know	total
Managers & Admin	8	37	33	6	17	100
Professionals & Assoc Profession	11	48	30	2	9	100
Clerks	6	51	33	2	8	100
Service	18	38	28	1	15	100
Ag & Fish, Craft, Mach Op, Elementary	16	53	18	3	10	100
Housewife	13	51	17	2	17	100
Retired	8	51	23	3	16	100
Unemployed	11	34	29	4	23	100
Student	6	52	29	3	10	100
total	10	48	26	3	13	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 62.06 with 32 df p = 0.0011

Chart/Table 32 shows a significant divergence between those in families earning under \$50,000 per month and those earning above that amount on whether to directly elect the Chief Secretary for Administration. The 11 percent of respondents who would not report their income have an almost identical pattern of responses as those earning above \$50,000 per month.

**Chart/Table 32 Directly elect the Chief Secretary for Administration BY Income**




**Table 32**

	Under \$50,000 per month family income	Over \$50,000 per month family income	Refuse to say	total
Strongly support	11	9	8	10
Support	50	40	40	48
Oppose	25	31	28	26
Strongly oppose	2	5	3	3
Don't Know	12	15	21	13
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 20.12 with 8 df p = 0.0099

The issue of money also produced very divergent responses among demographic groups on whether or not to apply direct election to the Financial Secretary. In the Hong Kong system the Financial Secretary is a very important person, more akin in influence to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer than the US Secretary of the Treasury. The Financial Secretary makes one of two major government addresses delivered each year to wide viewership and commentary. The first is the Policy Address at the opening of the legislative year in October, made by the Chief Executive. The second is the Budget Address given by the Financial Secretary in February. The Financial Secretary has considerable discretionary authority and the ability to impose spending restraints on other ministers.

**Chart/Table 33** In light of the global economic crisis, how much support or opposition would you have to the following reforms to improve accountability and performance:  
**Directly elect the Financial Secretary?**




**Table 33**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	111	9
Support	528	44
Oppose	369	31
Strongly oppose	39	3
Don't Know	157	13

The non-working sector is considerably more supportive of directly electing the FS than the private or public sector. In the public sector, more oppose than support.

**Chart/Table 34** Directly elect the Financial Secretary BY Work Sector



**Table 34**



	Public	Private	Non-work	total
Strongly support	7	10	9	9
Support	37	43	46	44
Oppose	44	32	27	31
Strongly oppose	4	4	3	3
Don't Know	7	12	16	13
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 21.74 with 8 df p = 0.0054

There appears to be some sense of distance between the civil service and the non-working sector heavy with poor, retirees and other lower income groups. Though as seen in Table 35, the unemployed are less supportive of direct election than many other groups.

**Chart/Table 35 Directly elect the Financial Secretary BY Occupation**



**Table 35**

	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't Know	total
Managers & Admin	6	32	39	7	17	100
Professionals & Assoc Profession	9	44	35	2	9	100
Clerks	4	45	40	4	8	100
Service	17	33	33	1	15	100
Ag & Fish, Craft, Mach Op, Elementary	17	52	22	3	8	100
Housewife	11	47	23	2	17	100
Retired	10	47	25	3	15	100
Unemployed	9	32	32	4	23	100
Student	4	50	31	3	12	100
total	9	44	31	3	13	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total


Chi-square = 77.18 with 32 df p ≤ 0.0001



The gap between upper income groups and lower income on directly electing the Financial Secretary is very large.

**FINDING:** While a majority of all surveyed support direct election of the FS, only 40 percent of those making over \$50,000 per month support while 57 percent of those under that mark do. This pinpoints one source of both grievance and fear toward Hong Kong's governance system. Upper income groups support full direct elections for Chief Executive and all members of Legco, but there is concern that extending direct election to the Financial Secretary could subject economic management to political pressures.

**Chart/Table 36 Directly elect the Financial Secretary BY Income**



**Table 36**

	Under \$50,000 per month family income	Over \$50,000 per month family income	Refuse to say	total
Strongly support	10	7	8	9
Support	47	33	35	44
Oppose	29	38	33	31
Strongly oppose	3	7	3	3
Don't Know	12	15	21	13
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 31.27 with 8 df p = 0.0001

There also appears to be a bit of a gender gap on directly electing the FS also. (See Table 37)

**FINDING:** While 50 percent of men support and 37 percent oppose, opening a 13 point gap between support and oppose, 57 percent of women support and only 32 percent oppose, a gap of 25 points or nearly double that of men. There may be evidence here of a strong disagreement between men and women on spending priorities for the government,

with women thus favoring direct election of the FS as a means to pressure the government to address their concerns more directly.


**Table 37 Directly elect the Financial Secretary BY Sex**

	Male	Female	total
Strongly support	11	8	9
Support	39	48	44
Oppose	33	29	31
Strongly oppose	4	2	3
Don't Know	13	13	13
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 14.64 with 4 df p = 0.0055

The final question in this bank of questions on direct election raised the relationship between the legislators and the Chief Executive directly. Should Legco be required to approve all the CE's appointments by majority vote? Two thirds favored.

**Chart/Table 38 In light of the global economic crisis, how much support or opposition would you have to the following reforms to improve accountability and performance: Require Legco to approve all Chief Executive appointments by majority vote**




**Table 38**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	93	8
Support	720	60
Oppose	248	21
Strongly oppose	20	2
Don't Know	123	10

There are NO significant differences between the public, private and non-working sectors on this issue.

**Chart/Table 39 Legco approve all CE appointments BY Work Sector**



**Table 39**


	Public	Private	Non-work	total
Strongly support	7	8	8	8
Support	65	60	58	60
Oppose	19	20	21	21
Strongly oppose	1	2	1	2
Don't Know	7	10	11	10
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 3.487 with 8 df p = 0.9002 NO SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION

Differences by occupation do not appear significant, with all occupations showing majority support.

**Chart/Table 40 Legco approve all CE appointments BY Occupation**




**Table 40**

	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't Know	total
Managers & Admin	6	56	26	4	8	100
Professionals & Assoc Profession	8	64	19	1	8	100
Clerks	4	65	18	3	11	100
Service	10	56	21	0	14	100
Ag & Fish, Craft, Mach Op, Elementary	11	62	18	1	9	100
Housewife	9	58	21	1	11	100
Retired	7	53	23	1	16	100
Unemployed	9	45	25	4	18	100
Student	7	71	18	1	3	100
total	8	60	21	2	10	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total  
 Chi-square = 44.68 with 32 df p = 0.0675

There are also small, but not greatly significant differences by income levels.

**Chart/Table 41 Legco approve all CE appointments BY Income**




**Table 41**

	Under \$50,000 per month family income	Over \$50,000 per month family income	Refuse to say	total
Strongly support	8	8	4	8
Support	62	51	57	60
Oppose	19	29	20	21
Strongly oppose	2	2	1	2
Don't Know	9	9	19	10
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 25.81 with 8 df p = 0.0011

The greatest difference on this issue is among age groups, though all ages show a majority support having Legco approve all CE appointments.

**Chart/Table 42 Legco approve all CE appointments BY Age group**



**Table 42**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-84	total
Strongly support	6	5	8	7	9	10	8	8
Support	68	71	63	59	55	56	51	60
Oppose	21	17	19	22	22	19	20	20
Strongly oppose	2	2	3	1	2	2	0	2
Don't Know	3	6	7	11	11	13	22	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 37.56 with 24 df p = 0.0384

**FINDING:** *Two thirds favor requiring Legco to approve all Chief Executive appointments by majority vote. There is no difference by work sector or gender. Minor differences by occupation and income. Among groups under 40 support for requiring Legco to approve the CE's appointments is better than 7 in 10. There appears to be considerable concern over the CE's power to appoint and perhaps the quality of his appointees.*

In sum, while directly electing the CE is uncontroversial for the vast majority, there is no consensus on extending direct election further into the executive branch. There is, however, clear support for increasing Legco's power over executive appointments, and evidence women feel their issues are not being accorded the priority they prefer by the Financial Secretary. These questions indicate problems in the present Executive policy making processes and in Executive-Legislative relationship that need repair. They are not meant as challenges to Beijing's right to confirm senior officials as laid down in the Basic Law. The answers to these questions show that appointing officials, particularly the Financial Secretary, is one means of assuring the wealthy that government will not be used as a political weapon. But the responses also show there are substantial proportions who feel now that government ignores their concerns. By supporting a vote for these officers, they show they wish an adjustment to government priorities in the areas over which they hold responsibility. The direct election of Chief Executive and of all Legco members would likely reduce support for election of ministers, but conversely, continuing to stymie fair and equal influence over government policy making by not moving toward direct elections would increase the sense of alienation the responses to these questions clearly reveal. As David Plouffe, Obama's brilliant campaign manager said in a global webcast on 16 June, survey questions and the responses they reveal are measures of perceptions. The wiser use of survey


methodology is to heed them, and act to address those perceptions of unfairness via fundamental structural changes that lessen the problems they reveal.

## VII Influencing Hong Kong’s political development

The final bank of questions in Part One asked for respondents to assess the amount of influence of a list of named groups have on Hong Kong’s development of democracy. (See Table 43 for list). While three in four considered that Top Beijing Officials had a great deal of influence over Hong Kong’s development of democracy, by far the highest influence according to the most respondents, big business, the Chief Executive, public opinion and political parties had almost the same levels of “a great deal of influence” and “some influence” combined. Only Beijing officials and big business garnered a clear majority from all as having a great deal of influence. Even the Chief Executive lagged these two. Local Communist Party members and professionals and experts are deemed as having the least of “a great deal” of influence, with local Communist Party members coming in last overall for influence over Hong Kong’s development of democracy. Apparently the idea of a united front Communist conspiracy undermining Hong Kong’s democratic development is simply not credible to most.

But that Beijing officials and big business might work together to block local democratic development is far from imaginary. This raises the danger that if frustrations build up, as they have, over democratization’s pace and over the degree of majority rule entrenched in the final structure adopted in 2020, such an impression of collusion between business and Beijing could have serious repercussions.

**Chart/Table 43 Who do you think has influence over Hong Kong’s development of democracy:**



**Table 43**


	A great deal	Somewhat	Not so much	None	Don't Know	Total
Top Beijing officials	76	13	3	3	5	100
Hong Kong big business	52	30	8	4	6	100
Chief Executive	44	32	14	5	5	100
Public opinion	32	43	14	5	5	100
Political parties	26	51	14	3	6	100
NPC & CPPCC members	23	40	20	10	8	100
Local CCP members	11	30	22	16	21	100
Professionals & experts	10	51	22	10	7	100

There are interesting, and significant, differences in the response patterns of different demographic groups to the questions above. In the sections below we examine how birthplace, work sector, age, occupation and income level affect four of the categories above: influence of top Beijing officials, big business, political parties, and public opinion.

### Assessments of influence on democratization BY Birthplace

Interestingly, more respondents born in Hong Kong awarded Beijing officials the greatest influence than those born in Mainland China.

**Chart/Table 44 Top Beijing officials influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Birthplace**



**Table 44**


	Hong Kong	Mainland China	Elsewhere	total
Great deal	77	71	75	75
Somewhat	13	13	8	13
Not much	3	3	6	3
None	2	6	4	3
Don't Know	4	7	8	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 13.59 with 8 df p = 0.0932

With big business, those born in Hong Kong differed even more with those born in Mainland China and born elsewhere on the great degree of influence exercised by big business over Hong Kong's development of democracy. A clear majority of Hong Kong born (55 percent) saw big business as having a great deal of influence while just 45 percent of mainland born and those born elsewhere made the same assessment.

**Chart/Table 45 Big business influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Birthplace**



**Table 45**

	Hong Kong	Mainland China	Elsewhere	total
Great deal	55	45	45	52
Somewhat	30	30	37	30
Not much	7	11	10	8
None	4	4	2	4
Don't Know	5	10	6	6
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 20.97 with 8 df p = 0.0072

Those born in Hong Kong and elsewhere gave political parties more influence than mainland born respondents. And mainland born and those born elsewhere also had much higher percentages of Don't Know responses.

**Table 46 Political parties influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Birthplace**

	Hong Kong	Mainland China	Elsewhere	total
Great deal	27	23	31	27
Somewhat	52	47	43	51
Not much	14	13	14	14
None	2	7	0	3
Don't Know	4	10	12	6
total	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 35.23 with 8 df p ≤ 0.0001



On public opinion influence, those born elsewhere had the most giving an assessment of the highest degree of influence, while Hong Kong born had the lowest. Those born on the mainland, however, had considerably more saying public opinion had no influence on development of democracy in Hong Kong.

**Chart/Table 47 Public opinion influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Birthplace**



**Table 47**

	Hong Kong	Mainland China	Elsewhere	total
Great deal	31	33	35	32
Somewhat	45	38	39	43
Not much	15	13	12	14
None	5	8	4	5
Don't Know	4	7	10	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 15.32 with 8 df p = 0.0533

### Assessments of influence on democratization BY Work Sector

There is no difference among the work sectors on assessments of Top Beijing official's influence on Hong Kong's development of democracy. All sectors agree by about 7 in 10 that Beijing officials have a great deal of influence.


**Table 48 Top Beijing officials influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Work Sector**

	Public	Private	Non-working	total
Great deal	78	77	73	76
Somewhat	15	13	12	13
Not much	3	3	4	3
None	1	3	4	3
Don't Know	3	3	7	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 10.60 with 8 df p = 0.2251 NO SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION

However, more respondents from the Public sector award big business the greatest amount of influence.

**Chart/Table 49 Big business influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Work Sector**



**Table 49**


	Public	Private	Non-working	total
Great deal	56	52	51	52
Somewhat	33	32	28	30
Not much	5	9	8	8
None	1	4	5	4
Don't Know	4	4	8	6
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 16.85 with 8 df p = 0.0317

And more from the Public Sector respondents also appear to give the political parties more influence over the process. When great deal and some influence are combined, 87 percent of the Public Sector assess political parties as having that degree of influence

while only 74 percent of non-working respondents gave political parties the same influence.

**Chart/Table 50 Political party influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Work Sector**



**Table 50**


	Public	Private	Non-working	total
Great deal	28	26	27	27
Somewhat	59	52	47	50
Not much	10	17	13	14
None	1	3	5	3
Don't Know	2	3	8	6
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 28.29 with 8 df p = 0.0004

While respondents from the public sector agreed by about the same proportions as the other sectors that political parties had a great deal of influence, the public sector differed greatly from the other sectors about that degree of influence from public opinion. Only one in four public sector workers thought public opinion had a great deal of influence on democratic development while one in three from the other sectors thought public opinion had a great deal of influence.

**Chart/Table 51 Public opinion influence over Hong Kong’s development of democracy BY Work Sector**



**Table 51**

	Public	Private	Non-working	total
Great deal	25	33	33	32
Somewhat	55	44	40	43
Not much	15	15	14	14
None	3	5	6	5
Don't Know	3	3	8	5
total	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 19.80 with 8 df p = 0.0111

### Assessments of influence on democratization BY Income Group

There is a significant difference in the assessments of those who have a monthly income over \$50,000 and those making under that mark. Nearly 9 in 10 of the higher income group say Top Beijing officials have a great deal of influence on Hong Kong’s development of democracy. While still a clear majority, about 3 in 4 of those earning less than \$50,000 per month say Top Beijing officials have the same degree of influence. This means there is a significant degree of difference between the much smaller top layer of income earners about Beijing’s control or influence over the process and the much larger in number bottom layers. The potential for miscalculation by these different social groups of what each other’s income group thinks and will do could be sizeable. This same gap opens up with age and occupation groups, with younger groups and students having very different views about what aspect has the greatest degree of influence on Hong Kong’s development of democracy.

**Chart/Table 52 Top Beijing officials influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Income Group**



**Table 52**

	Under \$50,000 per month family income	Over \$50,000 per month family income	Refuse to say	total
Great deal	74	87	70	76
Somewhat	14	6	13	13
Not much	3	3	5	3
None	4	2	2	3
Don't Know	5	1	11	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 30.47 with 8 df p = 0.0002

There is much more agreement among income groups on the degree of big business influence.

**Table 53 Big business influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Income Group**

	Under \$50,000 per month family income	Over \$50,000 per month family income	Refuse to say	total
Great deal	53	53	49	52
Somewhat	30	35	25	30
Not much	8	6	8	8
None	4	4	5	4
Don't Know	5	2	14	6
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 22.46 with 8 df p = 0.0041

On political parties' influence, again lower income groups tend to assign them in larger portions higher degrees of influence.

**Table 54 Political party influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Income Group**

	<b>Under \$50,000 per month family income</b>	<b>Over \$50,000 per month family income</b>	<b>Refuse to say</b>	<b>total</b>
Great deal	27	22	31	27
Somewhat	51	60	35	51
Not much	14	15	15	14
None	4	2	4	3
Don't Know	5	1	15	6
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 41.52 with 8 df p ≤ 0.0001

The income group earning over \$50,000 per month has a higher portion saying public opinion has no influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy (19 percent) than the low income group (13 percent). This may not be a dismissive assessment by the higher income group of lower income group's influence on the process, but if it is, again the potential for miscalculation could be significant.

**Table 55 Public opinion influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Income Group**


	<b>Under \$50,000 per month family income</b>	<b>Over \$50,000 per month family income</b>	<b>Refuse to say</b>	<b>total</b>
Great deal	32	32	30	32
Somewhat	44	44	39	43
Not much	13	19	14	14
None	6	3	5	5
Don't Know	5	2	13	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 24.05 with 8 df p = 0.0022

### Assessments of influence on democratization BY Age Group

These gaps in perception among groups described above also appear in terms of age groups. Those in their teens and twenties have a much lower portion assessing Beijing officials as having a great deal of influence than those who are older, except, interestingly, those above age 70.

**Chart/Table 56 Top Beijing officials influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Age Group**



**Table 56**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-84	total
Great deal	65	75	82	82	74	74	60	76
Somewhat	17	18	12	11	13	10	14	13
Not much	6	4	2	2	4	2	4	3
None	3	2	1	2	4	5	6	3
Don't Know	9	2	2	3	5	9	16	5
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 57.52 with 24 df p = 0.0001

**Chart/Table 57 Big business influence over Hong Kong's development of democracy BY Age Group**

