



**NATIONAL**  
**DEMOCRATIC**  
**INSTITUTE**  
**FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**Report of the Civil-Military  
Relations Assessment Mission**

**West and Central Africa**

*March 18 to April 10, 1997*



**NATIONAL  
DEMOCRATIC  
INSTITUTE**  
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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## Strengthening Civil-Military Relations

Establishing civilian oversight of the armed forces represents one of the most difficult challenges facing many emerging democracies. A legacy of military control of security affairs leaves political leaders without the expertise and oversight mechanisms necessary to oversee national defense. Military leaders, for their part, often lack an understanding about the role of the armed forces in a democracy and are reluctant to relinquish their autonomy. NDI works to strengthen civilian expertise in security affairs, to promote dialogue and confidence among civic, political and military leaders, and to enhance understanding about the role of the armed forces in a democratic society.

NDI has worked to strengthen civil-military relations and civilian oversight of security affairs in Angola, Argentina, Benin, Guinea, Honduras, Mali, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay. In conducting its programs, the Institute has drawn upon the talents of volunteer experts such as: Horacio Jaunarena, former Defense Minister of Argentina; Rudolph Joo, former Deputy Defense Minister of Hungary; Antonio Vittorino, former Defense Minister of Portugal; Erik Kjonnerod, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University; Brigadier General (Ret.) Nehemia Dagan, former head of Civic Education, Israeli Defense Forces; Gisela Von Muhlenbrock, former Senior Foreign Law Specialist at the U.S. Congressional Research Service; Julio Busquets, former Vice President of the Spanish Parliament's Defense Committee; Patricio Rojas, former Defense Minister of Chile; and Gen. (Ret.) Guilherme Belchior Vieira, former Director of the Portuguese Superior Military Institute.

**Strengthening Civilian Oversight of the Military** – Effective oversight of security affairs involves a complex array of responsibilities. Political leaders in new democracies must for the first time develop and manage national defense policy, coordinate the civilian and military agencies involved in national security and, in some cases, establish entirely new institutions, such as a ministry of defense or a congressional defense committee. NDI's programs emphasize the roles of both the executive and legislative branches in overseeing national security, as well as the obligation political leaders must assume to educate themselves about security affairs in order to exercise this oversight effectively.

**Bridging the Divide Between Civilians and the Military** – Civil-military relations are often characterized by mutual suspicion and a lack of communication. In transitional societies, this strain can inhibit the development of a civilian-led national defense policymaking process. Through forums, workshops and the use of international experts, NDI helps create a neutral environment where government, civil society and military leaders can build mutual confidence and bridge the gap between these distinct communities. NDI programs also foster an exchange of "lessons learned" about democratic civil-military relations among countries that have experienced similar transitions.

**Building Civilian Security Affairs Expertise** – Confidence and communication alone will not produce civilian oversight of the military. Before emerging democracies can establish effective political institutions to manage military affairs, they need civilians with expertise in defense issues. It is unlikely that military leaders in new democracies will defer to the judgements of civilians unless they have confidence in civilian capabilities to manage security affairs. Through its programs with international civil-military relations experts, NDI helps educate civilians about topics such as defense budgeting, oversight mechanisms and the defense policymaking process.

I have asked NDI to sponsor a civic education process to achieve, on the one hand, the people's respect for the army; and, on the other, the army's respect for the people's decisions and their political and legal statements.

-- President Violeta Chamorro, Army Day Speech, 1993.

**Distinguishing Between National Defense and Internal Security** -- In nondemocratic societies, the armed forces often fulfill internal security functions, blurring the line between law enforcement and military action and endangering human rights. Drawing a distinction between national defense and internal security is critical for a democracy. NDI works with political and military leaders to define the appropriate role of the military in security affairs and to establish rules of civilian oversight for those times when civilian agencies call upon the military to assist them with non-military duties.

**Building a Defense "Community"** – The formulation of national defense policy requires public involvement and support through nongovernmental organizations such as political parties, think tanks, universities and civic associations. NDI supports local efforts to build organizations that can both educate and provide an avenue for public involvement, as well as participate in a national debate about defense policy. The Institute also works to bring together civic leaders with political and military officials to share their perspectives about civil-military relations.



## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

This report of the civil-military relations assessment mission to West and Central Africa conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) reflects the written contributions and analytical insights of several people. NDI delegation rapporteur, Major Pierre Choquette wrote the first draft of the majority of the report; his work was based on contributions by the other members of the delegation, Dr. Rudolf Joó, Maren Leed and Colonel Abdolaye Tall. NDI Senior Program Officer Timothy McCoy and Program Assistant Katie Prud'homme edited the first draft and authored several sections of the report. Regional Director for West Africa Christopher Fomunyoh and Program Officer Linda Maguire edited the report. NDI's Senior Associate Thomas O.Melia and Program Officer Kirk Gregerson also contributed to the analysis articulated in this report.

Many individuals contributed to the success of this mission including: the civilian authorities and military officers who shared their time and insights into civil-military relations in their respective countries with the delegation, the Washington-based embassies of Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali and the US missions in the countries visited. Finally, NDI would like to recognize the time, energy and intellectual contribution to this mission of the four delegation members mentioned above.

NDI gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) that enabled NDI to undertake the mission described in this report.

**REPORT OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
ASSESSMENT MISSION TO WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA  
MARCH 18 TO APRIL 10, 1997**

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**I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Shortly after gaining independence from European colonial powers, most African countries experimented briefly with pluralistic political systems only to succumb to autocratic regimes by the early 1970s. The collapse of the Soviet bloc, the emergence of a "third wave of democratization" around the world, and economic and socio-political problems confronted by African states in the three decades since independence spurred democrats to advocate political reforms. In the early 1990s, these efforts began to bear fruit as a number of African countries embraced multipartyism and more open political societies. More recently, however, military coups and mutinies on the continent have once again raised the question of the role of the military and its threat to democratization efforts in Africa. The management of civil-military relations has thus emerged as one of the leading indicators in determining the future direction of Africa's efforts at democratization.

To obtain a better understanding of civil-military relations in Africa, and to initiate constructive dialogue with political, civilian and military leaders responsible for defining these relations, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) -- with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy -- conducted a baseline assessment mission to Benin, Congo<sup>1</sup>, Guinea and Mali from March 18 to April 10, 1997. Meetings were also held in Côte d'Ivoire with regional experts residing in Abidjan. The Central African Republic was initially included in the team's itinerary, but an ongoing mutiny by a faction of the Central African army caused NDI to cancel plans for the delegation to travel to Bangui. The four countries chosen represent a sampling of political transitions and the visit allowed the delegation to obtain a comparative perspective on the state of civil-military relations in the region.

The NDI delegation sought to identify key issues confronting civilian oversight and control of the military in nascent democracies in Africa and to explore ways in which NDI could assist further dialogue between civilian and military leaders in West and Central Africa. The long-term goal of these two objectives is to help create a "firewall" of democrats, within both civilian and military institutions, who will act to safeguard democratic gains in the area of civil-military relations in their respective countries and eventually throughout the region. In each of the countries visited, the mission met with senior government officials, members of parliament and leaders of political parties, civil servants responsible for advising executive branch officials in matters of national security, representatives of civic organizations, and high ranking officers within the armed forces.

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<sup>1</sup> Congo refers to the Republic of Congo. It is sometimes called Congo-Brazzaville to distinguish it from its neighbor to the East, the Democratic Republic of Congo, previously known as Zaire.

Overall, the delegation found that high-ranking military officers prefer to recognize the principle of subordination of the military to the country's legitimately elected political leaders. In some of the countries visited, significant progress has been made in the area of civilian control of the military. In one case, initiatives are underway to codify rules on the behavior by members of the armed forces, especially in relation to civil society. Through newly established public relations offices and open house events, efforts are being made in some of the countries to render the military establishment more transparent and more accessible to the public. In most of the countries visited, civilian leadership is considering alternative missions for the military, such as including the army in development projects and having the army participate in international peacekeeping efforts. Civilian leaders in these countries also seem well aware that resource poor armies that do not have the materials and skill base to train for their primary mission (and in certain cases, the funds to pay the soldiers) are less likely to maintain an apolitical role than well-trained and adequately supported armies.

At the same time, the delegation observed that the legacy of military and one party rule is still visible in civil-military relations in the region. The autocratic and sometimes brutal nature of past regimes engenders in the public a distrust and lack of respect for the military. This adversarial relationship impacts the morale of the military leadership and affects relations between the military and civilian institutions. In a number of cases, the lack of a clear understanding of the functioning of the military by newly elected civilian leaders has led to a deterioration of professional relationships that has adversely affected democratization efforts in the region. Civilian leaders and their advisors, many of whom previously suffered imprisonment or harassment at the hands of the military regimes, often possess an inadequate understanding of the military and a reticence to exercise meaningful oversight of the state's security apparatus. The delegation was left with the impression that, while in some respects African soldiers may have a limited understanding of the army's role in a democracy, civil society and civilian leadership also bear responsibility for having an equally limited understanding of the proper role for the armed forces in a democratic state.

On the basis of its findings, the NDI delegation formulated the following recommendations on initiatives that could be undertaken to improve the state of civil-military relations in the countries visited as well as in other nascent democracies in the region. The recommendations include: training elected officials on concepts of civilian control of the military; broadening the network of civilian authority with oversight responsibility of the military; encouraging political parties to play a more active role in debating and helping shape defense policies in their respective countries; exploring opportunities for increased civic education within the military; encouraging more public outreach on the part of the military; increasing participation in multinational civil-military relations programs; and conducting training for elected officials and high level military officials on legislative oversight of the military.

The assessment delegation consisted of: Colonel (Retired) Abdoulaye Tall from Senegal, who is currently an advisor to a Dakar-based NGO that deals with democratic transition and conflict resolution issues; former Vice-Minister of Defense of Hungary, Rudolf Joó, who now teaches at the George C. Marshall Center in Bavaria; Reserve Major Pierre Choquette from Canada, who has worked closely with the Nova Scotia-based Lester B. Pearson Centre for Peacekeeping Training; and Maren Leed, a former congressional staff aide and Rand Corporation research fellow at the US Department of Defense. NDI Senior Program Officer Tim McCoy and Program Assistant Katie Prud'homme accompanied the delegation.



## **II. BACKGROUND**

### **A. Historical Context**

The four African countries visited by the assessment mission achieved independence between 1958 and 1960 and each experimented to varying degrees with socialism beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. Under military leadership, Benin and Congo were formally known as "People's Republics" and adhered to Marxism-Leninism until the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the advent of multipartyism in Africa. Mali, also under military rule, and Guinea, under one-party rule, adopted socialist policies and developed close economic and political ties to Eastern bloc countries and the People's Republic of China. Marxist political ideology, which determined the structure and organization of the army, provided the armed forces in these countries with a heightened role in society, thereby determining their relationship with other socio-political institutions.

In these socialist leaning states, the army was often fully politicized, with each unit possessing an officer responsible for political indoctrination. In the case of Guinea, the military was organized as an army of citizen soldiers fully integrated into society and living side-by-side with the civilian population -- a tradition that continues to the present day. In the case of Congo-Brazzaville, the military, the gendarmerie and the police had a combined command structure during the Marxist period. Responding to queries from the assessment team, representatives of civil society still seemed to confuse the different security forces or, at the very least, were at pains to distinguish the army from the police and the gendarmerie.

Putting different forces under combined command, and using the military to handle law and order or internal security concerns unrelated to their primary mandate of defending against external threats, has obscured the division between the army and security forces that generally exists in a democracy. Although the political elite may have found domestic intervention to be effective and beneficial in the short term -- restoring order and a sense of security among the people -- repeated intervention by the military in domestic assignments of law enforcement has had the longterm effect of eroding the public's confidence in that institution. One Congolese civic leader complained that the presidential guard was still often the first to be deployed to resolve internal security problems that should be addressed by the police and/or the gendarmerie. In Guinea, opposition leaders complained of army tanks deployed on the streets at night even during peace time. These apprehensions by members of civil society, inspired and reinforced by the years of autocratic military rule in post-independence Africa, persist even in the post-transition era. Civilians continue to express profound fear of their respective national armies.

## **B. Regional Commonalities**

Although the assessment team recognized that each of the countries visited has a distinct political history and tradition, the team also noted similarities in civil-military relations that transcend national boundaries.

Beginning in the late 19th century, all four countries studied by the delegation --Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali -- were colonized by France and subsequently gained their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. All four countries visited also embraced political reforms at about the same time in the early 1990s; they had the first set of multiparty elections between 1991 and 1993, and between 1996 and 1998 will be organizing the second round of national, competitive elections. However, achievements in democratization and proper management of civil-military relations vary from country to country.

Despite over 30 years of independence, many of the defense and security institutions imposed by France have been maintained. One striking example of the French legacy is the three-tiered security apparatus found in each country. According to existing regulations under this system, national security is maintained by the army for external threats, and the *gendarmerie* and police for internal security questions. The *gendarmerie*, which has no equivalent in former British colonies, exists as a special militarized force that is responsible for maintaining internal security in exceptional circumstances and reinforcing the national police. As an armed force, the *gendarmerie* falls under the control of the defense ministry in all francophone African countries.

## **C. Country Specific Overviews**

- **Benin**

Considered by most observers to be a harbinger of political developments in the sub-region, Benin was one of the first countries in Africa to make the transition from an authoritarian military-led regime to a democratic political system. After nearly two decades of one party rule, pro-democracy elements within the country -- galvanized by international public opinion -- forced President Mathieu Kérékou to accede to democratic reform. At a national conference that was attended by representatives of civil society, professional associations and political leaders, the constitution of the country was rewritten. The approval of the draft constitution in 1990 paved the way for multiparty legislative and presidential elections in February and March 1991, respectively. Nicephore Soglo won the presidential election with 67 percent of the votes and entered office peacefully. The second multiparty legislative elections, held in March 1995, also proceeded without military intervention. Benin's second multiparty presidential elections, held in March 1996, returned Kérékou to power.

By maintaining its neutrality through the democratic transition and during both presidential elections, the Beninese military played a major role in contributing to the conduct of fair and transparent elections and guaranteeing a smooth transition of power from one ruler to another, thereby strengthening the newly acquired democratic culture of the country. The Beninese military also enhanced its credibility and stature as an institution amenable to multipartyism and eager to contribute to democratization efforts underway in the country. The military in Benin is organized under the Ministry of Defense, which is presently headed by a civilian who was formerly the president of one of Benin's opposition parties.

- **Congo**

The first democratic presidential elections took place in the Republic of Congo in August, 1992, after 24 years of one-party rule. Pascal Lissouba defeated Bernard Kolelas in a run-off election after the former military ruler Denis Sassou-Nguesso was eliminated in the first round. Results of the legislative elections held the same month were contested by opposition parties. Unable to form a parliamentary coalition, Lissouba dissolved the National Assembly in December 1992. Urban violence subsequently erupted when opposition leaders called for civil disobedience. While the military acquiesced to the democratic transition by allowing the national conference of 1992 to proceed uninterrupted, it played a more active role in the crisis of December 1992. Following widespread rioting, the defense minister initiated dialogue between the government and opposition leaders which resulted in the appointment of a new prime minister and the scheduling of new parliamentary elections in May 1993. After an opposition boycott of the second round of elections degenerated into civil strife, the defense minister once again served as a mediator between the government and opposition party leaders.<sup>2</sup>

As violence continued in Brazzaville despite the signing of several peace accords, the Congolese military became embroiled in the conflict. Heavy fighting broke out between party militia and elements of the government security forces. After lengthy negotiations, a peace pact was signed in 1995 that provided for the disarmament of the party militia. A decision was also made to integrate members of the militia into the national army. Soldiers have mutinied several times in the last few years, demanding better pay, and in some cases, integration of more militia members into the regular army.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Militia associated with the political parties formed in Brazzaville following the riots of 1992 and 1993. Each political leader organized an armed group, generally composed of unemployed youth of the same ethnicity of the leader, that "patrolled" an area of the capital city.

<sup>3</sup> Three months after the assessment team visited Congo, violence once again erupted in Brazzaville when the national army clashed with militiamen loyal to ex-president Gen. Denis Sassou-Nguesso. Fighting broke out several weeks before presidential elections --for which former incumbent president Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso were candidates -- were scheduled to be held. After a four month civil war that continued despite repeated internal and external efforts at mediation, Sassou-Nguesso gained control of the country (it is commonly accepted that Sassou-Nguesso's forces were aided by Angolan forces) and was inaugurated as president in on October 25th, 1997. The war

- **Guinea**

Guinea's current president, General Lansana Conté, seized power in 1984 shortly after the death of Guinea's founding president Sekou Touré. Conté permitted political parties to form in 1992 and a multiparty presidential election took place in 1993. Although Conté claimed to have won the election with approximately 52 percent of the vote, the opposition cried foul and organized widespread protests that were violently suppressed by the military and led to many deaths. As a result of the civil strife that followed the presidential election, legislative elections -- originally scheduled for December 1993 -- were postponed until June 1995, when, for the first time, Guineans voted for a multiparty legislature. Despite low voter turnout, the polling was peaceful and Conté's Progress and Unity Party (PUP) won 71 of the 114 parliamentary seats.

In February 1996, soldiers demanding higher pay and better working conditions rampaged through Conakry. Approximately 50 people died during that uprising. Conté quelled the rebellion by agreeing to conduct a dialogue with rebel soldiers. He also promised to establish a committee to consider their grievances. In 1996, Conté's government was also confronted by demands for compensation from the families of Guinean soldiers killed while on peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

- **Mali**

Mali presents an interesting case study regarding the military's role in democratization. On the one hand, the country was ruled for over two decades as a one-party state by military dictator Moussa Traoré. On the other, the transition to democracy was aided substantially by progressive elements within the military who joined prodemocracy elements of civil society to overthrow the Traoré regime in 1991. In 1991, a group of military officers led by then Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré overthrew the military dictator after he violently suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations. Touré pledged a democratic transition and moved quickly to organize a national conference that drafted a new constitution and electoral code. In accordance with Touré's timetable, national multiparty elections were held in 1992, for which Touré chose not to be a candidate. The military, remaining true to its avowed goal of democratic restoration, allowed a peaceful transfer of power to the President-elect Alpha Oumar Konaré.

In recent years, the greatest politico-military challenge for Mali has been the Tuareg rebellion in the northern part of the country. Ethnic-based tensions erupted into a full-fledged insurgency in 1991 and continued until late 1995. A December 1995 peace accord stipulated that many of the rebels would be incorporated into the Malian army, the gendarmerie and the

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killed more than 10,000 people, devastated Brazzaville and caused thousands of Congolese to flee. Sassou-Nguessou's government has since held a reconciliation forum that recommended a two to three year transition period before elections are rescheduled.

national police. By addressing Tuareg grievances regarding the group's socio-economic status, the integration proved to be successful in appeasing a potentially destabilizing group.

### III. FINDINGS

#### A. Positive Local Initiatives

- General Overview

In **Benin**, the delegation found a recognition by military and civilian leaders that, since the democratic transition of 1991- 92, healthy relations exist between the two sides. Military leaders seemed committed to the principles of political neutrality and military subordination to civilian authority. The appointment of a civilian defense minister -- one of two civilian defense ministers in the four countries visited -- has also bolstered relations across functional and professional areas and has enhanced the number of professional interactions and contacts between the two groups.

The delegation observed that, while civil-military relations are generally positive, exchanges and interactions between Beninese armed forces and civil society were few and far between. Some military officials lamented the level of ignorance regarding the military on the part of political and civic leaders, while most civic and political leaders continue to view the military as a closed society. Other Beninese described the public as more or less uninterested in military and defense issues. Military officers, however, were positively impressed by recent efforts by Beninese civic groups to organize civic education programs for soldiers.

In **Congo**, the delegation noted that political leaders were cognizant of the formidable problems they face, such as persistent political, economic and ethnic tensions in the country that have led to a considerable degree of volatility. While Congolese military officers seemed to subscribe to the subordination of the military to legitimate civil authority, most political leaders were less confident in their ability to genuinely and effectively control the military.

Leaders of civic organizations in Congo continue to fear and distrust their armed forces. The delegation heard reports from civilians and some elements of the military about the continued existence of armed militia that operate outside of the military command or control. In addition, the mutinies of the last few years -- during which soldiers occupied government buildings, looted stores and disrupted public transportation -- have reinforced the negative perceptions that civilians have of the military.

Of the four countries that the delegation visited during the course of its mission, **Guinea** was the one in which civil-military relations seemed most problematic. It was not clear to the delegation that Guinea's military fully understood or accepted its role in a newly democratizing society. For example, military policy is determined exclusively at the level of the presidency. The president, since the 1996 mutiny, has held the defense portfolio and remains the only active general in the country. Civilian political leaders, including the prime minister, are marginalized from policy-making decisions regarding defense issues.

The delegation was unable to meet formally with members of the general staff or with the president. However, it conducted informal interviews with military officers and departed Conakry with the impression that the Guinean military's perception of its role and missions has not altered significantly from that of the pre-transition era.

Members of Guinean civil society expressed a mixture of distrust, cynicism and fear regarding the armed forces and public security forces in general. While some members of the coalition of opposition parties have little confidence in reform projects proposed by the government, others referred to difficulties between civilian and military authorities as being more a function of thinly veiled professional and personal rivalries within the military, as opposed to tensions in civil-military relations.

With assistance from the international community, **Mali** has undertaken considerable reforms in the area of civil-military relations and has treated this issue as a cornerstone of its efforts to build a democratic society. Military and civilian political leaders as well as Malian civil society at large seem to have set a high premium on seeking to improve and strengthen the state of civil-military relations in the management of the country's democratic transition.

As the military has subscribed to the principles of an apolitical, republican army under civil authority, civilian political leaders and civil society at large have recognized the importance of ensuring the basic material needs of the military. Mali's armed forces also are involved in development and community work. Overall, Malian civil society and the various political actors perceive the contribution of the country's military as substantial and welcome. These groups all point to the military's contribution to the overthrow of the former dictatorship and its role in the post-transition period in resolving the Tuareg crisis that had plagued the country for many years.

In Mali, visits by civilians to military garrisons (open to the public on a regular basis since 1991) have made the population aware of the generally poor living conditions of soldiers. This increased citizen awareness helped generate a national consensus that allowed the government to increase the military budget to improve infrastructure, salaries and pension plans. The military's success in making the northern part of the country more secure during the Tuareg insurrection also played a major role in rehabilitating the Malian armed forces in the eyes of its public.

- **Redefining the Military's Role in the Post-Transition Period**

The delegation found that since the beginning of democratization efforts in 1990-91, more attention has been given to identifying and better defining a role for the military. While it was clear that such a focus has yet to bear fruit, the delegation found it significant that political leaders realized that the lack of a clear mission for the military could negatively impact the institution's relations with civil society and the course of democratization in their respective countries. On the one hand, military morale suffers when soldiers have little to do. On the other hand, some of the newly elected political leaders, hard-pressed to identify

a role for their army, resent a continued flow of resources to the military and, as reported to the delegation, see the army as a drain on the country's resources. When asked by the delegation, military and civilian leaders were quick to state the military's role as defending the nation and its territorial integrity, as defined in the countries' constitutions or relevant laws. Given the limited number and frequency of trans-border conflicts, these armies seemed to be searching for new roles for themselves as depoliticized institutions now operating in more politically open societies. The growing level of sensitivity and awareness of civil-military relations is also reflected in new constitutional and legal instruments that have emerged or been instituted since the transition to multipartyism.

For example, in the four countries visited -- as in all functioning democracies -- the President of the Republic is recognized as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The constitutions of these countries also stipulate that defense policy, enacted into law by the legislature after review by the appropriate legislative committees, is implemented by the minister of defense. The rules and procedures of the legislatures in these countries provide for parliamentary committees that have jurisdiction over defense and security issues, including the right to call the defense minister to committee hearings for questioning. Laws also exist that define the limits of civilian and military authority, emphasize the military's role as non-political and ban soldiers from fully participating in the political process while still in active service.

The delegation also found that political leaders were aware of the need to effectively train national armies to understand this new, depoliticized role. They also seemed to have understood the need to avoid isolating the military completely from the rest of society. Several political leaders stated to the delegation that they believed that a professional army, of which the soldiers undertake missions assigned by civilian authority, will better resist the temptation to meddle in politics because of the focus on its military role. Some of these leaders asserted, nevertheless, that acquiring professional skills would not necessarily make an army less politically oriented. They were also concerned about acquiring the necessary resources to fully professionalize their armies.

At the same time as the delegation witnessed political leaders grappling with the search for new missions for the military, there were also arguments from some political leaders, such as in Benin, that the military's history of involvement in politics had actually made the institution better able to understand the need for democratic reforms in their countries. A civilian political leader in one of the four countries visited even suggested a revision of laws to allow soldiers to participate fully in the political process even while still in active service.

- **Practical Experimentation with New Roles for the Military**

In all of the countries visited, while civilians and military officials stated that the primary role of the military is to provide for the defense of the country from external forces,



some have begun to recognize that what were previously considered secondary roles for the armed forces may indeed become areas of primary focus. In the case of Congo, the constitution states that the armed forces may participate in the economic, social and cultural development of the country. In all four countries, substantial initiatives have been undertaken in international peacekeeping operations and development assistance.

Political leaders in all four countries have placed a priority on contributing soldiers to international peacekeeping operations. The delegation learned that military forces from Benin and Mali had already participated in peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Central African Republic, Liberia and Rwanda, while forces from Guinea served with the ECOMOG<sup>4</sup> forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Benin and Mali are also members of another regional security arrangement, the Non-Aggression and Defense Assistance Accord (*l'Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en matière de Défense, ANAD*) (See Appendix B). The assessment team was told by both civilian and military leaders that military units that had participated in peacekeeping missions abroad frequently returned with a heightened sense of mission and a better understanding of the conduct of a professional, nonpolitical army. These leaders considered the forces' exposure to international norms while serving on such missions to be a positive influence on civil-military relations in their respective countries. Participation in international peacekeeping operations also enhanced respect for the armed forces from the citizenry thereby contributing to more cordial interactions between the military and citizenry in these countries.

The NDI delegation learned that involving the military in development and humanitarian projects was often mentioned as a possible role for the military in all four countries visited. Both civilian and military leaders recognized that in certain limited situations, and because of its discipline and resources, the military was the only organization that could be mobilized quickly and deployed to perform a wide range of humanitarian and/or development tasks in remote areas. While some military analysts would argue that such activities distract from the professional responsibilities of the military, the use of the armed forces for social and economic development missions was considered as one way to establish a convergence of interests between the public and the military in these nascent democracies. The delegation noted that non-combat units within various armies, such as the Engineering Corps or Health Services, were most frequently used in development and humanitarian projects. Some examples of past or proposed initiatives in support of development and/or emergency assistance included training the public on issues related to basic hygiene and sanitation; conducting inoculation and vaccination campaigns; construction and/or repair of roads and schools; providing air and land transport to remote areas; and placing teachers in areas that lack schools. Overall, the team found that armies in Benin and Mali had been

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<sup>4</sup>ECOMOG is the peacekeeping force constituted of troops contributed by the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

particularly active in contributing to development projects, while the Congolese and Guinean armies had participated to a lesser, albeit still significant, degree.

Military personnel interviewed by the assessment mission seemed open to working on development projects, as long as the required logistical support was made available. Indeed, the military frequently expressed pride that the public often recognized the superior quality of its performance in infrastructural development projects. Civic leaders and ordinary citizens were favorably impressed with the level of development work already carried out by the army -- especially in cases where it did not interfere with the interests of local entrepreneurs. Some of these citizens even criticized the military for not having been more active. One civilian leader in Guinea suggested that conducting development projects could become the source of additional revenues for cash-strapped African militaries.

Most of the officials with whom the delegation met recognized the short- and medium-term benefits of this positive interaction between the public and the military, and its impact in helping boost troop morale by providing clear, attainable goals. However, some military leaders noted that such activity could divert the time, energy, material and intellectual resources of the army away from its first and most basic mission, which is to ensure the defense of the country from external threats. They observed that an increase in the time and resources devoted to "secondary" tasks diminishes the operational capability of military units. Secondly, some of the officers cautioned that involving the military in non-combat roles could drag the military into a variety of domestic political issues and conflicts. They also claimed that it could set a problematic precedent because, as some experts assert, "non-combatant domestic roles convey to the armed forces that their involvement in broad economic, political and social problems is legitimate."<sup>5</sup>

- **Legislators as Catalysts of Change**

In each of the four countries visited, the delegation noted that elected officials in parliament made concerted efforts to play a constructive role in enhancing civilian control of the military. While in some cases, these efforts have met with limited success, legislators have faced many challenges as they seek to play a larger role in oversight of the military.

In Congo, parliamentary committees in both the Senate and National Assembly that have jurisdiction over defense issues have tried to play an active role in reducing tensions stemming from the state of civil-military relations in the country. The country's constitution and the rules of procedure of both houses give members the right and prerogative to call officials of the executive branch and the military to testify before various legislative committees. Since the democratic transition of 1992, committees in both chambers have

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<sup>5</sup> Wendy Hunter, "Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 15 (1994): 633-53.

exercised this right. At the time of the delegation's visit, parliament was considering two bills that will draw a distinction between the duties and responsibilities of the police and the armed forces and more clearly define their respective missions. The two houses also created a joint commission to address issues stemming from the unrest of 1993-4.

Still in Congo, the 12-member bipartisan Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee for Peace, composed of equal representation by opposition and majority members of parliament, was created following the 1995 peace accords. The Committee was chaired by a government minister and its main function was to oversee disarming of the militia groups. However, without the means to enforce disarmament, the committee's work has been limited to collecting weapons that have been voluntarily relinquished. While many Congolese cited the committee's efforts as a positive attempt to address the proliferation of arms in the country, they also described its overall performance as ineffective.

Another Congolese initiative on civil-military relations involved the creation of a *Commission Restreinte* composed of two representatives from the parliamentary committee on peace, heads of the major political parties and government ministers. The committee, an outgrowth of the 1995 UNESCO-sponsored multipartisan forum on the "Culture of Peace," is responsible for implementing decisions regarding the maintenance of peace. Its focus has been on the integration of former members of the militia into the regular army and the rebuilding of damaged buildings.

In Guinea, subsequent to the armed mutiny of February 1996, the Guinean National Assembly created a special multipartisan commission of inquiry to investigate the causes of the mutiny. After meeting with Guineans of different walks of life within civil society, the military and government, the Commission issued a preliminary report which concluded, among other things, that Guinean soldiers needed to be better paid (*See Appendix C*). The Commission also suggested a number of immediate policy remedies for healthier civil-military and intra-military relations. The Commission agreed that the parliamentary investigation should be continued to examine the root causes of some of the tensions in civil-military relations in the country that had been brought to light by the mutiny. Before the report was reviewed by the Assembly in plenary session, the Head of State disbanded the committee and directed the Ministry of Justice to open a judicial inquiry. The current status of the Ministry's inquiry is unknown to legislators.

Despite the eagerness of Guinean deputies to be better informed and involved in the management of civil-military relations, as illustrated by the investigative commission of 1996, the legislature that was elected in 1995 still lacks the political clout to play an effective oversight role. The lack of any control of the armed forces by the legislature is evidenced in the Assembly's inability to continue its investigation into the February 1996 mutiny. Guinean legislators noted that they had not initiated or dealt with any bills concerning the armed forces and had never been presented with a budget for the armed forces. Several members of the opposition coalition in parliament complained that their efforts to restart a

parliamentary investigation into the February 1996 mutiny were blocked by pro-government members of the parliamentary committee on defense issues.

In contrast to Guinea, the National Assembly in Mali and the Malian Ministry of Defense, have worked together closely to carve out a new role for the military. Government officials and military officers have frequently been called to testify before the legislative committee that has jurisdiction over defense issues. In 1995, a law was promulgated on the organization of the forces of public order; it defined the missions and functions of the armed forces and distinguished them from those of the police. A new military code of justice was approved in 1996, and representatives from parliament, the government, civil society and the military are involved in establishing the mechanisms for its implementation. Mali is also being used as a test case by the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa, which is working with the Malian government to adopt a new code of conduct for members of the Armed Forces.

While the Beninese Assembly has not initiated bills on defense policy, it has reviewed, debated and amended those submitted to it by the executive branch. The Beninese Defense Minister and Chiefs of Staff reported that they have regular interactions with the parliamentary committee that has jurisdiction over defense issues. The Ministry of Defense seemed generally satisfied with the competence exhibited by elected deputies in addressing defense issues. There is a new initiative underway to have the service chiefs meet regularly with members of the legislature to discuss each other's activities.

- **Micro-Initiatives by Civic and Political Organizations**

In Benin, several international and domestic NGOs, including the African-American Institute, Konrad Adenauer Foundation and GERDDES-Afrique, have organized conferences in the subregion on the role of the armed forces in a democracy. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and GERDDES indicated that additional seminars were being planned that would focus on encouraging civic education programs inside military camps. The Beninese minister of defense and the Beninese military welcomed such initiatives.

In Guinea, in contrast to its reluctance to permit elected deputies to be involved in the management of civil-military relations, the executive branch has allowed activities by Guinean NGOs in the area of human rights education for members of the armed forces. The Guinean Human Rights Organization (*Observatoire Guinéen des Droits de l'Homme--OGDH*) organized two seminars on human rights in 1996 for members of the military. The impact of the 1996 seminar remains to be assessed, since the military leadership has been reluctant or slow in conveying human rights values to the rank and file. According to OGDH, there seems to be little or no change in the attitudes or behavior of uniformed personnel. Representatives of OGDH stated that, during the 1996 seminar, the army promised to hold weekly follow up seminars but has not yet done so. A small number of military personnel are said to be members of OGDH.

Malian civil society has played an active role in contributing to the debate about the future direction of Malian armed forces. NGOs, political party leaders and military and government officials have, two times in the last year, jointly participated in seminars on armed forces code of conduct in peacetime, and the relationship between civil society, civilian state authorities and the armed forces. Both seminars have been co-sponsored by UNESCO and UNDP (*See Appendix D*). Malian civil society has also taken a serious and active interest in the living conditions of soldiers. With public support, the Malian government tripled the wages of soldiers between 1992 and 1994. While the Malian army is considered to be better paid than its counterparts in some of the other countries visited, the manner in which the pay increase was given -- after open debate at the national level -- suggests a positive direction for civil-military relations in the country.

- **Initiatives Undertaken within or by the Military Establishment**

The NDI delegation observed that high level military officials were conscious of the need to improve relations with civil society as a whole or with institutions that have emerged from the democratic transition. In Benin, the Ministry of Defense has a press attaché who handles public relations for the ministry and publishes a monthly bulletin covering stories of current interest to the public (*See Appendix E*). The military general staff also expressed an active interest in the public relations programs being implemented in countries such as Senegal and elsewhere in West Africa. According to Ministry of Defense officials, the military had organized seminars to bring together representatives of the military and political leaders to address issues of common interest, such as the military code of justice, which dates from the pre-transition period. Currently, initiatives are underway to review and possibly revise the code. Apart from conducting the traditional tour of military bases and holding separate meetings with officers and their troops, the Beninese minister of defense also undertook a round of working visits to other government ministries, during which printed informational material on the military was presented to civilian authorities.

In an effort to educate the public on the activities of the military, Congo developed a bi-weekly radio program called "Army-Nation" that seeks to inform the population about the army's involvement in development work (for example, public works projects undertaken by the engineering corp). The program also seeks to enhance the public image of the Congolese military. Despite these initiatives, the delegation found that the Congolese military did not have a public relations office.

The Malian military has actively engaged in public relations efforts to improve its relations with political leaders and the civilian population. It has established a press bureau designed to better inform the citizenry on activities of the military (*See Appendix F*). The bureau has also arranged for public "visiting hours" with the inspector-general of the armed forces, whose responsibilities include investigating complaints by civilians regarding members of the armed forces. Once every week, aggrieved civilians and soldiers may bring their complaints directly to the inspector-general of the armed forces. While this open and

formalized access to the inspector-general may help curb human rights abuses and misconduct by elements of the armed forces, it has also helped to diminish feelings of mistrust and hostility between the military and Malian civil society. The visiting-hour policy is seen by some observers as an outgrowth of the "open-door day" held during the 1992 transition when the chief-of-staff of the army requested the people's pardon for past offenses of the military. That symbolic event has had a major effect on improving the Malian military's relations and standing with civil society.

## **B. Obstacles**

The delegation found that Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali face numerous obstacles as they seek to establish and/or consolidate healthy civil-military relations. The shortcomings confronted by these countries are similar to those encountered by other emerging democracies in the sub-region.

### **• Budgetary and Material Constraints on Civil-Military Relations**

In each of the countries visited, the team found militaries that are confronted with a new political landscape in which they are forced to compete -- some for the first time -- with other institutions for the meager financial resources now available in national budgets. Once the pride of the nation, many militaries now feel as though they are no longer given the respect they once enjoyed. In some cases, military equipment and housing is in a dismal state of disrepair and many soldiers, like other civil servants, go for months without pay. In other cases, African militaries that relied on Eastern Bloc countries for equipment are now saddled with a wide range of hardware that is in disrepair and for which spare parts are nearly impossible to find or simply unaffordable.

The delegation observed that low morale within the militaries is widely believed to contribute to human rights violations, mutinies within the military and military coups d'état. Such incidents have eroded the confidence of civilian leaders in the military. They have also prompted civil society in some cases to openly question the sincerity in the militaries' public assertion of respect and subservience to civilian authority. Even within the military, while there remains general respect for the military hierarchy, professional relationships have been strained between soldiers trained in the East and a newer generation of recruits and officers who have been trained elsewhere.

In two of the countries visited, the team heard accusations that some soldiers frequently engaged in banditry and other illegal activities. The combination of low morale and unreliable pay have contributed to fears in some countries in the subregion about renewed mutinies, coups d'état and military rule. Pay issues were also cited as having contributed to military uprisings in two countries in 1996. In the Central African Republic -- a country that the delegation initially planned to visit -- a mutiny over salaries later turned into a bloody factional struggle and an armed attempt to oust democratically elected president Ange Félix

Patassé. The February 1996 mutiny in Guinea that nearly toppled elected President Conté started as a complaint over salaries and material needs. Even in Benin, which has not experienced any significant unrest within the military since the 1990-91 democratic transition, civilian leaders were quick to identify pay issues as a potential trigger for mutinous acts. These factors were repeatedly noted as increasing the risk that troops will often be tempted to find ways to extort additional income from the civilian population and/or civilian institutions.

- **Ethnicity, Regionalism and Civil-Military Tensions**

While ethnic and regional tensions are known to affect political processes in Africa and other parts of the world, these factors, though prevalent in civil society, are exacerbated within the military or in relations between military and civilian leadership. The delegation noted that politicization of ethnicity within African armies manifested itself at two levels: an imbalance in the membership of the armed forces as a whole and/or in the composition of special units. For example, by some accounts, approximately 90 percent of the armies of Burundi and Togo are staffed with soldiers from a single ethnic group. Even when the forces as a whole may be reflective of the ethnic balance in the country, experts on African militaries cite the creation of special units -- such as the presidential guard -- that are frequently better armed and cared for, and composed almost entirely of members of one ethnic group. In Guinea and Congo, the delegation heard comments about presidential guards constituted principally of individuals that belonged to the same ethnic groups as the two presidents. Officials who defended such decisions explained them in terms of trust and reliability. These arguments still speak to the lack of a military culture that could itself be trusted to adhere fully to the democratic principle of alternance in political power.

In all four countries visited, few of the assessment mission's interlocutors were willing to acknowledge forthrightly that ethnicity and/or regionalism were problems in their armed forces. When they did so, the problem was generally referred to as being something of the past. However, in a few instances military officers acknowledged that special recruitment programs had been implemented to help address ethnic imbalances. In a number of countries, attempts have also been made to neutralize ethnic divisions within the military by instituting a proportional representation system of recruitment. Even so, it still is doubtful as to whether this experiment will succeed. High-ranking military officers in Benin and Congo recognized that a tradition of discrimination may have left their armies with a lingering regional bias. However, the delegation was also told that the Beninese armed forces as presently constituted are relatively well-balanced in terms of ethnicity and regional representation. There was also a consensus in Mali that the country's army is ethnically balanced.

- **Low Level of Political Party and NGO Involvement**

Contrary to the activism that political parties have shown in other areas of political development, political parties in the four countries visited have not played an active role in

the area of civil-military relations. In many African countries, including the four that were visited by the delegation, political parties have assumed an important function in assisting legislatures acquire expertise through training seminars or party conferences to discuss challenges to democratization or by forming caucuses or study groups for their members on such challenges. These groups have served as forums to collect and analyze information, discuss policy options and devise strategies for achieving the parties' objectives. For example, at various moments during the democratic transition in Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Mali, both the ruling party and opposition parties developed their own proposals on constitutional reforms or electoral processes. Generally, in the area of civil-military relations, however, the delegation noted that political parties had not undertaken similar initiatives. On further questioning, it appeared to the delegation that political parties had not yet given thought to the appropriate approach to educate their members and leadership on the question of civil-military relations.

The delegation was encouraged that many active members of political parties and civic organizations recognized that the military's understanding of its role in the democratic process as an institution composed of "the nation's sons and daughters" was crucial to the further consolidation of democracy. However, at the same time, the delegation noticed a reluctance by some political and civic activists and members of the armed forces to recognize that difficulties exist in the area of civil-military relations. As one political leader asserted, "the history of military coups and fears of attempted coups is a military-military problem, and not a civil-military one."

- **Transparency and Public Accountability**

While recognizing the need to safeguard classified information regarding national defense and warfare, both civilian and military leaders agreed that public access to information on some sectors of the military are prerequisites for public trust in the armed forces. Following years of intense secrecy surrounding the structure, makeup and activities of the military in many African countries, the assessment team found encouraging signs that armies and defense ministries now recognize the importance of being more open to the public with information about defense issues. Evidence of this included the establishment of press offices within some of the defense ministries, and the conduct of radio and television programming for the purpose of informing the citizenry on the activities of the military. In each of the countries visited, military and civilian leaders were exploring ways to improve the public's access to information regarding the military by expanding initiatives such as military-sponsored "open-house" days at barracks and the sharing of information with civilian leaders through printed materials that explain the various functions and structures of the military.

The delegation found that an important effect on civil-military relations is the extent to which the public trusts the military to remain politically neutral. Mutual perceptions and attitudes, oftentimes ill-informed, influence relations between the two sides. The lack of



understanding and even disdain of the armed forces' ethics, values and traditions by some elements of civil society adversely affect the perception on the part of some soldiers of the value of a professional military that is fully subject to civilian authority. On the other hand, human rights violations and abuse of power by the military alienates the public, which then views the army as an agent of oppression.

Unlike in established democracies where legislative oversight of the military has played a fundamental role in enhancing the transparency of the military institution and improving the public's perception of the military, in most of the countries visited by the assessment team, legislators -- despite their interest in the military -- appeared to take a minimalist, hands-off approach on military issues and questions of national defense. Although appropriate committees exist for such oversight in the legislatures of all the countries visited, parliamentarians seemed to exercise little genuine oversight of the military. None of the legislatures visited possessed in-house expertise on defense issues, nor have they sought outside expertise on such issues when reviewing budgets or defense related bills. Rather, the legislator typically expected to vote on bills drafted by the executive branch, which traditionally controls all of the decision-making processes concerning the military. In Guinea, for example, where the head of state is also minister of defense, legislators had no recourse but to keep silent when the special parliamentary committee set up to investigate events surrounding the February 1996 armed mutiny was simply disbanded months later by the head of state.

Despite the hurdles that legislators face in trying to influence defense policy, some members of parliament, demonstrated a willingness to increase their involvement in the monitoring of defense issues through special or permanent committees. Such legislators stated that they saw the need and would welcome the opportunity to participate in professional interactions between their institutions and the military in the new era of democratization. In this regard, lawmakers have begun to win the appreciation of segments of civil society as viable actors in democratic consolidation including issues of civilian control of the military. In Congo, the Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Peace Committee, made up of senators, representatives and political party leaders from both sides of the political spectrum, supervised the deployment of an interposition force to restore order following politically motivated factional and ethnic strife in 1993-94. In Benin, legislators were described by civic activists and a member of the international donor community as having demonstrated scrupulous oversight of budgetary issues affecting the military. These limited successes underscore the fact that the legislative branch in the countries visited has little influence over defense policy and civilian control of armed forces. More important, the delegation heard sincere recognition by a sizeable number of policymakers and educated observers that the role of legislators ought to be enhanced.

### **C. Challenges for the Future**

The NDI delegation identified a number of challenges that could have the cumulative effect of increasing tensions between civilian authorities and the military establishment, even if each one of them taken singly may have little impact on the state of civil-military relations.

- **Civic Education Programs for the Military**

In all of the countries visited, the delegation was told that one of the main challenges to civil-military relations was the lack of financial resources to implement civic education programs for the military and to train elected civilian leaders on defense issues. While military leaders stated that they had made efforts to involve members of the officers' corp in civic education programs, they recognized the need for continuing civic education and expanding it to enlisted personnel. This presents a dilemma for most governments in emerging democracies as they attempt to deal with shrinking resources, slim defense budgets and prioritizing military spending between different line items. For example, in one of the countries visited, the delegation heard considerable concerns that the military's own budget cuts -- the military experienced a 10 to 15 percent reduction of its budget between 1996-97 -- may adversely affect civil-military relations either by contributing to the militaries marginalization or by provoking lapses in the discipline and professional conduct of soldiers.

- **Reconciling the Public's Right to Information and the Military's Desire to Safeguard Highly Sensitive Information**

The NDI delegation was told that the citizenry in most of the countries visited still viewed the military as a secretive institution. This perception is exacerbated by what one member of the international donor community characterized as the public's concern that the military is "doing absolutely nothing" and "leeching" resources away from the state.

In one of the countries visited, many independent observers described the military as the one institution in the country that has made little or no progress in the area of democratization. The complete lack of transparency in the management of the military establishment in this country and the lack of distinction between the president's several command functions and his control of defense policy were cited as factors that hindered meaningful improvements in the enforcement of the military's subordination to civilian authority. For example, after a major armed uprising in the country, the president announced that an agreement had been reached with the soldiers involved in the mutiny. The nature and contents of this agreement have never been made public. The only demand that was made known publicly was the mutineers request for higher salaries. The government concerned also refused to release any of the names of the soldiers implicated in the mutiny although reports have circulated that some of the mutineers were arrested and are being detained. On the other hand, civilian and military leaders in countries such as Benin and Mali are committed to transparency within the military and are eager to find advice on where to draw

the line with regards to the public's right to know and to gain access to information without jeopardizing the military's capability to engage in its primary function of combat and national defense.

- **Militia Movements**

Existing outside or on the margins of the state security and military apparatus, militia are seen to be in direct competition with legitimate public security forces. The delegation was told by credible sources that militia, where they existed, sought to justify their presence by discrediting official security forces and making them look ineffective and incompetent to provide national defense and to ensure the public's safety. Additionally, the existence of these groups undermines the public's confidence in the ability of new democratic institutions -- compared to the overwhelming presence of force under one-party or military rule -- to be able to effectively ensure the security of its citizens.

The NDI delegation was told that the phenomenon of armed militia had become commonplace in a number of countries in the subregion. Military leaders explained that militia emerged from the breakdown of the rule of law and their activities were facilitated by the availability and circulation of small arms across national boundaries. Civilian political activists generally deplored the existence of these armed groups but explained that in some cases political leaders resorted to forming militia for self-protection because they questioned the neutrality of the national army and security forces. The delegation noted that armed militia were likely to be prevalent in countries that had gone through protracted and contentious political transitions.

For example, in Congo at the time of the mission, the primary challenge facing the country was how to disarm and dismember the militia. One international diplomat characterized the political situation in Congo as armed ethnic conflict that used the cover of political parties to engage in urban warfare and criminality. Militia in Congo were formed by the major political parties following the contentious legislative elections of 1993. The three major political party leaders -- Pascal Lissouba, Bernard Kolelas and Denis Sassou-Nguesso -- each had a militia that occupied and protected or guarded sectors of Brazzaville, the national capital. Subsequent negotiations called for the integration of these groups into the regular army. Unfortunately, the integration never fully took place and political leaders continued to maintain militiamen as a private security force. Some Congolese claim that one of the reasons for the failure to dismember the militia was the favoritism allegedly shown in the integration process, with the ruling party's militia obtaining a larger share of positions in the army than militiamen loyal to other political parties.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Events since June 5, 1997 demonstrate the degree to which the continued existence of militia presented a serious challenge to Congo. Fighting, which soon consumed the country in civil war, began when the president at the time, Pascal Lissouba attempted to disarm members of Gen. Sassou-Nguesso's (president before Congo's transition to democracy in 1992 who came to power for a second time through force in October, 1997) Cobra militia.

Neutralizing militia means disarming them. However, political parties, which often form the militia, seem unwilling to risk partially eroding their own power base by eliminating the militia. The delegation also learned that because of the mistrust among political party leaders, opposition parties may have been fearful that the government-controlled military establishment could not be trusted to disarm all militia on an impartial basis. Nevertheless, as repeatedly emphasized by civilian and military leaders themselves, this problem requires urgent attention if democracy is to be consolidated further in Congo. The delegation heard reports that although some members of the three main militia had been incorporated into the national army as stipulated in the 1995 peace accords, the corps of the militia remain intact.

- **Raising Political Awareness on Both Sides of the Leadership Divide**

NGO and political party representatives and other independent observers stressed the continuing need for civic and political education for both military and civilian leaders. While military leaders and their subordinates need to be educated on the role of the military in a post-transition democratic society, people with whom the delegation met also stressed the need for greater education on military matters for civilian political leaders who determine policy in military affairs. Even in the cases where the delegation found the state of civil-military relations to be moving in the right direction, the lack of continuous civic education still constitutes an obstacle to improving upon these relations. The delegation found that except for a few conferences on the general topic of the role of the military in emerging democracies, no specific program activities had been planned or implemented to better prepare newly elected civilian leaders to interact with the military.

- **Commitment to Publicly Espoused Constitutional Norms**

In Congo and, to a lesser degree in Guinea, many policymakers with whom the delegation met attributed the tensions or crisis over civil-military relations to the gap between constitutional provisions and publicly stated intentions on the one hand, and the means and political will to implement or act upon decisions on the other. For example, Congolese repeatedly pointed out that their country had made progress in providing for the statutory control of the armed forces, but the lack of political will and the existence of weak institutional structures diminished the effect of any attempted reforms. In Guinea, the resistance that the executive branch has shown to parliament's attempt to exercise its constitutional oversight and investigative function in defense issues is indicative of the dichotomy between Guinea's legal framework and actual practice.

- **Lack of Transparency on Defense Allocations and Expenditures**

The inadequate and untimely formulation of armed forces budgets was frequently mentioned as a potential source of tensions in the area of civil-military relations. At the time the delegation met with aides to the chief of staff of the armed forces in one of the countries visited, they were still awaiting notification from political authorities on the amount of the

armed forces budget for the current year. Civilian authorities on the other hand, complained to the delegation that of a total 1996 defense budget of 2.4 billion CFA (approximately 1.2 million US dollars), two billion CFA alone was required to provide food for the soldiers.

In established democracies, legislatures and other agencies outside of the executive branch have helped shed light on the budget process, thereby diffusing potential suspicions and tensions over budget allocations and obligation of funds. In some of the countries visited, as is the case in a number of other emerging democracies, the role that institutions outside of the executive branch play in shaping the national budget is unclear and in most cases limited. One observer termed the role of parliament in passing the budget "decorative." The delegation was told that control over the military was exclusively the domain of the president and that the minister of defense was dependent on the president for policy decisions. In one case, a leading political figure alleged that an armed mutiny began when soldiers suspected that they were being paid less than had been allocated for their salaries in official budget-related documents. The problem of transparency in financial and budget matters has been exacerbated in countries such as Guinea, where military policy is highly centralized in the office of the president. No effective control mechanisms exist outside of the sphere of the president. It is symptomatic of the Guinean chain of command that the president is the only active general in the Guinean army, and for a time also held the defense portfolio himself.

- **Civilian Society's Perceptions of Military Justice**

During its mission, the delegation attempted to gauge how members of civil society perceived the level of discipline for members of the armed forces who infringed upon the rights of civilians and how that perception could influence the state of civil-military relations. For the most part, many civilians stated that they viewed the military as operating with impunity. The delegation heard numerous reports of intimidation and incidents of violence against the civilian population by members of the military. In some cases, many of the abuses were attributed to special units, such as the presidential guard, which were established by executive decree and are not under the normal command structure of the regular armed forces. The delegation noted that the perceived lack of legal redress perpetuates the view of the armed forces as an instrument of oppression, and exacerbates tensions between the military and the citizenry. In a country such as Mali, where civilians had access to, and were encouraged to petition the inspector-general of the army if their rights were infringed upon by a member of the armed forces, such a complaint mechanism has helped smooth tensions between civilians and members of the armed forces.

- **Broaden the Network of Civilian Authority to Include the Legislative Branch**

The delegation saw the need to broaden civilian control over the military beyond the executive branch to include elected political leaders within the legislative branch of government. The delegation was especially impressed by the potential demonstrated by elected officials in the different national legislatures. Their eagerness to learn and to participate in policy debates led delegation members to believe that improved legislative oversight could play an important role in increasing the transparency of the military and the public's understanding of and confidence in both civilian and military institutions.

- **Train Legislators and High Level Military Officials on Legislative Oversight of the Military**

The lack of reliable mechanisms for effective communication between military and civilian leaders and the lack of knowledge and understanding of the military by elected leaders, especially in the legislative branch, should be addressed through intensive training seminars. Such training programs should aim to diversify decision-making authority on defense issues, thereby providing the military with additional avenues through which to channel grievances to civilian authority as opposed to burying those concerns until they surface in violence and military coups. This training would also enable legislators to make informed decisions on defense policy, to respond to executive branch initiatives and to address issues of concern to the military through democratic channels.

- **Increase Civic Education for the Military**

Leaders in these countries have repeatedly requested assistance in raising the level of awareness of both civilian political leaders and members of the military. The region's short experience with democratic institutions necessitates further civic education about the role of both sides in a new (and sometimes confusing) system of governance. While many international and domestic groups are active in providing civic education to the civilian population, members of the military have not benefited from the same opportunities. And, although members of the officers corps may have had some exposure to the principles and practices of democratic civil-military relations, the enlisted soldiers within the military are still unfamiliar with basic notions of democracy and human rights. NDI has received specific requests from military officers and civilians responsible for defense issues to assist them in establishing mechanisms to provide civic education to the military.

- **Encourage Political Parties to Help Shape Defense Policy**

Judging from the work that newly formed political parties have played in effecting changes in the electoral process and party charters in the subregion since 1990, NDI believes that political parties could contribute to educating their leaders and members on the proper role of the military in democratic societies. In a number of countries, opposition and ruling

parties have developed alternative plans or projects on constitutional reforms and instruments such as electoral laws, media laws, party charters and rules of procedure of parliaments. Most of the debate around election administration entities has also been spearheaded by political parties that have formed study groups among their members to review archaic election laws and regulations, and to propose changes that would reflect better the democratic nature of the state. The delegation believes that, with special encouragement and focus, political parties may be able to influence constructive debate on the state of civil-military relations in the countries visited, as well as in the region. Political parties should be encouraged to draw upon the pool of retired military officers, some of whom would willingly contribute their experience to such democracy building efforts.

- **More Public Outreach**

Governments should be encouraged to help “humanize” the military through forums organized in military camps and garrisons. Militaries would also benefit from training programs in public relations that highlight activities such as “open-house” activities and civilian-military exchange programs.

- **Increase Participation in Multinational Civil-Military Relations Programs**

Multinational initiatives seemed to have had a positive effect on the state of civil-military relations for the countries that had taken part in such activities. As frequently suggested to the delegation, some of the most effective initiatives include: organizing regional training exchanges or defense networks, participating in humanitarian intervention and peace-keeping forces, and professional exchange programs. The delegation found that, partly because of the costs involved and the sensitive nature of internal debates on specific country issues, training programs that are conducted on a regional basis would attract particular support from both civilian and military leaders.

In addition, elected officials and representatives of civil society and military commanders should be encouraged to exchange opinions and perspectives on specific issues, such as the military code of conduct. The UNDP’s international conferences in Mali underscore the benefits of such an approach and its potential to contribute to more healthy civil-military relations and an acquiescence of the military to civilian control. Such integrated discussions could help demystify the military society establishment to the benefit of newly emerging civilian and political leadership.

## **NDI Future Programming**

To build upon the interest and momentum that has emerged from its assessment mission, NDI plans to conduct a regional training seminar to help provide elected officials in the subregion with the knowledge necessary to enhance their ability to play an increased role in decision-making processes related to defense and security issues. The seminar would also seek to encourage a wider range of elected civilian leaders--including political party leaders in parliament--to become knowledgeable and involved in helping frame defense policy. This program will have multiple components including: the sharing and discussion of this report with civilian political leaders and military leaders in the four countries visited, an intensive roundtable workshop for legislators and senior military officials to examine ways to enhance civilian oversight of the military and to formulate and agree upon specific measures for improving the legislature's oversight role of the military.



**Appendix A**  
**Schedule of Meetings**

**WEST AFRICA CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
BASELINE ASSESSMENT MISSION**

**March 18 to April 9, 1997**

***Draft Mission Agenda***

**CONGO (March 18-21)** *Please note that, due to the situation in Zaire and the arrival of Western troops in Brazzaville to assist a possible evacuation of Kinshasa, some of the originally scheduled meetings were cancelled.*

**March 18**

- 15h 00           Mission working lunch
- 17h 30           GERDDES-Congo President, Mme. Martine Galloy

**March 19**

- 09h 00           US Ambassador to Congo, Mr. Aubrey Hooks

**March 20**

- 11h 30           Vice-President of the Senate, with President of Senate Committee on Security and Diplomacy
- 12h 30           Army Chief of Staff
- 16h 15           President of the Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Commission for Peace, Mr. Victor Tamba-Tamba
- 17h 30           Legal and Political Advisor to the Minister of the Interior and Urban Development, Mr. Ted Bikinkita

**March 21**

- 11h 15           Second-Secretary of the National Assembly, with the President of the Assembly Defense Committee; Chief of Staff to the Assembly President; Chief of Staff of the Second Secretary; Advisor to the President on Communications; and Advisors to the Second Secretary on Military Affairs, Communications and Administration.
- 12h 30           Minister of Defense

**REGIONAL MEETINGS IN ABIDJAN (March 24-25; March 31)**

**March 24**

- 10h 30           US Ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Lannon Walker
- 13h 00           US Military Attaché for Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger and Togo, Colonel Saltness

18h 00 Mission Working Session

March 25

10h 00 Director of Studies for the Non-Aggression and Military Assistance Pact of the Association of West African States, Colonel Touré

March 31

10h 00 President of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), Mr. Laurent Gbagbo

**MALI (March 26 to 29)**

March 26

10h 00 NDI-Mali Staff, Ms. Tracy Gartenmann and Mr. François Kédowidé

12h 00 US Ambassador to Mali, Mr. David Rawson

13h 30 Political Advisor to the US Ambassador, Mr. Bill Fitzgerald

16h 00 Representatives of member groups of the Coalition to Support the Malian Electoral Process (APEM)

March 27

15h 00 Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel Doukouré, with the Comptroller-General, the Technical Advisor on Cooperation and the Director of Press Relations (all Ministry of Defense)

March 28

09h 00 Inspector-General of the Armed Forces, General Traoré

10h 00 UNDP Representative, Mr. Ivor Fung

11h 30 President of the opposition political party coalition, the Front for Democratic Change (FCD), Mr. Almamy Sylla

12h 30 French Military Attaché, Colonel Michel Chaillet

15h 00 Group 1: ADEMA political party coalition (ruling party)  
Group 2: Minister of Defense, Mr. Mamadou Ba

16h 30 Army Chiefs of Staff attached to the Presidency

March 29

17h 00           Outbriefing with US Ambassador

**GUINEA (April 1 to 4)**

April 1

08h 00           Economic and Political Advisor to the US Ambassador, Mr. Patrick Murphy

08h 45           US Embassy DCM John Limbert and USAID Director John Flynn

09h 30           President of the National Assembly, with the Second and Third Vice-Presidents; Assembly Secretaries; Secretary-General of the Assembly; President of the Assembly Defense Committee; and Assembly Press Advisor

11h 30           President and Vice-President of the Assembly Defense Committee

15h 00           Secretary-General of the PUP (ruling party), Mr. Amboucar Somparé

16h 00           Roundtable meeting/discussion with the opposition caucus of the National Assembly

April 2

13h 00           Secretary-General of the Grand Chancellory

14h 00           Friedrich Ebert Foundation

17h 30           Guinean Organization for Human Rights

April 4

12h 30           Prime Minister Sydia Touré

13h 30           Outbriefing with US Ambassador to Guinea, Mr. Tibor Nagy, DCM John Limbert, USAID Director John Flynn and Economic and Political Advisor Patrick Murphy

16h 00           USAID Mission Director John Flynn (McCoy only)

17h 30           Representatives of the government and opposition newspapers

**BENIN (April 7 to 9)**

April 7

09h 00           Chiefs of Staff for the Army, Navy and Air Force

10h 45           Minister of Defense, Mr. Severin Adjovi

16h 00 US Ambassador to Benin, Mr. Melvin Yates and DCM Samuel Brock

April 8

09h 30 Prime Minister Adrien Houngbedji

10h 30 Konrad Adenauer Foundation Regional Office Deputy Director, Mme. Rita Krommen

12h 00 Representative of the government daily newspaper, "La Nation", Mr. Jean D. Adandé

15h 00 Vice-President of Renaissance du Bénin (political party of former president Soglo), Mr. with party secretary-general, Mr. Aurelien Houessou

16h 00 President of GERDDES-Afrique, Mr. Sadikou Ayo Alao

April 9

11h 00 National Assembly Secretary-General, Mme. Noëlie Avognon, and Second Quèster, Mr. Ambroise Adanklounon

13h 00 Director-General of "Le Citoyen" (research institute), Professor Abraham Voglozin

18h 00 French Military Attaché, Colonel Michel Haye

## **Appendix B**

### **Information on the Non-Aggression and Defense Assistance Accord** *(l'Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en matière de la Défense, ANAD)*

ACCORD DE NON-AGRESSION ET D'ASSISTANCE  
EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE

INFORMATIONS SUR L'ANAD

L'ANAD a été créé le 9 juin 1977 à Abidjan, République de Côte d'Ivoire, à la suite d'une Conférence qui a réuni sept Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement des pays suivants :

- BURKINA FASO
- COTE D'IVOIRE
- MALI
- MAURITANIE
- NIGER
- SENEGAL et
- TOGO.

En procédant, à cette date, à la signature de l'Acte constitutif de l'ANAD, les Chefs d'Etat des pays susmentionnés voulaient ainsi concrétiser solennellement leur engagement à privilégier, dans l'unité et la solidarité, le dialogue et la concertation dans les relations entre leurs Etats.

Ce faisant, ils apportent leur contribution au respect des principes fondamentaux contenus dans la Charte des Nations-Unies et celle de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine qui interdisent formellement tout recours à la force pour le règlement des différends.

Instrument de consolidation de l'indépendance politique des Etats-membres, et conçu pour être le garant de la stabilité et de la sécurité indispensables à l'édification des économies nationales, l'ANAD représente un maillon important dans la longue chaîne de solidarité qui existe entre les pays et les peuples de la sous-région ouest-africaine, lesquels doivent consacrer l'essentiel de leur énergie et de leurs potentialités aux énormes tâches qu'imposent les impératifs de développement.

.../...

L'ANAD, il faut le souligner, n'est pas un instrument de guerre, il n'est au service d'aucune idéologie. Il ne développe aucune stratégie militaire et ne recherche aucune suprématie. Il est simplement au service de la Paix.

Si est vrai que depuis qu'il a été créé, l'ANAD n'a eu à intervenir qu'une seule fois sur le terrain lors du conflit armé entre deux Etats-membres, à savoir le Burkina Faso et le Mali (Décembre 1985-janvier 1986), il y a lieu d'insister sur le fait que cette première action commune a permis de tester avec succès la fiabilité et la solidité des structures mises en place. Ainsi l'ANAD est devenu opérationnel.

Quels sont les domaines d'intervention de l'ANAD ?

Le sigle ANAD comporte deux volets :

- la non-agression et l'assistance en matière de défense.

D'abord la non-agression

La paix ne peut se concevoir que dans un climat permanent de sérénité où sera écarté tout risque de conflit. Conscients de cette réalité, les Etats-membres de l'ANAD ont préconisé la non-agression et posé les bases d'un règlement pacifique des différends qui pourraient naître, éventuellement, entre eux.

Si ces Etats se sont engagés à faire la paix entre eux, il est tout aussi nécessaire de faire la paix avec les autres. C'est pourquoi ils ont également proclamé solennellement leur résolution à ne commettre aucune agression envers un Etat tiers.

Au demeurant, les différents textes juridiques conclus dans le cadre de l'ANAD font obligation aux parties contractantes à ne prendre aucune mesure ou à n'adopter aucune



attitude susceptible de créer des tensions et de nuire aux relations de bon voisinage qui doivent exister entre elles.

Le deuxième volet de la mission assignée à l'ANAD concerne l'assistance en matière de défense.

En effet, si la paix correspond à la non-agression, la sécurité appelle nécessairement une défense commune qui s'impose aussi bien en cas d'agression qu'en matière de protection civile et celle de l'économie.

L'ANAD repose sur une doctrine essentiellement défensive. Cependant, devant l'existence de risque d'agression émanant de circonstances qu'on ne peut toujours prévoir, et conscients de la nécessité de mettre en commun leurs moyens respectifs pour obtenir une défense plus efficace, les Etats concernés ont convenu de se porter aide et assistance en matière de défense, sur la base de l'égalité, du respect et de l'intérêt mutuels. Deux hypothèses sont envisagées à ce niveau.

La première hypothèse concerne le cas d'agression commise par un Etat-membre contre un autre Etat-membre. Les dispositions à prendre dans ce cas sont de nature purement pacifique et font appel au dialogue, à la négociation. Si la situation dégénère, il est prévu le déploiement éventuel d'une force de paix.

La deuxième hypothèse traite du cas d'agression venant d'un Etat tiers. En effet, c'est une chose rassurante que d'affirmer sa volonté de paix. Mais si un Etat-membre de l'Accord est victime d'une agression extérieure quelle serait alors la réaction des autres Etats-membres ?

L'idéal qui guide le fonctionnement de l'ANAD, il faut le répéter, c'est la PAIX. Ainsi, toute intervention de cet organisme dans le cadre communautaire, se traduit naturellement, tout d'abord par la recherche d'une solution pacifique. Diverses modalités d'intervention sont prévues à cet égard.

Il s'agit en premier lieu de s'efforcer à trouver un dénouement diplomatique à l'acte d'agression.

Si celle-ci persiste malgré cette première action, il est envisagé, ensuite, de recourir à des mesures coercitives n'impliquant pas l'emploi de la force armée.

Au cas où les moyens d'action que voilà s'avèrent inefficaces pour faire reculer l'agresseur, alors seulement la Communauté sera contrainte de déclencher une intervention armée, c'est l'ultima ratio.

Après la défense militaire qui constituait à l'origine la principale préoccupation de l'ANAD, celui-ci a vu, par la suite, son intervention élargie au domaine de la protection civile et de la protection de l'économie.

La sécurité, c'est d'abord la non-guerre, mais c'est aussi la protection du citoyen contre toutes formes de menaces ou de dangers susceptibles de troubler sa tranquillité, de détruire son moral, d'entraver ses activités quotidiennes.

Aussi, l'ANAD a-t-il pris des dispositions visant à lutter contre les calamités naturelles et les catastrophes qui sont autant de fléaux auxquels les populations peuvent se trouver confrontées. A cet égard, une décision prise par les Etats-membres tendant à la création d'un Comité Régional d'Assistance en matière de protection civile offrira un cadre dans lequel seront menées les activités qui touchent à ce domaine.

Si les calamités naturelles et les catastrophes sont difficiles à prévoir et à maîtriser, le fait de l'homme est un facteur que l'on peut réduire ou supprimer.

Il s'agit ici de la pollution maritime et fluviale, de la contrebande, du braconnage, de la destruction de la faune et de la flore.

En tout état de cause, pour faire face à tous ces dangers qui menacent l'économie des Etats-membres, l'ANAD a prévu

.../...

un mécanisme qui appelle la mise en oeuvre, dans un cadre communautaire, de tous les moyens nécessaires à l'image de la défense militaire visant à repousser une agression venant d'un Etat tiers.

Les nombreux protocoles et conventions adoptés par la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement définissent dans le détail les différents modes d'intervention de l'ANAD dans chacun des domaines qui constituent son champ d'action.

Pour atteindre les objectifs définis ci-dessus, l'ANAD a été structuré autour de trois organes :

- La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement ;
- le Conseil des Ministres ;
- le Secrétariat Général.

1°) La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement  
(C.C.E.G.)

La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement est l'organe suprême de l'ANAD. Elle se réunit une fois tous les deux ans et ses décisions sont prises à l'unanimité.

La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement nomme le Secrétaire Général de l'ANAD et le Contrôleur Financier, et approuve le budget biennal du Secrétariat Général.

2°) Le Conseil des Ministres (C.M.)

Le Conseil des Ministres comprend aussi bien les Ministres que les Chefs d'Etat-Major des Armées des Etats-membres.

Le Conseil des Ministres se réunit également une fois tous les deux ans avant la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement. Il est chargé de l'élaboration des mesures de défense qui sont soumises à l'approbation de la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement ainsi que de leur application en collaboration avec l'Etat assisté.

En cas de menace ou d'agression, le Conseil des Ministres examine la situation, prépare une étude sur la stratégie à adopter, émet un avis sur l'opportunité d'une action militaire et détermine les moyens d'intervention à mettre en oeuvre. Le Conseil des Ministres définit ensuite les modalités de participation de chaque Etat-membre à toute action commune à mener.

### 3°) Le Secrétariat Général

Le Secrétariat Général est l'organe permanent de l'ANAD. Il est chargé de l'administration et du suivi des décisions ainsi que de la préparation et de la gestion de son budget. Il est dirigé par un Secrétaire Général, au moins du rang d'officier supérieur, nommé par la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement pour un mandat de trois ans renouvelable, sur proposition du Conseil des Ministres.

Le Secrétaire Général étudie les questions d'intérêt commun et établit, tous les deux ans, un rapport sur le fonctionnement de l'ANAD et sur les progrès accomplis dans l'exécution des décisions arrêtées par la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement.

Le siège du Secrétariat Général est établi à Abidjan (République de Côte d'Ivoire).

L'organigramme du Secrétariat Général se présente comme suit :

a) le Secrétaire Général qui dispose :

- d'un secrétariat particulier ;
- d'une section administrative et financière ;
- d'une section trésorerie.

b) le Contrôle financier

c) la Direction des affaires juridiques

d) la Direction des études générales qui comprend :


- une division logistique,
- une division des opérations./.

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ACCORD DE NON-AGRESSION ET D'ASSISTANCE  
EN MATIÈRE DE DÉFENSE

A. N. A. D.

ORGANIGRAMME



LÉGENDE

—> : LIAISON HIÉRARCHIQUE

- - - - - : LIAISON FONCTIONNELLE

## **Appendix C**

### **The Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Committee Preliminary Report on the February 1996 Mutiny in Guinea**

ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE  
COMMISSION AD HOC  
DE REFLEXION

REFLEXIONS SUR LES EVENEMENTS DES 2 ET 3 FEVRIER

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Le Bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale préoccupé par les événements qui se sont produits à Conakry les 2 et 3 février 1996, a convoqué le mercredi 6 février tous les Députés présents à Conakry.

A l'issue de cette rencontre qui a regroupé 64 Députés, il a été décidé la création d'une Commission Parlementaire de réflexion chargée d'étudier les causes, les effets de ces événements en vue de formuler des recommandations susceptibles d'apporter des remèdes à cette situation préoccupante.

## I. CAUSES

Les causes qui ont conduit à l'éclatement de ces incidents sont multiples et profondes. La Commission dans ses réflexions a cru devoir se limiter dans un premier temps au cas spécifique de nos Forces Armées bien que le problème du relèvement des salaires se pose avec acuité à tous les niveaux.

### 1. Le recrutement

Ces dernières années, par le biais du recrutement, notre armée est devenue un deversoir. Le recrutement est fait dans des conditions inacceptables. On y retrouve ainsi des repris de justice, alcooliques invétérés, délinquants, etc,...

### 2. Injustices et favoritismes dans les nominations et les promotions en grades.

3. Sous-équipement de l'Armée qui se traduit par l'absence de vie de caserne (manque de logements, suppression de l'ordinaire, etc,...) obligeant les soldats à loger dans les quartiers avec leurs armes et munitions.

4. Manque d'occupations du fait de l'inexistence de manoeuvres militaires propres à toutes les Armées modernes et de son non-utilisation dans le développement économique (Génie-route, Génie-bâtiment, Génie-rural).

5. Inversion de la pyramide par le fait que les gradés sont trop nombreux par rapport aux hommes de troupes.

6. Absence de formation civique.

7. Sédentarisation aux postes.

8. Faiblesse des moyens d'encouragement pour les militaires servant à l'extérieur et sentiment d'abandon de la part de leurs familles restées au pays.

9. Non assistance aux familles victimes de guerre, insuffisance de soins médicaux convenables aux militaires et à leurs familles.

10. Aigreur de certains officiers de retour au Camp après avoir assumé de hautes fonctions gouvernementales.

11. Non participation des Etats-Majors particuliers (Terre, Air, Mer) dans la gestion des crédits budgétaires.

12. Révision unilatérale de la grille salariale de la Police et de la Garde Républicaine.

## II. EFFETS ET CONSEQUENCES

Les effets enregistrés par les causes citées plus haut se sont traduits par :

1. Un sentiment de frustration et une démoralisation chez les militaires.

2. Une incitation à la haine.

3. La transformation de nos casernes en petites industries de fabrique de tambanaya favorisant de la sorte le banditisme, l'alcoolisme et la consommation de stupéfiants.

4. L'inobservation des règles élémentaires de la discipline militaire à tous les niveaux.

5. L'iniquité dans le ravitaillement en denrées alimentaires.

Ce climat de mécontentement et le laxisme constaté au niveau des cadres du commandement ont eu pour conséquences :

a) La mutinerie à laquelle nous avons assisté les 2 et 3 février et qui s'est traduite par la perte en vies humaines, la destruction d'édifices publics, le pillage de magasins, de boutiques et stations de carburant ; faisant ainsi de la Guinée, un pays à haut risque avec tout ce que ce qualificatif entraîne (découragement des opérateurs économiques nationaux, méfiance des investisseurs étrangers, décrédibilisation du pays au plan extérieur).



b) La tentative de récupération de la mutinerie qui avait pour objet une revendication salariale et de ravitaillement par un groupe de militaires en vue d'une prise du pouvoir entraînant l'arrêt du processus de démocratisation du pays. Cette récupération aurait abouti à un renversement du régime (déclaration radiodiffusée à 2 reprises proclamant la dissolution du Gouvernement et des Institutions Républicaines, l'institution d'un Comité Militaire de Salut).

### III. RECOMMANDATIONS

Après cet aperçu sommaire, la Commission formule les recommandations ci-après en vue de trouver une solution à la crise actuelle et prévenir toute velléité de ce genre à l'avenir.

1. Inviter le Gouvernement à soumettre dans les meilleurs délais possibles à l'Assemblée Nationale, un budget additionnel au titre des rémunérations et des investissements en faveur du Ministère de la Défense Nationale.
2. Suspendre tout recrutement jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Des critères objectifs seront déterminés pour le recrutement au sein des Forces Militaires et Paramilitaires.
3. Rétablissement dans les plus brefs délais de l'ordre et de la discipline dans le Corps Militaire et Paramilitaire.
4. Application rigoureuse des dispositions contenues dans le Statut Général de l'Armée concernant les nominations, les avancements en grade et la retraite.
5. Application du règlement militaire en ce qui concerne le port de tenues et d'armes.
6. Création d'un fonds spécial pour les victimes de guerre.
7. Création d'une Caisse Militaire de Sécurité Sociale dans l'Armée.
8. Rattachement de l'Intendance à l'Etat-Major Inter Armes
9. Réinstitution des manoeuvres militaires et insertion du Génie-Militaire dans les actions de développement du pays.
10. Création d'un Service Civique National de 18 mois pour les jeunes ayant 18 ans et ceux issus de nos Universités et Ecoles Professionnelles. Les pays amis pourraient nous aider quant à la formation et l'équipement de ces jeunes.
11. Instauration de la formation civique dans l'Armée.
12. Dépolitisation totale de l'Armée.

A ce propos, la Commission suggère que les postes politiques (Ministres, Gouverneurs, Préfets, Sous-préfets) ne soient pas attribués aux militaires. Il en sera de même du Ministère de la Défense.

13. Interdiction à l'Armée de s'occuper du maintien de l'ordre, sauf cas exceptionnels prévus par la loi.

14. Mise sur pied progressivement d'une Armée d'élite et de métiers afin de réduire le nombre pléthorique de soldats.

La Commission suggère au Gouvernement de prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires en vue d'indemniser de façon directe ou indirecte tous les opérateurs économiques (nationaux ou étrangers) victimes de pillage et de destruction de leurs biens.

16. Envisager la tenue d'une table ronde entre le Gouvernement, les Administrations et les Syndicats en vue de permettre à tous de connaître les possibilités et les limites de l'Etat Guinéen en matière salariale.

17. Assurer constamment et équitablement le ravitaillement en denrées alimentaires de nos Forces Armées.

La Commission suggère à l'Assemblée Nationale de proclamer son attachement à la permanence des Institutions Républicaines et Démocratiques et de condamner de manière ferme et vigoureuse tout Coup d'Etat ainsi que de toute tentative de remise en cause du processus de démocratisation amorcé dans notre pays.

La Commission encourage le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, pour toutes les mesures prises en vue d'améliorer les conditions de vie et de travail dans les casernes.

La Commission félicite l'Armée Guinéenne pour sa loyauté et son refus de remettre en cause la légitimité constitutionnelle de l'Etat.

La Commission invite le Gouvernement à faire toute la lumière sur les événements des 2 et 3 février et à prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité en vue de renforcer l'unité et la concorde nationales.

La Commission propose à l'Assemblée Nationale de constituer très rapidement une commission d'enquête parlementaire qui se penchera sur les problèmes des Forces Armées (militaires et paramilitaires) en général et sur les événements des 2 et 3 février 1996 en particulier pour en situer les responsabilités.

Enfin, la Commission encourage le Gouvernement, les leaders d'opinion et tous les acteurs sociaux à privilégier le dialogue et la concertation dans la résolution de tous les problèmes nationaux.

Conakry, le 14 février 1996

LA COMMISSION

## **Appendix D**

### **Resolutions from a 1996 UNDP-sponsored Conference on Civil-Military Relations in Mali**

- le suivi et l'encouragement des initiatives de la société civile en matière de contrôle et d'évaluation du respect des principes fondamentaux des droits de la personne humaine ;
- le développement d'une stratégie de communication afin d'harmoniser les relations entre civils et militaires.
- la préférence du règlement pacifique au règlement par la violence des conflits internes;
- l'instauration de l'état de droit basé sur les principes d'égalité, de justice et de non exclusion;
- la garantie de l'indépendance du système judiciaire;
- la valorisation de la fonction militaire;
- la mise en oeuvre d'une politique sociale et harmonieuse le long des frontières ;
- le respect des institutions républicaines démocratiquement mises en place;
- renforcement de la démocratie par la mise en place de mécanismes permettant à l'Etat d'être à l'écoute de toutes les composantes de la nation.
- la mise en oeuvre d'une politique de développement économique et social équilibrée des différentes régions et l'accélération du processus de décentralisation ;
- le soutien aux initiatives et aux efforts de la société civile dans le règlement pacifique des conflits internes.

## 2. Au plan externe :

- le respect et la conformité aux obligations constitutionnelles et internationales notamment en matière de Droit de l'homme et du droit International humanitaire;
- le développement d'une politique dynamique de bon voisinage ;
- la conclusion et le respect d'accord de non agression avec les pays voisins;
- l'harmonisation de la politique de défense au niveau de la sous-région;
- Le renforcement de la diplomatie préventive et le règlement pacifique des différends.

Fait à Bamako, le 19 juillet 1996

LE SEMINAIRE

## RESOLUTIONS

Le séminaire sur les Relations entre Civils et Militaires organisé conjointement par le Gouvernement malien et les Nations Unies les 15, 16, 17, 18 et 19 juillet 1996 au Palais des Congrès de Bamako, après analyse en ateliers des différents thèmes constitutifs, a constaté :

### I. SUR LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES ARMÉES ET LES SERVICES DE SÉCURITÉ :

- qu'il s'agit des liens découlant des missions communes et des services qu'ils accomplissent les uns au profit des autres (police judiciaire militaire, police administrative, renseignement militaire, concours divers) ;
- que ces rapports peuvent être ainsi examinés :
  - en temps de paix ;
  - en période de trouble ;
  - en temps de guerre.

#### 1) En temps de paix :

Les armées et les services de sécurité entretiennent des rapports étroits de collaboration en matière d'échanges de renseignements, de formation des personnels, de mission de police, de service d'ordre, de la préparation de la mobilisation, etc...

Le séminaire a apprécié l'état particulièrement satisfaisant de ces rapports en temps de paix.

#### 2) En période de trouble :

Le séminaire a constaté que les rapports entre les Forces Armées et de Sécurité, en période de trouble, se situent au niveau des prestations sur requisition et sur concours aux services de sécurité par les armées en tant qu'élément de troisième catégorie en matière de maintien d'ordre.

A cet effet, le séminaire a constaté l'insuffisance des textes regissant actuellement les rapports entre les différentes composantes des Forces de l'ordre ainsi que les conditions de leur emploi.

### 3) En temps de guerre

La Gendarmerie Nationale et la Garde Nationale participent effectivement à la Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire aux côtés des armées.

Considérant l'état des relations entre les Forces Armées et de Sécurité comme une condition garantissant l'efficacité de leur actions sur le terrain, recommande qu'ils soient codifiés par des textes adaptés aux conditions actuelles d'emploi des Forces de maintien de l'ordre dans un contexte démocratique.

## II. S'AGISSANT DES "DEVOIRS DES FORCES ARMEES ET DE SECURITE ENVERS L'ETAT, LE SÉMINAIRE :

Considérant que la consolidation de la démocratie requiert la subordination des Forces Armées à l'autorité politique et constitutionnelle d'une part et le recentrage des Forces Armées sur leurs missions républicaines d'autre part;

Considérant, en revanche que des troubles sociaux ou politiques ainsi que l'accroissement de la criminalité sont autant de facteurs susceptibles de provoquer à tout moment des troubles à l'ordre public, le séminaire recommande trois axes principaux pour la définition des missions à assigner aux Forces Armées et de Sécurité Maliennes :

- la défense de l'intégrité territoriale du pays, la protection des personnes et des biens ;
- la préparation et l'équipement des Forces d'ordre en vue de leur permettre de lutter efficacement contre le banditisme ou toute autre forme d'actions de déstabilisation ;
- la poursuite de la participation des Forces Armées et de Sécurité maliennes à la dynamique des opérations de maintien de la paix aussi bien dans un cadre régional que sous l'égide des Nations Unies.

Conscient que l'emploi des Forces Armées et de Sécurité sur le plan national ou leur projection sur le plan International requiert que soient élaborées des normes précises concernant les rapports entre les Forces Armées et de Sécurité et la société civile et les modalités de leur emploi à l'extérieur ; le séminaire propose que les éléments ci-après constituent la substance d'un code de conduite pour les Forces Armées et de Sécurité :

1. l'institution militaire est à la disposition du pouvoir politique. La subordination au politique, clairement affirmée, doit être comprise et acceptée par tous.

2. les droits et les devoirs de l'ensemble des personnels des Forces Armées et de Sécurité doivent être codifiés dans le droit national ;
3. Le recrutement et la mobilisation des personnels des Forces Armées et de Sécurité seront en accord avec les obligations et engagements de respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales.
4. Les textes des droits de l'homme, de droit international humanitaire et du droit des conflits armés seront enseignés et diffusés dans l'ensemble du pays. Les contenus de ces textes seront insérés dans les programmes de formation militaire et dans les règlements en vigueur.
5. Les personnels des Forces Armées et de Sécurité recevront une instruction spécifique en matière de droit, règles, conventions et engagements relatifs aux conflits armés. Ils devront être conscients que leurs actions engagent leur responsabilité individuelle au regard du droit national et international.
6. Le personnel militaire d'encadrement et de commandement exercera ses fonctions en accord avec le droit. La responsabilité individuelle de chacun est engagée dans l'exercice de cette autorité. Aucun ordre ne saurait être donné en contradiction avec le droit national et international. De plus, la responsabilité des supérieurs ne dispense leurs subordonnés d'aucune de leurs responsabilités propres.
7. Les personnels des Forces Armées et de Sécurité pourront faire valoir et jouir de leurs droits humanitaires et de leurs libertés fondamentales tel que définis par le droit international ainsi que les dispositions constitutionnelles et légales s'y rapportant.
8. Les personnels des Forces Armées et de Sécurité seront incorporés, commandés, entraînés et équipés conformément aux dispositions du droit international et aux engagements relatifs à l'usage de la force dans les conflits armés notamment au regard des Conventions de la Haye de 1907 et 1954, des Conventions de Genève de 1949 et leurs protocoles additionnels de 1977, ainsi que de la Convention de 1980 sur l'emploi de certains armements classiques ainsi qu'aux besoins du service.



9. L'Etat fera en sorte que sa politique de défense soit en accord avec le droit international portant sur l'usage de la force (y compris dans le cadre de conflits internes) ainsi qu'avec les dispositions du Code à élaborer.
10. L'Etat fera en sorte que toute décision d'affecter les Forces armées et de Sécurité à des missions internes soit conforme aux procédures constitutionnelles, législatives et règlementaires. Les missions de ce type seront accomplies sous le contrôle effectif des autorités politiques et parlementaires et soumises à la pleine application du droit. Si le recours à la force ne peut être évité pour le maintien de la sécurité intérieure, l'Etat s'assurera qu'il demeure strictement proportionné aux besoins, de la mission assignée. Les Forces Armées et de Sécurité veilleront instamment à éviter tout préjudice à la population civile et dommage à la propriété privée.
11. Hormis les cas prévus dans les dispositions constitutionnelles, législatives et règlementaires, il ne sera fait en aucun cas recours aux Forces Armées et de Sécurité pour restreindre l'exercice pacifique et légitime des droits individuels et civiques des individus ou des représentants de groupes ou pour les priver de leur identité nationale, religieuse, culturelle, linguistique ou ethnique.
12. Le maintien d'ordre étant essentiellement dévolu aux Forces de Sécurité, il est recommandé de réduire au strict minimum le rôle de l'Armée dans les opérations de maintien de l'ordre.
13. Le métier du militaire doit être considéré. Compte tenu de leur haute qualification, les militaires doivent être intégrés dans la société et les civils doivent leur accorder considération.

Afin de donner une meilleure image de marque du militaire dans notre société qui évolue et se modernise, il est indispensable que l'Etat procède à la valorisation de la Fonction Militaire.

14. Cette évolution et cette modernisation de la société entraînent des besoins croissants de sécurité au dedans et au dehors.

L'Etat devra alors procéder à la modernisation des Forces Armées et de Sécurité et devra doter celle-ci d'équipements performants en rapport avec les nouvelles missions.

15. Une telle valorisation de la Fonction Militaire et la nécessaire modernisation des Forces Armées amèneront l'Etat à élaborer des textes pouvant fixer les droits, les responsabilités, les motivations et les avantages accordés aux Forces Armées et de Sécurité.

16. L'Etat veillera à préserver la neutralité des Forces Armées et de Sécurité dans le jeu politique.

**III. CONCERNANT LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES FORCES ARMEES ET LES POPULATIONS CIVILES, LE SÉMINAIRE :**

1. Les Forces Armées et de Sécurité observeront la plus stricte neutralité politique. Les individus qui les composent exerceront leurs droits civiques dans les limites des restrictions légales.
2. L'ensemble des Forces Armées et de Sécurité sera en toutes circonstances sous l'autorité effective des pouvoirs politiques constitutionnellement établis.
3. Afin de rendre harmonieuse les relations entre les civils et l'ensemble des Forces Armées et de Sécurité et promouvoir la stabilité, des programmes nationaux d'information et de sensibilisation soient organisés afin de créer un climat de confiance réciproque entre l'institution militaire et les populations civiles.
4. A travers les autorités constitutionnelles investies de la légitimité démocratique, la société devra dans tous les cas être en mesure d'exercer un contrôle effectif sur les Forces Armées et de Sécurité.

Ce contrôle pleinement exercé sur les Forces Armées et de Sécurité sera un élément indispensable de stabilité et de sécurité intérieure.

Conscient de la nécessité du contrôle effectif des Forces Armées et de Sécurité par l'autorité civile, une définition claire des missions et le respect strict du cadre constitutionnel en vigueur concernant l'emploi des forces s'imposent en conséquence ainsi que l'observation d'un certain nombre de recommandations :

- la non ingérence des pouvoirs politiques dans la gestion interne et spécifique des domaines militaires ;
- l'application des textes relatifs à la conscription pour favoriser le brassage du corps social au sein de l'institution militaire ;
- l'organisation des débats réguliers entre civils et militaires pour une bonne compréhension mutuelle ;
- par le respect de la neutralité des partis politiques des Forces Armées et de Sécurité et les autres composantes de la société politique des Forces Armées et de Sécurité ;

- des actions de sensibilisation et d'information pour prévenir certains comportements de nature à détériorer les relations entre civils et militaires.
- le séminaire recommande avec insistance l'élaboration d'un code de conduite des Forces Armées en s'inspirant des éléments du présent document.

**IV. S'AGISSANT DE L'ELABORATION DE LA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE, Le séminaire a examiné en premier lieu le schéma directeur et les composantes de la politique de défense dans une société démocratique.**

A l'issue des débats le séminaire a retenu comme éléments constitutifs de cette étude :

- L'étude du projet politique du gouvernement ;
- l'étude des menaces ;
- l'étude des stratégies ;
- les missions générales ;
- les capacités ;
- les moyens, organisation et emploi.

En ce qui concerne les composantes de la défense, le séminaire a noté que la défense étant globale elle comprend la défense militaire et la défense non militaire (aspects socio-économiques et civils) et des stratégies correspondant à chacun de ces domaines.

Ainsi la formulation et la mise en oeuvre d'une politique de défense mettent-elles en présence plusieurs acteurs constitutionnelles :

- le Président de la République
- le Gouvernement
- l'Assemblée Nationale.

Chacun de ces acteurs cités ci-dessus est investi de prérogatives précises.

Le schéma directeur de la politique de défense et les composantes ci-dessus définies devraient permettre d'assurer une meilleure stabilité d'une société démocratique.

En second lieu, le séminaire a examiné :

## V. LES METHODES ET STRATEGIES DE LA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE.

Considérant

1. Au plan international considerant la disparition de la division du monde en deux blocs,
  - La consécration du mécanisme de l'OUA pour la prévention, la gestion le règlement des conflits en Afrique ;
  - L'émergence de modèles démocratiques dans les pays en voie de développement accompagnée de la naissance de nombreux conflits internes poussant les populations vers des espaces plus sereins;
- 2- Au plan national, que le Mali est un pays en voie de développement, avec sept frontières totalisant 5200km de long, une population fortement caractérisée par un phénomène migratoire assez important, un passé récent marqué par un conflit armé et les événements sanglants de mars 1991 qui ont fortement affecté les relations entre civils et militaires;
  - Ces faits et réalités historiques étant des contraintes qui exigent l'élaboration d'une politique de défense nationale conséquente,

Le séminaire recommande:

1. Au Plan interne
  - la définition d'une politique de défense nationale doit viser comme objectif la culture nationale. Elle doit avoir comme objectif final d'assurer de façon harmonieuse le développement socio-économique des populations dans un environnement de paix, de sécurité, de stabilité dans le respect des principes fondamentaux des droits de l'homme;
  - la mise en oeuvre de mesures préventives appropriées afin d'assurer la tranquillité et la protection des personnes et des biens.
  - le respect des droits de l'homme et des principes fondamentaux des droits de la personne humaine, notamment par la mise en oeuvre de programmes éducatifs dans le domaine des droits de l'Homme et de la culture de la paix en direction de la société civile et des forces armées et de sécurité;

- le suivi et l'encouragement des initiatives de la société civile en matière de contrôle et d'évaluation du respect des principes fondamentaux des droits de la personne humaine ;
- le développement d'une stratégie de communication afin d'harmoniser les relations entre civils et militaires.
- la préférence du règlement pacifique au règlement par la violence des conflits internes;
- l'instauration de l'état de droit basé sur les principes d'égalité, de justice et de non exclusion;
- la garantie de l'indépendance du système judiciaire;
- la valorisation de la fonction militaire;
- la mise en oeuvre d'une politique sociale et harmonieuse le long des frontières ;
- le respect des institutions républicaines démocratiquement mises en place;
- renforcement de la démocratie par la mise en place de mécanismes permettant à l'Etat d'être à l'écoute de toutes les composantes de la nation.
- la mise en oeuvre d'une politique de développement économique et social équilibrée des différentes régions et l'accélération du processus de décentralisation ;
- le soutien aux initiatives et aux efforts de la société civile dans le règlement pacifique des conflits internes.

## 2. Au plan externe :

- le respect et la conformité aux obligations constitutionnelles et internationales notamment en matière de Droit de l'homme et du droit International humanitaire;
- le développement d'une politique dynamique de bon voisinage ;
- la conclusion et le respect d'accord de non agression avec les pays voisins;
- l'harmonisation de la politique de défense au niveau de la sous-région;
- Le renforcement de la diplomatie préventive et le règlement pacifique des différends.

Fait à Bamako, le 19 juillet 1996

LE SEMINAIRE

## **Appendix E**

**Excerpts from *La Défense*,  
the Newsletter of the Beninese Armed Forces**



# La Défense

Bulletin d'Informations & d'analyses  
du Ministère de la Défense de la République du Bénin

*Finis les  
prélèvements  
sur salaires et  
les retenues  
sur primes des  
militaires!*

Lire page 8

La Défense N°002 de janvier - février 1997 ■ Prix 200F ■ N° 160 / MISAT / DC/DAI / SCC/ du 21 Janvier 1997

**CE NUMERO EST GRATUIT POUR LES MILITAIRES**

**Dossier**

## **NANGBETO '97 LE PROJET LES FORCES EN PRESENCE LES OBJECTIFS**

Lire page 7





## POUR UNE ARMÉE NATIONALE PLUS PROCHE ET PLUS COMMUNICATIVE

Sévérin Adjovi

**L**e raffermissement et l'enracinement de la démocratie passent par une Armée plus solide, plus communicative, résolument ouverte sur le monde moderne, c'est-à-dire proche d'elle et du peuple.

A l'heure des satellites et de l'Internet, l'information s'impose comme un autre devoir de l'Armée, tout aussi important et impérieux.

Le présent bulletin de liaison vient justement, s'il en était encore besoin, attester de ce devoir, et combler une attente longue de plusieurs années.

Fortement approuvé et encouragé par le Président de la République, son Excellence Mathieu Kérékou, Chef Suprême des Armées et à l'instar de ses précurseurs que sont "Vert et Bleu" et "Voix du combattant" dont les dernières parutions datent de 1988, "La Défense" se veut une courroie de transmission entre les structures spécialisées de la Défense Nationale et les différentes Unités, Casernes, Garnisons, Compagnies, etc..., réparties sur tout le territoire national ; il sera aussi en matière de communication le principal trait d'union entre le citoyen et son Armée.

On comprend donc aisément que ce premier numéro soit pour moi l'occasion d'une humble et double exhortation.

-Officiers, Sous-officiers, Hommes du Rang et Personnels civils des Forces Armées Béninoises, ce Bulletin est le vôtre. Créé pour être le relais permanent de vos profondes aspirations et de vos actions concrètes au profit de la Nation, il sera aussi le témoin de votre mémoire d'hommes en armes.

Autant dire : "La Défense" est votre oeuvre.

-Commerçants, Paysans et Artisans, Conducteurs de Taxi-moto, Elèves et Etudiants, Cadres de tout bord et de toutes catégories professionnelles, etc..., votre Armée vous parlera désormais plus souvent ; elle souhaite que s'instaure entre elle et vous une sincère complicité de communication et de partage de l'information.

Parce que vous tous appréciez très favorablement cette initiative et entendez la soutenir et la rendre pérenne, je me fais le plaisir et le devoir d'exprimer les sincères remerciements du Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées Béninoises à tous nos amis et partenaires qui de près ou de loin, de diverses manières, ont manifesté leur soutien pour la réalisation effective de ce projet.

Qu'il me soit permis ici, au nom du Chef Suprême des Armées, d'assurer chaque Béninoise et chaque Béninois de la totale disponibilité de notre Armée à oeuvrer au renforcement continu de l'Etat de droit chez nous et à prendre une part active dans la construction nationale.

J'y trouve personnellement un défi quotidien et une force pour l'avenir.

Vive les Forces Armées Béninoises !

Vive la Démocratie !

Vive le Bénin !

## Phares s Militaire de

Situé à Bembéréké dans la septentrionale du Bénin, le Prytanée Militaire de Bembéréké est un établissement public d'enseignement secondaire, créé le 27 Mai 1980 et le décret de ratification N° 86 - 154 fut signé le 23 Avril 1986. L'établissement a pour mission d'éduquer et de former les jeunes gens recrutés parmi les meilleurs au Certificat d'Etudes Primaires Élémentaires (CEPE) des carrières militaires, civile et professionnelle. Le Prytanée Militaire de Bembéréké est directement rattaché à l'Etat-Major des Armées.

### Conditions d'admission

Statutairement, le recrutement au Prytanée Militaire de Bembéréké se fait par voie de concours. Ce concours est ouvert à tout jeune Béninois de sexe masculin, âgé de 13 ans au 31 Décembre de l'année du concours et ayant réussi au CEPE.

Mais suite à une décision du gouvernement, le recrutement de cette année a été ouvert autrement. En effet, les premiers élèves reçus au concours dans chaque département remplissant les conditions de candidature ci-dessus citées ont été convoqués. Après la visite médicale, 05 élèves ont été retenus par département et ainsi que la 10<sup>ème</sup> promotion d'Enfants de Troupes a été constituée.

### Conditions d'Etudes et de Vie

Au Prytanée Militaire de Bembéréké, les élèves sont appelés : Enfants de Troupes. L'instruction générale est couplée de l'instruction militaire.

En ce qui concerne l'instruction générale, les Enfants de Troupes reçoivent les cours comme tout élève du secondaire. Ces cours se déroulent tous les jours ouvrables de 08 heures à 12 heures et de 15h à 19h les lundis et vendredis conformément au programme établi par le Directeur des Etudes et de la personnalité de l'établissement.





## **Appendix F**

**Excerpts from *Frères d'Armes*,  
the Malian Armed Forces Quarterly**

*Spécial*

# FRÈRES D'ARMIES

Revue trimestrielle des Forces Armées

Ministère des Forces Armées et des Anciens Combattants

BUREAU DE PRESSE

B.P. 2083 - TEL : 23.25.03 - BAMAKO - MALI

N° 06 - Avril 1995

*Cent seize jours qui*

Prix : 750 FCFA

*re-fondèrent l'armée de la République*



*Notre dossier :*

**Le nouvel arsenal juridique militaire**

**adopté par l'Assemblée Nationale**

## Organisation générale des Forces Armées

*Avoir une armée mieux organisée, plus opérationnelle, est de la plus haute importance pour tout Etat qui se veut moderne. Mais cette organisation dans l'Etat républicain doit obéir aux exigences de légitimité et de légalité constitutionnelles.*



**C'**EST pourquoi la loi portant organisation Générale des Forces Armées sanctionne le

principe de la primauté de l'autorité politique en matière d'organisation des Forces Armées. Elle répartit les compétences entre, d'une part, les différentes autorités politiques au sein de l'exécutif et, d'autre part, entre l'autorité politique et les différentes autorités militaires. Elle détermine par ailleurs avec précision les niveaux d'organisation dans le cadre de l'exécution de la Politique de Défense Nationale, dont la définition relève des prérogatives du Président de la République en vertu de la Constitution et de la loi portant Organisation de la Défense.

### Primauté de l'autorité politique dans l'organisation des Forces Armées

La loi portant Organisation Générale des Forces Armées consacre la primauté de l'autorité politique en son article premier donnant com-

pétence au président de la République pour assurer le haut commandement des Forces Armées. En effet, cet article dispose: *"le Président de la République, chef Suprême des Armées, assure le haut commandement des Forces Armées, composées des Armées de Terre et de l'Air, de la Gendarmerie Nationale et de la Garde Républicaine"*.

En outre, cette loi organise la répartition des compétences entre les différentes autorités politiques intervenant dans la mise en œuvre de la politique de Défense du Mali. C'est ainsi qu'elle dispose en son article 2: *"le Premier Ministre est responsable de la Politique de Défense arrêtée en conseil des Ministres"*. Cependant, il revient, aux termes de l'article 3 de la loi précitée, au Ministre chargé des Forces Armées d'assurer *"l'exécution de la Politique Militaire de Défense"*, son

organisation et sa gestion. Ainsi que *"la mise en condition d'emploi et la mobilisation de l'ensemble des Forces, l'organisation, à la mobilisation et à l'emploi des Forces Armées"*.

Au total, la responsabilité de l'autorité politique est réaffirmée dans la nouvelle loi. Ce texte introduit une innovation, à savoir la répartition nette des compétences en la matière entre le Président de la République, le Premier Ministre et le Ministre chargé des Forces Armées.

### Niveaux d'organisation des Forces Armées

Comment les Forces Armées sont-elles organisées et structurées? Aux termes de l'article 4 de la loi, l'Inspection Générale des Armées, les États-Majors de différents corps des Forces Armées, l'État-Major Général des Armées, de même que les organes d'étude, d'information, de contrôle, et les organismes spécialisés, relèvent du Ministre chargé des Forces Armées. On peut en déduire que celui-ci exerce sur eux l'autorité administrative et politique.

Ainsi, l'État-Major Général des Armées, ceux de la Gendarmerie nationale et de la Garde Nationale, de même que les Officiers supérieurs qui les dirigent, agissent sous



## LOI N° 95-15/AN-RM PORTANT ORGANISATION GENERALE DES FORCES ARMEES

### L'ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,

Vu la Constitution ;

**A DELIBERE ET ADOPTE LA LOI DONT LA TENEUR SUIT :**

**Article 1<sup>er</sup> :** Le Président de la République chef suprême des armées assure le haut commandement des Forces Armées, composées des Armées de Terre, de l'Air, de la Gendarmerie et de la Garde Nationale.

**Article 2 :** Le Premier Ministre est responsable de l'exécution de la politique de défense arrêtée en conseil des Ministres.

**Article 3 :** Sous l'autorité du Premier Ministre, le Ministre chargé des Forces Armées est chargé de l'exécution de la politique militaire de défense et en particulier, de l'organisation, de la gestion, de la mise en condition d'emploi et de la mobilisation de l'ensemble des forces ainsi que de l'infrastructure qui leur est nécessaire.

**Article 4 :** Les forces armées sont organisées comme suit :

#### 1- Au niveau du Ministère Chargé des Forces Armées

- Une Inspection Générale des Forces Armées et Services;
- Un Etat-major Général des Armées ;
- Un Etat-major de la Gendarmerie Nationale ;
- Un Etat-major de la Garde Nationale ;
- Des Organes d'Etudes, d'Information et de contrôle ;
- Des organismes personnalisés.

#### 2- Au niveau de l'Etat-major Général des Armées :

- De l'Etat-major de l'Armées de Terre ;
- De l'Etat-major de l'Armée de l'Air ;
- Des Forces de réserve ;
- Des écoles militaires ;
- Des Organismes de soutien logistique ;

L'organisation et le fonctionnement des composantes des forces armées sont fixés par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres.

**Article 5 :** Les Forces de réserve sont celles dont l'emploi est spécifiquement réservé au chef suprême des armées. Leur détermination fait l'objet d'un décret du Président de la République.

**Article 6 :** En cas de crise ou de guerre les unités de la Gendarmerie Nationale et de la Garde Nationale sont mises à la disposition du Chef d'Etat-major Général des Armées pour emploi.

**Article 7 :** La présente loi qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires notamment celles de l'ordonnance n° 91-082/P - CTSP du 23 janvier 1992, et des lois n° 93-039, n° 93-040, n° 93-041, n° 93-042, n° 93-043 du 04 août 1994 sera enregistrée et publiée au Journal Officiel.

Fait et délibéré en Séance Publique  
Bamako, le 16 février 1995  
Le Secrétaire de séance,  
**Mahamadou M'BAYE**  
Le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale,  
**Professeur Ali Nouhoum DIALLO**

## Organisation générale des Forces Armées ( suite )

la direction et le contrôle du Ministre des Forces Armées.

Quant à l'Etat-Major général des Armées, il supervise et coordonne l'organisation de chacun des Etats-Majors qui le composent : Armée de Terre, Armée de l'Air. Les Forces de réserve, les écoles militaires et les organismes de soutien logistique entrent également dans le champ d'organisation de l'Etat-Major Général des Armées.

La loi renvoie la détermination des modalités d'organisation et de fonctionnement des composantes des Forces Armées à un décret adopté en Conseil des Ministres. Le législateur a sans doute voulu en laisser le soin au pouvoir réglementaire, mieux outillé pour traiter cette question à caractère essentiellement technique et pratique.

Outre la répartition des compétences et la détermination de différents niveaux d'organisation qu'elle aménage, la loi définit la notion de Forces de réserve, dont l'emploi dépend du pouvoir discrétionnaire du président de la République. Elle détermine également les conditions dans lesquelles les unités de la Gendarmerie Nationale et de la Garde Nationale peuvent être mises à la disposition du chef d'Etat-Major Général des Armées. Il s'agit essentiellement de situations de "crise ou de guerre".

Toutefois, il n'est pas précisé ce qu'il faut entendre par "crise".

## Organisation générale de la Défense Nationale ( suite )

a autorité sur l'ensemble des unités stationnées sur son territoire.

Le cas échéant, il peut être institué un nouveau découpage territorial en **théâtres d'opérations**. Ces derniers pouvant coïncider géographiquement avec une ou plusieurs zone(s) de défense. Ils peuvent aussi, à leur tour, comporter plusieurs **secteurs opérationnels**. Chaque théâtre d'opération est placé sous l'autorité d'un **Commandant en chef**. Et chaque secteur est confié à un officier qui prend le titre de **Commandant opérationnel**.

Le Commandant en Chef du théâtre d'opération, désigné par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres, est investi des pouvoirs relatifs :

- à la défense civile
- à la sécurité des troupes
- à l'utilisation des services, personnes et biens nécessaires
- à la conduite des opérations.

Il est donc institué une chaîne opérationnelle de la défense dirigée par le président de la République comprenant les organes opérationnels suivants :

- l'Etat-Major Général des Armées
- les Commandants Supérieurs Interarmées
- les Commandants en chef
- les Commandants Opérationnels