Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their implementation in Europe

STUDY

EN 2011
The report maps the diffusion of electoral gender quotas in the 30 EU/EEA countries. In 21 of the countries some type of gender quotas are in use, either legislated or voluntary party quotas. The report evaluates the effectiveness of different quota types in different electoral systems. Some gender quotas have resulted in major leaps in women’s representation, while others had led to almost no change.

The conclusion is that in order to be effective in changing women’s historical under-representation electoral gender quotas have to fit the electoral system and should include regulations about the rank order of women and men on the electoral lists as well as sanctions for non-compliance.

In general, the report reveals a mixed picture in Europe when it comes to women’s representation. This updated version of the 2008-study (PE 408.309) shows that women’s parliamentary representation increased only from 23.6 % in 2008 to 24.7% in 2011. In the most recent parliamentary election in 13 of the countries as well as in the election to the European Parliament women’s representation increased, but ten countries experienced stagnation and in seven for the countries women’s share of the MPs dropped. Eight case studies on Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom are included in the report.
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Gender Equality.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is an updated version of the 2008-study (PR 408.309).

The report maps the diffusion of electoral gender quotas in the 30 European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) countries and lists the many different types of quotas in use. The arguments for and against quotas are studied, and the implementation and effect of gender quotas are investigated. The report shows that six member states in the EU/EEA have introduced gender quotas by law – most recently Poland – and that in more than half of the EU/EEA countries some of the political parties have adopted voluntary party quotas for their electoral lists.

Updated in-depth case studies have been conducted of eight countries, five with legislated gender quotas – Belgium, France, Poland, Slovenia and Spain – and three with voluntary gender quotas – Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The result of a 2008 questionnaire, which was sent to all political parties in the EU/EEA countries, illuminates some attitudinal differences concerning gender quotas among the responding parties (the PARQUOTA Survey).

The report shows that gender quotas have led to rapid increases in women’s representation in some cases but also to less successful results in other cases. The main conclusion is that, in order to be effective, a quota system must be compatible with the electoral system in place and that quota rules – for example, of 30 or 40 per cent women on electoral lists – must be supplemented with rules concerning rank order as well as – in the case of legislated quotas – effective legal sanctions. The report also shows that while the last years have seen a general increase in the number of women in decision-making in Europe, the increase is small – from 23.6 per cent in 2008 to 24.7 per cent in 2011. Thus, women continue to be a minority in the political spheres, and political power still rests in the hands of men.

Quotas are one among many measures for increasing women’s political representation. In general, the political parties are the gatekeepers to gender balance in political decision making because they control ‘the secret garden of nominations’.

The study ends with eight recommendations for future action.

- **Recommendation 1**

  All political parties should adopt specific action plans for the recruitment of women and other under-represented groups based on an analysis of the causes of this under-representation. The action plans should focus on ways to achieve balanced participation and representation of women and men both in internal political party offices and elected bodies.

- **Recommendation 2**

  Political parties and women’s organizations as well as other stakeholders should develop tools for gender monitoring of nominations and elections.
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- **Recommendation 3**
  Requirements for gender-balance on candidate selection committees should be accounted for.

- **Recommendation 4**
  With or without gender quotas, multiple measures should be applied, such as capacity building programs, a system of mentoring for inexperienced new members, family oriented meetings hours, support to women’s organizations, recommendations and targets with specific goals according to the choice of the political party in order to redress the problem of women’s under-representation in politics.

- **Recommendation 5**
  In the promotion of a more balanced gender representation, party selectors should take ethnicity into account. Likewise, in the pursuit of a more balanced representation in terms of ethnicity, gender is to be accounted for.

- **Recommendation 6**
  If gender quotas are applied, they must be compatible with the electoral system in use in order to be effective.

- **Recommendation 7**
  If gender quotas are applied, clear criteria for quota implementation, such as placement mandates or rank-ordering rules, should be stipulated. In systems with legislated quotas, legal sanctions for non-compliance, such as strong financial penalties or rejection of lists must be allowed for. The rejection of lists is to be preferred, since large parties might neglect financial penalties. When voluntary party quotas are adopted, the central party organization must make a “contract” with local party organization or other relevant body about the practical implementation of the quota regulation.

- **Recommendation 8**
  If legislated quotas are applied, electoral authorities should be mandated to administer, supervise and control the implementation of the gender quota laws. Money should be made available for research on the implementation and effect of gender quotas.
SECTION A: MAPPING AND CROSS-COUNTRY/ CROSS-PARTY ANALYSES

1. MAPPING OF ELECTORAL GENDER QUOTAS: FREQUENCY AND TYPES

Introduction

Until recently, Europe was not in the forefront of the new global trend to adopt electoral gender quotas in order to change women’s historical under-representation in politics. During the last decade, however, many new measures have been adopted also in a European context. Legislated gender quotas, voluntary party quotas written into party statutes, as well as many ‘soft’ quota provisions such as recommendations and targets have now been introduced in order to achieve gender balance in political assemblies.

Electoral gender quotas by law have now been introduced in about half of the countries in the world. In 40-50 additional countries some political parties represented in parliament have written voluntary party quotas into their statutes (<http://www.quotaproject.org>).

Today, women constitute 19 per cent of the members of all the world’s parliaments. In Europe, in 1998, 15 per cent of the parliamentary seats were occupied by women, and today, more than ten years later, the figure has only increased to 22 per cent. In terms of regional averages, a process of convergence is taking place between most major regions of the world. For a very long time the Nordic countries and the Netherlands were alone at the very top of the world rank order in terms of women’s political representation, but this is no longer the case. Most of the countries that today are able to challenge the position of the Nordic countries and the Netherlands have introduced some type of electoral gender quota, as has happened in Argentina, Belgium, Costa Rica, Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa and Spain – countries that have all passed the 30 per cent threshold. In all, 24 countries have 30 per cent or more women in their lower or single house, against only five in 1998. However, some countries have experienced drop in women’s representation.

This report investigates the adoption of electoral gender quotas, their implementation and their effects on women’s political representation. It consists of two sections. Section A is a mapping and cross-country/cross-party analysis of the use of gender quotas in the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. This section has three themes: first, a mapping of the adoption of electoral gender quotas; second, an analysis of the arguments used in the quota debates; and, third, a study of the implementation of gender quotas and their possible effects.

Section B contains eight case studies, covering Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). For a discussion of the selection of these cases, see appendix I on the methodology of the study. The catalogue of questions for all the case studies includes the following.

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1 The European members of the OSCE (<http://www.ipu.org>).
2 The following countries are included in this study: the 27 EU member states – Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – and the three EEA members – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
1. What are the dominant arguments used in favour of and against the implementation of quotas?

2. What types of quota regulations are in use, what do they entail, what levels of election do they target and how compatible are they with the electoral system in use?

3. To what extent are quota regulations, if any, implemented? Are there any placement mandates, e.g. rules about the rank order of women and men on the electoral lists; are there sanctions for non-compliance and/or law enforcement bodies?

4. To what extent has the under-representation of women belonging to ethnic minorities as well as immigrant women been identified as a problem at a national level, and what measures have been introduced to address this issue?

The sources on which this analysis is based thus consist of the eight in-depth country studies plus data collected on the use of quotas in all the EU/EEA countries. Further, a questionnaire was sent to all the political parties in these countries asking questions about their actual use of quotas and other measures to increase women’s political representation and their attitudes towards such measures, the PARQUOTA survey (see appendix I on the methodology). This report will also refer to studies by other researchers on gender quotas around the world and to our own previous research (see the list of references at the end of section A).

In Europe, as in the rest of the world, women are still under-represented in political decision-making assemblies. But many initiatives have started to promote an increase in women’s representation in politics. Since 1994 six countries in the EU/EEA have introduced legislated (also called legal) electoral gender quotas into their constitutions and/or electoral laws – most recently Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Poland. In many other European countries, political parties have introduced voluntary party quotas for their own electoral lists, as this report will show. However, the PARQUOTA Survey, which was returned by 80 political parties (see appendix I), also shows that even among political parties that do not use gender quotas many have instead introduced recommendations and guidelines or have otherwise worked actively to increase women’s political representation in political assemblies and within the parties’ own organizations. However, there are political parties that are doing very little or nothing to improve women’s representation.

The focus of this study is on the introduction of gender quota provisions for electoral lists, written down in the law or in individual parties’ statutes. Consequently the many other types of measure to increase women’s representation, sometimes labelled ‘soft quotas’, are not the subject of investigation in this report, even if they may be of considerable importance.

1.1. International recommendations

Today, the international community recommends that a number of measures be taken in order to promote a more balanced representation of men and women in decision-making bodies. This shift in equality policy towards affirmative action policies is supported by the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), according to which countries that have acceded have to report regularly on their progress, and by the UN World Conferences for Women. These

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3 This definition corresponds to the one we have used for the global website on quotas, <http://www.quotaproject.org>.
documents have been important for policies in this area, nationally and internationally, and for legitimating the demands for gender balance in politics put forward by women’s organizations.

Article 3 of CEDAW requires that states take “all appropriate measure, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality of men.” Further, Article 4 of CEDAW makes clear that measures taken by states to ensure the de facto equality of women “shall not be considered discrimination...but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards.”

One of the 12 objectives of the Beijing Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference for Women in 1995, was formulated as women’s equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision making. There is a clearly stated aim in the document to achieve gender balance in the nomination process as well as in all decision-making processes. The Platform talks about ‘discriminatory attitudes and practices’ and ‘unequal power relations’, thus shifting the focus from women’s (lack of) resources to the practice of political institutions and political parties. Consequently, affirmative strategies are recommended, even if the controversial word ‘quotas’ was not mentioned.

Gender balance in decision making is a stated goal of the European Union, and recommendations for the introduction of legislated, regulatory and incentive measures to redress the under-representation of women in decision making have since long back been adopted by the major EU institutions. The European Commission’s road map for equality between men and women for 2006–10 included the promotion of equal representation of women and men in decision making as one of the six priority areas for action – all within the framework of the recognition of equality between women and men as one of the fundamental principles of the Community, laid down in the treaties ever since the Amsterdam Treaty’s. The Commission’s ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’ states as one of its key actions that the Commission will: ‘Consider targeted initiatives to improve the gender balance in decision making’. Also the European Parliament has supported active measures to increase women representation in order to ‘strengthen democracy’, a notion known from the Beijing Platform for Action (indicate the EP resolution). The expert network, ‘Women in Decision-Making’ was during the 1990s very important for creating a favourable atmosphere for what was later formulated into a demand for ‘parity democracy’, among others by the European Women’s Lobby (Kantola 2010).

The Council of Europe has also been very active in this field. It’s Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 on balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision making calls for ‘positive action measures’. The principle of equal participation of women and men in political life was reaffirmed by the Council of

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4 See, for instance, Recommendation 96/694/EC on the balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process, from the European Commission, 1996.
5 Strictly speaking one cannot ‘improve gender balance’, which is either there or not. As the strategy plan rightly states gender balance is far from achieved.
6 The forth indicator adopted by the Council of the European Union pertaining to the strategic objective of "taking measures to ensure women’s equal access to and full participation in power structure and decision making” concerns politics to promote a balanced participation of women and men in political elections. In Beijing +5: The Platform for Action and the European Union: Report from the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2009), special measures in the form of general goals/targets, minimum recommendations or gender quotas that regulate the composition of the list of candidates put forward for election are suggested measures of improving the gender balance amongst candidates.
7 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 of the Committee Council of Ministers on balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision making, 12 March 2003; see also Sineau 2003.
Europe’s Committee of Ministers in its Declaration “Making Gender Equality a Reality” (CM(2009)68), where member states are urged to “enable positive action or special measures to be adopted in order to achieve balanced participation, including representation, of women and men in decision-making in all sectors of society, in particular in the labour market and in economic life as well as in political and public decision-making.”

More recently, in Recommendation 1899(2010), entitled “Increasing women’s representation in politics through the electoral system”, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe encourages the member states to increase women’s representation by introducing quotas.

1.2. Constitutional reform and rejection

In several countries in the world, gender quotas have been adopted at times of constitutional reform. Actors involved in quota campaigns, including civil society actors, state actors and transnational actors, have many times utilised the rewriting of constitutions and other constitutional reforms as a window of opportunity to push for quotas to be introduced. This is a fairly common trajectory in post-conflict countries.

In other instances, existing constitutions have been used to resist or overturn quotas. In France, for example, the National Assembly in 1982 voted in favour of the introduction of gender quotas in local elections as part of a bill on municipal electoral reform. It was decided that lists of candidates should not include more than 75 per cent of candidates of the same sex. The quota provision was, however, declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council, which reviewed the bill, on the grounds that article 3 of the constitution and article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen promoted the principle of equality before the law and precluded any type of categorization of voters and candidates (see the case study on France).

In the light of this court ruling, campaigns for quotas in the 1980s and 1990s revolved around the existing principle of equality and the normative implications of reform. While proponents of quotas argued the need for constitutional reform, opponents referred to the legal precedent. When the constitution was amended in 1999, with the phrase ‘The law favours the equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions’, and the principle of partité was specified in the Electoral Law in 2000, advocates had carefully separated the demand for parity from the demand for quotas and created a link between the proposed reform and the goals of French republicanism (Constitutional Law no. 99-569 and Law no. 2000-493).

In the UK, as another example, the Labour Party’s policy from 1993 on all-women short lists (AWS), which compelled certain electoral districts to consider shortlists comprising women only, was declared illegal by an Industrial Tribunal in 1996. In this case, two male party members who had tried to obtain nomination in districts designated for AWS claimed that their exclusion from candidate selection violated the Sex Discrimination Act and brought the case to the Industrial Tribunal in Leeds. The Tribunal ruled in favour of the two men, since the policy of AWS did not allow men to be considered as candidates in these districts. In 2002, however, the policy was reintroduced when the Sex Discrimination Bill was approved, permitting parties to apply positive action without risking legal challenge when selecting candidates for election to the House of Commons, the European Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly of Wales and local councils.

Also in other countries in the world we have seen courts cases against quotas for elections. The European Court of Justice has not ruled in any case on electoral gender quotas;
since electoral systems are decided by the nation states; but the courts have ruled in several cases dealing with the use of quotas and affirmative action in the labour market with uneven results.

### 1.3. Mapping the use of gender quotas

Table 1 provides an overview of women’s representation in national assemblies in the EU/EEA countries. Since 2008, two more countries, Iceland and the Netherlands have joined Sweden and Finland over the 40 per cent line. The table shows that in most of the countries that have crossed the 30 per cent threshold (most recently Belgium and Spain) some type of quota provision is in use, in the form either of legislated quotas or of voluntary party quotas. Furthermore, the table shows that most of the countries with a high percentage of women in their parliaments apply a proportional representation (PR) electoral system. This is a global tendency. Women’s representation in parliaments in the world is around twice as high in countries with PR electoral systems than in countries that use majority/plurality electoral systems (Norris 2006).

Table 1. Women’s representation in national parliaments in the EU/EEA countries: level of representation, quota type and electoral system (lower house or unicameral parliament)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women’s representation (latest election)</th>
<th>Type of quota</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>45.0% (2010)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>42.9% (2009)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>42.5% (2011)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>40.7% (2010)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 – 30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>39.6% (2009)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>39.3% (2010)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>37.4% (2007)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>36.3% (2008)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32.8% (2009)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 – 20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>27.3% (2008)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>26.5% (2011)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>25.0% (2009)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>24.0% (2009)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>22.0% (2010)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>22.0% (2010)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Representation</th>
<th>Quota Type</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>21.3% (2008)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20.8% (2009)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>20.4% (2007)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>19.0% (2010)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>18.8% (2011)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18.5% (2007)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>TRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>17.7% (2008)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17.3% (2009)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>15.3% (2010)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>15.1% (2011)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>STV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>13.3% (2008)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>11.4% (2008)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>10.7% (2011)</td>
<td>No quotas</td>
<td>List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9.1% (2010)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>8.7% (2008)</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>STV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average women’s representation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Italy had a legislated quota for the National assembly 1987 - 2001.

*b No general election has yet been held in Poland since the new quota law.

*c The Irish government has announced a bill of legislated quota of 30% with financial penalties for parties who do not reach the proportion of women candidates.

**Electoral systems**


**Key to quotas:**

Legislated quotas (also called legal quotas) are written into constitutions and/or electoral laws. Party quotas are voluntary measures adopted by individual political parties. If at least one party represented in the national parliament uses quotas for its electoral lists, the country is listed here as a country with voluntary party quotas. Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011, <http://www.ipu.org>; International IDEA and Stockholm University, 2011, <http://www.quotaproject.org>; official statistics, election-day figures – i.e. changes that have occurred after Election Day – are not included, which explains some discrepancies between this table and <http://www.ipu.org>.
Table 1 maintains that, of the 30 EU/EEA countries, six – Belgium, France, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and most recently Poland – have introduced quotas by law that are binding for all political parties. In 15 of the countries, at least one of the political parties represented in parliament has written electoral gender quotas into its statutes, which is the definition used in this study for a country with voluntary party quotas for elections. In nine of the countries, no gender quotas are in use for national elections⁹. Table 1 reveals that some type of gender quota for public elections is in use in a majority of the EU/EEA countries.

However, the table also shows that gender quotas are not a necessary condition for a high level of female representation, as the cases of Finland and Denmark indicate. Nor are quotas a sufficient condition for a high representation of women. As this report will show, the specific design of the quota system is crucial for the successful implementation of quotas.

All in all, nine countries have more than 30 per cent women in their parliament (single or lower chamber). That is in fact one less over the 30 per cent line than in 2008! As the January 2008 report from the Slovenian EU Presidency already showed, the general picture is a mixed one (Antíc Gaber 2008). It is important to understand that women’s political representation does not increase in any linear way by some historical necessity. Table 2 gives an overview over increase, stagnation and decrease during the last parliamentary elections in the EU/EEA countries (single or lower chambers).

⁹ This in 2011 report, in contrast to the 2008 version, a written quota rule among at least one political party represented in parliament places the country in the category with voluntary party quotas. In the 2008 version the demand was at least one of the three largest parties represented in parliament. This change of criterion, however, had little effect on the placement of the countries in table 1.
Table 2. Latest parliament renewals – increase, stagnation or decrease?

*Women in national parliaments and the European parliament in the two most recent elections (change in per cent units)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries with increase</th>
<th>Countries with stagnation*</th>
<th>Countries with decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iceland +11.2</td>
<td>Denmark +0.5</td>
<td>Estonia -5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic +6.5</td>
<td>Finland +0.5</td>
<td>Austria -4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France +6.2</td>
<td>Spain +0.3</td>
<td>Cyprus -3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg +5.0</td>
<td>Bulgaria 0.0</td>
<td>Lithuania -2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European parliament +4.7</td>
<td>Latvia 0.0</td>
<td>Sweden -2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands +4.0</td>
<td>Liechtenstein 0.0</td>
<td>Hungary -1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy +4.0</td>
<td>Poland 0.0</td>
<td>Portugal +1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium +2.6</td>
<td>Romania -0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom +2.2</td>
<td>Malta: -0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland +1.8</td>
<td>Slovakia -0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece +1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway +1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2005: 37.9 – 2009: 39.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia +1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany +1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2005: 31.8 – 2009: 32.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The category, stagnation includes all countries with a change below one percent between the two most recent election*


Table 2 shows a mixed picture. The European Parliament experienced an increase in women’s representation of 4.7 per cent units. Thirteen countries had an increase in women’s parliamentary representation at their last election. In ten countries we saw stagnation, and in seven countries the share of women among those elected actually fell. The recent electoral success of Extreme Right Wing parties with few women in their parliamentary fraction is one factor which for instance in Sweden contributed to this decrease. In some countries like Portugal the decrease at the recent election came after a large increase in the previous election, in the Portuguese case of 6.5 per cent units.
Quotas at different levels

Electoral gender quotas are not only used at the national level for parliaments but are also applied in local, regional and autonomous state elections and in elections to the European Parliament. The extent to which gender quotas are used at different levels by the eight case study countries is mapped in figure 1. As demonstrated by this mapping, the specific quota regulations adopted in countries with legislated quotas apply to all levels of election. France is an exception to this rule.

In Italy, previous quota laws for national parliament have been abolished, but in 2004 legislated quotas were introduced for the Italian election to the European Parliament. In some cases quota laws have been adopted sequentially. This was the case in Slovenia, where legislated quotas were first introduced for elections to the European Parliament and not until later for other elections (this is further discussed in the case study on Slovenia). In the case of voluntary party quotas, a party will usually apply a quota rule to its lists in elections at all levels\(^{10}\). However, some local elections are not based on political party lists to the same extent as national and regional elections, which may limit the effect of quota rules adopted by a central party organization.

**Figure 1. Mapping of gender quotas at different electoral levels: the eight case studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislated/ party quotas</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National elections (single/ lower house)</th>
<th>State/ autonomous region elections</th>
<th>Regional elections</th>
<th>Local elections</th>
<th>Elections to the European Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France(^a)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas(^a)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland(^b)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas (varies)</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td>Party quotas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Denmark is an exception because gender quotas were abolished there after being in use for only a few years, and were never applied to elections at all levels. The Social Democratic Party applied gender quotas only for elections to the European Parliament and only during the years 1988–96. The Socialist People’s Party used gender quotas for elections the national Parliament and for local councils during the period 1983–90, and for elections to the European Parliament during 1983–90. In both parties gender quotas were abolished because they were no longer considered necessary. However, in the last ten years the previous steady increase in women’s representation in Denmark has stagnated at the national, regional and local levels (Freidenvall et al. 2006).
Note: Following the definition used in table 1, a country is listed as having voluntary party quotas if at least one of
the parties represented in the parliament uses quotas for its electoral lists.

* At the local level the French parité law is only obligatory for municipalities with over 3,500 inhabitants. Further, the
parité law is only obligatory for the regional assemblies (26 regions) but not for the general councils (conseils
généraux) of the 3,966 cantons
* No general election has yet been held in Poland since the new quota law.

Sources: the eight case studies

Other types of gender quotas for appointed positions in decision-making assemblies are
also in use in Europe: (a) legislation or regulations concerning the gender composition of
public committees and boards were introduced in the Nordic countries in the 1980s and in
many other countries since then; (b) legislation in order to achieve gender balance in
committees and executives in local politics was adopted in Finland and Norway in the 1990s
and most recently in Spain; and (c) legislation demanding a certain minimum of women in
the boards of public and private companies was first passed in Norway, followed in 2011 by
France.

1.4. Types of gender quotas

Quotas in politics may be defined as an affirmative measure that establishes a fixed
percentage or number for the nomination or representation of a specific group – in this
case women – most often in the form of a minimum percentage, which may be 20, 30 or
40 (Dahlerup 2006: 19). Quotas are generally used to increase the participation of under-
represented groups in decision-making positions, for example, in parliaments, governments

It is also common for parties and governments to adopt different forms of targets,
recommendations or guidelines regarding gender balance in representative bodies, called
’soft quotas’ (Dahlerup 2006: 21; Krook et al. 2006: 199–200). These can be defined as a
less strict form of quota requirement. The guidelines could involve, for example, targets
regarding when and how a certain percentage should be reached (Dahlerup 2006: 21).
Some researchers talk about just three types of electoral gender quotas, namely reserved
seats legislated quotas and voluntary party quotas. (Norris 2004: 190; Lovenduski 2005a:
94) However, a closer analysis will show that many more types are in use today.

1.4.1. Two dimensions of quota systems

So far, this report has operated with just two types of electoral gender quotas, following
the most important distinction, between legislated quotas for all parties and voluntary party
quotas. This may be labelled the first dimension (Dahlerup 2006: 19; Dahlerup and
Freidenvall 2009). The first dimension concerns where the quotas system is mandated – in
the constitution/the electoral law or in party statutes, as table 1 has illustrated. *Legislated
candidate quotas* are included in the constitution and/or electoral laws of a country, and
they target the gender composition of the electoral lists of all political parties, for instance,
requiring a certain minimum of women candidates. *Voluntary party quotas* are adopted
voluntarily by political parties and take the form of internal party requirements to nominate
at least a minimum number or percentage of women for elected office.

However, there is a second dimension. This second dimension concerns the *level of the
selection and nomination process* on which gender quotas are used. A quota system may
aim to change the gender composition of: (a) the pool of potential candidates, called the
aspirants; (b) the candidates that stand for election; and/or (c) those elected (Dahlerup
2006: 19). Figure 2 illustrates various combinations of these two dimensions. The
eight case countries are placed in this figure according to type of quota.

**Figure 2. Quotas in different stages of the nomination process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandated by/level</th>
<th>Aspirants</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislated quotas (constitution or electoral laws)</td>
<td>Quotas for primaries</td>
<td>Candidate quotas</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary party quotas</td>
<td>Aspirant quotas (shortlists)</td>
<td>Candidate quotas</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*: Voluntary party quotas: a country is listed as having voluntary party quotas if at least one of the parties represented in the parliament uses quotas for its electoral lists.


The first step in the electoral selection process is to find aspirants to be considered for nomination, either through primary elections or by nomination committees and other parts of the party organization. In this step, gender quotas are designed as a requirement that a certain number or percentage of women or of either sex be represented among the pool of candidates under discussion. These kinds of quotas are often dubbed aspirant or primary quotas and have been used in countries with plurality/majority electoral systems (Sawer 2006). Such quota provisions may be legally mandated, as with the primaries in Panama, or voluntary, as in the case of the British Labour Party, as illustrated in figure 2.

In the second step in the selection process, political parties nominate and place candidates on their party lists for public election. A common form of quota rule is that a certain minimum percentage of female candidates must be placed on the parties’ lists, for example, 20, 30, 40 or even 50 per cent; but it can also be formulated in a gender-neutral way. This is primarily used in countries with PR electoral systems. Again, candidate quotas may be legally mandated, as in France, Slovenia, Spain, Belgium and Poland, or voluntary, as in Sweden and Germany as illustrated in the middle column of figure 2. Often voluntary party quotas have been the first step, usually introduced by Green parties, Social Democrats and Left Socialists. Legislated quotas might follow when the idea has become more generally accepted as in the cases of Slovenia, Spain, Belgium and Poland, who all started out with voluntary party quotas.

In the third step, which targets those elected, quotas take the form of reserved seats. Regulated in the constitution or electoral law, a certain number or percentage of seats is reserved for women members in the country’s legislature. Increasingly today, reserved seats are subject to election, usually elected by a special electorate or by an additional vote, as in the cases of Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, as well as in India and Bangladesh at the local level\(^{11}\). Reserved seats are mostly found in countries in Asia and the Middle East and in post-conflict countries in Africa (Matland 2006: 286; Dahlerup 2006: 294, table 14.1; Krook 2009). In the EU/EEA countries, reserved seats for women are not used. However,

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\(^{11}\) Even if reserved seats are normally written into the constitution or into the electoral laws, in Morocco political parties have adopted a special form of reserved seats, reserving all 30 places on a national list, elected nationwide for women candidates after the Constitutional Court had ruled the quota law unconstitutional (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2009: 4).
some European countries, such as Poland, Denmark and Croatia, have adopted reserved seats for minorities. Voluntary party quotas at the candidate level are the most commonly used quota type in EU/EEA countries.

Knowledge of different electoral quota systems shows that the result of a specific system is partly dependent on how compatible it is with the electoral system (Norris 2004; Dahlerup 2006; Matland 2006; Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2009).

1.4.2. Quotas for women or gender-neutral quotas?

Quotas can be designed as gender-specific or gender-neutral. Quotas for women require a minimum number or percentage of women. Gender-neutral quota provisions set a minimum and maximum for both sexes, typically no more than 60 per cent and no less than 40 per cent of positions for either sex. In the case of gender-neutral quota provisions, the quota sets a maximum for both sexes, which quotas for women do not (Dahlerup 2005: 142).

In countries with a high level of female parliamentarians, such as the Scandinavian countries, gender-neutral quotas have in a few cases led to men moving up on lists in order to fulfill the quota provisions (Freidenvall et al. 2006: 69).

1.5. Electoral systems and quota design

Depending on the electoral system in use, quotas have different designs and are used in different steps of the nomination process (Larserud and Taphorn 2007).

1.5.1. Quotas in proportional representation electoral systems

In countries with PR electoral systems, candidate quotas are most often used for the party lists (the candidate stage), either voluntarily by the political parties or compulsorily by legal requirement. Candidate quotas are found in several countries in the EU/EEA, most commonly adopted voluntarily by the political parties (see table 1). In the EU/EEA countries the quota provision varies from 25 per cent up to 50 per cent. The most common percentage globally is 30 per cent for voluntary party quotas (<http://www.quotaproject.org>).

In general, it is easier to construct a quota system that is compatible with a PR electoral system, since it is possible to introduce a greater number of candidates on party lists and since parties consciously try to balance their lists in order to win seats. Voluntary party quotas, for example, are used in Sweden and Germany, where some of the political parties have adopted different regulations to ensure that a certain number of female candidates are placed on the party lists. This is further described in the case studies. In Belgium legislated candidate quotas are applied in its PR system, as discussed in the case study on Belgium. Worldwide, legislated quotas vary between 10 and 50 per cent. In Europe (the Council of Europe's 47 countries), the variation is from 15 per cent (Armenia) to 30 per cent (Bosnia and Herzegovina) to 50 per cent (Belgium and France). In the 30 EU/EEA countries, legislated gender quotas vary between 50 per cent and 33 per cent (Portugal).

1.5.2. Quotas in plurality/majority and mixed electoral systems

In general, it is much more complicated to construct gender quotas that are appropriate for single-member constituency electoral systems (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, forthcoming).
Only one-third of the countries around the world with plurality/majority electoral systems have introduced some sort of gender quota, as compared to four-fifths of the countries with PR systems (Dahlerup 2007: 80–1).

In most plurality/majority systems the parties only select one candidate per party and electoral district, and, consequently, it is not possible to introduce both men and women at the same time, as in a PR system. Instead, quotas can be introduced at the aspirant stage of the nomination process.

An example of aspirant quotas that is often cited is the previously contested model introduced by the British Labour Party called ‘all-women’s shortlists’. A shortlist consists of the pool of potential candidates from which the party chooses the actual candidate. The all-women’s shortlists only include female potential candidates and were in the start to be applied in half of the ‘safe’ Labour seats where an MP has retired and also in half of the target marginal seats. Another quota type, which can be placed between the categories of aspirant quotas and candidate quotas, is the successful ‘twinning system’ applied by the Scottish Labour Party. It involved two electoral districts together selecting one man and one woman, respectively, in order to achieve balanced representation. This model was used in first election to the Scotland’s parliamentary in 1999 (see the case study on United Kingdom). In countries that combine a plurality/majority electoral system with proportional representation lists (mixed systems), party quotas have usually only been applied to the list-based elections, as in the case of Germany. However, thanks to the ‘twinning system’, the Scottish Labour Party did have its greatest number of women MPs elected from the single-member constituency part of the election, which is rather unusual.

The radical quota law in France, called the ‘parité law’ (parité means equality or balance, parity), requiring gender balance among all the candidates from a political party, was a great disappointment in the elections to the National Assembly, as it resulted in only 12.3 per cent women being elected in the first election with parité in 2002 and 18.5 per cent in the 2007 election. Elections to the National Assembly are based on a plurality/majority system with two rounds. In contrast, the law was a success at the local level, where it applies to municipalities with more than 3,500 inhabitants elected in PR systems. The plurality of quota systems in use is described in the case study on France.

1.6. Political parties as gatekeepers

Many studies fail to take into account that not only countries but even political parties within individual countries differ in the proportion of women in their parliamentary fractions. Parties vary in terms of how many women they nominate, where they place women on party lists and in which electoral districts they promote female candidates, as well as in the proportion of women representing them in elected bodies. Moreover, parties differ with regard to their internal rules for the selection of female candidates, ranging from no rules at all to general goals and targets to voluntary quotas (Lovenduski 2005b; Norris 2006). The selection and nomination process is sometimes called ‘the secret garden of nomination’; this refers to the fact that most often voters have very little knowledge of how the candidates they can choose between have emerged. Even in open list systems where voters are able to choose between candidates, they do so only after political parties have limited their options. Thus, parties are the real gatekeepers to public decision-making bodies (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

During all the stages of the nomination process (see figure 2), political parties play a very important role in the work of equalizing the political representation of women and men.
The voters may decide how many mandates a party receives, but it is the political parties that are the most decisive factor in deciding who receives the mandates, even in most open list systems.

Party ideology influences the adoption of formal rules for women’s political representation. Studies have shown that voluntary candidate quotas are most common in parties on the left of the political spectrum, including social democratic, labour, communist, socialist and green parties. International Socialist Women, an organization of social democratic women, has successfully campaigned for gender quotas in both Western and Eastern/Central Europe. However, while left ideology once had a strong influence on women’s political representation and on the adoption of quotas, the support for female candidates has spread across the ideological spectrum, and gender quotas or ‘soft quotas’ have also been used by parties oriented towards the centre and right (Norris 2004: 198; Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 1999).

Another aspect that needs to be taken into account is the process of imitation, or contagion. Political scientists Richard Matland and Donley T. Studlar (1996) argue that support for gender quotas is diffused across parties due to a process of contagion: Once one party has introduced a new policy, this triggers a process by which other parties may feel forced to follow suit. Over time, as each party reacts to an electoral threat from close political competitors, the perceived need to nominate women will lead to more or less all the parties on the political spectrum complying with the new norms in order to demonstrate their commitment to equal rights. This seems to be a general trend, however, not without exceptions.

2. QUOTAS – A HOTLY DEBATED ISSUE

At the same time as the introduction of gender quotas is spreading rapidly across the world and is raising hopes for increases in women’s political representation, quotas are also meeting fierce resistance. Not all women support quotas, not even all feminists; and men are also divided on the issue. As the case studies show, opinions vary in terms of effects and repercussions but also concerning the meaning of key concepts in political analysis, such as ‘equality’, ‘representation’ and ‘rights’.

2.1. Arguments for and against quotas

Some of the most common arguments for and against quotas are listed below.

Arguments against quotas

- Political representation is about the representation of ideas and interests, not about gender or the representation of social groups.
- Political representation is a question of merit – let the best candidate for the job win!
- Quotas go against the principle of equal opportunity for all and the principle of equal treatment, since one group is given priority.
- Quotas are discriminatory, since one group of candidates will be favoured at the expense of better-qualified candidates who are set aside. Thus, quotas represent reverse discrimination, where better-qualified men will lose out in order to achieve a quota for women.
- Quotas are in conflict with the principle of local autonomy, since the prerogative of
party organizations to decide over their own candidate selection processes is restricted.

- Quotas are undemocratic, since voters should have the final say on who is to represent them.
- Many women do not want to hold office. If they did, their numbers in politics would increase.
- Many women do not want to be elected just because they are women. Quotas contribute to a suspicion that women have been promoted thanks to their sex rather than their talent.
- Quotas for women will be followed by demands for quotas for other groups, which will result in what has been termed an increased ‘balkanization’ of politics and a politics of sheer group-interest representation (Phillips 1995: 22).
- Quotas are irrelevant. Women and men have equal status in society.
- Quotas are symbols of ‘Soviet-style’ forced emancipation.

Arguments for quotas

- Political assemblies should reflect the major social groups in society. Since women constitute half of the population, they should have half of the positions in public decision-making bodies.
- Political representation is not only about merit and competence. It is about representing the people.
- Political representation is about rights and justice. Women have the right as citizens to equal representation. How can the fact that men occupy more than 80 per cent of the parliamentary seats in the world be justified?
- Quotas for women do not discriminate. Rather, they compensate for existing barriers that hinder women from receiving their fair share of political seats, and they prevent further barriers and mechanisms of exclusion.
- Quotas for women do not discriminate against individual men. Rather, quota rules limit the tendency of political parties to nominate mostly men and compel them to seek out active and competent female candidates. For the voters, the opportunities are expanded, since it now becomes possible to vote for parties with women candidates.
- Women are just as qualified as men, but their qualifications are downgraded and minimised in a male-dominated political system.
- Women’s experience is needed in political life. Political assemblies should take advantage of all the resources and of all the pools of competence in society.
- Women are best represented by women, since they have an understanding of what equality means for them, an understanding that men do not have.
- Quotas are a quick method for increasing the number of women elected. Introducing quotas thus accelerates the process and leads to major leaps in the number of women elected.
- Quotas are already in use in other countries, and targets for women’s political representation are acknowledged in several internationally recognised conventions, including CEDAW, as well as the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.
- Quotas, formal or informal, are already in use for other categories in nomination processes – such as geographical territories, trade union interests, occupation, age and so on.
- Including women may contribute to the process of democratization and increase the legitimacy of established democracies.

As these lists show, the arguments for and against quotas are based on various assumptions related to key concepts, such as ‘equality’, ‘representation’ and ‘rights’. For
instance, while opponents of quotas argue that quotas are in conflict with principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and become a form of discrimination of men, proponents of quotas argue that they are not a form of discrimination against men but a response to the discrimination against women and an effort to prevent present and future mechanisms of exclusion. Quotas are an attempt to achieve justice. Thus, while the opponents of quotas base their arguments on the classical liberal notion of equality as equal opportunity and the removal of formal barriers, their proponents base their arguments on the notion of equality as real equal opportunity or even equality of result (Dahlerup 2007). The removal of formal barriers, such as extending voting rights to women, is not enough to achieve an equal share of political influence. Rather, active measures must be introduced to achieve substantive equality.

Furthermore, the discursive controversy over quotas is connected to a debate concerning the relation between descriptive and substantive representation of women and the likely consequences of more women in politics. Many opponents of quotas argue that quotas bypass competitive processes and hence ignore the merit principle that ensures that the best person for the job is selected. Quotas will, consequently, ultimately lead to deterioration in competence: since women will be selected on the basis of quota rules, there will be no need for them to improve their skills. Nor will men improve their skills, since they will know in advance that they will lose out to women.

Advocates of quotas would rather assume that quotas will not only improve the level of female representatives (descriptive representation) but also lead to a more ‘women-friendly’ agenda (substantive representation). Women will thus bring specific experience and knowledge to politics, which in turn will be beneficial to society, contributing to economic benefits, organizational advantages and other gains to be made from having more balanced and integrated decision-making bodies.

Also, even if women do not represent common ideas, interests or preferences, they could counter the partiality of those who currently dominate elected bodies and could contribute new ideas and new ways of solving common problems. Democracy will thus be revitalised.

Moreover, the debates over quotas feed into a discussion of rights, and in particular of justice and democracy. According to the justice argument, the numerically equal representation of women and men in elected bodies is in itself an expression of parity – of parity democracy – regardless of the ideas and interests of those elected or the policies endorsed. Based on this line of argumentation, quota proponents argue that the issue of gender-equal decision-making bodies is a question of democracy. A society that does not have gender-balanced elected bodies cannot be seen as having an efficiently functioning democracy.

**Quotas as preferential treatment, positive discrimination or affirmative action?**

At the same time as many opponents of quotas argue that quotas are a discriminatory measure in that they involve treating individuals or groups of people unequally, the proponents of quotas often refer to them as preferential treatment or positive discrimination. This is done partly to counter arguments about quotas being discriminatory against men. However, as the Australian political scientist Carol Lee Bacchi (2006) has pointed out, the reference to quotas as preferential treatment may have severe negative implications. The characterization of quotas as preferential treatment risks not only stigmatizing those who are the target of these measures but also undermining the effectiveness of the measures themselves. By referring to preferential treatment, one
could get the impression that certain people need ‘special help’ in order to improve, thus construing these people as the problem, as being ‘disadvantaged’. This is based on the understanding that society generally functions in a fair manner but that some people face prejudice that prevents them from advancing.

In a similar vein, references to positive discrimination indicate that discrimination is taking place and that the principle of equal treatment is sidelined, thus giving rise to negative associations. But quotas are not preferential treatment or positive discrimination, according to Bacchi. Rather, the focus must be shifted from quotas as preferential treatment to quotas as affirmative action and attempts to remedy problems of deep-rooted privilege and to achieve justice (Bacchi 2006: 35).

In sum, the arguments for and against quotas highlight key political concepts, such as ‘equality’, ‘representation’ and ‘justice’, and the debate can also have serious implications for women in politics. As will be illustrated below, the ways in which problems of women’s under-representation in politics are framed and the concepts on which they are based have consequences for the strategies that are presented as being relevant solutions.

2.2. Fast track vs. incremental track

It has been suggested that a movement towards gender-balanced political representation can take an incremental track or a fast track (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). For instance, it has been suggested that the Nordic countries have taken an incremental track: it has taken approximately 60 years for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden to exceed the 20 per cent threshold and 70 years for them to reach 30 per cent. In contrast, countries such as Argentina, Belgium and Rwanda have taken the fast track, introducing legislated quotas in situations in which women only constituted a small minority in Parliament and increasing the percentage of women very quickly. Belgium, for instance, went from 9.4 to 36.7 per cent in the course of just a few elections. By and large, the fast track route has entailed the introduction of legislated gender quotas (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

The incremental track and the fast track not only represent two different accounts of the actual speed of historical development in women’s political representation. They can also be seen as two different types of equality policy, where one promotes formal equality based on the principle of gender equality as equal opportunity and the other promotes substantive equality based on the principle of gender equality as equality of results.

The two tracks can also be seen as involving two models, constructed as an analytical distinction between two ideal types, which are based on different problem identifications with regard to the diagnosis of women’s under-representation, different goals in terms of women’s political representation and, as a consequence, different political strategies for change. The two models are also based on different perceptions of historical development.
Figure 3. The incremental track model and the fast track model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnosis</th>
<th>The incremental model</th>
<th>The fast track model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women lack resources</td>
<td>Discrimination and mechanisms of exclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>More women in politics</td>
<td>Gender-balanced elected bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Capacity-building activities</td>
<td>Active measures, such as gender quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View on historical development</td>
<td>Gender equality will be reached in due time</td>
<td>Gender equality will not be reached by itself</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the incremental track discourse, the primary problem of women’s under-representation in politics is that women do not have the same political resources as men, for instance in terms of education, experience, time and money. Also, while ingrained attitudes and prejudice against women are recognised, it is assumed that they will eventually disappear as society develops. There is, thus, an inherent notion of gradualism, often imbedded in an optimistic, linear view of progress. With such a diagnosis, skills training for women is promoted, including political candidate schools for women, where women are trained in public speaking and electoral campaigning, etc., mentor projects and so on. In addition, baby-sitting activities, modified meeting hours and so on are promoted in order to help women combine political work with family responsibilities.

The fast track discourse, conversely, rejects the ideal of gradual improvement in women’s representation. It is even assumed that an increase in resources might not automatically lead to equal representation. Discrimination and mechanisms of exclusion are identified as the core of the problem, the solution to which may very well be special measures, such as affirmative action. Based on the new diagnosis of the problem associated with the fast track discourse, according to which gender balance will not come about automatically – and backlash might even occur – there is a growing impatience among women (and men) who are not willing to wait decades in order to achieve an efficient functioning of democracy.

Thus, while both models are based on the perception that it is important to have more women in politics, the ways in which problems of women’s under-representation are framed and diagnosed have implications for which political strategies are seen as relevant. If the problem is framed as women’s limited knowledge and experience, strategies such as skills training and other capacity-building activities for women are seen as relevant solutions. If the problem is framed as hidden norms in candidate selection, overt or covert discrimination and other institutional mechanisms of exclusion, the burden of responsibility is shifted to the political system itself and the political parties. While both models suggest important strategies, the latter transfers the focus away from women as the problem and the ones that need to be changed to the inadequacies of the political system and the political parties that have a responsibility to act.
2.3. **Quota discourses in the eight case studies**

The case studies in this report illustrate various discourses for and against gender quotas.

2.3.1. **Discourses against quotas**

The most dominant discourse against quotas revolves around the *incremental track discourse*. In most countries increased women’s political representation and ultimately gender-balanced decision-making bodies are recognized goals. However, even if many political parties have identified barriers for women, even in politics, quotas have been rejected or resisted as an option for getting more women into political office. Only a few political parties totally reject the relevance of gender when it comes to representation. Rather, most parties and countries work hard to recruit, educate and nominate women in order to get more women into decision-making bodies, in this way showing that quotas are unnecessary. Many parties have also promoted women in politics through soft quotas. Thus, the predominance of the incremental track discourse shows that many parties agree on the goal but differ in their views of the methods by which it is to be accomplished. This discourse can primarily be found in Sweden, Germany and, most recently, the UK.

Another common discourse against quotas is the *liberal, individualistic discourse*. Even if gender is recognized as an important category, the goal is that it should not play a vital role in politics. Any attempts to redress the under-representation of certain groups in society (e.g. gender, ethnicity etc.) via quotas thus highlight different groups and categories instead of treating each and every one as an individual. Thus, quotas violate the principles of equal opportunity and merit as key considerations in candidate selection. This discourse is common in liberal citizenship models, which favor equal opportunities and place the responsibility for unequal outcomes and prospects for change on individuals themselves. This discourse can be seen in the UK, in particular.

A common discourse in Central and Eastern Europe against quotas is what might be labeled the *post-communist opposition*, where quotas are associated with ‘forced emancipation’ Soviet-style. Although quotas for women under communism were not as prevalent as is commonly believed, arguments for quotas have had difficulty in gaining acceptance in post-communist countries. This has been a strong argument in Slovenia but was recently overcome when quota legislation was passed.

Another discourse, though a less common one, is the traditional view of *politics as men’s business*. Resistance to quotas is here based on patriarchal views of women’s role in society, with women being the principal caretakers of the home and the family. In this discourse, women do not want to take part in politics, and should not be forced to do so. It seems that such traditional attitudes have declined during recent decades, as the Polish case study suggests.

2.3.2. **Discourses in favour of quotas**

The most dominant discourse for quotas revolves around *justice and democracy*. The major problem of women’s under-representation in politics is deficiencies in the functioning of democracy. Quotas are thus seen as a method of redressing injustice and democratic deficiencies. This discourse is fairly common in consociational and corporatist citizenship models, which in general terms share a commitment to social partnership and consensus and to democracy defined as ‘as many as possible’ rather than as ‘bare majority’. The case
studies on Belgium and Spain, as well as Germany and Sweden, exemplify this position. This discourse is also common in republican states, where universalism rather than individualism is promoted and where quotas are seen as a method for promoting equal opportunity. The French case study is an example of this.

Many post-conflict societies as well as countries under major reconstruction represent a window of opportunity for the inclusion of women and minority groups. Here quotas have been introduced with the help of donor countries, other forces – such as the Stability Pact Gender Task Force for South-Eastern Europe – and local women’s movements. The discursive framing has here centred around democratization and adjustment to international norms on representation. The case study on Slovenia demonstrates this position to some extent.

The fast track discourse on women’s under-representation as one of discrimination and exclusion has been less dominant in the eight countries studied. It has been used primarily by feminist movements and by minor parties to the left on the ideological spectrum. The major reason for this is probably that gender quotas remain controversial and that campaigns for quotas are framed by prevailing and contextually based beliefs about equality, representation and rights. The fast track discourse, however, finds resonance in the Polish case study, reporting on discursive framings of mechanisms used to date as proven ineffective and slow and of quotas as systems that will help accelerate the proportion of female legislators and compel political parties to actively recruit female candidates.

2.3.3. Quota arguments in the form of predictions

Arguments for and against quotas are often formulated as predictions of the anticipated effects of quota implementation. While research on the adoption, design and implementation of quotas is mounting, there is, however, limited research on the effects of quota implementation. Many of the claims made in these predictions, thus, remain to be studied systematically.

What is more, many of the quota arguments revolve around three dimensions of representation: descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation (Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2010). As noted previously in this study, descriptive representation – or mirror or numeric representation - refers to the sociological representation of decision-making bodies and the conviction that elected bodies should reflect the social composition of the electorate in terms of gender, ethnicity, etc. Substantive representation denotes to the idea that agency matters and that gender balanced bodies will have an effect on the policy content, legislative outcome as well as the working climate in decision-making bodies. Symbolic representation concerns the links between representatives and electorate, for instance the ways in which individual citizens and various groups of citizens in society feel represented. Figure 4 illustrates a series of arguments for and against quotas in the form of predicted outcomes, structured into the three dimensions of representation.
Figure 4. Nine quota arguments in the form of predictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proponents’ predictions (PP)</th>
<th>Opponents’ predictions (OP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descriptive representation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP1: Quotas will result in and are necessary for a rapid increase in women’s political representation.</td>
<td>OP1: Quotas are unnecessary, since the proportion of female parliamentarians will gradually increase in a natural way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP2: There will be a sufficient number of women who are willing to participate in politics, if political parties seriously strive to become more inclusive.</td>
<td>OP2: It will not be possible to find a sufficient number of (qualified) women. Women will not want to be selected because of their sex. Quotas will constitute a glass ceiling for women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP3: Quotas will contribute to enlarging the pool of potential candidates and, thus, better use will be made of various and diverse qualifications in society.</td>
<td>OP3: Quotas will result in the nomination and election of unqualified candidates and, consequently, quotas are demeaning to women and undermine the principle of merit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive representation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP4: A critical mass of women will bring a different style and approach to politics.</td>
<td>OP4: Women elected via quotas will only be seen as representatives of the group ‘women’, and their political effectiveness will, consequently, be limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP5: A critical mass of women will be able to introduce new policy concerns onto the political agenda.</td>
<td>OP5: Quotas will contribute to a suspicion that women have been promoted thanks to their sex rather than their talent. Women elected on the basis of quota rules will be stigmatised and consequently ‘quota women’ will not be able to function well as politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP6: Women will contribute to more gender sensitive legislation and policy outcomes.</td>
<td>OP6: Women elected on the basis of quota rules will tend to be regarded as ‘tokens’ or ‘proxy women’, too dependent on their party or their husbands. They will not be able to represent women and women’s interests – or they have no qualifications of their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic representation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP7: Gender will remain one of the most important axes of power in society. Gender quotas are, thus, necessary and essential.</td>
<td>OP7: After gender quotas, other groups will also demand quotas – where does it stop? Volvo owners, left-handed people, redheads!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP8: Quotas will contribute to the process of democratisation in a country and to the legitimacy of new and established democracies.</td>
<td>OP8: Quotas will result in the ‘balkanisation’ of politics (and sheer interest politics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP9: Quotas will contribute to the process of democratisation by opening up the ‘secret garden of nomination’.</td>
<td>OP9: Quotas will only treat the symptoms of women’s under-representation and consequently will only be a symbolic gesture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From Dahlerup, Drude & Freidenvall, Lenita, ‘Judging gender quotas: predictions and results”, *Policy & Politics*, vol 38 no 3, pp.407-25, 2010 (p.409-19). This article was produced as part of the FEMCIT project, entitled ‘Gendered Citizenship in Multicultural Europe’ and funded by the EU’s Sixth Framework Programme
All of the arguments listed in figure 4 find resonance in the eight case studies. However, in order to draw valid conclusions on the actual effects of quota implementation, some of the arguments must be rephrased in order to be subject to systematic empirical investigation. In part 3 in this report, some preliminary conclusions are made on the implementation of gender quotas. For instance, the first prediction with regard to descriptive representation - that quotas will lead to rapid change - is discussed in the section 3.3 on "leap change versus gradual change." A general conclusion made is that quotas might lead to rapid changes, but the actual effect of quotas in terms of the proportion of female decision-makers is dependent on many factors, not least the design of the quota system and the electoral system. It is, thus, important to bear in mind that many of these predictions are too imprecise and vague to form a firm base for valid conclusions. Furthermore, as for quotas and the substantive representation of women, the number of women politicians is no doubt important for gender sensitive policies to be passed, even if the theory of a specific turning point, a critical mass of women by 30 per cent representation cannot be confirmed by research. In general, for gender-sensitive legislation to be passed many other factors than sheer numbers must be included in the analysis, not least the strength of the women’s movements and the positions of equality policy units within governments.

2.4. Political party views on quotas

In the PARQUOTA Survey, which has been sent to all political parties in the EU/EEA as part of this project, political parties were asked to state their general position on the importance of gender in candidate selection by choosing the option which comes closest to the general orientation of their party. The result is presented in table 3.

Table 3. Political parties’ views on the importance of gender in candidate selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Gender is a crucial criterion in candidate selection since there is both internal and external pressure for more gender-balanced decision-making bodies</th>
<th>Gender is important in candidate selection due to internal pressure, e.g. by women’s groups</th>
<th>Gender is important in candidate selection since more women among the party’s candidates will attract more voters</th>
<th>Gender is not important in candidate selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All (N=63)</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s representation in party fraction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (N=67)</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–25%</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–45%</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;45%</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PARQUOTA Survey 2008. N: 63; 67. The political parties were asked to place themselves as left, centre or right.
As table 3 shows, a majority of the parties responding to the PARQUOTA Survey indicated that gender is a crucial criterion in candidate selection. Parties to the left and centre parties chose this option to a greater extent than parties to the right. While two-thirds of the left parties (66.7 per cent) and half of the centre parties (50.0 per cent) believe gender is crucial in candidate selection, a minority of the parties to the right (27.3 per cent) share this view. Almost half of the parties to the right (45.5 per cent) indicated that gender is not important in candidate selection.

Table 3 also shows that parties with more women parliamentarians (26–45 per cent and 46 per cent or more) indicated that gender is a crucial criterion in candidate selection. Correspondingly, parties with fewer women parliamentarians (0–25 per cent) were more divided on the issue: while one-quarter chose the option that gender is crucial, one-third was of the opposite opinion, and the remaining parties indicated one of the two other options.

The parties were also asked to choose which of three options concerning quotas came closest to the general orientation of their party. Table 4 illustrates the general position on gender quotas of the parties responding (PARQUOTA Survey 2008).

**Table 4. Political parties’ general positions on gender quotas**
*Figures are percentages of respondents.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quotas are a good and fair method</th>
<th>Quotas are a ‘necessary evil’ since it is the only way to rapidly increase the number of women in elected bodies</th>
<th>Quotas are unacceptable and in principle wrong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (N=65)</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s representation in the party parliamentary fraction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (N=66)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–25%</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–45%</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;45%</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party leader</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (N=67)</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Female or female and male party leader.
The political parties were asked to place themselves as left, centre or right.
Table 4 shows that parties are split on the issue of gender quotas. While one-third of the respondents (35.4 per cent) chose the option that gender quotas are a good and fair method, one-third (32.3 per cent) chose the option that quotas are a ‘necessary’ evil, and one-third (32.3 per cent) believed that quotas are unacceptable and in principle wrong.

Moreover, as table 4 shows, parties to the left on the political spectrum seem to be more positive towards quotas than parties in the centre, and much more positive than parties to the right among the parties responding. While 66.7 per cent of the left parties responding chose the alternative that gender quotas are a good and fair method, only 13.0 per cent of the centre parties marked this alternative and none of the parties to the right.

Furthermore, table 4 illustrates that party fractions with a greater proportion of women parliamentarians selected the alternative that quotas are a good and fair method to a greater extent that parties with a smaller proportion of female parliamentarians. Similarly, the alternative that quotas are a good and fair method was chosen by parties with female party leaders or a male and a female party leader to a greater extent than parties with a male party leader.

This survey thus shows that there is a significant correlation between a party’s position on the left–right ideological spectrum and the views it expresses on gender as an important candidate selection criterion and on quotas. Moreover, it shows that there is a correlation between a party’s proportion of women in the party parliamentary fraction and its views on gender as an important candidate selection criterion and on quotas. The more women in a party’s parliamentary fractions, the more positive the party is to the presupposition that gender is a crucial candidate-selection criterion and to gender quotas. Likewise, the data show that there is a correlation between the sex of the party leader and the position of the party on quotas.

Finally, viewing the two tables together, a correlation between a party’s attitudes on gender as a crucial criterion in candidate selection and support for quotas can be seen. Parties that express positive attitudes towards gender as a crucial selection criterion tend to support gender quotas. And, conversely, parties that believe that gender is not important in candidate selection tend to have a more negative position on gender quotas.

### 2.5. The Representation of Minority Women

The current representation system in Europe is challenged by the advent of multicultural societies and the increased diversity among citizens. It is also challenged by the differences between women and men, among women, and men, as well as between minority women and minority men. Given the growing concerns about changing migration patterns, but also about multiple forms of inequality and discrimination as well as intersectionality, one may ask how elected bodies can better reflect the diversity of the population, in particular minority women, and whether or not quotas for minority groups should be adopted?

Thus, do increased proportions of women include minority women? Likewise, does an increased representation of ethnic minorities include women? In recent years, ‘ethnic quotas’ have been adopted by several countries, especially as a way of redressing the problems of ethnic tension in Central and Eastern Europe following the breakdown of communism (Freidenvall 2008). But to what extend do these discussions about the representation of old national minority and new immigrants actually include a gender perspective? These questions in effect point to new problems and demand new strategic thinking. Minority women often suffer from a combination of gendered and ethnic forms
of political exclusion, and special measures are needed to redress this problem.

Table 5. Attitudes on Quotas for Minorities among Left, Centre and Right Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties / Attitudes on gender quotas</th>
<th>Quotas for minorities are a good and fair method</th>
<th>Quotas for minorities are a 'necessary evil’</th>
<th>Quotas for minorities are unacceptable and principally wrong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PARQUOTA Survey 2008 and Freidenvall & Dahlerup 2009. N: 65. Only political parties in countries without quota laws for the candidate lists are included. The political parties were asked to characterize themselves as left, centre or right.

Table 5 reveals that quotas for minorities have much less support among political parties than gender quotas. Even if left parties still support the idea in principle, the majority of left parties see quotas for minorities as a necessary evil. Such quotas are totally rejected - even more so than gender quotas - among parties that characterize themselves as rightist. No party that views gender quotas as unacceptable supports quotas for minorities as a good and fair method or even as a necessary evil.

In general, information is scarce on the representation of minorities, and even more on minorities divided by gender. One of the problems is that there is no commonly agreed way of defining ‘minorities’ or ‘minoritised’ people (Freidenvall & Dahlerup 2009).

In the following case studies information on the political representation of minority women are included when available. One interesting questions is, how does gender and minority position intersect in actual representation. The case studies show that minority women are not always worse represented than minority men, as the notion of double disadvantages would predict.

3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GENDER QUOTAS

Much of the debate for and against gender quotas rests on predictions about the future, as it was described in figure 4. Will women’s representation in fact increase with quotas? Will this occur rapidly, following the so-called fast track model, or are the effects of quotas mainly gradual? Which factors other than the quota percentage are important for the successful implementation of quotas? Moreover, will there be a sufficient number of women candidates, and will the women elected on the basis of quotas be particularly inclined to raise gender-sensitive policy issues – or is this frequently-asked question in fact wrongly phrased?

Even if gender quotas are a relatively recent phenomenon, it is now possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about how quotas work, at least on a short-term basis. The following analysis is based on the eight case studies, but will also include some of the conclusion of other research on experiences with quotas from around the world, including our own (Ballington and Binda 2005; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Dahlerup 2006; Dahlerup 2007; Larserud and Taphorn 2007; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Krook 2009; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2009). A general conclusion is that in some instances gender quotas have led to historic leaps in women’s representation. But in general, the actual effect of quotas is dependent on many
Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Implementation in Europe

Factors, not least the design of the quota system and the electoral system. Quotas do not automatically lead to the highest representation of women. Moreover, they are not the only way of increasing women's representation, as the cases of Finland and Denmark show (see Table 1). In addition, candidate quotas do not guarantee that a certain number of women will be elected, only reserved seat systems do that. Most quota regulations the number of women, and sometimes also the position on women on the candidates lists for election (Dahlerup 2007).

Consequently, the relevant question to ask is: Under what additional circumstances might different types of gender quotas system produce what most advocates of quotas seek – an increase in women’s political representation, or even ‘gender balance’ in political assemblies? To answer this question, this study will look at the interaction between quota types and electoral systems, at the regulations regarding rank ordering on the lists and at sanctions for non-compliance. One of the most frequently asked questions is whether voluntary party quotas or legally-mandated quotas are to be preferred.

Figure 5 Women’s representation in national parliaments 2011, by type of quota

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Quota</th>
<th>Women’s representation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Quotas</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quotas</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Quotas</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figure 5 shows women’s representation according to quota types, based on statistics from Table 1 in this report. Countries with voluntary party quotas are defined as countries in which at least one of the parties in parliament has adopted quotas for women.

Note: The statistics on Poland is contained in the category of party quotas because no general election has yet been held according to the new quota law.

Note: Since 2008 years Quota report, the category of party quotas has increased with 2.1 per cent unit, while the no quotas category has decreased with 0.8 per cent units, and the score for countries with legislated quotas has decreased with 3.7 per cent units, primarily because of the entrance of Portugal into that category. This shows a trend in which voluntary quotas is having the most positive result in relation to the other systems.

Sources: Table 1

Figure 5 compares the electoral results in all the 30 EU/EEA countries according to quota type. As Table 1 has shown, gender quotas are a widely used measure in the EU/EEA countries. Figure 5 reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that women’s representation on the average is rather similar under the three quota regimes, with countries applying legislated/legally mandated quotas at the top with 26.8 per cent women. This should not be surprising,
since legislated quotas apply to all the parties in a country, while only some parties may have adopted quotas when they are voluntary. Countries with voluntary party quotas has an average of 25.2 per cent women, while countries without any quotas, be it legislated or voluntary party quotas, has the lowest score, 22.6 per cent. Denmark and Finland, two countries with a historical high women’s representation but no quotas, contribute to the relative high average among countries without any quotas.

However, within each category, major variations can be found between the countries, depending on the electoral system and the chosen quota system. Within the countries without legal quotas, big variations can also be found between political parties.

3.1. Party discussions about quotas for women and for minorities

The PARQUOTA Survey shows that gender quotas are highly debated within European political parties, both for electoral lists and for the internal party organization. A left–right divide can be seen here. In response to the question whether there have been discussions within the party on gender quotas for elections, 47 per cent of the left parties that responded answered ‘yes, a lot of discussion’ and 38 per cent ‘yes, but not much discussion’, while only 15 per cent answered ‘no discussion’. The corresponding figures for centre parties are 32 per cent, 44 per cent and 24 per cent, while the answers from those right parties that responded show that there has been much less discussion on gender quotas: 14 per cent answering ‘a lot of discussion’, 36 per cent ‘yes, but not much’ and 50 per cent have had no discussion on gender quotas at all.

In comparison, the PARQUOTA Survey shows very clearly that the issue of gender quotas is much more salient than the issue of quotas for minorities among the political parties that responded. Leftist parties discuss quotas for minorities more than centre and right wing parties. But even among leftist parties the question of quotas for minorities is a non-issue in more than half of the parties, as compared to only in eleven per cent when it comes to gender quotas. Parties which do discuss minority quotas at all also have internal discussions about gender quotas, but not always the other way round. Only responses from parties in countries without legislated gender quotas are included here (Freidenvall & Dahlerup 2009).

Several interpretations are possible. One possibility is that within political parties, quotas for minorities are simply not seen as an option, while the question of gender quotas is a hot issue right now. An alternative interpretation could be that the question of quotas for minorities has not yet reached the party agendas but will eventually become a hot issue in the future, in particular with regard to changing migrations patterns. The representation of minority women in political and economic decision-making is also highlighted as one of the future challenges in the report Beijing +15: The Platform for Action and the European Union (2009, 140). It would be interesting to study to what extend parties with gender quotas have started discussing and taking actions on the question of representation of diverse groups of women (and of men).

The focus of the following analysis is on what factors influence the effects of actual electoral gender quotas once quotas have been adopted, either by law or as voluntary party quotas.

3.2. The effects of the electoral system

The electoral system is extremely important for the implementation of quotas. It was mentioned above, that electoral systems based on proportional representation (PR)
are more open to the implementation of a quota system than plurality/majority systems, which only allow for one candidate per party to compete in the election. Within PR system, one key factor is the number of available seats candidates are competing over, that is, district and party magnitudes. It is generally agreed that large electoral districts, and even more so large party magnitudes in each district, are favourable for the election of women and also facilitate quota systems, since this allows for the nomination of many candidates for winnable seats.\(^\text{12}\)

However, researchers disagree on the importance of closed as opposed to open list elections for women’s chances of being elected. With open lists, the voters, by voting for individual candidates, can change the order of the candidates on the lists, whereas in closed-list systems the nominating party’s rank-ordering of the candidates is decisive for which candidates will be elected. In evaluating whether women gain most from open as opposed to closed lists, it all comes down to whether the parties or the voters can be expected to be more favorable towards women candidates. No general conclusion on open versus closed lists is possible, since the results of preferential voting for women candidates seem to vary over time, between countries and even between parties within the same country. In some parties and in some elections, women candidates do receive strong electoral support; in other parties and other elections, the voters favour male candidates (Caul 2001; Htun and Jones 2002; Matland 2006).

Furthermore, a quota system that is not compatible with the electoral system in place will remain purely symbolic (Matland 2006; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2009). Because it is so difficult to apply a quota system to an electoral system based on single-member electoral districts, which the cases of the UK and France (at the national level) exemplify, the new trend of introducing quotas will tend to increase the gap in women’s representation between countries with plurality/majority systems and those with PR systems. Scotland and Wales, however, have shown a way to combine quotas and single-member electoral districts, as has India with its 33 per cent reserved seats for women in local elections.

### 3.3. Which are best: voluntary or legislated quotas?

For advocates of quotas the crucial question is what is the most effective in terms of increasing women’s representation – voluntary or legislated gender quotas? The results in figure 5 do not provide much help, as it only shows averages. Several criteria seem to be relevant when evaluating the effectiveness of legislated versus voluntary party quotas. The analysis shows both commonalities and differences between these two main quota types.

The first criterion is how the two types of quota systems work in terms of **successful implementation**. When one compares legislated and voluntary party quotas at the candidate level, the conclusion is that the two types function to a great extent in the same way and that the success of the implementation process depends very much on the same factors – the specific type of electoral system, the mean party and district magnitude, rank-ordering rules, open or closed lists, and sanctions for non-compliance.

What is generally important for candidate quotas, be they voluntary or legislated, is that quota regulations initiate a process within each of the political parties in which the party leadership places more emphasis on trying to recruit a greater number of women candidates. If the party does not look for potential women candidates, then it will not find any!

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\(^\text{12}\) District magnitude is the number of representatives an electoral district elects to the legislature. Average party magnitude is the average number of seats elected per party in the district (Matland 2006: 284).
Some see legislated gender quotas as emanating from above, leaving the local party organizations and potential women candidates unprepared. There may be some truth to this. However, seen from the point of view of local party organizations, even voluntary party quotas may be viewed as coming ‘from above’. The only sanction available in the case of voluntary candidate quotas is pressure from central party organizations and from the public if a local nominating body does not comply with the party rules on quotas. In general, local organizations must be stakeholders in this process, whether it be legislated or voluntary party quotas, in order to achieve long-term results with regard to the empowerment of women. In general, the strength of women’s groups within the political parties and of the international, national and local autonomous women’s movement, as well as good-faith compliance on the part of political parties, is vital.

The second criterion is the level of compliance. The main difference between legislated and voluntary party quotas is that the former are binding for all political parties. Moreover, legislated quotas make it possible to have legal sanctions on parties that do not comply with the quota rules, which can be enforced by the electoral authorities. In contrast, voluntary party quotas are only binding on the individual parties that adopt them, and the degree of compliance in local districts may vary. However, even with voluntary party quotas, individual parties and their many party districts may show a high level of compliance, as in the cases of Swedish and German political parties with gender quotas. In the Netherlands, the central political parties have sometimes made agreements (‘contracts’) with their local party organizations concerning stipulated percentages of women (Leyenaar 2004: 174). Further, even legislated quotas may not be adhered to by all the political parties, as the French case study has shown. Here the type of sanction is important (see below).

A third criterion is how easy it is to have one or the other quota regulations adopted in the first place? The chances of getting a quota reform through are an important consideration for the advocates of quotas, and in this respect there are differences between the two quota systems. Even if legislated quotas may be preferred, since they are binding for all parties, it obviously takes a majority in parliament to introduce them, and this may prove difficult. Nevertheless, all over the world male-dominated parliaments – all the parliaments in the world have a majority of male members – have recently passed gender quota laws to include more women. This is truly an amazing development.

In contrast, voluntary party quotas may begin with only one party – usually the most gender-sensitive party. This first move may start a chain reaction, providing legitimacy and momentum for demands for gender quotas in other parties due to party competition. In general, the Green parties and the socialist/social democratic parties have been leading the way. This kind of chain reaction – a contagion effect – has taken place, for instance, in Sweden and Germany, in the beginning only among parties on the left. In several other cases, for instance in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Spain and Poland, voluntary party quotas preceded legislated quotas. Usually, quota laws are been initiated in parliament by those political parties that were already making use of voluntary party quotas.
3.4. Leap change versus gradual change

Table 6 shows women’s representation at the national level in the eight selected countries in a historical perspective, focusing on the past five elections. Successive elections, rather than specific years, are used here, since experience shows that it may take several elections to make quota system work.

Table 6. Women’s national representation in the eight case studies through five elections – before and after the introduction of quotas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election 5</th>
<th>Election 4</th>
<th>Election 3</th>
<th>Last election but one</th>
<th>Latest election</th>
<th>Difference (1 - 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (L)</td>
<td>1995: 12.0%</td>
<td>* 1999: 23.3%</td>
<td>2003: 35.3%</td>
<td>2007: 36.7%</td>
<td>2010: 39.3%</td>
<td>+27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (L)</td>
<td>1988: 3.6%</td>
<td>1993: 6.0%</td>
<td>1997: 10.9%</td>
<td>* 2002: 12.3%</td>
<td>2007: 18.5%</td>
<td>+14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (L)</td>
<td>1992: 12.2%</td>
<td>1996: 7.8%</td>
<td>2000: 13.3%</td>
<td>2004: 12.2%</td>
<td>* 2008: 13.3%</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (P)a</td>
<td>* 1994: 26.3%</td>
<td>1998: 30.9%</td>
<td>2002: 32.2%</td>
<td>2005: 31.8%</td>
<td>2009: 32.8%</td>
<td>+6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (P/L)b</td>
<td>1993: 13.0%</td>
<td>1997: 13.0%</td>
<td>* 2001: 20.2%</td>
<td>2005: 20.4%</td>
<td>2007: 20.4%</td>
<td>+7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (P)c</td>
<td>* 1994: 40.4%</td>
<td>1998: 42.7%</td>
<td>2002: 45.2%</td>
<td>2006: 47.3%</td>
<td>2010: 45.0%</td>
<td>+4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shows the first election after the introduction of quotas.

a Following the definition of party quotas used in this report, Germany is classified as having introduced quotas in 1986, when the Green Party decreed that 50 per cent of all their candidates should be women. In 1990 the German Social Democratic party, SPD, decreed that 40 per cent of all their candidates should be women. In the election to the Bundestag in 1987 women gained 15.4 % of the total number of seats, in the election 1990 20.5 %, see the case study on Germany.

b Poland changed to a legislated quota system in January 2011. No general election has yet been held.

c In Sweden, the Social Democrats adopted party quotas in 1993. In the election prior to the introduction of quotas, the percentage of women in the national Parliament was already high, at 33.5 per cent. The Left party and the Green party had introduced quotas regulation in 1987. Key to quotas: Legal or legislated quotas (L) are written into constitutions and/or electoral laws. Party quotas (P) are voluntary measures adopted by individual political parties. Quotas are considered to have been introduced when at least one of the parties represented in the parliament has done so. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the eight case studies.

Table 6 shows the extent to which the introduction of quotas has had an immediate effect on women’s representation. If a leap change is defined as a leap in women’s representation from one election to the next that exceeds 10 percentage points, the table shows that the introduction of gender quotas in several countries does seem to have had an immediate effect, even if other factors, of course, may have played a role.

In Belgium there was a jump from 12 percent in 1995 to 23.3 per cent in 1999 and 35.3 per cent in 2003. The combined effect of quotas and larger electoral districts was significant, as the Belgian case study explains. Larger districts do not automatically lead to a greater number of women candidates. However, this reform, one may conclude,
represented a window of opportunity for the push for more women candidates provided by the law and the general discussion on women’s under-representation.

In **France** the successful quota law at the local level resulted in a leap change in one election of about 20 percentage points, while the result at the election to the National Assembly was very disappointing. At the level of nomination, **Slovenia** experienced a leap change due to the new quota law – from 21.2 per cent female candidates in the local elections in 2002 to 32.8 per cent in 2006 – although only increasing women’s share of those elected from 13.5 to 21.5 per cent. In the general elections in Slovenia, the quota provisions did almost not increase women’s representation at all. In **Spain**, the quota law did not result in any increase, probably because women’s representation was already high in Spain and the rank-order rules introduced did not add any new incentives to the existing practice of the political parties, see the case studies.

Globally, legislated quotas have led to several historic leaps in women’s representation, most notably in Costa Rica and Argentina, where legislated quotas drastically increased women’s representation – in Argentina from 5 per cent in 1995 to 34 per cent in 2003 and in Costa Rica from 19 to 35 per cent in 2002, in the latter case in just one election (Araújo and García 2006).

‘It takes three elections to implement a new quota rule’, it was said in the Norwegian discussion on quotas in the 1980s (Dahlerup 1988). The reason is that most parties are hesitant to get rid of an incumbent MP (most of whom are males) and therefore prefer to wait for a seat to become vacant. In general, research has shown that the incumbency factor is extremely important and prevents a rapid increase in the representation of women and minorities.

Compared to legislated quotas, voluntary quotas tend to result only in gradual increases in the overall representation of women, as the above quotation indicates. With voluntary quotas, in contrast to legislated quotas, not all parties become bound by quota regulations at the same time. Consequently, when studying the effect of voluntary party quotas, the focus has to be on the individual parties.

**The British Labour Party’s** all-women shortlists are an exception, leading to a leap change in the 1997 election in which the application of all-women shortlists increased the percentage of women among the Labour Party’s MPs from 13.7 per cent in 1992 to 24.2 per cent in 1997.

In **Sweden**, the voluntary party quotas have led to smaller and more gradual, though nonetheless constant, improvements in women’s representation. The starting point was high (e.g. so-called high-echelon quotas), and even the ‘zipper’ quota regulation of 1993 in the Social Democratic Party only increased the percentage of female Social Democratic MPs from 41 to 48 per cent between the 1991 election and the 1994 election (Freidenvall et al. 2006: 75). In a zipper system, female and male candidates are alternated on the list. Due to the Social Democratic Party being the largest political party in the Swedish Parliament, the Social Democrats’ quota (together with the re-election of the Green Party and the failure of the right wing party, New Democracy, to be re-elected) contributed to a new high in women’s overall representation in the Swedish Parliament – 40.4 per cent in 1994 as compared to 33.5 per cent in the 1991 election. In the same way, the very high level of women’s representation in the new democratic **South Africa** in 1994 was also the result of a quota regulation within the dominant party, the African National Congress (ANC).
3.5. The importance of rank-order rules

Under all electoral systems – and with legislated as well as voluntary candidate quotas – it is important that the quota provisions include rules about the gendered rank-ordering of candidates on the lists and according to ‘winnable’ seats. In fact, a quota system that does not include such rank-order regulations may have no effect at all. Thirty per cent women placed at the bottom of a candidate list in a PR system – closed or open – leads to nothing but disappointment. Consequently, many quota systems today combine rules about the total number of women and men on the candidate lists, for instance, no less than 40 and no more than 60 per cent of each sex, with specific rules concerning the gender composition among the top candidates, sometimes labelled ‘double quotas’ (PR systems only). Also, in plurality/majority systems, having 50 per cent women candidates may result in the election of very few women if the female candidates are mostly placed in constituencies where the party is normally weak. That was the problem with the implementation of the French parity law, see the case study. Some examples of rank-ordering systems follow.

In Slovenia, the quota law for local elections requires at least 40 per cent of each sex and alternation by sex on the first half of the list. However, for the first transitional period only 20 per cent women candidates were required and only one candidate of each sex in at least one of the first three places. The Slovenian case study shows that all the political parties complied with the transitional requirements.

The most radical rank-order system in use today is the zipper system, which under the right circumstances renders a result close to gender balance by alternating women and men throughout the list, as the Swedish and German case studies show. For small parties, even a 50 : 50 per cent quota combined with zipper rules may result in few women being elected:

‘Most party districts adhere to a 50% policy. However, since there is often only one elected representative from each district, this does not guarantee that there are as many women as men among the representatives’ (the Christian Democrats in Sweden, 38% women in the parliamentary fraction).

This quotation highlights the importance not only of the mean district magnitude but also of the average number of seats won by individual parties – what Richard Matland calls the importance of party magnitude (Matland 2006). Acknowledging this, the Green Party in Germany has decided that the zipper list must be headed by a woman, as described in the German case study. In general, the green parties have been in the forefront in many countries in achieving gender balance. Some green parties even allow a majority of women, while most other parties aim at strict gender balance. Here is an example of gender quotas in the party organization:

‘If there is a sufficient number of female candidates, party bodies and chairs of assemblies shall be occupied on the basis of parity. Parity is achieved if at least half of the posts are occupied by women. If the number of posts is uneven, the proportion occupied by women must be more than half in order to achieve parity’ (The Greens, Luxemburg).

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13 PARQUOTA Survey 2008, answer to an open question.
14 PARQUOTA Survey, answer to an open question.
Table 7 presents an overview of the construction of the gender quota in five European countries. The quota requirements vary from 33 to 50 per cent, but more important for the variations in the results are the rank-order rules and the sanctions for non-compliance. The new Spanish quota law of 2007 requires that lists in elections at all levels be composed of no more than 60 per cent of either sex. In addition, this rule also applies to every five posts on the list. The results of the first national election after the quota law was disappointing to quota advocates, since there was no change at all in women’s representation in the Spanish House of Deputies, as the case study on Spain shows. The explanation is probably that these rank-order rules did not push the parties any further, since Spain previously had a relatively high level of female representation (over 30 per cent).

Table 7. The construction and effect of legislated gender quotas in five European countries General election (lower chamber or unicameral parliament), Latest election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotas</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota rule (%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35*</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank-order rules/winnable seatsc</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The two top candidates cannot be of the same gender. Parity (50-50%) of men and women for the total list.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40 % (e.g. at least 2 W/M in every stretch of 5 throughout the list). 40-60 M/W for the whole list.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
<td>Financial penalty</td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
<td>Rejection of listd</td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual women candidates</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation in women’s repr. in party groups in parliaments</td>
<td>0–50%</td>
<td>0–26%</td>
<td>0–28%</td>
<td>0–42%</td>
<td>(3-23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected women</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>(20.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No general election has yet been held in Poland since the new quota law

For the first election after the new law only 25 per cent is required.

All countries have formulated their quota regulations in a gender-neutral way.

The parties are given a short period to amend their lists.


In Belgium, the quota regulations have been gradually strengthened. The law passed in 2002 states that lists must include an equal share of women and men. In case of non-compliance, places on the lists have to be left open. Moreover, in the first election in which the law was applied, the top three positions on the lists could not be held by members of the same sex. In the subsequent elections, the top two on the list cannot be of the same sex. The Belgian quota regulations no doubt has contributed to the sharp increase in women’s representation, but it has not been the only factor. As the Belgium case study shows, only a few women were placed in the first position. The lowest result came from the Walloon Parliament, where the political parties complied with the overall provision of an equal number of men and women but with the result that only 19 per cent women were elected. Again, the Belgium case study shows that the actual construction of the rank-order
rules in combination with district and party magnitudes are decisive for the outcome.

Even if all French parties had obeyed the law and nominated 50 per cent women and men in the 2002 or 2007 elections – which most of them did not – gender balance would not have been assured. If most women are placed in districts with low chances of election for that specific party, then the requirement of 50 per cent women candidates has little effect. In single-member districts, quota rules should target safe or winnable seats in order to have an effect – like the British Labour Party’s all-women shortlists for vacant seats, see section 1.5 and he case study in this report.

3.6. Sanctions for non-compliance

The effective implementation of quotas is also dependent on the sanctions for non-compliance. Even if legal sanctions are only possible in legislated quota systems, central party organizations may have some power to influence decisions during the nomination process of the local party organizations.

Sanctions may be financial, as in the case of France at the national level. The French case shows, however, that only small parties cannot afford non-compliance. In general, the study of gender quotas worldwide shows that the most effective sanction involves the right of the electoral authorities to reject lists that do not have a sufficient number of women in the prescribed positions – and the use of that right. This radical sanction is, in general, seldom used. Why? Because the political parties, in order to avoid having their lists rejected, work hard to recruit a sufficient number of women.

In general, changing the recruitment pattern of political parties and making them seriously look for and develop a greater number of female candidates is at the core of any gender quota system.

Table 8 illustrates all major elements of voluntary party quota design in six social democratic parties in Europe. The table shows variations in target (35–50 per cent) and in rank-order rules, as well as in the sanctions applied for non-compliance. The rate of compliance and the result in terms of women’s representation can be seen from the table.
Table 8. The construction and result of voluntary gender quotas in six social democratic parties in Europe

*Party quotas for general election (lower chamber of unicameral parliament) latest election*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Ireland*</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quota rules</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Quotas (%)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40% target</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rank-order rules/winnable seats</td>
<td>The zipper system is recommended alternating women and men on the party list</td>
<td>Zipper system: positions on the list must be given in turn to a man and a woman, yet every 5th seat can be taken by a man or a woman.</td>
<td>No No strict rules because of the STV voting system</td>
<td>The two first candidates on the list must be of opposite gender: 50% women among first 6 candidates on list 50% W/M on the total list, zipping is recommended</td>
<td>Zipper system: alternating women and men throughout the party list</td>
<td>All Women Shot Lists (AWS) in half of the vacant constituency seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Internal party sanctions</td>
<td>A general monitoring documents the progress</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>The electoral area has to seek a waiver from the party’s National Executive Committee if women candidates cannot be found</td>
<td>Party organizations are asked to re-nominate</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Implementation of quotas in latest election</td>
<td>In a majority of the constituencies</td>
<td>In a majority of the constituencies</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>All constituencies</td>
<td>In a majority of the constituencies</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Elected women in parliamentary party fraction</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s representation in parliament (all parties)</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: NA = no information available.

*The Irish government has announced a bill of legislated quota of 30 % with financial penalties for parties who do...*
not reach the proportion of women candidates. 
Sources: PARQUOTA Survey 2008, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011, <http://www.ipu.org>; International IDEA and Stockholm University, 2011, <http://www.quotaproject.org>, case studies (Germany, Sweden, UK) and mail corresponding with the parties (Austria, Ireland, Norway).

Three of the social democratic parties in PR or mixed electoral systems (Austria, Germany and Sweden) have adopted the zipper system, where women and men are placed in alternate slots on the party lists. While the system is mandatory in the German and the Swedish parties, it is a recommended policy in the Austrian. In Norway, which also has a PR electoral system, there are multiple placement rules: the first two candidates on the list must be of the opposite sex, and there must be a gender balance among the first six candidates and among all candidates on the list. In the British Labour Party, the system of all-women shortlists means that shortlists consisting entirely of women are applied in certain electoral districts (in at least half of all seats where incumbent Labour MPs are retiring). In the Irish Labour Party, there are no strict rules since all seats are considered winnable under the STV electoral system.

Furthermore, in three of the six parties sanctions for non-compliance have been adopted and are being implemented by the parties’ central organizations. For instance, in the Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet, the party organizations are being asked to reorder lists in order to comply with the stipulated rules. In the Irish Labour Party, a waiver must be obtained from the National Executive Committee if an electoral district fails to come up with female candidates.

Table 8 also shows that the parties differ in terms of the actual implementation of the stipulated quota rules. In the PARQUOTA Survey, some of the parties responded that they applied the quota rules in almost all electoral districts, while others stated that this happened in a majority of all electoral districts.

Finally, table 8 shows that one of the six parties, the Swedish Social Democrats, has reached its stipulated goal (50 per cent) in terms of proportion of elected women. For three of the parties, the difference between the stipulated goal and the outcome is less than 5 percentage units – the Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet (0.8 per cent), the Austrian Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich (1.8 per cent) and the German Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (4 per cent). For the Irish Labour Party and the British Labour Party the differences are 5 and 7 percentage units, respectively. Although not all six parties have reached their stipulated numerical goals, the proportion of women elected in the parliamentary party fractions of all six is higher than the total proportion of female parliamentarians in the respective national parliaments. The biggest difference can be found in the Irish Labour Party, the British Labour Party and the Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet.

Was it difficult to find a sufficient number of women to stand for election under new quota rules, as some critiques of quotas predicted? Most of the parties that responded to the PARQUOTA Survey said they had not had difficulty finding a sufficient number of female candidates, but one-third agreed that it had been difficult. In general, during the course of the historical increase in the numbers of women candidates, parties have been able to find qualified women, especially if they started recruiting a long time before elections rather than at the last minute. However, at the local level there have been reports of a lack of women candidates, even in non-quota systems. The general trend is that, ever since women gained the suffrage, the numbers of female candidates and of women elected have gradually increased all over the world. If the parties make serious use of inclusive

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15 PARQUOTA Survey 2008, case studies on Germany and Sweden.
strategies and at the same time open up for changes in old patriarchal structures, then there seem to be few problems with regard to recruiting a balanced number of women and men in politics.

3.7. **Quotas in elections to the European Parliament**

Table 9 and 10 shows the use of electoral gender quotas in the eight case study countries for elections to the European Parliament. In general, countries and parties follow the same quota rules for all their elections, as the tables maintain. But there are some exceptions to this trend.

France and the United Kingdom elect according to the proportional representation electoral system (PR) for the European Parliament in contrast to elections for their national parliaments.

Two other countries have a law on gender quotas for their election to the European parliament, Portugal and Italy. **Portugal** has identical quota rules for all its elections: a minimum of 33% of each gender among the candidates and a rank order rules that the lists cannot have more than two consecutive names of the same gender. Italy today has special quota rules for the European election. The previous quota laws for national parliament have been abolished, but in 2004 legislated quotas were introduced for the election to the European Parliament with the provision that the same gender cannot have more than two-thirds of the candidates.

In some cases quota laws are adopted sequentially. This was the case in Slovenia, where legislated quotas were first introduced for elections to the European Parliament and not until later for other elections (this is further discussed in the case study on Slovenia).
### Table 9. The construction and effect of legislated gender quotas for election to European parliament 2009. Five case study countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotas</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Poland*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td>List-PR</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank-order rules</strong></td>
<td>The two top candidates cannot be of the same gender. The total number of candidates of one gender cannot be greater than that of the other.</td>
<td>Zipper-system: alternating women and men throughout the list</td>
<td>At least one candidate of each gender in the first half of the list</td>
<td>40% (e.g. at least 2 W/M in every stretch of 5 throughout the list) and 40-60 W/M for the whole list</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions</strong></td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
<td>Rejection of list with 3 days warning</td>
<td>Rejection of list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual women candidates</strong></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variation in the share of women in the party groups from resp. nationalities</strong></td>
<td>0-50%*</td>
<td>0-66%*</td>
<td>0-50%</td>
<td>0-50%*</td>
<td>(0-29%*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elected women EU parliament</strong></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elected women national parliaments</strong></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The variation shows the relationship in June 2011 which means that some changes may have occurred since the Election Day.


Table 9 shows that for two of the five selected countries, France and Slovenia, with legislated gender quotas for the elections to the European Parliament, women’s representation is considerably higher than for national parliament. For Spain the results are identical, but for Belgium the result is better for the national parliament. According to the analysis shown in table 9, the percentage of women in the various party groups originating from each of the five countries varies considerably. Some political groups in the European parliament have no women from the respective countries. The table also shows a high level of compliance with the quota rules in terms of women candidates, being between 46 and 50 per cent.
In the case of voluntary party quotas, a party will usually apply the same quota rule to its lists in elections at all levels, see table 10. In Denmark, however, the Social Democratic party only adopted gender quotas for the elections to the European Parliament, and only for a very short period (1988-96).

Table 10. The construction and effect of voluntary party quotas for election to European Parliament 2009. Three case study countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotas</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
<td>List-PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties with Quotas</td>
<td>The Left</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank-order rules</td>
<td>Zipper system: alternating women and men all through the list</td>
<td>Zipper system: alternating women and men all through the list, yet every fifth can be either a woman or a man.</td>
<td>Odd number reserved for women, including first place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>The positions for women remain open and are filled in by-election</td>
<td>Women at election meeting has veto-right.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual women candidates</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected women in EP group</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>43%*</td>
<td>50%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected women in national parl. fraction</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected women in EP (all parties)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Liberal democrats didn’t have any hard quotas in latest election but the party have used quota rule in election before. Because of that, they are included in table 10.
* The proportion shows the representation of women in June 2011 which means that some changes may have occurred since the Election Day 2009.


Table 10 shows the election to the European parliament for parties with voluntary party
Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Implementation in Europe

Quotas from three case study countries, Germany, Sweden and the UK. Even if small numbers here result in large variations, the conclusion is that women’s share of the EP groups tends to be bigger than their share of the national parliamentary fractions. Even if not all data are available on candidates, the results in terms of elected women point in the direction of a high degree of compliance with each party’s quota regulations.

A gender neutral quota system can also help men when in minority. Here is an example from the Socialist People’s party in Denmark, which for a short period operated a quota system for European Parliament elections (1983-90) and for national elections (1988-90). A male candidate was elected to the European Parliament in 1984 thanks to the gender-neutral quota provision in the Socialist People’s Party. After a nomination vote among the party members had only placed him as number five, with four women above him on the list, he was moved up number two on the party list thanks to the quota provision. In the end only two members of Parliament (MPs) were elected from that party. Nobody asked him, how it was to be elected “just because of your sex”, a question often posed to women.

3.8. Recommendations

Parties as gatekeepers

A general conclusion of this study is that political parties are vital in the promotion of women in politics. The power to recruit, select and nominate candidates is in the hands of political parties, whatever the electoral system. Any attempt to address the issue of women’s under-representation in politics must, therefore, target the political parties and their views and strategies on more inclusive decision-making assemblies.

- **Recommendation 1**

All political parties should adopt specific action plans for the recruitment of women and other under-represented groups based on an analysis of the causes of this under-representation. These specific action plans should focus on ways to achieve balanced participation and representation of women and men both in internal political party offices and elected bodies.

- **Recommendation 2**

Political parties and women’s organizations as well as other stakeholders should develop tools for gender monitoring of nominations and elections.

- **Recommendation 3**

Requirements for gender-balance on candidate selection committees should be accounted for.

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16 The Danish Socialist People’s party and Danish the Social Democratic party are among the few parties who has abandoned a quota once installed.
Goals, targets and additional measures

A second general conclusion of this study is that the goal of gender balance in decision-making may be attained by several measures and that multiple measures, hence, remain necessary for the achievement of more inclusive decision-making assemblies. As this study has shown, the proportion of women in elected bodies may very well be increased by measures other than quotas, such as targets and recommendations, actions plans and capacity-building activities in individual parties. However, it is important to point out that the application of these measures depends on the good-faith compliance of the political parties, since there are no legislated sanctions for non-compliance. In addition, this study has found that, without written quota provisions, the placement of women on party lists and the distribution between female and male candidates in good or bad districts for the party needs to be negotiated in every candidate selection process, which might result in less stable proportions of women parliamentarians across time.

The presence of a strong women’s moment is also an important factor in the promotion of women in politics. Women’s organizations may mobilize the electorate and put pressure on the political parties or on governments to adopt special measures to enhance the political representation of women. Without an active pressure group, women’s political representation might not increase as quickly as desired. In order to support women candidates and to ensure the representation of women’s diverse interests in public decision-making assemblies, the mobilization and organization of women are crucial preconditions for capacity building, political empowerment and the enlargement of the pool of eligible aspirant women.

- **Recommendation 4**

With or without gender quotas, multiple measures should be applied, such as capacity building programs, a system of mentoring for inexperienced new members, family oriented meetings hours, recommendations and targets with specific goals according to the choice of the political party in order to redress the problem of women’s under-representation in politics.

- **Recommendation 5**

In the promotion of a more balanced gender representation, party selectors should take ethnicity into account. Likewise, in the pursuit of a more balanced representation in terms of ethnicity, gender is to be accounted for.

Gender quotas

A third conclusion is that gender quotas are an effective policy tool for increasing women’s representation in political bodies, if adequately constructed. Both legislated quotas and voluntary party quotas may lead to permanent increases in women’s political representation at all levels. But quotas do not automatically result in equal representation of women and men in political decision-making. This study suggests that the introduction of quotas may fall short if they are not compatible with the electoral system in use and do not include rules about rank order and sanctions for non-compliance.

Rank-ordering rules are critical to the successful implementation of legislated quotas and party quotas in List-PR electoral systems. If 40 per cent of a party’s candidates on the electoral list in a PR system are women but they are placed at the bottom of the list,
this may result in no women being elected at all. In plurality/majority electoral systems, rules are needed with regard to the gender distribution of “winnable” of “safe” seats.

Furthermore, gender quotas must be specific and stipulate details of implementation. When there is a lack of clear criteria or when quota provisions are vague, considerable discretion is left to the local political parties to apply quotas as they see fit.

Finally, for quota provisions to be effective there must be sanctions for non-compliance. On this point, legislated quotas and party quotas differ. In countries with legislated quotas, effective sanctions take the form of strong financial penalties on parties that do not comply with the law or the right of electoral management bodies to declare a party’s list of candidates invalid. The successful implementation of legislated quotas therefore requires institutional bodies that administer, supervise and control the application of quotas. In parties that have party quotas, on the other hand, there are not legal sanctions for non-compliance. the sanction available is pressure from central party organizations, women’s groups and the electorate.

- **Recommendation 6**

If gender quotas are applied, they must be compatible with the electoral system in use in order to be effective.

- **Recommendation 7**

If gender quotas are applied, clear criteria for quota implementation, such as placement mandates or rank-ordering rules, should be stipulated. In systems with legislated quotas, legal sanctions for non-compliance, such as strong financial penalties or rejection of lists must be allowed for. The rejection of lists is to be preferred, since large parties might neglect financial penalties. When voluntary party quotas are adopted, the central party organization must make a “contract” with local party organization or other relevant body about the practical implementation of the quota regulation.

- **Recommendation 8**

If legislated quotas are applied, electoral authorities should be mandated to administer, supervise and control the implementation of the gender quota laws. Money should be made available for research on the implementation and effect of gender quotas.
4. LIST OF REFERENCES

Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Implementation in Europe


Databases

SECTION B: CASE STUDIES INCLUDING BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY, POLAND, SLOVENIA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, UNITED KINGDOM

CASE STUDY: BELGIUM: THE IMPACT OF GENDER QUOTAS AND PLACEMENT MANDATES

Petra Meier

1. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

All elections in Belgium are based on a proportional list system, but there are certain differentiating features across different levels of elections, some of which are important for the promotion of a gender balance in political decision making. A first and important differentiating feature is district magnitude – the number of representatives an electoral district elects to the legislature. District magnitude varies because there are large disparities in population density and also because different assemblies and elections at different levels use different types of districts. While the representatives of the Flemish Parliament, for instance, are elected in provincial electoral districts, their Walloon colleagues are elected in electoral districts that follow the boundaries of much smaller administrative districts.

A second differentiating feature is the 5 per cent formal provincial threshold applied to the House of Representatives and the Flemish Parliament. A third differentiating feature is the fact that the calculation of the seats allocated to the various parties is based on the D'Hondt highest average method for all elections except for the communal elections which use the Imperial system. A fourth differentiating feature is the fact that in all elections except communal elections, substitutes are elected on a list that is separate from the list of effective candidates. Finally, in Wallonia mayors are directly elected in communal elections, while this is not the case in Flanders and Brussels.

Elections are characterized by a system of multiple preferential votes, but preferential votes apply for only 50 per cent in the allocation of seats to candidates, the other 50 per cent being allocated on the basis of the list vote. Hence, the electoral lists are ‘half-open’: the number of preferential votes does help in getting elected, but candidates need a high number of preferential votes in order to get a seat on that basis. While the order in which candidates appear on the list does not completely determine who is elected, the candidate’s position on the list does influence his or her chances of getting elected. This is due to the fact that positions higher on the list take advantage of the list votes. Over the last couple of elections, the number of candidates elected through preferential votes has increased since the rule that preferential votes count for 50 per cent in the allocation of seats to candidates has been established in 2003. Over the last century not even 1% of the members of the

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17 Except for two electoral districts, Vlaams Brabant and Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde/Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvoorde.
18 The candidate on the substitute list who came out best at the elections will substitute the first MP dropping out during the parliamentary term, the candidate who came out second-best will substitute the second such, and so on. This implies that candidates on good positions on the list of substitutes often have more chance of becoming an MP than candidates on hopeless positions of the list of effective candidates, due to the fact that candidates elected on that latter list might decline their seat (because they are a member in another assembly and only figured on the list to attract votes, or because they become a member of government and therefore need to give up their parliamentary seat, etc.).
House of Representatives and of the Senators obtained a seat due to preferential votes (Celis and Meier 2006; Marques-Pereira and Meier 2005; Meier 2007). In 2003 and 2007 11 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives got elected on the grounds of their preferential votes, in 2010 12 per cent. In the Senate the share of Senators elected on the basis of preferential votes is slightly higher, being 13 per cent in 2003, 23 per cent in 2007 and 18 per cent in 2010 (Wauters and Weekers 2008; Vanlangenakker et al. 2010; data on the French candidates of 2010 by the courtesy of Jean-Benoit Pilet).

The relative impact of the list vote and of preferential votes is slightly different at the communal level in Flanders. There, preferential votes apply for two third in the allocation of seats to candidates, the other third being allocated on the basis of the list vote. Hence, the electoral lists are more open than at the higher electoral levels. For the communal elections in Wallonia and Brussels the relative impact of the list vote and preferential votes are the same as at the other electoral levels. Overall, of all elections, the communal elections are characterized by the highest number of preferential votes being cast. Multiple preferential voting has a longer tradition in communal elections than in the other elections, but voters also tend to vote more personally in communal elections. Consequently, the percentage of candidates who are elected regardless of the list order is much higher in communal elections; about half of the candidates are elected because of their personal score.

2. LEGISLATED GENDER QUOTA PROVISIONS

From the 1970s onwards, the women’s movement and political women’s groups pleaded for ‘more’ and later on for ‘an equal number’ of women in politics, putting forward legislated gender quotas as a way of overcoming structural thresholds for women. Not all the advocates of gender quotas necessarily thought that quotas were the ideal arrangement. Rather, many saw quotas pragmatically, as the most efficient and reliable solution, reasoning that without structural measures nothing would change. Their case was that quotas were the only means of overcoming the subtle mechanisms of discrimination that women encounter in trying to find their way in a men’s world. Actors in the women’s movement and women MPs also explicitly mentioned men’s will to preserve their dominant power position.

Opponents of quotas, mainly to be found within the Liberal and Far Right parties, claimed that they preferred sensitizing and training measures, if anything at all, for women because a quota would diminish the status of women so elected. They saw the problem in terms of a lack of concern on the part of the electorate and a lack of aspiration to political office on the part of women. They argued that women lacked interest in politics compared with men, probably because of the demanding rules of the political game. Women’s putative lack of interest was sometimes overtly invoked, but it was mainly disguised by the argument that there were no barriers to women’s participation in politics. In addition, the opponents of quotas explicitly rejected the idea that the reason why women experience difficulty entering politics was the unwillingness of men to share power (Meier 2005b).

After the 1991 elections, the feminist movement managed to get a point about the position of women in politics included in the government declaration thanks to unusually extensive consultations with civil society organizations. This resulted in the federal government itself having to take the lead on such matters. In 1994 a first gender quotas act was adopted.\footnote{Act of 24 May 1994 to promote a balanced distribution of men and women on electoral lists, Belgisch Staatsblad, 1 July 1994.} It stipulated that electoral lists must not comprise more than two-thirds of
candidates of the same sex. In the event of non-compliance, the authorities in charge of receiving parties’ lists of candidates would not accept the list. The act was applied to the 1994 and 2000 communal and provincial elections (on the occasion of the former, with the temporary measure that lists needed to comprise at least 25 per cent female candidates) as well as to the 1999 European Parliament, federal and regional elections. The 1995 general elections were exempted from the quotas.

From the beginning, the 1994 act was criticized because it did not insist on an equal number of women and men or impose a placement mandate to guarantee that women were given eligible positions on the parties’ electoral lists. This criticism led to the 2002 gender quota acts, compelling parties to put forward an equal number of female and male candidates. Moreover, candidates of the same sex may not occupy the top two positions on a list. Non-compliance will again result in the list being rejected by the public authorities.

A female and a male candidate on the two top positions on a list were to be achieved by the time of the second election to take place after the acts entered into force (in 2007 for elections to the Senate and the House of Representatives, and 2009 for regional and European Parliament elections). In the first election after entry into force (in 2003 for elections to the Senate and the House of Representatives, and 2004 for regional and European Parliament elections), the first three positions on the electoral lists could not be occupied by candidates of the same sex.

While the 1994 act applied to all elections, the 2002 acts do not apply to communal and provincial polls, since organizing them had become the responsibility of the regions. All the regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) have adopted measures copying the federal legislation, with the exception that in Flanders only one of the three top candidates has to be a woman, due to resistance in some of the parties to having more women in top list positions. In sum, therefore, the legislated quota provision is very homogeneous across all levels of elections, from communal to European Parliament elections. In contrast to other countries, in Belgium no distinction has been made in the sense that legislated quotas only apply to certain levels of elections or that different legislated quotas apply to different levels of elections. This is all the more interesting since these quota provisions have been adopted by authorities which are in charge of different (levels of) elections. Also, the Flemish government recently submitted a decree to Flemish Parliament, introducing, among others, the rule that the two first candidates on communal and provincial electoral lists have to be of a different sex. Once this decree passes the gender quota rules will again be identical for all elections across Belgium.

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21 While the position of women from ethnic minorities as well as immigrant women is identified as a problem that requires particular attention in (gender equality) policies, their position in politics is not questioned as such. Most parties tend to pay attention to including candidates from ethnic minorities, and in many cases women do better among them than men, among other reasons – but not exclusively – because they help to address the lack of candidates both from ethnic minorities and from the female sex.

Another interesting feature of the Belgian legislated gender quota provisions is their sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms. Again unlike some other countries such as France at the national level, the Belgian provisions do not give parties the option of ignoring the quotas, for instance by paying a fine. In the run-up to the first gender quotas act of 1994, sanctioning mechanisms such as a cut in a party’s allowances were discussed, but none of the sanctions on the table were withheld, mainly because of party leaders’ opposition to such sanctioning mechanisms. The only sanction applied is that electoral lists that do not conform to the quota provisions are not accepted (and parties do indeed comply with the quota provisions). Since this excludes parties from participating in an election, parties respect the gender quota provisions. However, this compulsory character of the gender quota provisions at least partially explains the limited scope of the first gender quotas. The party leaders were not willing to accept far-reaching gender quotas provisions by which they would be bound.

There is no monitoring of the gender quota provisions. The 2002 gender quota acts stipulated that the acts would be evaluated, but this was not specified further. In defence of the law it has to be stressed that monitoring the gender quotas is difficult because of the complexity of separating out their precise impact from that of other factors (Meier 2004a). However, in the wake of the federal elections of 2003, 2007, and 2010, the federal Institute for the Equality of Women and Men published facts on the share of women candidates (in eligible positions) and of the share of women elected (http://www.igvm.be), whereas it commanded similar analyses from academic institutions in the wake of the 2004 and 2009 regional and European elections (Fiers et al. 2006; Sliwa et al. 2010). So far, no political consequence have been attached to the results of these analyses (which, on the overall, underline the increase of the number of women candidates elected since the implementation of gender quotas, but argue that this is not solely due to these gender quotas but also due to the reform of the electoral system).

3. THE NUMBER OF WOMEN IN ELECTORAL POLITICS

Until the mid-1990s, on average women accounted for no more than 5–10 per cent of those elected. From the second half of the 1990s when the first quotas act was adopted, however, the number of women standing or elected rose spectacularly at all levels of elections. For some elections, this trend was still visible after the adoption of the new gender quotas act. In the federal elections of June 2007, the percentage of women MPs elected rose slightly, to nearly 37 per cent, while the proportion of women elected to the Senate was 30 per cent (which was less than in the previous elections of 2003). At the occasion of the latest elections of June 2010, the proportion of women elected to the Senate rose to 43 per cent, while that of women elected to the House of Representatives rose slightly to 39 per cent. The fluctuating figures for the Senate are less dramatic if one considers the fact that on the whole but 40 Senators out of 71 are directly elected, meaning that small changes in absolute numbers make percentages fluctuate drastically. A similar, though less significant, evolution can be seen in the results of elections to the European Parliament, where the Belgian delegation disposes of 22 seats and where 29 per cent of the Belgian candidates elected in 2004 were women, while in 2009 this was 32 per cent (again, as in the case of the Senate, the percentage of women elected in 2004 was actually lower than that elected during the previous elections).

In the various regional legislatures the share of women elected climbed from 19 per cent to 35 per cent (in the Walloon Parliament), from 24 per cent to 32 per cent (in the Parliament of the German-speaking Community), or from 31 per cent to 41 per cent (in the Flemish
Parliament) between 2004 and 2009. In one case (in the Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital) it dropped slightly, from 46 per cent in 2004 to 44 per cent in 2009. At the provincial level the percentage of women candidates elected rose from 29 per cent to 37 per cent between 2000 and 2006, while at the communal level it rose from 27 per cent to 33 per cent.

Table 11. The percentage of women in the two most recent Belgian elections (for all levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Latest election (2006–10)a</th>
<th>Election before last (2000–7)b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% women candidates</td>
<td>% women first candidate on the list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish Parliament</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walloon Parliament</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament of the German-speaking community</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial councils</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal councils</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c Gender quotas act of 1994 in force.
N/A Data not available.
In sum, the percentage of women elected at the various electoral levels varies between 32 and 44 per cent. On the whole the percentage of women elected is relatively high in Belgium as compared to many other countries, especially since the figures go for all electoral levels, whereas in many other countries the percentage of women elected differs more considerably for the various electoral levels. On average the percentage of women candidates elected has increased significantly over the last 15 years for all elections. The slight reverse in elections to the Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital is curious, especially as it has traditionally been among the more gender-balanced assemblies. However, it still comes close to gender parity and is probably one of the few parliamentary assemblies where a 50 per cent candidate quota without an extensive placement mandate (the zipper principle applies but to the first two positions on the list) leads to such a result. Also, similar slight drops in percentage terms have been witnessed in the case of the Senate and the European Parliament two elections ago. In those cases they reflect just one or two fewer women, since the overall number of seats is low. In the case of the Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital district and party magnitude, the number of seats a party gets in a district, is higher, and therefore the drops in shares of women elected reflect shifts in generations and in ideological composition. But on the whole the figures are relatively stable and show a move upwards or a stabilisation of the number of women elected in the zone of one third to nearby parity.

In parallel to the increase in the number of women in elective positions, there are also more women in executive positions. Here again we find important differences between levels of government. While women account for between 25 per cent and 44 per cent of ministers in most governments (with the exception of the Walloon government accounting for 13 per cent of women ministers), one-third of the communal councils of the previous legislature in Belgium had no woman elected representative. Since a parity clause was inserted in the Belgian constitution in 2002, all executives need to include at least one woman, and governments at all electoral levels do now include at least one woman.

4. WOMEN ON TOP POSITIONS AND THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATED GENDER QUOTA PROVISIONS

To summarize, the 2002 legislated gender quotas were in force for the most recent elections at all electoral levels, and the last-but-one elections except for the communal and provincial elections, for which the former (1994) legislated gender quotas were in force. It is interesting to note that, when the gender quotas acts prescribed a minimum of 33 per cent female candidates, the latter tended to be more numerous than the requested minimum (see table 11).

This 'doing better than what the law prescribes' can also be observed on the occasion of earlier elections. However, when the 2002 gender quotas acts prescribe an equal number of female and male candidates, the margin given by the law tends to favour male candidates. When electoral lists comprise an odd number of candidates, there tends to be one more male candidate than female (which explains why the percentage of female candidates is sometimes a little below 50 per cent). An equal sharing of access to positions of political decision making is still not evidence.

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23 These percentages do not take into account the variation in percentages of women elected in the various provincial or communal councils.
This is also reflected in the number of women heading electoral lists. While on the whole the percentage of women occupying the first position on the list has increased, women are far from sharing this position on an equal footing with men. Still, in most cases where a stricter placement mandate was in place, the share of women heading a list rose. At the occasion of the latest 2009 European and regional elections, a female and a male candidate on the two top positions on a list were to be achieved, at that of the one but latest 2004 European and regional elections women had to occupy but one of the first three positions on the electoral lists. And in 2009 the percentage of women heading the list was, on average, higher than in 2004, with the exception of the Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital (9 per cent in 2009 as compared to 20 per cent in 2004). In that case, as well as in that of the Senate (27 per cent in 2010 as compared to 36 per cent in 2007), the percentage of women heading the list has even decreased at the occasion of the latest elections. In the case of the Senate this finding is all the more interesting, since both at the occasion of the latest and the one but latest elections, a woman and a man had to occupy the two top positions on the list. Hence, the rule was no longer new. However, – again – shifts in small numbers often lead to high shifts in percentages. Nonetheless, forcing parties to place a woman on at least the second position on the list does not make them distribute the first position equally between women and men. The placement mandate in the 2002 gender quotas acts has not led to a serious increase in the number of women occupying the first position on lists of candidates. Most parties position their first female candidate only in second place.

5. PARTY MAGNITUDE AND THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATED GENDER QUOTA PROVISIONS

When it comes to the number of women elected, the gender quota partly did make a difference. However, the differences in the numbers of women elected across the different electoral levels are to a large extent due to the differences in the electoral system that are explained above, and the way in which the various aspects of the gender quotas interact with these differences. A feature of the electoral system that has a primordial influence on the share of women elected is district magnitude and, more precisely, party magnitude. It is difficult to assess the exact impact of party magnitude, since it is almost impossible to control for all other independent variables, but there are strong indications that the rise of the number of women in politics is at least partly due to an increase in party magnitude and not to the implementation of gender quotas.

First, an increase in party magnitude has always been accompanied by an exceptional rise in the number of women elected. In 1993 the Senate was reformed, bringing all the former electoral districts back to two, one for each of the major language groups. At the next election, in 1995, there was a phenomenal increase in the number of women elected to the Senate. The introduction of provincial districts on the eve of the 2003 elections also profoundly altered party magnitude in the case of elections to the House of Representatives; and the Flemish Parliament followed this example in 2004. The introduction of electoral districts along the boundaries of the provinces eliminated a couple of very small districts in both assemblies. This involved a considerable rise in party magnitude since the number of parties remained stable. Parallel to this increase in party magnitude, there was a considerable rise in the number of women elected to the House of Representatives in 2003 and in Flanders in 2004. In the run-up to the regional elections of 2004 the number of seats had been raised in the Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital, in order to guarantee the Dutch-speaking community a minimum of 17 MPs, but the number of parties did not alter. This increase in party magnitude was followed by a leap
in the number of women elected in the 2004 elections, coming close to parity.

A second indication of the importance of party magnitude is the fact that the largest number of women is found in those assemblies that have sizeable electoral districts. The Parliament of the German-speaking Community and that of the Region of Brussels-Capital were the assemblies where the highest party magnitude was to be found initially. Both started off with a higher proportion of elected women than their counterparts.

A final indication of the importance of party magnitude was delivered through an Ordinary Least Squares regression of the regional elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, which confirmed the former intuitive findings that party magnitude and not gender quotas led to the considerable increase of women in the various regional parliaments over the last fifteen years (Sliwa et al. 2011).

High party magnitude involves more winning candidates on a list and, since parties feel the need to present lists containing a ‘good mix of candidates’ (Erzeel and Meier 2011), women are on the winning side. Lists of candidates should reflect diversity in terms of age (initially younger but recently also senior candidates), ethnicity (mainly candidates with their roots in North and Sub-Saharan Africa or Turkey), sexuality (gay and lesbian candidates), but also women –.

However, the gender quotas did also have an impact. This is especially visible in smaller electoral districts. In the Walloon Parliament the spectacular rise of the number of women elected took place but at the occasion of the 2009 elections. The reason for this late evolution is due to the fact that party magnitude is much smaller in the Walloon Parliament than in the others. Neither the imposition of an equal number of men and women on the lists, nor the initial placement mandate of at least one candidate of each sex among the first three candidates on the list had an impact wherever party magnitude was small. But the placement mandate imposing a woman and a man on the first two list positions in 2009 made a difference in the case of small party magnitude (Sliwa et al. 2011). As a thumb rule it can be said that the placement mandate had an effect in the case of small party magnitude, guaranteeing women winnable seats when the stakes are high. In the case of high party magnitude the placement mandate in its current form does not make a difference since it only focuses on a very small share of winnable seats. This is also due to another aspect of the Belgian electoral system, namely the impact of the personal score of candidates obtained through preferential votes. The idea behind legislated gender quotas containing placement mandates is to place female candidates in safe seats. The halving of the impact of the list vote combined with the strategic placing of well-known candidates towards the bottom of the lists increases the likelihood that these candidates will be elected at the expense of candidates who figure at the top of the list. Traditionally safe seats at the top of electoral lists lose their safe character. Well-known candidates at the bottom of the list attract votes but they generally have no intention of taking up their mandate. Even if they refuse their mandate, someone from the list of substitutes will take up their mandate. In the case of high party magnitude the likelihood for candidates to breach the list order is much higher than in cases of small party magnitude. This effect therefore also contributes to the fact that the placement mandate mainly has an effect where party magnitude is small.

Also, at the level of communal elections, where no separate lists of substitutes are employed, the use of preferential votes is so frequent that it tends to strongly undermine the placement mandate contained in the legislated gender quotas. Also, the increased impact of personal scores is favourable for well-known candidates, and here women
have a disadvantage given their historical under-representation in politics. In the long run, the increase in the number of female candidates may lead to women politicians becoming better known, which might raise their personal scores and hence their chances of getting (re)-elected (Meier 2005a, 2008b).

However, the other rule that half of the candidates on the list have to be women and the other half men goes hand in hand with high party magnitude and in that respect the gender quota also have an effect in cases of high party magnitude. But it does not have a similar effect in the case of small party magnitude. The overall conclusion is therefore that in PR list systems with a broad range in party magnitude both a 50 per cent quota and a placement mandate for at least the first positions on the list are important tools to improve the gender balance among women and men representatives.

6. THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN PARTY QUOTAS AND QUOTAS BY LAW

Before the legislated gender quotas were adopted, the three major Flemish parties (Christian Democrats, Liberals and Socialists), the French-speaking Christian Democrats and both green parties already applied their own quotas or target figures to their electoral lists. While the existence of party measures paved the way for a gender quotas act in 1994, it is interesting to note that this act in turn stimulated the introduction of further party measures. Once the act had been introduced, individual parties adopted new measures in response to it in order to outbid other parties in terms of women-friendliness. These new party initiatives, in their turn, paved the way for the new and more stringent gender quotas acts in 2002.

This contagion effect between legislated gender quotas and voluntary party quotas indicates that the parallel use of legislated and party gender quotas is not a question of duplication. Rather, it can create a dynamic which opens up the political forum to women more than would have been the case if either party or legal measures alone had been applied (Meier 2004b). However, an analysis of party statutes and rules in 2005/2006 showed that these do not contain more provisions on gender equality than they had two decades ago (Meier et al. 2006). Parties tend to have less gender quota provisions than before, at least when it comes to the composition of electoral lists. In contrast to two decades ago, most party statutes contain the rule that at least one person in the party presidium has to be a woman. But parties have no other formal rules with respect to gender equality when it comes to functions within the party apparatus (both paid staff and elected positions). Hence, the legislated gender quota provisions did not spark off similar measures for functions within the party apparatus (both paid staff and elected positions).

Nonetheless, in order to meet the legislated gender quotas, parties are paying more attention to female candidates than they did 15 years ago. They mobilize within the party structure and broader networks or even launch general calls in order to find female candidates. This is especially the case for elections that require a large number of candidates, such as communal elections, where many lists have to be filled, or elections for the Parliament of the Region of Brussels-Capital, where party magnitude is high. However, even if parties do pay more attention to female candidates than they used to, women tend to have a utilitarian but not an intrinsic value for parties. Women are valued because of the quota provisions and because women are considered to attract voters, but not because parties intrinsically subscribe to the parity principle.
Also, at least within the party headquarters the conviction reigns that the candidate selection process and other nomination processes within the party are transparent, open and not gender-biased. Research in Flanders has revealed that women active in politics are not convinced of this neutrality (Erzeel and Meier 2011). They consider that their under-representation in politics can partly be explained by the fact that they may lack some of the assets (such as contacts and networks) that facilitate a political career, but also that they are given fewer chances than male colleagues. In their view, the causes of women’s under-representation are to a great extent to be found at a more structural level, for example in the way in which political parties operate when selecting candidates for electoral lists or deciding on political careers. Male politicians differ significantly in their explanation of women’s under-representation in politics. They believe that women’s under-representation is due to their personal choices and that the system functions as it should. Men do not think that women face discrimination, or lack the formal or informal assets needed to build a political career, or fail to invest enough in such a career. According to men, women are simply less interested in political office than men are, giving priority instead to their family life, and this explains the lower participation of women in politics. In this respect, the legal gender quota provisions have not changed the perception of potential gender related thresholds in electoral politics (Meier 2008a).

Finally, voluntary party quotas do not have the same status as legislated gender quotas. Especially if gender quota provisions are not put down in documents that are binding upon the party, they can be set aside whenever they conflict with other priorities. Furthermore, research on the latest (2006) communal elections reveals that voluntary party quotas seem to get adopted in circumstances where they are less necessary (Meier and Verlet 2008b). It seems that local party sections tend to adopt voluntary quotas that are meant to complement the provisions of the law whenever the ideological climate is women-friendly, where party magnitude is highest and when the number of women present within the local section is already relatively significant. In this respect voluntary gender party quotas are only of a second order.

7. OTHER QUOTAS

Belgian citizenship is believed to be embedded in its social groups. Belgium is a consociational society that recognizes and integrates different social groups into decision-making processes. Such recognition means that, in this political system, descriptive representation prevails whereby the membership of public bodies and elected assemblies should mirror the society by including the salient groups. Although the segmentation of Belgian political and civil society is decreasing, and political ideology tends to have a less lasting influence on people’s choices with respect to, for instance, a party, health insurance or a newspaper than before, the balanced representation of key social groups and the representativeness of institutions continue to be seen as essential legitimizing features of the political system.

There is, furthermore, a consensus that it is legitimate to institutionalize the presence of specific social groups. There is no reluctance to enshrine structural measures in party and other organizations’ statutes, legislation or the constitution in order to ensure the presence of particular social groups in bodies of representation or of public interest. Thus there exist numerous rules to ensure the presence of the main ideological and philosophical or language groups whenever relevant. For instance, in all relevant parliamentary assemblies the various language groups are guaranteed reserved seats (Meier 2000, 2003). It was partly on the basis of this ‘logic of presence’ that quotas for women were argued for and
adopted, not only for electoral lists but also for public advisory committees (Meier 2005b). Currently, the federal parliament debates on imposing a 33 per cent quota of women to boards of directors of state enterprises and of companies quoted on the stock exchange.24 However, language and sex or gender are the only criteria for which formal quotas apply to electoral politics (Celis et al. 2010; Meier and Verlet 2008a). While parties also started to pay attention to issues of age, ethnicity and sexuality from the 1990s onwards, there are no formal quotas for these social groups and parties tend not even to enshrine target figures for such groups. But wherever party magnitude is high, parties with a strong social profile diversify their lists of candidates in socio-demographic issues. But data on the political representation of candidates with foreign roots or from other social groups such as LGBT people are not collected or published the same way as the data on the political representation of men and women.

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

All in all, various political variables have an important impact on the position of women in Belgian politics. While a large district magnitude is favourable for women, the importance of preferential votes might in the longer run have a beneficial effect for women. Adaptations to the electoral system that were meant to balance sex ratios in politics – the gender quota acts – have, in themselves, had less of a positive impact on the number of women elected than those modifications that were not intentionally introduced to increase the number of women, such as the increase of district magnitude. But the 50 per cent gender quota went hand in hand with the subsequent increase of party magnitude. And the placement mandate enshrined by the 2002 gender quota acts did have an impact in those cases where party magnitude remained small.

24 Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van de wet van 21 maart 1991 betreffende de hervorming van sommige economische overheidsbedrijven en tot wijziging van het Wetboek van vennootschappen, teneinde te garanderen dat vrouwen zitting hebben in de beslissingsorganen van de autonome overheidsbedrijven en de genoteerde vennootschappen (DOC 53 0211/B.Z. (2010).
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CASE STUDY: FRANCE: LEGISLATED ‘PARITÉ’

Mariette Sineau

1. INTRODUCTION

France is the first country in the world to have adopted a law demanding a gender balance between candidates standing in certain elections. This reform – which might appear in contrast to the Republican doxa and the philosophical heritage of the French Revolution – has gradually become a necessity in the face of the parties’ resistance to ensuring women’s satisfactory access to political representation. The relatively new concept of ‘parité’ (parity, meaning equality or balance) is of greater symbolic significance than that of quota. It is enjoying considerable success because it seems to reconcile the irreconcilable: equality between the sexes and gender difference. It also relies on a dual logic: that of equality, in line with the republican ideal, and that of positive action, somewhat more alien to French culture.

From the mid-2000s onwards, the concept of ‘diversity’ – a category invented some 20 years previously in the United States and one that, like ‘parity’, clashed with the republican ‘no distinction’ approach - began to enter the field of French politics (Escafré-Dublet and Simon, 2009). Today, most of the political parties (with the exception of those on the extreme right) claim to be working for a better representation of the diversity of French society. Marked by a ‘constitutive ambivalence’ (Bereni and Jaunait, 2009), the concept of diversity – which has not been translated into the legal sphere – has blurred the requirement for parity (Sénac-Slawinski, 2010). Although the political establishment seems to be agreed on the issue, discrepancies can clearly be seen between the parties’ rhetoric and their electoral practice: candidates and elected members representing the diversity of French society (primarily ‘visible’ black and North African minorities) remain in a very small minority. This ambiguity of rhetoric on diversity is due largely to a desire to ‘address racial discrimination without, however, facing up to it or naming it’ (Avanza, 2010: 765).

2. ORIGINS OF THE PARITY REFORM

2.1. Political and historical background

Given pride of place by the Council of Europe in 1989 (Sineau, 2003), the term parity was taken up in France at the start of the 1990s by intellectuals, party activists and women’s organisations. Demands for parity proliferated, on the basis that republicanism had failed by persistently excluding women from politics. In France, women did not achieve the vote until 1944, almost a century after male ‘universal’ suffrage was granted (in 1848). Equality before the law, however, simply resulted in de facto inequality on the ground. By the early 1990s, French women still held less than 6% of the seats in the National Assembly and Senate, lagging far behind Europe in terms of their parliamentary presence. This marginalisation on the national scene was in sharp contrast to their representation in the European Parliament, however: following the 1994 elections, nearly 30% of French MEPs were women.

This under-representation of French women in the res publica is rooted in history but also has political origins (Sineau, 2005 and 2011). In 1958, the restoration of single-member constituencies (two-round, first-past-the-post system) to elect députés to the National
Assembly - a rare system in Europe – became a weapon with which the parties were able to prevent women from gaining access to the Chamber. This system, in which ‘there is only one member as there is only one seat to be filled’ (Emeri, 2001) is also used to elect 50% of the Senate seats and the members of the general councils ('conseils généraux' or department-level assemblies). Such a system disadvantages women because parties tend to choose the candidate that is most well-known to the electorate and thus better equipped with political resources. This particularly discriminates against newcomers given that it is possible to hold several electoral mandates and functions concurrently in France. These two rules have thus led to a model of the *homo politicus*, who, neutral in theory, is in actual fact male as this system favours already well-established local dignitaries (Sineau, 2008).

The parties could have taken proactive measures to counter the discriminatory effects of the single-member constituency. The Communist Party (PC), for example, was long the only party to set aside a certain informal quota of places for women in elections, although this party is now of little political influence. It was not until 1996 that the Socialist Party (PS), formed in 1971, approved a 30% quota of women candidates in the parliamentary elections, far later than its sister parties (Dahlerup, and Freidenvall, 2005). (The party had previously set a 30% quota of women candidates for the European Parliament, which uses a system of proportional representation). For 20 years, from the 1973 through to the 1993 parliamentary elections, the proportion of women selected as candidates by the Socialists, always less than that of the PC, only once (in 1986) exceeded 10% and the proportion of Socialist women actually elected was always less. On the right, neither the UPM (**Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle** now the **Union pour un Mouvement Populaire**), nor the UDF (**Union pour la Démocratie Française**) has applied a quota. Only the Greens have included a requirement for gender parity of electoral candidates (and for gender parity within party bodies) in their statutes, and this since they were first formed in 1984.

In the end, the policy of legislated quotas was thwarted by a decision of the Constitutional Council: on 18 November 1982 it ruled that the 1982 law stipulating no more than 75% representation of either sex on the local electoral lists was unconstitutional. This decision, taken on the basis that everyone is equal before the law, set a legal precedent that was to put future gains at risk. International law, however, helped to legitimise this reform: it encouraged French legal culture to mutate by making the principle of positive action by which to balance power sharing between the sexes lawful. Moreover, the acute crisis of political representation in France had begun to make the male monopoly of the *res publica* unpopular with the general public. Women’s political marginalisation was now seen as the symptom of a ‘sick’ democracy, with parity the necessary cure. The political actors eventually acknowledged this. Ever since the 1995 presidential elections, power sharing between the sexes has been included in the party manifestos. The political alternation that brought the left to power in 1997 only hastened the timetable for reform: the Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, placed parity at the heart of political modernisation.

### 2.2. Ideological controversy: universalism revisited

The issue of parity has transcended the left/right paradigm and divided feminists. The theoretical and political debate that preceded the reform was fuelled by intense controversy over the content of universalism (Gaspard *et al*, 1992; Lépinard, 2007; Sénac-Slawinski, 2008). ‘Fundamentalist’ republicans criticised the reform in the name of universalism. In

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25 Under the 5th Republic, the single-member system was scrapped once in favour of proportional representation, in 1986, at department level.
their eyes, the French nation, a nation of all citizens, is an indivisible entity that transcends groups (class, gender, ethnic minority, etc.). By undermining the unity of representation, parity endangers the republic itself. In an attempt to discredit the parity reform, some referred to the dangers of an American-style ‘community withdrawal’. Others objected that parity would ‘naturalise’ politics, thereby acknowledging the inherent differences between men and women, something that ‘egalitarian’ feminists refute. The ‘universalists’ admit that the republic has not kept its promises to women, but find the cure worse than the disease.

On the other side, those advocating the reform justify parity by criticising the liberal individualism that forms the basis of the republican order. Formal equality, which bears the seeds of exclusion, needs to be replaced by real equality. Parity is presented as different from quotas, identifying not with minority representation but with equal status between men and women. It is the only way of ensuring the real equality of women in elections, something that has been spurned by the French parties who, as in all democracies, hold a monopoly over the selection process. The pro-parity camp refute all ‘particularism’: women are not a category but half of humanity. It is precisely the universality of gender difference that must serve as a basis on which to reconsider republican universalism.

3. LEGISLATIVE TEXTS

3.1. The initial laws

3.1.1. Constitutional Law of 8 July 1999

This law on gender equality supplements Article 3 of the Constitution with the following: ‘The law favours the equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions’. It states (Article 4) that the political parties shall ‘contribute to implementing (this principle) under the conditions established by law’. While this reform could be criticised as minimalistic, it does however create a significant symbolic landmark as it replaces the abstract ‘universal’ with a two-sex order. The ‘one and indivisible’ republican France is paradoxically becoming the first democracy to be organised on the basis of parity.

3.1.2. Law of 6 June 2000

‘Aimed at favouring the equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions’, this law is often called the ‘parité law’, although the word was carefully avoided. It imposes a two-tier rule: compulsory numerical gender equality on candidate lists, but optional parity for the single-member system used in the parliamentary elections.

For list PR elections, the law makes it an absolute obligation for parties to present equal numbers of candidates of each sex (+/- 1). If they fail to do so, the list will be rendered invalid. Moreover, a zipper system (alternating men and women) is compulsory from the top of the list to the bottom. To begin with, the law anticipated strict alternation for one-round ballots and alternation in blocks of six candidates for two-round ballots. Since the 2003 and 2007 reforms (see point 3.2), strict alternation has been required for all list ballots. The elections affected by this obligatory gender parity and zipper system are:

- The European Parliament;
- Half of the Senate (departments with 4 senators or more);
- The regional councils;
- The local councils for towns of 3 500 inhabitants or more (i.e. only 7.7% of
For the single-member parliamentary elections, where it is technically difficult to implement a policy of equality, the law provides an incentive in the form of financial penalties. It fines parties that do not present 50% male/female candidates (+/- 2%). This penalty is deducted from the party’s first instalment of public funding (which is proportional to the number of votes obtained in the first round), while the second instalment (proportional to the number of people actually elected) remains paid in full. The amount is reduced by a percentage equal to half the difference between the number of candidates of each sex as a percentage of the total number of candidates: if a party presents 40% women and 60% men, the difference is 20 percentage points and so the allowance will be reduced by 10%.

In its initial version, the law placed no constraints on either elective functions (executive committees of assemblies, including: mayors, deputy mayors, vice-presidents and presidents of regional councils) or on numerous mandates:

- Half of the Senate seats, elected via the single-member system or list PR (in small departments);
- The department-level assemblies, elected via the single-member system;
- The local councils for towns of less than 3 500 inhabitants, elected via a majority list system (i.e. 92.3% of towns).

The legal void regarding the department-level assemblies is the real weak link in the law, given that they are a breeding ground from which parliamentary members are recruited. French law is thus dual in nature. It is both detailed, reflecting the complexity of electoral methods, and incomplete, hinting at weaknesses in it.

3.2. Later reforms

The law of 11 April 2003 establishes strict gender alternation on the regional lists, while that of 31 January 2007 introduces 4 amendments:

- For the next parliamentary elections (in 2012, failing early dissolution), it increases the financial penalties for parties that do not field 50% male/female candidates, +/- 2%: these penalties increase to 75% of the difference on average.
- For the department-level assemblies, the law provides for ‘substitutes’ – who replace the representative should they resign – and establishes a ‘parity ticket’: the representative and substitute must each be of a different sex.
- For the local elections (towns of 3 500 inhabitants or more), the law requires strict gender alternation on the lists.
- Finally, the law imposes parity on the executive committees of the regions and towns (3 500 inhabitants or more). From now on, the vice-presidents of the regional councils and deputy mayors will be elected by list PR (instead of first-past-the-post); the difference between the number of candidates of each sex may be no greater than one on each list.
4. ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW

In force for almost 10 years during which elections of different kinds have taken place, the French law can be evaluated critically with hindsight. This assessment will first look at the figures by which to analyse women’s progress within the local and national assemblies and then assess the party-political strategies that have been aimed at resisting the law. Finally, the overall effects of the law will be considered, both inside and outside the field of politics.

4.1. A review of the figures: unequal progress

The law led to a two-speed increase in female participation: rapid for assemblies elected via list PR, slow for the National Assembly, elected via a single-member system. This reflects the content of the law which, in the first case, imposes strict and obligatory requirements on the parties, whilst stipulating more lax and optional rules for the latter. In the list PR elections, the law (which requires parity of candidates and a zipper system) led automatically to an almost equal number of male and female representatives being elected. The 2001 and 2008 local elections, the 2004 and 2010 regional elections and, finally, the 2004 and 2009 European elections all demonstrate the legislation’s effectiveness in terms of producing equality.

In the 2001 local elections (towns of 3 500 inhabitants or more), application of the law led to an almost 85% increase in the proportion of women elected, up from 25.7% to 47.5% (Table 12). After the 2008 local elections, women held 48.5% of the seats. The dynamic was almost as strong in the regional elections, with the proportion of elected women increasing from 27.5% in 1998 to 47.6% in 2004 (+ 73%). Since the last elections in 2010, the proportion of women elected to the regional councils has reached 48%. The difficulty in achieving the 50% threshold has been due to the parties’ reticence in appointing women as heads of list. This consequently reduces the electoral chances of all women candidates on the list if it is short. In terms of the European Parliament, the proportion of elected representatives (already high before the law) increased from 40.2% in 1999 to 43.6% in 2004, and then to 44.4% in 2009. This progress was hampered by the creation of 8 super-regions in 2004, which replaced the previous system of full PR. Finally, the requirement for gender parity with alternation that applies to the Senate seats that are elected proportionally (i.e. around half of the seats) enabled a certain increase in female participation in the Upper Chamber. By the time the last seats were up for renewal26, the proportion of women had risen from 5.6% in 1998 to 10.6% in 2001, to 16.9% in 2004 and then to 21.9% in 2008.

26 A third of the Senate, which is indirectly elected by a body of elected representatives, is replaced every three years. As from 2011 on, a half will be replaced every time.
Table 12. Proportion of women elected to political assemblies in France, by electoral method and terms of the law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assemblies</th>
<th>PRIOR TO THE LAW</th>
<th>AFTER THE LAW</th>
<th>ELECTORAL METHOD</th>
<th>TERMS OF THE LAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>'Parity' encouraged = Financial penalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>LPR (large depts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>FPTP or MM (small depts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Large departments: Compulsory ‘parity’ Strict alternation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Small departments: No requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>LPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Compulsory ‘parity’ Strict alternation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Councils</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>LPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>Compulsory ‘parity’ Strict alternation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Councils*</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>No requirement except parity representative/substitute ticket as from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Councils (towns &gt; 3 500 inhabs.)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>LPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>Compulsory ‘parity’ Alternation in blocks of six in 2001; strict alternation in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Councils (towns &lt; 3 500 inhabs.)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>No requirement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Observatoire de la parité entre les Femmes et les Hommes – Ministry of the Interior. 
FPTP = single-member first-past-the-post 
MM = multi-member first-past-the-post (block vote); LPR = list proportional representation 
ML = majority list (To be elected in the first round on the list, an absolute majority is necessary, along with ¼ of the registered voters. At the second round, a relative majority is sufficient).

Applied twice to parliamentary elections, in 2002 and 2007, the law has had ambiguous effects in this regard. It gave rise to a rapid increase in the number of women candidates to the National Assembly although the increase in actual members elected was far slower. The proportion of women candidates, less than a quarter in 1997 (before the law), increased to 38.9% in 2002 and then 41.6% in 2007; the proportion of députés, however, which was 10.9% in 1997, languished at 12.3% in 2002, and only reached 18.5% in 2007, then stabilising at 18.2%, once the government was appointed.27 (Table 13). Progress in the seats held by women was stronger in 2007 (+ 50%) than in 2002 (+ 12%). Yet this

27 In France, a député cannot also hold ministerial office (Article 23 of the Constitution); once appointed as a minister, s/he must step down from Parliament. In January 2011, there were 107 women députés out of 577, or 19.4%. 

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remained limited when compared to the increase that took place before the law, in 1997 (+84%). This latter leap was due primarily to the PS winning the elections: with few incumbents to re-select, it approved a 30% quota of women candidates for the parliamentary elections.

Table 13. Proportion of women candidates fielded by the parliamentary parties in the National Assembly elections, 1997-2007, and proportion that were actually elected

| Parliamentary parties | Candidates | | | Elected members | | |
|-----------------------|------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| PC                    | 26.8 44.0 48.2 | 11.1 19.0 20.0 |
| PS                    | 27.8 36.3 46.5 | 17.6 16.3 25.9 |
| Greens                | 27.7 50.4 50.2 | 9.0 33.0 25.0 |
| RPR in 1997           | 7.7 20.6 26.6 | 3.6 10.4 14.3 |
| UMP in 2002 and 2007  | | | | |
| UDF in 1997 and 2002  | 8.9 18.9 27.9 | 6.4 6.8 0 |
| UDF-Modem in 2007 (democratic movement) | | | | |
| Nouveau Centre*       | - - 36.9 | - 0 |
| All parties           | 23.0 38.9 41.6 | 10.9 12.3 18.5 |

Source: idem

* Party comprising parliamentarians formerly belonging to the UDF and who reached an electoral agreement with the UMP, thus splitting with the UDF, François Bayrou’s party.

In the absence of official statistics, the few figures available on ethnic minority candidates elected suggest that they are few and far between. Only seven parliamentary members (députés and senators) elected to represent metropolitan France at national level come from ethnic minorities (0.8%), over half of whom (4) are women. The National Assembly has only one ethnic minority women: George Pau-Langevin, of West Indian descent and a socialist member for Paris, while the Senate has three women of North African origin. Paradoxically, the Senate, which is generally the more conservative chamber, has both more women (than the National Assembly) and more ethnic minority women. The 'ethnic' diversification of elected representatives is a little greater at local level, particularly at regional level. A survey of regional councillors (elected in 2004) conducted in 2005 by the Association des Régions de France (ARF) revealed that 11.5% of women councillors came from an immigrant background, as opposed to 6.5% of men.

4.2. Party resistance and gaps in the law

For list PR elections, the parties had no freedom of choice²⁸; parity between candidates was compulsory. For the parliamentary elections, however, they often adopted strategies with

²⁸ In the senatorial elections, however, the incumbents used a strategy of presenting a dissident list to get round the law. Rather than risk being beaten by being third on the official list, they preferred to be first on the dissident list, and their parties did not disown them.
which to circumvent the spirit of the law. In both the 2002 and 2007 elections, it was the small parties with no representation in parliament that best complied with the requirement for gender parity. The parliamentary parties (with the exception of the Greens), in contrast, tended to ignore it, and this was for two main reasons. The first was political: the large parties, particularly those on the right, had incumbent members to re-elect (in 2007, the UMP had more than 360 incumbents), which made it difficult to open up the selection process to women. The second was financial: bolstered by significant financial resources, they could afford to pay the fines. In 2007, and according to the Observatoire’s figures on gender parity, deductions from public subsidies for failure to implement parity in the selection process represented a loss of more than EUR 5 million out of total public funding of some EUR 74 million. The UMP suffered the highest penalty: more than EUR 4 million per year, as opposed to EUR 500,000 for the PS.

From the 2002 parliamentary elections until those of 2007, under pressure from activists, the parties (particularly those of the left) were forced to ensure greater compliance with the requirement for parity. As in 2002, however, each parliamentary party presented far more women candidates than were actually elected (Table 13). In 2007, the percentages were 26.6% for the UMP, as opposed to 14.3% elected (a 12.3 percentage point difference) and 46.5% for the PS, as opposed to 25.9% elected (a 20.6 percentage point difference). Can the women’s lack of success be put down to the fact that they performed less well? Or did the parties select them to stand in more marginal constituencies? We can verify this by looking at the scores achieved by each of the large political parties at the first round of the presidential elections in 2007, and then classifying the constituencies into four groups according to these scores. For the PC, the PS and the UMP, an analysis of the candidates selected to run in the parliamentary elections is illuminating (Table 14): the stronger a party’s position within a constituency, the more likely it is to field a male as opposed to a female candidate. As in 2002, the parties preferred to select men for the safe seats and leave the women in ‘missionary land’. The women were clearly the victims of a two-pronged discrimination: less often selected to begin with and, when they were, it was for ‘lost cause’ constituencies (Murray 2004 and 2010; Sineau and Tiberj, 2007).

### Table 14. Proportion of male candidates in the June 2007 parliamentary elections according to party strength in the constituency at the 1st round of the presidential elections in April 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores at the first round of the presidential elections</th>
<th>Proportion of male candidates in the parliamentary elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low score (--)</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low score (-)</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High score (+)</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high score (+++)</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations done with the help of F. Chanvril (Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po).

However, it is also the UMP (allied to the Nouveau Centre) that receives the biggest financial handout from the State, EUR 34 484 773 in 2007. The deduction represented 37.5% of the first instalment of its allowance but only 11.9% of its total allowance. Modem had some EUR 444 000 deducted, and the Communist Party EUR 67 000.

These took place before the parliamentary elections, on 26 April and 11 May 2007.
The parties were able to use an ambiguous law that enabled them to obtain money on the basis of ‘parliamentary gains’ (the number of members obtained) rather than by honouring the parity of candidates or elected members. In an electoral system that prioritises the incumbents, the parties – particularly those on the right – preferred to pay the ‘parity tax’ than to grant ‘good’ constituencies to novice women. In the UMP group, which has 55.1% of seats in the Assembly, women account for 14.3% (as opposed to 10.4% in 2002). Among the Socialists, which had less incumbents than the UMP, the increase in women has been stronger: they form 25.9% of the group’s numbers (as opposed to 16.3% in 2002).

All in all, the parties bear responsibility for having betrayed the mission conferred on them by Article 4 of the Constitution (see point 3.1.1). Despite a positive action law, France has not made up for lost time in relation to the proportion of women députés. It has even backslid in ten years, slipping in the world rankings from 42nd in 1997 (before the law) to 65th in 2002, 58th in 2007 and 61st in 2011. In the European Union, France languishes in 18th place, below the average (24.3). In contrast, Belgium – which applies legislated parity to list PR – has the greatest female parliamentary presence (39.3% of women députés in 2010).

5. A ‘VIRTUOUS DYNAMIC’: THE SYMBOLIC STRENGTH OF THE LAW

Has the so-called ‘parité’ law had an impact beyond its strict field of application? Although the law does not cover the composition of the government, its influence has been felt at this level, due to the explicit will of the President of the Republic. In France, the hybrid system of the Fifth Republic (where you do not have to be elected a député to become a minister) means that women are often appointed to government without having been elected to Parliament, even possibly being complete novices with regard to politics. Their appointment emanates from ‘an act of State’ and has no direct relation to their strength in Parliament as it is the President of the Republic who appoints ministers (except in times of ‘cohabitation’) during the presidential elections of April/May 2007, the UMP candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, faced a Socialist candidate, Ségolène Royal, in the second round. This ‘parity duel’ between a man from the right and a woman from the left led Sarkozy to make numerous promises to women during the campaign. Once President, he endeavoured to make his government a ‘shop window of representativeness’ (Sineau, 2011). The three governments of François Fillon that have been formed since 2007 have comprised between 33% and 36% women, a percentage never before achieved under a right-wing government. Moreover, these women ministers have been given important political roles of a ‘sovereign’ nature: Minister of the Interior, of Justice, Economy and Finances, of Foreign Affairs. The third Fillon government (following a reshuffle in February 2011) includes 10 women out of 30 members, or 33%, of which five Secretaries of State, two assistant Secretaries of State and 3 ministers. French women – lagging behind in terms of the parliamentary power they hold – are clearly up to speed in terms of the executive power they exercise (the European average being 26.1% as of 28 February 2011).

31 Classification of the Union interparlementaire to 30 April 2011.
33 Although, in France, ever since the 1970s, women have always been proportionally more numerous in their appointments to government than in their election to parliament, particularly when the left is in power.
34 This term is used when the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are of different political persuasions. As the Head of State does not have a majority with which to govern, the Prime Minister enjoys more significant de facto powers, including that of appointing the members of the government.
35 Source: www.robert-schuman.eu.
Moreover, the President of the Republic has given women the task of representing the immigrant community and ‘diversity’. In the second Fillon government (formed in June 2007), Nicolas Sarkozy appointed three women from ethnic minorities: one, Rachida Dati, as Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice, the second, Rama Yade, as minister in the Home Office, and the third, Fadela Amara, as minister within the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, with responsibility for town policy. The first two, Rachida Dati and Rama Yade, became extremely popular with the general public. Now, in the third Fillon government, there are two women from immigrant backgrounds, while a third (Marie-Luce Penchard), originally from Guadeloupe (West Indies,) is minister within the Home Office with responsibility for overseas departments and territories. Why is it that women (and not men) are especially chosen to demonstrate the diverse nature of the government? It is because, implicitly, they are more likely to give a soft image of immigration, stripping it of the fears it can inspire in some electors. More ‘visible’ too, they are appointed as being most suited to demonstrating the President of the Republic’s concept of a ‘mirror’ government intended to represent society’s diversity as closely as possible. Moreover, most of the women from ‘visible’ minorities who have been promoted to ministerial positions are also young, and from modest social backgrounds. They consequently hold a number of symbolic roles: within government they speak both on behalf of women, ethnic minorities, youth and, finally, social integration.

The so-called ‘parité law’ has also created a ‘virtuous dynamic’ within a number of the assemblies not covered by the law. Such is the case of the local councils in small communes. The proportion of elected women at this level increased from 21.0% in 1995 to 30% in 2001, but stabilised in 2008 at only 32.2% of those elected. The shockwave of the ‘parity revolution’ also extended to a number of local executive posts: deputy mayors in towns of 3 500 inhabitants or more (26.4% of women in 2001 and 48% in 2008) and vice-presidents of regional councils (34.6% in 2004 and 48.1% in 2010). Because of the new mechanism imposed by the law of 31 January 2007 (cf 3.2), parity is therefore on the point of being achieved in the executive committees of the towns and regions. In contrast, parity ‘engineering’ has had no knock-on effect at the level of the general councils. When seats were last up for renewal in 2011, only 13.8% of those women successfully elected were elected as full general councillors, the remaining 86.2% being elected as substitutes. These figures confirm that the new provisions of the law of 31 January 2007, which imposed parity on the holder/substitute ticket, have had a disappointing impact. Finally, the law has had no effect in terms of increasing female participation in the supreme executive functions of local assemblies, which remain almost exclusively a male preserve. In 2011, only 13.8% of mayors are women, along with 7.7% of presidents of regional councils and 5% of presidents of general councils. The increasing involvement of women at the grassroots and intermediary levels has clearly not filtered through to the top.

The law of 6 June 2000 also helped to raise awareness within the political parties: nearly all had to conform to the parity spirit, ensuring better representation of women in their governing bodies. Several parties, including government parties, currently have a woman as their elected head: the Greens (which merged with Europe Écologie in 2010) have been led by Cécile Duflot since 2006 while the Socialist Party, the main opposition party, appointed Martine Aubry as First Secretary in 2008. Among the smaller parties, Lutte ouvrière (extreme left) has been led since 2007 by Nathalie Arthaud (who took over from Nora Berra is the Minister for Health and Jeannette Bougrab Minister for Youth and Community Life. It should also be emphasised that this proportion varies depending on the size of the town: from 14.2% in small communes of less than 3 500 inhabitants, the proportion of women mayors falls to 9.6% for towns of 3 500 inhabitants or more.
Arlette Laguiller) and the Christian Democrats (right) are led by Christine Boutin, who founded the party in 2009.

The diffuse effect of the parity reform can also be measured against the yardstick of women’s growing presence in the elections around which the whole of French political life revolves: the presidential elections. Initially absent from a race that places great emphasis on men, increasing numbers of women are now taking up the challenge of running for president. Arlette Laguiller was the first and only woman of 12 candidates in 1974, but others soon followed her lead. Three stood in 1981, and then four in the presidential elections of 2002 and 2007. In 2007, for the first time, a government party chose a woman (following primaries) as its presidential candidate.

The unions and professional associations are not covered by the parity legislation but here, too, the law has been an indirect instrument with which to legitimise the presence of women. Medef (the French employers’ association) first elected Laurence Parisot as its head in 2005, and then again for a second term in 2010: a symbolic change in the professional world where male dominance remains high.

The parity logic has won over the business world: in February 2006, an initial law was passed imposing a 20% quota of women on the boards of public and private companies, to be met within a 5-year period. This provision was overruled by the Constitutional Council as not conducive to the principle of equality before the law (decision of 16 March 2006), and so the Constitution had to be revised once more. The law of 23 July 2008 amends Article 1 of the Constitution as follows: ‘The law favours the equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions along with social and professional responsibilities’. Since then, further legislation was passed on 13 January 2011 specifying that the proportion of either male or female directors in large companies must not be less than 40% by 2017. This law affects some 2,000 companies, setting aside 8,000 directorships for women. Even before it was enacted, the law had an immediate and beneficial effect: over the course of 2010, the proportion of women on the boards of large companies increased from 10% to 15%.

6. CONCLUSION

Whilst French legislation has failed in some ways, this must be balanced against other positive considerations related to the symbolic strength of the law: it has been an instrument by which to legitimise the presence of women in the public sphere as a whole, including the highest levels of State. Badly drafted by the lawmakers, however, it could certainly be improved. One solution would be to remove all public funding from parties who do not ensure equal numbers of male and female candidates in parliamentary elections, something which is advocated, moreover, by the Socialist Party and various organisations. A single mandate could also be imposed on députés (no possibility of holding concurrent positions), which would open up the circle of political elites to women and prevent the same person from holding both executive and deliberative powers. Finally, the use of the single-member system could also be restricted: it is a 'conservative' system that promotes a continuation of the same people in post, and lends itself badly to application of the concept of parity. For the time being, however, the right, currently in power, is hostile to any reform aimed at extending the use of the list PR system, as they consider it favours the parties of the left.

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38 The law concerns companies that employ an average of at least 500 permanent staff and have a net turnover or total balance sheet of at least EUR 50 million.
Moreover, the regional government reform bill recently approved in 2010 opted for a single-member system by which to elect the new ‘territorial councillors’ that will replace the current regional councillors (elected by a list system with compulsory parity) and general councillors (elected by the single-member system)\(^{39}\). The Constitutional Council has endorsed this electoral system, stating that it does not undermine the constitutional principle by which: ‘The law favours the equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective functions’, as this provision is not ‘of a binding nature’\(^{40}\). Parity is clearly going to be the first victim of this extension of the single-member system, even if it is accompanied by financial penalties for parties that do not present 50% of women candidates\(^{41}\). There is a fear that the local power so recently achieved by women may be reduced to nought because of the choice of an electoral system that restricts the scope of action of compulsory parity. The process of increased female participation in political life has thus far been achieved from the bottom up, at the local level, and it is this base that is going to be eroded through implementation of the regional reform.

\(^{39}\) With 3 493 of them in all, these territorial councillors, who will sit in both the departmental (general) and regional assemblies, are to be elected in a two-round, single-member ballot (with a second-round qualifying threshold of 12.5% of registered voters) in the context of the new canton-level constituencies. In order to try and compensate for this backdown on parity obligations, the text of the regional government reform provides that (as from 2014 on), list PR (with compulsory parity) will be established in communes of more than 500 inhabitants (instead of the current 3 500).

\(^{40}\) Decision No. 2010-618 of 9 December 2010. The Council considered that the second paragraph of the first article of the Constitution has neither the aim nor the effect of depriving the lawmaker of the power s/he derives from Article 34 of the Constitution to establish the electoral system for assemblies.

\(^{41}\) Deductions for failing to comply with parity in the canton-level elections will apply to a third of the parties’ overall publicly-funded budget, the remaining 2/3 being reserved for the parliamentary elections.
7. **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

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- Observatoire de la parité entre les femmes et les hommes, on line at: <http://www.observatoire-parite.gouv.fr>
CASE STUDY: GERMANY: SUCCESSFUL QUOTA RULES IN A GENDERED SOCIETY

Brigitte Geissel

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Since its founding in 1949, the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany has rested firmly on the principle of representative democracy. The framers of the German constitution, fearing supposed anti-democratic popular tendencies, designed moderating institutions between the people and the exercise of power. Political parties became the most important of these. Parties control access to the legislatures at all levels, in terms of both candidate selection and access to the policy-making process. Political scientists have even characterized the FRG as a ‘party state’ because parties make all the most important political decisions.

At the local lever, however, the power of political parties is slowly fading. Two electoral reforms at the level of the municipalities are giving voters more opportunities for selecting candidates and diminishing the traditional dominance of political parties: a) During the 1990s most federal states abolished the right of the local council to decide on the mayor. Today, the mayor can be elected directly by the people and most municipalities apply this option. b) Until recently, party lists have always been closed: candidates were ranked by the parties and citizens voted for a party list, but not for specific candidates. This is changing at the local level in more and more states. Voters can elect the candidates they want, no matter where the candidates are ranked on the party list. They can aggregate votes on one or several candidates and vote for candidates of different parties.

Some words about the German voting system: Germany’s electoral system combines the proportional system (‘party ballot’, based on party lists) with the single-member districts system (‘direct election’). Each party is assured representation in Parliament according to its share of the party ballot – if it is above the 5%-threshold. The party ballot determines how many parliamentary seats each party receives. Half of the national parliamentary seats (Bundestag) are normally elected on each system. However, all elected ‘directed candidates’ become member of the Bundestag. Since the ‘party ballot’ and the ‘direct candidates’ are set off against each other it can happen that most members of parliament of one party can be directly elected candidates (s. table 17). Most of the Bundesländer – Germany being a federal nation-state with 16 states (Bundesländer) – have adopted a similar voting system.

2. THE ORIGINS OF QUOTA PROVISIONS AND DEBATES

Until the 1970s quota rules were hardly discussed in Germany. Debates about the need to increase women’s political representation came to prominence with the rise of the Green Party (inception: 1980), the emergence of the new women’s movement, and the public mood on equality of the sexes. Quota rules through constitutional provisions or electoral laws/legal quotas, common in several other countries, are not discussed in Germany. Quotas adopted voluntarily by parties are the only existing form in Germany.

 Debates about gender quotas were conducted within the Green Party from its inception and among the Social Democrats (SPD) from the 1980s. The Party of Democratic Socialism
(PDS, since 2007 The Left/PDS) discussed quota rules in the early 1990s, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) did so in the mid-1990s and the CSU discussed quota rules several times until today (see below). In the Free Democratic Party (FDP) quota rules were never discussed seriously.

The debates within the SPD illustrate the arguments ‘pro’ and ‘con’ quota rules in an illuminating way. Despite the under-representation of women – for example, in 1972 only 5.4 per cent of the SPD members of the Bundestag were women – the SPD majority, including the party’s Women’s Commission, rejected quota until the 1980s. Since the 1980s the women of the SPD’s Women’s Commission, along with other proponents, drew on the feminist discourse on gender equality, on equality between human beings and the conviction that no group in society should be excluded from political representation. They argued mainly that women should have the same possibilities and political opportunities as men (Journal: Sozialdemokratischer Informationsdienst 28 (1988): 10). Other debate participants referred to quality – its enhancement or preservation. Discussants expressed either their hope that ‘quota rules improve quality’ or their fear that ‘quota rules hinder quality’. Proponents argued that female politicians would enhance the quality of policy making and political outcomes. Inge Wettig Daniemeier, the chair of the SPD’s Women’s Commission, and Hans Jochen Vogel, chair of the Equal Rights Commission of the SPD, argued in their speeches at the SPD’s 1988 meeting that female politicians ‘will change our party. They will also change politics’, and they expected that ‘these changes are a tremendous opportunity’ (Journal: Sozialdemokratischer Informationsdienst 28, 1988: 10). This argument was based on the assumption that women and men have different interests, attitudes and experience. Because of Germany’s traditional gender concept – the breadwinner–housewife model – this argument may have been especially convincing in Germany (see also section 6 of this case study). On the basis of the dominant breadwinner–housewife model, the proponents of quotas stressed that women and men live in ‘different realms’ and that it is mostly women who have to combine family work and employment. They argued that women – more often than their male colleagues – put topics related to the lives of women on the political agenda, thus leading to better policy outcomes (Geissel 1999: 194). Opponents declared that quota rules would lead to a lack of quality in politics because they would undermine performance as the criterion for political promotion. They emphasized that unconstrained, open recruiting mechanisms are needed to find the best candidate and to make sure that candidates are chosen who possess the necessary skills and abilities to be a politician.

Discussions about quota rules have been recently (2010) held within the CSU. Several members of the CSU, who have opposed quota rules for years, now support them. Especially a lot of women, who have been active in the CSU for a long time, were frustrated because main positions were still taken by men as a matter of course and there was no change during the last 20 years to this tradition. For example out of 42 local CSU county commissioners there is no single woman. They point out that there was no progress concerning representation of women within the CSU, but steps backwards. Finally the supporters of quota rules pushed their arguments forward and forced a new discussion.

42 The breadwinner–housewife model means that one party of a couple, usually the man, earns money and the other, usually the woman, stays at home and is responsible for childcare and housework. The whole German system is based on this model, for example, day-care for toddlers is very rare, schools normally close around noon, and children finish their school day at lunchtime. Mothers are expected to be available for childcare the whole day: for example, if teachers cannot be present, the children are sent home. The German tax system favours the breadwinner–housewife model significantly by offering substantial tax relief for breadwinner–housewife couples. This tax relief adds up to over 20 milliard Euro every year and there is hardly any discussion about changing the state’s tremendous support for this lifestyle.
3. THE ADOPTION OF QUOTA PROVISIONS

In Germany quota rules were self-imposed by some parties only. It may be worth mentioning that most German parties had established several informal quota rules for years – in the context of regional background, position in the work force, membership in different political wings and so on. These rules are not written, but in the process of selection and nomination most parties try to balance more conservative versus progressive candidates, candidates from trade unions versus employers, candidates from the north of the country and the south, to mention just a few of the hidden quota rules.

Since its inception in 1980, and fixed in the party statute in 1986, the Green Party has had a 50 : 50 rule for all candidates on electoral lists (local, state and nation-state), internal party committees and party leadership. On electoral lists the odd numbers are reserved for women, including the first place. Women can, however, also be placed on even numbers on the list and women-only lists are allowed.

The SPD decreed and implemented its quota rule in 1988: by 1990, 40 per cent of each SPD candidate list on all political levels had to be women. By 1993, 40 per cent of all internal SPD positions, including the internal party leadership, were to be held by women and by 1998 all the party’s mandates to public office.

The PDS introduced a 50 per cent quota rule at its founding in 1990 (local, state and nation-state elections as well as internal party committees).

The CDU and the FDP initially rejected any quota regulations, though the CDU eventually introduced soft quotas (Quoren) in the mid-1990s, stating that women should be represented to at least 30 per cent on electoral lists. The statutes also demand that in ‘group elections’ for internal party positions (Gruppenwahlen zu Parteiämtern) at least one-third of the candidates must be female.

The Christian Social Union (CSU) had until recently adopted a non-binding guideline that ‘women must be taken into account’ and had a voluntary commitment that a woman should get the second position of every electoral list and that there should be at least four women in every ‘block of ten’. However, in 2010 the CSU adopted an internal quota rule, demanding that within party’s governing boards 40% of positions should be held by women – local party chapters don’t have to follow this rule.

The FDP opposes any quota rules because they would not fit with its liberal tradition.

In systems of proportional representation, such as Germany, quotas work through party lists. This means that approximately equal numbers of men and women are represented on the party lists. To guarantee that half of the seats will go to women regardless of how many seats a party wins, the Green Party and the PDS have adopted a ‘zipper system’ alternating one woman and one man. The Green Party even demands that a woman must occupy the first position on the list. The SPD in its statutes established a slightly different kind of ‘zipper system’. Positions on the list must be given in turn to a man and a woman and every fifth seat can be taken by a man or a woman. At the local and the state level (Landtag) the regulations on the listing system are less strict: they are just that 40 per cent of the candidates on the list must be women.

What do the monitoring and sanction mechanisms look like? The CDU regulation provides a
soft formulation – that the list can be rejected if women are not sufficiently taken into account. If not enough women are on the list, an internal election committee has to receive an explanation as to why this is the case. If the quorum for internal positions is not filled, a second election is necessary. However, if the lack of women persists in the second election, the outcome is considered valid (CDU statute, 2007).

The SPD does not provide sanctions in its statute if the quota rules are not complied with for elections to legislative bodies. If in elections for internal party positions more than 60 per cent of one sex is chosen, a second ballot is needed in which only people of the under-represented sex can be elected. If there are not enough people of the under-represented sex available, exceptions are possible (SPD statute on the organization, 2007).

The women’s statute of the Green Party (2007) established that the election meeting decides about the procedure if no woman is interested to take a reserved position on the list. The female participants at the election meeting have a veto right.

For The Left/PDS, if it is not possible to follow the zipper system because of a lack of female candidates, the positions for women remain open and are filled with a by-election. If the percentage of available women is below one-fourth, exceptions from this rule may be possible. For internal party positions the mechanism is similar: in the first ballot the list must follow the zipper system, even if one position on the list is empty. If there are residual positions, a second ballot is held (statute of The Left/PDS).

In elections for legislative bodies the zipper system may not be the final word. In more and more Bundesländer the electoral lists are no longer predetermined by the parties - at the local level and in a couple of Bundesländer also at the state level (e.g. Hamburg): constituents can decide the order of the elected candidates by accumulating votes on one or several candidates and they can vote for candidates of different parties. Case studies in Baden-Württemberg show inconsistent results on the gender balance. Some electoral districts have voted in favour of women, while in other communities the voters have ‘pushed men up the list’ (Wehling 2000: 205ff.).

4. IMPLEMENTATION

This section evaluates the effectiveness of the quota system in Germany. It does so in three ways. First, the candidate selection and the nomination process are described briefly. Second, it examines whether the parties that have quota rules comply on the electoral lists with their zipper systems. Third, the numerical outcomes in nation-state, state and local parliaments and in the European Parliament, as well as internal party positions, are analysed.

4.1. Candidate selection and nomination process: quota regulations increase the recruitment of women

Interviews with female German politicians demonstrate that the candidate selection and nomination processes are strongly influenced by quota rules (Geissel 1999; Geissel and Hust 2005). Because of the quota rules, parties were looking for women. In parties with quota rules, female party members often received encouragement to start a political career. Women seem to develop political aspirations more often in these parties than in non-quota parties. The findings of qualitative studies lead to the hypothesis that quota rules lead not only to the mobilization of women generally but also to the mobilization of
women who do not have a strong political or social elite background.

In contrast, recruitment of women in parties that do not have quota rules is often restricted to women who come from politically involved families and a social elite background. These women have often aspired to political careers from the beginning of their party membership, supported strongly by their families (Geissel and Hust 2005; Geissel 1999; Schwarting 1995: 41ff; Meyer 1994). However, quantitative studies are necessary to substantiate this hypothesis.

4.2. Positions of women on electoral lists: quota rules mostly fulfilled

At elections on the nation-state and state level as well as elections to the European Parliament, parties that have quota rules do mostly abide by them (SPD, Green Party, The Left). Exceptions are few and minor. The situation looks different at the local level. In big cities, compliance is relatively high, but in small or rural districts quota rules are often not fully applied. However, today, as already mentioned, most Bundesländer allow voters to select the candidates themselves – no matter where the candidate is ranked on the party list. The zipper system does no longer provide equal representation of women at the local level and in some state elections.

4.3. Women in legislative and executive bodies: success of quota rules

What about the numerical representation of women? For decades women’s political representation in Germany lagged behind. Until the early 1980s fewer than 10 per cent of elected legislators in the Bundestag were women, but this share climbed to 20 per cent in 1990 and 30 per cent in 1998. It has been stagnant at around 30 per cent since then (see table 15).

Table 15. Women in the German national Parliament (Bundestag) 1949–2011
Figures are for the beginning of the parliamentary term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary term</th>
<th>% of women MP’s</th>
<th>Parliamentary term</th>
<th>% of women MP’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: <http://www.db-decision.de>, August 2003, websites of the Bundestag

As could be expected, there are significant variations in the proportion of women within the parliamentary party groups (see table 16). The results of the elections illustrate clearly that
parties with quota rules have performed much better regarding gender equality than parties without these rules.

**Table 16. The percentage of women in the parliamentary party groups of the Bundestag (Bundestagsfraktion), by political party 1949-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>Green Party</th>
<th>The Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>13,0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>12,2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>10,3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>13,0</td>
<td>8,3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>8,6</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>35,7</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>56,8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>20,3</td>
<td>27,2</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>47,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>13,9</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>33,7</td>
<td>59,2</td>
<td>43,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18,4</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>35,2</td>
<td>57,4</td>
<td>58,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23,0</td>
<td>21,3</td>
<td>37,9</td>
<td>58,2</td>
<td>(100)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>19,9</td>
<td>24,6</td>
<td>36,0</td>
<td>56,9</td>
<td>46,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20,1</td>
<td>24,7</td>
<td>38,4</td>
<td>54,4</td>
<td>52,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the Bundestag a party must have at least three elected members to become a parliamentary party group. The PDS had 2002-2005 only two MPs, both female, and was therefore not considered as a parliamentary party group.

**Sources:**

Table 16 also shows that the most significant increase of women’s descriptive representation took place during the 1990s in most parties. Since the turn of the millennium however, this trend has come to a stop. For example representation of women within the CDU/CSU parliamentary party group went form 23% in 2002 to 19,9% in 2005 and to 20,1% in 2009.

How many women were now elected on the party lists and how many as direct candidates? Table 17 provides information on this question. However, interpreting the findings is an intricate matter as two of the quota parties (the Green Party and The Left/PDS) are relatively small and the probability of their winning districts in direct elections is tiny.
The percentage of women elected by ‘direct election’ (single-member districts system) did hardly change since the election in 2005. Looking at the percentage of women from party lists (proportional system), there was little change as well – with one exception, the CDU/CSU. However, most of the candidates of the CDU/CSU received their mandate by direct election (218 out of 239), only 21 candidates were selected by party list. Nine of these 21 candidates were women. This is due to the fact that most candidates on the party lists have already gained their seats via direct elections – and these members of parliament, elected via the single-member districts system, are mostly men. All together only 20% of the CDU/CSU parliamentarians are women.

Within the national executive body (the cabinet), until the 1980s there were at most two female ministers, but since then constant growth could be seen – until the beginning of the millennium. In the last years there was no real progress: after the election of 2005 five out of 14 ministers have been females (36 per cent) – plus a female chancellor. After the election of 2009, four out of 15 ministers were female and today, 2011, after some changes within the German cabinet, 5 out of 15 ministers are women.

The members of the second chamber, the Bundesrat (Federal Council), which represents the governments of the states, are appointed by the cabinets of the states. The competence of the members of the Bundesrat, who are delegates of their state’s governments, are limited. The members of the Bundesrat are required to cast the votes of the state they represent as a bloc. So each state can only vote ‘with one voice’ and if the delegates cannot reach a consensus they must abstain. The percentage of women in the Bundesrat is traditionally low. There are no quota rules for the Bundesrat and no such rule has ever been discussed – they would be useless anyway.

Within the parliaments of the Bundesländer the percentage of women had risen significantly during the 1990s and is now stagnating as well. The average percentage of women was below 10 per cent until the mid-1980s but has increased gradually to above 30 per cent since the turn of the millennium – differing clearly between parties. Generally the proportion of women of the SPD in the Landtage is, with minor fluctuations, between 30 and 40 per cent, the Green Party and The Left/PDS have around 50 per cent women, and the CDU and the FDP have around 20 per cent. However, the distribution between men and women varies also significantly between the Länder. The lowest rates of women’s
representation (less than 30 per cent) were found in the two southernmost and most politically conservative states (e.g., Bavaria), while the highest percentage was in the city-states (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg), and some northern and eastern states.

The percentage of women within state governments varies vastly. The number of women in the executives of the Bundesländer, the state governments, depends on the party in charge. With few exceptions the proportion of women in Landesregierungen (state cabinets) is higher where the SPD governs alone or as part of a coalition (see table 18).

Female leaders of a German state (Ministerpräsident) are still rare. The first female leader of a German state was Heide Simonis (SPD, Schleswig-Holstein, 1993-2005). Today (2011) two women are leading state governments, Christine Lieberknecht (CDU, Thuringia, since 2009) and Hannelore Kraft (SPD, North Rhine-Westphalia, since 2010).

43 The calculation of the percentage of women in state governments varies in different publications, because sometimes only ministers are taken into account, sometimes ministers plus the respective state secretaries of the ministry. And some Bundesländer have a different system of ‘government’, which makes it more difficult to calculate the percentage of women.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria (CSU – 2008, CSU + FDP 2008-)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia (CDU – 2009, CDU + FDP 2009- )</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Percentage of women in parliaments and governments* of the German states (Bundesländer), 1992-2011

Note: The dates of elections for the German Landtage and their legislative terms (four or five years) are not harmonized. The dates in this table (1992, 1996, 2006 and 2011) were chosen because in many states elections took place in or around those years.

* See footnote 2 about the different calculations of women in state governments.

** Several elections and changes of state cabinets took place between 2006 and 2008. Thus we add the numbers for 2008 in brackets.

Sources:
http://www.db-decision.de, accessed 14 May 2011
- Websites of the regional parliaments and governments (statistics), accessed 14 May 2011
- Websites of the political parties, accessed 14 May 2011
A study of women in the state parliaments in Baden-Württemberg reveals a trend already shown at the national level: after a rapid growth of the percentage of women in legislative bodies during the 1990s: the growth flattens (see figure 6). In the election of 2011 the percentage of women within the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg was declining for the first time since 1968, from 23.7% to 18.1%. (Green Party: 30.6%, SPD: 17.1%, CDU: 13.3%, FDP: 0%). The situation is not that dramatic in all state parliaments, but there is a clear trend that the rise of women in politics came to a stop.

Figure 6. Development of the percentage of women in state parliaments of Baden-Württemberg 1972-2009

Available statistics on the representation of women at the local level are meagre. Most studies were conducted in the 1990s and few current compilations of data are available. On the local level the percentage of women in representative bodies climbed from about 10 per cent in the 1970s to 25 per cent in the mid-1990s (Geissel 1999). This percentage seems to be stagnating – with substantial differences between the parties. The CDU and the FDP, had the lowest percentages of women, with about 20 per cent; the Green Party and The Left/PDS have about 40 per cent.

However, the percentage of women in local representative bodies is not only dependent on their party affiliation. It is generally higher in major cities than in smaller cities and it is lowest in the countryside. Both criteria – party affiliation and size of the municipality – matter.

4.4.  Representation of women on parties’ governing boards

The presence of women on the political parties’ governing boards (or steering committees and national executive boards) differs as between the parties (see table 19). As mentioned above, the SPD, the Green Party and The Left/PDS adopted quota rules for internal party positions; the other parties had non-binding guidelines - until recently, when the CSU adopted quota rules for internal party positions. In the parties that do not have (strict) quota rules – the CDU and the FDP – the proportion of women is mostly around 25 per cent. In contrast, the percentage of women is higher in the quota parties (see table 19). Recent quota rules adopted by the CSU have not yet shown effects.
Table 19. The percentage of women in the German parties’ governing boards (Parteigremien) 2003/2004 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Steering committee Präsidium</th>
<th>National executive board Bundesvorstand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left/PDS</td>
<td>–*</td>
<td>–*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU**</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Within the Left/PDS no Präsidium exists, just a Präsidium of the Länderrat, which is a different from the Präsidium of the other parties.
** At the federal level the CDU and CSU have to be mentioned conjointly because they work as one parliamentary party. However, on the party level they have different committees and boards.

Source:
Deutsches Jugendinstitut (DIJ), 2005.
Websites of the political parties

The question whether there are barriers to the effective implementation of electoral gender quotas is difficult to answer. Quota rules seem to work relatively effectively. Every now and then some voices from within a party question the quota rules, but hitherto there seem to have been no serious challenges. It may also be worth mentioning that even in parties that have quota rules the organizational structures, for example time and place of meetings, are based on the concept of a politician without family commitments (for more examples and details, see Geissel 1999: 129–32.). Thus, on the one hand parties with quota rules may support women, but on the other hand their structures impede women.

5. INTERSECTIONALITY

In Germany, just one minority group is provided with guaranteed political representation in the parliament of one Bundesland, Schleswig-Holstein: the party of the Danish Germans is free from the 5% hurdle. Up to now there are discussions about similar rights for the Sorben in Brandenburg. However, these are very small, regional groups and are almost unknown at the federal level. Rules concerning the political representation of the biggest minority in Germany – migrants, and especially migrants from Turkey – are just emerging (see below).

Statistical data about the political representation of minorities is not available for Germany. As in most other countries, research depends on the ‘visibility’ of minorities. Appearance or name are the main indicators to identify people with migrant background.

However, there are some interesting developments in Germany concerning the representation of migrants within political leadership: First, one of the two chair-persons of the Green Party is a man with a Turkish background, Cem Özdemir. Born in Germany, his parents were so called Gastarbeiter (immigrant workers). Second, recently a female muslim of Turkish ascent became minister in one of the German Länder, in Lower-Saxony. Ayguel Oezkan is a member of the CDU (Christian Democrats) and was appointed minister...
of social affairs. Her career as minister started with a scandal. She criticized the presence of crucifixes in state schools and not only her conservative party fellow considered her critique as wrong. Within days Oezkan back-pedalled and followed the party line.

A **third** example is Philipp Roesler, Vietnamese-born leader of the German liberal party (FDP) and former health minister, now minister of economics at the federal level (Bundesminister). He was adopted by German parents as a child. His appearance is Asian, whoever he is German and defines himself as German. The fourth example is Bilkay Öney, a female politician with Turkish origin, who was appointed minister of integration in Baden-Württemberg in May 2011 by the social democratic party.

Within political leadership men and women with migrant background are represented relatively equally - if this can be said based on such a small number. However, it is telling that female politicians with migrant background gained positions as ministers.

Of course, politicians with migration background can not only be found within political leadership, but are also increasingly represented as members of parliament. Whereas in the last legislative period just 11 parliamentarians (out of over 600) had a migration background, today 21 parliamentarians are of Turkish, Iranian, Indian, Polish, Czech, or other migrant descent. As it might be expected – since Turks are the biggest migration group – most members of parliament with a migration background are of Turkish ascent. At the federal level, these are for example Sevim Dağdelen (Left), Ekin Deligöz and Memet Kilic (both Greens) as well as Serkan Tören (FDP). But also other migrant backgrounds are represented: Gnieszka Malczak (Green party), born in Poland, Raju Sharma (Left), whose father is Indian, Michaela Noll (CDU), born as Michaela Tadjadod, Bijan Djir-Sarai (FDP), Omid Nouripour (Greens) and Niema Movassat (Left), all with an Iranian background, are among the most ‘visible’ members. Obviously men and women with migrant background are both represented. It is not the case that women with migrant backgrounds are ‘left out’, quite the opposite. It looks like especially female descendants of migrant workers are active politicians.

Members of state parliaments (Landtage) are as well more and more ‘multi-culti’, again mainly people with Turkish heritage can be found in the parlaments of the states (for example Muhterem Aras, Greens, BW; Hamide Akbayir, Left, NRW; Evrim Baba-Sommer, Left, Berlin; Canan Bayram, SPD, Berlin; Özlem Demirel, Left, NRW; Emine Demirbüken-Wegner, CDU, Berlin, Kadiye Karci Left, Berlin; Dilek Kolat, SPD, Berlin; Bilkay Öney, SPD, Berlin (until 2011); Ülker Radziwill, SPD, Berlin; Şirvan-Latıfah Çakıcı Left, Bremen).

Some political parties are very aware of the challenge to integrate citizens with migrant background. The social democrats (SPD) recently (May 2011) adopted a rule that 15 per cent of their governing boards at the federal level (‘Bundespartei’) should be held by party members with migration background. The number, 15 per cent, was decided due to the fact, that 15 per cent of the party members have a migration background. Sanctions for non-compliance are not yet decided on. With this decision, the SPD is the first party adopting quote rules for migrants/migrant descendants within their governing boards. And immediately the party produced facts and elected Kenan Kolat, a Turkish party member, into the national executive board. Governing boards at state level are asked to follow this quote rule as well, but for state level governing boards an official quota rule does not exist. A combination of gender quotas and minority quotas is not yet discussed.

The other parties are reluctant to adopt quotas party member with migration background. It does not come as a surprise that the liberals reject any kind of quote for
migrants, because it would be discriminatory – similar to the arguments against gender quota.

Constitutional or legal quotas concerning the representation of migrants are very unlikely to be adopted in Germany. However, it might be possible that other parties follow the policy of the social democrats and decide on rules concerning the representation of citizens with migrant background for their governing boards or for the legislative. Combinations of quotas for women and for people with migrant backgrounds are not yet discussed.

6. **THE OUTCOME OF GENDER QUOTA IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION ON QUOTAS IN OTHER ARENAS**

Up to now the struggle for gender equality in Germany has been relative successful in the world of party politics, but in other arenas success is very slow. In social policies the dominant breadwinner model still prevails and quota rules, anti-discrimination policies or affirmative action in the workforce have barely been able to gain ground. For example, the Anti-Discrimination Law, primarily directed at eliminating discrimination in the workplace, was rejected by the Bundesrat in 2005\(^4\), and opportunities to reconcile work and family are still less developed than in other countries (Wahl 2006).

The German Minister of Labour, Ursula von der Leyen, has recently started a debate about quotas for women in supervisory and management boards, on company boards and in executive positions. She is strongly in favour of quotas and has been very engaged to push rules to increase the proportion of women on these boards. However, she was not successful. Her party, the conservative CDU and most business organizations strongly oppose her proposal.

Von der Leyen, who had been former minister for families, was also very active demanding better day nursery and full-day schools. In this field she was partly successful. However, the new minister of families, Kristina Schröder, is not continuing the path of von der Leyen. Schröder opposes, for example, quote rules in supervisory and management boards and has more mixed attitudes about the role of women within family and workforce.

It is almost impossible to find out whether the implementation of quota rules facilitated the election of the first German female chancellor, Angela Merkel. Her selection was probably more due to the fact that she seemed to be one of the few CDU party elite members with a clean record after the scandal around Kohl was revealed. Furthermore she is a strategic thinker. Being a woman was never part of her political program.

7. **CONCLUSION**

The main question of the study on gender quotas in Europe is whether quotas really result in a greater involvement of women in the decision-making process. On the basis of the findings in Germany, the answer is in the affirmative. Quota rules have led to a better representation of women in the decision-making bodies. However, quota rules do not necessarily lead to equal representation of women. The German example shows that there is not much movement after a peak of around 30 per cent has been reached. Stagnation around the 30% threshold seems to become the new ‘unofficial rule’. This finding is

\(^4\) The bill was finally passed by the Parliament in 2006 in a slightly changed version.
relatively new, at least in the German case, and the future will show whether and how this threshold can be overcome.

8. LIST OF REFERENCE


Other sources

- Current statutes, rules and regulation concerning quota rules – the CDU, SPD, FDP, Green Party, The Left
- For the national elections 2002 and 2005 – electoral lists of the CDU, SPD, FDP, Green Party, PDS and The Left/PDS.
- For the last elections in the states (*Landtagswahlen*) – electoral lists of the CDU,

- Electoral lists of the CDU, SPD, FDP, Green Party, PDS and The Left/PDS for local elections: case study of randomly selected municipalities (Mainz, the 13 districts of Mainz, Brandenburg, Cottbus, Frankfurt/Oder, Potsdam, Barnim, Dahme-Spreewald, Elbe-Elster, Havelland, Oberhavel, Oberspreewald-Lausitz, Oder-Spree, Ostprignitz-Ruppin, Schwerin, Südwestpfalz, Berlin-Mitte, Spiesen-Elversberg, Saarlouis, Frankfurt/Main, Wiesbaden-Mitte, Kassel, Leipzig, Uckermark, districts of Bremen, districts of Berlin; Stadt Frankenthal including election for district elections)

CASE STUDY: POLAND: IT’S TIME FOR WOMEN: GENDER QUOTAS ON ELECTORAL LISTS

Małgorzata Fuszara

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Men and women in Poland were fully enfranchised in 1918. Before World War II women were not promoted as candidates for Parliament: they made up just over 2 per cent of candidates and were placed at the end of candidate lists. As a result, over the entire period 1919–39, women won 41 seats in the lower chamber (the Sejm) and 20 in the upper chamber (the Senat), thus accounting for 1.9 per cent of members of the Sejm and 3.8 per cent in the upper chamber.

From the end of World War II until 1989, the Polish Parliament consisted of one chamber only, the Sejm. In practice, between 1945 and 1989 candidates were nominated by the ruling party (the United Workers Party) and its allies (the agrarian United Peasants’ Party and the middle-class Democratic Party) (Kurczewski 1999). The number of women in Parliament increased, although they never accounted for more than 23 per cent of all deputies.

As a part of the round table agreement between the ruling parties and the political opposition (Solidarity), in 1989 the Senat was reintroduced into the Polish system. The elections to the Senat in 1989 were free, but only 35 per cent of the seats in the Sejm were elected in free elections (65 per cent was reserved for United Workers Party, United Peasants’ Party and Democratic Party, it was the ‘contractual Sejm’ of 1989–91). Since 1991 MPs have been elected in general, direct, equal and proportional elections to the Sejm (article 96 of the constitution). Voters cast one preferential vote on a semi-open list.

In elections to municipalities with a population below 20 thousand, the majority rule is in force. In other cases (municipalities with population over 20 thousand, as well as higher-level administrative units – powiat, and regional legislatures, sejmiki) the electoral system is proportional representation. Senators are elected in general and direct elections (article 97 of the constitution), following a majority rule.

Since 1993 there has been a 5 per cent threshold for political parties and a 7 per cent threshold for coalitions to win seats in the Parliament. As a result, the number of parties represented in the Parliament fell sharply (currently there are only four parties represented in the Sejm).

45 “It’s time for women” (Czas na kobiety) was the motto and leitmotif of the first Women’s Congress that took place in Warsaw in 2009, with the aim of implementation of 50/50 gender quotas on electoral lists.
46 Poland regained its independence in 1918. The decree of 28 November 1918 on the election procedure for the Sejm, the first legal regulation regarding elections in the reborn Polish state, recognised women’s and men’s rights to vote and to be elected. The first article read: ‘Any citizen aged 21 or over by the day the election is announced, regardless of gender, may vote in the Sejm election’. According to article 7, ‘All and any citizens who are eligible to vote ... may be elected to the Sejm’.
47 Article 133 of the Electoral Statute (Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu RP i Senatu RP) of 12 April 2001, as amended. According to article 134, parties that are minority-based are not required to pass the 5 per cent threshold.
2. WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT AND LOCAL COUNCILS: ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE QUOTA SYSTEMS

The percentage of women in the Sejm and the Senat in Poland has always been rather low: it has never exceeded 23 per cent.

Table 20. Female members of the Polish Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of women among members of the Sejm</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of women among members of the Sejm</th>
<th>% of women among members of the Senat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is noticeable that the number of women in the Sejm decreased rapidly in the years of political ‘thaw’, that is, when the communist regime was slightly less oppressive. In 1956, the percentage of female MPs in the Sejm reached the exceptionally low level of 4 per cent. The percentage of women fell from 20 per cent to 13 per cent after the first free (in fact partly free) elections in 1989: this happened in all post-communist countries. One factor that seems to be important here should be mentioned: the percentage of women decreases when the Parliament wields real power. When the Parliament seemed to gain real power granted under the constitution (in 1956) or when it actually gained this power (in 1989), the percentage of female MPs fell sharply.

Elections in the autumn of 2001 were preceded by extensive programme to increase women’s participation in power, which brought noticeable results. There were a number of reasons for this shift.

1. Three parties (the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD\(^{48}\)), the Labour Union (UP\(^{49}\)) and the Freedom Union (UW\(^{50}\)) guaranteed women a minimum 30 per cent of the positions on their candidate lists.

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\(^{48}\) A left-wing political party, represented in the Parliament, currently in opposition. In the past several prime ministers were members of the party – Jozef Oleksy, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Leszek Miller and President Aleksander Kwasniewski.

\(^{49}\) A left-wing political party, now in alliance with the SLD. The feminist MP Izabella Jaruga Nowacka, who was government plenipotentiary for the equal status of women and men between 2001 and 2004 and vice-prime minister 2004–2005, was a member of the party.

\(^{50}\) Unia Wolnosci (Freedom Union), a liberal-democratic party, rooted in the Solidarity movement. Among the members of the party were first prime minister after the democratic political transformation, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the well-known politician Bronislaw Geremek and the only women prime minister in Poland, Hanna Suchocka. The party lost the election in 2001 and split: some members formed a new party (demokraci.pl), and some members are currently part of the ruling party Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, the PO).
2. Society’s electoral preferences changed: very rightist parties which promote traditional gender roles did not enter the Sejm at all, while the left-leaning parties had a majority and formed the governing coalition.

3. The women’s lobby gained strength. Before the 2001 elections, women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs), women politicians and women activists undertook many initiatives aiming to increase women’s participation in power.

4. Attitudes to the presence of women in politics were slowly changing – more and more people share the opinion that women should make up a larger proportion of the membership of authorities.

Moreover, a slow but steady increase in the proportion of women in the local authorities has been observable in Poland. In 1998, women held overall 16% of seats in local councils; in 2002 the figure was 18%, in 2006 – 21%, and in 2010 – 25% of seats.

2.1. Attempts to introduce a quota system into the general legal system before 2009

As the above data show, the participation of women in political representation in Poland is much lower than that of men. A debate on the introduction of a mechanism which would accelerate the process of achieving equality between men and women has been conducted on and off since the early 1990s. Attempts to introduce it have centred around two strategies.

1. *The introduction of a quota system as a part of the law on the equal status of women and men.* Drafts of such a law were being created jointly by the Parliamentary Women’s Group, women’s NGOs and women experts from the early 1990s. The bill was supposed to regulate fully the issue of equality of women and men, create mechanisms to prevent discrimination, and set up institutions to which a person who suffered discrimination could file a complaint in a discrimination case. One of the most divisive issues in the bill was a 40 per cent quota in all appointed or nominated authorities. The bill was submitted to Parliament many times and just as often rejected.

2. *The introduction of a quota system as a part of the electoral law.* A legislative proposal intended to give both sexes equal opportunities in elections was submitted during debates on the election law in 2001. During those debates in 2001 the UW proposed a regulation that would require parties and election committees to have a minimum quota – at least 30 per cent of their candidates – of each gender among their candidates standing in general elections. The bill was rejected almost without debate.

2.2. Women’s Congress and campaign for parity

In June 2009 in Warsaw, Women’s Congress was held. The Congress had been organized by a network of women, some of whom are members of women’s NGOs, but the great majority of whom has never been active in such organizations. Some of these women are active in business organizations or in the academia, while others work as actresses, directors, journalists, hold ministerial offices currently or held such offices in the past. In other words, they are women from a wide range of circles, professions, interests and political options. The Congress, which was preceded by a series of regional conferences, met with great interest not only form women’s organizations but also from general

51 The Parliamentary Women’s Group was formed in 1990. The main goal of the group is the promotion of women and women’s issues. Currently 61 MPs are member of the group.
audience: from women who had never been members of such organizations as well as from local and national media. Over 4000 women participated. The activism it sparked has all the characteristics of a broad women's movement. A decision was made to propose a citizens’ bill on gender parity on electoral candidate lists. Consequently, a social campaign was required, and a drive to collect the 100 000 signatures necessary for the bill to be considered by the Sejm, i.e. the lower parliamentary chamber. During the signature collection drive, participants of the Congress lobbied for a gender parity regulation among politicians. They met with the President, the prime minister, leaders of all parliamentary caucuses and all political parties, Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, as well as conveners of the legislative committees both in the Sejm and the Senate.

The signature collecting drive was a huge success. More than 150 000 signatures were collected. The action was carried out in public spaces: shopping malls, theatres, museums, etc. As such, it provided an excellent opportunity for a public debate on the subject. The first reading of the bill took place in the Sejm on February 18, 2010. Prof Małgorzata Fuszara presented the bill in the Sejm.

2.3. Legal regulation

In the course of further work on the bill, the ruling party (Platforma Obywatelska – the Civic Platform) lodged an amendment to replace the gender parity rule (50:50) with a gender quota (no less than 35% of either gender) on electoral candidate lists. The ruling party demanded voting discipline from its members during the vote on the bill. Nonetheless, ten MPs from this party, all male, breached the party discipline and voted against the bill. They were all fined for the breach. In subsequent votes (December 3 in the Sejm, later in December in the Senate, and finally January 5 in the Sejm again) the gender quotas were adopted.

A law enacted on 5 January 2011 introduced quotas on electoral lists in the elections to local councils, to the Sejm and to the European Parliament. The law stipulates that the number of candidates of either gender on the electoral lists may not be lower than 35% of the overall number of candidates on this list. If a list falls short of meeting this requirement, the committee notifies the authorised person of the necessity to amend the list within 3 days. Should this fail to result in a properly structured list, the committee refuses to register the entire list. For lists that include 3 candidates, there must be at least one candidate of each gender. The new regulations will apply to any elections called after a 6-month period from the date of entry into force of the new law.

2.4. The arguments in the debate

The proponents of equalizing opportunities for men and women in the public sphere, including in politics, used the following arguments.

1. Inequality exists and it requires the introduction of measures that will make it possible to give men and women equal opportunities. Mechanisms used so far (for example, constitutional regulations) have proved ineffective since the inequalities persist.

2. Quota systems help accelerate processes which are inevitable (such as the increase in the proportion of women among those in power). The point is not to wait for the

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52 In the case of citizens’ initiative, the committee that endorses the bill selects a person who will present the bill at a plenary sitting of the parliament (i.e. at the bill’s first reading). At subsequent readings, following the debates in the parliamentary committee, the bill is further presented by an MP selected by the committee.
slow evolutionary change which will lead women to power but rather to actively influence this process by means of legal regulations.

3. Experience shows that women are very good politicians.

4. Quota systems compel political parties to seek out women who are active and competent in holding office.

5. Women are faced with extra requirements and additional barriers in their way into the public sphere, both in professional and in political life; it is therefore necessary to help them overcome these barriers by means of a quota system.

6. Examples of other countries show that mechanisms aimed at accelerating the entry of women into the public sphere result in the participation of competent, well-prepared women in the exercise of power.

The opponents used the following arguments.

1. Women and men have equal status in Poland; talk of discrimination is demagogic.

2. Unequal participation in power is a consequence of the difference in the roles of women and men: for women, their family status is of primary importance.

3. Unequal participation in power is a consequence of women having less interest in politics and of their unwillingness to hold office. If women want and seek a role in politics and public life, their numbers in politics will increase.

4. The law introduces a mechanism that is artificial; the increased participation of women should arise out of changes in mentality and such changes require time.

5. The introduction of a quota system will result in individuals of lower competence being placed in positions of power.

6. The introduction of a quota system is offensive to women: each woman will be suspected of having been promoted thanks to her gender and not to her talents, competence and qualifications.

2.5. Quotas at the party level

Before the 2001 election, three political parties – the SLD, the UP and the UW – implemented their own rules that the representation of each gender on the candidate list must be at least 30 per cent. The SLD went the furthest in formalizing this rule: it introduced a provision into its bylaws (article 16):

1. Women and men are equally represented among the candidates to party leadership at every level as well as candidates for delegates. No gender can constitute less than 30 per cent of candidates.

2. Section 1 shall apply accordingly to candidates for public offices.

The party currently in power, Civic Platform (the PO), has not introduced a quota system. However, before the 2007 election, following a motion by one of its female members, Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska, a resolution was adopted that one of the three first positions on each candidate list must be held by a woman. There is no sanction for infringing this rule, but the party leadership has been obliged to ensure that it is enforced. In practice, 34 out of 41 electoral districts observed the rule, and three others included a woman in fourth position. In the other four districts, women held positions much lower down the list (in two districts the sixth, and in another two the ninth), which illustrates how

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53 This argument was used without specification concerning country or the mechanism aimed at increasing women’s chances in politics, and was advanced in spite of fact that not all Scandinavian countries introduced quota systems.

54 There is no sanction for infringing this rule.
difficult it is for women to get high positions on candidate lists even when there is a party rule which theoretically guarantees them a good position.

The remaining two parties which are currently represented in the Parliament – Law and Justice (PiS, a right-wing party) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL, an agrarian party) – have not been using any quota regulations or other mechanisms aimed at ensuring equality between men and women.

3. EVALUATION

3.1. Candidate lists in parliamentary elections

As mentioned above, before the elections in 2001 three political parties applied quotas to their lists of candidates. Thanks to these rules, in 2001 women constituted a larger proportion of candidates for Parliament than in previous elections. This increase was also translated into election results: the representation of women in the Sejm rose from 13 per cent to 20 per cent (see table 21).

Table 21. The percentage of women on lists of candidates and among members of Parliament in Poland since 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Among candidates for the Sejm</th>
<th>Among members of the Sejm</th>
<th>Among candidates for the Senat</th>
<th>Among members of the Senat</th>
<th>Among candidates to Sejm and Senat</th>
<th>Among members of Sejm and Senat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The National Electoral Office

Thanks to these rules, women, who in the previous (1997) election accounted for only 15 per cent of candidates on the SLD lists, in the 2001 election accounted for 36 per cent of the lists of the SLD–UP coalition, and the share of women on the Freedom Union’s lists rose from 18.5 per cent in 1997 to 31 per cent in 2001. Unfortunately, in the next election the SLD and its coalition partners no longer observed this rule, and the percentage of women on its candidate lists was much lower (in 2005 women constituted 27.6 per cent on the SLD’s candidate lists, and in 2007 they accounted for only 22.2 per cent of those on the lists of the coalition The Left and Democrats – the SLD is member of this coalition). This shows the fundamental weakness of a regulation which is not backed by any sanction.

Before elections the parties which fail to introduce quota systems feel that they need to demonstrate their awareness of the problem of unequal political representation, and try to show that despite the lack of formal regulations they promote women and their presence in high positions. A good example is a speech by the PiS leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, in the 2007 election campaign. He stressed the fact that there were five women in his government – the highest number, he claimed, since 1989 (Jerzy Buzek’s government in the late 1990s had in fact included the same number of women). Despite the lack of quota regulations, PiS had placed women in first position on as many as nine candidate lists (out of 41 electoral districts), which was the highest proportion of first positions held by women.
in any political party that was subsequently represented in the Parliament.

**Table 22. The percentage of women among the parliamentary candidates in 2007 in Poland in the parties which subsequently won parliamentary seats (lower chamber only)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>% of women among candidates</th>
<th>% of women on the first position on the list</th>
<th>% of women among MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left and Democrats (LiD)*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The National Electoral Office

Note: This table disregards the German minority which in the 2007 election won one seat, which went to a man. The parliamentary representatives of the German minority have so far not included a single woman.

* The SLD, with its 30 per cent quota, is a member of this coalition.

Thus, with the exception of the PSL, in the recent election the parties differed very little as regards the proportion of women on their candidate lists, or in terms of the proportion of women in their parliamentary representation. These data and analysis of the electoral campaign lead to the following conclusions.

1. Political parties, whether they declare right-wing or left-wing leanings, have not made an important political issue out of the equality of representation of men and women.
2. Women in many parties attempt, particularly before elections, to convince the party leaderships to adopt regulations which prevent the exclusion of women from politics.
3. The introduction of a quota system by some parties, even just on the declaratory level, compels the leaders of the other parties to reach out to the female electorate despite the lack of quotas, for example by means of placing prominent women in top positions on candidate lists and by otherwise demonstrating that the party does promote women.

In Poland there has so far been one study focused on the selection of candidates placed by political parties on their electoral lists (Spurek 2002). Research based on 52 interviews with members of various political parties shows that the most common method of selecting candidates, officially declared and included in party documents, is a combination of grassroots initiatives to select candidates and subsequent confirmation of the candidacies by the national-level party structures. The respondents stressed that this method of selecting candidates through the local party structures is the most democratic one, and it allows for the promotion of local activists who have contributed much to the work in their region. At the same time, however, some respondents, particularly women, drew attention to the fact that parties’ management and leadership, at both local and national level, consist mainly of men, and as a result it is often much more difficult for a woman to become a candidate, and in particular to be given a high position on the candidate list.

The research so far (Fuszara 2006) points to an important barrier that occurs at the candidate selection stage, and greatly influences the effectiveness of the work of women MPs. This barrier is the search for candidates who constitute no threat to the political

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55 The PSL is supported by voters in rural districts and has almost no support in urbanized areas. It placed women in first position on the lists in urban districts (e.g. Warsaw, Gdynia), and men at the top of the lists in rural districts. As a result only one woman was elected; she was placed in first position in Torun.
establishment (which is made up almost entirely of men). It results in women with political achievements being eliminated from politics. Men like to select women candidates whose strongest points are their looks. This leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy: in politics, there are still too few women with considerable political experience, but women with no experience are being introduced onto the political scene, which confirms the claim that ‘women know nothing about politics’. In Poland, this problem has been most pronounced in the case of local elections, where women who were very active as members of local councils have not been included on the lists, and they have established their own committees with other women (Fuszara 2006).

Political parties have been unfavorable towards women (putting only small numbers of women on the candidate lists, placing women on the bottom of the lists, leaving out women with very good track records and so on), and this led to an exceptionally high number of election committees being founded by women in the period leading up to the 2002 local elections. These included committees set up in large cites (e.g. Szczecin, Warsaw and Kraków) as well as smaller localities: for example, in Świebodzice the Women’s Voice committee was set up, in Kruszwica the Nadgoplańska Women’s List, in Ozorków Women of Tomorrow, and in the Szemudy local district the Equal Opportunity election committee. Some of these consisted exclusively of women; others also included men on the candidate lists. In some local districts women from these committees were elected, but never in any great number.

Observations about the exclusion of women from politics and the need to increase women’s representation were the basis on which the Women’s Party (Partia Kobiet) was founded. It presented candidates for election in a number of electoral districts in the 2007 election. The party, which was founded by a famous female writer, was able to bring together well-known women who supported it as well as many women who used to be active in smaller communities but lost the opportunity to work locally on women’s issues when the right-wing government took power in 2005. Unfortunately such initiatives have very little chance of gaining significant support and truly entering the political scene. The current system of political party financing means that new parties have practically no chance to establish themselves. This applies not only to the Women’s Party but also, for example, to the Green Party.

However, the presence of the Women’s Party in certain electoral districts raised the overall percentage of women on the electoral lists: women amounted to 97 per cent of candidates on the Women’s Party lists.

3.2. The presentation of men and women candidates in electoral campaigns

One of the most popular forms of presentation of candidates and programmes during the election campaign is television election shows. Analysis of shows prepared by the parties

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56 This way of selecting women candidates was stressed by some women politicians interviewing for FEMCIT.
58 Article 64 of the Electoral Statute in local elections (Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmik ów województw, law of 16 July 1998, as amended) states that candidate lists in local elections can be submitted by committees formed by political parties, NGOs or voters. A committee can be formed by not less than five voters supported by 20 others. Lists of candidates have to be supported by no fewer than 25 voters (in gmina up to 20,000 inhabitants) or by 150 (in larger ones).
59 Before the 2005 elections offices for gender equality were created on both the national and regional (województwo) levels. After the 2005 elections these offices were dissolved.

In elections in 2007 the Women’s Party did not pass the 5 per cent threshold for political parties.
for Channel 1 of public television within their free TV air time before elections in 1993, 1997 and 2001 indicates that the TV election campaign was ‘male’ – political parties promoted men, and devoted almost all their free air time to their statements. The vast majority of parties devoted less than 10 per cent of their time to women’s statements and more than 90 per cent of their time to men’s statements (Fuszara 2006).

3.3. Public opinion on gender equality in politics

Public opinion polls show that the protest against the low participation of women in governing bodies is expressed, in the first place, by women, although there is an increase of men who think that women’s participation in governing bodies is too low60. Society notices inequality of opportunities: a large majority of respondents (74 per cent) maintain that women have less opportunity to succeed in a political career than men. This opinion is presented a little more often by women (78 per cent) than by men (70 per cent). The percentage of women who feel that women have fewer opportunities has increased considerably: in 199361, 64 per cent of female respondents felt certain about this, and in 2000 78 per cent of women thought that women have fewer chances.

Public opinion polls in Poland also show that an increasing number of people think that there should be more women in the public sphere. In 2004, 54 per cent of respondents thought there should be more women in government, 53 per cent that there should be more in the Parliament, and 53 per cent that there should be more in local government62. Opinions on this issue are closely correlated with the gender of the respondents. All public opinion research shows that it is much more often women than men who want an increase in women’s participation in power (in Parliament, government, local government, the courts, and high positions in public administration). There is also a clear connection between opinions on women’s participation in power and level of education: the higher the level of education, the higher the percentage of respondents who are of the opinion that there should be more women in power than there are now.

Answers to the question whether there is a need for a greater share of women in power do not yet clarify what level of representation is regarded by respondents as appropriate. In 2000 the largest proportion of respondents believed that women should constitute half or more of the membership of the Sejm and Senat (42 per cent), of government (40 per cent), of the public administration (47 per cent) and of local authorities (50 per cent). These opinions are also related to the gender of the respondents: far more women than men favour a considerable share for women in public authorities. Men more often than women think that that the gender of persons in positions of authority is insignificant, and more often opt for low participation by women63 (Fuszara 2006).

The respondents listed the following reasons for women’s lower participation in politics64.

1. The reason most often cited, given by 30 per cent of respondents, was the burden of duties in the private sphere – motherhood, family responsibilities, housework, responsibility for others, and the potential conflict between these duties and activity in the public sphere.

60 Research conducted in 2000, representative sample of 1,010 adult Poles.
61 The sample in research conducted in 1993 included only women.
62 Research conducted in 2004, a representative sample of 1,002 adult Poles.
63 Men more often than women expressed the opinion that women should constitute less than 25 per cent or even less than 10 per cent of the membership of the Parliament, the government, local governments and high positions in public administration.
64 An open-ended question.
2. Twenty-three per cent of respondents mentioned discrimination and the barriers placed in front of the women by men – favouring men, fear of competition from women, and male chauvinism.

3. Thirteen per cent of respondents mentioned tradition, custom and stereotype, for example, ‘men had power for many many years’, ‘it is generally believed that power is held by men’ and so on.

4. Ten per cent of respondents mentioned women’s unwillingness to take on such roles, and a lack of interest in getting involved.

5. Six per cent of respondents spoke of qualities of women such as gentleness, submissiveness, and lack of ability to fight for themselves.

Other reasons that were also mentioned included, inter alia, women being undervalued, that women lack the political connections which make it possible to succeed, and the decisions of the electorate.

Public opinion surveys conducted just after the citizens’ bill on gender quotas on electoral lists was lodged with the Sejm, offered most interesting results. As many as 60% of respondents supported the bill, while 30% of respondents opposed it (the remaining 10% chose the answer “it is difficult to say”). Women were more numerous among the supporters of the bill (66%), but even the men were more often in favour of it (53%) than not. The survey demonstrated that supporting the 50/50 gender quota is not directly related to socio-demographic factors. The respondents more likely to support the gender parity measure were the young pupils and students (68%), white-collar office and administration employees (72%), but also housewives (67%). Among those who said they were religious, those who attended church a few times a week were more likely to support the bill (69%) than those who did not (52%). Perhaps surprisingly, the survey found no relation between support for the bill and declared political views. In fact, those declaring leftist views were even a bit less likely to support the bill than those with other political orientations (especially among those who said they were not certain which party to vote for). Support for the 50/50 gender quota was strong among individuals of different genders, with differing educational and professional backgrounds, different income levels, religiosity levels, political views and place of residence.

3.4. Representation of women in other bodies Public opinion on gender equality in politics

In Poland there is no legal mechanism which would make it obligatory to work towards ensuring equal participation of men and women in power. However, a slow process is observable whereby this has been transformed into a political issue. For many years, both before 1989 and after the transformation, either there were no women in government or there was one token woman. For the first time women held five ministerial positions in Jerzy Buzek’s government (1997–2001), and then in Jarosław Kaczyński’s government (2006–7). There is the same number of women (five) in ministerial positions in the current government of Donald Tusk, which has been in power since 2007 (they currently make up 28 per cent of government ministers).

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65 The percentages do not add up to 100 since some respondents gave no reasons while others gave more than one reason.
66 Some respondents used this very general expression, without any explanation as to by whom women are undervalued.
67 The survey was commissioned by the Women’s Congress; it was conducted by CBOS on 20-27 January 2010 on a representative random sample (N=1027) of adult residents of Poland (see: daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 March 2010).
The situation is similar in local authorities. Until a short time ago, there was no woman wojewoda (head of one of the 16 regions\textsuperscript{68}). Now four women hold this position (making up 25 per cent of the total).

Twice, in 1999 and in 2004, respondents were asked about guaranteeing women a certain number of positions on candidate lists in an election. In both studies the majority of respondents said that the idea was good (63 per cent in 1999, and 53 per cent in 2004), and just over a quarter of the respondents said it was bad (27 per cent in 1999, and 28 per cent in 2004).

4. CONCLUSIONS

1. Quota systems, even those that are very limited in scope, contribute to enforcing equal opportunities for women and men.

2. When quota systems are not backed by sanctions, they often fail to be observed even if they have been introduced by the parties voluntarily. This may be because these provisions are often adopted by parties immediately before elections, under pressure from women who are not powerful enough and whose political participation is not strong enough for them to be able to force the parties to observe the regulation within a time frame beyond the immediate election.

3. An argument often used by opponents of quota systems is the fear that individuals who are not competent will be appointed to positions of power if such systems are introduced. However, research shows that the opposite mechanism operates in politics: competent women are held away from power and influence by men. This may lead to the deduction that the fear of competition from competent women is one of the most important, but at the same time most carefully masked, reasons for the opposition to a quota system. Moreover, instead of searching for women who are competent, the parties seek out women who have no political experience, who pose no threat to incumbent leaders, and who at the same time serve as evidence that women are inexperienced, ‘new’ and not knowledgeable about politics.

4. The Polish experience shows that if at least one party introduces a system of enforcing equal opportunities for men and women, other parties attempt to demonstrate that they too are familiar with the issue of equal opportunities and the under-representation of women, for example by appointing more women at government level, or by placing more women on high positions on electoral lists. Thus, even if to a limited extent, the position and opportunities of women are being increased across the spectrum of political parties.

5. The example of Poland demonstrates that the women’s movement plays a pivotal role in getting quota systems implemented, if it is able to exert the necessary pressure on the political elites and win them over for the project. As one of the Polish female MPs said: “Being right is not enough, you need to have the majority too”. The Polish example shows how strong pressure may lead to the emergence of such a majority, even if the government and parliament are dominated by parties of centre-rightist orientation.

\textsuperscript{68} Poland is divided into 16 administrative districts (województwo), each headed by an official (wojewoda) appointed by the prime minister.
5. LIST OF REFERENCE

- Siemieńska, Renata, *Nie mogą? Nie chcą? Nie potrafią? O postawach i uczestnictwie politycznym kobiet w Polsce* [They do not want, they are unable, do they? About attitudes and women’s political participation in Poland] (Warsaw: Scholar, 2000).
CASE STUDY: SLOVENIA: FROM VOLUNTARY TO LEGISLATED QUOTAS

Milica Antič Gaber

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In Slovenia, political discussion on the possibilities of implementing some sort of special measures for the improvement of women’s representation (quotas included) started at the beginning of the 1990s. The problem in Slovenia was, and perhaps still is, that quotas have negative connotations among politicians, and among the general public as well, and are associated in people’s minds with the legacy of the socialist past. Different kinds of quota were used in socialist times as a means of equalizing the position of women, peasants and young people in the spheres of decision making. There is a widespread understanding of these times that we were all forced to be active and women were forced to be equal, but that all that was only the external appearance and not a reality: it was a mask behind which the most powerful Communist Party leaders (in the Central Committee) were the people who decided. After the collapse of the socialist regime, many people – of both genders – had the opportunity to choose – possibly to choose not to be politically active, as well, and to choose between women and men. This is why many people still view gender quotas as a means of forcing women to enter politics (see also Jalušić and Antič Gaber 2001). This was why so many attempts to get quotas accepted as a kind of agreement within the parties, or as a cross-party attempt to put quotas into a specific law (either the law on political parties or the electoral law), failed so many times. (For further details, see Antič Gaber and Gortnar 2004.)

The situation started to change in the late 1990s, for several reasons. One was that EU politicians coming to Slovenia kept asking about the ‘absence’ of women in politics. At the time of its accession to the EU in 2004, Slovenia, a highly developed country, had one of the poorest levels of representation of women in political decision making. A second is the fact that the governing coalition, with Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (the LDS) as its strongest party (whose support for women’s rights and gender equality was widely known in Slovenia), started to think that this was an important problem to solve, and gave it more public support. The third reason was the establishment of a nationwide network, the Coalition for Parity, in 2001. Almost 200 well-known women from different political backgrounds (and parties), as well as some influential male supporters, signed a petition to achieve ‘equal representation’ in all political decision-making bodies. In 2001, this coalition began to use the process of accession to the EU as a pressure factor. It also worked closely with some female MPs and some prominent male political leaders to introduce changes into the Slovenian legislation to improve the situation of women in politics. (For further detail, see Antič Gaber and Lokar 2006.)

An examination of the changes concerning quota provisions shows that there were three stages in the short history of the policy on gender quotas in Slovenia:

1. almost total rejection of the quotas, because they were associated with the socialist past (in the early 1990s);
2. the period of the introduction of voluntary party quotas in some left and centre–left parties, and the rejection of each attempt in the Parliament to introduce quotas into the law (second half of the 1990s); and
3. The introduction of gender quotas into the national legislation for national elections, local elections and elections to the European Parliament (middle of the first decade of the 2000s).

Among the supporters of greater representation of women in politics, it was widely believed that the introduction of quotas in the national legislation was an urgent step forward in this respect. Before this, women’s representation was visibly stagnating and no improvement was expected in these circumstances unless there were firm quota provisions.

2. THE LEGAL SITUATION

Slovenia’s parliamentary democracy is based on bicameral Parliament with a lower house, the National Assembly (Državni zbor) and an upper house, the National Council (Državni svet). The upper house has 40 seats. Elections to the National Council are indirect – they take place through appropriate interest organizations or local communities. The National Assembly has 90 seats (two of these being reserved for the representatives of Italian and Hungarian minorities). The president is elected by direct vote and has limited political power but can have strong symbolic power. The president is the head of state, but does not have any significant legislative power. Government is formed by the winning political party (due to PR electoral system this is coalition of the parties).

At the local level, there are now 211 local communities in comparison with 147 in 1994; and there are eleven city councils (big cities) and 200 others (smaller towns) and in these, 3377 councilors who are directly elected. Law on local elections stipulates that the local councils with national minorities at least 10 percent of the seats (minimally 1) belong to their representatives. The result therefore is: 7 representatives of Hungarian, 8 of Italian and 18 of Roma populations. In the European Parliament, Slovenia has seven representatives who were directly elected for the first time in 2004.

The electoral system for election to the National Assembly is a (quite complicated) variant of proportional representation. Slovenia is divided into eight constituencies, each of which is further divided into 11 voting units. For each full electoral quota, the party receives one seat from that constituency. Seats remaining when all full quota seats have been awarded are distributed in a second tier, using the D’Hondt method. The two seats reserved for the Hungarian and Italian minorities are allocated according to a First Past The Post (FPTP) system. There is also a 4 per cent electoral threshold.

From the perspective of women’s electoral chances, there is an important ‘deviation’ from the ‘pure’ PR system that forces the Slovenian political parties to behave like majoritarian parties, namely, in each constituency, the parties submit 11 candidates, but they are not presented as a complete list, as in most PR systems. Rather, constituencies are divided into 11 voting units. Voters cannot vote for the entire party list, but have to choose a party by choosing a single candidate put forward by the party in their voting unit. The votes given to candidates in each voting unit are aggregated in order to determine how many seats the list/party is entitled to receive in the given constituency.

This practice was designed with the aim of limiting ‘partitocracy’ and assuring a linkage between the MP and the voter, but it has some strange implications. ‘Party gatekeepers’ must choose one candidate for each of 88 electoral units. This fundamentally alters the logic of formation of the party electoral list in such a PR system. If the party chooses a
A woman, she will be the only name to present the party in that voting unit, rather than being part of a party list. This makes ‘party gatekeepers’ more hesitant to nominate women.

For local elections in Slovenia the situation is complicated. There are two parallel systems – a plurality/majority system for the small towns and a proportional system for the big cities. In small towns, the voters choose among individual candidates and in the bigger cities there are party candidate lists, the number of candidates depending on the number of the seats on the local council. The positions of candidates are therefore not comparable – in the first the candidate stands as the individual candidate in the second as the member of the party list - and in this case there is also a possibility to get a preferential vote. The latter has not yet worked for women.

For elections to the European Parliament, Slovenia is a single constituency. The system is List PR. The position on a list is important– especially since the leading position almost guarantees success. There is also the possibility of a preferential vote, which can alter a candidate’s possibility of being elected (as has once occurred, when the candidate in the last position, but who was well known, was actually elected).

3. THE INTRODUCTION OF QUOTA PROVISIONS

3.1. Voluntary party quotas in the 1990s

Prior to the changes described below, two parties had incorporated quotas into their party statutes – the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and the Social Democrats (SD, previously the ZL and ZLSD), both left of centre on the ideological spectrum. A strong women’s section in the ZLSD managed to introduce a minimum of 40 per cent of representatives of both gender before the general elections in 1996 on all party lists for all elections (Antić Gaber and Lokar 2006). This was a real boost for women politicians in other parties. However, because of the poor results for ZLSD in the national election in 1996, for which women’s share on the electoral lists was to blame, according to influential party leaders, the ZLSD made the quota provision voluntary and not obligatory for the local party organizations for the next election.

The LDS agreed in its programme from 1990 to have 30 per cent quotas for the next election, but did not act accordingly. In 1994, it adopted the rule that made it obligatory to follow the 30 per cent rule except the last stage of the nomination process (the party council’s nomination stage) for the candidate lists for the national election. However, this was not reflected in the final result: since the party lists were composed of less than 20 per cent of female candidates when presented for the election.

In 1998, the LDS’s Women’s Network made a gender-neutral proposal for quotas by which neither gender could have more than one-third of the candidates on the party list for the national election (Antić Gaber 1998: 214). This share was reduced to 25 per cent for the 2000 election by a decision to increase it in each subsequent election for 3 percentage points, with a 40 per cent share of men and women set as the final objective. Influential women from the Women’s Network, with internal party pressure, succeeded in making quota provisions obligatory, and this was respected in both subsequent elections – in 2000 and 2004. In 2000, five women from the party made it to the Parliament (out of 34 MPs).
In 2004, after the party lost 11 seats, it still maintained three women in the parliamentary party group (out of 23 MPs).69

### Table 23. Parties in Slovenia with voluntary quotas and other provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year of introduction</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Rules about ranking</th>
<th>Women or neutral</th>
<th>Sanctions?</th>
<th>Implementing body</th>
<th>Sanctions used?</th>
<th>Women MPs of the party70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD (ZL, ZLSD)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Neutral Neutral</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14.2% (1992) 0% (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Neutral Neutral</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first two parties that introduced voluntary party quotas were pioneers of gender equality in Slovenia, among political parties and in the political arena more widely. They made further steps in this respect more achievable.

### 3.2. Legislated quotas

After a period of stagnation in the second half of the nineties of the political representation of women in Slovenia, and after a few failures to get quotas accepted into the law, awareness that something should be done in this respect started to grow among the left-of-centre-oriented political elite.

#### 3.2.1. The preparation phase

The first step was taken in June 2002, with the adoption of the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, which contains several provisions for the promotion of gender-balanced participation in decision making. The most important are the following. It determines:

(a) that the establishment of equal opportunities is a duty of the entire society;
(b) that it is the obligation of the National Assembly to respect the principle of balanced representation of women and men in the establishment of committees (?) and the composition of delegations; and
(c) that the political parties have a duty to promote gender-balanced representation/participation; furthermore, political parties that are included in the register of political parties shall adopt a plan in which they shall determine methods and measures for the promotion of more balanced representation of women and men within party bodies, and on candidate lists for elections to the National Assembly and to bodies of local communities, as well as for elections for the president of the state.

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69 The People’s Party tried to follow the track of the LDS and the SD (ZLSD) but has not introduced party quotas; its Action Plan anticipates a gradual increase in the number of female candidates in accordance with Equality Law.
The second step was taken in June 2004, when the National Assembly adopted a Constitutional Act amending article 43 of the constitution of Slovenia by adding to the provision on universal and equal rights, a new paragraph conferring on the legislature the power to determine, in a law, measures for encouraging equal opportunities for women and men in standing for election to state authorities and local community authorities.

The third step was taken in September 2004 when, in compliance with article 14 of the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, the government adopted a decree regulating the criteria for implementation of the principle of balanced representation of women and men. The decree lays down the procedure for ensuring balanced representation in the composition of public committees and boards and in appointing and nominating government representatives. Both the decree and the act provide that the principle of gender-balanced representation is respected when at least 40 per cent representation of women and men is ensured. In certain specified circumstances the decree permits exemptions from this principle on objectively justified grounds. Such an exemption is permitted in cases where membership of a particular government body stems from a particular function.

3.2.2. The introduction of legislated quotas

In 2004 there were changes to the Act on Election of Slovenian Members to the European Parliament (this even before the amendment to the constitution mentioned above introduced the requirement of gender-balanced representation in parties’ lists of candidates.) This act requires that at least 40 per cent representation of each sex is ensured in any list of candidates. Lists of candidates must be drawn up in such a way that at least one candidate of each sex figures in the first half of any list of seven candidates.

In 2005 changes to the Local Elections Act provided that lists of candidates for the election to a municipal council must be drawn up in such a way as to ensure that each sex accounts for at least 40 per cent of all candidates listed, and that the candidates in the first half of the lists must alternate by sex. The act provides that, in the transitional period up to 2014, when 40 per cent representation of each sex becomes compulsory, at least a 20 per cent share of each sex must be listed in the candidate lists for the first local election to be held in 2006; for the election in 2010, the requirement is a 30 per cent share for each sex. In addition during this transitional period, a partial derogation is permitted as regards the principle of candidates alternating by sex in the upper half of the list, which means that it will be regarded as sufficient if they are arranged so that at least each third candidate is of the other sex.

In 2006 there were changes to the National Assembly Elections Act. Article 43 provides that a minimum of 35 per cent of candidates listed on a candidate list shall be of each sex. In the transitional provisions, the act provides that at the first National Assembly elections to be held after the act enters into force the minimum percentage of candidates of each sex shall be 25 per cent.

The lowering of the required quota for the first elections at local and at national level was a result of the political debates in National Assembly, when some parties underlined the concern that they will not be able to ensure the required percentage of female candidates so soon.

Table 24 shows the situation in Slovenia after the introduction of legislated gender quotas for elections at all three levels, with additional provisions required for elections at local level.
and elections to the European Parliament which are beneficial for female candidates. At all three levels, a party that does not follow the rule risks having its electoral list rejected by the state electoral management body (EMB), which means that this rule can be understood as a firm electoral gender quota rule.

Table 24. The introduction of legislated quotas in Slovenia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level of election</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Additional provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Yes (one of each sex in the first half of the list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>40% by 2014 (beginning with 20% in 2006)</td>
<td>Yes (one of each sex in the first half of the list; partial derogation possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>35% (begin in 2008 with 25%)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: all three laws on elections.

4. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

So far, legislated gender quotas have been implemented for the local elections in 2006 (20 per cent quota), for the election 2010 (25 per cent representatives of both gender) and for the elections to the EU Parliament in 2004 and 2008 (40 per cent quota) and for the national election in 2008 (25 per cent quota). It is thus too early for a comprehensive analysis to be possible, but a few conclusions can be drawn from these two elections.

4.1. Implementation of quotas at the local level

Since the early 1990s there have been more candidates competing for local councillor positions in each election, and there are more local councillor seats available as well. There are also more women competing for these seats at each election. For the elections in 1994, there were six male candidates parallel to one female candidate and in the 2006 elections there were three male candidates to each female candidate.

Table 25. Comparison of the last three local elections in Slovenia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All candidates</td>
<td>23.426</td>
<td>26.721</td>
<td>26.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female candidates</td>
<td>4.976</td>
<td>8.754</td>
<td>10.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of female candidates</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of all councillors elected</td>
<td>3.231</td>
<td>3.386</td>
<td>3.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of female councillors elected</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of female councillors elected</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The legal 20 percent gender quota has been required for the first time for the local elections 2006, this resulted in significant rise of female candidates standing for election. All party lists increased their percentage of female candidates from the last election on
average by more than 11 percentage points, followed by a rise of almost 8 percentage points of elected female councillors.

This trend, however, did not last. Despite the fact that required quota for the election 2010 had been risen to 25 percent and that the number of female candidates has risen to 38.4 percent, this had not resulted in the significant rise of elected female councillors their share after the 2010 election stayed almost the same (21.9 percent). Table 26 shows the results for each political party.

Table 26. Total number of candidates and percentage of women candidates at last three local elections in Slovenia, by party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of candidates</td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>No. of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>1.648</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>2.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŽS</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>2.829</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi (SKD)</td>
<td>2.340</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>2.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (ZL. ZLSD)</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>2.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS (SDSS)</td>
<td>2.703</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEGS</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLS</td>
<td>2.629</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>1.104</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeleni (Greens)</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-ZE</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZP</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zares</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZK</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZS</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>5.024</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>5.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.426</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only parties with more than 100 candidates are included in this table.
* Source: Lokalne volitve 2010 (Local elections 2010), Statistical Office RS, Ljubljana, May
Table 26 shows that only one of the larger party list in the 2006 elections had slightly less than 30 per cent female candidates (the Slovenian People’s Party, SLS, with 29.8 per cent). From the table above it is also clear that all the bigger parties put many more women candidates for each election than required share and that in each subsequent election the overall share is significantly higher then legally demanded. But this (as it is shown in table 27) has not lead to the rise of elected female councillors at each election.

Table 27. Comparison of elected female councillors in the last three local elections in Slovenia, by party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of councillors</td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>No. of councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi (SKD)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (ZL, ZLSD)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS (SDSS)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLS</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeleni (Greens)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŽS</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-ZE</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zares</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


All in all, the rise in numbers of elected female councillors at the 2006 local level can be interpreted as impressive. The final result is, however, not fully satisfactory: the percentage of women is still quite low, even if it has risen by over 8 percentage points. But optimistic vision from the perspective after 2006 election was not proved to be true. It was namely expected that so long as the above mentioned ranking orders do not change for the worse for the next local elections, and women can be expected to benefit from the possibility of the preferential vote, there should be more women elected at each next election. Another element come the forefront of our analysis, namely the discrepancy of
chances of the female candidates that was elected through majority (in small towns) where gender quota has no impact or through proportional electoral settings (in bigger cities) where gender quota can work, proved to be more carefully examined in the future.\textsuperscript{71}

As far as the representation of minorities is concerned, at the local level there are few communes where the Roma population is based, and this is reflected in the fact that there are few Roma councilors. Their number has first grown from election to election, from one in 1998 to 11 in 2002 and to 19 in 2006, but stays the same after 2010 election. Among the elected Roma councilors in 2002 was one woman, and in 2006 there were two and stays two women after election 2010 as well. However, representation of other minority groups (nationalities from the previous common state, Yugoslavia – Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Macedonians and others) has not been yet taken in consideration in Slovenia.

\textbf{4.2. Representation of women at national level (National Assembly)}

As stated above, the National Assembly has 90 seats, two of them reserved for the representatives of national minorities (Italian and Hungarian). The representation of women in the National Assembly is low. It was at its lowest after 1996 election (at 7.8 per cent) but has stayed constant at slightly over 10 per cent since then (see table 28).

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{center}
\caption{Number and percentage of women deputies in the Slovenian National Assembly, 1990–2008}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Year of election & No. of women & % of women \\
\hline
1990 & 27 & 11.3  \\
1992 & 12 & 13.3 \\
1996 & 7 & 7.8  \\
2000 & 12 & 13.3  \\
2004* & 11 & 12.2 \\
2008* & 12 & 13.3  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

* The number and percentage of women after the formation of the government, was in 2004 12 or. 13.3 per cent and in 2008 election 13 or. 14.4 per cent. \textit{Source}: State Electoral Commission and parliamentary web pages and, <http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=91>

As mentioned above, two political parties (the LDS and the SD) adopted quota provisions for their candidate lists for national elections. Table 29 shows that these parties have the highest percentages of female candidates (the LDS 25 per cent in 2000 and 28 per cent in 2004, and the SD 33 and 31 per cent in 2000 and 2004, respectively), but this has not resulted in a visible increase in female representation in their parliamentary party groups. From the table below the gradual increase of the percentage of women candidates from election to election (23.5 in 2000, 25 per cent in 2004 and 35.2 per cent in 2008) shows that quota rule from 2006 was only the codification of the status quo.

\textsuperscript{71} Discrepancy between female councilors elected thorough majority rule and the ones elected through proportional representation is namely 7 percentage points. For more see: <http://www.uem.gov.si/fileadmin/uem.gov.si/pageuploads/LokalneVolitve2010/LV2010KoncnoPorocilo.pdf>
Table 29. Comparison of the percentages of female candidates for elections to the Slovenian National Assembly, by party, 1992–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSi (SKD)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD (ZL, ZLSD)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLS</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zares</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: author’s own calculation on the basis of the parties’ candidates lists, Statistical Office data and data of the State Electoral Commission.

The LDS’ and the SD’s shares of female parliamentarians are the biggest in terms of absolute numbers, but not relatively in comparison with some other small parties, such as New Slovenia (NSi), where the share of women in the party group is 28 per cent. It was also obvious that quota provisions that were accepted and respected only by two parties could not bring bigger increases in female representation in the National Assembly, especially if they do not win the election.

Table 30. Comparison of the numbers and percentages of female deputies in the Slovenian National Assembly, by party, 1992–2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>No. (%)</td>
<td>No. (%)</td>
<td>No. (%)</td>
<td>No. (%)</td>
<td>No. (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>– / –</td>
<td>1 (20.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>2 (9.1%)</td>
<td>1 (4.0%)</td>
<td>5 (14.7%)</td>
<td>3 (15.0%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi</td>
<td>2 (16.6%)</td>
<td>1 (25.0%)</td>
<td>1 (25.0%)</td>
<td>2 (28.5%)</td>
<td>–/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (ZL, ZLSD)</td>
<td>2 (14.2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (27.2%)</td>
<td>2 (25.0%)</td>
<td>8 (27.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (6.2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (7.4%)</td>
<td>2 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLS</td>
<td>2 (20.0%)</td>
<td>1 (10.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>–/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLS+SMS</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>– / –</td>
<td>– / –</td>
<td>2 (25.0%)</td>
<td>1 (20.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zares</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>1 (11.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 (13.3%)</td>
<td>7 (7.8%)</td>
<td>12 (13.3%)</td>
<td>11 (12.2%)</td>
<td>12 (13.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number (percentage) after the formation of government is usually higher and women in the winning parties benefit from that (as it also happened in the winning party SD, after 2008 election when their number increase to 10 and total to 13 (or 15.5%).
Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Implementation in Europe

Source: Author’s own calculation on the basis of the parties’ candidates lists, Statistical Office data and data of the State Electoral Commission.

It is obvious from the results of the election to Slovene National Assembly as in many other country studies (see Women, Quotas and Politics) quota rules with only percentages for the total number of candidates, and no rank order or other rules, may have very little effect.

4.3. Implementation of gender quotas for elections to the European Parliament

Slovenia has been a member of the EU since May 2004. An amendment to introduce gender quotas for elections to the European Parliament was accepted by the National Assembly shortly before the election in June 2004. There were 13 party lists competing for seven seats in the European Parliament, and four got members elected: the NSi, the LDS, the SDS and the SD.

Table 31. Number and placement of female candidates for election to the European Parliament in Slovenia, 2004 and 2009, by party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of women candidates (for 7 seats)</th>
<th>Placement of women candidates</th>
<th>No. of women elected/no. of MEPs elected for the party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD (ZL,ZLSD)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2,4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GZS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>1,2,4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS and DeSUS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2,5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desus</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,3,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2,3,4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS and Greens</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>1,2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZ</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>1,3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2,5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zares</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLPB</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSS</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number (percentage) in June 2011 is 2 for SD and total 3 from 7.
Table 31 shows that this provision forced all the political parties to follow the rule and there was no party that did not place 40 per cent of women on its candidate list (For further details, see Fink-Hafner 2005). Only three small parties placed women at the top of their lists. Among the 13 parties that competed for seats in the European Parliament, two put women in third position and lower, eight (all the biggest parties) put a woman in second position, and three put a woman in first position – the SMS, Slovenia is Ours (SN) and Women’s Voice (GŽ) – although none of these three got through. Three parties (the NSi, the LDS and the SDS) won two seats each and each has one male and one female member of the European Parliament (MEP). It can be assumed that these three parties calculated if they got only one seat it would go to a male candidate, but if they got two there would be a female as well. The party that put its first woman in third position, or the small parties that put their first woman in second position on the list, knew that they did not have a serious chance of being elected.

Slovenia now has 42.9 per cent female MEPs (and take fourth position among the EU countries) compared with 30.3 per cent women in the European Parliament as a whole. Without the provision in the law on elections to the European Parliament, which required 40 per cent gender quotas and the placement of a candidate of each sex in the first part of the list, this result would not have been possible.

5. CONCLUSION

A period of stagnation of women’s representation in politics, combined with the activities of women activists in party politics and outside it (in the Coalition for Parity, and some researchers), led to an open public debate about legislated gender quotas for the elective positions in politics. As a result, quota provisions were incorporated into the three laws for elections at the local, national and European levels. Immediate positive results after the quota introduction at the local and European levels have been shown in this analysis, but also a stagnation and even decrease after the second European election and at the long term the results are still to be seen. We can, however, see for now that gender quotas can serve their purpose – to improve the possibilities for women candidates to stand for election in greater numbers and to improve their chances of being elected once they appear on the electoral lists. But there are also some elements of the electoral system (for example for parliamentary election an impact of voting units inside each electoral constituency or for local election – majority rule for the small towns) that do not have a positive effect and have to be carefully analyzed in the future.
6. LIST OF REFERENCES

- Antić Gaber, Milica, Ženske v parlamentu (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1998).

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CASE STUDY: SPAIN: SUCCESS AND OBSTACLES ON THE PATH TO PARITY DEMOCRACY

Christina Alnevall

1. INTRODUCTION

Compared with all the Western democracies, Spain has witnessed one of the largest rises in female participation in parliament since the 1970s (Caul Kittilsen 2006: 139), gaining 30 percentage points from 6.0 per cent in the first democratic election in 1977 to 36.3 per cent in the last national election in March 2008. However, Spain is a relatively young democracy, formed after the death of General Francisco Franco in November 1975, and women’s political representation had no obvious position on the general political agenda initially but has slowly gained importance. From being a country with little focus on gender issues, Spain has developed to one of the most advanced countries in the world in terms of gender equality, even if research shows that the gender quota law of 2007 failed to increase the number of female representatives (Bagues & Esteve-Volart 2010; Martínez Pérez & Calvo Borobia 2010; Verge & Troupel 2010; Verge Mestre 2008).

2. THE ORIGINS OF GENDER QUOTA PROVISIONS AND DEBATES

Historically, the Spanish women’s movement has been weak and gender issues have not been placed on the public political agenda nor had much mass media coverage. During the transition to democracy the question about the relationship between the feminist movement and mainstream politics was raised in most feminist meetings. Generally feminist groups were close to the political left and among them there was a split between those who relied on the state as a collaborator and those who did not. Some feminists argued for the importance of having more women in decision-making positions, while other were much more suspicious about the state as the place to work for greater gender equality since it actively contributed to the maintenance of unequal gender relations. The section of the movement which believed in cooperation with the state and the fact that state policy could improve the status of women gave high priority to women’s political representation. Despite its relative weakness, the women’s movement and feminist lobbies have been the main actors in the rise of women in party politics and quotas for women (Threlfall 2007: 1078).

Until the creation of the Women’s Institute (WI, Instituto de la Mujer) in 1983, which is the main central-state-level women’s policy office in Spain, there was no possibility of a women’s policy agency intervening in the debate. The debates, thereby, took place mostly within the political parties. Initially the WI had five broad goals: to promote policy initiatives for women; to document and study all aspects of women’s situation in Spain; to monitor the implementation of policy directed towards women; to administer women’s complaints about discrimination; and, finally, to inform women and increase their knowledge about their rights (Valiente 2005: 181). However, women’s political representation was one of the high priorities from the very beginning. The debate in the WI took place at the same time as a similar debate was being conducted within the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and in some cases the persons involved were the same, that is, members of the WI played a role as ‘insiders’ in the debate about quotas for women within the PSOE (Valiente 2005).
Since the 1980s the public debate in Spain on women’s political representation has had four general characteristics (Valiente 2005). First, the debates have taken place mainly within the political parties, where the more left-oriented parties have been the main actors and the conservatives, the People’s Party (PP, Partido Popular), have remained strongly against quotas for women. Second, women’s political representation was not discussed jointly between political parties and the women’s movement until the late 1990s since there was a general reluctance to raise constitutional issues. Third, the debates on political representation were mainly conducted at the central-state level. Fourth, references were made to experiences internationally, which included both successful cases, such as the Nordic countries, and failures, such as France in the early 1980s and Italy in 199372.

2.1. Debates on women’s political representation and electoral quotas

According to political scientist Celia Valiente (2005: 174–7), the WI and the PSOE women’s secretariat were able to put forward the goal of the Spanish women’s movement to raise the number of women in elected positions and to gender the frame of the debates on political representation. The debate was divided into three phases which originated from three discussions within the PSOE on women’s representation, two of which resulted in a commitment to raise the number of women.

The first phase concerned the initiative and the endorsement of a 25 per cent quota for women in the PSOE. It started as early as the 1970s but accelerated during the 1980s as feminists within the party focused on the low representation of women in the party elite and in decision-making positions. In the general elections in 1977, 1979, 1982 and 1986, the percentage of female deputies was only 6 per cent and the presence of PSOE female politicians in those four years amounted to 9, 5, 9 and 7 per cent, respectively (Valiente 2005: 178). Feminists within the party pressed for an internal party debate, which resulted in a proposal for a 25 per cent quota for women for internal party positions and on the party’s electoral lists being discussed at the PSOE federal congress in January 198873.

Within the first phase the debate mainly focused on questions regarding the low political representation of women. The overall political debate centred largely on questions of democracy and democratic deficit, and the more general discussion about democracy in Spain involved a range of other issues since the democratization process taking place at that time required much attention and energy. Thereby, women’s political representation had low priority on the public political agenda.

Advocates for quotas for women lobbied inside the PSOE by using arguments such as the fact that women were discriminated against, and that this was the main reason why they were not represented to a greater degree. Opponents claimed that the reason was a

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72 In 1993 two quota regulations were introduced in Italy. The first stated that neither sex could account for more than 75 per cent of the names on a party list, and the second that male nor female candidates should alternate on the list for any election. However, in 1995 the Constitutional Court repealed the law and declared it unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the legislation on equal treatment. Yet Italy introduced a legal quota system for the European Parliament elections in 2004, Law no. 90 of 8 April 2004: ‘neither of the two sexes may be represented by more than two-thirds of the candidates’. Party reimbursement will be reduced in case of non-compliance. This law is valid for ten years (<http://www.quotaproject.org/displayCountry.cfm?CountryCode=IT>). On France, see the case study in this report.

question of there not being sufficient and competent women for these positions, that is, there was a shortage of women with the qualifications and ambition needed to reach decision-making positions. The argument raised was that mandatory quotas for women would not solve the problem of the under-representation of women at this level (Threlfall 2001: 4). Even so, the PSOE feminists believed and were optimistic that the left-wing parties, because of their general commitment to equality, would therefore be more favourably disposed to quotas for women (Bustelo 1979: 14, quoted in Valiente 2005: 179). The debate was also influenced by the fact that the Socialist International recommended member parties to adopt measures to increase the number of women in political decision-making positions (Threlfall 2001: 5). At the PSOE federal congress in 1988 a 25 per cent quota for party positions and electoral lists was passed. During the years that followed, the proportion of female PSOE MPs increased gradually, from 7.1 per cent in 1986 to 17.1 per cent in 1989 (Verge 2006a).

The second phase concerned the approval of a 40 per cent quota for women in the PSOE and took place between 1992 and 1997. After the European Summit of Women in Power in Athens in 1992, the PSOE feminists took the concept of ‘parity democracy’ back home and started to use it in the national debate. As a result, they brought pressure to bear for the quota for women to be increased from 25 to 40 per cent. As a consequence, the PSOE federal congress in 1997 discussed and approved an increase of the internal and electoral party quota for women to 40 per cent (Partido Socialista Obrero Español 1997: 207). The percentage of female PSOE deputies increased from 17.6 per cent in 1993 to 27.7 per cent in the 1996 election, and then to 36.8 per cent in 2000. However, the percentage of female PSOE senators fell, from 23 per cent to 17 per cent, between 1996 and 2000, although it rose again to 27 per cent in 2004 (Instituto de la Mujer 1997a: 98–99; 2002; 2004).

In the spring of 1996, when the conservative People’s Party came to power, the topic of political representation took on very low priority in the Women’s Institute since the PP decided to replace the director with a civil servant who had no ties with the feminist movement and no experience of the policy area of women’s rights (Mujeres 22/5 (1996)). Conservative politicians were openly opposed to quotas for women and presented arguments against it. However, they could never interfere in the debate within the PSOE, and consequently the strength of the counter-movement can be considered as moderate (Valiente 2005: 183). However, in the 1990s a Spanish parity movement started and developed, and many well-known feminist groups and associations joined, such as the Federation of Progressive Women (Federación de Mujeres Progresistas) and the Dolores Ibárruri Foundation (Fundación Dolores Ibárruri), among others. The approval of an increase in the quota for women within the PSOE coincided with the goals of the branch within the feminist movement working with parity issues.

The third phase started in August 1998 when the PSOE announced that it would submit a bill to reform the 1985 General Electoral Act (Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General), the modification consisting of a requirement on all political parties that they make up their electoral lists with no more than 60 per cent names of the same sex. The governing conservative party, the PP, opposed the proposal, but the left-wing United Left (IU, Izquierda Unida) supported the idea (El País, 31 August 1998, in Valiente 2005: 187). The arguments for mandatory quotas focused on concepts such as democracy and justice: in an authentic democracy, women, who constitute half of the population, should be represented in fair proportions. Some advocates also argued that gender parity in legislative bodies would give different and more positive policy outcomes. The counter-arguments pointed out the need for a ‘fair’ and ‘neutral’ process in which the ‘best’ people could be elected, while others claimed that there were unconstitutional
Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Implementation in Europe

aspects to mandatory quotas. The bill to reform the 1985 General Electoral Act was submitted in November 2001. In April 2003 it was debated and rejected, and the arguments still concerned questions regarding unconstitutional aspects. Even though the bill was rejected, there was a parallel development. All political parties but the main conservative party, PP, had adopted either gender quotas or targets for women’s representation (Verge & Troupel 2010:4).

3. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Before exploring the quota provisions in Spain it is important to explain the electoral system. Spain is a parliamentary representative democratic constitutional monarchy. The legislative power is vested in the Congress (Cortes Generales), which consists of two chambers, the Congress (Congreso de los Diputados) and the Senate (Senado). The Congress and the Senate serve concurrent terms which run for a maximum of four years and elections are held simultaneously. All elections at all levels are held with closed and blocked party lists, with exception for the Senate, elected by partial bloc vote. The Spanish Senate currently consists of 264 senators, 208 directly elected in general elections and 56 appointed by the 17 autonomous regions (comunidades autónomas). The Congress is formed by 350 members, elected from each province following proportional representation.

In election to the Congress, voters can only choose which party to vote for, and the parties choose freely how to place the candidates on the ballot. The electoral chances of candidates depend on the vote received by the party list and their position on the ballot. The ballot order determines who gets elected directly. In Senate elections, voters may vote directly for their preferred candidate. Each party presents three candidates per province, listed alphabetically on the ballot. A voter may vote for up to three candidates, and the four most voted candidates in each province are elected. For the Senate, candidates are placed by surname. In Congress elections, the ballot order determines who gets elected directly.

4. THE ADOPTION OF QUOTA PROVISIONS

In the 2004 general election the PP lost in favour of the PSOE, and the latter’s leader and appointed prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, nominated the first Spanish government ever to have the same number of female and male ministers. Gender equality became a prominent issue with high priority, and this was accentuated on 22 May 2007, when an Equality Law (la Ley de Igualdad, Ley Orgánica 3/2007) was approved without any extensive debate. The law sets up parity among electoral candidates through the “principal of equal presence or composition” which modify Art. 44 bis of the 1985 General Elections Law (LOREG, Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General).

The reform forces political parties to incorporate a minimum of 40 per cent and a maximum of 60 per cent of either sex and guides the conjunction of the ballots but also demand the measure of every set of five places of the list. If the number of eligible posts is less than five, the list must be as close as possible to the 40 : 60 equilibrium. This quota system is implemented for election at all levels except for municipalities less than 3,000 habitants.

74 For the complete debate, see http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Intervenciones.
75 The regions are divided into 50 provinces (provincias). The cities of Ceuta and Melilla which are located on the African continent have the status of province and hold a high level of autonomy (autogobierno). The cities of Ceuta and Melilla are given one seat each, and two seats are given to each of the other 50 provinces. The remaining 248 seats are allocated proportionally according to population.
and the Senate elections. The law is framed in such a way that no sex can be represented with more than 60 per cent, and, consequently, no less than 40 per cent, on the electoral lists. For the senate elections, parties present a three-candidate list, and at least one woman has to be included. Electoral authorities invalidate party lists, which fail to meet the quota requirements.

Table 32: Quota provision process in Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Application</th>
<th>Non-compliance</th>
<th>First elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Parity (40/60 per cent for either sex) in each stretch of five candidates.</td>
<td>Party lists invalidated</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For towns over 5,000 inhabitants (2007 election) and over 3,000 (from 2011 onwards)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Parity in each stretch of five candidates (40/60 per cent for either sex)</td>
<td>Party lists invalidated</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some regions use zip lists or a 50/50 percentage for either sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party lists invalidated</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007 (Basque Country), 2007 (Castille-La Mancha, Balearic Islands), 2008 (Andalucia), 2009 (Basque Country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>Parity in each stretch of five candidates</td>
<td>Party lists invalidated</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Parity in each stretch of five candidates</td>
<td>Party lists invalidated</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>One woman (man) for every group of three candidates on the list</td>
<td>Party lists invalidated</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Verge & Troupel 2010.

5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUOTA PROVISIONS AND WOMEN’S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

The quota law was not debated to any significant extent. One reason for this may be the limited change required by the law in relation to the fact that the number of female politicians had already increased in accordance with the 40 per cent quota. The increase in the numbers of female deputies in the Spanish Congress followed the PSOE’s adoption of quotas for women and had already reached 36 per cent. Table 33 also shows that the party quota adopted within the PSOE in 1988 and 1997 resulted in numerical jumps, which were followed by increases in the number of female deputies in the other two largest political parties, the People’s Party and the United Left.
Table 33. The percentage and number of female deputies in the Spanish Congress, 1982–2008, for the three largest political parties or coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>IU</th>
<th>Total % of female deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6.9% (14)</td>
<td>0.9% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7.1% (13)</td>
<td>5.9% (5)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>17.1% (30)</td>
<td>10.4% (11)</td>
<td>11.0% (2)</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>17.6% (28)</td>
<td>14.9% (21)</td>
<td>22.0% (4)</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>27.7% (39)</td>
<td>14.3% (22)</td>
<td>33.0% (7)</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36.8% (46)</td>
<td>25.1% (46)</td>
<td>25.0% (2)</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>46.3% (75)</td>
<td>28.4% (42)</td>
<td>40.0% (2)</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>42.3% (71)</td>
<td>30.7% (47)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The PP was the only party that had a negative opinion regarding the modification of the 1985 General Electoral Act on 22 March 2007, even if it agreed on the need for more women in public politics. Its arguments were that quotas are unnecessary, since Spain was already high on the ranking list of women’s political representation worldwide, and the parties should be free to choose where to place women on the electoral lists. The PP was the only party that had a negative opinion regarding the modification of the 1985 General Electoral Act on 22 March 2007, even if it agreed on the need for more women in public politics. Its arguments were that quotas are unnecessary, since Spain was already high on the ranking list of women’s political representation worldwide, and the parties should be free to choose where to place women on the electoral lists.

Today’s United Left was created in 1986 by the association of the Communist Party and other parties to the left of the PSOE. An internal debate resulted in the 1989 commitment to a quota for women, of 30 per cent for internal party positions and on the party electoral lists. Later this debate resulted in a 35 per cent quota being adopted in 1990 and a 40 per cent quota being adopted in 1997 (Ramiro 2000: 225–6). This development can be noticed in the increasing numbers of female IU representatives in table 33. In addition, five regional parties in Spain have adopted a 40 per cent quota for either sex – the Socialist Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya) since 2000, the Initiative for Catalonia-Green (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds) since 2002, the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) since 2004, the Nationalist Galician Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego) since 2002, and the Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria) since 2000.

In the Congress there are two major jumps in the number of women. These increases can be traced back to voluntary gender quota within the PSOE, as discussed earlier. The development in the Senate has followed suit but is still under 30 per cent.

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76 Camarero Benítez, MP for the PP, speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 22 March 2007.
Table 34. The percentage of female senators in the Spanish Senate, between 1982 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first election after the new quota law took place in May 2007 when municipality elections were held. It resulted in 39.4 per cent female members and 60.6 per cent male members of the regional parliaments (concejales), which should be compared with the result of the 2003 election, when the shares of women and men were 32.3 per cent and 67.7 per cent, respectively.

Table 35. Municipality elections in Spain: women’s political representation at the two most recent elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Percentage of women</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Percentage of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top Ten</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teruel</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudad Real</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuenca</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>Albacete</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>Salamanca</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>Huelva</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pàlecia</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>Guadalajara</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>Ciudad Real</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceuta</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>Illes Balears</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melilla</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>Almeria</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicante</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>Valladolid</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bottom three</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontevedra</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Coruña</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>Soria</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugo</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>Girona</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.1. Ordering of candidates

In Senate elections, parties can affect the placement of the candidates by nominating candidates by their surname since voters tend to vote for candidates placed on the top of the list. Research has shown that political parties tend to select female candidates whose surnames starts with a letter of the second half of the alphabet, especially in those constituencies where the party only expect to win one seat (Esteve-Volart & Bagues 2010:14-15). In the case of the Congress, the share of female candidates has increased
since the election law was passed, from 34 per cent in 2004 to 46 per cent in 2008. However, the female representative in the Congress has remained at 36 per cent (Ortega, Torres & Trujillo 2011:120). The placement of female candidates on the ballots is thereby unfavourable to them. This shows that gender quotas, as they are currently defined, have an impact on the number of female candidates but have limited effect on the number elected. As Berta Esteve-Volart and Manuel Bagues show in their research, parties nominate female candidates to the bottom of the lists to both Senate and Congress, where they have fewer chances to get elected (Esteve-Volart & Bagues 2010:19). When studying the two main parties, PSOE and PP, and the impact of the gender quota on women’s representation in the 2008 election to the Congress, the results show that women’s representation rather depends on party voluntary compliance. Therefore, the future major political composition of the Congress could decrease the number of female representatives (Ortega, Torres & Trujillo 2011).

A study made at the occasion of the 2007 local election in Catalonia shows the same pattern (Verge 2010). Examination of 1300 party lists from 197 Catalan towns illustrates how political parties assigned the lowest proposition of candidatures, 40 per cent, to women and placed men higher in the five top positions and they were consequently over-represented in winning positions (Verge 2010: 176). In the Spanish case, the ordering of candidates is an obvious obstacle for female politicians running for public offices.

5.2. The European Parliament

Spain became a member of the European Union in 1986 and already in the election in 1989 women obtained a noteworthy proportion of seats with 32.8 per cent. The female share of the seats has remained almost the same, with a 36.0 per cent of representation in the last election in 2009, despite the fact that 46 per cent of the candidates were women in comparison with 33 per cent female candidates in 2004 (Ortega, Torres & Trujillo 2011:120; Navarro Marchante, no date).

Table 36. The percentage of women elected to the European Parliament, Spanish delegation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto de la Mujer, online statistics.

6. QUOTAS IN OTHER AREAS

The gender equality law has no legal effects concerning quotas for women or reserved seats in the private sector and legalisations of gender quotas in the private sector is not debated to any extent in Spain today, nor are quota provisions for minority groups. The 2007 Equality Law, Art. 75, only recommends equilibrium of women and men in executive boards. Statistics show that only 7 per cent of the top management of Spanish companies listed on the stock-market are women (Instituto de la Mujer, online statistics). However, the spirit of the speech of Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero on 22 March 2007 was to remove the obstacles to the effective participation of women in all public and private arenas. He expressed a wish to see more women in decision-making positions not only in public politics but also in the private sector.
7. CONCLUSIONS

The debate on women’s political representation developed principally, but not exclusively, on the left wing of the political spectrum. The debates were greatly influenced by a feminist lobby and the work of party feminists inside the PSOE which led to electoral quotas being adopted by the party in 1988 and in 1997. On 22 March 2007, the General Act on Equality between Women and Men was approved, which in turn modified the 1985 General Electoral Act to guarantee at least 40 per cent women in elected positions at all levels in Spain. The Spanish women’s movement, the PSOE women’s secretariat and initially also the Women’s Institute were the crucial actors in the process of getting quotas for women approved. After the implementation of the Equality Law and thereby the modification of the General Election Law there has only been one election held at each level. Therefore it is still too early to draw any comprehensive conclusions.

However, the results since the adoption of legislated quotas show small changes in women’s political representation. The number of female candidates has increased but there was no or small effects on the number of women elected. Women are systematically placed on less favorable positions on the party lists. According to political scientist Tânia Verge “the introduction of the quota law cannot be considered a critical juncture in the Spanish case” (Verge 2010:184). Consequently, the consolidation of a parity democracy started already in the 1980s with voluntary party quotas and the introduction of a legal electoral quota has been rather secondary in increasing women’s political representation. Still, the importance of the law is the fact that from now on there is a legal prohibition of moving backwards.
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CASE STUDY: SWEDEN: STEP BY STEP TOWARDS GENDER BALANCED POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Lenita Freidenvall

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In worldwide comparisons of women in national parliaments, Sweden and the other Nordic countries are regularly ranked at the top of the lists. Today, in 2011, Sweden is ranked number two, after Rwanda, on the world ranking list, with women currently making up 45.0 per cent of the membership of the national Parliament (www.ipu.org).

In a historical perspective, social representation has a strong tradition in Sweden, dating back to 1435 and the establishment of the four-estate Parliament, which represented the nobility, the clergy, the bourgeoisie and the landowners. The proportional representation system introduced in 1911 paved the way for a multiparty system with five political parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, the Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party, representing (on a spectrum) the interests of workers, farmers and business. This five-party system later developed into a seven-party system, including the Green Party and the Christian Democratic Party. At the 2010 election, an eight party entered the parliamentary arena, the Sweden-Democratic Party.\(^77\) In an historical perspective, the Social Democratic Party has been a dominant player, being in government 1932-1976, 1982-1991 and 1994-2006. A coalition government, consisting of the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party, was installed in 2006 and re-elected in 2010. As of 2011, the 349 Members of Parliament are elected in 29 electoral districts in a PR system with open lists.\(^78\) Seats are allocated using the “adjusted odd-number method”, and the electoral threshold for parties to enter parliament is 4 per cent. However if a party gains at least 12% of the votes in one electoral district, it may also participate in the distribution of permanent seats in that constituency.

Contrary to common belief, no constitutional clause or electoral law requires any specific level of representation for women in elected bodies in Sweden. Rather, the relatively high representation of women in the Swedish parliament may be attributed to a combination of conditions that are conducive to high levels of women’s political representation, including political/institutional factors such as the proportional representational system and the historic dominance of the Social Democratic party, socio-economic factors such as the high level of women’s participation in higher education and in the work force, and cultural/religious factors such as the prominence of an egalitarian culture and secularism (Bergqvist 1994, Freidenvall 2006, Wide 2006, Wängnerud 1998). The increase in the 1970s in the number of female parliamentarians can be attributed to the sustained pressure by political parties and women’s groups within parties and in society. Also, some political parties, although not all, have introduced voluntary party quotas. However, these measures were introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s when the proportion of women parliamentarians already exceeded 30 per cent. The take-off in the increase in women’s representation occurred in the 1970s, before any voluntary party quotas were adopted. It

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\(^77\) The notion of social representation has also been reflected in the parliamentary committee system, the referral system through which all reports of government commissions of inquiry are distributed to advocacy groups for comment and the corporatist arrangements in policy making and administration (Sainsbury 2005).

\(^78\) Preference voting is used, but only since 1998. The voter casts a preference vote by marking one of the candidates on the ballot paper with a cross.
was not until 1993 that the Social Democratic Party adopted the ‘zipper’ system, by which women and men alternate on the electoral lists.

2. THE ORIGINS OF QUOTA PROVISIONS AND DEBATES

Even if voluntary party quotas for women were introduced fairly late in Sweden – in the late 1980s and early 1990s – debates on quotas have been going on for a long time. As early as 1928, the National Federation of Social Democratic Women proposed to the Social Democratic Party congress the adoption of gender quotas so that women would be placed in winnable positions on the electoral lists (Karlsson 1996). The proposal was rejected on the basis of the idea that all positions in the party and all positions on the electoral lists should be based on equal opportunity and subject to open competition. Over the next 50 years, party women and women organized in the women’s sections of the political parties continued to mobilize, recruit and nominate women. Even if calls for quotas were heard within some women’s federations, most women and men were against their introduction. Quotas were seen as a special measure in conflict with the fundamental principles of equal opportunity for all and of merit as the legitimate differentiating criterion in selection processes. They were thus seen as a form of reverse discrimination against men; and they were also seen as an unjustified limitation of party members’ right to select their own representatives and an illegitimate constraint on the sovereignty of local party organizations in the composition of electoral lists (Freidenvall 2005, 2006).

Gradually, the view of quotas changed, especially within the women’s federations, which were dissatisfied with the pace at which the number of women elected was increasing (Freidenvall 2006). In 1970, almost 50 years after women’s enfranchisement, women’s representation in the Swedish Parliament had just passed 10 per cent. Although there were still internal disagreements over the issue of gender quotas, quotas were identified as a reasonable solution, but one that should be used as a last resort. If geography, occupation and age were important selection criteria, why not gender, women’s federations argued. The under-representation of women in elected bodies and all male assemblies was now – to a much greater extent than before – seen as an effect of deficiencies in the functioning of democracy (Dahlerup 1998). National women’s federations claimed that the percentage of women on candidate lists should correspond to the percentage of women in the population, and that an under-representation of women should be seen as a violation of equal rights, contributing to a skewed view of democracy. According to political scientist Diane Sainsbury, the framing of women’s political representation as citizens’ rights had strategic advantages. It highlighted the unity among all women, as well as the fact that although women constituted half the citizenry, they were only awarded a marginal proportion of seats in elected bodies. The under-representation of women was thus framed as a question of a “deficient functioning of Swedish democracy” (Sainsbury 2005:199).

The adoption of party quotas was begun at the local level, in particular by some local branches of the Social Democratic Party. In Stockholm, for instance, the local Social Democratic Party introduced a principle according to which a woman was placed in every third position on the electoral list for the municipal elections of 1968 and 1970. Another example is Järfalla, a municipality on the outskirts of Stockholm, where the local Social Democratic Party selected women for all new positions. For the local election in 1970 in this municipality, the party’s list alternated women and men from the 11th seat onwards; for the local election in 1973, the list alternated from the fifth seat onwards; and for the local election in 1976, the entire list alternated.
3. THE ADOPTION OF PARTY QUOTA PROVISIONS

In the 1970s, pressure to increase women’s political representation was being applied to all political parties. The turning point came in 1972, when the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party challenged each other in order to win women’s votes. While Social Democratic Party leader and Prime Minister Olof Palme promised to establish a Gender Equality Unit within the Cabinet to deal better with gender equality issues, Liberal Party Leader Gunnar Helén introduced a formal recommendation within the party that internal party boards and committees be made up of a minimum of 40 per cent of either sex. This competition between the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party set the snowball in motion, being spurred by the intra-party women’s organizations.

In the course of the 1970s, all the political parties tried to outbid each other and introduced special measures – such as targets and recommendations – to ensure increased representation of women in elected bodies at all levels, national, regional and local (Wängnerud 2001). The increased levels of women in decision-making in the 1970s and 1980s can hence be seen as a result of a contagion process (Cp. Matland & Studlar 1996). However, it was not until the number of women elected to Parliament had passed the 30 per cent threshold that some parties responded by introducing voluntary party quotas.

The introduction of voluntary party quotas should also be understood as a response to debates on legislated quotas in the state bureaucracy in the 1980s. In 1987, a commission of inquiry appointed by Anita Gradin, the minister for gender equality, suggested that the government adopt targets to improve the proportion of women on state boards and committees (Bergqvist 1994). Several arguments for and against quotas were outlined, and it was concluded that quotas represented the only way to overcome inequality. Only through legislation could a balance between women and men in public bodies be ensured. As a concession to political parties and trade unions that opposed the adoption of legislated quotas, the commission’s final report suggested that women’s representation on state boards and committees should reach 30 per cent by 1992, 40 per cent by 1995 and 50 per cent by 1998. If these goals were not achieved, the question of quotas should be followed up. The proposal for a law on quotas was consequently replaced by the threat of a law on quotas.

3.1. Voluntary party quotas

In 1981, when it was established, the Green Party adopted internal gender quotas, stipulating a minimum of 40 per cent of either sex on internal boards and committees as well as a joint male/female chair of the party. This provision was extended in 1987 to include a minimum of 40 per cent of either sex on the party’s electoral lists as well. In 1997, the quota provision was extended to 50 per cent of either sex on electoral lists, plus or minus one person. In 1987 the Left Party adopted a quota policy of at least the same proportion of women on electoral lists as women party members in the electoral district. This policy was extended in 1990 to a minimum of 40 per cent of either sex on the electoral lists and in 1993 to a minimum of 50 per cent women on the electoral lists.

In 1993, the Social Democratic Party – by far the largest party – adopted gender quotas in the form of the zipper system, by which women and men alternate on the electoral lists – the so-called ‘Every other for the ladies’. Previously, the party had introduced party targets, such as the recommendation from 1987 for a minimum representation of 40 per cent of either sex at all levels within the party. In 1990, this policy was extended to ‘an equal
representation of the sexes’.

An unanticipated decrease from 38 to 34 per cent female parliamentarians in the 1991 general election contributed to a renewed and revitalized discussion of women’s political representation. This decrease, together with the threat posed by the feminist network the Support Stockings, which threatened to form a women-only party if the established parties did not present more women candidates on their electoral lists, challenged the political parties. In particular, however, it offered Social Democratic women a new window of opportunity finally to get their demands for quotas implemented.

3.2. Soft quotas

The political parties to the right and in the center did not introduce voluntary party quotas. Rather, they preferred non-mandatory targets or minimum recommendations, so-called soft quotas. In 1974, the Liberal Party extended its recommendation that all party boards and committees be composed of at least 40 per cent of members of each sex to cover its electoral lists as well. In 1984, this recommendation was extended to include alternated lists at general elections. The Christian Democratic Party followed a similar path, introducing a recommendation for a minimum of 40 per cent of members of each sex on its electoral lists in 1987.

In 1996 the Centre Party decided on a goal of equal representation of women and men on its electoral lists, while leaving the final decision on the composition of lists to the nomination committees. The same was the case for the Moderate Party, which in 1993 decided on a goal of equal representation. To these parties, equal representation of women and men is often defined as a minimum of 40 per cent of either sex. In 2007, the Moderate Party introduced a recommendation stipulating that the top four positions on the electoral list for the European Parliament election in 2009 must comprise an equal number of women and men. The Sweden-Democratic Party stands out as an exception pertaining to the adoption of voluntary party quotas in Sweden. No party quotas have been introduced. Thus, in Sweden all the political parties, except for the Sweden-Democratic Party, have adopted special measures to increase the number of women in elected bodies at all levels of government, ranging from non-mandatory general goals and recommendations to voluntary party quotas. All these measures were introduced step-wise, usually first targeting the internal party boards and committees and then the electoral lists, and were gradually strengthened. Voluntary party quotas were introduced when the share of women parliamentarians already exceeded 30 per cent. Thus, the introduction of voluntary party quotas does not explain the high number of women in Swedish politics. Rather, these so-called ‘high echelon quotas’ function to safeguard gains already made (Freidenvall et al. 2006: 56).

4. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY QUOTA PROVISIONS

To what extent have voluntary party quotas been implemented by the political parties in Sweden? This section will analyze the implementation of voluntary party quotas in relation to the candidate selection process as well as to the proportion of women on the electoral lists at the national, regional, local and European Parliament levels. The number of women on the party executive boards as well as in high official government positions will also be presented.

The Swedish candidate selection system can be characterized as formal and institutionalized in the sense that each party has adopted formal and transparent sets of rules that affect all its candidates. The main responsibility for candidate selection and power over the final composition of the electoral list rests with the local party organizations. This means that a decentralized system for candidate selection is applied. One of the key concerns of the local party organizations, and particularly their nomination committees, is to ensure that groups and interests that the party perceives itself as representing are represented on the party lists. Parties are conscious of trying to balance their party tickets, ensuring that the list is composed of a certain number of women, union representatives, young candidates, candidates from different parts of the electoral district, and so on. A diverse slate is usually perceived as imperative in appealing to as many voters and different groups of voters as possible, and to guaranteeing party peace among the different fractions within the party. In ticket balancing, thus, the party organizations pay attention to both external and internal pressures.

Table 37 shows the extent to which women have been nominated by the political parties and elected to the Swedish Parliament in the last three elections to the national Parliament. A distinction is made between parties with recommendations (soft quotas), parties with party quotas and additional parties (parties without any special measures to increase the number of women parliamentarians).
Table 37. The proportions of women nominated and elected to the Swedish Parliament 2002, 2006 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nominated</td>
<td>elected</td>
<td>nominated</td>
<td>elected</td>
<td>nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties with party quotas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties with recommendations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(soft quotas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Party</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden Democratic Party</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Freidenvall, 2006; official electoral statistics.

As table 37 illustrates, the proportion of women and men in the Swedish Parliament is close to a 50 : 50 gender balance, with 45 per cent female parliamentarians as of 2010. In 2010, the proportion of female parliamentarians decreased from 47 to 45 per cent, which illustrates that the process towards balanced parliamentary delegations is not linear. While the proportion of female parliamentarians is comparatively high in all the political parties, with the exception of the Sweden-Democratic Party, it is higher in parties with voluntary party quotas than in parties that do not have party quotas. The rejection of formal party quotas in the right and centre parties has been followed by various measures to improve women’s representation – and thereby to prove that quotas are unnecessary. An analysis of the 2002 nomination process shows that the issue of gender balance in list composition is taken for granted within quota parties (Freidenvall 2006). In non-quota parties, however, gender balance is indeed identified as an important value, but not necessarily more important than other values, such as the right of local party organizations to decide their own lists. This indicates that the promotion of gender balance needs to be negotiated within non-quota parties. Nevertheless, the special measures adopted by the parties, ranging from targets and recommendations to party quotas, indicate parties’ attitudes towards women as politicians.

Table 37 also shows that the proportion of women in parties with quotas has remained relatively stable, while it has fluctuated to a greater extent in those parties that do not
have quotas. For instance, the share of women in the Centre Party parliamentary fraction fell by 12 percentage points between 2002 and 2006, and another decrease by 8 percentage points between 2006 and 2010. A similar pattern can be found in the Liberal Party, with a decrease of 8 percentage points between 2006 and 2010. It should, however, be noted that these two parties are small, and any numerical change in the gender composition of their parliamentary party fractions has great effects in percentage terms.

Table 38 illustrates the relative success rates of female and male candidates in the parliamentary elections of 2002, 2006 and 2010 by party. The concept of relative success rates refers to the success of one group (here women) in relation to the success of another group (here men). The relative success ratio equals 1, when the two groups are equally successful (Lilliefeldt 2011, forthcoming). When women are more successful than men, women’s relative success rate is more than 1, and vice versa. When women are less successful than men, their relative success rate is less than 1, and vice versa.

Table 38. Success rates of female and male candidates in the Parliamentary elections 2002, 2006 and 2010, by party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative rate of women elected (rate of women elected/rate of men elected)</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties with quotas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties with recommendations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate party</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre party</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal party</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic party</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additional parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden-Democratic Party</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Election Authority (Valmyndigheten), Freidenvall (2011).

Taken together, the table shows that women were more successful than men in the Green Party and in the Moderate Party in the elections of 2002, 2006 and 2010. Women were more successful than men in two of the three elections 2002-2010 in the Left Party and in the Liberal Party, while men were more successful than women in two out of three elections in the Social Democratic Party and in the Centre Party. Men were more successful than women in the Christian Democratic Party in these three elections. In the elections of 2010, men were more successful than women in the Sweden-Democratic Party. (See below details on the electoral system)
4.2. Implementation of quota rules

The adoption of special measures, including recommendations and party quotas, indicates a willingness to increase the proportion of women in decision-making. Good will is not enough however, if the quota system does not comply with the electoral system or if there are problems in the implementation process. So, to what extent do the political parties implement their quota rules? Sweden is divided into 29 electoral districts for national elections, and each party presents a party list in each district. Table 39 illustrates the number of party districts that applied the quota rules or the ‘soft quotas rules’ (recommendations) on their respective party lists.

Table 39 The implementation of quota rules and ‘soft quotas’ on party lists in Sweden, 2002 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>No. and % of party districts that applied the quota rule in 2002</th>
<th>No. and % of party districts that applied the quota rule in 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties with party quotas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>22/29 (76%)</td>
<td>22/29 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>23/29 (79%)</td>
<td>22/29 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>19/29 (66%)</td>
<td>20/29 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties with recommendations (soft quotas)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Party</td>
<td>10/31 (32%)</td>
<td>10/20 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>19/29 (66%)</td>
<td>24/29 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>16/29 (55%)</td>
<td>23/29 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>4/33 (12%)</td>
<td>0/29 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freidenvall, 2006; official electoral statistics.

As table 39 illustrates, most parties that have voluntary party quotas abide by their quota rules. The quota rules were implemented in the majority of all party lists for the national elections in 2002 and 2006. For instance, the zipper system was implemented on 23 and 22 (respectively) of the 29 Social Democratic Party district lists. In the six and seven remaining lists, the zipper system was implemented at the top of the lists, that is, including all safe seats. In some of these cases the zipper system was set aside to the advantage of women by placing two women in a row. Moreover, although a third of the lists of the Left Party did not comply with the quota rule of having more than 50 per cent women on the party list in the 2002 and 2006 elections, only two of its lists included less than 40 per cent women. Similar patterns could be found within the Green Party.

Table 39 also shows the extent to which soft quota rules were implemented by the parties. While a majority of the Centre Party districts (83 per cent) and the Christian Democratic Party districts (79 per cent) implemented their rules in 2006, half of the Moderate Party districts did so. The Liberal Party implemented its recommendation on the zipper system in few of its districts in 2002 and in none of the districts in 2006. However, it is important to note that in a majority of the lists of the Liberal Party the zipper system was applied at the top of the list where the so-called safe candidates are placed. It is also important to note that 69 per cent of the Liberal lists comprised more than 40 per cent women candidates.
4.3. **Women in elected bodies: national, regional, and local levels and the European Parliament**

To what extent has the implementation of the quota rules increased the number of elected female politicians at the various electoral levels? Only parties with party quotas are included in the following description.

**Table 40. Women in elected bodies in Sweden: national, regional and local levels and the European Parliament**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Year of introduction</th>
<th>Women elected (%), national Parliament</th>
<th>Women elected (%), county councils</th>
<th>Women elected (%), municipal councils</th>
<th>Women elected (%), European Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1985: N/A</td>
<td>1985: N/A</td>
<td>1985: 43%</td>
<td>1995: 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991: N/A</td>
<td>1991: 50%</td>
<td>1991: 41%</td>
<td>2004: 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002: 59%</td>
<td>2002: 53%</td>
<td>2002: 45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006: 53%</td>
<td>2006: 50%</td>
<td>2006: 47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010: 56%</td>
<td>2010: 55%</td>
<td>2010: 48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002: 47%</td>
<td>2002: 49%</td>
<td>2002: 47%</td>
<td>2009: 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006: 50%</td>
<td>2006: 51%</td>
<td>2006: 48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010: 48%</td>
<td>2010: 51%</td>
<td>2010: 49%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002: 47%</td>
<td>2002: 57%</td>
<td>2002: 47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006: 64%</td>
<td>2006: 50%</td>
<td>2006: 49%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010: 58%</td>
<td>2010: 49%</td>
<td>2010: 46%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Freidenvall, 2006; official electoral statistics.*

As table 40 shows, the implementation of voluntary party quotas has been quite successful in all political parties and at all electoral levels. The 40 per cent rule introduced in the Green Party in 1987 resulted in more than 40 per cent women being elected in all elections at all levels over the period 1988–1994 (ranging from 41 to 56 per cent). The subsequent 50 per cent (plus or minus one person) rule adopted by the Green Party in 1997 resulted in proportions ranging from 45 to 59 per cent in all elections at all levels over the period 1998–2006.

The zipper system (50 per cent) introduced by the Social Democratic Party in 1993 resulted in proportions of elected women ranging from 47 to 51 per cent at all levels and in all elections between 1994 and 2006.

The proportion of women elected within the Left Party fluctuates to a greater extent than it does within the other parties. The 40 per cent rule introduced by the Left Party in 1990 resulted in proportions of women elected ranging from 31 to 38 per cent in the three elections of 1991. The subsequent 50 per cent (women) rule adopted in 1993 resulted in variations between 42 and 64 per cent in the elections between 1994 and 2006. These
fluctuations can be explained mainly by the facts that the party is small, with only one safe seat in most electoral districts, and that men topped most of the party lists in these electoral districts. This result highlights the significance not only of the mean district magnitude but also of the number of safe seats for individual parties (Matland 2006; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008a). In general, however, the introduction of quotas contributed to safeguard levels already gained.

4.4. **Representation of women on party executive boards and within government offices**

To what extent are women represented on the political parties’ executive boards and in government offices? Table 41 illustrates the proportion of women in party executive boards in 2008.

**Table 41. The percentage of women members in party executives, by political party and the gender of party leader, 2008.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Gender of party leader 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties with quotas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic party</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green party</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Female and male spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties with recommendations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate party</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre party</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic party</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additional parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden Democrats party</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6 males, 3 females</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freidenvall 2008.

As table 41 indicates, party executive boards are gender-balanced. In general, there are no dramatic differences in the gender composition of party executives in terms of differences between parties with quotas (average 50 per cent) and parties without quotas (49 per cent). As the table also shows, gender quota rules can also be applied to positions of party leadership: the Green Party has two party leaders, a man and a woman.

Table 42 illustrates the sex distribution among top officials in government offices in 1973, 1985, 1998 and 2006. State secretaries are politically recruited and are the most important associates of the ministers. Top administrators refer to additional senior officials in a ministry, such as the permanent under-secretary and under-secretary for legal affairs.
Table 42. Women as top officials in government offices in Sweden in 1973, 1985, 1998, 2006 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet ministers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State secretaries</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top administrators</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gender Equality Statistics in Sweden (Stockholm: Statistiska Centralbyrå, 2006).

As table 42 shows, the proportion of female Cabinet ministers has increased. In 30 years there has been a four-fold increase, from 11 to 45 per cent. In 1994, when the zipper system was introduced by the Social Democratic Party for the first time in a national election and applied by most other parties – either as a party quota rule or as a recommended policy – Ingvar Carlsson, the leader of the winning Social Democratic party, formed the first Cabinet ever in which women and men were equally represented. The present, 2008, Cabinet, being a coalition of the four right and centre parties, consists of 10 women and 12 men.

5. QUOTAS FOR MINORITY GROUPS

At the same time as Sweden has been recognized for its high representation of women in politics, there are limits to women’s political representation in terms of majority as opposed to minority ethnic groups. While there are difficulties to attain data on the political representation of ethnic groups, there is available data on the number of representatives born in Sweden as well as the number of foreign-born representatives. As of 2010, 8 per cent of the MPs were foreign born.

Table 43 shows the proportion of elected decision-makers at the three levels of government in Sweden: the national parliament (national level), the county councils (regional level) and the municipal councils (local level).
Table 43. Nominated and elected decision-makers 2002, 2006 and 2010 at three levels of government, gender & country of birth (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002 Nominated (women)</th>
<th>2002 Elected (women)</th>
<th>2006 Nominated (women)</th>
<th>2006 Elected (women)</th>
<th>2010 Nominated (women)</th>
<th>2010 Elected (women)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARLIAMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominated and elected women</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women among foreign born</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTY COUNCILS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominated and elected women</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women among foreign born</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUNICIPAL COUNCILS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominated and elected women</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women among foreign born</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån (Statistics Sweden).

In all elections at all levels, the nomination and the political representation of foreign-born female decision-makers are within the 40-60 percent range. Moreover, the nomination of and the political representation of foreign-born female decision-makers is the same or higher than among female decision-makers in average. This leads to the interesting hypothesis that a high representation of women in politics spurs a high political representation of a diversity of women.

While quotas for minority groups have been rejected, most political parties have started actively recruiting minority groups, and some of them have adopted special measures to increase the number of persons born in non-Nordic countries (Freidenvall 2006). For instance, the Social Democratic Party recommends that each of its party lists comprise the same proportion of candidates with a minority background as the proportion of minorities in the population of the electoral district. Similar rules can be found in the Left Party and the Green Party.
6. QUOTAS IN OTHER ARENAS

Quotas on corporate boards have also been debated in Sweden. In 2002, the minister for gender equality, Social Democrat Margareta Winberg, made a statement on the male dominance on the boards of directors of Swedish companies and stated that by the end of 2004 Swedish companies must have a minimum of 25 per cent women on their boards; otherwise a law on quotas would be introduced. In 2006, a government commission of inquiry proposed the introduction of a quota law similar to the one introduced in Norway in 2006, which prescribes a fixed allocation of board members according to sex, generally defined as 40 per cent of each sex, depending on the number of board members (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008b). With the change of government in Sweden in 2006, various kinds of capacity building courses and advanced skills training courses for women in the corporate sector have been prioritized at the expense of quotas.

7. CONCLUSION

As this case study has shown, no constitutional clause or electoral law in Sweden requires any specific level of representation of women in elected bodies. Rather, the almost gender-balanced decision-making bodies can be explained by several factors, in particular the sustained pressure on the political parties by women’s groups within parties, the autonomous women’s movement as well as some progressive men. Also, while all the political parties have introduced special measures to increase the proportion of women elected, leading to an almost 50:50 gender balance in all political parties, they vary in the extent to which they regard these measures as a recommendation or as a binding rule.

The case study also has shown that the existence of quotas tends to result in somewhat higher proportions of women in elected bodies. Moreover, while the number of women elected is fairly stable in the parties with quotas, the issue of women’s political representation needs to be negotiated again and again once it is time for candidate selection and list composition in parties that do not have quotas. However, due to both external and internal pressures, all the parties have to show that they can live up to the demands for fair gender representation, with or without formal quotas.
8. REFERENCES

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- Inter-Parliamentary Union, <http://www.ipu.org>
CASE STUDY: THE UNITED KINGDOM: POLITICAL PARTIES AND QUOTA REFORM

Mona Lena Krook

1. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

Campaigns for gender quotas in the United Kingdom go back more than 20 years. In the light of the FPTP electoral system, quota strategies have focused on the composition of candidate shortlists, the final lists of candidates being considered in each single-member electoral district. In 1993, the Labour Party adopted the most controversial of these policies in the form of all-women shortlists (AWS), which required certain districts to consider shortlists consisting entirely of women. When an industrial tribunal declared this policy illegal in 1996, activists devised other quota strategies, known as ‘twinning’ and ‘zipping’, in the run-up to elections for the new devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales in the late 1990s. In 2002, the Sex Discrimination Act was amended and AWS were reintroduced, set to expire in 2015 unless an order was made to the contrary. In 2008, a Speaker's Conference was established by the House of Commons to make recommendations for rectifying the political under-representation of women, ethnic minorities, and disabled people. In response to its recommendations, the Labour government extended the use of AWS to 2030 and the new Equality Act that came into force in 2010 allows parties to reserve places on electoral lists for other groups that are under-represented in politics, including Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) citizens.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND GENDER QUOTA DEBATES

The policies of all-women shortlists, twinning and zipping grew out of earlier efforts to get parties to select more female candidates. The first party to pass a measure was the Social Democratic Party. In 1981, its party congress approved a resolution that at least one woman be included on every candidate shortlist. This was then increased to at least two women per shortlist in the run-up to elections in 1983. Two years later, the Liberal Party passed a similar resolution that at least one woman be included on every candidate shortlist. When the two parties merged to form the Liberal Democrats in 1988, they agreed to retain the policy of at least one woman per shortlist.

The Labour Party first established a goal to nominate more female candidates in 1987, when it decided that in electoral districts where women’s names had been suggested, at least one woman had to be included on the shortlist. In 1989, the party conference approved Composite 54, accepting that quotas were the only way to ensure equal representation at all levels of the party. Yet, despite support for quotas for internal party positions, delegates strongly opposed the use of quotas for the selection of candidates to Parliament (Russell 2003). In contrast, the Conservative Party did not consider any proposals to nominate more female candidates during this period. At a more informal level, the party nonetheless sought to include at least 10 per cent women on its approved list of candidates.

Around this time, Labour women learned about gender quotas in other socialist and social democratic parties across Europe (Short 1996). They distributed a pamphlet at the party conference in 1990, stressing the need for AWS for the selection of candidates to
Parliament. In response, the conference agreed to a 40 per cent quota for women in positions inside the party and a target of 50 per cent women among the party’s MPs within ten years or three general elections. Although the party leadership urged local parties to adopt AWS, most parties had already selected their candidates, and thus only one AWS was considered before the 1992 elections (Eagle and Lovenduski 1998). While the party did nominate more women, most of them were placed in unwinnable seats (Russell 2003: 69).

After the party’s loss to the Conservatives, research suggested that a means of expanding support among female voters was to nominate more female candidates. Women inside the party stressed that any new policy had to target the seats that Labour was likely to win. They concluded that the best policy was to group constituencies regionally and to require that, within each group, AWS be used to select candidates in half of all vacant seats that the party was likely to win, including seats where a Labour MP was retiring. This policy was viewed as a compromise solution that would increase the number of women in safe seats at the same time as preserving some discretion for the local parties, as well as opportunities for men to contest these seats. The proposal was presented to the 1993 party conference as part of a package of proposed changes to the party constitution. The main subject of debate, however, revolved around whether or not to do away with collective voting at party conferences that would transform relations between the trade unions and the party at large, and the proposal to adopt AWS thus did not receive very much public attention, although both reforms were instituted when the package passed.

Once approved, AWS attracted strong criticism within the party (Lovenduski 1997). Noting these objections, party leaders asked constituencies to organise consensus meetings to decide which seats would be subject to AWS. Most managed to comply, although the central leadership did force one constituency to adopt an AWS when the regional meeting failed to agree (Russell 2003). In early 1996, however, the party was forced to abandon the policy following a successful court challenge by Peter Jepson and Roger Dyas-Elliott, two male party members who had sought nomination in districts designated for AWS. Although earlier complaints had been dismissed by the Equal Opportunities Commission, Jepson and Dyas-Elliott brought their case to the Industrial Tribunal in Leeds and argued that their exclusion from candidate selection violated the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA). The Tribunal ruled that the policy of AWS did violate the employment provisions of the SDA because it did not allow men to be considered as candidates in districts designated for AWS. The party leadership decided not to appeal to a higher court (Russell 2000).

3. THE ADOPTION AND FORMS OF GENDER QUOTAS

Although AWS were declared illegal in 1996, these controversies had an important effect on the debates and proposals for gender quotas that took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s. When the Labour Party came to power in May 1997, one of the first items on its agenda was the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and a National Assembly for Wales. In the light of the ruling on AWS, which no longer allowed parties to apply positive action in candidate selection, female Labour MPs voiced concerns that women might be excluded unless guarantees for women’s representation were explicitly incorporated into the bills on the devolved assemblies. Proposals to this effect were strongly opposed by the government, which pointed to the European Court of Justice and the EU Equal Treatment Directive to argue that it could not guarantee that parties would be free from legal challenge. Like the SDA, the Equal Treatment Directive mandated equal treatment in access to employment and promotion (Russell 2003). Despite these setbacks, women persevered with their demands for representation, leading several parties to consider
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quotas in candidate selection.

In Scotland, an additional-member electoral system was introduced, with 73 members elected from single-member constituencies and 56 members elected from party lists. All parties but the Conservatives considered positive action, but the only one to adopt a policy was Scottish Labour. Realizing that it would win most of its seats in constituency elections, members focused on devising a mechanism to promote the election of women in single-member seats. They proposed ‘twinning’ districts according to geography and ‘winnability’ and then selecting a woman as the candidate for one of the constituencies and a man as the candidate for the other. Advocates argued that this system would produce the same results as AWS, but would be more difficult to challenge on the basis of the SDA, as men would not be excluded (Brown et al. 2002; Russell, Mackay and McAllister 2002). The party agreed to adopt this policy on a one-time basis, recognizing that incumbency in subsequent elections would make twinning virtually impossible to apply.

In contrast to Labour, the Scottish National Party (SNP) expected to win most of its seats through the regional lists. For this reason, the party’s women’s organization suggested ‘zipping’ the party lists so that they alternated between women and men. This proposal was rejected by a narrow margin by the party conference in 1998 (Bradbury et al. 2000).

In Wales, an additional-member electoral system was also approved, with 40 members elected from single-member constituencies and 20 members elected from regional lists. As in Scotland, all parties except the Conservatives debated positive action. Only Labour and Plaid Cymru decided to adopt formal policies, however. The leaders of Welsh Labour initially expressed strong hostility towards any form of positive action. When the new electoral system was introduced, some suggested using regional lists to compensate for under-representation of women in constituency seats. However, this proposal was quickly dismissed, given that the party expected to win few of the list-based seats. After the British Labour Party conference endorsed ‘twinning’ as the only feasible option in Wales, delegates to the Welsh party conference approved the measure by a narrow margin (Russell, Mackay and McAllister 2002).

Plaid Cymru had never elected a single female MP to Westminster (Russell 2000: 11), but pressure from the women’s section led to recommendations that the party adopt the goal of 50 per cent female candidates. It rejected twinning but accepted the need to use the regional lists to compensate for shortcomings in electing women to constituency seats. Party leaders decided that women would occupy the first and third places on the five regional lists so that at least five women would be elected to balance out the four men (Bradbury et al. 2000).

Meanwhile, few parties were able to agree on any form of positive action for women in the run-up to the general elections in 2001. Without AWS, Labour activists worried that local parties would select only men in the seats where sitting Labour MPs were retiring. By early 2000, several female MPs began to call for reform of the SDA to allow parties to pursue positive action. Later that year, the party conference endorsed a plan to allow parties to introduce measures to guarantee the selection of women and people from ethnic minorities in winnable seats. While included in the party manifesto, for the present elections the party simply required gender-balanced shortlists for all vacant seats. The only other party to consider positive action was the Liberal Democrats, who decided to require at least one woman on each shortlist, without any restrictions on actual candidate selection (Russell 2000).
After the elections, the new Labour government submitted the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Bill for debate. The bill did not seek to compel parties to adopt positive action but did aim to exclude from the SDA any act by a political party to reduce inequality in the numbers of women and men elected at any level of political office. Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats decided not to object to the reform, given the permissive rather than prescriptive nature of the bill. It thus passed all stages in both houses of Parliament without a vote – a type of expedited passage normally reserved for entirely non-controversial bills on topics of low public salience (Childs 2002). With little media attention, the bill passed virtually unnoticed into law in February 2002, allowing political parties to employ positive action without any risk of legal challenge when selecting candidates for the House of Commons, the European Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and local government. Unusually, however, the bill contained a ‘sunset clause’ stating that the act would expire at the end of 2015 – in time for at least three general elections to have taken place – unless a specific order was made to the contrary.

These reforms occurred in time for the second elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. Scottish Labour did not repeat its twinning strategy, but introduced a limited amount of positive action in its list selections by picking women to head its lists in the two areas where it stood the best chance of gaining new seats. The SNP, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Conservatives, in contrast, all rejected positive action (Russell, Mackay and McAllister 2002). In Wales also, Labour did not repeat its twinning policy, but did decide to apply AWS in half of its vacant constituency seats. Plaid Cymru strengthened its requirements for list elections by reserving the top two seats on all regional lists for women (Russell, Mackay and McAllister 2002). New quota policies were also introduced for local and European Parliament elections. In 2004, the British Labour Party instituted AWS for local elections. Later that year, the Liberal Democrats mandated that at least one of the top three candidates in each regional list, and a third of candidates overall, had to be of each sex, building on the zipping policy that had been adopted for European Parliament elections by the English branch of the party in 1999.

Leading up to the general elections in 2005, all three major parties considered whether to adopt measures to recruit more female candidates. Labour agreed to apply AWS in at least half of all seats where incumbent Labour MPs were retiring, with the goal of electing at least 35 per cent women. The Liberal Democrats considered AWS at their party conference in 2001, but rejected this measure in favour of a target of 40 per cent female candidates in districts where sitting MPs were standing down and seats requiring a swing of less than 7.5 per cent to win. The Conservatives remained much more divided. Some members called on the party to adopt quotas, but even the mild efforts of the party chairman to persuade local parties to select women met with little or no response (Childs 2004; Russell 2003).

Six months after the elections, however, the party chose a new leader, David Cameron, who noted, only minutes into his acceptance speech, that it was crucial to change patterns of representation in the party. One week later, he proposed a plan that would involve a ‘priority list’ of aspirant candidates – consisting of at least 50 per cent women and a ‘significant’ proportion of black, minority ethnic and disabled candidates – from which Conservative-held and target constituencies would be required to select their candidates (Campbell, Childs and Lovenduski 2006). By August 2006, the central party executive had drawn up an ‘A list’ of 150 candidates, including nearly 60 per cent women. Due to lack of

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79 It is not known exactly why this ‘sunset clause’ was included. One can speculate, however, that it might have been intended to garner further support for the bill by calling attention to the temporary nature of the reform.
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Response, six months later Cameron officially dropped the A-list policy but required local parties to consider gender-balanced shortlists at every stage – while also declaring the policy to have been a success, as it had helped ensure that nearly 40 per cent of the candidates that had been selected to that point were women (The Times 24 January 2007).

Debates over diversity and political representation continued, however, and the House of Commons set up a Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary Representation in November 2008 to consider ways of closing the gap in the representation of women, ethnic minorities and disabled people in politics and in the population at large. In April 2009, a new Equality Bill was also introduced, with the aim of replacing nine major pieces of legislation and around 100 statutory instruments into one single act that would cover race, sex, religion, disability, and age discrimination. When the law came into force in October 2010, it addressed questions of political representation, but made different provisions for women as compared to blacks, Asians and minority ethnic (BAME) groups, stemming from differences in the legal status of positive discrimination in candidate selection for groups based on sex versus race. As a consequence, the period for which parties could employ AWS was extended to 2030 but parties were only permitted to reserve places on shortlists on the grounds of race or disability; lists made up solely of individuals with a particular protected characteristic (apart from sex) would not be allowed.

The category of ‘black, Asian, and minority ethnic’ citizens is understood to encompass both Caribbean and South Asian populations, which despite being grouped together, diverge greatly in terms of language, origins, culture, and religion. Due to differences in anti-discrimination law for race versus sex at both the UK and European Union levels (Russell 2000), efforts to institute positive action measures for BAME groups has proceeded under greater legal ambiguity than has been the case for women. Nonetheless, after the 1997 elections the Labour Party changed its selection rules to ensure that minority candidates were reaching final shortlists, although this new provision did not lead to a major increase in number of minority candidates selected and elected in 2001 (Ali and O’Cinneide 2002). Together with concerns that ‘Labour’s all-women shortlists will be all-white women shortlists’ (Muslim News 25 April 2003), these patterns led to increased calls for the use of all-black shortlists in certain designated regions with high BAME populations (The Guardian 25 September 2007). Yet, some Asian MPs worried that all-black shortlists would be like ‘political apartheid’ and would deepen racial divides (Daily Mail 28 March 2008).

In the context of the Speaker’s Conference, leaders of the three major parties were pressured to state what they were doing – or planned to do – to improve inequalities in parliamentary representation. In response, Cameron announced that he wanted parliament and his party to better reflect society, and as such, he was prepared to impose AWS for constituencies selecting candidates after January 2010 in the run-up to elections later that year. Prime Minister Gordon Brown reiterated the Labour Party’s commitment to AWS, although he was questioned about keeping women and ethnic minorities out of ‘real’ centres of decision-making power. Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg also acknowledged the under-representation of women and minorities, and at the party’s annual conference in March 2011 declared that his party was ‘too male and too pale.’ In earlier statements, however, he attributed this pattern not to the selection process, but to the problem of not enough women coming forward.

The public debates over representation led all three parties to apply some type of positive action for women in candidate selection for the general elections in 2010. In addition, some parties created new policies to enhance the representation of BAME candidates. The Labour Party continued its policy of AWS, but added the requirement that there be at
least one BAME candidate on every shortlist – including at least one female BAME candidate in every district using AWS. The Conservatives, as part of their ‘A list’ policy, nominated a larger proportion of female and BME candidates than ever before, although in the event, no AWS were in fact used. The Liberal Democrats again applied quotas for candidate shortlists, but took no specific steps to increase the number of female and minority candidates that were actually selected (Squires 2011). The resulting poor representation of both groups among the party’s MPs, combined with the Liberal Democrats’ declining popularity among voters, inspired new calls after the election to take concrete steps in the direction of positive action. In 2011, the party created a ‘leadership programme’ involving a list of 50 names – 50 per cent women and 30 per cent ethnic minorities – with strong support to stand in the party’s safest seats.

4. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF GENDER QUOTAS

All-women shortlists, twinning and zipping have been successful to varying degrees across levels of government in the UK. Although the Jepson decision declared AWS to be illegal, the Labour Party was not required to alter any of the selections that took place before January 1996. Women thus made up 25 per cent of all Labour candidates and, following the party’s landslide victory in 1997, constituted 24 per cent of all elected Labour MPs (Eagle and Lovenduski 1998: 7). As a result, the proportion of women in the House of Commons increased from 9 per cent in 1992 to 18 per cent in 1997, although the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats both registered decreases in the number of women elected. This change sprang partly from the use of AWS, as all 35 women selected this way won their seats. Five women had been selected to replace sitting Labour MPs after the intervention of the national party, while 11 women won unexpectedly in marginal seats (Russell 2003: 72).

The twinning and zipping policies adopted for Scottish and Welsh elections produced even more striking results. Women won more than 37 per cent of the seats in the first Scottish Parliament in 1999 – 41 per cent of all constituency seats and 32 per cent of all regional list seats (Squires 2004: 10). Due to the twinning policy, Scottish Labour elected 50 per cent women. Although the SNP did not adopt any formal measures, women formed nearly one-third of all constituency candidates and were placed at the upper end of all regional lists (Brown et al. 2002), electing 43 per cent women. Similar patterns emerged in Wales.
Women won 40 per cent of the seats in the first National Assembly for Wales in 1999 – 48 per cent of all constituency seats and 25 per cent of all regional list seats (Russell 2003: 73; Squires 2004: 11). The twinning strategy used by Welsh Labour led to the election of women to more than 57 per cent of the seats won by Labour in the new Welsh Assembly. Plaid Cymru applied a zipping policy for the first three positions on the regional lists, starting with a woman (Bradbury et al. 2000). However, the party did better than anticipated in the constituency-based elections, resulting in the election of only 35 per cent women overall.

Table 45. Women’s representation in the Scottish Parliament, 1999–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal democrats</th>
<th>SNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 46. Women’s representation in the National Assembly for Wales, 1999–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal democrats</th>
<th>Plaid Cymru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the run-up to general elections in 2001, the British Labour Party required gender-balanced shortlists for all vacant seats, which led to only four women being selected out of the 39 candidates chosen to replace sitting Labour MPs (Russell 2003: 77). This meant that the proportion of new candidates who were women was lower in 2001 than in 1992 and 1997, leading some to conclude that balanced shortlists might in fact have been counterproductive, as they enabled constituency parties to comply fully with the quota while still selecting men (Squires 2004). Although very few seats changed between parties, the proportion of women dropped from slightly more than 18 per cent in 1997 to slightly less than 18 per cent in 2001 (Russell 2003: 77).

The second elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales took place in 2003. Although Labour employed only a limited amount of positive action, and other parties rejected quotas, the percentage of women elected to the Scottish Parliament increased slightly, from 37 per cent to 39 per cent. The number of women elected to single-member constituencies remained stable, while the number of women elected to list
seats increased by three (Squires 2004: 11). In Wales, Labour did not repeat its twinning policy, but the party did apply AWS in half of its vacant constituency seats. Plaid Cymru strengthened its requirements for list elections by reserving the top two seats on all regional lists for women (Russell, Mackay and McAllister 2002). Although no other parties changed their candidate selection policies, these shifts contributed to an increase in the proportion of women elected to the National Assembly for Wales, from 40 per cent to 50 per cent (Squires 2004: 12).

In 2004, the British Labour Party introduced AWS for local elections. In general, the proportion of women elected to local councils is higher than the proportion elected to the House of Commons, at approximately 27 per cent. The percentage of women varies significantly across councils, however: while some district and county councils have as few as 15 per cent women, others have as many women as men or more (<http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/index.asp/PageID=61>). Perhaps surprisingly, there are only small differences across the parties: 27 per cent of Labour councillors are women, compared to 31 per cent of Liberal Democrats and 25 per cent among Conservatives (Bochel and Bochel 2008: 5). By 2011, these numbers had improved slightly to 31 per cent women in 100 local authorities surveyed by the Centre for Women and Democracy, with Labour electing 33 per cent women, and the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives 34 and 29 per cent, respectively:<http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/documents/RepresentativeDemocracyFinal.pdf>.

In the British delegation to the European Parliament, the percentage of women is also higher than it is at Westminster. Since 1979, when direct elections to the European Parliament were first held, there has been a disparity in these proportions: between 1979 and 1994, women formed between 13 per cent and 17 per cent of the British delegation, compared to 3–9 per cent in the House of Commons. In 1999, the electoral system was changed to PR and the percentage of women increased to 24 per cent, where it has remained since 2004. Due to their zipping policy, the Liberal Democrats elected 50 per cent women. In contrast, Labour elected 37 per cent women and the Conservatives only 4 per cent (<http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/index.asp/PageID=61>). In 2009, the overall percentage of women in the British delegation increased to 33 per cent, with marked differences again among the three major parties: the Liberal Democrats led with 55 per cent women, while women made up 39 and 24 per cent of the Labour and Conservative delegations (<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2009/rp09-053.pdf>).

Leading up the general elections in 2005, all three parties initiated discussions regarding positive action. However, Labour was the only one to adopt a quota, namely AWS in at least half of all seats where incumbent Labour MPs were retiring, with the goal of electing at least 35 per cent women. The result was that 20 per cent women were elected to the House of Commons, with marked differences across the political parties: Labour elected 28 per cent women, the Liberal Democrats 16 per cent and the Conservatives 9 per cent (Childs, Lovenduski and Campbell 2005: 19).

In the 2007 elections to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, women’s representation declined slightly. In Scotland, the proportion of women fell from 39 per cent to 34 per cent. Interestingly, all parties elected a higher percentage of women than they had in 2003 (Scottish Parliament 2007a; Scottish Parliament 2007b). However, the distribution of these seats shifted in significant ways, with the SNP – a party that elected only 28 per cent women – gaining 20 seats, while Labour – which had the highest proportion of women elected, 50 per cent – lost four. Similar patterns prevailed in
Wales, as women’s representation dropped from 50 per cent to 47 per cent, at the same time as Labour lost three seats and Plaid Cymru and the Conservatives gained three seats and one seat, respectively. While both Labour and Plaid Cymru elected fewer women than before, moving from 63 per cent to 62 per cent and 50 per cent to 47 per cent, the most significant drop was among Conservatives, from 18 per cent to 8 per cent (National Assembly for Wales 2007).

In contrast, discussions within all three major parties regarding the selection of female and BAME candidates in the run-up to the general elections in 2010 led to a striking increase in the numbers of female and BAME candidates. Labour elected fewer women in absolute terms than in 2005, but due to the dramatic decrease in their share of MPs overall, in fact elected a greater proportion of women than previously, rising from 28 to 31 per cent. At the same time, the party elected two more minority candidates (up from 14 in 2005), including the first two female Muslim MPs – who were also the first Asian women ever to be elected to the House of Commons (The Guardian 7 May 2010). The Conservatives registered a major increase in both female and minority representation, with a growth from 9 to 16 per cent women and from 2 to 11 BAME MPs (Squires 2011), including the first black and the first Asian female Conservative MPs. The Liberal Democrats, in comparison, elected fewer women than in 2005, declining from 15 to 12 per cent, and none of their BAME candidates, who often lost to minority candidates from one of the other two major parties (The Guardian 7 May 2010). Together, these shifts resulted in historically high levels of representation for both women and ethnic minorities – 22 per cent for women and 4 per cent for BAME groups – although both groups remain under-represented in comparison to their share of the UK population, standing at roughly 50 and 8 per cent, respectively.

Despite these gains, the results of the most recent round of elections in Scotland and Wales in 2011 caution against predictions that women’s representation will continue to rise ‘naturally’ over time. The proportion of women elected to the Scottish parliament grew slightly to reach 34.9 percent, an increase compared to 2007 but less than the number of women elected in 1999 and 2003. Similarly, the percentage of women elected to the Welsh Assembly dropped to 40 per cent, back to the level achieved in the first elections in 1999. Notably, in Scotland only the Conservatives increased the share of women in their parliamentary delegation, whereas the proportion of women in all other parties declined. In Wales, increases were registered by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, as Labour and the SNP held more or less even with their earlier numbers. The overall drop in the percentage of women elected to both assemblies immediately inspired calls by equality campaigners for renewed changes to party candidate selection procedures – including AWS – to ensure that women’s representation would not decrease further in future elections. In comparison, the number of successful BAME candidates improved slightly in both assemblies, standing at 1.5 per cent in Scotland, where minorities make up 4 per cent of the population, and 3 per cent in Wales, which mirrors the proportion of black, Asian and minority ethnic residents (The Guardian 9 May 2011).
5. CONCLUSIONS

Debates over gender quotas thus have a complicated history in the UK, stemming in part from the structure of its electoral system organised around single-member districts. Recent developments indicate ongoing efforts to promote women’s representation, even in parties that have been resistant to positive action strategies. However, they also suggest that the numbers of women elected to various political bodies are subject to changing electoral fortunes, as parties on opposite sides of quota debates win or lose in relation to their opponents. The main difficulty seems to be the permissive nature of the reforms made to the SDA, which enable parties to decide to apply or not apply quotas, leading to mixed results across the parties in terms of the increased election of women.

Over the last several years, these debates have grown to include discussion of the political under-representation of other groups, most notably black, Asian and minority ethnic citizens. The lack of a similar reform of the Race Relations Act – which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, colour, nationality, ethnicity, national origin and religious belief in the fields of employment, the provision of goods and services and education and public functions – has created lingering ambiguity regarding the legality of positive action in candidate selection for members of these groups. All the same, all three major parties have launched initiatives to recruit and select more BAME candidates, including minority women. The results thus far have been limited, but ongoing debates over questions of equality and representation suggest improved opportunities for more diverse candidates to be elected to the British parliament.
6. REFERENCES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: THE METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY

Selection of countries

The 27 EU member states and the three EEA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) were selected for this study. The selection thus corresponds – with two exceptions (Croatia and Turkey) – to the countries included in the report ‘Women and Men in Decision-making 2007’, published by the European Commission in January 2008.

Eight countries were selected for special scrutiny – Belgium, France and Germany (pre-selected by the European Parliament), Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. They were selected because they represent countries with legislated quotas as well as countries with voluntary party quotas, countries with a high (over 30 per cent) and with a low (under 20 per cent) representation of women in their national parliaments, countries with different electoral systems, and countries in different parts of Europe.

Sources

Eight experts were selected to write in-depth studies from the eight countries selected.

Statistics from various sources, primarily official statistics, in relation to all 30 countries were collected.

A questionnaire – the PARQUOTA Survey – was sent to all political parties represented in the national parliaments in the 30 countries of study during the spring of 2008. It was sent to 220 parties, and 80 questionnaires were completed and returned. Thus the response rate is 36.4 per cent. The low response rate, which unfortunately is common in this kind of research, limits the applicability of the survey, since the respondents are not representative of all parties. Left wing parties are over-represented, and the response-rate was by far the highest in the Nordic countries. Consequently, the survey is not used for mapping, but only to show correlation, for instance between party group and attitude on gender quotas. All the correlations from the PARQUOTA Survey presented in this report are significant at the 5 per cent level.

The extensive knowledge of the research team from previous studies of gender quotas globally (see the list of references) as well as <http://www.quotaproject.org>, a global website on gender quotas in politics run by the research team at Stockholm University in cooperation with International IDEA, were also utilized in this study.
APPENDIX II: ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Christina Alnevall is a PhD candidate in political science at Stockholm University, Sweden, and is currently completing her dissertation on gendered political representation in Mexico. Her latest publication is *Helig, dygdig och inskränkt. Tveeggade diskurser om kvinnor i mexikansk politik* (Sacred, virtuous and incapacious. Double-edged discourses about women in Mexican politics, in Swedish 2010) and on behalf of the Nordic Council of Ministers; *Kön och politisk makt i Sverige* (Gender and Political Power in Sweden, in Swedish 2009 and in English 2011). Her research interests also include development studies, global governance and comparative politics. She has been a visiting scholar at the Dept. of Political Science at University of California at Berkeley.

Drude Dahlerup graduated from Aarhus University, Denmark. Since 1998 she has been professor of political science at Stockholm University, Sweden. She was a visiting scholar at Radcliffe College, Harvard University, USA, in 1981–2 and a visiting professor at Birkbeck College, University of London, UK, 2003–4. She has published extensively on women in politics, social movements and feminist theory, including *Rødstøæmperne: Den danske Rødstømpebevægelser udvikling, nytænkning og gennemslag* [The redstockings: the development, new thinking and impact of the Danish Redstocking movement 1970–1985, 2 vols] (in Danish, 1998). She is editor of *The New Women’s Movement: Feminism and Political Power in Europe and the USA*, Sage 1986. Her edited collection, *Women, Quotas and Politics*, Routledge 2006, was the first global study of the use of electoral gender quotas. She is the editor of the global quota websites, www.quotaproject.org (with International IDEA and IPU). She has been a UN and IPU consultant on how to increase women’s political representation in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and latest in Tunisia, see www.statsvet.su.se/wip

Milica Antić Gaber is professor of sociology and sociology of gender at the University of Ljubljana (Faculty of Arts, Sociology Department), Slovenia. She was a co-founder of the postgraduate interdisciplinary gender programme and feminist journal *Delta*, a member of the editorial board of the journal *Družboslovne razprave* and an editor of the journal *Ars et Humanitas*. She has contributed to journals in Slovenia and elsewhere, among others *Delta*, *Družboslovne razprave*, the *Feminist Review*, *Electoral Studies*, *European Political Science*, and the *Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics*, and contributed chapters in international edited volumes dealing with the issues of women in politics, the political representation of women and gender quotas. She is author or co-author, among others, of three books – *Women in Parliament; Women – Politics – Equal Opportunities, Prospects for Gender Equality Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*; and *Women in Parliamentary Politics: Hungarian and Slovene Cases Compared.*

Lenita Freidenvall is a senior lecturer and researcher at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, Sweden. She received her PhD in political science in 2006 on the topic ‘Every Other One For the Ladies: On Women’s Political Representation, Gender Quotas and Candidate Selection in Swedish Politics 1970–2002’. She has published widely on women and politics, gender quotas and candidate selection in, for example, the *International Feminist Journal of Politics, policy & politics* and the *Nordic Journal of Gender Studies*, and has written reports on constitutional reform and gender on behalf of the Swedish National Working Commission on Constitutional Reform.

Małgorzata Fuszara is professor and head of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies on
Situation of Women and director of the Gender Studies Program at Warsaw University, Poland. She teaches sociology of law, sociology of culture, gender discrimination and women’s rights. She has taught on women’s rights at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA and at the Institute of Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain. She is a member of the advisory board of Signs, Journal of Women in Culture and Society and the European Journal of Women’s Studies, and is the author of over 60 articles in Polish, English, German, Slovak and Romanian. She edited Women in Poland in Turn of the Century: New Gender Contract? (2002), co-authored Civil Society in Poland (2003), and co-edited (with J. Kurczewski) Polish Disputes and Courts (2004). She is the author of three books: Everyday Conflicts and Ceremonial Justice (1988), Family in Court (1995) and Women in Politics (2006).

Brigitte Geissel is professor for political science and political sociology at Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany,. She is speaker (with Kimmo Grönlund) of the new ECPR-Standing Group “Democratic Innovations”. She has published widely on German and comparative politics, women and politics, new forms of governance, democratic innovations and political sociology, especially political actors (new social movements, associations, civil society, parties, political elites, citizens), including in Comparative Sociology, the European Journal of Political Research and the Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics.

Mona Lena Krook is assistant professor of political science and women and gender studies at Washington University in St Louis, USA. She received her PhD from Columbia University, USA, in 2005. In 2004–5, she was an Economic and Social Research Council postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bristol, UK, and she was a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University, USA, during 2008–9. Her research on the diffusion and effects of gender quotas has been published in the European Journal of Political Research, Politics & Gender, British Politics, Comparative Politics, and the British Journal of Political Science. She is the author of Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide (Oxford University Press, 2009) and co-editor of Women, Gender, and Politics: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Petra Meier is assistant professor at the Politics Department of the University of Antwerp, Belgium. Her background and training cover the fields of political science, gender studies and social geography. She holds a PhD in political science from the Free University of Brussels, Belgium, on the topic ‘Guaranteeing Representation: Democratic Logic or Deficit? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Techniques Enhancing Representativeness and the Argumentation on their Behalf in a Plural Society’ (2002). Her major areas of research and teaching are theories of democracy and representation, the normative foundations of electoral systems and electoral system design for influencing the presence of women and of other social groups in political decision making, feminist approaches to public policies, and Belgian state feminism. Together with Emanuela Lombardo and Mieke Verloo, she recently edited a volume on The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality: Stretching, Bending and Policy-Making (2009).

Mariette Sineau is a political scientist. She is a CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) affiliated senior researcher at the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po (CEVIPOF, Paris). She is a consultant from time to time for the Council of Europe. She has worked on gender and politics, political elites and parity in politics. She has extensively published in academic journals, notably Revue française de science politique, Swiss Political Science Review, French Politics, Culture and Society, and Modern & Contemporary France. Her more recent books include: Femmes et pouvoir sous la Ve République. De l’exclusion à l’entrée dans la course présidentielle (2011); La force du nombre. Femmes et démocratie présidentielle (2010); Genderware: The Council of Europe and the Participation of Women in Political Life (2003).
**APPENDIX III: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>All-women shortlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKACIJE</td>
<td>Acacias Party (Stranka Akacije) (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAME</td>
<td>Black, Asian and minority ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (Demokraticna stranka upokojencev Slovenije)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Slovenia (Demokratska Stranka Slovenije/Demokrati Slovenije)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Workers’ Party of Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>electoral management body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First Past The Post (electoral system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŽ</td>
<td>Women’s Voice (Glas Žensk) (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>United Left (Izquierda Unida) (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Liberalna demokracija Slovenije)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPA</td>
<td>Lime Tree Party (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>List for equity and progress (Lista za pravičnost in razvoj) (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZČPV</td>
<td>List for clean and drinking water (Lista za čisto in pitno vodo) (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>member of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Avanat Slovenia (Naprej Slovenija)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi</td>
<td>New Slovenia (Nova Slovenija)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) (Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) (Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>People’s Party (Partido Popular) (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>proportional representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) (Spain)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SAP  Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (Social Democratic Party, Sweden)
SD  Social Democrats (Socialni demokrati) (Slovenia)
SDA  Sexual Discrimination Act (UK)
SDS/SDSS  Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenska demokratska stranka)/Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (Socialdemokratska stranka Slovenije)
SEG  Party of Ecological Movements (Stranka Ekoloških Gibanj Slovenije)
SKD  Christian Democrats of Slovenia (Slovenski Krščanski Demokrati)
SLD  Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojuz Lewicy Demokratycznej) (Poland)
SLS  Slovenian People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka)
SMS  Youth Party of Slovenia (Stranka mladih Slovenije)
SNP  Scottish National Party
SNS  Slovenian National Party (Slovenska nacionalna stranka)
SPD  Social Democratic Party (Germany)
SSN  Slovenian Nation’s Party (Stranka Slovenskega Naroda)
SU  Slovenian Union (Slovenska Unija)
UFD  Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française) (France)
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UP  Union of Labour (Unia Pracy) (Poland)
UPM  Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) (France)
UW  Freedom Union (Unia Wolności) (Poland)
WI  Women’s Institute (Instituto de la Mujer) (Spain)
ZARES  Zares – New Politics (Zare – Nova Politika) (Slovenia)
ZLSD  United List of Social Democrats (Združena Lista Socialnih Demokratov) (Slovenia)
ZK  Green Coalition : Green Party and Green Progress (Zelena koalicija : Zelena stranka in Zeleni progres)
ZS  Greens of Slovenia (Zeleni Slovenije)
ZZP  Association for the Primorska Region (Zveza za Primorsko) (Slovenia)
ROLE

Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.

POLICY AREAS

- Constitutional Affairs
- Justice, Freedom and Security
- Gender Equality
- Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
- Petitions

DOCUMENTS