GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH

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Hope for New Government Hindered by Divisions

Report on the October 12-20 2014 Focus groups

A new round of focus groups[1] reveals deep frustration with Iraq's sectarian divisions, which hinder economic development, obstruct an effective response to ISIS and the security situation, delay budget and salary payments, weaken government accountability, and weigh down opinion toward the government and democracy in general. Focus group participants from all backgrounds are frustrated with Iraq's internal divisions and see more inclusive policies as the top priority of the new government. Some express encouraging signs of cross-sect optimism for new leaders, including Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi who is seen as more diplomatic and less divisive compared to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Abadi's ability to reduce tensions between Iraq's various factions may ultimately decide how much patience Iraqis have with their new leadership.

The security threat that ISIS poses is a dominant concern, though on equal footing as economic concerns. Participants predominantly blame foreign interference for the rise of ISIS. The United States is seen as both one of the primary causes of ISIS's rise as well as the solution to the problem, as US support (*not* in the form of ground troops) is necessary to help a weak Iraqi army. Even with the ISIS threat, these Iraqis remain acutely frustrated with the economy and the level of corruption in their country. They view Iraq as a wealthy country, but feel that the oil revenue is diverted to the political elite as opposed to average Iraqis, as evidenced by poor living conditions.

The research also includes a focus on Turkmen, Yezidi, Christian, and Sabian minority groups and on women. Like Iraq's majority ethno-religious groups, minorities are primarily concerned with their economic situation and view ISIS as an existential threat that is perpetrating terrible crimes against their families and communities. This security threat, coupled with discrimination in daily living, leads to demands from minorities for new protections, for equal treatment, and intensifies a desire for assimilation. Like the majority groups, minorities see further divisions—such as more autonomous regions and quotas—as counterproductive moves that might perpetuate sectarian divisions.

Participants also view the role of women in political, professional, and family life being hindered by cultural and religious barriers that impact gender equality. Openness to women in leadership positions is limited, and many feel that there are positions that women cannot hold, such as prime minister or minister of defense. Despite both men and women believing women should receive more rights, women participants do not feel that their voices are being heard, even with

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[1] With IIACSS, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner conducted 12 focus groups between 12-20 October – four in Baghdad, three in Erbil, two each in Sulaymaniyah and Basra, and one in Dohuk. The groups were demographically and politically homogenous (e.g., only women, State of Law voters), but together spanned Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and minority groups of both genders and all age ranges and levels of education. Specifications for each group can be found in Appendix A. All findings are qualitative and inherently not statistically representative. An upcoming survey will test these insights empirically.
Due to the security situation in Iraq, we were unable to conduct groups in all parts of the country; while the focus groups encompass many segments of society, some regional sentiments may be underrepresented in these findings.

the government quotas. Mirroring some minorities' opinions, many participants want to see hiring decisions based on merit, not on gender.

New Government Brings Some Optimism

These groups reveal a degree of optimism for the new government and prime minister, even among Sunnis and Kurds. This optimism from those two sects stands in sharp contrast to their strongly negative feelings toward former Prime Minister Maliki's government, which is often blamed for heightening divisions within the country.

This optimistic sentiment is largely driven by hopes and early signs that the new prime minister will be more inclusive and diplomatic than his processor. A Baghdad Sunni woman says, "I see [Abadi] is educated and enlightened. His ideas are open, when you talk to a man like this, then you would reach a result, unlike with the former prime minister." At the same time, though, some participants criticize Abadi for being a puppet of the US or Iran, or do not feel that he was elected, since he was not at the top of the party list in 2014 elections.

Part of the positive sentiment toward Abadi also stems from some of the initial actions he has taken in the first few months in office. Participants mention his dismantling of the office of the general commander, firing under-performing Iraqi Army officers, reducing nepotism, and having his photo taken down from government buildings. A Kurdish man from Sulaymaniyah says, "He was moderate. For example he came to Kurdistan and held negotiations. He does not have harsh speeches in the media. These are positive things. If he continues like this and being moderate, he will be successful."

This has helped to foster more positive feelings toward the new government, which is generally viewed as being more inclusive of Sunnis (particularly compared to the prior government) and willing to make changes. Despite the fact that perceptions of government inclusiveness remain low, many participants think it is at least improving. A Baghdad Sunni man says, "The rate of the participation of the Sunnis in the al-Maliki government was 0 percent, now it is 33 percent."

The cross-sect optimism also applies to the new Sunni Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Salim al-Jabouri. Participants see him as competent and able to keep strong control over parliament, while allowing all sides to voice their opinions. A Baghdad Shia man says, "I respect [Jabouri] despite the fact he does not belong my sect. Unlike the former spokesman, who wasn't controlling the sessions. He switches the microphone off if he dislikes the MP's [harsh] talk, and gives the chance to another MP. He makes everybody respect him." This supports many participants' view that Iraq needs strong leaders who are willing to take control, while still being diplomatic and inclusive.

Sentiments toward the new Kurdish president, Fouad Massoum, are also mostly positive, although many within and outside of Kurdistan see the role as mostly ceremonial. One woman from Baghdad even calls his appointment a "turning point" toward better relations between Arabs and Kurds.

This general optimism, while tempered, creates room for the government to tackle some of Iraq's most serious challenges. Most believe the government's top priority over the next six months should be uniting the country in order to remove ISIS from Iraq. They see improving

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security as critical to impacting other important priorities, such as revitalizing the economy, reducing sectarian tensions, and curtailing the power of militias.

Entrenched Sectarianism Limits Optimism, Impacts Views of Democracy

Hope for a more inclusive government, however, is tenuous given the deep distrust built over a decade of sectarian tensions and violence. Many participants believe the new government is no more inclusive than the previous one and driven primarily by sectarian preferences. This hits at a core paradox that casts a shadow over Iraq's future and its ability to progress: while almost all participants are highly critical of sectarianism in Iraq, many—even in the same statement—demonstrate sectarian attitudes. Though participants are eager to end the sectarian divisions, many still use sectarian language that further enhances this division. For example, a Baghdad Shia man says, "Iraq is one of the most important Arab countries; it is unbelievable that we have a Kurdish president."

Many participants view sectarianism as the underlying barrier to improving lives, strengthening the economy, resolving the security situation, and fighting ISIS. Sectarian tensions affect attitudes toward Iraqi leaders and democracy in general. For example, many Sunni and Kurd participants worry that Abadi will only represent Shia interests and think that someone coming from Maliki's party, Da'wa, will focus more attention on those within his sect and ignore the needs of others. An Erbil woman says, "Al-Abadi is from the same political party as al-Maliki and they have the same ideas and politics. They are doing the same, that is why the problems of the time of al-Maliki are still persisting."

The critique goes beyond the prime minister; many participants view the new government as more of the same, just with different faces, and say they would not trust any Shia-led government—again illustrating the deep sectarian tensions that cloud Iraq's future. An Erbil woman says, "This government is only for Shia. This government will not treat everyone equally. It is the same as previous cabinets." And a Sabian Baghdad man adds, "Iraq failed at every step, the economy, the politics, and the corruption. I tell you why that is: for 10 years the same people are ruling us. They just change the seats but they are the same faces."

Many participants specifically blame quotas—filling leadership positions based on religion or ethnicity—for cementing sectarianism into the government's official processes, including hiring. Some believe quotas cause ministers to only feel accountable to their own sect, as opposed to Iraq as a whole. Others say it means that unqualified Iraqis are placed in positions that could be filled by qualified experts and PhDs. Almost all participants say they want to see the interior and defense ministries led by ministers who represent all of Iraq and who were proven experts in their fields, but worried those positions would instead be filled using sect-based quotas.

Quotas reinforce many participants' doubts about how democracy in Iraq is implemented. In most groups, ironically, participants are adamantly opposed to the quota system to appoint leadership positions in the government, but no one championed the other side of the argument: that this system might be needed to ensure that all groups have a seat at the table. A Sunni Baghdad woman says, "If there are no professional people to work, and as long as the militias and the sectarianism exist… then nothing will be solved." This again goes to the paradox: Iraqis are highly critical of provisions that solidify ethnic divisions—such as sect-based autonomy and

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quotas—and support signs of unity, Iraqi nationalism, or decisions based on merit. Yet sectarian attitudes are deeply entrenched in the societal undercurrents.

Blame for ISIS is Widespread; Unity, and Foreign Help, Needed to Defeat It

Criticism of ISIS comes from all groups including Shia, Sunni, Kurd, and minority participants. The negative impact of ISIS on personal security, the economy, Iraq's cohesiveness, and government leaders is unanimous. Participants see ISIS as giving Islam a bad name and relay personal stories of its crimes against their friends or families. They see ISIS's rise as an embarrassment for the government and Iraqi Army, and have little confidence in its ability to defeat ISIS without major international assistance.

Blame for the rise of ISIS is spread broadly among both foreign countries and domestic forces. The list of those receiving blame is long: the US, Israel, the UK, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, Iran, former Prime Minister Maliki, Ba'athists, Kurds, the Iraqi Army, Sunni and Shia militias, and Iraqi society more broadly. Participants disagree about how much support ISIS has from domestic groups. Some believe Sunni support was necessary for ISIS's rise, and see it as a direct response to Maliki's policies toward Sunnis. A Dohuk man says, "[Sunnis] have seen lots of unfairness during the time of Nouri Al-Maliki's government and they feel ignored under the governing of Shia. As a result, they want to take revenge and use this opportunity of ISIS's coming to prove themselves, and they support ISIS to stop the Shia, although ISIS is a dangerous group."

A few participants blame de-Ba'athification. A Baghdad Shia male says, "The Baath party and the idle high-ranked officers joined ISIS because of the Accountability and Justice Law. There was no accusations toward them, but they don't have the right to buy a house, or to register a car in their names, or to have pension, so when you issue such a repressive law toward people with white hands, then you will make them follow the person who says that he will free them."

Others claim that locals either viewed ISIS as a better option than a Sunni-led government, were brainwashed or enticed with money or a better life, or were physically forced. A Baghdad man says, "Young people now want to have money and girls, you know, to get married to more than one girl. So they convinced people with stuff like this: if you kill 20, you will get more virgins and so on, and you will be paid more. In Ar-Raqqah, Syria, the immigrants get $1,400 and the residents get $800, and this money ensures them a good life, so these things are brainwashing the people down there."

Despite the lack of consensus about ISIS's origins, most blame the United States for its rise. Some participants think the US directly supports the group, while others believe that the US is indirectly benefitting from it, and therefore doing less to stop it. Many think the US wants ISIS to have a role in Iraq so that Americans can sell more weapons or bring troops back to Iraq, or so the country is destabilized, allowing the US to have more control over Iraqi oil.

Yet many also feel that the United States is necessary to contain and eventually defeat ISIS. Participants feel that the Iraqi Army, Kurdish forces, and militias are underequipped and need American weapons, training, and air strikes. However, they almost unanimously push back against having more American combat troops on the ground.

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Support for American and foreign assistance is largely due to the belief that the Iraqi Army is incompetent, divided, or adheres to the wrong loyalties. Some feel that the Army suffers from being predominantly Shia, and therefore is not concerned with the security of *all* Iraqis. Many relay stories of how quickly troops lost battles against ISIS and how soldiers quit. A Baghdad man says, “It is unbelievable that a country spent millions of dollars to arm and to train the Army, and then saw [ISIS] take Mosul with only two hours.”

Iraqis both within and outside Kurdistan view the Peshmerga as comparatively more competent than the Iraqi Army, partially due to past success against ISIS and because they are less susceptible to internal divisions. Some people outside of Kurdistan say the Peshmerga’s success comes from their commitment to protecting Kurdistan, but wish they would fight for all of Iraq. A Sulaymaniyah woman says, “I say yes, they can [defeat ISIS] because the Peshmerga are not like Iraqi armies, they are united and strong.” Despite the perception that the Peshmerga is more competent than the Iraqi Army, most still believe the Peshmerga needs outside assistance and modern weapons.

Ultimately, these Iraqis say the only true way to defeat ISIS is through Iraqi unity among troops and sects. Another Sulaymaniyah woman says, “Yes, if the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga worked together, they could defeat ISIS, otherwise they cannot do anything alone. The Peshmerga and Iraqi Army, along with America’s army, can destroy all of ISIS, as they are not that much.”

Security concerns extend beyond ISIS to Shia and Sunni militias. Sunni participants are particularly critical of Shia militias and see the rise of ISIS as a natural response to the increasing power of armed Shia groups and the Shia dominated Army. This distaste for sect-based militias negatively colors opinions—especially among Shias participants—of a National Guard as a way to incorporate Sunni militias as local reserves under control of provincial governors. Many participants view a National Guard as a way of sowing even more division in Iraq, and fear that governmental support for a National Guard could lead to increased security concerns between Shia and Sunni in the future. Sunni and minority participants were slightly more open to the concept of a National Guard.

Several participants instead call for an army that truly represents all of Iraq’s backgrounds. The concept of compulsory military service in the Iraqi Army emerges numerous times in the groups. Participants see this as a means to ensure the army is not just composed predominantly of one sect, but instead of all Iraqis.

Corruption, Privatization, and Foreign Meddling Holds Back Economy

Despite the concerns about the rise of ISIS, participants often mention their economic worries first. Iraqis view their country as wealthy, with substantial oil resources, but are frustrated that this wealth benefits elites and does not reach average Iraqis. A Sulaymaniyah man says, “[The economy] is strong for some people, especially for the political parties, but for me a as normal citizen and wage earner, I feel that nothing in this country belongs to me. We are in a country that is famous with oil. We see many oil tankers on the streets but we don’t know to whom it belongs, its destination, and what happens with the income, as if we are watching a movie. We don’t get anything from the oil income.” The issue of administrative corruption, particularly relating to oil revenues, is a common theme throughout the groups.

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Participants express frustration over the fact that Iraq imports almost all its goods and there is little focus on domestic production. Several participants explicitly blame former administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer, for levying taxes on raw materials and not taxing imports. Others express frustration that foreign companies are awarded projects while local factories are shut down. They are aware of privatization, but see none of the benefits. Many rely on salaries provided directly from the government and are angry that the government is squandering money instead of making payments. Kurds are particularly angry about not receiving salaries from the government, and many list this as their top demand from Baghdad.

Others complain that they see no long-term planning from the government, and instead only see responses to immediate threats. Even with the ongoing major security threats, these Iraqis want to see a plan for long-term growth and a clear explanation of how it will benefit them; this suggests the government needs to improve its communications efforts.

Kurdistan Safer, More Unified, and Divided on Its Relationship with Iraq

Participants within and outside Kurdistan widely agree that the region is more stable and secure than Iraq as a whole. They see the region's internal unity as a contributing factor to greater economic development and security, including its fight against ISIS. Nonetheless, Kurdish independence is a divisive topic within the region, while Iraqis outside of Kurdistan are strongly opposed to parceling Iraq into different countries.

Groups suggest the primary frustration between Kurdistan and the central government hinges on the distribution of the KRG's budget from Baghdad. Participants are frustrated that the government stopped paying salaries under Maliki and still has not resumed payment under the new prime minister. An Erbil Turkmen woman says, "Maliki was occasionally sending us salaries but this government sent nothing at all."

The lack of payment weighs heavily on Kurdish perceptions of Abadi and the government in Baghdad, and their patience is wearing thin. An Erbil woman says, "We need someone to act. No one is taking action to raise the issue [of salary payments] so that it can be solved." This complaint is not limited to the North. A Baghdad female says, "Most of the goods that reach Kurdistan are through the al-Basra port, which got affected from the recent [security] incidents; and even [Kurds] got affected as they didn't receive their salaries because of these incidents."

Many participants within and outside of Kurdistan cite safety as a main difference between the region and the rest of Iraq, and the primary reason displaced people relocate to Kurdistan. A Yezidi man from Dohuk says, "It is true that things are better in Kurdistan. We came to Duhok as displaced people and they respect us, help us. We are really very thankful to people from Kurdistan." A Sabian living in Baghdad adds, "Kurdistan protects the minorities more than any other place."

Even if Kurds are seen as hospitable to minorities and the internally displaced, many of the participants outside of the North do not see Kurdistan as hospitable to Arabs, further fueling sectarian tensions. A Baghdad man says, "You now have get the sponsorship of a Kurdish person to stay in Kurdistan. We have to pay $3,000 or $4,000 to have it, and when we pass through another checkpoints, they won't accept this residence card, pleading it is not original."

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Views toward Kurdish independence remains contentious, even within the region. For some, the prospect of economic independence drives the desire to separate from Iraq. An Erbil woman says, “I think it is better to stay away from Iraq. It is like shopping with someone that you constantly ask for money to buy something. If we are independent, we could have our money and will neither ask al-Abadi nor al-Maliki. We will have enough to live in peace, regardless of which religion or group we are belonging to.”

Yet many fear that independence would increase external threats to Kurdistan, including potential invasions by Iran or Turkey . An Erbil Kurdish woman says, “Now everyone wishes to separate, but we should keep in mind that we will make a large number of enemies to ourselves by doing so.” Some participants believe external forces will prevent Kurdistan from achieving independence.

Skepticism in Kurdistan for independence reflects an aversion to the divisions found in the rest of Iraq. Some Iraqis sound almost envious of Kurdish security, unity, and oil production, but are frustrated that Kurdish forces only fight for Kurdistan and not all of Iraq. A woman in Baghdad says, “It is the cohesion among them, also their government cares about them… they are committed to their unity.”

Minorities Want Stronger Voice and to Simply be Treated Like Others

Turkmen, Yezidi, Christian, and Sabian focus group participants provide insights into Iraqi’s minority populations. Many sentiments among minority participants reflect those of other Iraqis, including calls for national unity, poor economic conditions, and deep fears for personal security.

Security is a predominant concern of these minority participants, heightened by ISIS’s attacks on minority communities. Several openly relay stories of murder, rape, and the abduction of women from their families or communities. One Yezidi man says, “We are not living in our homes and are displaced, which is very difficult for us. Moreover, we are very sad because ISIS took our girls.” Another says, “What I recently heard about them is that they use our girls in business. They sell our girls. This is unbearable.”

Beyond security, most of these participants can recall times when they or family members were discriminated against by the government, employers, or others in their communities because of their ethnicity or religion. They view themselves as second-class citizens of Iraq, despite feeling that their people have an ancient presence in the country. An Erbil Christian man says, “I personally had a very large plot of my own at Ankawa and the government took it and gave it to other people and built projects on it. I lost my land and no one would do anything for me. This is because I am Christian. My Islam neighbors who had the same issue as me are compensated.”

As a result of this discrimination, many of these minority participants say they simply want to be treated like other Iraqis, with some pointing out they do not wish to be called minorities, but prefer “Iraqis.” A Baghdad Sabian man says, “We are against this idea [of autonomy]. We want civil and fair country to live in. We don't want a country of tribes. We have to exchange ideas and the cultures.” Some mention the desire to assimilate fully with other Iraqis, and suggest a preference to hide their minority status in public. A man in Baghdad says, “Just a few people know about my religion. I compare the religion to underwear: Don't show it to anybody and don't

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let anybody see it. It is better like this in Iraq. Some of my friends don't know that I am Sabian, and I don't ask them about their religion."

These minorities are open to a number of hypothetical government initiatives that would help their communities. They generally have positive views about a decentralization policy that would give them more control over their communities' budgets and decisions. They also like the idea of constitutional or legal protections that ensure their safety and allow them to make an official claim when they are discriminated against due to their ethnicity or religion. A few suggest creating a ministry dedicated to minority rights.

However, minorities, like their Muslim counterparts, are almost unanimously against more structural divisions, such as new autonomous regions for minorities. Minority groups see this possible solution as bad for their own security and economic situation, exacerbating their already vulnerable situation. "We have not yet taken autonomy and we have lots of enemies. What if we take autonomy? Everything will be worse," says an Turkmen woman from Erbil.

Similarly, they were critical of quotas to ensure that they received more positions in government, and instead preferred that positions were filled based on merit. An Erbil Turkmen woman says, "I think the most important thing to be done is to establish a rule or law that keeps equality between everyone of this country, regardless of what religion or group he or she belongs to. A law that could be practised when we want to get employed." An Erbil Christian man adds, "I do not think giving us positions would make any difference in our situation, even if we have ten ministries. What we need is an international force or support to protect everyone in Kurdistan including Christians from Arabs. But I do not think Shia Iraqi government can be a good government for Christians."

Nonetheless, most minority participants do not feel that their current representatives in the government or Council of Representatives have a voice that is taken seriously. A Dohuk Yezidi man says, "My view is, it does not make any difference whether we ask for support or not. We have our leader and Sheikh and even if he asks for something no one listen to him."

For their part, Shia, Sunni, and Kurd participants are aware of the discrimination that minorities face and know of the tragedies caused by ISIS. They do not exhibit discrimination toward minorities in groups but instead feel that minorities play an important and historical role in Iraqi society, one they want to protect. Similar to the minority participants, these non-minority participants are open to constitutional and legal protections for minorities, but are wholly against creating autonomous regions. A small group of participants think that minorities already receive more benefits and attention than they deserve from the government given their small numbers.

Women Held Back By Societal Views, Lack Representation

Men and woman both view Iraqi women as having fewer rights than men. They see these inequalities as societal and representative of Middle Eastern culture. Participants of both genders view women's role as one of compliance, both to male political leaders and family members. These viewpoints on gender influence opinion toward women in leadership roles.

Many female participants state that they are unable to go out alone—especially after dark—as one example of the differences between men and women. Other examples of discrimination

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include higher barriers for opening businesses, and harassment on the street. An Erbil woman says, “In Iraq, generally, women do not have rights. No one cares of women emotions. If you are a woman, you have to live for others, you have to wear clothes that others want. There is a saying among Iraqi men: ‘Listen to women, but do not do what they say.’”

Some participants note regional differences regarding the rights of women. An Erbil woman says, “The situation is better in Kurdistan. KRG has introduced some laws that deal with women rights, but in [the rest of] Iraq, they are still going on the old law project of 1958.” Others outside of Kurdistan note that women from the North fight ISIS as part of the Peshmerga forces, viewing this with a sense of pride.

Both male and female participants feel that women’s opinions are not taken seriously, both in government and society. Although a number of participants agree that women’s participation in government is a good idea, women participants feel their voices are not yet heard. A Basra man says, “The government holds symposiums and conferences to support the women and her rights, but in real life, we don’t know it [women’s rights].”

Participants stress that traditional roles call into question women’s capacity to perform certain tasks in government that are perceived to be reserved for men. One man in Dohuk says that government’s distrust for women “is all about the cultural things of Iraq. They think that women are unable to perform great tasks or it is a shame for them to let women do those things.”

Awareness of current and previous women MPs and former ministers is relatively high; however most view these as token positions given out to fulfill quotas. Participants say that positions need to go to most qualified candidates, regardless of gender—a similar argument to that used for sectarian quotas.

Yet openness to women leaders in government stops at “peaceful ministries,” like education and cultural posts. A Sulaymaniyah man says, “Defense and Interior Ministries need somebody with a leading role, somebody with a military rank. [Women] don’t have that power over men. Like it or not, the power men has over other men, women do not have over men. But some other ministries yes, like culture.”

A Basra man points to Iraq’s instability and says, “Our country is full of assassination, kidnapping and fights; [a woman] cannot be the premier.” Still, some participants note that if women became prime minister or received more important ministerial positions more “moderate thinking,” as noted by a Sulaymaniyah man, would emerge, which participants agree would be good for Iraq.

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Appendix A: Focus Group Specifications

Iraq Focus Group Specifications (2014)

Date	Language	Location	Urbanicity	Gender	Age	Ethnoreligion	Education	Political Leaning	Voted in April
Minority-focused groups									
Oct. 13	Kurdish	Erbil	n/a	Male	30-50	Christian	Primary, intermediate, and secondary	n/a	n/a
Oct. 13	Kurdish	Erbil	n/a	Female	25-45	Turkmen	Intermediate and Secondary	n/a	n/a
Oct. 18	Kurdish	Dohuk	n/a	Male	30-50	Yezidi	Primary, intermediate, and secondary	n/a	n/a
Oct. 16	Arabic	Baghdad	n/a	Male	20-35	Sabians	Intermediate and secondary	n/a	n/a
Political/current event groups (women focus included)									
Oct.18	Arabic	Baghdad	Urban	Female	20-35	Sunni	Intermediate and secondary	Any Sunni Coalition	Voted
Oct.17	Arabic	Baghdad	Urban	Male	30-50	Sunni	Secondary and diploma	n/a	Did not vote
Oct.17	Arabic	Baghdad	Urban	Male	25-40	Shia	Intermediate and secondary	SOL	Voted
Oct. 12	Kurdish	Erbil	Urban	Female	25-45	Kurd	Secondary and diploma	KDP	Voted
Oct. 16	Kurdish	Sulaymaniyah	Urban	Male	30-50	Kurd	Intermediate and secondary	Goran	Voted
Oct. 16	Kurdish	Sulaymaniyah	Urban	Female	20-35	Kurd	Primary and intermediate	PUK	Voted
Oct. 20	Arabic	Basra	Urban	Male	40-60	Shia	Primary and intermediate	Al-Muwatin/ISCI	Voted
Oct. 20	Arabic	Basra	Urban	Female	30-50	Shia	Primary and intermediate	SOL	Voted