NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

FINAL INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT ON THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

NOVEMBER 9, 2010
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NDI extends its gratitude to all 61 members of the international observer delegation who volunteered their time and expertise to make this mission a success. The Institute also thanks the representatives of NDI’s domestic monitoring partners in Jordan, the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) and Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development (Al Hayat), as well as Jordanian election authorities and members of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Al Quds Center for Political Studies, and Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism, for meeting with the delegation before, during, and after the elections. NDI also expresses its appreciation to the four members of its pre-election delegation who visited Jordan from September 14 through 17 and whose work contributed to the efforts of the election observation delegation. This program was made possible by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 9, 2010, Jordanian citizens elected their 16th parliament. The polls, held under a new temporary election law passed by the cabinet in May 2010, saw the Jordanian government allow international election observation for the first time in the kingdom’s history. To demonstrate international support for Jordan’s democratic development and to provide an impartial assessment of the electoral process, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) deployed a pre-election delegation and long-term observers to monitor the lead-up to the elections, and organized a 61-member delegation to observe election-day processes.

NDI found that enhanced electoral procedures marked an improvement over the 2007 polls. The technical preparations for balloting and the conduct of the voting on election day compared favorably to accepted international practices. Poll workers were well trained and professional and polling centers well organized. The counting and tabulation process—open for the first time to citizen and international observers—and the announcement of full results, including vote tallies for all candidates, provided greater transparency than in previous elections. Nevertheless, the NDI delegation noted structural shortcomings—widely unequal districting, the lack of an independent election body, and limited press freedoms—that demonstrated that greater improvements must be made to the electoral process.

The new parliament included 37 returning incumbents and 83 first-time parliamentarians—a turnover rate of nearly 70 percent that reflects widespread public dissatisfaction with the previous body. The elections also ushered in notable gains for women, who with 13 seats nearly doubled their level of representation from the previous parliament. Six of Jordan’s 12 governorates elected the first women representatives from their regions. The first woman from a Bedouin district was elected to parliament, as well as the first Christian woman and the first woman from Amman to win outside of the quota system.

While there were positive developments in the administration of the polls, observers noted cause for concern, including a large number of voters claiming to be illiterate and many cases of “public voting”—the practice of announcing a voter’s choice out loud. Other potential violations included voter intimidation by tribal members, attempts to vote with fake identification cards, and isolated instances of voter secrecy being compromised. Observers heard numerous allegations of vote-buying, a practice public opinion research confirms the majority of Jordanians believe is taking place. The government of Jordan, which has launched investigations into some of these allegations, is encouraged to take further measures to address voter intimidation and vote-buying, and to take steps to ensure the secrecy of the vote.
The election period was marred by rioting and isolated incidents of violence, including, regrettably, two deaths. While many observers reported that security forces responded to incidents appropriately, more could be done to prevent and deter election-related violence. Much of the tension was linked to competition among candidates and tribes, reinforcing the imperative of adopting measures to reduce tribal influence on politics in Jordan.

Additionally, while the new election law incorporated several recommendations proposed by civic and women’s groups—including increasing the women’s quota, incorporating transparent counting procedures at polling stations, and increasing penalties for electoral transgressions—it did not significantly address the fundamental problems of disproportionate districting, the absence of an independent election management body, and the dearth of vibrant political parties. Jordan’s most prominent political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), boycotted the election because of its concerns about the electoral law. The election law also introduced a new sub-districting system, which resulted in a number of candidates winning with fewer votes than other losing candidates in the same district. An electoral law that addresses these problems is the minimum required to address public skepticism and dissatisfaction and to build confidence in the ability of citizens to participate effectively in the country’s political process.

To guarantee the integrity of the electoral process and to ensure that the resulting legislature is representative of the Jordanian people, the NDI delegation recommends that the government of Jordan:

- Establish an independent election management body to administer elections;
- Correct the unequal weighting of districts to allow full and equal representation for all Jordanians;
- Revise the election system to promote political party development and fair competition;
- Introduce in parliament a permanent election law that incorporates different stakeholders’ views;
- Regulate campaign finance to increase transparency and accountability and address concerns about vote-buying. Regulations on electoral violations should also be reviewed to ensure that existing rules are enforced and that penalties are adequate and appropriate;
- Reform voting procedures for illiterate voters, including through the use of a printed ballot with candidate photos or symbols;
- Regulate media conduct during the campaign period to ensure equitable air-time and coverage for candidates;
- Introduce regulations to allow for the appeal of election results by candidates in a systematic, neutral and timely manner;
- Encourage parties and candidates to provide better training for candidate representatives;
- Improve procedures for assisting voters with disabilities;
- Adopt measures that allow voters whose names do not appear on the voter list to cast a provisional vote under alternate procedures with proper identification; and
- Post election results, including vote tallies for all candidates, as well as blank and spoiled ballots, at polling centers and tabulation centers and online immediately after the counting and aggregation of votes has taken place.

Political reform in Jordan, however, must go beyond the electoral framework and the conduct of elections. The groundswell of discontent, protests, and revolutions in the Middle East in 2011 presents an imperative to the Jordanian government to take significant steps toward political reform. The government has announced its intention to revise legislation governing political parties, the media, public gatherings, and associations, and every effort should be made to ensure that these and other laws guarantee fundamental freedoms and political rights and broaden public participation in government. Meaningful democratic reform should also reach into the parliament, empowering elected officials to form governments, provide meaningful representation, ensure robust government oversight, and create effective laws. Such measures would increase citizen confidence in Jordan's political processes, further democratic development, and enhance government accountability.
INTRODUCTION

The 2010 parliamentary elections in Jordan marked the first time that the Jordanian government allowed international election observers to monitor elections in the kingdom. In response, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) organized a 61-member delegation to monitor the elections, which took place on November 9, 2010. The Institute’s delegation was led by former President of Colombia Andrés Pastrana Arango; Canadian Member of Parliament Paul Dewar; former U.S. Congressman Sam Gejdenson; Speaker of the Minnesota House of Representatives Margaret Kelliher; and Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at NDI. The delegation included parliamentarians, political and civic leaders, regional and election experts, and members of the media from 18 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas.1

The goal of the international election observation was to support the electoral process by furnishing accurate, impartial information about the character of the process and, where appropriate, by providing recommendations for improvement based on international experience. The delegation was guided in its mission by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and its accompanying Code of Conduct for International Observers2, which have been endorsed by 35 of the world’s leading international election observation organizations.

NDI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in government. NDI has sponsored democratic development programs in Jordan since 1993 and has maintained an office in Amman since 2004.

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1 See Appendix E for a list of delegation members and Appendix F for the Preliminary Statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to Jordan’s 2010 Parliamentary Elections.
2 See Appendix B for the combined documents.
**POLITICAL CONTEXT**

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, an independent country since the end of the British Mandate in 1946, began a process toward political reform in 1989. At that time, political unrest and economic pressures led the late King Hussein to call for the country’s first parliamentary elections in 32 years. Since then, Jordan has legalized political parties and held parliamentary and municipal elections at regular intervals. The participation of women as voters, activists, candidates, and elected officials has grown dramatically and the capacity of Jordanian civil society organizations to advocate for more transparent and representative government institutions and policies has increased. King Abdullah II, who ascended the throne in 1999, has continued to emphasize the need for political reform.

Notwithstanding these achievements and rhetorical support for reform, powerful interests vested in the status quo have ensured that political authority remains largely concentrated in the regime. In the context of a historically weak parliament, underdeveloped political parties, strong and competitive tribal allegiances, and a political system designed to preserve a tenuous balance between “East Bank” Jordanians and the kingdom’s sizeable Palestinian-origin population, the November 2010 parliamentary elections did not significantly alter the kingdom’s fundamental power structure.

**Political Institutions and the Monarchy**

As a monarchy, Jordan’s legislature is subject to the ultimate power of the king. The king participates in legislative functions through several methods, including appointing prime ministers and senators, introducing legislative proposals, extending legislative sessions, calling “extraordinary sessions” outside of the established four-month legislative calendar, and dissolving both houses of parliament at will, as King Abdullah has done twice since ascending the throne in 1999.\(^3\) In the absence of a legislative body, the government can pass temporary laws, as was the case with the 2010 temporary election law.

\(^3\) In addition to the 2009 dissolution of parliament, King Abdullah dissolved parliament in 2001 for a period of three years. During the three-year suspension of parliament, the government passed more than 270 temporary laws.
Although the government has introduced modest measures of parliamentary reform since reinstituting elections in 1989, the legislative body remains primarily composed of independent tribal figures and businessmen with no collective agenda. The Jordanian public has consistently expressed dissatisfaction and cynicism toward parliament and parliamentarians, with many viewing the institution as a “rubber-stamp” for government initiatives and a venue for a small group of people to advance their personal interests at the expense of the public good. The outcomes of elections have been relatively predictable, characterized by a waning presence of opposition members, an underrepresentation of women, and a majority of seats filled by tribal notables who are well-disposed toward the palace.
Some of the weaknesses of the Jordanian parliament are a direct result of Jordan’s electoral framework. Jordan uses an election-districting system that is disproportionate, resulting in an underrepresentation of urban voters. For instance, one rural district in Karak has on average 7,555 voters per seat, while a district in Irbid has in excess of 46,000 voters per seat. This system has resulted in the underrepresentation of urban, primarily Palestinian-origin voters and a disproportionate dominance of East Bank Jordanians in parliament, and contributes to a sense of apathy among many Jordanians, who do not view the parliament as representative.

### Disproportionate Weighting of Districts in 2010 Elections

#### Districts with the Least Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Registered Voters</th>
<th>Number of Subdistricts/Seats</th>
<th>Average Number of Registered Voters per Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irbid 7: Ghor Shamally</td>
<td>46,277</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid 6: Al Koura</td>
<td>45,866</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa 4: Al Russaifeh</td>
<td>89,140</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa 4: Ain Al Basha</td>
<td>43,463</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman 4: Qweismeh-Sahab-Kherbet Al Souk</td>
<td>127,861</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Districts with the Most Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Registered Voters</th>
<th>Number of Subdistricts/Seats</th>
<th>Average Number of Registered Voters per Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma'an 3: Al Petra</td>
<td>10,010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid 8: Taybeh</td>
<td>18,023</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma'an 2: Al Shoubak</td>
<td>7,894</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak 2: Al Qaser</td>
<td>15,554</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak 6: Faquqa</td>
<td>7,555</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another controversial element of Jordan’s election system is its use of the single, non-transferrable vote (SNTV), commonly called “one man, one vote” system. Introduced in 1993, the SNTV system allows voters to cast a single ballot for one candidate regardless of the number of seats reserved for the district. The government described its introduction of the SNTV system as a way to create equality among voters. Many analysts, however, believe that this system was implemented to minimize the influence of organized Islamist groups. (After the SNTV system was introduced, the number of seats held by Muslims decreased by nearly one-third.) Critics of the system argue that the SNTV system encourages voters to vote along tribal lines,
rather than on the basis of issues or political platforms. Political parties cite the SNTV system as an obstacle to their development.

Finally, a general lack of transparency in election operations and results has contributed to widespread public cynicism about elections and the parliament. In 2007, for example, challenges to election results were dismissed without review; voting irregularities, like vote-buying, went unaddressed, and the government did not fully embrace the right of domestic civic groups to monitor elections. Jordanian citizen groups have also criticized the electoral process for lacking an independent electoral commission and transparent vote-counting procedures.

Identity and National Unity

While Jordan does not face the sectarian strife of some of its neighbors, identity politics remains a central issue in the Jordanian political system. Despite being home to millions of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, as well as a sizeable Circassian minority, the ruling elite remain largely “East Bank” Jordanians. Tribes play a central role in Jordanian society, and strong tribal allegiances induce many voters to support candidates selected from their own tribe or region based on promises of patronage, rather than the candidate’s ideology or platform. Although tribes can form coalitions and act as political parties in many ways, the fractious nature of tribal politics, steeped in historical and contemporary disputes, impedes the creation of factions within the parliament and carries the risk of transforming political differences into inter-tribal tensions and inter-tribal tensions into political differences.

Jordan has played an intimate role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it is estimated that Palestinians comprise more than half of the population, though the exact figure is a source of extensive and ongoing debate.\(^4\) Although Jordan has granted Palestinians citizenship since 1950, prejudices toward this community and lingering questions over the future of a Palestinian state have resulted in the continuing political marginalization of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Many East Bank

\(^4\) As the most organized political movement in Jordan, the IAF remains the most successful party in terms of capturing seats, even under the SNTV system. However, independent analysts—and IAF leaders—believe that the movement would be able to win even more seats under a proportional system.

\(^5\) The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) lists the figure at 31.5%, but they also admit that many refugees are not registered with the agency. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) claimed that Palestinians make up about 50% of the population in 2006. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/end_year06e.pdf
Jordanians fear their country will become an alternate state for Palestinians, leading to the Jordanian government’s continued emphasis on the Palestinian people’s “Right of Return” to their original land and the creation of a state of their own. Jordanians of Palestinian origin are underrepresented in the Jordanian parliament, and the system of disproportionate electoral districts is commonly understood to be an attempt to sideline this population.

Women in Politics

While there are no formal restrictions on the participation of women in Jordanian politics, women’s political representation in Jordan is limited. Women were enfranchised in Jordan in 1974 and the first woman was elected to parliament, under the Circassian quota system, in 1993. After dissolving parliament in 2001, King Abdullah announced the creation of six new parliamentary seats for women to boost their participation in the 2003 elections. The quota remained in place for the 2007 parliamentary elections, which also saw the election of the first woman outside of a quota system in Jordan’s history.\(^6\)

Notwithstanding these positive developments, women face informal barriers to entering the political process. For women candidates, such barriers include limited access to resources and funding, limited practical experience in campaign skills and tactics, little experience in local governance or public service, and the continued reluctance of the male-dominated society to accept women in public positions. In addition, women voters often face pressure from husbands and fathers to vote for “family candidates.”

Political Parties

Political parties in Jordan remain weak, in part due to restrictive laws and a lack of public understanding of the roles of such organizations. While political parties existed in Jordan in the post-independence period, the monarchy banned them in 1957 in order to consolidate control in the face of growing regional instability. Parties remained illegal until 1992, when they were reinstated under strict regulations. A 2007 political parties law, which ostensibly improved the standing of political parties by providing them with public funding, is widely viewed as restrictive as it imposed stringent membership requirements and transferred supervision of

\(^6\) In the 2003 parliamentary elections, 54 women ran as candidates, three times the number that ran in the 1997 race. In 2007, there were 199 women candidates.
political parties from the Ministry of Political Development to the Ministry of Interior, the agency that controls the Jordanian security apparatus. The law resulted in a dramatic reduction of the number of registered political parties, from 35 to 18. Jordanian political parties unanimously declared their rejection of the new law, pointing to constitutional provisions that guarantee political freedom and pluralism.

The strongest and most organized party in Jordan is the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Unlike most other parties, whose membership largely draws from the Jordanian elite, the IAF’s base is comprised largely of working-class citizens. The party has a strong presence in Amman and Zarqa, concentrated urban areas with large Palestinian-origin populations. The IAF is in the midst of an internal debate over the future direction of the party. Hardliners or “hawks” support more engagement with Hamas and a stronger stance vis-à-vis Israel; moderates or “doves” advocate for the movement to focus on domestic issues. Although the IAF is recognized as the organized opposition, it has historically maintained good relations with the monarchy.

Aside from the IAF, most of Jordan’s political parties are small, disorganized, and attractive mostly to Jordan’s middle and upper classes. For the most part, the parties center more on individual leaders and personalities than on political platforms or ideologies, and lack sufficient financial resources to operate effectively. Parties tend to rely on a limited number of outside donations, typically from the party leader or small groups of wealthy members.

**Politics and the Press**

The Jordanian constitution provides for nominal freedom of speech and the press, but legal restrictions exist and self-censorship is widespread. Until very recently, the government owned more than 50 percent of all of Jordan’s newspapers and broadcast media. This is changing due to the emergence of independent radio and TV stations, as well as independent dailies such as Al Ghad newspaper, though all publications in Jordan must be licensed by the government and many wait for a “government line” before reporting on controversial issues. Journalists must be members of the Jordanian Press Association (JPA) to work legally. In the past, journalists who are critical of the government have been excluded from the JPA and prevented from practicing their profession.
On March 21, 2008, the parliament approved a new press and publications law that explicitly prohibits “detention as a result of the enunciation of an opinion in speech, writing, or through other means.” Nevertheless, the new law increased fines to up to 20,000 dinars (USD $28,000) for speech that offends religious beliefs, the prophets, or “individuals.” Security agencies maintain tight supervision on journalists, and they may still be prosecuted for defaming the king or royal family, a crime which can lead to imprisonment of up to three years. In practice, however, limited criticism of the government and its allies is often tolerated.

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7 Article 38: “It is prohibited to publish any material that: a) Offends any of the religions whose freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution; b) Offends prophets in writing, drawing, symbols or any other means; c) Offends religious feelings or beliefs or triggers sectarian or racial tensions; d) Offends the dignity and personal freedom of individuals or includes false information and rumors against them”, and article 46: “d) Whoever breaches Paragraphs A, B and C of Article 38 of this law shall be fined an amount between JD 10,000 and JD 20,000; e) Whoever breaches Paragraph D of Article 38 of this law shall be fined an amount between JD 500 and JD 1,000”. 
LEAD UP TO 2010 ELECTIONS

Call for Early Elections and Electoral Reform

In response to public dissatisfaction with the parliament elected in 2007, King Abdullah dissolved parliament in November 2009, calling for a revised electoral law and early elections “that are a model of integrity, impartiality, and transparency.” Political observers, analysts, and civic activists, who had long engaged in a public debate on Jordan’s political system, increased their calls for changes to the system. Civil society organizations saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their role in shaping the electoral process in Jordan and worked to build public demand for electoral reform. A coalition of civil society organizations as well as women’s groups formally submitted recommendations to the government, advocating specific changes they believed would support healthy competition and produce a more representative and effective legislature. Proposed changes included increasing the women’s quota to 20 percent, reforming the electoral districts to produce more proportional representation, and creating harsher penalties for violations.

2010 Parliamentary Elections: Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 23, 2009</td>
<td>Call for Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 19, 2010</td>
<td>Cabinet approves Temporary Election Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15, 2010</td>
<td>Cabinet sets Date of Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6 - July 22, 2010</td>
<td>Voter Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1 - 7, 2010</td>
<td>Publishing of Preliminary Voter Lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8 - 14, 2010</td>
<td>Challenge Period for Voter lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10 - 12, 2010</td>
<td>Candidate Registration Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16 - 18, 2010</td>
<td>Candidate Objection Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 2010</td>
<td>Publication of Preliminary List of Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24, 2010</td>
<td>Deadline for Applications for International Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24, 2010</td>
<td>Publication of Final Voter Registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 27, 2010</td>
<td>Deadline for Public Objection to Candidate List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2, 2010</td>
<td>Publication of Final List of Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7, 2010</td>
<td>Deadline for Candidates to Register Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8, 2010</td>
<td>Deadline for Obtaining new ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 9, 2010</td>
<td>Election Day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After much anticipation, the government released the new temporary election law on May 19, 2010. The new law introduced a unique system of districting, in which the country’s main electoral zones were divided into “virtual” sub-districts equal to the number of seats assigned to the zone. (Candidates registered to run in a sub-district of their choosing and voters cast one ballot for a candidate in any sub-district in their electoral zone. The sub-districts were called “virtual” because they did not correspond to any particular geographic area.) The new law preserved the SNTV system, which was controversial in Jordan as many political players contended that it favored tribes and well-organized political groups. It also increased the number of seats in the lower house from 110 to 120, adding four seats for heavily populated areas in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa, as well as six new quota seats for women. Furthermore, the law invoked stricter penalties for electoral fraud (including vote-buying), broadened election administration beyond the Ministry of Interior (adding a judge as a deputy to the head of each election committee and an independent judge to arbitrate electoral disputes) and introduced a number of procedural changes to protect the secrecy of the vote and to enhance the transparency of the process.

While the new law incorporated several recommendations that were put forward by civic and women’s groups—including increasing the women's quota, the publication of voters' lists, transparent counting procedures at polling stations, and increasing penalties on electoral transgressions—it fell short of public expectations. The number of seats allocated for women doubled to 12, but failed to reach the 20 percent representation demanded by women's organizations. While there were some modest changes to the administration of elections, the new law maintained the Ministry of Interior as the body responsible for supervising the electoral process, rather than establishing an independent commission as had been recommended by the civil society coalition. Additionally, the 2010 temporary election law left campaign finance and media regulations unaddressed.

Of greatest significance, the new system did not address the issue of the disproportionate weighting of districts, which under-represents citizens in urban areas, who are largely of Palestinian origin. Furthermore, political parties and others have criticized the law because its retention of the SNTV system presented an obstacle to the development of a multi-party political system in Jordan. The IAF cited the new election law as a primary reason for its decision to boycott the elections.
Main Changes Introduced by the 2010 Temporary Election Law

- Divides electoral zones into “virtual” sub-districts equal to the number of seats per zone.
- Broadens election administration beyond the Ministry of Interior, adding an independent judge as the deputy of the Higher Election Committee and a representative from the Ministry of Political Development.
- Adds ten new seats to the parliament:
  - four seats for urban, primarily Palestinian, areas and
  - six seats for women candidates (raising quota from 6 to 12 seats).
- Invokes tougher penalties on electoral crimes, including vote-buying.
- Introduces a special registration system for illiterate voters.
- Enfranchises civilians working for military and security agencies.
- Grants suffrage to all citizens turning 18 years old as late as January 1, 2010.

On June 15, the government announced that parliamentary elections would take place on November 9, 2010. Also during the summer, the government announced that domestic groups would be allowed to observe the election. This marked a major achievement for civic groups, which launched the kingdom’s first domestic election observation effort for the 2007 parliamentary elections. In a more dramatic development and a further departure from previous statements, government officials in July signaled a willingness to allow international groups to “witness” the elections. This position set an important precedent in Jordan, which, had previously maintained that international observation was a violation of national sovereignty.

IAF Boycott

Citing a “lack of genuine desire on the part of the government for real political reform” and lingering concerns with the electoral law, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) announced its intention to boycott the parliamentary elections in July 2010. The government initially responded to the IAF boycott by expressing its respect for the Islamists’ decision and confirming that it had no intention to amend the elections law.

Although several rounds of talks between the government and the Islamists were held in August and September 2010, they ultimately failed to result in a change in position of the IAF. The party’s decision to boycott was communicated to party members, who were encouraged not to vote on election day. The Jordanian Assembly of Professional Laborers and the Committee to Revive the Teachers’ Association, both of which have traditionally been IAF strongholds, also announced their intent to boycott the polls. The Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party and the Higher Coordination Committee for Opposition Political Parties, an umbrella group of seven political parties, also voiced their discontent with the government’s administration of the electoral process. However, only two of the seven committee members, the IAF and Al Wahda Party, boycotted...
the elections. Notwithstanding the party’s decision to boycott, seven IAF members decided to run as independent candidates. As a consequence, the party’s internal central court “froze” their party memberships for one year, a move the party’s executive office characterized as insufficient, requesting, instead, that they be expelled from the party.

The IAF’s decision to boycott was covered widely in the Jordanian and international press, and columnists were nearly unanimous during the pre-election period in acknowledging the doubt that the boycott would cast on the significance of the elections. Although the IAF faced some criticism for passing on its “national duty” to participate, the discourse focused on the effect the boycott would have on voter turnout. As the kingdom’s largest organized political party, the IAF’s decision to boycott the election may have very well deprived a significant group of voters of an electoral choice.

8 None of the independent, IAF-affiliated candidates were elected.
FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

Voter Registration Process

Voter registration for the 2010 parliamentary elections opened on June 6, 2010. The initial closing date was July 5, but it was extended to July 22 in an effort to encourage additional eligible voters to register. The final number of newly-registered voters was 243,555, including 104,000 first-time voters who had turned 18 since January 1, 2007. The registration process was overseen by the Ministry of Interior and took place in the local offices of the Civil Status and Passports Department (CSPD).

Citizen monitoring groups observed voter registration processes at 61 registration centers, including seven universities, and published periodic reports detailing registration irregularities and recommending future improvements. These reports described the process as more transparent than in 2007. Throughout the registration period, the government worked with civil society organizations to address particular concerns.

Citizen observers noted that a large percentage of registration centers lacked adequate facilities to accommodate people with disabilities, and that more than a quarter of the centers observed lacked written instructions to guide citizens through the registration process. Notwithstanding these concerns, the observers noted that CSPD officials performed their duties adequately and reported cases where officials resisted attempts by several candidates to register a number of voters by submitting stacks of identification cards (IDs), a malpractice widely exercised by candidates during the 2007 voter registration period.

In accordance with the 2010 temporary election law, the government published the preliminary voters’ list and publicly displayed lists in each electoral district from August 1 through August 7. Domestic observers estimated that hundreds of thousands of voters had been incorrectly listed in their electoral district, an indication that a large number of voters had been improperly moved to electoral districts for the 2007 election.

Following the publication of the preliminary voters’ list, the government opened a challenge period lasting from August 8 through August 14. During this period, the CSPD received more than 400,000 challenges to the list. Upon review of the challenges, the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that 165,000 voters had been listed incorrectly in the 2007 electoral districts. These individuals were directed to register in their pre-2007
districts. Approximately 9,000 individuals successfully appealed the decision of the MOI, leaving 156,000 voters who would be required to obtain new government identification cards for their pre-2007 districts in order to participate in the 2010 polls. An additional 65,000 registered voters were required to have their identification cards stamped with their electoral district.9

In response to the demands of citizen observers, the Ministry of Interior published the final list of registered voters online on October 24, including the list of voters who were referred back to their pre-2007 electoral districts. This was viewed as a positive step that exceeded the requirements of the temporary election law, most likely taken to restore public confidence in light of the vote transfers that the government acknowledged had plagued the 2007 polls. 2,215,000 citizens were listed on the final registered voters’ list.

**Changes to the Voter Registration Process Implemented by the Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In response to the recommendations of citizen observers, the government:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cancelled registration fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access for persons with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended the voter registration period to allow more citizens to register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved the voter registration process in CSPD offices by organizing the queue and giving numbered cards to citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opened CSPD offices in universities to facilitate registration of student voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducted a public education campaign to promote voter participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lifted the requirement that citizens whose parents were not born in Jordan check in with the Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eased the registration process for young Jordanians by lifting the requirement that male citizens born in 1989, 1990, and 1991 present proof of postponement of their compulsory military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforced strict procedures to prevent group voter registration, especially by candidates and their representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited municipal councilors from working in favor of certain candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Published the voters’ list online, including the voters’ ID number, place of issue, and place of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed citizens to challenge voters’ lists at any CSPD office within the electoral district, and not only at the CSPD office where their ID was issued</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allowed citizens to challenge more than one name using a single application form</td>
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</table>

As of November 4, the deadline established by the government for voters to receive new identification cards for free, approximately 20,000 (or 12.8 percent) of the 156,000 voters who had been returned to pre-2007

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9 Identification cards issued after the 2007 elections did not list the assigned electoral district of the voter. In order to vote, however, the voter must have his/her electoral district stamped on his/her ID card.
districts had obtained new identification cards, and 8,000 (12.3 percent) of the 65,000 voters who had been issued replacement cards since the 2007 elections had added their district number for their ID card. Of those 28,000 voters, approximately 80 percent were from Amman. To address the issue of the 193,000 voters who did not have an identification card with the required district number, the government continued to issue new identification cards to registered voters for a fee of three JD through November 8.

NDI’s long-term observers noted that a number of CSPD offices refused to provide specific answers about the publication of the final voters’ list. While some offices were more helpful, none could or would provide a detailed demographic breakdown of the voters’ list, such as would be helpful for the targeting efforts of candidates and campaigns. In addition, the timing of the registration process limited the utility of the voters’ list for candidates. Nevertheless, candidates and other stakeholders referred to the voter registration process, including the challenges and appeals process, as transparent and regular.

Candidate Registration Process

The candidate registration period opened 30 days before election day, as designated by the temporary election law, and remained open for three days: October 10 through October 12. The candidate registration process took place from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. at the governors’ offices in each governorate. Domestic and international observers, as well as media representatives, were present throughout the registration process and noted that the process proceeded smoothly without any noticeable problems or incidents. The registration process was fairly uniform across governorates. Candidates used a consistent application form, paid the registration fee, and met with the election district and central committee officials. There were some differences, however. While most governors conducted the registration in a conference room or hall, governors in Ma’arqa, Aqaba, Tafileh, and Madaba received candidates in their personal offices. There was also a discrepancy among municipalities about the clean-up deposit required of candidates to ensure the prompt removal of advertisements following the election, with fees ranging from 400 JD to 4,000 JD.

10 Candidates from Bedouin districts registered in corresponding governorates: North Badia in Ma’arqa; Central Badia in Amman; and South Badia in Ma’an.
**Sub-district Selection**

One of the most significant elements of the candidate registration process was the selection of sub-districts. Candidates were free to register in any electoral zone, regardless of where they lived, and, within that zone, to choose a particular sub-district (or seat) within the electoral zone for which they would compete. With the exception of the Bedouin seats, which were limited to specific tribes, as well as the religious and minority seats, which were pegged to a particular district, candidates could choose to run for any seat within the district. Sub-districts were not geographically bound.

The unique and untested sub-districting system was a source of significant confusion among citizens, domestic and international observers, and candidates. This was exacerbated by a complete lack of transparency surrounding the process for selecting sub-districts. Throughout the pre-election period, candidates consistently described sub-districts in terms of geographic boundaries, illustrating the lack of understanding about how and who would decide where candidates would run.\(^{11}\)

In many districts, candidates and/or tribes reached agreement in advance on which sub-districts to run in. Many tribes organized tribal primaries, and several tribes imposed internal penalties to prevent candidates from the same family or tribe from competing against each other. NDI observers heard, for example, about one tribe that required candidates who lost in the tribal primaries to put forward a deposit of 10,000 JD (approximately $14,000 US) as a guarantee that they would not run in the general election. NDI observers also noted the phenomenon of smaller tribes opting to support women candidates in order to take advantage of the women’s quota. While this strategy was tested in 2007, it became a widespread approach in 2010, with tribes seeking out potential women candidates as well as women working to convince their tribes to support their candidacy. Nevertheless, supporting women candidates was still seen as a risk, and the fear of shame and anticipated backlash if they lost the elections prevented some women from entering the race.

Shortly in advance of the candidate registration period, the government announced that it would release sub-district selections only at the conclusion of the registration process, rather than throughout the registration period. This decision prompted some criticism from domestic observers and candidates, as it increased suspicion that the government was manipulating the process. Discrepancies among governorates on how candidates disclosed their chosen sub-district further clouded the matter: some candidates shared the information about their selected sub-district with only the three-person central committee in the registration office; other candidates were asked to inform the entire district election committee. In Jerash, the governor

\(^{11}\) Prior to the registration process, candidates in Irbid told NDI observers that they would not need to choose the sub-district upon registering because the government would decide for them. Although this practice did not turn out to be the case, the confusion about the system raised concerns about the fairness and transparency of the process.
cited the confidentiality of sub-district selections as a reason not to allow international observers to monitor the candidate registration process.

Notwithstanding the government’s decision to keep sub-district selections confidential, a number of candidates announced their sub-district upon registration. News websites and Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development (Al Hayat) published this information daily throughout the registration period. In practice, the sub-district system resulted in the registration of prominent and strong candidates on the first day, with the majority of the other candidates—including most women candidates—registering on the last day. By the conclusion of the registration period, 854 candidate applications had been received.

Candidate Objections

The temporary election law stipulated that candidate registration would be followed by a three-day objection period. Unfortunately, there was great confusion about the exact dates. The Ministry of Justice, which oversaw the Courts of First Instance that received the objections, interpreted the law to mean that the candidates’ objection phase followed immediately after the candidate registered. Courts in the Amman second district, for example, denied the objection of one candidate, which was filed on October 17 on the grounds that it was filed too late. The Ministry of Interior, on the other hand, announced that the objection period would be from October 16 to 18. A number of candidates interpreted the law to mean that the objection period would open immediately following the publication of the candidate’s list, which took place on October 21. But by that time, at least one governorate-level election office (Balqa) had announced that the list was final and that no more objections would be considered. A comprehensive count of objections is not available.

The government published the final candidates list on November 2. The final list included 763 candidates. Of the 87 candidates who withdrew, nine were women. NDI observers noted that the majority of candidate withdrawals were perceived to be the result of candidates running out of money or reassessing their viability, as well as last-minute tribal negotiations. NDI observers did not learn of any instances of candidates being bought out, although some may have been “convinced” to withdraw by their opponents, nor did NDI hear any suggestions that the government interfered or pressured any candidates to withdraw.
Candidate Representatives

Beginning the week of October 22, candidates registered representatives to witness the voting and counting procedures on election day. Candidates registered their representatives with district-level governors’ offices, and the dates for candidate representative registration varied among governorates. Information about the candidate representative registration process was disseminated by governors to candidates. In some cases this information was given to candidates during the registration process; in others, governors held separate meetings with candidates to share information.

Campaign Period

The campaign period officially began at 12:00 a.m. (midnight) on October 10, 2010, although conflicting government statements led to some confusion over the start of the period. Signs appeared in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid on the first day. In the southern areas of Karak, Ma’an, Tafileh, and Aqaba, the candidates incorrectly understood that they were not permitted to begin campaigning until October 13, after the candidate registration process was complete.

While many candidates evoked images of national unity and identity in their campaigns—using slogans such as “equality for all” and “Jordan comes first”—personal and, in particular, tribal identity remained the most salient campaign issue for the vast majority of candidates and voters. Candidates emphasized their tribal and family affiliations in campaign literature, and very few reached out beyond their immediate tribes for support. As in 2007, campaigns focused predominately on the promise of jobs and services. Any discussion of issues, such as unemployment, education, water, etc., was predominantly part of electoral rhetoric and was a distant second to emphasis on patronage.

Very little unbiased information or independent analysis existed to assist voters in making informed choices at the polls. Al Hayat hosted candidate debates, one of the only venues that provided candidates an opportunity to address issues in front of mixed crowds of voters. Unemployment was the main issue discussed at campaign events, but other issues included education, water, immigrants and refugees, and infrastructure. Nevertheless,
few candidates developed concrete policy proposals or issue-based platforms. Notwithstanding considerable disagreement over the electoral framework, most candidates indicated that reforming the election law and making it permanent should be a top priority for the new parliament.

The traditional practice of hosting large events in campaign tents continued to present the main campaign activity, with the size of the crowds ranging from several hundred to several thousand people for different candidates. Candidates also utilized other campaign tools to communicate with voters, including: individual meetings with potential voters and heads of families; signs and banners; and paid advertising in newspapers, online, and on television, although the high cost of paid media was prohibitive for most candidates outside of Amman. Several candidates experimented with new media, including Facebook, although such tools were not central to any campaigns and did not replace in-person outreach methods. Urban and younger candidates utilized social media, short-message-service (SMS), and email to reach voters. In the Southern governorate of Aqaba candidates also experimented with direct-dial voice messages, a technique new to campaigns in Jordan.

Men continued to dominate campaign teams, for both male and female candidates, with few women occupying senior positions.

**Campaign Spending**

The temporary election law does not regulate financial limits or financial disclosure for campaigns, so it is impossible to monitor fundraising and campaign spending. Financial disclosure of campaign funds is essential to a transparent and fair election process. The estimated cost of running a campaign ranged from between a few thousand dinars to several million. The majority of candidates relied on personal wealth and support from relatives to finance their campaigns. Regardless of individual financial capacity, the majority of candidates did not intend to raise money. A few candidates hired paid staff, while the majority relied on volunteers.

A number of candidates in Amman voiced frustration about having to buy advertising in order to receive favorable media coverage. Local TV and online banner ads seemed to be among the most economical options,

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12 In Karak, for example, one candidate estimated that he would spend one million JD on his campaign, but that his main opponent would spend five million JD.
13 A woman running in Madaba’s second district told NDI that her financial support would largely derive from her relatives and that she anticipated spending 3000 JD of her personal funds. In Amman, a male candidate running in the second district indicated his intent to spend 150,000 JD of his personal funds.
although one news website pitched home-page banner ads to prospective candidates for between 2,000 and 10,000 JD depending on the period of advertising. According to a journalist at a local newspaper, a quarter-page ad would average 300 JD per day, as opposed to 1000 JD per day in 2001. The same journalist explained that the sales department was kept separate from the reporting and editorial departments to prevent any real or perceived conflict of interest.

Throughout the campaign period, vote-buying remained an issue of serious concern. Despite the harsh new penalties (up to seven years in jail) introduced by the 2010 temporary election law, many candidates alleged that vote-buying was common and that the government was aware that it was taking place. Several candidates who spoke with NDI observers described financial transactions and other favors for constituents as charitable work, noting that the poor state of the Jordanian economy created a need for so-called “political money.” In the days before the election, the government announced that they had initiated ten investigations into alleged vote-buying incidents.14

Security

The campaign period was marred by tribal tensions and violence. On October 25, a man was fatally shot while driving with his cousin, a candidate running in Al-Shobak (Ma’an’s second district), to Al Hussein University to attend a debate organized by Al Hayat. Other reported incidents included: arson at candidates’ tents in Balqa and Irbid and at a woman candidate’s home in Amman; gunfire directed at the vehicle of a female candidate campaigning in northern Badia; and tribal clashes in Ajloun, Irbid, Karak, and Ma’fraq. University students clashed in Karak and Irbid, though later reports raised questions about whether the Irbid clash was election-related. One candidate, formerly with the IAF, was beaten and hospitalized on October 20. The incidents were a result of heightened tension between rival families and tribes, and were not attributed to government actions. While observers noted that security forces responded quickly and appropriately to such incidents, the government could have done more to prevent election-related violence. In addition, little is known about the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators.

There were a number of reported incidents of intimidation, threats, and in some cases, violence against women.

14 Dalgamouni, Rand. “10 under investigation for vote-buying, including candidate.” Jordan Times 5 November 2010
http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=31597
candidates, in addition to those noted above. This could be a result of tribal politics or traditional views against women in politics. No women candidates ran in the district of South Badia, which is considered a more conservative district. At least six women candidates reported direct threats and had their campaign signs and banners vandalized or destroyed. Two women candidates reported threats upon their lives. Much of the pressure on women candidates came from within the candidate's family. In Tafileh, for example, one woman candidate who had previously received her family's endorsement withdrew from the race in the final weeks of the campaign due to threats after the tribe decided to support a male candidate.

ELECTION-DAY VOTING AND COUNTING PROCEDURES

Voter turnout and participation

According to official figures, 53 percent of registered voters cast ballots on election day. This figure is in line with previous years. The Islamic Action Front disputed the official figures, claiming that turnout did not exceed 30 percent. It is impossible to independently verify the official turnout without having access to the total number of voters that cast ballots in each polling station. Although officials released the total number of votes received by each candidate, the number of invalid votes, blank ballots, and spoiled ballots at each polling station were not made available to domestic and international observers, nor publicly released.

Voter Turnout in Recent Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Eligible Voters Participating in Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turnout varied from district to district, with higher participation in rural areas than in urban centers. According to official figures, Tafileh, a rural governorate in the south, recorded the highest turnout figures at 75.3 percent. The governorates of Amman and Zarqa, which contain two of Jordan’s largest cities, had the two lowest recorded turnouts at 37.3 percent and 39.1 percent respectively. Official figures did not include information regarding voter demographics.

**Voter Turnout by Governorate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Number of Registered Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Badia</td>
<td>80.6% (45,091 voters)</td>
<td>55,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Badia</td>
<td>79.6% (33,069 voters)</td>
<td>41,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Badia</td>
<td>77.9% (30,452 voters)</td>
<td>39,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafileh</td>
<td>75.3% (32,126 voters)</td>
<td>43,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba</td>
<td>75.0% (50,543 voters)</td>
<td>69,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>74.2% (85,790 voters)</td>
<td>120,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun</td>
<td>73.2% (52,037 voters)</td>
<td>73,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>72.23% (40,991 voters)</td>
<td>56,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’an</td>
<td>70.3% (27,119 voters)</td>
<td>38,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerash</td>
<td>70.2% (48,351 voters)</td>
<td>68,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa</td>
<td>66.7% (131,245 voters)</td>
<td>189,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>60.8% (247,714 voters)</td>
<td>485,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td>59.6% (15,934 voters)</td>
<td>26,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>39.1% (105,071 voters)</td>
<td>298,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>37.3% (256,456 voters)</td>
<td>780,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Voting process**

Notwithstanding some tension due to long lines in several polling stations, voting proceeded in a calm and orderly fashion in the majority of polling stations visited by NDI. For the most part, polling officials were well trained and followed electoral procedures.
Polls opened at 7:00 a.m. and closed at 7:00 p.m. Governors were allowed the discretion to extend voting by two hours (until 9:00 p.m.) if they deemed that a significant number of voters would be disenfranchised by closing the polls on time. No governor chose to exercise this right. Most polling stations opened on time, and those that did not cited minor issues with the new computerized voter identification system and other isolated difficulties that were resolved in short order. Ballots, voter lists, voter sign-in sheets, complaint forms, and other materials were on hand in almost all polling stations observed by NDI’s delegation.

When voters arrived at the polling station, they joined a queue in front of the room containing the election officials and the private voting booth. Election procedures stipulated that only one voter be allowed in the polling station at a time, though in practice several queues spilled into the voting rooms. Upon arrival, the voter would present an identification card, which the chairman of the polling and counting committee would then examine to ensure that:

a) The national identity card had not already been used to vote.
b) The photograph on the card matched the voter. If a female voter was wearing a niqab\(^\text{15}\), a female member of the voting committee was to make sure that the photo matched the voter behind a privacy screen.
c) The electoral district of that particular polling station matched the information on the card.

This last criterion caused confusion at numerous polling centers, and some voters were turned away because they had not updated their identification cards before the election. Many of these voters were among the 165,000 voters who had been moved back into pre-2007 districts during the registration period and who did not get new identification cards. Although some dismissed voters reacted with anger, NDI did not observe any significant disruption to regular voting procedures due to this practice. No measures for provisional voting were in place.

Once the voter identification card had passed the initial screening, it was handed to a computer operator, who would check the electronic voter list to ensure that the voter had not previously voted. Election day witnessed the use of a high-tech, computerized voter identification system. Voters who presented identification

\(^{15}\) Veil that covers the face.
cards were checked against the database of eligible voters, with changes made in each district updated in real time throughout the entire system. Despite isolated reports of system malfunction, the system seemed to work efficiently.

As a further measure to prevent double voting, poll workers clipped two corners of the voter’s national identification card with pinking shears before returning the card to the voter. NDI observers noted several instances of individuals attempting to vote multiple times, some even in the same polling station. Through the use of the computerized system and the marking of voter identification cards, officials caught many of these offenders and either ordered them to leave the polling station or alerted security officers stationed inside or near the polling center. NDI observers noted, however, isolated incidents of multiple voting through the use of fake identification cards and, in one case, a simple change of clothing.

Once cleared to vote, voters received an official blank ballot, stamped on-site by election officials. The use of voting booths with curtains and transparent ballot boxes with serial numbers and seals were in line with international standards and represented a step forward in ensuring voter secrecy.

The unusual “virtual” sub-districting system was addressed inconsistently inside of polling stations. In some stations, the candidate list noted the sub-district in which each candidate was running. In other stations, the candidate list did not include the sub-district. Although Jordanian officials explained that including the sub-district in the candidate list was not necessary for voters, who only cast one vote for the candidate of their choice, the delegation believes that a lack of information about candidates and their direct competitors limits the ability of citizens to vote strategically.

A matter of concern among international observers was the prevalence of “public voting” – the practice of announcing a voter’s choice out loud. This tradition has been popular in Jordan for many years,
and while the 2010 election law introduced stricter penalties for the practice, the procedure is still used for illiterate voting and thereby difficult to fully ban. Many elderly Jordanians have been voting “publicly” for their entire lives, and some Jordanians expected this process to continue. Nevertheless, “public voting” can be used as a verification process by those who have sold their vote, and the tradition has been criticized as a technique used to intimidate voters into supporting a certain candidate.

Accessibility for Illiterate Voters and Voters with Disabilities

Upon entering a polling station, illiterate voters were to notify the chairman, who would announce to all present that the voter was illiterate. If no proof was presented to the contrary, the chairman recorded the voter’s name and national identification number, and took fingerprints.16 The voter would then whisper the name of the preferred candidate to the chairman, who would then fill out a ballot and present it to the voter to place in the ballot box. This practice, known as “secret whispering,” is inconsistent with international standards. While the law requires the chairman to expel any literate voter who claims to be illiterate, NDI observers did not witness any such instance.

While the procedures for illiterate voters were improved over previous elections, it would appear from observer reports that an abnormally high number of voters claimed to be illiterate. Twenty percent of the voters in polling stations visited by NDI observers were included on the “illiterate voters” sign-in list although the national illiteracy rate in Jordan is 9.4 percent. This raises concerns about the secrecy of the vote, potential vote-buying, and other irregularities.

Arrangements were made to accommodate voters with disabilities, including the opening of dedicated polling stations for disabled voters and an allowance for voters with disabilities to bring a personal assistant of his or her choosing to assist during the voting process. Observers commended the inclusion of “tips” for dealing with voters with disabilities in the poll worker procedures manual. Nevertheless, observers noted that a number of polling stations lacked ramps and other accommodations for disabled voters. In some cases the security forces and polling officials were not aware of the priority given to voters with disabilities.

16 NDI observers noted that fingerprinting procedures for illiterate voters were not followed consistently.
Women on Election Day

There were three types of polling centers available to voters: all male, all female, and mixed. In the mixed polling centers, men and women were still segregated by station. Despite these efforts to encourage women voters, female polling stations were staffed predominately by men. The only electoral posts occupied primarily by women were the clerks responsible for data entry in the polling stations on election day. The dearth of female poll workers and uniformed security forces in polling stations presented some challenges to the process of confirming the identity of women voters wearing the niqab. Election observers also noted that the all-male polling committees posed a problem for illiterate women who were uncomfortable with the proximity required to whisper their vote to the polling committee chair.

Domestic observers also noted concern that women voters who are accompanied to the polls by men, who then linger outside of the polling station, might receive additional pressure to vote for certain candidates.

Candidate Representatives

Candidates and their agents actively campaigned in the streets outside of polling centers and candidate representatives were present in most polling stations, although many candidate representatives did not seem to understand their roles. Observers noted some instances of candidate insignia or material inside of polling stations, a contravention of the law that went largely unchecked by election officials.

Domestic and International Observation

These elections were the first in which Jordan accepted and accredited significant numbers of domestic and international observers. NDI fielded a delegation comprised of 61 accredited observers, both long- and short-
term, from 18 countries and territories. These international observers were deployed across Jordan, including districts in all of Jordan’s 12 governorates. The International Republican Institute and the European Union also fielded delegations. These international observers, identified by blue badges issued by the government, observed the opening of the polls, voting, the counting of the votes in polling stations, and the aggregation of results in district tabulation centers.

Jordanian civil society organizations, led by the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) and Al Hayat, deployed more than 3000 citizen observers throughout the country, in both stationary and mobile teams. This represents an important precedent, however, NDI is aware of more than 100 citizen observers who were denied entry into polling and tabulation centers. Likewise, there were instances of officials prohibiting observers from bringing mobile phones into centers—critical for their observation efforts—or denying reentry after observers exited the center to report on the process.

**Accusations of Vote-buying**

Vote-buying is very difficult to investigate or confirm, and neither domestic nor international observers were able to collect material evidence or take systematic testimony from voters who may have been bribed on election day. Nevertheless, observers heard numerous allegations about vote-buying, and at least one report that efforts to buy votes had triggered a violent clash between competing tribes. Domestic observers identified vote-buying, and the absence of governmental action to prevent the practice, as one of the most serious problems witnessed during the elections.

**Election-day Security**

There was sporadic violence throughout the country on election day, including a tribal clash in Karak that left two people dead and at least ten injured. In the sixth district of Amman, riots erupted and one candidate was hospitalized after his home was attacked. Observers in Zaraq noted rowdy crowds outside of many polling centers, with female polling centers particularly vulnerable as they were surrounded by large crowds of men pressuring women voters. Additionally, several district tabulation centers in Balqa, Amman, and northern
governorates were unruly and chaotic. In some districts, security forces in riot gear were required to calm the candidate supporters who had assembled with sticks. For the most part, the reaction of Jordanian security forces to the violent incidents was professional, efficient, and in accordance with procedures.

An additional matter of concern is that observers noted the presence of plain-clothes security personnel inside polling centers and expressed concern about the influence that may have had on voters. According to the election procedures, security officials were only to enter the polling stations if the chairman of that station's election committee asked them to resolve a disturbance. Notwithstanding this directive, many remained in the polling station throughout the voting process.

IMMEDIATE POST-ELECTION PERIOD

Tabulation of Results

At the conclusion of voting, ballots were counted by the chairman of each polling station. Observers reported that, for the most part, the counting procedure was transparent and the chairs showed each ballot to the audience as the vote was counted, in accordance with counting procedures. However, there were several polling stations in which the chairman did not show the ballot to observers in the room. There were also several incidents of unused ballots not being counted. The results from each polling station were posted clearly on a large board and a written copy, signed by candidate representatives, was placed in a sealed envelope. The results were also entered into the computer and virtually transmitted through the Ministry of Interior's internal network to the district tabulation centers. It was impossible, however, for observers to verify where the information was sent and what information was received at the other end of the transmission.

Following the count, the ballots and sealed envelope were transported to district tabulation centers where the votes were aggregated. Domestic and international observers were allowed to observe
and take notes during the vote tabulation process at district centers, an important precedent in Jordan. Although the tabulation process was difficult to follow, NDI observers verified that, in a random sampling of polling stations, the count at polling stations aligned with the count at the tabulation centers. Final results and vote tallies were not publicly posted nor were they distributed to observers or candidate representatives.

Election Results

On November 10, the Minister of Interior announced the names of the winning candidates. First-time parliamentarians accounted for 83 of 120 seats, with eight former government officials and two former senators entering parliamentary ranks. Women secured 13 seats in the parliament, although only one won outside of the quota system. The new class of women parliamentarians includes the first Christian woman and the first woman elected from a Bedouin area, as well as the first woman from Amman to win outside of the quota system. Despite initial fears that the quota system would disadvantage women from urban areas, women representatives from Amman and Zarqa were elected.

Despite the IAF boycott, eighteen members of political parties were elected. This marks the first election in which political parties other than the IAF were successful in electing members to parliament. Nevertheless, most of the party affiliates elected ran as independents, rather than on a party platform, and parliament remains a body comprised mainly of independent tribal loyalists. There is no organized opposition.

In response to pressure from the media and citizen observers, the Ministry of Interior published the vote tallies of all candidates—winners and losers—on its website on November 11. This marks a clear improvement over the announcement of election results from 2007, when only the names of winners were announced.

The release of vote tallies provided the opportunity to analyze the effect of the “virtual” sub-districts. While the majority of winners won their seats outright, 23 winning candidates—including four women who were awarded quota seats—received fewer votes than losing candidates in other sub-districts within their districts. For example, in Amman’s first district, one winning candidate received 2,125 votes, while a losing candidate in the same district received 2,404 votes. Had the virtual sub-districting system not been in place, the latter candidate would have defeated the former and won a district seat.
The publication of candidate results also revealed that although some winners achieved landslide victories, 12 contests were decided by fewer than 100 votes. The law does not outline provisions that would trigger an automatic recount, but there are races that would benefit from such a provision.

Since candidates were able to freely choose the sub-district in which they would compete, the number of landslide victories implies that many candidates may have coordinated with each other in selecting sub-districts, a practice NDI had learned from candidates was taking place. The practice was also true of women who were competing for quota seats; many of them made a strategic decision not to compete against one another so as to avoid splitting the vote. The election results show modest gains for women, with women candidates receiving 6 percent of the total vote, up from 3.4 percent in 2007.

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**Post-Election Violence**

Tension and sporadic violence continued in the immediate post-election period, particularly following the announcement of results.
The premature—and ultimately incorrect—announcement of results in Irbid on election night prompted rioting on November 10 and 11. Tribal supporters of one candidate set fires and destroyed property in Jerash and on the outskirts of Irbid. NDI observers witnessed riots, gunfire, and highway closures. Highways remained closed and a curfew was in effect for two nights in parts of the northern region. Fourteen people were arrested for participation in the riots.

Election-related violence was also reported elsewhere in the country, including the Jordan Valley, Balqa, Mafraq, and Zarqa. Much of the violence seemed to be linked to inter- and intra-tribal competition, reinforcing the imperative of adopting measures to reduce tribal influence on politics in Jordan. Incidents included rioting, rock-throwing, clashes with police, and blocking roads with burning tires to protest election results. Tensions were also high in Amman, where candidate rallies disrupted traffic patterns on November 10. Officials from the Jordanian Public Security Department (PSD) downplayed the violence, declaring that the security situation across the kingdom was “under control.”

**Adjudication of Electoral Disputes and Investigation of Electoral Violations**

Candidates have a constitutional right to challenge the validity of the election results. There were a total of 32 complaints—contesting the election of 21 parliamentarians—put forward for review, but the new parliament declared all of the claims to be invalid.

On election day, candidates and candidate representatives at each polling station could object to the chairman’s decision regarding the validity of ballots and the allocation of votes to each designated candidate. The law stipulates that any objections be referred to the polling and counting committee, which has the authority to decide on all such objections. Decisions by this committee are made by majority vote and cannot be appealed. If the committee reaches a stalemate regarding a decision, preference is given to the chairman’s vote. In practice, very few election day objections were filed, and the extent to which such claims were addressed remains unclear.

In the days leading up to the election, the government announced that it had launched ten investigations into alleged vote-buying incidents. However, the government has not released information on the results of these investigations, nor final figures on the number of vote-buying cases or any information regarding any corresponding prosecution or penalties.
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the spirit of international cooperation, NDI and the international election observation delegation offer a series of recommendations that are outlined below. While the recommendations touch on technical issues regarding Jordan's electoral framework and procedures, the most important recommendations relate to the need for accelerated political reform.

**Political Reforms**

Strong voter turnout and a generally well-administered poll indicate that government officials and voters regarded the 2010 parliamentary elections as an important vehicle for political participation. Nevertheless, questions remain about the significance of elections in a political system that places few limits on the authority of the monarchy. NDI encourages Jordan to undertake political reforms that strengthen the role of elected officials and ensure government accountability to the electorate. The government’s decision to consider constitutional revisions and review the temporary law on elections—as well as laws on associations, political parties, public gatherings, and the press—presents an opportunity for such reform. Revisions should ensure that Jordanian citizens are able to fully exercise their fundamental political rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and universal suffrage, all of which are prerequisites for a meaningful electoral process.

**The Electoral Framework**

**Review the electoral system and districting.** The 2010 elections were governed by a temporary election law—Jordan’s fourth in 25 years—that preserved the most controversial elements of the system, including the use of the single, non-transferrable vote system and disproportionality in electoral districting. NDI and the delegation encourage the Jordanian government to revise the electoral system to encourage political party development and promote fair competition.
Many Jordanians have advocated for the use of a proportional representation (PR) or mixed electoral system. The PR system is recognized internationally as one means of opening the doors of parliament to a diverse group of political actors who appeal to a broad base of constituents. The introduction of a PR or mixed system in Jordan could provide the basis for the development of political parties, as elections would provide an incentive for political actors to build coalitions and aggregate interests. It may also have the benefit of contributing to a more policy-focused national political debate. While NDI does not endorse any particular electoral system, it would encourage the Jordanian government to engage political parties, election experts, relevant civil society groups, and elected officials in developing a more permanent electoral system. A stable electoral framework, developed democratically, would provide the transparency and consistency that political parties, candidates, election officials, and voters need to prepare for elections. Continuity in the electoral framework, over time, could also aid in party development and preserve the principle of fairness among electoral competitors.

Whatever electoral system is chosen, the Jordanian government should revisit the delimitation of districts and allocation of seats to ensure full and equal representation for all Jordanians. The 2010 temporary election law, which introduced four additional seats for urban areas, represented a positive, albeit modest, step in this direction. Further adjustments are needed to ensure equal representation for all Jordanians. The use of 'virtual' sub-districts, a subject of considerable confusion among candidates and voters, should also be reconsidered.

Establish an independent election commission. Independent election management bodies are common in democracies around the world and the establishment of such a body in Jordan would help raise the level of public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the election process. There are many examples of independent election management around the world and NDI does not endorse a particular model. Rather, it urges Jordan to empower an independent body with sufficient judicial, administrative, and financial authority to administer and supervise the election process. Such a body, if it were to uphold international standards of transparency and consult regularly with stakeholders, would provide greater confidence in electoral processes and results.

Provide a mechanism for adjudicating electoral complaints. The electoral framework should provide mechanisms that allow citizens and parties to exercise their fundamental right to seek legal remedies for electoral violations. This process should ensure due process, equality before the law, equal protection of the law, effective remedies, and accountability for those who commit violations. While processes may differ based on the nature of the violation and complaint, the electoral framework should clearly outline the steps for filing and adjudicating complaints. Judicial review should be made available wherever fundamental rights are at stake.

17 Proportional representation (PR) is an electoral system that awards seats based on the proportion of votes lists receive. A mixed electoral system awards some seats on the basis of proportional representation and others on a single-seat district system.
Jordan’s constitution authorizes the newly-elected parliament to adjudicate challenges to election results. This practice, which runs counter to the principles of neutrality and independent adjudication of complaints, should be reconsidered. Final election results should only be certified once election-related complaints and appeals have been fully adjudicated in a due and transparent process.

**Institutionalize election observation.** The formal accreditation of domestic and international monitors in Jordan marks a step forward in the effort to increase transparency of and confidence in the electoral process. Although the precedent for election observation has been established in practice, the right of political parties, candidates, citizens, media representatives, and international organizations to monitor electoral processes should be codified in law.

The electoral framework should provide accredited election observers with full access to election officials and the election process, including: preparation and verification of the voter list; voter registration and candidate registration processes and documentation; polling stations; voting and counting procedures; transportation of the voting materials; and the adjudication process of election-related complaints and appeals. In particular, candidates and accredited observers should receive an official copy of results from every polling and counting station.

Parties and candidates should also provide their representatives with better training.

**Assign voters to specific polling centers.** To provide clarity and continuity for citizens and to prevent fraudulent voting, voters should be assigned to a particular polling center in their place of residence. The preliminary and final voter lists, which the law already requires be made public to provide citizens and candidates an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the data, should also be broken down by polling center. Not only would this contribute to a more efficient process, but it would also facilitate the voter-targeting efforts of candidates and political parties.

**Clarify the candidate registration process and campaign timeline.** The electoral framework should ensure that prospective candidates have sufficient time and opportunity to register as candidates and to challenge decisions made by registration authorities. The candidate registration timeline should be clear and communicated consistently, and the candidate list should be made final before the campaign period begins to ensure fair conditions for certified candidates.

The requirement that public employees resign before declaring candidacy should be reviewed; it may be considered more appropriate to require public employees to take an unpaid leave of absence to run for office and be required to resign if elected.
Strengthen campaign finance regulations. Unclear political spending limits, weak financial disclosure laws, and opaque enforcement of rules raise questions about the role of money in elections. The delegation recommends introducing legislation to regulate campaign finance, including campaign spending, financing of candidates and parties, and disclosure of campaign spending and contributions. The law should also stipulate penalties for violations, including vote-buying, that are adequate, appropriate, and, most importantly, enforced. An independent body, such as an election management body, audit office, or another judicial body, should be empowered to adjudicate violations of campaign finance regulations. An independent audit office can be established to audit financial disclosures, campaign spending, and contributions.

Such regulations should also ensure equitable access among candidates to public property and resources, including state media.

Address shortcomings in voting and counting procedures. The electoral framework should outline clear voting and counting procedures to ensure that election results reflect the people’s will. To that end, NDI recommends that the government of Jordan and election officials:

- Utilize pre-printed ballots that are uniform throughout the voting district.
- Modify procedures for illiterate voters to ensure that the integrity of the voters’ intention is upheld and voter secrecy is preserved. Pre-printed ballots with candidate photos and symbols would be an important step toward this end.
- Expand access to polling centers for voters with disabilities, either by making all polling centers fully accessible or designating particular polling centers for voters with disabilities.
- Introduce provisional voting.
- Count votes at the polling station where the voting has taken place, before the ballot boxes are transported and/or moved in any way.
- Display ballots, as they are counted, to all people accredited to observe counting processes, including election administration staff, election observers, candidates and/or their representatives.
- Post election results where the votes are counted, at polling stations, centers, and district tabulation centers, immediately after the counting and aggregation of election results and publish full results online as soon as possible.
APPENDICES

METHODOLOGY

Citizens and voters ultimately determine the merit of elections, but international observers can play an important role by focusing international and domestic attention on aspects of the process, helping to reinforce the credibility of domestic observer groups and, where appropriate, increase public confidence in the election process.

NDI’s approach to election observation is based on the premise that a complete assessment of an election must take into account all aspects of the electoral process, and that no election can be viewed in isolation from the political context in which it takes place. Among the factors considered are: the legal, administrative, and logistical framework for the election; the security situation before, during, and after the election; citizens’ access to accurate information; the ability of political actors to compete openly; the conduct of the mass media in its electoral coverage; the ability of citizens and political competitors to act free from fear of intimidation, violence, or retribution; the conduct of the voter registration process and integrity of the final voters register; the right to stand for election; the candidate selection process; the conduct of voting, counting, results tabulation, and announcement of results; the complaints adjudication process; and the installation to office of those duly elected. When conducting international observation missions, NDI assembles multi-national teams of observers from diverse disciplines, including political and civic leaders, election and human rights experts, and country or regional specialists, in order to reach a balanced assessment of the process. The Institute briefs its delegates on the political, legal, and historical context of the country before deploying them to observe electoral processes.

Given the need to take a holistic approach to observation, the Institute deployed a pre-election assessment delegation in September whose task was to assess the electoral environment in Jordan prior to the elections. This delegation was followed by a group of long-term observers who remained in-country for six weeks, and later a group of short-term observers who monitored the activities on election day. Throughout its work, NDI coordinated its observation activities with domestic election monitoring groups the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) and the Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development. The NDI delegation also met with international observers from the Washington-based International Republican Institute (IRI) on election day, and coordinated with diplomatic observers from the European Union. In addition, NDI met regularly with representatives of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to obtain up-to-date information on election administration as overseen by the Ministry of the Interior.

18 Over the last 25 years, NDI has organized more than 150 election delegations to assess pre-election, election-day, and post-election processes around the globe and in the Middle East and North Africa region, including in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and Yemen.
Pre-Election Delegation

From September 14-17, 2010, NDI deployed a four-person pre-election assessment delegation to Jordan to observe preparations for the November 9, 2010 parliamentary elections. The four members of the delegation were Frances Fitzgerald, senator from Ireland; Sam Gejdenson, former U.S. congressman; Francesca Binda, NDI’s senior director in Jerusalem and former elections official from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and Leslie Campbell, NDI’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africa. While in Jordan, the delegates met with senior government officials, political party representatives, prospective candidates, citizen election monitors, civil society leaders, and media representatives to demonstrate the interest of the international community in the development of stronger democratic political processes and governance in Jordan, provide a preliminary assessment of the electoral environment, and assess the prospects for a comprehensive international observation for the actual elections. On the basis of their meetings, the delegation issued a public statement on September 19, 2010.19

Long-Term Observers

The legitimacy of an election often hinges on events that take place months before ballots are cast or on events that occur in the backdrop of the election process itself. To observe and analyze the pre-election processes, NDI deployed eight long-term observers from September to November 2010. Observers included civic activists, election specialists, and academics from Canada, Kosovo, Lebanon, Serbia, Slovakia, and the United States.20

Following a two-day briefing and orientation session in Amman, the long-term observers deployed in four teams of two to various areas of the country so as to ensure coverage of each of the kingdom’s 12 governorates:

- Amman team (covered Amman, Central Badia, Al Balqa and Madaba)
- Irbid team (covered Irbid, Ajloun and Jarash)
- Zarqa team (covered Zarqa, Al Mafraq and North Badia) and
- Karak team (covered Karak, Al Tafila, Ma’an, Aqaba and South Badia).

To assess the political environment and preparations for the upcoming election, long-term observers met with relevant political actors in their respective areas of responsibility, including government and electoral officials, community leaders, candidates, domestic election monitors, civic activists, members of the media, and individual voters. They attended rallies, press conferences, candidate debates, and other events conducted by local parties, organizations, and leaders in relation to the parliamentary election. They also observed the

19 The full text of this statement can be found in Appendix F.
20 A list of long-term observers is included in Appendix E.
candidate registration process, political campaigns of all major candidates active in the local area, and other election-related procedures and activities.

Delegate teams produced weekly reports and supplemental incident reports during their deployment, in which they evaluated the political environment and preparations for the election, including the exhibition and challenge period for voter lists, the candidate registration process, and the campaign period. Observation of these processes allowed teams to assess the effectiveness of logistical planning, the extent to which all candidates had access to a level playing field, and the involvement of civic organizations, marginalized groups, and traditional leaders in the electoral process.

**Election-day Observers**

NDI's election-day observers, also known as “short-term observers,” arrived in Amman on November 5, 2010. The delegation was comprised of 61 credentialed observers, both long- and short-term, from 18 countries and territories. Following two days of briefings in the capital on Jordan’s political context and the electoral system, delegates deployed on November 8 in 25 teams of two to electoral districts in all of Jordan’s 12 governorates. Upon arrival in their areas of responsibility, delegates met with regional and local election authorities, civic organizers, and candidates to assess pre-election developments at their respective observation sites. The leadership group remained in Amman, and met with senior government officials and representatives of the international community. On election day, the teams observed the opening and closing of polls and voting and counting processes in over 250 polling stations. Following the election, the delegation members returned to Amman to debrief and issue a preliminary statement of their findings and recommendations on November 10.

**Domestic Observers**

In addition to its international observation efforts, NDI also worked with two domestic monitoring groups: the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) and the Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development (Al Hayat). NCHR and Al Hayat met with high-level government officials to discuss election-related preparations, released reports detailing the voter and candidate registration periods, and deployed observers to monitor election day processes. With the help of NDI elections specialists and technology consultants, the two organizations were able to train and deploy over 90 regional coordinators and more than 3000 pre-election and election-day observers to monitor the elections.
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION
October 27, 2005

Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine democratic elections are internationally recognized human rights. Genuine democratic elections serve to resolve peacefully the competition for political power within a country and thus are central to the maintenance of peace and stability. Where governments are legitimized through genuine democratic elections, the scope for non-democratic challenges to power is reduced.

Genuine democratic elections are a requisite condition for democratic governance, because they are the vehicle through which the people of a country freely express their will, on a basis established by law, as to who shall have the legitimacy to govern in their name and in their interests. Achieving genuine democratic elections is a part of establishing broader processes and institutions of democratic governance. Therefore, while all election processes should reflect universal principles for genuine democratic elections, no election can be separated from the political, cultural and historical context in which it takes place.

Genuine democratic elections cannot be achieved unless a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised on an ongoing basis without discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, including among others disabilities, and without arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions. They, like other human rights and democracy more broadly, cannot be achieved without the protections of the rule of law. These precepts are recognized by human rights and other international instruments and by the documents of numerous intergovernmental organizations. Achieving genuine democratic elections therefore has become a matter of concern for international organizations, just as it is the concern of national institutions, political competitors, citizens and their civic organizations.

International election observation expresses the interest of the international community in the achievement of democratic elections, as part of democratic development, including respect for human rights and the rule of law. International election observation, which focuses on civil and political rights, is part of international human rights monitoring and must be conducted on the basis of the highest standards for impartiality concerning national political competitors and must be free from any bilateral or multilateral considerations that could conflict with impartiality. It assesses election processes in accordance with international principles for genuine democratic elections and domestic law, while recognizing that it is the people of a country who ultimately determine credibility and legitimacy of an election process.
International election observation has the potential to enhance the integrity of election processes, by deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud and by providing recommendations for improving electoral processes. It can promote public confidence, as warranted, promote electoral participation and mitigate the potential for election-related conflict. It also serves to enhance international understanding through the sharing of experiences and information about democratic development.

International election observation has become widely accepted around the world and plays an important role in providing accurate and impartial assessments about the nature of electoral processes. Accurate and impartial international election observation requires credible methodologies and cooperation with national authorities, the national political competitors (political parties, candidates and supporters of positions on referenda), domestic election monitoring organizations and other credible international election observer organizations, among others.

The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers therefore have joined to declare:

1. Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine democratic elections are internationally recognized human rights. Genuine democratic elections are central for maintaining peace and stability, and they provide the mandate for democratic governance.

2. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and other international instruments, everyone has the right and must be provided with the opportunity to participate in the government and public affairs of his or her country, without any discrimination prohibited by international human rights principles and without any unreasonable restrictions. This right can be exercised directly, by participating in referenda, standing for elected office and by other means, or can be exercised through freely chosen representatives.

3. The will of the people of a country is the basis for the authority of government, and that will must be determined through genuine periodic elections, which guarantee the right and opportunity to vote freely and to be elected fairly through universal and equal suffrage by secret balloting or equivalent free voting procedures, the results of which are accurately counted, announced and respected. A significant number of rights and freedoms, processes, laws and institutions are therefore involved in achieving genuine democratic elections.
4. International election observation is: the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. International election observation should, when possible, offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral and related processes, while not interfering in and thus hindering such processes. International election observation missions are: organized efforts of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations to conduct international election observation.

5. International election observation evaluates pre-election, election-day and post-election periods through comprehensive, long-term observation, employing a variety of techniques. As part of these efforts, specialized observation missions may examine limited pre-election or post-election issues and specific processes (such as, delimitation of election districts, voter registration, use of electronic technologies and functioning of electoral complaint mechanisms). Stand-alone, specialized observation missions may also be employed, as long as such missions make clear public statements that their activities and conclusions are limited in scope and that they draw no conclusions about the overall election process based on such limited activities. All observer missions must make concerted efforts to place the election day into its context and not to over-emphasize the importance of election day observations. International election observation examines conditions relating to the right to vote and to be elected, including, among other things, discrimination or other obstacles that hinder participation in electoral processes based on political or other opinion, gender, race, colour, ethnicity, language, religion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, such as physical disabilities. The findings of international election observation missions provide a factual common point of reference for all persons interested in the elections, including the political competitors. This can be particularly valuable in the context of disputed elections, where impartial and accurate findings can help to mitigate the potential for conflicts.

6. International election observation is conducted for the benefit of the people of the country holding the elections and for the benefit of the international community. It is process oriented, not concerned with any particular electoral result, and is concerned with results only to the degree that they are reported honestly and accurately in a transparent and timely manner. No one should be allowed to be a member of an international election observer mission unless that person is free from any political, economic or other conflicts of interest that would interfere with conducting observations accurately.
and impartially and/or drawing conclusions about the character of the election process accurately and impartially. These criteria must be met effectively over extended periods by long-term observers, as well as during the more limited periods of election day observation, each of which periods present specific challenges for independent and impartial analysis. International election observation missions should not accept funding or infrastructural support from the government whose elections are being observed, as it may raise a significant conflict of interest and undermine confidence in the integrity of the mission’s findings. International election observation delegations should be prepared to disclose the sources of their funding upon appropriate and reasonable requests.

7. International election observation missions are expected to issue timely, accurate and impartial statements to the public (including providing copies to electoral authorities and other appropriate national entities), presenting their findings, conclusions and any appropriate recommendations they determine could help improve election related processes. Missions should announce publicly their presence in a country, including the mission’s mandate, composition and duration, make periodic reports as warranted and issue a preliminary post-election statement of findings and a final report upon the conclusion of the election process. International election observation missions may also conduct private meetings with those concerned with organizing genuine democratic elections in a country to discuss the mission’s findings, conclusions and recommendations. International election observation missions may also report to their respective intergovernmental or international nongovernmental organizations.

8. The organizations that endorse this Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers pledge to cooperate with each other in conducting international election observation missions. International election observation can be conducted, for example, by: individual international election observer missions; ad hoc joint international election observation missions; or coordinated international election observation missions. In all circumstances, the endorsing organizations pledge to work together to maximize the contribution of their international election observation missions.

9. International election observation must be conducted with respect for the sovereignty of the country holding elections and with respect for the human rights of the people of the country. International election observation missions must respect the laws of the host country, as well as national authorities, including electoral bodies, and act in a manner that is consistent with respecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
10. International election observation missions must actively seek cooperation with host country electoral authorities and must not obstruct the election process.

11. A decision by any organization to organize an international election observation mission or to explore the possibility of organizing an observation mission does not imply that the organization necessarily deems the election process in the country holding the elections to be credible. An organization should not send an international election observation mission to a country under conditions that make it likely that its presence will be interpreted as giving legitimacy to a clearly undemocratic electoral process, and international election observation missions in any such circumstance should make public statements to ensure that their presence does not imply such legitimacy.

12. In order for an international election observation mission to effectively and credibly conduct its work basic conditions must be met. An international election observation mission therefore should not be organized unless the country holding the election takes the following actions:

   a. Issues an invitation or otherwise indicates its willingness to accept international election observation missions in accordance with each organization’s requirements sufficiently in advance of elections to allow analysis of all of the processes that are important to organizing genuine democratic elections;

   b. Guarantees unimpeded access of the international election observer mission to all stages of the election process and all election technologies, including electronic technologies and the certification processes for electronic voting and other technologies, without requiring election observation missions to enter into confidentiality or other nondisclosure agreements concerning technologies or election processes, and recognizes that international election observation missions may not certify technologies as acceptable;

   c. Guarantees unimpeded access to all persons concerned with election processes, including:

      i. electoral officials at all levels, upon reasonable requests,

      ii. members of legislative bodies and government and security officials whose functions are relevant to organizing genuine democratic elections,

      iii. all of the political parties, organizations and persons that have sought to compete in
the elections (including those that qualified, those that were disqualified and those that withdrew from participating) and those that abstained from participating,

iv. news media personnel, and

v. all organizations and persons that are interested in achieving genuine democratic elections in the country;

d. Guarantees freedom of movement around the country for all members of the international election observer mission;

e. Guarantees the international election observer mission's freedom to issue without interference public statements and reports concerning its findings and recommendations about election related processes and developments;

f. Guarantees that no governmental, security or electoral authority will interfere in the selection of individual observers or other members of the international election observation mission or attempt to limit its numbers;

g. Guarantees full, country-wide accreditation (that is, the issuing of any identification or document required to conduct election observation) for all persons selected to be observers or other participants by the international election observation mission as long as the mission complies with clearly defined, reasonable and non-discriminatory requirements for accreditation;

h. Guarantees that no governmental, security or electoral authority will interfere in the activities of the international election observation mission; and

i. Guarantees that no governmental authority will pressure, threaten action against or take any reprisal against any national or foreign citizen who works for, assists or provides information to the international election observation mission in accordance with international principles for election observation.

As a prerequisite to organizing an international election observation mission, intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations may require that such guarantees are set forth in a
memorandum of understanding or similar document agreed upon by governmental and/or electoral authorities. Election observation is a civilian activity, and its utility is questionable in circumstances that present severe security risks, limit safe deployments of observers or otherwise would negate employing credible election observation methodologies.

13. International election observation missions should seek and may require acceptance of their presence by all major political competitors.

14. Political contestants (parties, candidates and supporters of positions on referenda) have vested interests in the electoral process through their rights to be elected and to participate directly in government. They therefore should be allowed to monitor all processes related to elections and observe procedures, including among other things the functioning of electronic and other electoral technologies inside polling stations, counting centers and other electoral facilities, as well as the transport of ballots and other sensitive materials.

15. International election observation missions should:

   a. establish communications with all political competitors in the election process, including representatives of political parties and candidates who may have information concerning the integrity of the election process;

   b. welcome information provided by them concerning the nature of the process;

   c. independently and impartially evaluate such information; and

   d. should evaluate as an important aspect of international election observation whether the political contestants are, on a nondiscriminatory basis, afforded access to verify the integrity of all elements and stages of the election process. International election observation missions should in their recommendations, which may be issued in writing or otherwise be presented at various stages of the election process, advocate for removing any undue restrictions or interference against activities by the political competitors to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes.

16. Citizens have an internationally recognized right to associate and a right to participate in governmental and public affairs in their country. These rights may be exercised through nongovernmental organizations monitoring all processes related to elections and observing procedures, including among
other things the functioning of electronic and other electoral technologies inside polling stations, counting centers and other electoral facilities, as well as the transport of ballots and other sensitive materials. International election observation missions should evaluate and report on whether domestic nonpartisan election monitoring and observation organizations are able, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to conduct their activities without undue restrictions or interference. International election observation missions should advocate for the right of citizens to conduct domestic nonpartisan election observation without any undue restrictions or interference and should in their recommendations address removing any such undue restrictions or interference.

17. International election observation missions should identify, establish regular communications with and cooperate as appropriate with credible domestic nonpartisan election monitoring organizations. International election observation missions should welcome information provided by such organizations concerning the nature of the election process. Upon independent evaluation of information provided by such organizations, their findings can provide an important complement to the findings of international election observation missions, although international election observation missions must remain independent. International election observation missions therefore should make every reasonable effort to consult with such organizations before issuing any statements.

18. The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that substantial progress has been made in establishing standards, principles and commitments concerning genuine democratic elections and commit themselves to use a statement of such principles in making observations, judgments and conclusions about the character of election processes and pledge to be transparent about the principles and observation methodologies they employ.

19. The intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that there are a variety of credible methodologies for observing election processes and commit to sharing approaches and harmonizing methodologies as appropriate. They also recognize that international election observation missions must be of sufficient size to determine independently and impartially the character of election processes in a country and must be of sufficient duration to determine the character of all of the critical elements of the election process in the pre-election, election-day and post-election periods – unless an observation activity is focused on and therefore only comments on one or a limited number of elements of the election process. They further recognize that it is necessary not to isolate or over-emphasize election day observations, and that such observations must be placed into the context of the overall electoral process.
20. The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that international election observation missions should include persons of sufficiently diverse political and professional skills, standing and proven integrity to observe and judge processes in light of: expertise in electoral processes and established electoral principles; international human rights; comparative election law and administration practices (including use of computer and other election technology); comparative political processes and country specific considerations. The endorsing organizations also recognize the importance of balanced gender diversity in the composition of participants and leadership of international election observation missions, as well as diversity of citizenship in such missions.

21. The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration commit to:

   a. familiarize all participants in their international election observation missions concerning the principles of accuracy of information and political impartiality in making judgments and conclusions;

   b. provide a terms of reference or similar document, explaining the purposes of the mission;

   c. provide information concerning relevant national laws and regulations, the general political environment and other matters, including those that relate to the security and well being of observers;

   d. instruct all participants in the election observation mission concerning the methodologies to be employed; and

   e. require all participants in the election observation mission to read and pledge to abide by the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, which accompanies this Declaration and which may be modified without changing its substance slightly to fit requirements of the organization, or pledge to abide by a pre-existing code of conduct of the organization that is substantially the same as the accompanying Code of Conduct.

22. The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration commit to use every effort to comply with the terms of the Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. Any time that an endorsing organization deems
it necessary to depart from any of terms of the Declaration or the Accompanying Code of Conduct in order to conduct election observation in keeping with the spirit of the Declaration, the organization will explain in its public statements and will be prepared to answer appropriate questions from other endorsing organizations concerning why it was necessary to do so.

23. The endorsing organizations recognize that governments send observer delegations to elections in other countries and that others also observe elections. The endorsing organizations welcome any such observers agreeing on an ad hoc basis to this declaration and abiding by the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.

24. This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers are intended to be technical documents that do not require action by the political bodies of endorsing organizations (such as assemblies, councils or boards of directors), though such actions are welcome. This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers remain open for endorsement by other intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations. Endorsements should be recorded with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS

International election observation is widely accepted around the world. It is conducted by intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations in order to provide an impartial and accurate assessment of the nature of election processes for the benefit of the population of the country where the election is held and for the benefit of the international community. Much therefore depends on ensuring the integrity of international election observation, and all who are part of this international election observation mission, including long-term and short-term observers, members of assessment delegations, specialized observation teams and leaders of the mission, must subscribe to and follow this Code of Conduct.

Respect Sovereignty and International Human Rights
Elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine elections are internationally recognized human rights, and they require the exercise of a number of fundamental rights and freedoms. Election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country, as well as the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.

Respect the Laws of the Country and the Authority of Electoral Bodies
Observers must respect the laws of the host country and the authority of the bodies charged with administering the electoral process. Observers must follow any lawful instruction from the country’s governmental, security and electoral authorities. Observers also must maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral officials and other national authorities. Observers must note if laws, regulations or the actions of state and/or electoral officials unduly burden or obstruct the exercise of election-related rights guaranteed by law, constitution or applicable international instruments.

Respect the Integrity of the International Election Observation Mission
Observers must respect and protect the integrity of the international election observation mission. This includes following this Code of Conduct, any written instructions (such as a terms of reference, directives and guidelines) and any verbal instructions from the observation mission’s leadership. Observers must: attend all of the observation mission’s required briefings, trainings and debriefings; become familiar with the election law, regulations and other relevant laws as directed by the observation mission; and carefully adhere to the methodologies employed by the observation mission. Observers also must report to the leadership of the observation mission any conflicts of interest they may have and any improper behavior they see conducted by other observers that are part of the mission.
Maintain Strict Political Impartiality at All Times
Observers must maintain strict political impartiality at all times, including leisure time in the host country. They must not express or exhibit any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process. Observers also must not conduct any activity that could be reasonably perceived as favoring or providing partisan gain for any political competitor in the host country, such as wearing or displaying any partisan symbols, colors, banners or accepting anything of value from political competitors.

Do Not Obstruct Election Processes
Observers must not obstruct any element of the election process, including pre-election processes, voting, counting and tabulation of results and processes transpiring after election day. Observers may bring irregularities, fraud or significant problems to the attention of election officials on the spot, unless this is prohibited by law, and must do so in a non-obstructive manner. Observers may ask questions of election officials, political party representatives and other observers inside polling stations and may answer questions about their own activities, as long as observers do not obstruct the election process. In answering questions observers should not seek to direct the election process. Observers may ask and answer questions of voters but may not ask them to tell for whom or what party or referendum position they voted.

Provide Appropriate Identification
Observers must display identification provided by the election observation mission, as well as identification required by national authorities, and must present it to electoral officials and other interested national authorities when requested.

Maintain Accuracy of Observations and Professionalism in Drawing Conclusions
Observers must ensure that all of their observations are accurate. Observations must be comprehensive, noting positive as well as negative factors, distinguishing between significant and insignificant factors and identifying patterns that could have an important impact on the integrity of the election process. Observers’ judgments must be based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence. Observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not draw conclusions prematurely. Observers also must keep a well documented record of where they observed, the observations made and other relevant information as required by the election observation mission and must turn in such documentation to the mission.

Refrain from Making Comments to the Public or the Media before the Mission Speaks
Observers must refrain from making any personal comments about their observations or conclusions to the news media or members
of the public before the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission’s leadership. Observers may explain the nature of the observation mission, its activities and other matters deemed appropriate by the observation mission and should refer the media or other interested persons to the those individuals designated by the observation mission.

Cooperate with Other Election Observers
Observers must be aware of other election observation missions, both international and domestic, and cooperate with them as instructed by the leadership of the election observation mission.

Maintain Proper Personal Behavior
Observers must maintain proper personal behavior and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

Violations of This Code of Conduct
In a case of concern about the violation of this Code of Conduct, the election observation mission shall conduct an inquiry into the matter. If a serious violation is found to have occurred, the observer concerned may have their observer accreditation withdrawn or be dismissed from the election observation mission. The authority for such determinations rests solely with the leadership of the election observation mission.

Pledge to Follow This Code of Conduct
Every person who participates in this election observation mission must read and understand this Code of Conduct and must sign a pledge to follow it.
PLEDGE TO ACCOMPANY THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER

I have read and understand the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers that was provided to me by the international election observation mission. I hereby pledge that I will follow the Code of Conduct and that all of my activities as an election observer will be conducted completely in accordance with it. I have no conflicts of interest, political, economic nor other, that will interfere with my ability to be an impartial election observer and to follow the Code of Conduct.

I will maintain strict political impartiality at all times. I will make my judgments based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence, and I will base all of my conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence.

I will not obstruct the election process. I will respect national laws and the authority of election officials and will maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral and other national authorities. I will respect and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of the country. I will maintain proper personal behavior and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

I will protect the integrity of the international election observation mission and will follow the instructions of the observation mission. I will attend all briefings, trainings and debriefings required by the election observation mission and will cooperate in the production of its statements and reports as requested. I will refrain from making personal comments, observations or conclusions to the news media or the public before the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission’s leadership.

Signed ____________________________

Print Name __________________________

Date ________________________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers were developed through a multi-year process involving more than 20 intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations concerned with election observation around the world.

The process began informally in 2001 at the initiative of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) and included an initial meeting at the UN in New York and a meeting in Washington co-hosted by the OAS and NDI.

Building on that foundation, the UNEAD, The Carter Center, and NDI formed a joint secretariat and launched the formal phase of the process in October 2003 at a meeting held at The Carter Center in Atlanta. This was followed by a September 2004 meeting in Brussels, which was hosted by the European Commission. An ongoing consultative process transpired among the participating organizations, which resulted in a consensus document that was offered for organizational endorsements beginning in July 2005.

The secretariat was comprised of Carina Perelli and Sean Dunne for UNEAD, David Carroll, David Pottie and Avery Davis-Roberts for The Carter Center, and Patrick Merloe and Linda Patterson for NDI. The secretariat members prepared the documents, with Mr. Merloe serving as the lead drafter, drawing on a substantial body of existing documentation from organizations involved in election observation. During the process, the secretariat received critical input and comments from many of the participating organizations.

The process was supported by financial assistance from the United Nations, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission, the Republic of Germany and the Starr Foundation, as well as a number of individual contributors.
PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION FOR JORDAN’S NOVEMBER 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Francesca Binda
Senior Director, West Bank & Gaza
National Democratic Institute
Canada

Leslie Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa
National Democratic Institute
Canada

Frances Fitzgerald
Senator
Ireland

Sam Gejdenson
Former Congressman
United States
STATEMENT OF THE PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT DELEGATION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE REGARDING JORDAN’S NOVEMBER 9, 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

September 19, 2010

From September 14-17, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) organized a pre-election assessment mission to observe preparations for the November 9, 2010 parliamentary elections in Jordan. The members of the delegation were Frances Fitzgerald, senator from Ireland; Sam Gejdenson, former U.S. congressman; Francesca Binda, NDI’s senior director in Jerusalem and former elections official from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and Leslie Campbell, NDI’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africa. Following meetings with senior government officials, political party representatives, prospective candidates, citizen election monitors, civil society leaders, and media representatives, the delegation issued this statement on September 19, 2010.

On November 9, 2010, Jordanians will go to the polls for the Kingdom’s third parliamentary election in seven years. In dissolving the parliament in November 2009, King Abdullah cited public dissatisfaction with the performance of the lower chamber and called for a revised electoral law and elections “that are a model of integrity, impartiality, and transparency.”

Subsequent statements by senior government officials reiterated the promise of a fair and open election. Civil society groups saw the official statements as an opportunity to strengthen their role in shaping the electoral process in Jordan and worked to build demand for electoral reform. A coalition of civil society groups formally submitted recommendations to the government that they believed would support healthy competition, produce a more representative and effective legislature, and increase the number of women elected.

Civil society recommendations included: replacing the single, non-transferable vote system (commonly called “one man, one vote”) with a mixed electoral system; reconsidering the districting system to ensure greater equality among districts; establishing an independent national commission to supervise elections; increasing the women’s quota; ensuring the secrecy of the ballot and making provisions for illiterate voters; lowering the voting age to 18; maintaining the process of counting votes inside polling stations and announcing results immediately; publicizing voters lists; and allowing civil society organizations to observe the electoral process.

In May 2010 the government unveiled a new temporary election law. The law did not address all of civil society’s demands, but introduced a number of changes to the electoral system, including:
The division of electoral zones into non-geographic or “virtual” sub-districts equal to the number of seats per zone.

The broadening of election administration beyond the Ministry of Interior, adding an independent judge as the deputy of the Higher Election Committee and a representative from the Ministry of Political Development.

The addition of ten new seats to the parliament, including four seats for urban, primarily Palestinian, areas and six seats for women candidates.

The invocation of tougher penalties on electoral crimes, including vote-buying.

The introduction of a special registration system for illiterate voters.

The enfranchisement of civilians working for military and security agencies.

The lowering of the voting age to 18.

Many of the Jordanians that the NDI delegation spoke with expressed cautious optimism about the prospects for a better election process, noting that voters lists have been produced electronically and publicized, preparations are being made to protect the secrecy of the ballot that include new private voting booths and enhanced security for ballot boxes, and arrangements are being made to accommodate disabled voters.

The government has authorized domestic election observation and it appears that as many as 3,500 non-partisan observers will be allowed to witness election procedures—a vast improvement over the 150 who were accredited only 48 hours ahead of the 2007 election.

Political parties and candidates told the NDI delegation that they welcomed the government’s commitment to make the candidate registration process more transparent and there was praise for election officials for actively consulting with political parties.

While there have been improvements, many Jordanian political activists and analysts emphasized that the most significant recommended electoral changes—redistricting and the possible revision of the voting system—have been postponed. Jordan has allowed electoral districts to become grossly disproportionate—there is a rural electoral district, for example, that has fewer than 7,000 voters while one district in Amman has in excess of 200,000. This underrepresentation of urban, largely Palestinian-origin voters has long been an issue of political contention.

The government responded to the districting question by adding four new urban seats, but it also created new “virtual” sub-districts—a source of great confusion for parties and potential candidates. The sub-districts do not correspond to a particular geographical area within the main district, but voters will be free to cast a vote.
for any one candidate in any one sub-district. At the time of writing, procedures for managing the sub-district process were unclear and it remains to be seen what electoral effect this unique and untested system will have. A great deal of transparency on the part of election officials will be required to ensure that candidates and voters gain faith in the new system.

Jordan’s voting system, which allows only one vote to be cast for one candidate in districts with multiple seats (corresponding to the virtual sub-districts), is seen to favor tribal- and clan-backed independent candidates, as voters are under family pressure to vote for local notables and candidates with strong tribal affiliations, rather than political party-backed contestants or newer entrants to the political scene. Many Jordanians have advocated for a form of proportional representation to enhance political party development and encourage renewal of the political class.

In addition to examining the technical aspects of election preparation, the NDI delegation also discussed with Jordanians the atmosphere surrounding the election and observed concern over potential voter apathy and the impact of an election boycott advocated by the Kingdom’s largest organized political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and a number of allied opposition parties.

Not unlike many countries in the world, Jordanian citizens are experiencing economic hardship and are increasingly skeptical of the ability of elected representatives to have a positive impact on living conditions. Combined with the perception of a flawed election in 2007 and disenchantment with the resulting parliament, there is a distinct lack of enthusiasm for another political exercise that may have little meaning.

If a threatened boycott materializes, IAF supporters, who make up a significant percentage of Jordan’s population, may be deprived of an electoral choice. Voter cynicism and a boycott could seriously undermine the effectiveness of the parliament resulting from the 2010 election, and therefore should be of concern to Jordan’s government.

Prime Minister Samir Rifai has been meeting with IAF representatives to discuss their concerns and the content of such meetings is clearly a political matter to be left to the participants themselves. Many Jordanians, however, expressed to the NDI delegation their trepidation about a boycott and hope that the government encourages the widest range of political options for voters. Averting a boycott would send a powerful, positive signal to voters, and, no matter the outcome of talks, election officials should consider a voter education campaign to encourage participation in the election and to reassure voters that the process will be fair and that their choices will be respected.
There are also widespread concerns about the effect of money in Jordanian political processes. Several potential candidates complained that the cost of running political campaigns kept them out of the race and that unclear political spending limits, weak financial disclosure laws, and opaque enforcement of rules limit public awareness of the role of political contributions.

Questions were also raised about access to public media, with suggestions that all candidates receive equitable access to free or reduced-fee time on television and radio.

The delegation heard some concern about the established practice in Jordan of appealing election results to the parliament. Although the new election law includes provisions for complaints and appeals processes for voter registration and candidate registration, it is silent on the issue of appealing election results.

Finally, the delegation noted confusion about the meaning and utility of international election observation. For some Jordanians, election “observation”—a term that in practice means “watching and reporting,” not “interfering” or “supervising”—is seen as a potential affront to sovereignty. In fact, international election observation is an accepted practice in most democratic nations and is welcomed around the world, including in the United States and Western European nations. Election observation, a highly cooperative and mutual process in most instances, can improve electoral processes and greatly enhance public confidence in the system. In partnership with citizen observers, international observers can objectively note adherence to procedures while respecting the authority of local officials.

A request by the NDI delegation to meet with the officials charged with the operational election preparations at the Ministry of Interior was declined. The delegation did meet with members of the Higher Committee for Elections and other senior government officials. NDI hopes to arrange discussions with operational elections officials at a later date.

In conclusion, NDI’s pre-election delegation to Jordan would like to emphasize the many steps already taken to enhance the 2010 parliamentary election, including the expanded role of domestic election monitors, the publication of voters’ lists, the enhanced role of judges in election committees, the increased women’s quota, special provisions to accommodate disabled voters, and the professional quality of election administration.

The delegation would respectfully suggest that there are further improvements and guarantees that could be put in place before election day to promote greater voter confidence in the process. These include:

- The publication of candidate lists by sub-district during the registration period as well as the publication of the final candidate lists by sub-district.
• Confirmation that election results at all levels of the counting and aggregation process will be made public immediately after the counting and that counting of the votes will happen at the polling station where the voting has taken place before the ballot boxes are transported and/or moved in any way.
• Good faith attempts to maximize the choices available to voters by encouraging the broadest possible participation.
• Introduction of regulations to allow for the appeal of election results by candidates in a systematic, neutral, and timely manner.
• A concerted media campaign to discourage vote buying and financial violations and to encourage voter participation. A voter education campaign should also include information about the sub-districts to help ameliorate confusion.
• Implementation of appropriate measures to ensure against multiple voting, as voters can vote in any polling station.
• An initiative to provide equitable air time at no or reduced cost to all registered candidates.

Background on International Observation and NDI

NDI welcomes the public statements made by senior Jordanian government officials that international groups are welcome to witness the electoral process. These statements reflect the growing consensus that international election observation, along with citizen observation and party poll-watching, has become widely accepted by countries around the world and that it plays an important role in informing citizens and the international community about the nature of each country’s electoral process.

Pre-election assessment visits are an important component of international election observation methodology. In the weeks leading up to the November polls, NDI will send a team of experienced election experts from Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the United States to witness electoral preparations throughout the country. NDI will deploy an additional international group of observers for the November 9 elections and the immediate post-election period. This comprehensive approach to assessing the pre-election, election-day, and post-election periods demonstrates the interest of the international community in the development of democratic political processes and ensures that election day is understood in its proper context.

International election observation, when done in accordance with accepted principles for impartial assessments, has the potential to enhance the integrity of election processes by encouraging best electoral practices and deterring misconduct, as well as by identifying problems and irregularities, which can lead to effective redress. It thus contributes to building public confidence in elections and elected parliaments.
International election observers are welcomed by countries in all stages of democratic development. NDI has organized more than 150 delegations to assess pre-election, election-day and post-election processes around the globe and in the Middle East and North Africa region, including in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and Yemen. NDI conducts its election observation in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which is endorsed by 35 intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Secretariat. (http://www.ndi.org/files/1923_declaration_102705_0.pdf)

The pre-election delegation does not seek to interfere in Jordan's election process, nor does it intend to—or could it—render a final assessment of the election process. NDI recognizes that it will be the people of Jordan who will determine the credibility of elections. The delegation offers this pre-election statement in the spirit of supporting and strengthening democratic institutions in Jordan.
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION FOR JORDAN’S NOVEMBER 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Maram Abdelhamid
Long Term Observer
National Democratic Institute
United States

Ikhlas Nouh Osman Abdelrazig
Professor
Babiker Badri Scientific Association for Women’s Studies
Sudan

Ebru Ağduk
Deputy Country Director, Turkey
National Democratic Institute
Turkey

Abduljalil Yusuf Ali Abdulla
Head of Monitoring Committee
Bahrain Human Rights Society
Bahrain

Cathy Allen
President/CEO
The Connections Group, Inc.
United States

Andrés Pastrana Arango
Former President
Colombia

Roula Attar
Country Director
National Democratic Institute
Jordan

Sherwan Azad
Resident Senior Program Assistant/Coordinator
National Democratic Institute
Iraq

Amadou Ba
Resident Senior Program Assistant
National Democratic Institute
Mauritania

Lee Berthiaume
Managing Editor
Embassy Magazine
Canada

Francesca Binda
Senior Director, West Bank & Gaza
National Democratic Institute
Canada

Amal Boutkhil
Resident Financial and Program Coordinator
National Democratic Institute
Morocco

Leslie Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa
National Democratic Institute
Canada
Elizabeth Clark  
Former Foreign Service Officer  
*United States*

Ghadeer Dajani  
Resident Political Party Coordinator  
National Democratic Institute  
*West Bank/Gaza*

Paul Dewar  
Member of Parliament  
*Canada*

Anna Ekindjian  
Long Term Observer  
National Democratic Institute  
*United States*

Hakima El Haite  
Member, Political Bureau  
Mouvement Populaire  
*Morocco*

Veronika Kapustova  
Long Term Observer  
National Democratic Institute  
*Slovakia*

Mohamed El Kettab  
President, Mauritania Chapter  
Arab Organization for Human Rights  
*Mauritania*

Margaret Anderson Kelliher  
Speaker of the House  
Minnesota House of Representatives  
*United States*

Abbas Fadhil  
Resident IT Technician  
National Democratic Institute  
*Iraq*

Karen Farrell  
Senior Program Officer  
National Endowment for Democracy  
*United States*

Meryl Frank  
U.S. Ambassador  
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women  
*United States*

Sam Gejdenson  
Former Congressman  
*United States*

Kathy Gest  
Director, Public Affairs  
National Democratic Institute  
*United States*

Jay Ghazal  
President  
Ghazal & Associates, LLC  
*United States*
Margaret Goodlander
Legislative Aide
Office of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman
United States

Dina Guirguis
Keston Family Research Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
United States

Shirley Robinson Hall
Former Public Delegate to the United Nations
52nd General Assembly
United States

Jasim Hasan Radhi Hasan
Member
Bahrain Transparency Society
Bahrain

Omar Kader
Chairman
Middle East Policy Council
United States

Karima Kassi
Resident Program Assistant
National Democratic Institute
Algeria

Patricia Keefer
Assistant Director, International Affairs Department
American Federation of Teachers
United States

Luc LaPointe
Long Term Observer
National Democratic Institute
Canada

Monika Le Roy
Deputy Chief of Party
National Democratic Institute
Jordan

Neil Lewis
Former Correspondent
New York Times
United States

Zoran Lucic
Long Term Observer
National Democratic Institute
Serbia

John Maisner
Program Assistant
National Democratic Institute
Washington, DC

Leon Malazogu
Long Term Observer
National Democratic Institute
Kosovo

Leigh Catherine Miles
Senior Program Manager
National Democratic Institute
Washington, DC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stephanie Mlynar</strong></td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peter Novotny</strong></td>
<td>Long Term Observer</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td><strong>Leigh O’Neill</strong></td>
<td>Long Term Observer</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td><strong>Molly Raiser</strong></td>
<td>Former Chief of Protocol</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Khaled Saifi</strong></td>
<td>Civil Society Activist</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jad Sakr</strong></td>
<td>Long Term Observer</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td><strong>Dalal Salama</strong></td>
<td>Former Legislative Council Member</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kate Seelye</strong></td>
<td>Vice President of Programs and Communications</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE NDI ELECTION OBSERVER DELEGATION TO JORDAN’S 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Amman, November 10, 2010

This preliminary statement is offered by the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) international election observer delegation to Jordan’s November 9, 2010, parliamentary elections. The delegation visited Jordan from November 5 to November 10, 2010, and was deployed throughout the country.

The delegation was led by Andrés Pastrana, former president of Colombia; Paul Dewar, member of parliament in Canada; Sam Gejdenson, former member of Congress from the United States; Margaret Anderson Kelliher, speaker of the House of the state of Minnesota in the United States; and Leslie Campbell, NDI’s regional director of programs in the Middle East and North Africa. The delegation was comprised of 61 credentialed observers, both long- and short-term, from 18 countries and territories.

The delegation’s findings were informed by a pre-election assessment mission in September 2010. A team of eight long-term observers has been monitoring the electoral process since October 2010. The National Democratic Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness, and accountability in government. NDI has sponsored democratic development programs in Jordan since 1993 and has maintained an office in the country since 2004.

Prior to the elections, the delegation met with senior government officials, election officials, candidates, citizen election monitors, civil society leaders, and media representatives. On election day, the delegation visited more than 250 polling centers in all 12 governorates.

The purpose of the delegation was to demonstrate the interest of the international community in the development of stronger democratic political processes in Jordan and to provide an impartial assessment of the character of the election process. NDI conducted its activities in accordance with the laws of Jordan and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

Summary of Observations

Jordan’s November 9, 2010, parliamentary elections were held under a new election law and with improved procedures that mark a clear improvement over the conduct of the 2007 elections.
The technical preparations for balloting and the conduct of the voting on election day compared favorably to accepted international practices, although the delegation noted that structural shortcomings – widely unequal districts, lack of an independent election body and limited press freedom – means that Jordan’s political processes need further improvement.

Poll workers were well trained and conducted their duties efficiently and professionally. Polling stations were well organized, the procedures for identifying voters were clear and the counting process was transparent. Technology was used effectively with a computer network that linked polling stations around the country and allowed for immediate verification of voter identification and continuously updated voter turnout figures.

There were sporadic incidents of election-day violence and, regrettably, one reported death. Many observers reported that security forces provided appropriate support to the voting process and that responses to incidents were prompt and effective. Some violence seemed to be linked to competition among candidates and tribes, reinforcing the imperative of adopting measures to reduce tribal influence on politics in Jordan.

The kingdom’s largest organized political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), announced a boycott of the parliamentary elections, potentially depriving a significant group of voters of an electoral choice. Efforts were made by Prime Minister Samir Rifai and other government officials to convince the party to rejoin the election process, but the party, after consultation with its members, declined to participate.

Voter turnout varied across the country. A lower percentage of registered voters cast ballots in urban areas than did in rural areas, where turnout has traditionally been higher, but the overall percentage of voters casting ballots appeared to be close to the average of past elections.

Domestic election observers were officially accredited in Jordan and this election also marked the first time that international observers were welcomed. International observers were given access to every level of election administration and were given full cooperation by poll workers and security forces at polling centers.

Jordan’s new election law doubled the number of parliamentary seats set aside for women to 12. While final results have not been released, Jordan’s new parliament will include the first woman representing a Bedouin district and two women elected from the capital, Amman. At least one woman won a seat outside the quota.

NDI’s observer delegation noted an unusually high number of voters claiming to be illiterate, and many cases of “public voting” – the practice of announcing a voter’s choice out loud. Many observers witnessed insignia, brochures, candidate cards and other voting materials inside polling stations, which is a contravention of the law and which went largely unchallenged by polling officials.
Although the government conducted a publicity campaign to encourage voters to update their voter registration, dozens, perhaps hundreds, of voters whose identification cards did not match the district where they tried to vote were turned away. Other potential violations reported by observers included: voter intimidation by tribal members, attempts to vote with fake identification cards, and instances of voter secrecy being compromised. (Not systemic.)

There were numerous allegations of vote buying, both in the pre-election period and on election day. The government reported a number of arrests and NDI’s observer delegation recommends further measures to address vote buying and the role of money in politics.

Jordan’s government tried to address a long-standing complaint about Jordan’s single non-transferable vote system (often described as “one man, one vote”) with the creation of “virtual” sub-districts. In some polling stations, the candidate lists were broken down by sub-districts while in others only the overall candidate list was displayed. Voters had to make their choice without knowing the full list of competitors in each sub-district. This system should be improved or changed for future elections.

King Abdullah called for elections “that are a model of integrity, impartiality and transparency,” and Jordan has made significant progress in that direction. Still, voter skepticism and apathy remains, in part because elections are organized and conducted by the government itself rather than an arms-length election body. Consideration should be given to the creation of an independent election commission.

The addition of four new seats for heavily populated areas like Zarqa and Amman was a welcome improvement, but large discrepancies in district sizes mean that citizens in urban areas, large numbers of whom are of Palestinian origin, continue to be underrepresented.

Although the conduct of the 2010 election is a significant improvement over 2007, the true test of whether it is a successful exercise will come in the acceptance by the public of the results and in the conduct and effectiveness of the parliament that arises from this event. A parliament that provides meaningful representation, robust government oversight and effective laws will increase citizen confidence.

The increased integrity of the 2010 polls should also encourage more Jordanians, particularly young Jordanians, to participate in the political system. Further improvements to election administration, including some of the recommendations included in this report, could encourage more confidence in Jordan’s political processes, furthering democratic development and enhancing government accountability.
Electoral Context

In response to public dissatisfaction with the parliament elected in 2007, King Abdullah dissolved parliament in November 2009, calling for a revised electoral law and early elections “that are a model of integrity, impartiality, and transparency.” Political observers, analysts, and civic groups, which had long engaged in a public debate on Jordan’s political system, increased their calls for changes to the system. Civil society organizations saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their role in shaping the electoral process in Jordan and worked to build public demand for electoral reform. A coalition of civil society organizations as well as women’s groups formally submitted recommendations to the government, advocating specific changes they believed would support healthy competition and produce a more representative and effective legislature, including increasing women’s representation in parliament to 20 percent.

After much anticipation, the government released the new temporary election law in May 2010. The new law introduced a unique system of districting, in which the country’s main electoral zones are divided into “virtual” sub-districts equal to the number of seats assigned to the zone. Candidates register to run in a sub-district of their choosing and voters cast one ballot for a candidate in any sub-district in their electoral zone. The sub-districts are called “virtual” because they do not correspond to any particular geographic area.

The new law preserved the single, non-transferrable vote system, which has been controversial in Jordan as some argue that the system favors tribal voting over the development of political parties. It also increased the number of seats in the lower house from 110 to 120, adding four seats for heavily populated areas in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa, as well as six new quota seats for women. Furthermore, the law invoked stricter penalties for electoral fraud (including vote-buying), broadened election administration beyond the Ministry of Interior (adding a judge as a deputy to the head for each election committee and an independent judge to arbitrate electoral disputes) and introduced a number of procedural changes to protect the secrecy of the vote and enhance the transparency of the process.

While the new law incorporated several recommendations that were put forward by civic and women’s groups—including increasing the women’s quota, the publication of voter lists, transparent counting procedures at polling stations, and increasing penalties on electoral transgressions—it fell short of public expectations. The number of seats allocated for women doubled to 12, but failed to reach the 20 percent representation as advocated by women’s organizations. A number of civil society organizations and political commentators have expressed concern that the new system does not solve the problem of the disproportionate weighting of districts, which under-represents citizens in urban areas (who are largely of Palestinian origin). Political parties and others have criticized the law because its retention of the single, non-transferrable vote system presents an obstacle to the development of a multi-party political system in Jordan.
In the weeks following the introduction of the new law, the Jordanian government announced that domestic groups would be allowed to observe the election. This marks a major achievement for civic groups, which launched the kingdom’s first limited domestic election observation effort for the 2007 parliamentary elections, when 150 monitors were formally accredited by the government in 2007 to observe the polling.

Building on their experiences in 2007 and with NDI assistance, two domestic monitoring partners, the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) and Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development (Al Hayat) launched election observation efforts for the 2010 elections. NCHR and Al Hayat have built national coalitions, trained and deployed observers to monitor the voter and candidate registration processes, and released statements with specific recommendations on ways the government can improve electoral processes. In several instances, the government has responded positively to these recommendations. Nevertheless, questions remained about the level of access that would be granted to citizen observers on election day and whether all qualified and interested civic organizations will be formally accredited. Early reports on election day suggested that as many as one third of Al Hayat’s accredited observers were denied entry to polling stations.

In a departure from previous statements, government officials in July 2010 signaled a willingness to allow international election observers to monitor the upcoming elections. A comprehensive international election observation mission—assessing the pre-election, election-day, and immediate post-election periods—provides relevant stakeholders such as Jordanian government officials, political parties, and domestic monitoring organizations with feedback and recommendations on all aspects of the electoral process, including areas of recent reform. International observation also sets an important precedent in Jordan, which has previously maintained that international observation is a violation of its sovereignty. The presence of international observers contributes to a growing acceptance of international election observation and electoral standards in the region and buttresses and informs the work of domestic election observers.

**Pre-election Observations**

The pre-election period witnessed important positive developments.

Voter lists were produced electronically and publicized, an important step to restore public confidence in light of the vote transfers that the government acknowledged had plagued the 2007 polls. Following an official challenge period in August 2010, the government moved 165,000 voters to their pre-2007 districts and published the final voter list online.
Officials introduced a series of election-day procedures designed to protect the secrecy of the vote and ensure greater transparency in the polling process. New procedures require polling stations to keep a separate record of illiterate voters. Pollworkers are required to count the ballot papers in each polling station prior to the opening of the polls and count the ballot papers again prior to classifying them during the counting process. Objection forms should be made available in polling stations. Candidate representatives now have the option to record the serial numbers that mark ballot box seals and to sign the official polling station opening and closing forms. The voter identification system has been computerized, linking individual polling stations with the central database list in real time.

The procedures also introduce new measures in the counting and tabulating process. Pollworkers must show the ballot papers to candidate representatives during the vote count and candidates can sign the official results form in each polling station. Redundancy has been built into the tabulation process: results are transmitted electronically from polling stations to district tabulation centers, but are also reentered manually at tabulation centers from the official polling station results that have been signed by candidate representatives.

Arrangements have been made to accommodate disabled voters, including the opening of dedicated polling stations for voters with disabilities and an allowance for voters with disabilities to bring a personal assistant of his or her choosing to assist during the voting process. The poll worker procedures manual includes a section on “tips” for dealing with voters with disabilities.

Election officials published these changes in a polling-and-counting procedures manual, produced a short documentary film on election-day proceedings that has been used to train pollworkers and educate the public, and adopted a code of conduct for polling officials.

In addition to these procedural changes, the government accredited 2,750 nonpartisan domestic election observers—a vast improvement over the 150 who were accredited only 48 hours ahead of the 2007 election—including 100 observers to monitor the polling stations for disabled voters. Throughout the pre-election period, these citizen observers made a number of recommendations on how to improve the voter registration and candidate registration processes, a number of which were addressed by election officials.

In addition, the acceptance and accreditation of international election observers for the first time in Jordan’s history brings an added degree of transparency to the process and helps to build confidence in the elections among Jordanian citizens.

At the same time, the pre-election period highlighted challenges for the election and post-election period.
The 2010 temporary election law, which was enacted by the government without parliamentary approval, should be revisited by the new parliament.

One of the most significant features of the electoral context in Jordan remains the disproportionality among electoral districts. The underrepresentation of urban, largely Palestinian-origin voters, has long been an issue of political contention. Although the new law adds four additional seats for urban areas, further progress in this area is needed to meet international standards.

There also remain widespread concerns about the effect of money in Jordanian political processes. Unclear political spending limits, weak financial disclosure laws, and opaque enforcement of rules limit public awareness of the role of political contributions. Notwithstanding the tougher penalties for vote-buying introduced by the 2010 law and the fact that the government has initiated investigations into a number of alleged cases during the campaign period, more than two-thirds of Jordanians believe that vote-buying is taking place.

**Election-day Observations**

*Conduct of Elections*
While there was active campaigning in the streets outside of polling centers and candidate representatives were present in most polling stations. Observers did note some instances of candidate insignia or material inside of polling stations, a contravention of the law that went largely unchecked by election officials. The government reported 53% turnout, ranging from a high of 80% in at least one rural Bedouin region and as low as 34% in Amman.

*Organization of Polling Centers*
The vast majority of polling stations NDI visited were calm and orderly. Pollworkers were well-trained and followed electoral procedures conscientiously. Measures to ensure the secrecy of the vote were in place and observed by election officials. For the most part, polls opened on time and workers processed voters efficiently.

Election day witnessed the trial of a high-tech, computerized voter identification system. Voters who presented identification cards were checked against the database of eligible voters, with changes made in each district updated in real time throughout the entire system. Despite isolated reports of system malfunction, the system seemed to work efficiently.
Security
For the most part, Jordanian security forces, which were charged with maintaining public order on election day, performed their responsibilities professionally and efficiently and in accordance with procedures. Observers did note, however, the presence of plain clothes security inside polling centers and expressed concern about the influence that may have had on voters. Observers and public reports also indicate that there was sporadic violence in areas of the country, including one death.

Vote Buying
Observers heard numerous allegations about vote-buying before elections and on election day. The delegation notes that the government has announced a number of arrests and would encourage further measures to discourage this practice.

Voter Identification and Voter Rejections
In a number of polling stations visited by NDI, observers witnessed voters being turned away because their voter identification cards did not match the computerized list. Many of these voters were among the 165,000 voters who had been moved back into pre-2007 districts during the pre-election period and who did not get new identification cards.

Role of Domestic Observers and International Election Observers
These elections were the first in which Jordan accepted and accredited significant numbers of domestic and international observers. Jordanian civil society organizations, led by the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) and Al Hayat Center for Political Development (Al Hayat), deployed citizen observers throughout the country, in both stationary and mobile teams. Although, a certain number of domestic observers were not allowed access, the delegation notes that international observers were welcomed, afforded full cooperation, and given every access to every level of election administration.

“Virtual” Sub-districts
The unusual “virtual” sub-districting system, a source of confusion among candidates, was addressed inconsistently inside of polling stations. In some stations, the candidate list noted the sub-district in which each candidate was running. In other stations, the candidate list did not include sub-district. Although Jordanian officials explained that including the sub-district in the candidate list was not necessary for voters, who only cast one vote for the candidate of their choice, the delegation believes that a lack of information about candidates and their direct competitors limits the ability of voters to vote strategically.
Illiterate voting
While the procedures for illiterate voters were improved, it would appear from observer reports that an abnormally high number of voters claimed to be illiterate, raising concern about the secrecy of the vote, potential vote-buying, and other irregularities.

Recommendations
On the basis of these pre-election and election-day observations, NDI’s delegation respectfully suggests that the government of Jordan consider:

- Establishing an independent election management body.
- Continuing efforts to achieve better representation through balancing the distribution of voters per seat.
- Revising the election system to promote political party development.
- Introducing in parliament a permanent election law that incorporates different stakeholders’ views.
- Regulating campaign finance for more transparency and accountability and addressing concerns about vote buying. Regulations on electoral violations should also be reviewed to ensure that existing rules are enforced and that penalties are adequate and appropriate.
- If the “virtual” sub-district system is retained, assigning voters to specific polling stations. Candidate lists, delineated by sub-district, should be clearly posted at every polling center.
- Reforming voting procedures for illiterate voters, including through the use of a printed ballot with candidate photos or symbols.
- Regulating media conduct during the campaign period to ensure equitable air-time and coverage for candidates.
- Introducing regulations to allow for the appeal of election results by candidates in a systematic, neutral and timely manner.
- Encouraging parties and candidates to provide better training for candidate representatives.
- Improving procedures for assisting voters with disabilities.
- Adopting measures that allow voters whose names do not appear on the voter list to cast a provisional vote under alternate procedures with proper identification.

Background on the Delegation and International Observation
International election observation has become widely accepted by countries around the world and it now plays an important role in informing citizens and the international community about the nature of each country’s electoral process. International election observation, when done in accordance with accepted
principles for impartial assessments, seeks to enhance the integrity of election processes by encouraging best electoral practices and deterring misconduct, as well as by identifying problems and irregularities, which can lead to effective redress.

International election observers are welcomed by countries in all stages of democratic development. NDI has organized more than 150 delegations to assess pre-election, election-day and post-election processes around the globe and in the Middle East and North Africa region, including in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and Yemen. NDI conducts its election observation in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which is endorsed by 35 intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Secretariat.

The delegation is grateful for the welcome and cooperation it received from voters, election officials, candidates, domestic election observers, and civic activists. NDI has been officially accredited to conduct an international election observation mission by the Ministry of the Interior and is grateful to the Ministry and to the Ministry of Political Development for welcoming this and other international observation groups. The delegation offers this election statement in the spirit of supporting and strengthening democratic institutions in Jordan.

NDI’s international election observation mission in Jordan is funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development.
2010 ELECTORAL DISTRICT MAP
### Winning Candidates in 2010 Elections (By District/Subdistrict)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Sub-District</th>
<th>Winning Candidate</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th># Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AJLOUN Governorate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 1: Qasabat Ajloun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Ahmad Al-Qdah</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>6681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Sameeh Al-Momani*</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 3 (Christian Seat)</td>
<td>Rida Haddad</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 3 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Salma Al-Rabadi</td>
<td>F</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2: Kufranjeh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Ali Al-Ananzeh</td>
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<td><strong>AMMAN Governorate</strong></td>
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<td>District 1: Basman-Marka-Tarq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Khaleel H. Attiyyeh (Abu Hussein)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Ja'far M. Al-Abdallat</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>5806</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 3</td>
<td>Hasan M. Safi*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 4</td>
<td>Rashed O. Al-Baraiseh (Abu Odeh)</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 5</td>
<td>Salem A. Al-Hidban (Abu Khaldoon)</td>
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<td>Ablah M. Abu Ilbeh</td>
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<td>District 2: Yarmouk-Al Naser-Ras Al Ain Bader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Mohammad A. Al-Thweib*</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Mohammad S. Al-Koz (Abu Raed)*</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 3</td>
<td>Mohammad A. Al-Halayka</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 4</td>
<td>Yahya M. Al-Sou'ood</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 5</td>
<td>Ghazi A. Ilayyan (Abu Sultan)</td>
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<td>District 3: Zahran-Al Madena-Al Abdali</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Mamdooh S. Al-Abadi*</td>
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<td>Reem M. Badran</td>
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<td>Ghazi F. Al-Musharbash</td>
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<td>District 4: Qweisneh-Sahab-Kherbet Al Souk</td>
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<td>Ahmad I. Al-Hmeisat</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Salah Al-Dein A. Sabrah</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 3</td>
<td>Hamad S. Abu-Zeid</td>
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<td>District 5: Sweileh-Jbeiha-T'la Al Ali</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Saleh M. Al-Lozi</td>
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<td>Saleh A. Wreikat Al-Idwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 3 (Circassian/Chechen Seat)</td>
<td>Tamer Beeno</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1390</td>
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### District 6: Wadi Al Sear-Bader Al Jadedeh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Candidate Name and Party</th>
<th>Gender</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fawwaz O. Al-Nahar (Al-Manaseer)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Lutfi M. Hasanen (Al-Derbani)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Muneer Sobar (Abu Anzooz)*</td>
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### District 7: Naour

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anwar Al-Iyadeh (Al-Ajarmeh)</td>
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### AQABA Governorate

**District 1: Qasabat Al Aqaba**

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<th>Candidate Name and Party</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mahmood Yaseen</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ahmad Harara (Abu Ali)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Tamam Al-Riyati</td>
<td>F</td>
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### BALQA Governorate

**District 1: Mahes, Fuheis & Qasabat**

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abdallah Nsoor (Abu Zuheir)*</td>
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<td>1 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Huda Abu-Rumman*</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Mustafa Shneikat</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Khaled Al-Hiyari (Abu Hadeetheh)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Mahmood Al-Kharabsheh*</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Mo'tasem Al-Awamleh</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 (Christian Seat)</td>
<td>Jamal Gammo</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 (Christian Seat)</td>
<td>Dirar Q. Al-Dawood</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4556</td>
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**District 2: Shouneh Al Janoubieh**

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<td>1</td>
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**District 3: Deir Alla**

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**District 4: Ain Al Basha**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Candidate Name and Party</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abdalla Al-Nweirat</td>
<td>M</td>
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### IRBID Governorate

**District 1: Qasabat Irbid**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
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<th>Votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abdel-Kareem A. Abu-Al-Heija (Abu Mua’th)*</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Radaydeh</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Abdel-Naser Bani Hani (Abu Jamal)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>6558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zeid H. M. Shquerat (Abu Mua’th)*</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2863</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hameed Batayneh (Abu Mithfer)</td>
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**District 2: Bani Abed**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Candidate Name and Party</th>
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<th>Votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Husni Al-Shyab (Abu Fandi)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>6167</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Saleh F. Darweesh*</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>3046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (Christian Seat)</td>
<td>Jameel Al-Nimri</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2215</td>
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### District 3: Al Mazar Al Shamally

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bassam A. Abdel-Ghani (Al Omari)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>3407</td>
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### District 4: Liwa Ramtha

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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fawwaz Al-Zoubi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>9782</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ahmad Y. Al-Shikran (Abu Yazan)*</td>
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### District 5: Bani Kenaneh

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ali M. S. Al-Kelani (Ali Al-Badra Al-Malkawi)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>5072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Nareeman Al-Rousan (Um Yasmeen)*</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>3254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yahya Obeidat</td>
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### District 6: Al Koura

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Emad Bani Younes</td>
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### District 7: Ghor Shamally

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mijhem Al-Sqoor Abu Mderes &quot;Abu Hamad&quot;</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>15326</td>
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### District 8: Taybeh

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Akef N. Al-Mikbel (Al-Makableh)</td>
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### District 9: Wasateh

<table>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nayef M. Omari &quot;Abu Mahmood&quot;</td>
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### JERASH Governorate

#### District 1: Qasabat Jerash

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Basel Ayasrah</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Zrekat / Zreqi*</td>
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<td>3393</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mifleh Al-Rahimi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>3946</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ahmad Al-Otoom</td>
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<td>3650</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Wafa' Bani Mustafa*</td>
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### KARAK Governorate

#### District 1: Qasabat Karak

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Talal Al-Ma’ayta</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2228</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Kholood Al-Marahleh (Um Saddam)*</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1462</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abdel-Qader Al-Habashneh</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4067</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Abdalla Zreikat</td>
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#### District 2: Al Qaser

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ayman Al-Majali</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Talal Al-Akasheh</td>
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#### District 3: Al Mazar Al Janoubi

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mahmood Ne’mat/Al Awasa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4289</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Atef Y. S. Al-Tarawneh</td>
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#### District 4: Al Aghouar Al Janoubieh

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mahmood Al-Hwernel</td>
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<td>District 5: Aiy</td>
<td>Subdistrict 1 (Ai)</td>
<td>Shareef Al-Rawashdeh</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>District 6: Faqoua</td>
<td>Subdistrict 1 (Fakoo*)</td>
<td>Raed Bin Tareef</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MA’AN Governorate</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>District 1: Qasabat Ma’an</strong></td>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Khaled Zaher Al-Fanatseh</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Abdalla Al-Bazaigha*</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>District 2: Al Shoubak</strong></td>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Wasfi Al-Rawashdeh</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>District 3: Al Petra</strong></td>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Sami Al-Hasnat</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 1 (Women's Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Asma' A. Al-Rawadieh</td>
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<td><strong>MADABA Governorate</strong></td>
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<td><strong>District 1: Qasabat Madaba</strong></td>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Barjes Al-Ababseh*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Shawabkeh</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 3 (Christian Seat)</td>
<td>Mbarak Twal Al-Izezat</td>
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<td><strong>District 2: Thieban</strong></td>
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<td><strong>MAFRAQ Governorate</strong></td>
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<td><strong>District 1: Qasabat Mafraq</strong></td>
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<td>Abdel-Kareem Al-Daghmi</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Ibrahim Al-Shdefat</td>
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<td>Samia Olimat</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 3</td>
<td>Mifleh Al-Khaza'leh</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 4</td>
<td>Nawwaf Al-Khawaldeh*</td>
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<td><strong>TAFILEH Governorate</strong></td>
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<td><strong>District 1: Qasabat Al Tafileh</strong></td>
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<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
<td>Hazem Al-Oran*</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 3</td>
<td>Nidal Al-Qatameen</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>District 2: Bseira</strong></td>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Shroosh Al-Mse’ddeen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Subdistrict 1 (Women’s Quota Seat)</td>
<td>Amal Al-Rofou’</td>
<td>F</td>
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ZARQA Governorate

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 2</td>
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<td>Subdistrict 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subdistrict 5 (Christian Seat)</td>
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District 2: Bereen

| Subdistrict 1                  | Mousa B. S. Al-Zawahreh | M    | 2865 |
| Subdistrict 2                  | Mohammad Al-Hjouj       | M    | 3461 |
| Subdistrict 3                  | Ali S. F. Al-Khalayleh  | M    | 3217 |

District 3: Al Hashemieh

| Subdistrict 1                  | Khalaf Y. Al-Zyood     | M    | 4924 |

District 4: Al Russaifeh

| Subdistrict 1                  | Mohammad J. Jibreen    | M    | 2955 |
| Subdistrict 2                  | Marzooq Al-Habarneh    | M    | 2675 |
| Subdistrict 2 (Women's Quota Seat) | Rudaynah M. M. Al-Ati | F    | 1789 |

NORTH BADIA Governorate

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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CENTRAL BADIA Governorate

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CENTRAL BADIA Governorate

<table>
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SOUTH BADIA Governorate

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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

* This winning candidate would have lost had the subdistricting system not been in place, since he/she won fewer votes than a losing candidate within the same district (in a different subdistrict).
**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

**Al Hayat** Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development  
**CSPD** Civil Status and Passports Department  
**DRI** Development of Regional Impact  
**IAF** The Islamic Action Front  
**IFES** International Foundation for Electoral Systems  
**IRI** International Republican Institute  
**JD** Jordanian Dinar  
**JPA** Jordanian Press Association  
**MOPD** Ministry of Political Development  
**MOI** Ministry of the Interior  
**MP** Minister of Parliament  
**NCHR** National Center for Human Rights  
**NDI** National Democratic Institute  
**OSCE** Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
**PNA** Palestinian National Authority  
**PR** Proportional Representation  
**PSD** Jordanian Public Security Department  
**SNTV** Single, non-transferable vote  
**UNHRC** United Nations Human Rights Council  
**UNRWA** The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees  
**USD** US Dollars
**NDI STAFF LIST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruba Awad Abdelkarim</td>
<td>Resident Logistics Officer</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Al-Omari</td>
<td>Resident Program Assistant</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour El-Assaad</td>
<td>Resident Translator</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Cassin</td>
<td>Project Assistant</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lana Haddad</td>
<td>Resident Interpreter</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Haddaden</td>
<td>Resident Interpreter/Administrative Assistant</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rama Halaseh</td>
<td>Resident Program Assistant</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Harb</td>
<td>Resident Operations Assistant</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lama Khateeb</td>
<td>Resident Program Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pauline Lewis</td>
<td>Senior Program Assistant</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nasser Mardini</td>
<td>Resident Administrative Assistant</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Ahmed Obaid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nourhan Shelleh</td>
<td>Resident Grants Officer</td>
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<td>Resident Senior Administrative and Financial Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Wilson</td>
<td>Project Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dina Zayadine</td>
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