Final Report on
The Lebanese
Parliamentary
Election

June 7, 2009
The National Democratic Institute's observation mission for the 2009 Lebanese parliamentary election was made possible by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NDI expresses its appreciation to the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities (MOIM) and the many government officials, candidates, political parties, civic leaders, and poll workers who facilitated the work of both the pre-election and international observer delegations during their missions. Similarly, the Institute thanks the citizens of Lebanon for their warm welcome and the many voters with whom delegation members spoke.

NDI extends its gratitude to all 52 members of the international observer delegation who volunteered their time and expertise, and each of whom contributed to the success of the mission. The Institute thanks NDI Chairman, Secretary Madeleine K. Albright and former Prime Minister of Canada Joseph Clark for their leadership of NDI’s observation mission. NDI also extends its gratitude to former U.S. Senator John E. Sununu; Secretary of State for the State of Missouri Robin Carnahan; former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and India Frank G. Wisner; and former Member of Parliament and former leader of the New Democratic Party (Canada) Audrey McLaughlin for their leadership of the observer delegation. The Institute also expresses its appreciation to the two pre-election delegations that visited Lebanon whose work contributed to the efforts of the election observation delegation and this report. Finally, NDI thanks the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon for its cooperation with the international observer delegation.
# Table of Contents

**Executive Summary**  
**Summary of Recommendations**  
**Introduction**  
**Methodology**  
**Political Context**  
**Preparations for the 2009 Election**  
**Findings/Observations**  
**Recommendations**  

**Appendices**

A. **Background on the National Democratic Institute**  
B. **Short-Term Delegation Members**  
C. **Long-Term Observers**  
D. **Preliminary Statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to Lebanon’s 2009 Parliamentary Elections**  
E. **Pre-election Assessment Delegations**  
F. **Statement of the Pre-election Assessment Delegation of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) Regarding Lebanon’s June 7 Parliamentary Elections**  
G. **Lebanon’s 2009 Electoral Districts**  
H. **Number of Voters per Seat**  
I. **Complete List of Winning Candidates per District**  
J. **Election Results by Political Party and Bloc**  
K. **Mapping Lebanon’s Main Political Groups**  
L. **List of Acronyms**  
M. **Ceilings for Electoral Spending per District**  
N. **Declaration of Principles for International Observation**
NDI Final Report on The Lebanese Parliamentary Election

June 7, 2009

Executive Summary

On June 7, 2009, Lebanese citizens voted in an historic election, ushering in a new Parliament, and in turn a Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister. These national polls were held under a new electoral law agreed to in 2008 by all parties. They were also the first in post-war Lebanon to be held on one day.

To demonstrate international support for Lebanon's democratic development and provide an impartial assessment of the electoral process, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) deployed long-term observers, fielded two pre-election delegations during the campaign period, and organized an election day observation mission.

NDI found the election fundamentally peaceful and well-administered but noted that political deals and the unique electoral system based on an allocation of seats along confessional lines meant that the outcome was predetermined in all but a few of the most contested regions. There are also other structural issues not resolved in the 2008 electoral reforms. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of voters on election day and relatively high voter turnout demonstrated that there is significant political competition and that voters regarded the election as an opportunity to shape the country's future.

Following the election, Lebanon's Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities (MOIM) announced that the incumbent March 14 bloc and its allies secured a victory, winning 71 seats, with the opposition bloc winning 57 seats. On June 25, Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal Movement (opposition), was re-elected to a fifth consecutive term as Speaker of Parliament, and on June 27, Saad Hariri, leader of the Future Movement (March 14) and son of assassinated former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, was named Prime Minister.

A central issue of the 2009 parliamentary election has been whether the new Prime Minister would form a national unity cabinet in which the opposition has veto power. After the designation of Hariri, political
parties agreed on a power sharing formula within the cabinet: 15 ministers from March 14, 10 ministers from the opposition and five independent ministers proposed by President Michel Sleiman. This formulation leaves the opposition one seat short of holding veto power, yet one of the five ministers proposed by the President would get the opposition's approval. Though most political forces appeared to accept the national unity formula as early as July 2009, Prime Minister-designate Hariri was not able to form the government until November 9, 2009, 135 days after the election. Political negotiations over the distribution of portfolios seem to have overshadowed the election results as the determinant of cabinet formation.

The long delay in forming a government after the election was disappointing to Lebanese and outside observers alike, but the positive role played by Lebanon's government in the election period and the high level of professionalism shown by the MOIM contributed to a greatly improved electoral process, as did the sustained commitment of civil society organizations to promote and support a peaceful and democratic election.

The Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC), which was formed just six months before the election and fell under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, was found to be a credible and neutral body. SCEC's monitoring of media and campaign finance regulations, while in need of improvement, was a significant step forward. The SCEC, insofar as it can be viewed as a precursor to a fully independent election commission -- as was the case with a similar commission in Mexico in the 1990s -- is an important development in Lebanon.

Observers noted the strong performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) during the election and the positive role that this election may play in boosting public confidence in Lebanese security forces. It was also noted that the presence of domestic election monitors, particularly those associated with the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), lent greater public confidence to the results. NDI observers saw domestic monitors at every polling place they visited.

Within this overall positive context, there remained structural flaws including unequal district sizes and the lack of a pre-printed, standardized, and official ballot, which opened the door to fraud. Indeed, while difficult to prove conclusively, there were widespread reports of vote buying. Weak enforcement of campaign finance and media regulations failed to curb the outsized role of money in this election. Most of the weaknesses in the election resulted from the continued "confessionalization" of the election process and the power exerted by regional, sectarian and familial power brokers.

While there may be increasing numbers of Lebanese who express a desire to "de-confessionalize" Lebanon's political system, such an initiative would require strengthening of the independence and
authority of Lebanon's military. The existence of party militias with arms that are beyond the control of the state has, in the past, made significant moves toward strengthening the Lebanese army difficult.

NDI recommends that measures included in the National Commission for the Electoral Law, known as the Boutros Commission, be considered for future elections. Prior to, and during the June 2009 election, Lebanon witnessed an unprecedented level of civic activism and a high level of cooperation between the MOIM and civil society groups. These groups may represent the emergence of a new generation of young leaders committed to decreasing the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics and they are well placed to lead further election reform initiatives.

While the parliamentary election was a positive step in the development of Lebanon's institutions, every step toward better governance in Lebanon is tentative. If there is to be a long-term, gradual transformation of the confessional system and if substantive reform is to continue past the election period, Lebanon's vulnerable democratic institutions would benefit from the continuation of the remarkable international interest in the country demonstrated throughout 2009. To that end, NDI respectfully offers a series of recommendations for improving Lebanon's electoral processes. It is hoped that the recommendations will be taken into account in the preparations for the next municipal and parliamentary elections. NDI's recommendations are not technical but broad in nature and the rationales for the recommendations are elaborated on in the body of the report that follows.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- Build on the steps taken in the 2009 election to move to a system administered by an independent election commission.

- Implement a system that employs pre-printed, standardized, and official ballots to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot, reduce undue influence on voters, and make vote buying more difficult.

- Build on the initial steps in the 2008 Electoral Law to strengthen campaign finance regulations in order to reduce the role that money plays in the electoral culture in Lebanon.

- Begin the process of moving away from a pure confessional system towards a system that places less power in the hands of sectarian elites and encourages the formation of parties and political blocs around philosophical and policy platforms, in line with the Lebanese Constitution, which calls for a transitional plan to abolish political confessionalism.

- Engage in further review of the country's electoral map and electoral system through extensive consultations with all political parties, electoral experts, and relevant civil society groups. Whatever electoral system is employed, work to insure that the number of voters per seat is roughly equivalent in all districts so that each vote carries equal weight.

- Take steps to enhance women's political participation and representation in all aspects of the political system.

- Allow voters to cast ballots in their place of residence as opposed to their ancestral village (or their husband's ancestral village in the case of married women).

- Move forward with the necessary steps to amend the Constitution to extend the right to vote to citizens who have attained the age of 18.

- Implement the clause in the 2008 Electoral Law that allows for Lebanese citizens residing abroad to vote in their resident countries beginning with the 2013 parliamentary election.

- Develop a system that will allow members of the security forces and police to vote.

- Refine institutional structures to insure that campaign finance regulations and regulations relating to abuse of the media can be enforced in a timely manner.

See page 49 for NDI’s detailed recommendations.
Deliver on the promise in the election law that all polling stations should be fully accessible to voters with disabilities.

Establish consistent rules to make sure that polling stations are adequately staffed, authority over the polling station is clearly established, and the role of security forces and police in the vicinity of the polling stations is clarified.

Continue to build on and improve voter and poll worker education programs used in the 2009 election.

Further institutionalize and support the right of domestic and international monitors to observe the elections in the effort to increase the transparency of and confidence in the process.

Utilize this post-election environment to institutionalize the improvements made in the 2009 election and to advance electoral reform based on lessons learned from this electoral cycle.

To conclude, too often Lebanon has been defined negatively by events and actors outside the country’s borders. Regional actors should give space so that continued electoral reform and democratic development can move forward and Lebanon can freely determine its own future within the framework of autonomous democratic institutions. As the people of Lebanon pursue that goal, NDI stands ready to be of assistance where requested.
I.  INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 2009, the MOIM accredited NDI to observe the June 7, 2009 parliamentary election. In response, NDI organized a 52-member international delegation. The delegation was co-led by John E. Sununu, former U.S. Senator, Robin Carnahan, Secretary of State for the State of Missouri, Frank G. Wisner, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and India, and Audrey McLaughlin, former Member of Parliament and former leader of the New Democratic Party (Canada). The delegation included parliamentarians, political and civic leaders, regional and election experts, media specialists, and human rights activists from 22 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America.2

The goal of international election observation is to support the electoral process by furnishing accurate, impartial information about the character of the process and, where appropriate, by providing recommendations for improvement based on international experience. The Institute is guided in its election observation missions by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and its accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, which have been endorsed by 29 of the world’s leading international election observation organizations. In Lebanon, NDI also abided by a code of ethics prescribed by the MOIM.

NDI, a registered NGO in Lebanon, has worked with political and civil society actors in the country since 1995 and has maintained an office in Beirut since 2001. The Institute is working to support and strengthen Lebanese civil society, electoral reform, and other elements that are needed to create strong democratic institutions and a peaceful and stable society. The Institute’s international election observation mission in Lebanon was funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

II.  METHODOLOGY

Citizens and voters ultimately determine the merit of elections, but international observers can play an important role by focusing international and domestic attention on aspects of the process, helping to reinforce the credibility of domestic observer groups, and, where appropriate, increasing public confidence in the election process. Over the last 20 years, NDI has organized over 150 election observation missions in 50 countries around the world.

NDI’s approach to election observation is based on the premise that a complete assessment of an election must take into account all aspects of the electoral process, and that no election can be viewed in isolation from the political context in which it takes place. Among the factors considered are: the legal, administrative, and logistical framework for the election; the security situation before, during, and after the election;
citizens’ access to accurate information; the ability of political actors to compete openly; the conduct of the mass media in its electoral coverage; the ability of citizens and political competitors to act free from fear of intimidation, violence, or retribution; the conduct of the voter registration process and integrity of the final voters register; the right to stand for election; the candidate selection process; the conduct of voting, counting, results tabulation, and announcement of results; the complaints adjudication process; and the installation to office of those duly elected. When conducting international observation missions, NDI assembles multi-national teams of observers from diverse disciplines, including political and civic leaders, election and human rights experts, and country or regional specialists, in order to reach a balanced assessment of the process. The Institute briefs its delegates on the political, legal, and historical context of the country before deploying them to observe electoral processes.

Given the need to take a holistic approach to observation, in Lebanon, the Institute deployed long-term observers who were in-country for 10 weeks, fielded two short-term delegations to assess the pre-election environment and fielded an international delegation for the actual election period. NDI’s observation activities were coordinated with international election observation missions from the European Union and the Carter Center, and with the Coalition Libanaise pour l’Observation des Elections (CLOE), the Lebanese nonpartisan domestic election monitoring mission led by the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE).

Long-Term Observers

The legitimacy of an election often hinges on events that take place months before ballots are cast, or on events that occur in the backdrop of the election process itself. To observe and analyze the pre-election and post-election processes that shape the overall electoral process, NDI fielded eight long-term observers (LTOs) in Lebanon from March to June 2009. Observers included civic activists, elections specialists, and academics from the Kazakhstan, Peru, Portugal, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen.3

NDI deployed four two-person LTO teams to Lebanon’s five geographic regions to monitor the political environment before, on, and after election day. Deployed to Beirut (based in the capital and also covering Mount Lebanon), the North (based in Chekka), the South (based in Jezzine), and the Bekaa valley (based in Zahlé), LTOs traveled throughout each region to ensure full national coverage. LTO teams covered a mix of highly contested districts and less highly contested ones to establish a baseline for monitoring indicators such as press freedom and intimidation of voters and candidates. LTO teams developed rapport with political actors at the national, regional, and local levels including political party leaders and members, community activists, domestic observers, government officials, election administrators, and members of the international community. Observers attended election-related rallies, press conferences, and other campaign events conducted by political parties, civil society, and local leaders. They

3 A list of long-term observers is included in Appendix C.
produced weekly reports and supplemental incident reports during their deployment.

LTO teams evaluated the political environment and preparations for the election including the exhibition period of the preliminary voters list, the party nomination and candidate registration process, political campaigns, and the post-election environment. Observation of these processes allowed teams to assess the effectiveness of logistical planning, the extent to which all candidates and parties had access to a level playing field, and the involvement of civic organizations, marginalized groups, and traditional leaders in the electoral process.

**Short-Term Delegations**

In addition to the short-term delegation deployed during the actual election period, NDI fielded two pre-election delegations. From March 23 to 26, 2009, NDI fielded a three-member delegation to assess the pre-election environment in advance of Lebanon’s legislative election and to present the Minister of the Interior with NDI’s application for accreditation. The team, which was led by Mona Yacoubian, Special Adviser to the United States Institute of Peace’s Muslim World Initiative, and Paul Adams, Executive Director of EKOS Research, met with Lebanese political and civic leaders, electoral authorities, government officials, political analysts, and representatives of the media and the international community in Lebanon.

NDI fielded a second pre-election delegation from May 5 to 8, 2009 to assess the campaign period and preparations for the election. Co-led by NDI’s Chairman, Madeleine K. Albright and former Prime Minister of Canada Joseph Clark, the delegation met with Lebanon’s top political leaders, including President Michel Sleiman, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, as well as political party leaders, civic organizers, electoral authorities, government officials, youth activists, and representatives of the media and international community in Lebanon.

The actual election delegation arrived in Beirut on June 3, 2009, and attended rigorous briefings on Lebanese politics and the electoral system. On June 6, 2009, delegates were deployed in 22 teams across 20 of Lebanon’s 26 districts. Upon their deployment, delegates met with regional and local election authorities, party leaders, and candidates to assess pre-election developments at their respective observation sites. On election day, the teams observed the opening and closing of polls and voting and counting processes in over 300 polling centers. Following the election, the delegation members returned to Beirut to debrief and issue a preliminary statement.

---

4 A list of delegates from the two pre-election delegations is included in Appendix E.
5 The statement of the May pre-election delegation is included in Appendix F.
III. POLITICAL CONTEXT

Lebanon, which has one of the most complex political landscapes in the world, has held periodic elections since it won independence in 1943. Upon Lebanon's independence, political leaders agreed on the "National Pact", an unwritten agreement that balanced representation among Lebanon's diverse religious groups, confirming Lebanon's confessional system, which had been in place since 1860. This system guarantees representation in the Parliament for the nation's religious "confessions" and reserves certain political posts for specific groups. Under the confessional system, the country's President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Parliament's Speaker a Shi'a Muslim. The country’s unique history and political system have resulted in a political landscape characterized by shifting alliances in which former deadly foes become allies each in defense of either their sectarian group or personal interests. This volatile political scene has also consistently been exacerbated by the fact that Lebanon has traditionally been a theater in which regional competitions have been pursued.

Civil War: 1975-1990

Until 1975, Lebanon's confessional system appeared to ensure a measure of stability. Though all sects had a role in the government, the Maronite Christians were the power brokers. The weaknesses of this system became evident as demographics in Lebanon shifted and the Muslim population, which felt underrepresented, pushed for a greater voice in the workings of the state. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the influx of Palestinian refugees, who used Lebanon as a battleground against Israel, served as a catalyst, stirring pre-existing tensions within Lebanon. Civil war officially broke out in Lebanon on April 13, 1975, when fighting erupted between Christian factions and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), along with its Lebanese Muslim and leftist allies, most notably the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party, led by Kamal Joumblatt.

Lebanon's civil war also had important regional dimensions. In 1976, the Syrian government led by President Hafez Al-Assad intervened, ostensibly to "restore peace", beginning an occupation that would last for nearly 30 years. Israel too intervened during the war, first in 1978, when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded South Lebanon and created a "security zone", which it maintained until 2000, and again in 1982, when Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in an attempt to force the PLO out of the country. In the early 1980s, after Israel had established its occupation of South Lebanon, Hezbollah, the militant Shi'a group formed after Israel's 1978 invasion, began to garner increasing support, including outside the Shi'a community, as the resistance force against Israel.

After 15 years of bloodshed, political players from all factions came together to sign the Taef Accord.
on October 22, 1989. The Accord amended the division of power between Christians and Muslims to
annul the 6-to-5 ratio of seats in favor of Christians and instead introduced a principle of parity between
the two groups. Fighting continued for another year, until Syrian forces were able to overrun the posi-
tion of General Michel Aoun, head of the caretaking Cabinet, who rejected the Taef Accord and Syria's
presence in the country and had launched a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese
allies. The toll of the 15 year civil war was heavy; over 100,000 Lebanese were killed and an estimated
900,000 people, roughly 25% of the population, displaced from their homes.

**Syrian Domination (1990-2005)**

While Lebanon's feuding factions made peace at Taef, Lebanon remained under Syrian domination, and
all major decisions were dictated by the Syrian regime. Syria's presence in Lebanon enabled it to safe-
guard its national interest, ostensibly at the request of the Lebanese government to help maintain stabili-
ty. The United States and its allies in the 1990-1991 Gulf War acquiesced to Syria's military and securi-
ty presence in Lebanon and Syria cooperated in the war against Saddam Hussein and contributed sol-
diers to the coalition forces.

Nevertheless, Lebanon's Parliament reconvened in 1991 and the first post-war election was held the
following year. Rafiq Hariri, a billionaire who proposed an ambitious reconstruction project to rebuild
downtown Beirut, was appointed Prime Minister. Most of the wartime militias disbanded in the 1990s,
with the notable exception of Hezbollah, an ally of Syria that was still leading the national resistance
against the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Even during Syria's domination, Lebanon held regu-
lar parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2000, though the electoral law was formulated to keep Syria's
allies in power. Lebanese Presidents during this period were also generally seen as staunch allies to the
Syrian regime.

After 22 years of occupation, the Israeli Army withdrew from South Lebanon in May 2000. Though
Hezbollah claimed that it maintained its arms to resist Israeli occupation, it did not disband after Israel's
withdrawal justifying its position based on claims that it considered the Israeli occupied land between
Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, known as the Shebaa Farms to be Lebanese, and therefore maintained its
arms to liberate this territory, to free Lebanese prisoners detained in Israeli prisons, and to defend
Lebanon against future Israeli threats. The year 2000 was also marked by the death of Syrian President
Hafez Al-Assad and the succession of his son Bashar Al-Assad.

These new regional dynamics had repercussions on the Lebanese political scene. On the one hand the
Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) gradually moved to the anti-Syrian opposition ranks, joining the

---

6 The Shebaa Farms territory is internationally recognized as Israeli occupied Syrian territory; however Lebanon and Syria consider it to be Lebanese.
leading Christian parties: Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Lebanese Forces (LF), Kataeb, and various independent Christian members of the "Qornet Shehwan" gathering, which was sponsored by Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. On the other hand, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, fully supported Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who was trying to curb Saudi-supported Prime Minister Hariri's growing power and influence and reinforce the Syrian intelligence's control over Lebanon's political life.

That same year, a parliamentary election took place according to a new electoral law, which was tailored by the Syrians to clearly gerrymander districts to favor Syria's allies. Hariri and his allies won the election in Beirut and southern Mount Lebanon and Hariri was re-appointed as Prime Minister. The period between 2000 and 2004 was marked by a growing tension between President Lahoud and Prime Minister Hariri. In 2004, the presidential term of Lahoud was extended by a constitutional amendment that was opposed by 29 anti-Syrian Parliamentarians. Hariri's bloc voted for the amendment, but in October 2004, after the assassination attempt of PSP MP Marwan Hamadé (a close Hariri ally), Prime Minister Hariri resigned from his post and started edging closer to the anti-Syrian coalition.

On February 14, 2005, Hariri and 22 others were killed by a car bomb as his motorcade drove along Beirut's seaside road. The assassination of Hariri led to a series of demonstrations in downtown Beirut against Syria's presence and political and intelligence network in Lebanon organized by the opposition Christian parties, PSP, and Hariri's Future Movement. As demands for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon grew stronger, pro-Syrian parties, including Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Lebanese Communist Party, organized on March 8, 2005 a massive demonstration just blocks away from the anti-Syrian protests. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese gathered to thank Syria for the role it played in Lebanon and to reject Western "interference" in the country. The anti-Syrian camp responded by staging its largest demonstration on March 14, 2005, which attracted over one million demonstrators in downtown Beirut. Following the protests and under international pressure, Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon by April 2005.

**The 2005 Parliamentary Elections**

In the wake of the assassination of Hariri and the so-called Cedar Revolution that followed, Lebanon prepared to hold its first parliamentary elections free of Syrian influence. The elections were held over four consecutive weekends between May 29, 2005 and June 20, 2005. A coalition named for the date of a major anti-Syrian demonstration -March 14 -won the 2005 elections, and the group known as the March 8 coalition, named after the date of a popular pro-Syrian rally, plus Michel Aoun's Free FPM, became the parliamentary minority. The March 14 coalition won 69 seats, the opposition won 57 seats, and independents won 2 seats. Christian leaders who had been forced out of Lebanese politics

---

7 This number includes MP Basil Fuleihan, who was injured in the February 14, 2005 blast but died on April 18, 2005.
during the Syrian occupation returned to positions of power. On May 7, 2005, General Michel Aoun returned to Lebanon from exile in Paris, and on June 26, 2005 Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea was released from prison where he was serving a sentence, imposed during the period of Syrian domination, for assassination of public figures.

2005- The May 2008 Doha Accords Setting in Motion the 2009 Election

Following the 2005 elections, Lebanon experienced a string of political assassinations. From June 2005 through January 2008 eight public figures, who were predominant supporters of the March 14 movement, including four March 14 MPs, were assassinated. The victims were prominent March 14 journalist Samir Kassir, former Communist leader George Hawi, MP Gebran Tueni, MP Pierre Amine Gemayel, MP Walid Eido, MP Antoine Ghanem, Brigadier General Francois Hajj, and Captain Wissam Eid. Additionally, there were several failed assassination attempts. Concern spread among some Lebanese during this period that if the assassinations continued, March 14 would lose its majority in Parliament.

Regional tensions erupted again in mid-July 2006 when Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers and killed eight in a border skirmish aimed at pressuring Israel to release all Lebanese prisoners in Israeli prisons. Israel responded by launching a full-scale war intending to eliminate Hezbollah’s arsenal. After 34-days of conflict, Israel and Hezbollah accepted a UN brokered ceasefire, UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which put an end to hostilities on August 14, 2006. Lebanese officials stated that approximately 1,100 Lebanese died in the war, the vast majority of which were civilians. Israeli authorities put their death toll at 159, 120 soldiers and 39 civilians. While Israel damaged much of Hezbollah's stronghold, and destroyed infrastructure of the Lebanese state, it retreated without achieving its stated aim of eradicating Hezbollah's military capacity. Therefore, Hezbollah was hailed by many in Lebanon and in the Arab world as the victor. Many Lebanese, however, view the massive destruction and loss of life inflicted by the Israelis as a direct result of Hezbollah’s precipitous, unilateral decision to take action without consulting with the government which drew Lebanon into a war.

Following the July 2006 war, the governing March 14 coalition and the opposition coalition clashed on two primary issues: the right of Hezbollah to maintain weapons and the formation of an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. On November 11, 2006, the five Shi’a Ministers representing Hezbollah and the Amal movement resigned from the Council of Ministers. The opposition launched an open-ended sit-in around the government offices in Beirut and called for the formation of a "national unity cabinet" in which it would hold veto power. Speaker of Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri subsequently closed the doors of the Parliament, arguing that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s cabinet had lost its legitimacy and was no longer constitutional due to the absence of Shi’a representation.
Despite several international attempts to bring leaders back to the dialogue table, the rival coalitions failed to reconcile and resume the political process. November 2007 marked a new development in the crisis when the mandate of the President came to an end and no successor was elected, because the President of the Republic is elected by Parliament under the Lebanese Constitution, and the Parliament was paralyzed. The presidential vacuum served to further exacerbate the ongoing crisis.

The standoff escalated in May 2008 when the government was perceived by Hezbollah to have challenged the group’s influence over security of the airport and its surrounding areas and called for the dismantling of its private telecommunications network in Lebanon. Street fighting erupted in Beirut and other regions throughout the country with Hezbollah and its allies establishing dominance in Beirut.

The escalating crisis prompted the Arab League to invite Lebanese leaders to Doha, Qatar. On May 21, 2008 all sides signed the Doha Accord and agreed to end all acts of violence, elect Army Commander General Michel Sleiman as President of the Republic, form a national unity cabinet (in which the opposition holds veto power - the so-called "blocking third"), and organize a parliamentary election in the spring of 2009 based on the districts of the 1960 electoral law. Parliament elected President Sleiman on May 25, 2008 who subsequently asked Prime Minister Siniora to form the new government.

IV. PREPARATIONS FOR THE 2009 ELECTION

Electoral Framework

The conduct of Lebanon’s polls is governed by the Constitution, Election Law No. 25/2008 passed on September 29, 2008 ("The 2008 Electoral Law"), and decrees and decisions issued by the Ministry of the Interior Municipalities (MOIM). The MOIM is the primary body responsible for administering elections in Lebanon, however other state institutions share various responsibilities of the electoral process, including the newly created Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) under the jurisdiction of the MOIM, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Education, governors, qaimaqams (district coordinators), and mukhtars8 (mayors) at different levels of government.

Lebanon’s unicameral Parliament consists of 128 Deputies who are elected directly by Lebanese citizens. As stipulated by Lebanon’s Constitution, Christians and Muslims have an equal share of all parliamentary seats. The seats are further sub-divided into eleven confessional branches (four within Islam and seven within Christianity). See the following page for a breakdown of the allocation of parliamentary seats by confession.

---
8 In Lebanon, a mukhtar is a public servant, elected every 6 years at the village level, in charge of personal status issues.
### Confessional Distribution of Parliamentary Seats among the 26 Electoral Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shia</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Alawite</th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Greek Orthodox</th>
<th>Greek Catholic</th>
<th>Armenian Orthodox</th>
<th>Armenian Catholic</th>
<th>Evangelical</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minieh-Dinneh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becharre</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zghorta</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jbeil (Byblos)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesswan</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida (Sidon)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahrayn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour (Tyre)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjayoun-Hasbaya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck-Hermel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Bekaa-Rachaya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut III</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seats by Confession</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parliamentary elections are conducted through a plurality-majority system that uses the bloc vote. This system is based on the principle that whichever candidate, or group of candidates, wins the plurality of votes (i.e. more votes than any other candidate or list), wins the seat(s) they were contesting. Within multi-member electoral districts, voters are able to vote for as many candidates as seats available. Candidates may only contest seats designated for their confession, though voters can vote for all available seats within the district regardless of the voter's own confessional group.
Electoral Reform

In August 2005, following the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Council of Ministers invited civil society and legal experts to form the National Commission for the Electoral Law, better known as the Boutros Commission, to draft an improved electoral law. The Boutros Commission produced a draft law in May 2006, which included several recommendations for reform. Chief among the Commission's recommendations were introducing:

- Official pre-printed ballots
- Partial proportional representation
- Holding the election on one day
- A 30% women's quota
- An independent electoral commission
- Lowering the voting age from 21 to 18
- Campaign finance and media regulations
- Out of country voting
- Access for people with special needs

The following month, the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER), an umbrella organization comprised of Lebanese non-governmental organizations and members of civil society, began to advocate for key reforms of the Boutros Draft Law.

In May 2008, when the political crisis brought Lebanese leaders to Doha with the agenda of ending the violence, electing a new President, forming a national unity government, and organizing a parliamentary election, civil society groups that had gathered under CCER launched a massive lobbying campaign to include key administrative reforms to the 1960 Electoral Law. Post-Doha, newly elected President Sleiman named one of the Boutros Commission members, Ziyad Baroud, as Minister of the Interior. Minister Baroud was previously a leading civil society activist and his appointment was viewed with favor by electoral reform advocates, creating a significant opening for electoral reform. For the first time in Lebanon, civil society experts were invited to attend the meetings of the Parliament's Justice and Administration Committee, the body in charge of drafting the electoral law.

On September 29, 2008, the Parliament adopted a new electoral law after it was thoroughly studied in the Justice and Administration Committee during 35 meetings. While the law that ultimately passed included some of the reforms recommended by the Boutros Commission-- campaign finance and media regulations and a single-day election-- MPs defending elements of the status quo from both the governing and opposition coalitions prevented the adoption of other amendments. Proportional representation, a
quota for women, lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, and the adoption of a pre-printed, standardized, and official ballot failed to make it into law. Another significant change in the electoral law was the return to districting based on the 1960 law, creating smaller districts that had the effect of increasing the ability of Christian communities to elect their own leaders. Under the 2000 electoral law, which also governed the 2005 parliamentary elections, Christian communities were grouped into larger Muslim districts. The redistricting, however, had the effect of creating districts of very different sizes, which resulted in significant disparities in the number of votes required to be elected in different constituencies.

2008 Electoral Law

Newly introduced reforms included in the 2008 Electoral Law are outlined below:

- Lebanon is divided between 26 electoral districts, an increase from 14 electoral districts mandated by the 2000 Electoral Law.
- Elections are held on one day in all districts. All post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon were held over multiple consecutive weekends due to security concerns.
- The Supervisory Commission for Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) is created and charged with supervising compliance with campaign finance, media, and advertising regulations.
- National identification cards and Lebanese passports replace the voter card used in past elections to identify voters on election day.
- A campaign silence period is introduced starting midnight the day before the election.
- Domestic and international election observers are invited to observe election day as well as the pre- and post-election periods.
- The MOIM is required to publish the voter register on the Internet.
- Polling stations are required to be accessible for people with disabilities.

Timeline

In accordance with Article 42 of Lebanon's Constitution, parliamentary elections must be held within a sixty day period preceding the expiration of the Parliament's mandate. Traditionally, elections have been held every four years in the spring on a Sunday. Consistent with the Constitution, on January 5, 2009 the Ministry of the Interior announced that the parliamentary election would be held on June 7, 2009. On the following page is a chart representing key electoral dates.

---

9 The voting age in Lebanon is determined by the Constitution rather than the electoral law. When Electoral Law No. 25/2008 was adopted, the Constitution determined that the voting age was 21, even though Lebanese citizens are granted most political and civil rights at the age of 18. Since the adoption of the electoral law, steps were taken to amend Lebanon's Constitution to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. On March 19, 2009, Parliament voted unanimously to adopt a constitutional amendment to lower the voting age and the Cabinet of Ministers approved the amendment on May 13, 2009. In order to amend the Constitution, Parliament must vote a second time on the final text of the amendment approved by the Cabinet, and finally, the President and Prime Minister must co-sign a promulgation of the amendment. Because Parliament did not approve the amendment a second time before June 7, the amendment was not promulgated and citizens under 21 were not eligible voters in the 2009 parliamentary elections.

10 See Appendix H for a chart listing the number of voters per seat for each district.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 5</td>
<td>Call for election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10</td>
<td>Publication of preliminary voter register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenges period begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 20</td>
<td>Deadline for media outlets application for political broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2</td>
<td>Registration of candidates begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10</td>
<td>Deadline for submission of challenges to preliminary voter register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30</td>
<td>Publication of final voter register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 7</td>
<td>Final date for registration of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>Publication of preliminary list of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22</td>
<td>Deadline for candidates withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23</td>
<td>Publication of final list of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8</td>
<td>Last day for responding to election observation requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>Last day for publishing list of polling stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28</td>
<td>Prohibition of opinion polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6</td>
<td>Campaign period ends (24 hours before election day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7</td>
<td>ELECTION DAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>Deadline for complaints before the Constitutional Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities (MOIM)

The principle administrative responsibility for elections lies with the MOIM. The Directorate General of Political Affairs and Refugees in the MOIM prepares the voters lists, produces national ID cards, trains poll workers, produces and distributes election materials, organizes polling stations, and coordinates security apparatuses on election day. Given the legal changes authorizing domestic and international observation, for the 2009 election, the MOIM also opened an Observation Coordination Unit (OCU), which served as a liaison between observers and the MOIM. The OCU produced observer accreditation and information on the electoral process, and fielded observer inquiries. The MOIM also maintained an elections website -- in Arabic, English, and French -- where citizens, candidates, and observers could access information about various aspects of the electoral process.

The MOIM received financial support and technical assistance from the international community for the 2009 electoral process. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU), and the German government, together, pledged approximately $17 million for the following areas: technical support for the Ministry; developing and conducting a poll worker training of trainers (TOT), printing training material; setting up the OCU; launching the Ministry's election website; opening ID centers to facilitate the issuance of
additional national ID cards ahead of the election; printing the voters list; launching a voter education campaign; and procuring international standard electoral equipment, including digital fingerprint scanners and printers to produce national ID cards.

The Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC)

One of the innovations of the 2008 Electoral Law was the creation of SCEC, a semi-independent regulatory body that falls under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, as well as the development of media and campaign finance regulations to be implemented by SCEC. The Minister is empowered to supervise the work of the Commission and chair all SCEC meetings, but cannot vote. The composition of the ten-member Commission is as follows: one presiding judge of the Court of Cassation (as President), one presiding judge from the State Council (as Vice-President), one presiding judge from the National Audit Office, one former President of the Beirut Bar Association, one former President of the Tripoli Bar Association, two media and advertising experts, and three senior experts in election-related disciplines (including elections management, funding, and promotion). All members of the Commission must be approved by a vote by the Cabinet of Ministers.

According to Chapter 3 (Article 19) of the 2008 Electoral Law, SCEC is charged with the following tasks and prerogatives:

1) Supervise private printed and audiovisual media that wish to participate in paid electoral advertising pursuant to the provisions of Electoral Law No. 25/2008;
2) Supervise the compliance of lists, candidates, and mass media with the rules and regulations governing the electoral competition pursuant to the provisions of this law;
3) Supervise electoral spending pursuant to the provisions of Electoral Law No. 25/2008;
4) Receive and audit the financial statements of the electoral campaigns of lists and candidates within one month of election day;
5) Draft a report on the Commission’s activities and forward it to the Minister of the Interior who shall submit it to the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament. The report shall be published in the official gazette.11

Campaign Finance Regulations

Chapter 5 (Article 55) of the 2008 Electoral Law requires, for the first time, that candidates open an "Electoral Campaign Account" with an operating bank in Lebanon. The account is not protected by banking secrecy laws and all electoral contributions and expenses must be made exclusively through this account.

---

11 SCEC expects to issue its final report in early December 2009.
account. The law establishes a fixed flat spending ceiling of 150 million LBP ($100,000) plus a varying amount depending on the number of voters within the electoral district. Candidates are strictly prohibited from accepting or receiving—either directly or indirectly—contribution or aid from foreign states or from a non-Lebanese natural or legal person. SCEC has access to campaign account records at any time during the campaign period, and candidates are required by law, after the election, to submit an exhaustive statement of the account, listing in detail contributions received and nature of expenses, along with other documentation.

While the introduction of campaign finance regulations marked a significant improvement from past practices, the system put in place from Chapter 5 of Electoral Law No. 25/2008 was weak in several ways. First, the law failed to introduce a standard campaigning period for all candidates because individuals who registered for candidacy before the April 7, 2009 deadline were subject to regulations beginning when they registered, whereas those who actively campaigned, but waited until April 7, 2009 to register, circumvented any oversight until the deadline. Secondly, only the candidate’s "Electoral Campaign Account" is subject to scrutiny from SCEC, while the account of a candidate’s spouse or family member, for example, is protected by Lebanon’s strict banking secrecy laws.

**Media Regulations**

Chapter 6 of the 2008 Electoral Law introduces regulations on media coverage during the election campaign. The regulations apply to media outlets and candidates beginning 60 days prior to election day. The law stipulates that broadcast media outlets must request approval from SCEC to carry electoral advertising 10 days ahead of the campaign period (70 days before election day), and they must establish and comply with a set advertising rate for all candidates. In this case, the deadline for media outlets to apply for political broadcasting was February 20, 2009. The law requires media outlets to present to SCEC a weekly report in which it accounts for all electoral advertisements and promotions that it broadcasted in the previous week, along with the time and rates received. No free electoral advertising is permitted during the campaign period. According to Article 67, all broadcast media outlets must remain impartial, and they may not carry out any activity that could be considered in favor of any candidate or list at the expense of another candidate or list. Additionally, every outlet is required to reserve at least three hours for voter education programming each week.

---

12 See Appendix N for chart of campaign ceilings per district.
SCEC is empowered to ensure that all candidates and lists have equal access to media during the campaign period and that media outlets host all competitors. Article 68 of the 2008 Electoral Law forbids all candidates and media from:

- Acts of libel, slander, and defamation towards any candidate or list;
- Broadcasting material that might trigger religious, confessional, or ethnic sensitivities or acts of violence or riots, or support terrorism, crimes or sabotage;
- Broadcasting material that may be a means of pressure, intimidation, mistrust, or promise of material or in-kind benefits;
- Distorting, falsifying, omitting, or misrepresenting information.

The 2008 Electoral Law also introduced a 43-hour campaign silence beginning at midnight on June 6, 2009 and ending at 7 pm on June 7, 2009, when polls close. During that period, media is prohibited from broadcasting electoral advertising. SCEC is empowered to initiate action against violators of the media regulations and to refer cases to the Court of Publications, which can fine violators, suspend broadcasting of violating material, or close an outlet for a period of three days. Candidates can initiate cases at the Court of Publications as well.

The 2008 Electoral Law also outlined guidelines for campaigning in public spaces. Relevant local authorities are responsible for designating billposting places for electoral advertisements and posters, and no advertisement or poster should be posted outside the places reserved for this purpose. Public utilities, governmental institutions, public institutions, private or public universities, faculties, institutes and schools, and houses of worship may not be used for electoral events, rallies, or for posting pictures for electoral promotion purposes.

V. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

A. PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

1. Election Administration

Qualification to Vote

According to the Lebanese Constitution, the name of every Lebanese citizen who has attained the legal voting age of 21 and enjoys his or her civil rights should appear listed on the voters list. The 2008 Electoral Law, like previous electoral laws in Lebanon, excludes "non retired military personnel of
various ranks" from voting. In order to vote, a voter's name must appear on the voter list and the voter must present a qualifying form of identification. For the 2009 elections, the qualifying forms of identification were a national ID card or a Lebanese passport.

Forming the Voters Roll

The voters roll in Lebanon is permanent and is an extract of the civil registrar. It is updated periodically based on records maintained by the Directorate-General of Personal Status.\textsuperscript{13} The process of updating the voters roll began on December 5, 2008, when regional registration committees submitted to the Directorate-General of Personal Status the names of registered persons legally eligible for registration, the names of persons who are expected to become eligible by the closing date of voter rolls, March 30, 2009, and the names of persons omitted, deceased, or crossed off the personal status records for any reason whatsoever, such as conviction of a criminal offense. Lebanese law requires citizens to vote in their ancestral villages rather than where they reside. Married women vote in their husband's family's ancestral village. Once the voters roll had been updated for the 2009 parliamentary election, there were approximately 3,258,000 eligible voters. This represents an 8.5% increase from the approximate 3,003,008 eligible voters in the 2005 parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{14}

Exhibition of Voters Roll

In accordance with Lebanon's laws and international standards, the preliminary voters roll was displayed at registration centers during an "exhibition and challenges" period from February 10, 2009 through March 10, 2009. The 2008 Electoral Law stipulates that the Directorate-General of Personal Status is required to send copies of the voters roll to municipalities, mukhtars, mohafaza (governorates), cazas (districts), and Lebanese embassies and consulates abroad to publish and circulate them in order to facilitate the final editing. Consistent with the 2008 Electoral Law, the Ministry also published the preliminary voter register on its website http://www.elections.gov.lb.

The MOIM put in place procedures to inform voters of their responsibility to check the roll and if necessary challenge the preliminary voters rolls by contacting their registration committee before March 10, 2009. The Ministry produced and mailed 250,000 fliers, sent two million emails, and sent one million

\textsuperscript{13} In Lebanon, most of the records concerning changes in civil status (birth and marriage) are first issued by religious authorities, countersigned by the mukhtar, and then entered in the records of one of the MOIM registration offices. Lebanon lacks a centralized civil registration system.

\textsuperscript{14} 2005 figures are taken from the National News Agency.
SMS messages, in addition to airing television and radio spots and holding conferences with mukhtars. The MOIM estimates that it added approximately 102,000 names to the voters list and extracted the names of around 34,000 convicted criminals. Inaccurate data was corrected as a result of the exhibition and challenge period, such as the spelling of names and incorrect ancestral villages, especially for newly married women. While citizens did request changes on the voter register themselves, most changes were initiated by employees of the MOIM, who were instructed to check every name on the preliminary voters roll. Some parties, however, told the delegation that the Ministry was not as effective as it should have been in communicating the process and deadline for challenging the preliminary voters roll.

The Mechanism for Voter Identification

The 2008 Electoral Law mandated that a national ID card or a Lebanese passport replace the national voter card used in previous elections. This was an improvement from previous elections since the national voter card was very easy to counterfeit and party agents and other influential people could "get it for you", thus facilitating voter intimidation and vote buying practices. Nevertheless, the process of obtaining national ID cards to vote in the 2009 parliamentary polls was characterized in some cases as being politicized.

Given this change though, one of the MOIM’s first undertakings was to educate voters about this administrative reform and to produce national ID cards for the estimated 600,000-700,000 eligible voters who lacked the necessary identification to vote. The Ministry held a press conference, ran television spots, posted billboards, and printed and distributed a quarter of a million voter education leaflets instructing citizens on how to register for the national ID card. Initially, the Ministry set February 29, 2009 as the deadline for applying for a national ID card to have it in time for election day, however the deadline was later extended several times. The MOIM continued accepting applications and producing national ID cards until it closed for the national holiday on June 6, 2009.15 The MOIM set up 27 national ID production centers in the country, which produced at least 307,000 new IDs.

Some Lebanese applied for passports out of concern that their national ID card would not be processed in time, since passport applications require only three days to process. But given their considerably higher cost,16 this was not an option for all Lebanese.

The process of issuing national IDs did face administrative challenges that the MOIM with support for international donors sought to overcome. For example, there has been a longstanding issue with fingerprints being rejected in the inking process for obtaining the national ID card and many eligible voters were required to return to the registration centers multiple times to retake their fingerprints. In some

15 To discourage voters from travelling long distances on election day, the Minister of the Interior recommended to the Cabinet of Ministers that June 6, 2009 and June 8, 2009 be declared public holidays. The Cabinet of Ministers issued a decree to this effect on May 28, 2009.
16 A one-year passport costs 60,000 LBP ($40) and a national ID card costs 5,000 LBP ($3).
centers the rate of human error in taking fingerprints was as high as 20%-40% because the *mukhtars* were negligent in their method of taking fingerprints and because they were using ink that was of a low quality. The MOIM helped mitigate this issue by using digital scanners for the problematic cases and by proactively calling the concerned individuals involved to retake their fingerprints rather than waiting for them to reapply. The machines had an accuracy rate of nearly 100%, but they were obtained towards the end of the pre-election period, which may have limited the MOIM from reaching all citizens whose fingerprints had been rejected. There were also a small number of cases in which the problem lay with the fingerprints themselves, rather than the method used to document them, but these represented a very small portion of eligible voters.

A concern consistently voiced by political parties and civic groups was the politicization of the process for obtaining national ID cards. NDI observers were told that *mukhtars* were intimidated by political parties, or were political themselves. There were cases of *mukhtars* or municipalities that were known to be affiliated with a particular party or to be corrupt and likely to take bribes. Furthermore, observers heard instances of "flying *mukhtars*," *mukhtars* who were flown abroad at the behest of political parties to facilitate the processing of national ID cards for eligible voters abroad. The MOIM cancelled approximately 600 applications for the national ID card of voters in Zghorta because voters' fingerprints were obtained abroad. To accommodate these voters, the MOIM accepted late applications for national ID cards once they were in the country, but in some cases these applications were submitted as late as two days before the election, which made it impossible for the MOIM to process them before the election. NDI observers noted that polling stations in Zghorta had lists with names of voters who fell into this category and polling officials were instructed not to let them vote with the national ID card. If they possessed a Lebanese passport, they were able to vote on that documentation, but otherwise these voters were turned away. It should be noted that the 600 votes in question would not have had an impact on the outcome of the election in Zghorta given that the difference between the lowest vote getter securing a seat and the highest vote getter not securing a seat in that district was greater than 600.

Parties themselves also some times played a significant role in voters’ access to ID cards. In Chouf, for example, parties not only provided the application documents, but used their political connections to expedite the application and approval process ensuring that their voters received ID cards in time for election day and helping resolve any problems that would cause a delay, such as illegible fingerprints. A wide range of parties facilitated home delivery of ID cards. For example, NDI was informed by a credible source that Hezbollah carried out door-to-door visits in Baalbeck to assist voters with the application for the national ID. NDI observers were informed that a candidate's campaign was confiscating voters' ID cards, making a payment of $200 for receipt of the card. On election day members of the party would return the ID to voters with a prepared ballot including the names on their list, and make a second payment of $100 to the voters once they cast the ballot. Reports from domestic observers echoed this observation.
While there were challenges and accusations surrounding the issuance of national ID cards, it does not appear that any of the formal challenges to election results in individual districts turned on such issues.

**Voter Education**

The MOIM launched a voter education program that made use of a variety of means to reach voters in urban and rural areas. The Ministry held press conferences, ran television and radio spots, maintained an election website, distributed filers, posted billboards, and sent SMS messages and emails. The Ministry's user-friendly elections website allowed voters to check their identification information on the preliminary voters list, locate their polling center, access the electoral law and clarifying decrees, and search for the answers to frequently asked questions. The website received five million hits during the election period. The MOIM also launched a free hotline (1790) to answer citizens’ questions.

The 2008 Electoral Law specified in Article 69 that audiovisual outlets are required to reserve at least three hours per week of air time during the campaign period to broadcast voter education programming. The law stipulated that the voter education programming should be produced by the Ministry of Information, in collaboration with the MOIM. Observers noted that Ministry-sponsored voter education programming fell short of the minimum three hours per week. The short media campaign that ran was aimed at raising awareness about procedural elements during the pre-election period, such as obtaining ID cards and checking for names on voter registries, but did not highlight the larger democratic process or the role of citizens in the electoral process.

NDI observers noted there was little neutral voter education except in the weeks immediately preceding election day. Many political parties, however, did conduct robust voter education programs. Civil society also engaged in voter education efforts with LADE taking the lead by issuing four television spots, each explaining one critical article of the law (Articles 59, 71, 72, and 81). These articles prohibit behavior that is considered part of the Lebanese electoral culture, such as vote buying, which LADE highlighted as being illegal. LADE’s television spots were meant to be aired in the week leading up to election day, however SCEC did not permit the spots to run during the 43-hour campaign silence period.

**Candidate Registration**

Lebanese who enjoy their civil and political rights, are registered in the voters roll, are literate, and are at least 25 years of age on election day are eligible to run for parliamentary seats. Naturalized citizens may stand for Parliament, once they have been citizens for ten years. Lebanese law prohibits military personnel, judges, public employees of the 1st and 2nd rank, and full-time board chairpersons, directors,
and members of public institutions and bodies, mixed (semi-public) companies, public capital companies, and public utility institutions as well as Presidents and Vice Presidents of municipal councils in mubajaza, district centers, and municipal unions from running for Parliament unless they have resigned by specified periods in advance of the election.

In accordance with the 2008 Electoral Law, candidate registration took place between March 2, 2009 and April 7, 2009. This timeline marks a considerable departure from the 2000 Electoral Law, under which candidates were required to register only 15 days before election day. Candidates nominated themselves by presenting to the MOIM a notarized request signed by themselves including their full name and the seat and district they are contesting. The electoral law requires that candidates attach to the request a personal civil status record less than one-month old, a police record less than one-month old, two passport photos (authenticated by the mukhtar), and a certificate from the Department of Personal Status official who is a member in the registration committee of the concerned district, proving that the candidate is registered on the voters rolls.

Candidates were required to pay a fee of 2 million LBP ($1,333) and a deposit of 6 million LBP ($4,000) upon filing for candidacy. A candidate who wins more than 20% of valid votes is entitled a refund of the deposit. The 2008 Electoral Law also required candidates to present a bank certificate confirming that they opened an "Electoral Campaign Account" as well as a certified copy of a declaration listing his or her auditor's name to SCEC. The MOIM approved all candidates' nominations within five days. There is no requirement that candidates present a fixed number of signatures in support of their inclusion on the ballot or indication of support from a registered political party or entity to be place on the ballot.

A total of 703 candidates registered to run for 128 parliamentary seats. Among the candidates were 12 women. All but one of the seats was contested - MP Hagop Pakradounian (Tashnaq-opposition) was uncontested for the Armenian Orthodox seat in Metn district. As parties engaged in political horse trading to form lists and candidates considered the personal cost of moving forward in the race, 106 candidates eventually withdrew. By the April 22, 2009 deadline for candidate withdrawal, there were 597 candidates registered to contest the June 7, 2009 election, leaving a total of three seats uncontested. Compared with the 2005 parliamentary elections, when 17 seats were left uncontested, the 2009 race represented a more competitive environment. Additional candidates announced that they withdrew from the race after the official deadline and encouraged supporters to not vote for them. Candidates who withdrew after the April 22, 2009 deadline did not receive a partial deposit refund from the MOIM; however it is likely that some were paid off by other candidates to withdraw.
Training of Poll Workers

The MOIM initiated a poll worker training on May 16, 2009, and trained 45 high level civil servants (an average of two per district) including qaimaqams (district commissioners), their deputies, or civil servants nominated by the qaimaqams. The 45 qaimaqams and deputies trained approximately 300 persons in all districts, who in turn trained the remaining poll workers (approximately 10,384). It is worth noting that the 2009 election marks the first time in Lebanon women were able to serve as poll workers. Approximately 1,500 women served as poll workers in the 2009 election. The MOIM also printed a polling station handbook for the trainings, which contained comprehensive information on the voting process.

Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities (MOIM) in the Pre-election Period

Throughout the process, NDI found the MOIM to be a credible and effective institution in administering the election. Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud managed to secure the confidence of all major contestants by establishing a record of impartiality. The Minister and Ministry also gained the trust of the public. Observers noted, however, that the Ministry was highly centralized and could have benefitted from utilizing the resources of municipalities, which could have played a more integral role in logistical preparations and in coordinating security apparatuses on election day. Furthermore, given the perceived politicization of the mukhtars, some of their election-related functions could have been transferred to local levels of the election administration.

The delegation observed that the Ministry issued clarifications on the eve of the election, creating confusion and uncertainty about which procedures the poll workers should follow. For example, in trainings, poll workers were told to ink fingers after the voter cast his or her ballot, but on June 5, 2009 the Ministry issued Circular no. 48/I.M/ 2009, which stated that inking should occur before the ballot is cast. The clarification was issued too late to notify all polling officials. Also on June 5, 2009 the MOIM issued a clarification regarding how to identify voters with their national ID cards and passports. In another case the Ministry issued two contradicting decrees. With regards to Article 84 of the 2008 Electoral Law, which prohibits campaigning in the "vicinity of the polling station", the Ministry initially
issued a clarification on May 28, 2009 defining the polling station's vicinity as 75 meters, but on June 4, 2009 it issued Circular No. 33/IM/2009, which defined vicinity of the polling station as 50 meters around the polling station in all directions of the road. The last minute nature of these clarifications made difficult to ensure that all polling officials were informed of the correct way to implement various procedures on election day. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these minor administrative complications and the challenges inherent in the high voter turnout and polarized electoral environment, the election was remarkably well administered.

The MOIM was generally proactive in sharing information with contestants and the general public, contributing to greater transparency. Some candidates noted, however, that it was more fruitful to use unofficial contacts within the MOIM to receive clarification on issues pertaining to the campaign, media, and finance rules, as such information was not readily available through official channels. Independent candidates and parties lacking unofficial contacts in the Ministry may have had difficulty accessing the necessary information.

On the logistical end, the MOIM regularly communicated through the media its plans for overcoming the unprecedented challenges associated with holding the election on one day. Because voters in Lebanon must return to their ancestral villages to vote, traffic jams and road blocks were major concerns in disrupting the voting process. One month before election day, the Minister of the Interior held a joint press conference with the Minister of Telecommunications to announce a comprehensive security plan for election day. Furthermore, the Ministry set up an operations room for election day, where officials from the MOIM, security forces, and French traffic experts coordinated efforts to troubleshoot and resolve any potential incidents.

The Ministry’s newly created Observation Coordination Unit (OCU) proved to be an efficient and valuable resource for observers, especially with regards to accrediting short-term observers; however, it should be noted that the OCU was formed late in the pre-election period, once the MOIM had already accredited some international long-term observers.

2. Candidate Campaigns:

The candidate campaign period began on March 2, 2009 and ended on June 5, 2009 to allow for the campaign silence to begin on midnight of June 6, 2009. Since each candidate’s campaign only officially began once he or she filed for candidacy, the campaign start date differed per candidate, beginning anywhere between March, 2, 2009 and April 7, 2009. Before the campaign period officially began, candidates pursued their campaigns through public events and statements in the media, which were not
overtly campaign-oriented, but were meant to influence public opinion in the spirit of elections nonetheless. At the beginning of the campaign period, parties signed on to a code of conduct, and throughout the pre-election period, candidates and parties from across the political spectrum engaged in vigorous and competitive campaigns.

17 On March 2, 2009 all major political parties represented at the National Dialogue session signed on to a declaration proposed by the Minister of the Interior and issued by President Sleiman. Participants agreed to: 1) Coordinate with security apparatuses to ensure a safe and peaceful security situation ahead of election day; 2) Abstain from all forms of political violence, including aggressive media campaigns and political rhetoric; 3) Hand over all offenders to Lebanese security forces and lift political immunity from party members and supporters; and 4) Bind all party members and supporters to the above-mentioned articles, and commit them to the concerned pledges of nonviolence.

Lebanon has a history of being defined by events and actors outside the country's borders, and this history was well reflected in electoral campaigns. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United States were often the focus of campaign rhetoric, while national issues such as the economy, electricity, education, and health care, took a back seat. An oft-repeated criticism by Lebanese civil society was that candidates lacked actual issue-based campaigns and instead rallied their base by stirring up deep-seated, historic, sectarian sentiments. The role of money in electoral campaigns (See "Campaign Spending Section" below) increasingly meant that the choice of voters was in some cases defined by bribes or the promise of service provision, rather than by policy platforms proffered by candidates.

Parties and candidates, nevertheless, waged active campaigns. Parties posted billboards, distributed
posts, banners, and T-shirts, aired television and radio advertisements, and held rallies. While billboard battles between the two political blocs captured the country’s attention, some candidates used more local strategies, such as door-to-door campaigning. Televised debates gained prominence compared to previous elections. Some candidates also engaged in round table discussions and town hall meetings organized by Lebanese NGOs.

Campaigning Violations

Candidates generally adhered to the code of conduct and media regulations outlined in the electoral law, however, civil society and candidates themselves recorded and reported violations both to the media and to SCEC. Below is a description of campaign infractions observed by NDI, and referenced by domestic observers and the media.

Incendiary Speech and Campaigning

Article 68 of the 2008 Electoral Law outlines rules regarding media coverage of campaign speech. Given the depth of divisions, competing visions about the fundamental direction for the country and sectarian basis for politics in Lebanon, it is not surprising that candidates from across the political spectrum criticized their opponents in the media and at campaign rallies by using provocative language accusing them of a variety of misdeeds, from embezzlement to sedition to murder. There were also numerous instances of campaign posters being torn down or desecrated with slanderous words.
Some electoral campaigns made use of violent images from Lebanon's past, such as the civil war or the street violence that broke out in May 2008, which risked stirring sectarian tensions and possibly violence. March 14 parties and candidates used violent images more frequently in their campaigns than opposition candidates, promoting the idea that they would safeguard Lebanon from future violence. Though campaign posters from FPM (opposition) tended to be more light-hearted in nature, FPM leader General Aoun used provocative speech in rallies and media appearances. While the prevalence of provocative rhetoric was striking and unfortunate, the low level of actual political violence under the circumstances was equally striking and positive.

Campaign Spending

The pre-election period was characterized by large amounts of money being spent by governmental and charitable organizations, as well as candidates and their campaigns, in service provision directed at benefiting particular constituencies. Observers also noted the misuse of public funds and widespread allegations of vote buying. While international observers were not able to determine the extent to which candidates engaged in unlawful campaign spending, it is worth noting that the delegation observed a pervasive cynicism among Lebanese regarding the role of money in electoral campaigns, one that furthered the notion that patronage and sectarian loyalties dominate the electoral process. With Lebanon's stringent banking secrecy laws, it is very difficult to regulate the money flowing into the country, but reports in local and international media estimate that the money arriving from Saudi Arabia alone, a backer of the March 14 alliance, topped $715 million. Likewise, sources indicate that Iran has sent Hezbollah hundreds of millions of dollars over the years. Generally, candidates obscured any foreign support that they received, however a Shi'a candidate aligned with March 14 in Marjayoun-Hasbayah, said he welcomed support from Saudi Arabia for his campaign as a non-Hezbollah alternative in South Lebanon.

In terms of service provision, NDI long-term observers heard allegations and saw evidence of candidates and their campaigns paying hospital bills, tuition fees, and salaries for youth "scouts" in their constituencies. Observers also noted the paving of new roads and sponsorship of new annexes to religious buildings, allegedly funded by electoral campaigns. In some cases a stream of public works that was previously halted was implemented right as the pre-election period began - a tactic, opponents said, was used to influence voters to elect the politicians who were currently governing the district. Local media also reported cases of money being misappropriated from the Ministry of the Displaced's reconstruction fund to constituents. All of these actions constitute violations of Article 59 of the 2008 Electoral Law.
It should be noted that this activity was observed as common practice by candidates regardless of their political affiliation and unfortunately is not radically different than what happens in many democracies.

There have been widespread allegations of direct vote buying and of political parties sponsoring expatriate voters to return to Lebanon for the parliamentary polls. The Institute was not able to confirm specific allegations, but the domestic observation mission echoed this observation and documented numerous cases of bribery and vote buying throughout the country. The cost of a vote reportedly ranged from $100 per voter up to $5,000 for the support of entire families. Rates reportedly increased as election day neared and through election day. Analysts estimate that the number of expatriate voters who flew to Lebanon between May 25, 2009 and June 7, 2009 ranged between 25,000 and 120,000. This estimate does not distinguish between expatriate voters whose trips were sponsored by political parties and those who traveled in at their own expense. The ratio of the Lebanese expatriate community to Lebanese residing in Lebanon is approximately three to one; however there was no provision in the electoral law for out of country voting in the 2009 parliamentary elections. For this reason, sponsoring trips for expatriate voters has become popular practice by some parties in Lebanon. Both political blocs accuse the other side of vote-buying.

SCEC's audits of the financial statements of candidates' "Electoral Campaign Accounts" did not reveal large amounts of overspending. This is likely due to the fact that candidates found ways of circumventing the requirement that all campaign funds be channeled through the campaign account. SCEC noted that most of the cases in which candidates' campaigns exceeded the spending limit, miscalculations were at the root of the problem because candidates' auditors were not familiar with the regulations. It should be noted that not all candidates submitted their financial statements, though all elected MPs and serious contenders met this requirement. The names of candidates who did not submit their statements were submitted to the Prosecutor General, who will judge whether to levy the penalty in the 2008 Electoral Law.

Use of Public Space for Campaigning

Although Article 71 of the 2008 Electoral Law prohibits using public utilities, governmental institutions, public institutions, private or public universities, faculties, institutes and schools, and houses of worship for electoral events and rallies or for posting pictures for electoral promotion purposes, these public

---


19 Article 62 of the 2008 Electoral Law states "Whoever intentionally breaches any of the provisions of this chapter shall be sentenced to 6 months imprisonment at most and to a fine ranging between 50 million LBP and 100 million LBP, or to one of the said sentences, with no prejudice to sanctions of penal crimes as per the law."
spaces were frequently observed as sites for campaign posters and elec-
toral events. The electoral law states that relevant local authorities are
responsible for designating locations for electoral advertisements, but in
many cases they failed to do so. The absence of legal parameters for
where electoral advertisements could be posted in some parts of the
country gave candidates the pretext to disregard the law. Campaign
posters were commonly seen on public buildings throughout the country,
such as in public and private universities.

Domestic observers noted that candidates made electoral appearances
at universities, hung posters on municipal buildings, and engaged in
electoral activities in places of worship, such as churches, mosques, and
Husseiniyas. SCEC published Decision No. 73 on 30/4/2009 that left determining the perimeter of a
place of worship, and whether its annexes are also described as places of worship, up to the religious
authorities in charge. Some religious figures issued decisions allowing annexes of places of worship to
be used for electoral purposes, which paved the way for parties to use religion to influence voters.

More generally, there was a common misuse of public funds by candidates who used state resources to
campaign. Some candidates, especially incumbent MPs and ministers, used state resources and their polit-
ical resources generated from their posts for electoral gains, which can be considered in violation of
Chapter 6 Article 71 (paragraph 1) of the electoral law. The most overt case of this was when Minister of
Telecommunications and opposition candidate in Batroun circulated a voice message notifying citizens
that service rates were cut. Minister Bassil made no reference to the Ministry of Telecommunications or
his position as Minster. Outgoing Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who was running as a March 14 candi-
date in Saïda (Sidon), received guests at the governmental palace for electoral purposes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 6 stipulates that civil servants and employees of public institutions, municipali-
ties, and municipal unions may not use their powers in favor of any candidate or list. Yet, several
instances of municipalities acting in a politicized manner emerged in the press. Municipality workers
claimed staff were promoted or penalized based on their political affiliations and that municipal budg-
etts were used to provide in-kind contributions or provision of services to benefit an electoral campaign.
Additionally, as noted below in the "Security Concerns" section, some candidates considered the secu-
ri ty forces and public institutions to be politically biased in favor of their opponents, and unresponsive
to their security concerns.
3. Campaign Period

Security Concerns

The campaign period passed without any large-scale domestic strife, however this period was marked by sporadic incidents of violence that may have impeded some candidates from campaigning freely. Some candidates claimed that their opponents intimidated them and their staffers as well as voters in their districts; others alleged that the security institutions were being used by campaigns to intimidate voters and failed to respond appropriately to security infringements because of political considerations.

Ahmad Al-Assad, a Shi'a candidate with the Lebanese Option Gathering (pro-March 14) in Marjayoun-Hasbayah, reported that he was repeatedly intimidated and harassed to the point that he was limited in his ability to campaign. Over the campaign period at least 10 of his supporters’ cars were the subject of arson, though no group claimed responsibility for the acts. Additionally, the uninhabited family home of Free Patriotic Movement (opposition) candidate Ibrahim Kanaan was set ablaze on May 13, 2009. On May 19, 2009 after a televised debate between candidates in Zahlé on the popular Lebanese Broadcasting Company, an argument erupted between two competing Shi’a candidates, Okab Sakr (March 14) and Hassan Yacoub (opposition). Yacoub was recorded during a break threatening Sakr, "We will kill you. You will cost us just one bullet." March 14 Shi’a candidates in Baabda, Salah Haraké and Bassem Sabaa, reported that they and their supporters were threatened and intimidated throughout the campaign period. On election night, Haraké’s family’s home in Borj al Barajneh was targeted by opposition supporters carrying Hezbollah and Amal flags, who threw explosives at the house. Haraké criticized the police and security forces for failing to respond promptly to his request for protection, and criticized the MOIM for its inaction in response to his request for help.

The Media

Lebanon has a long tradition of press freedom, though nearly every major media outlet is owned by a political party or family. Five independent television stations and more than 30 independent radio stations operate, as do dozens of independent print publications, reflecting a diverse range of views.20 In order to ensure that the media was balanced, gave equal access to all political parties, refrained from airing hate speech or material likely to incite violence, and respected silence periods, SCEC monitored print and electronic media, received weekly reports from all media outlets authorized to air campaign advertisements, and referred violations to the Publication Court. Domestic observers noted that local media outlets that were not licensed by SCEC distributed campaign materials and promoted candidate lists.

In SCEC’s three pre-election reports, it noted a total of 1,204 violations of Article 68 of the 2008 Electoral Law, which calls for all media to observe the freedom of expression of opinions and thought during the electoral campaign to guarantee fairness, balance, and impartiality among candidates. Candidates, parties, political blocs, and media outlets submitted approximately 109 complaints alleging violations of Article 68 to SCEC.

At the time of the completion of this report, SCEC had forwarded six violations to the Publication Court for violating media regulations. The Court ruled in favor of Ad-Diyar (one time) and Al-Masira, but fined Ad-Diyar (a second time), New TV, Al-Liwa’, and As-Safir a penalty of 50 million LBP (approximately $33,333). SCEC also advised against the broadcasting of one television advertisement and the posting of one billboard because of content that infringed the guidelines stipulated by Article 68.

The Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) in the Campaign Period

Throughout the electoral process, NDI observers found SCEC to be a credible institution that operated with impartiality. The Commission built and maintained relationships with civil society organizations and observers; however, its lack of institutional capacity due to the fact it was formed just before the election, and at times its lack of communication with the public, weakened its impact. NDI noted that there were high expectations from international observers in terms of access to information, and the delegation found that SCEC was not open enough in sharing information. SCEC appeared to not see the merit in making information on violations public, which may be due to political pressure the Commission would face if the information was released. For example, SCEC did not make public candidates’ campaign finance reports, nor did it release the names of candidates who filed or were the subject of complaints. SCEC’s media reports named media outlets that had violated media regulations, but did not name which candidates were responsible for the violations. When asked by NDI for additional information on complaints and violations, SCEC released only general information, such as which parties, blocs, or candidates were filing complaints, from which districts complaints were generated, and the general nature of the complaints.

SCEC embarked upon an ambitious program of campaign finance monitoring reporting, however without a presence on the district level, it lacked the resources necessary to fulfill its mandate. For instance, for campaign finance monitoring SCEC initially relied on information provided by the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), the Lebanese branch of Transparency International, because it was unable to monitor campaign spending actively on the ground. By the week before election day, NDI observers noted that the SCEC had introduced an improved coverage mechanism for all 26 electoral districts.
SCEC also faced challenges in its monitoring of the media in the first week of the campaign period because its media monitoring facilities were still being constructed when the campaign period began on April 7, 2009. SCEC's first media monitoring report was released exactly one month after the campaign period began and it covered the period from April 14-18, 2009. Subsequent reports covered May 7-13, 2009 and May 23-30, 2005. Therefore, SCEC's media reports only covered 19 of the 60 days in the campaign period. NDI, however, observed that when confronted with media infringements, the SCEC acted impartially, without preferences for any media outlet, which are largely owned by political parties or families.

Civil society and political parties have voiced complaints that SCEC was not rigid enough in its enforcement of media regulations. Minister Baroud announced that offenders mentioned in the first report would only be issued warnings and not fined, to allow for media outlets to become familiar with the new regulations. But the number of violations SCEC recorded in its reports only increased after the first report and the Commission referred just six cases to the Publications Court. Critics say the system was too lenient, allowing too much "forgiveness" time to media outlets to understand and adhere to the new guidelines.

While the creation of SCEC was a positive step, the fact that it fell under the authority of the Minister of the Interior stripped it of much administrative and financial autonomy and regulatory authority. SCEC served as an important forum for complaints in the pre-election period, but its lack of regulatory power and failure to make public much of its findings lessened its impact.

B. Early Voting by Poll Workers

A notification issued by the Minister of the Interior permitted poll workers to vote early, on June 4, 2009. Almost 98% of polling officials voted early. Early voting was generally well administered by the MOIM and no major incidents were reported. In Akkar, there was a tense atmosphere with overcrowding and chaos outside the polling station. Domestic observers noted that security forces were present in some polling stations without a request from the head of the polling station. They also observed bribing taking place in Metn and Zahlé and saw candidates campaigning around and inside polling stations. Additionally, LADE reported that a journalist was prevented from entering a polling station.
C. Election Day

Voter Turnout and Participation

One indicator of the significance of an election can be the level of public participation. Voter turnout on June 7, 2009 was 20% higher than in the 2005 elections. Nationwide, approximately 53.37%\(^{22}\) of eligible voters casted ballots at 5,181 polling stations. The percentage may sound modest, but this figure is based on the total number of eligible voters which includes many persons living outside of Lebanon. While some of those people could return to vote, the vast majority, as a practical matter, could not. As a consequence, the percentage of voters who could reasonably have voted and who did vote on election day is significantly higher than 53.37%.

Turnout varied from district to district, reaching 68% in the most contested districts. Voters arrived at polling centers early, likely due to candidates encouraging voters to vote in the morning in case any unexpected incidents occurred because of the one-day election. Voter turnout surpassed 45% by 5 pm. Long lines and slow procedures contributed to tension in a few areas, particularly in the more hotly contested districts. NDI observers noted the voter turnout and enthusiasm and camaraderie among poll workers, voters, party agents, and domestic observers alike, especially given the long distances many were required to travel in order to vote in their ancestral villages. The outcome in some districts was pre-determined by political deals among contestants and demographics determined by the sectarian system, but nevertheless the relatively high voter turnout suggested that the parliamentary election was seen as an opportunity to shape the future of Lebanon. See the chart on the following page for voter turnout rates by district.

---

\(^{22}\) The MOIM did not report official voter turnout numbers for the districts of Jbeil (Byblos), Nabatiyeh, Saida (Sidon), Zahlé, and Zahrany. The numbers used to calculate the overall voter turnout were obtained from unofficial results reported by the National News Agency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of Registered Voters</th>
<th>Number of Votes Cast</th>
<th>Voters Turnout</th>
<th>Number of Blank Ballots</th>
<th>Number of Invalid Ballots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92,764</td>
<td>37,284</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>101,787</td>
<td>27,787</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut III</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>252,301</td>
<td>103,243</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>223,538</td>
<td>120,060</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minieh-Dinnieh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97,352</td>
<td>54,916</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>196,149</td>
<td>89,886</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zghorta</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71,035</td>
<td>34,399</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becharre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46,422</td>
<td>17,183</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57,794</td>
<td>27,417</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mount Lebanon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58,444</td>
<td>32,914</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jbeil (Byblos)*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75,582</td>
<td>49,128</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesrawan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89,228</td>
<td>60,336</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>170,744</td>
<td>96,748</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>151,590</td>
<td>84,546</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>116,181</td>
<td>59,779</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>181,949</td>
<td>91,642</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida (Sidon)*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53,859</td>
<td>36,624</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahrany*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92,995</td>
<td>50,217</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour (Tyre)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>153,060</td>
<td>74,941</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54,188</td>
<td>29,225</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>121,912</td>
<td>59,737</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>123,396</td>
<td>52,899</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjeyoun-Hasbaya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>138,844</td>
<td>64,975</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bekaa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck-Hermel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>255,637</td>
<td>126,038</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahle*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>158,005</td>
<td>88,483</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bekaa-Rachaya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>122,487</td>
<td>65,237</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>3,257,243</td>
<td>1,635,644</td>
<td>53.37%</td>
<td>11,197</td>
<td>10116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Voters’ turnout number taken from the National News Agency
Voting Process

Overall the voting process went smoothly and polling officials showed professionalism on election day. Many polling centers were taxed by higher than expected turnout, which led to long lines -- in some cases voters waited as long as four hours -- a disorganized environment, and frustrated voters. Some voters left polling stations without voting and the slow procedures caused tensions leading to minor disruptions of the process. The media and domestic observers reported a small number of violent incidents. In Zahlé an armed man entered the polling center and in Beirut III a gunshot was heard in a polling center. LADE reported that the voting process was suspended in 11% of polling centers at different times throughout the day, especially between 3pm and 7 pm.

The backlog of voters may have been exacerbated by the fact that many polling stations were operating with two instead of three staff, as required by the electoral law. It was unclear at times who held authority over the polling center and observers noted a discrepancy in the methods used by polling officials to relieve the pressure due to overcrowding. Larger polling stations were equipped with two or three voting booths, but poll workers rarely utilized more than one booth at a time. The MOIM issued a decision mid-day on June 7, 2009 instructing poll workers to allow up to three voters in the polling station at once to alleviate overcrowding, but poll workers rarely implemented this decision. The fact that the number of voters allocated to each polling station increased to 800 from 600 under the 2000 Electoral Law, combined with the unexpectedly high turnout, contributed to the congestion. In some cases, polling centers were not well marked, which also contributed to the atmosphere of confusion and overcrowding.

While there were incidents of friction and campaigning in close proximity to many of the polling stations observed, election day was generally marked by a spirit of enthusiasm and cooperation. Despite widespread security and logistical concerns about holding the election on one day, logistics did not prove to be a challenge and voters were easily able to get to and from polling stations. Overcoming this challenge may have been facilitated by the significant security presence, careful planning, and announcement of national holidays on the day before and after the election. Domestic observers were present in virtually every polling center and party representatives from each major political coalition attended the majority of polling places, providing oversight of the process and helping to mitigate potential political clashes.
The polls opened at 7:00 am and closed at 7:00 pm, with persons in the queue at 7:00 pm allowed to vote. Most polling stations opened on time, though a small percentage of polling stations opened on the order of 30 minutes late. Ballots, voters lists, and other necessary election materials were on hand in almost all of polling places observed by NDI's delegation. In rare cases, observers noted that blank ballots were placed on tables in the polling station rather than inside the voting booth, which may have facilitated putting pressure on voters.\textsuperscript{23} Sound mechanisms were employed to prevent voters from voting twice. The easily counterfeit voter card used in past elections was replaced with the national ID or passport and indelible ink was introduced to prevent multiple voting. Poll workers, however, did not employ a consistent procedure in checking whether voters had already been inked. Indeed, some voters were inked before they voted, others were inked afterwards. Poll workers also employed different methods of inking voters—some followed the MOIM's directions to ensure the ink submerged the thumbnail, while others only inserted the tip of the thumb.

Upon arrival at the polling station, voters' ID cards or passports were checked against the voters rolls. There were a few reports of irregularities in voter identification and some problems with inaccurate voters lists. Polling officials did not always employ standard procedures for voters whose names were misspelled or missing from the voters list at the polling station. Article 81 (3) of the 2008 Electoral Law stipulates that "No one shall be allowed to vote unless their name is registered on the check list of the polling station or unless they obtain the competent registration committee's decision allowing them to register their name." Some polling officials turned away voters whose names were incorrect or missing from the voters list without referring them to the registration committee. Other officials directed the voters in question to the registration committee. NDI observers witnessed voters who had initially been turned away return with handwritten notes from the registration committee authorizing them to vote. The delegation also observed voters who were turned away and were unable to vote. Some illiterate voters were also turned away.

\textsuperscript{23} Even if a voter was given a form ballot by a party agent that voter could, in theory, take a blank sheet of paper and vote for who they choose in the secrecy of the polling booth. However, if the voter must take that blank ballot in public he or she would be forced to signal his or her intention in public not to use the pre-marked ballot.
Observers also noted that polling officials called the names of voters when it was their turn to vote. This practice created an atmosphere of intimidation in some cases. Secrecy of the ballot was generally respected. Newly procured voting booths with curtains in line with international standards were utilized, and the introduction of an envelope for the ballot and transparent ballot boxes represented a step forward in voter secrecy. Lack of a pre-printed, standardized, and official ballot led to the majority of voters voting with ballots printed and distributed by party agents. This practice made it possible, in theory, for party agents to identify the ballots distributed by their faction, and discern whether a voter, or the degree to which a group of voters, adhered to promises in return for payment to vote for their slate.

Political Party Agents

Each candidate is entitled to one fixed party agent and either one mobile agent per village or five mobile agents per city. Party agents must be accredited by the MOIM, and are authorized to enter polling stations and observe the entirety of the electoral process. Parties and the campaigns of independent candidates recruited and trained supporters to observe the polls as party agents on election day. Party agents were not allowed to interfere with the polling and counting process in any way, but had the right to demonstrate their concern regarding any alleged irregularity.

Party agents were present at 100% of polling stations observed by NDI. There were numerous reports of active campaigning in and around polling stations. Party agents distributed campaign materials (such as party-branded lunch boxes) and displayed party paraphernalia in and around polling stations, and in some cases they played party songs in the parking lots outside of polling centers. Observers noted that in some cases, party agents escorted voters in and out of polling stations, carried elderly or disabled voters to polling stations to facilitate their vote, and distributed lists within polling centers. Some party agents sat at the polling...
desk, alongside the voting materials, instead of sitting aside with the rest of the party agents and observers. Furthermore, NDI witnessed candidates and members of their families in polling centers other than where they were registered to vote on polling day. Candidates mingled with voters, in some cases asking how the voting was going and even encouraging voters to vote for them.

Article 84 of the 2008 Electoral Law prohibits "any electoral advertising or activity" on election day, but the law is not comprehensive in stipulating the specific actions or material that are banned from polling stations. While the law does specifically prohibit the use of loudspeakers, loud music, party flags, and parades, it makes no mention of party paraphernalia, which was widely and uniformly displayed at polling stations throughout the country. The display and distribution of party material in and around polling stations appeared to go against the spirit of the law; however in post-election meetings with the delegation, the MOIM indicated that it considered the presence of party paraphernalia technically admissible under the current law.

Assisted Voters/Accessibility for Voters with Disabilities

Despite the provision in the electoral law requiring all polling centers to be accessible to disabled voters, very few polling centers met this requirement. The overwhelming majority of stations lacked proper access for disabled voters. Observers saw a number of disabled and elderly voters being carried up flights of stairs to reach their assigned polling station. In the vast majority of polling centers, polling stations were on the first, second, or even third floors in spite of the fact that many ground floors of buildings had courtyards and playgrounds could have been utilized. In some cases the security forces and polling officials were not aware of the priority given to voters with disabilities and elderly voters.

In a pre-election mapping of polling stations, the Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union (LPHU) revealed that very few polling stations met the criteria required to be considered handicapped accessible. Based on a sample of 1,741 polling stations, LPHU found that six polling stations met all six criteria, seven met five of the six criteria, and 21 met four of the six criteria. LPHU fielded 155 election day observers in its own delegation and contributed 45 observers to the CLOE domestic observation mission. LPHU observers recorded almost 250 violations in districts in the Bekaa, Beirut, Nabatiyeh, Saida (Sidon), Sour (Tyre), and Zahlé. Violations included the absence of an elevator at a polling station and voters with disabilities being carried up stairs or escorted by party agents.
Election Day Security

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF), which were charged with maintaining public order on election day, performed their responsibilities professionally and efficiently. The media and domestic observers reported a small number of violent incidents, but the security apparatuses contained them effectively. They behaved respectfully with voters, observers, and poll workers. While their overall performance boosted public confidence in the security forces and made voters comfortable in turning out to the polls, in some cases their role was unclear. Observers noted instances in which security forces played a more active role than mandated by law inside polling stations, and other instances in which they were passive in crowd control. There was an overall inflated presence of police and army personnel in urban areas. Numerous instances were observed of armed security personnel posted inside the polling stations as well as of police officers commanding polling station doors inside the polling stations. Because of some friction in overcrowded polling stations, the ISF was forced to intervene and maintain order.

Election Administration on Election Day

Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities (MOIM)

Throughout election day, the MOIM behaved professionally, responsibly, and impartially. The Ministry ran an operations room that received questions from voters, polling officials, observers, and party agents maintaining an open line of communication for all stakeholders on election day. Employees of the Ministry directly responded to queries and followed up on violations reported. The operations room fielded 15,000 calls on election day and there were times at which all 40 phone lines were busy. The MOIM took measures to respond to incidents or potential disruptions to the voting process by issuing decisions throughout the day, such as the decision to allow three citizens to enter the polling station at once. The responsiveness of the Ministry helped reduce the procedural difficulties resulting from implementing the new electoral law. Furthermore, the MOIM consented to the presence of a domestic observer in the Ministry's operations room on election day. The LADE observer reported 250 critical incidents to the MOIM, most of which were a result of overcrowding at polling stations. LADE noted that the Ministry responded comprehensively and effectively, and worked immediately to resolve a fair number of them.
Poll Workers

Poll workers generally conducted their duties with professionalism and integrity in the majority of stations observed, however at times, polling station workers were unable to answer questions posed by voters. In the more congested polling stations, polling officials seemed unclear of their role and authority. Polling officials were inconsistent in carrying out some procedures, likely because of last minute clarifications from the MOIM. Some polling officials appeared meticulous in implementing new procedures, as they were hesitant to breach the new electoral law. The unfamiliarity of polling officials with the law slowed down the voting process and contributed to the congestion and the chaotic environment at times.

Accusations of Vote Buying

On election day, the delegation heard numerous allegations of vote buying, and the domestic observation mission reported 49 incidents of bribes in a number of districts, particularly in Chouf, Kesrwan, Saida (Sidon), Tripoli, and Zahlé. Domestic observers witnessed mukhtars and party agents distributing money and candidate lists to use as ballots to voters in rooms in and around polling centers. Vote buying, however, is very difficult to investigate or confirm and neither domestic nor international observers were able to take systematic testimony from voters who were bribed on election day or collect material evidence. LADE referred incidents of alleged vote buying to the MOIM.

Vote Count

Votes cast were counted in each polling station immediately following the close of the polls. The counting process proceeded without major incident in most places witnessed by NDI observers, although there were inconsistencies on the procedures in some instances. The vote count took place under the supervision of party agents and domestic and international observers. Cameras and television screens were employed to project the vote counting process on the screens, allowing the polling officials, party agents, and observers to easily read the names on the ballot papers during the vote count. Copies of the provisional results from polling stations were then certified and posted outside, thereby providing candidates, parties, and the public the ability to track the results at the national level.

NDI’s observer team in Sour (Tyre) was initially prevented from observing the vote count. Polling officials informed them that once the vote count began, observers were not authorized to enter the polling station. The team found another polling station in Sour (Tyre) that would admit them. This seemed to
be an isolated incident as, according to LADE, domestic observers and party agents were permitted to observe the vote counting process in all but 4% of polling stations visited in its sample.

**Domestic and International Observation**

Lebanon continues to be a leader in the region in terms of domestic election observation. LADE was established in 1996 and has led the Coalition Libanaise pour l'Observation des Elections (CLOE) since it was formed in 2005. In addition to LADE, 58 NGOs and eight universities participated in CLOE’s observation of the 2009 parliamentary election.

LADE has observed all elections since its establishment, including four parliamentary elections, two municipal elections, four by-elections, and numerous union and syndicate elections. The 2009 parliamentary election marks the first time that the law recognized the right of domestic groups to monitor elections. In addition to election observation, LADE’s main areas of activity include voter education projects, advocacy, and lobbying. Following the 2005 elections, LADE, as a founding member of CCER, advocated to amend the electoral law to make it more democratic and in line with international standards. LADE’s Executive Director was invited to attend meetings of the Parliament's Justice and Administration Committee as it deliberated on the 2008 Electoral Law and LADE’s former Secretary General, Ziyad Baroud has been Minister of the Interior since July 2008.

For the 2009 parliamentary elections the MOIM charged the OCU with accrediting and serving as a liaison to domestic and international observer groups. The OCU accredited 2,294 domestic monitors. The domestic observation fielded stationary and mobile observers who together covered 100% of polling centers. Domestic observers utilized an SMS-based reporting system that enabled them to report incidents that LADE categorized as critical instantaneously on election day. They logged 1,010 critical incidents through the system, marking the first time in the Arab world that such technology was utilized on a large-scale basis to produce real-time reports on election day. LADE also hosted observers from other Arab countries as part of its observation mission.
LADE and CLOE observers faced sporadic but sometimes serious harassment on election day. LADE reported that at least 14 observers experienced some type of harassment, mainly concerning their use of cameras in polling stations. Both the electoral law and the MOIM were vague regarding whether or not observers were permitted to use cameras in polling stations, even though it is established that taking photographs can be a tool of documenting violations. LADE observers were arrested and interrogated by ISF after taking photographs in front of a polling center; they were hit by campaigners because they took a picture of them in a potential violation of the law; they were intimidated by campaigners through verbal attacks; they were prevented from observing the vote counting procedures; and in one instance cars were destroyed during a clash between campaigners as the campaigners did not want observers to be present. These cases of harassment occurred in the districts of Aley, Baalbeck-Hermel, Batroun, Bint Jbeil, Chouf, Kesrwan, Metn, Nabatiyeh, Saida (Sidon), Zahrany, and Zghorta.

International monitors first observed Lebanese elections in 2005. Observers from the European Union were able to observe the 2005 parliamentary elections, but without full accreditation. In passing the 2008 Electoral Law, the Lebanese government for the first time invited international observers to monitor the electoral process. Several international organizations monitored the elections in addition to NDI, including the Arab League, the Carter Center, the European Union, the International Organization of the Francophonie, and the Government of Turkey. The OCU accredited 225 international observers, 52 special visitors, and 43 translators. NDI, the Carter Center and EU delegations coordinated their observation efforts to achieve broad coverage and efficient monitoring on election day. International observers were welcomed throughout the country, and there were no reports of interference with their activities.

### Media Access on Election Day

Article 66 (b) of Electoral Law No. 25/2008 invites audiovisual and printed media wishing to cover the voting and vote count procedures to obtain written accreditation. The OCU accredited 3,401 members of the press. For the most part, accredited members of the press were able to enter polling stations and report on the electoral process, however there were isolated incidents of accredited members of the press being harassed or prevented from entering polling stations by polling or security officials. Observers noted that the political affiliation of a journalist's media outlet may have influenced the way in which he or she was treated by the authorities.

### D. Immediate Post-Election Period

#### Tabulation and Announcement of Results

Following the count, the voting materials were transported to the registration committees, which studied
the minutes from the vote count and took any necessary decisions. The voting materials were then transported to the higher registration committees, where the results were proofread, corrected (if necessary), and tabulated. The higher registration committees are responsible for filling out a table tabulating total votes cast and blank and invalid ballots for the whole district, however, higher registration committees in Jbeil (Byblos), Nabatiyeh, Saida (Sidon), Zahlé, and Zahrany failed to fill out the tables fully, so the official results are incomplete in these districts. Finally, results were sent to the muhafaza where the mohafez or qaimaqam signed a confirmation statement to verify the results, and then to the MOIM in Beirut. The ballot papers were then sent to the Central Bank of Lebanon, where they are stored for three months after election day. The handover of polling station result sheets and sensitive election material was generally well managed and transparent.

Official results were announced by Minister Baroud in a series of press conferences on June 8 as results from districts were verified. By the early afternoon, nationwide results were announced and posted on the Ministry's website at the district level. The results were taken off-line during the immediate post-election period for adjustments, but they were eventually re-posted at the district and polling station levels. The complete data for Jbeil (Byblos), Nabatiyeh, Saida (Sidon), Zahlé, and Zahrany (including total votes cast, invalid ballots, and blank ballots) has not been posted on the Ministry's website as of November 2009, and from interviews with the MOIM, it is not clear whether this information will be made available.

**Election Results**

The March 14 bloc and their allies secured a victory, winning 71 seats, and the opposition bloc won 57 seats. Forty-seven (~37%) members of the 2009 Parliament are newly elected, 38 of which (~30% of the Parliament) are first time MPs. Of the new MPs, 18 come from political families, while 29 do not. The number of seats held by women dropped from six to four, with women representing just over 3% of Lebanon’s new Parliament. Of the four women elected, one is a first time MP, whose father and grandfather were MPs, and whose father was assassinated.

---

24 For Jbeil (Byblos), Saida (Sidon), Zahlé, and Zahrany, the data is not published regarding the total number of votes cast or blank or invalid ballots. For Nabatiyeh, the data is not published for the total number of votes cast.

25 Of the 597 registered candidates, 12 (2%) were women.
Some parties that were not represented in the 2005 Parliament gained seats in 2009. These include: Jamaa Islamiya (March 14), the Lebanese Democratic Party (March 8), the Marada Movement (March 8), the National Liberal Party (March 14), the National Youth Party (March 14-allied), and the Solidarity Party (March 8). Parties that lost their representation in the 2009 Parliament include the Democratic Renewal Movement (March 14), the Independence Movement (March 14), and the Popular Nasserite Organization (March 8). The results revealed a significant increase in support for the March 14 Christian parties (from roughly 30% in 2005 to 50% in 2009) and a decrease in support for FPM-endorsed candidates (from roughly 70% in 2005 to 50%).

Following the announcement of the election results, the MOIM ran television advertisements and billboards declaring every citizen a winner, thus maintaining its position of neutrality and encouraging a calm post-election period.

**Adjudication of Electoral Disputes/Complaints**

Losing candidates can challenge the results of an election in the district for which they ran by filing a challenge with the Constitutional Council. The deadline for filing challenges was July 8, 2009, 30 days after the announcement of the official results. Nineteen candidates filed challenges, primarily in the competitive districts of Metn and Zahlé. The Speaker of Parliament and the Minister of the Interior were informed of challenges filed and the MOIM and SCEC were required to provide the Constitutional Council with all of the documentation related to the cases. An MP who is challenged has the right to be provided with the full details of the claim and may provide evidence to support his case within 15 days.

The President of the Constitutional Council assigned two members of the Council to review each challenge, and they had three months from the date they were assigned the challenge to issue a draft report. Upon receipt of the reports, the President of the Council will call a session to discuss the challenges and reach a decision within approximately six weeks. As of mid-November, the Council members were still working on their dossiers, which means that they will be delayed in submitting their reports to the President of the Council. If the Council accepts the challenge as valid, it may either annul the result of the election for the challenged seat, cancel the mandate of the MP, and announce the name of the new MP, which may or may not be the candidate who submitted the challenge or annul the result of the election for the challenged seat and call for a by-election for the seat in question. On the following page is a list of the challenges submitted to the Constitutional Council.

NDI has observed the complaints adjudication process. Meetings with Constitutional Council members indicate that the process of gathering evidence and reviewing the challenges is going smoothly, though
Complaints Filed with the Constitutional Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Contesting</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>MP being Challenged</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mikhael Daher</td>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>Hadi Hobeich</td>
<td>Future Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rchaid Daher</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>Hadi Hobeich</td>
<td>Future Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Arakji</td>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>Beirut 2</td>
<td>Nohad Al Machnouk</td>
<td>Future Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Yaacoub</td>
<td>Popular Bloc</td>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>Okab Sakr</td>
<td>Zahlé Bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajaj Haddad</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>Issam Sawaya</td>
<td>March 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elias Skaff</td>
<td>Popular Bloc</td>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>Nicolas Fattouch</td>
<td>Zahlé Bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fouad Al Turk</td>
<td>Popular Bloc</td>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>Tony Abou Khater</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim Aoun</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>Elie Marouni</td>
<td>Kataeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rida Al Mess</td>
<td>Popular Bloc</td>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>Assem Araji</td>
<td>Zahlé Bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camille Maalouf</td>
<td>Popular Bloc</td>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>Joseph Maalouf</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghassan Rahbani</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Michel Murr</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghassan Achkar</td>
<td>SSNP</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Sami Gemayel</td>
<td>Kataeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sehnaoui</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>Beirut 1</td>
<td>Michel Pharaon</td>
<td>March 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rami Olleik</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Jbeil (Byblos)</td>
<td>Abbas Hachem</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkis Sarkis</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Nabil Nicolas</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elias Moukheiber</td>
<td>March 14</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Ghassan Moukheiber</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emile Kanaan</td>
<td>March 14</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Ibrahim Kanaan</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddy Abillamaa</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Salim Salhab</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elie Karame</td>
<td>Kataeb</td>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>Edgar Maalouf</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

behind schedule. Most challenges concern alleged slander in the media and the illegal transfer of voters' registration from one district to another. As this report goes to print, the Constitutional Council is studying the evidence to determine whether or not these issues could have influenced the outcome of the races concerned. The President of the Constitutional Council Issam Sleiman informed NDI that he expects that the Council will issue all decisions by mid-November or December 2009, at the latest.

Formed less than two weeks before the June 7, 2009 polls, one of the first steps of the Council was to invalidate all of the challenges pending from the 2005 elections and 2007 by elections, since the last Constitutional Council disbanded in 2005 before ruling on the electoral challenges. Though the judgment was issued after the mandate of the 2005 Parliament expired, the Council invalidated the challenges and endorsed the decisions of the 2005 Parliament.

NDI Final Report on The Lebanese Parliamentary Election

48
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

REINFORCING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

High voter turnout, a generally well administered election, and significant political competition were indications that government officials and voters regarded the 2009 parliamentary election as an opportunity to shape their country's future and as a vehicle to address and resolve political differences through peaceful means. In Lebanon, strengthening the mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes is of the highest priority.

THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

Review the Electoral System and Districting The confessional system evolved in Lebanon as a mechanism to protect the rights of sectarian groups. Increasingly, however, political leaders and civil society advocates in Lebanon have expressed an interest in at least supplementing the confessional system with other avenues for representation, such as proportional representation. The delegation encourages the debate of further electoral reform as recommended by President Michel Sleiman, Minister of the Interior Ziyad Baroud, SCEC, the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER), and others.

Proportional representation (PR), an electoral system that awards seats based on the proportion of votes lists receive, is recognized as one means of opening the doors of Parliament to a more diverse group of political actors who appeal to a broader base of constituents. The simple first-past-the-post majoritarian system encourages the hegemony of Lebanon's highly sectarian parties and hinders independent candidates and smaller parties, who are not on party lists, from winning seats. The introduction of PR, even for a limited number of seats in Parliament, as the Boutros Commission recommended, could encourage smaller parties, women, and independent candidates to enter Parliament. Should Lebanon adopt a PR system either on a national basis or with larger districts based on the mohafaza, more policy-based national political programs may gain influence in Lebanon's political system, as candidates would have to appeal to a larger, more diverse base instead of relying on concentrated, local confessional groupings.

In any case, the Lebanese government should consider engaging in further review of the country's electoral map and electoral system through extensive consultations with all political parties, electoral experts, and relevant civil society groups. Even if the basic structure of the system remains in place, authorities should revisit the delimitation of districts and allocation of seats so that the number of voters per seat is roughly equivalent in all districts.
Establish an Independent Election Commission  Independent election commissions are common in democracies throughout the world and the establishment of such a commission could institutionalize the important steps made by the MOIM and SCEC in this election. Following the model of Mexico in the 1990s, the Lebanese government should explore the feasibility of converting SCEC to an independent election commission with judicial authority and administrative and financial autonomy for administering and supervising the electoral process, as recommended by the Boutros Commission. Lebanese electoral experts have said that they consider the establishment of an independent commission to be the best mechanism for ensuring the neutrality and fairness of elections and for moving the electoral process away from the influence of politics. The conversion of the SCEC into a fully independent body could lend credibility to the existing transparent and professional administration of the elections among the public. 

Short of creating a fully independent commission with judicial authority, Lebanese authorities should immediately strengthen the existing framework for filing and adjudicating complaints throughout the electoral process by making it more transparent. The authority for filing complaints in the campaign period and on election day is delegated to criminal courts, the Publication Court, and the State Council. However, a shortfall of this system is that the process is considered by many to be opaque and politicized. Lebanese authorities should work to strengthen the image of the judiciary so that citizens and candidates alike have confidence that it can act in a non-partisan nature in matters as political as electoral disputes.

Begin the Process of "Deconfessionalization"  Consistent with the Lebanese Constitution, which calls for a transitional plan to abolish political confessionalism, Lebanese officials and civil society alike should begin the process of moving away from a pure confessional system towards a system that places less power in the hands of sectarian elites. As stipulated in Article 95 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic should form a National Committee including the Prime Minister, Speaker of Parliament, experts, and leaders of civil society to study the means of abolishing confessionalism, and propose and implement a transitional plan.

Enhance Women's Political Participation  The level of women's representation in Lebanon's Parliament falls below international norms. Even within the Arab world, Lebanon has one of the lowest levels of women's political participation. Despite the decrease in their number of parliamentary seats, women were active in other parts of the electoral process, serving as poll workers (for the first time), and in key positions in their political parties. But as other electoral reforms are pursued, consideration should be given to the best means to increase women's political representation as elected officials, in political party leadership, in the government, and as election administrators.

Lebanese authorities should study the experiences of other countries that have put in place mechanisms to achieve significant increases in the number of women elected at the municipal and national
levels. In Iraq, a quota was introduced to ensure that one-quarter of parliamentary and municipal seats go to women. Egypt recently adopted a law introducing a women's quota of around 12% for its legislature. In Morocco, political parties signed onto a 2002 charter that reserves for women candidates, 30 seats (10%) on a special National List, elected nation-wide. On the municipal level, Morocco has also adopted a minimum quota of 12%. Women in Morocco have been successful in exceeding these quotas both at the national and municipal levels. In order for an increase in the participation of women in politics to be effective and organic, the political, electoral, and cultural framework of Lebanon must be taken into consideration.

**Strengthen Campaign Finance Regulations** To strengthen campaign finance regulations, NDI recommends the following reforms:

- Introducing a standard campaigning period for all candidates;
- Closing loopholes that allow candidates or their families to hold multiple bank accounts that are protected under Lebanon's strict banking secrecy laws;
- Requiring candidates to disclose their incomes and assets inside and outside of Lebanon, as well as the incomes and assets of their close family members;
- Requiring candidates to disclose income related to companies and foundations in which he or she has strong influence and which can reasonably expected to contribute to the candidate's campaign;
- Increasing the public's access to information related to campaign finance regulations, such as reports on candidates' campaign accounts.

Furthermore, a law is only as strong as it is enforceable; therefore, NDI recommends empowering either a newly created independent election commission, or another judicial body, with the judicial authority to adjudicate violations of campaign finance regulations.

**Voting in Place of Residence** Lebanese authorities should consider revising the current system to allow voters to vote in their place of actual residence. Enabling voters to vote where they live rather than in the ancestral villages of their families would help to relieve the logistical burden of traffic management and security encountered in the 2009 parliamentary election. This reform would also reduce the role of political parties and candidate campaigns in transporting voters on election day, which opens the door for pressuring voters and potential fraud.

**Lowering the Voting Age** The Lebanese government should take the necessary steps remaining to amend the Constitution and lower the voting age from 21 to 18. Specifically, this requires a second vote by Parliament on the final text of the amendment approved by the Cabinet, and the co-signing of a promulgation of the amendment by the President and Prime Minister.
Implement Out of Country Voting The 2008 Electoral Law deferred Out of Country Voting (OCV) until 2013 citing logistical challenges. NDI recommends strategic planning and coordination well ahead of the next parliamentary election so that expatriate voters are extended the franchise in their resident countries. Given the high numbers of expatriates who flew in for the 2009 election and the perceived role that parties wielded in facilitating their transportation, it is critical that OCV is implemented ahead of the 2013 parliamentary polls.

Enfranchise Members of the Security Forces Though an argument exists against enfranchising the police and army based on the principle that security forces should remain politically neutral, barring security forces from voting does not prevent them from holding a political position; it simply denies them of their civic duty of expressing it through the ballot box. The principle of universal suffrage is based on every citizen being able to express an opinion and political preference by casting his or her ballot. The disenfranchisement of the Internal Security Forces and Lebanese Armed Forces violates this principle. Therefore, NDI recommends amending the electoral law to extend the franchise to members of the security forces and installing appropriate measures to ensure that each member of the security forces exercises his or her own right to vote in secrecy, as an individual.

VOTING PROCEDURES

Adopt a Pre-printed, Standardized, and Uniform Ballot In accordance with international standards, NDI recommends the adoption of a pre-printed, standardized, and uniform ballot. Lack of a pre-printed, standardized, official ballot led to the majority of voters voting with ballots printed and distributed by party agents, which may have compromised the secrecy of the vote and strengthened the power of political elites, creating the opportunity for deal-making and undue political influence.

Expand Assistance to Voters with Disabilities In advance of the next elections, the law that all polling centers be fully accessible to people with disabilities should be implemented. Alternatively, if the government is not able to make all polling centers handicapped accessible, steps should be taken to identify which polling centers within each district are handicapped accessible and permit voters with disabilities to vote at these specific locations.

Clarify Authority over Polling Stations While the 2009 election was generally well run, there were administrative challenges resulting in part from the high voter turnout and because officials were administering a new electoral law. Among improvements that might be considered are:

- Clarifying authority over administration of polling centers by appointing a single civilian official as head of the polling station;
- Ensuring that there is an adequate number of officials in polling stations;
- Enforcing the prohibition on campaigning by party agents in polling stations.

The polling center head could also help in addressing questions and complaints from voters, party agents, and observers by streamlining and troubleshooting their concerns and referring them in an organized manner to the MOIM.

**Increase the Number of Polling Officials per Polling Station** To improve the organization of polling stations and the administration of the polling process, NDI recommends the following:

- Allocating additional polling officials to polling stations where high voter turnout is anticipated; the MOIM should clarify to the *qaimaqams* how to better allocate the polling staff that they are assigned based on expectations for voter turnout. A shortage of polling officials could be overcome by a strategic deployment of the officials on hand.
- Expanding traditional recruitment pool to target university students and individuals in the private sector to bolster the numbers of poll workers;
- Training an equal number of women as men as poll workers. Achieving this level of parity would serve to boost the total number of polling officials.

**Implement a More Robust Training Program for Polling Officials** There will likely be a new electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary election, requiring a more robust polling official training program to be implemented. The delegation recommends streamlining the different tiers of future trainings so that information is conveyed to poll workers more clearly. Additionally, an evaluation of poll workers during training sessions should be considered to test their knowledge.

**Clarify the Role of Security Forces** While the NDI observer delegation praised the effectiveness of the security and logistics planning and the positive role of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF), observers noted instances in which security forces played a more active role than mandated by law inside polling stations, and other instances in which they were passive in crowd control. In future elections the LAF and ISF’s role should be limited to security and queue management, with election officials taking full control of polling centers requesting security intervention only when needed. The delegation recommends that the LAF and ISF undergo special training on queue management and that they be supplied with materials to aid this role, such as barrier tape and posts.
Expand Voter Education  NDІ recommends that the election administration initiate a more extensive voter education campaign in advance of the next elections. Specifically, the delegation recommends that the election administration utilize the three hours of airtime that the 2008 Electoral Law reserved for government produced voter education. Additionally, voter education material should be widespread and visible at each polling centre and at entry to each station. A clear pictorial display of voting procedures would help inform and guide voters regarding new procedures. Furthermore, civic education programs and voter information should be disseminated early and nationwide, including at village and local level. Targeted voter education for first time voters should be considered for future elections.

Institutionalize Observation  The formal accreditation of domestic and international monitors for the first time in Lebanon marked a step forward in the effort to increase the transparency of and confidence in the electoral process. NDI recommends further institutionalizing the right of domestic and international observers for future elections.

Planning for 2010 Municipal Elections

The post-election period is in fact the beginning of a new electoral cycle, and plays an important role in adopting lessons learned and recommendations for future electoral reform. Lebanon will hold two elections in the next four years-- municipal elections in 2010 and a parliamentary election in 2013-- and it is critical that Lebanese authorities and civil society reflect and capitalize on the post-election period to prepare for the upcoming elections. The MOIM should invest in programs that can in effect strengthen institutional and professional development of its staff, as well as focus on institution building and bolstering the independence and mandate of SCEC. Civil society should utilize this post-election environment to advance its reform agenda by organizing forums to discuss lessons learned, formulating recommendations, and developing an advocacy policy to lobby the government.
APPENDIX A

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

Build Political and Civic Organizations: NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well organized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions—the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

Safeguard Elections: NDI promotes open and democratic elections. Political parties and governments have asked NDI to study electoral codes and to recommend improvements. The Institute also provides technical assistance for political parties and civic groups to conduct voter education campaigns and to organize election monitoring programs. NDI is a world leader in election monitoring, having organized international delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries, helping to ensure that polling results reflect the will of the people.

Promote Openness and Accountability: NDI responds to requests from leaders of government, parliament, political parties and civic groups seeking advice on matters from legislative procedures to constituent service to the balance of civil-military relations in a democracy. NDI works to build legislatures and local governments that are professional, accountable, open and responsive to their citizens.

International cooperation is key to promoting democracy effectively and efficiently. It also conveys a deeper message to new and emerging democracies that while autocracies are inherently isolated and fearful of the outside world, democracies can count on international allies and an active support system. Headquartered in Washington D.C., with field offices in every region of the world, NDI complements the skills of its staff by enlisting volunteer experts from around the world, many of whom are veterans of democratic struggles in their own countries and share valuable perspectives on democratic development.
APPENDIX B

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION MISSION TO LEBANON
SHORT-TERM DELEGATION

JUNE 2009

DELEGATION CO-LEADERS

JOHN E. SUNUNU
Former Senator
United States

ROBIN CARNAHAN
Secretary of State, Missouri
United States

FRANK G. WISNER
Former United States Ambassador
to Egypt and India
United States

AUDREY MCLAUGHLIN
Former leader of the New Democratic
Party
Canada

Leslie Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute
Canada

Delegation Leadership Group

PAUL DEWAR
Member of Parliament
Canada

Ahmed Herzenni
President of the Advisory Council on Human Rights
Morocco

Eugene Eidenberg
Executive Committee, Board of Directors, National Democratic Institute
United States

Emeka Ihedioha
Majority Whip in the House of Representatives
Nigeria

Nevin Gaye Erbatur
Member of Parliament
Turkey

Brigitta Ohlsson
Member of Parliament
Sweden

Nancy Soderberg
Former Ambassador to the United Nations
United States
Delegation

Paul Adams
Executive Director of EKOS Research Associates
Canada

Cheikh Sid Ahmed Ould Babamine
Former Chairman, National Independent Election Commission
Mauritania

Graeme Bannerman
Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute
United States

Daniel Brumberg
Director, Muslim World Initiative, United States Institute of Peace
United States

Perry Cammack
Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
United States

J. Scott Carpenter
Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
United States

Anna Chavez
Communications Consultant
United States

Elizabeth Clark
Former Foreign Service Officer
United States

Katie Croake
Program Manager, National Democratic Institute
United States

Gefarina Djohan
Former Deputy Secretary General, National Awakening Party (PKB)
Indonesia

Karen Farrell
Senior Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy
United States

David French
Former Chief Executive, Westminster Foundation for Democracy
United Kingdom

Matthew Frumin
Senior Advisor, National Democratic Institute
United States

Kathy Gest
Director, Public Affairs, National Democratic Institute
United States

Jay Ghazal
Director, Ghazal & Associates, LLC
United States

Joseph Hall
Senior Advisor for the Middle East and North Africa; Resident Senior Director, Lebanon, National Democratic Institute
United States
STEVEN HEYDEMANN  
Vice President, 
United States Institute of Peace  
United States

JANE HURTIG  
Resident Country Director, Mauritania, 
National Democratic Institute  
Canada

LILA JAAFAR  
Resident Senior Program Officer, Egypt,  
National Democratic Institute  
United States

PATRICIA KEEFER  
Deputy Director, International Affairs,  
American Federation of Teachers  
United States

ZORAN LUCIC  
Executive Director, 
Center for Free Elections and Democracy  
Serbia

MONA MAKRAM-EBEID  
Former Member of Parliament;  
Professor of Political Science,  
American University in Cairo  
Egypt

MAUD TENDAI NYAMHUNGA  
Former Member of Parliament  
Zimbabwe

HAMADOU SALI  
Vice President, Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic States  
Cameroon

ARIANIT SHEHU  
Resident Senior Program Manager, Jordan,  
National Democratic Institute  
Kosovo

RANDA SLIM  
Guest Scholar,  
United States Institute of Peace  
United States

SAMANTHA SMOOT  
Lebanon Election Observation Mission Director, National Democratic Institute  
United States

SHARON TEE  
International Accounting Manager,  
National Democratic Institute  
United States

KARIN VON HIPPEL  
Co-Director, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies  
United States

LOUSEWIES VAN DER LAAN  
Former Member of Parliament  
The Netherlands

TAMARA COFMAN WITTES  
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution  
United States

DRAGAN ZELIC  
International Relations Coordinator, GONG  
Croatia
APPENDIX C

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION MISSION TO LEBANON

JUNE 2009

LONG-TERM OBSERVERS

Margarida Alves
Long-Term Observer Coordinator
Portugal

Ajay Patel
Long-Term Observer
United Kingdom

Maren Milligan
Long-Term Observer
United States

Karla Jamankulova
Long-Term Observer
Kazakhstan

Luis Duarte
Long-Term Observer
Paraguay

Rabab Al Medhwahi
Long-Term Observer
Yemen

Peter Novotny
Long-Term Observer
Slovakia

Yani Tyskerud
Long-Term Observer
United Kingdom
Appendix D

Preliminary Statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to Lebanon's 2009 Parliamentary Elections

Beirut, June 8, 2009

I. Executive Summary

This preliminary statement is offered by the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) international election observer delegation to Lebanon's June 7, 2009, parliamentary elections. The delegation visited Lebanon from June 3 to June 9, 2009, and was deployed throughout the country.

The delegation was co-led by Robin Carnahan, Secretary of State for the State of Missouri, Audrey McLaughlin, former Member of Parliament and former leader of the New Democratic Party (Canada), John E. Sununu, former U.S. Senator, and Frank G. Wisner, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and India. The delegation leadership also included parliamentarians from Canada, Nigeria, Sweden, and Turkey, and political and civic leaders, regional and election experts, media specialists, and human rights activists from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America. The delegation consisted of 52 credentialed observers, both long and short-term, from 22 countries.

The delegation's findings were informed by two pre-election missions, one in March and one in May. A team of eight NDI long-term observers has been monitoring the electoral process since March 30, 2009. NDI, a registered NGO in Lebanon, has worked with political and civil society actors in the country since 1995 and has maintained an office in Beirut since 2001. The Institute is working to support and strengthen Lebanese civil society, electoral reform, and other elements that are needed to create strong democratic institutions and a peaceful and stable society.

Prior to the elections, the delegation met with representatives of political parties, civil society, the domestic election monitoring group, the incumbent government, election administrators, and the Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC). On election day, the delegation visited over 300 polling centers throughout the country.

The delegation's purpose was to demonstrate the international community's continued support for advancing the democratic process in Lebanon and to provide an impartial assessment of the June 7 parliamentary elections. NDI conducted its activities in accordance with the laws of Lebanon and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.
Summary of Observations

The Lebanese people went to the polls on June 7 to elect a new parliament. They did so under a new electoral law and administration agreed to by all political contestants. This represents a significant step toward transparency and confidence in the process and the development of Lebanon and its institutions as a sovereign state. The Lebanese people should be proud of the progress made in the electoral process.

Too often Lebanon has been defined by events and actors outside the country's borders. NDI is part of a growing network of friends of Lebanon who agree that Lebanon's people alone should determine the country's future.

Lebanon's history and sectarian divisions have given rise to a unique electoral system based on an allocation of seats along confessional lines. The outcome in some districts was pre-determined by political deals among contestants, but the enthusiasm and voter turnout on election day demonstrated that there is significant political competition and that voters regard the parliamentary elections as an opportunity to shape their country's future.

While not without flaws, Lebanon's June 7 election was fundamentally peaceful and well administered and should provide the basis for confidence in the electoral process and by extension, the formation of the new government.

In this competitive environment, set in an already polarized context, the Minister of the Interior, formerly a civil society activist, secured the confidence of all major contestants by establishing a record of impartiality. The Minister and Ministry, charged with the administration of the elections and with coordinating logistics and security on election day, also gained the trust of the public.

Most polling stations opened on time. Ballots, voters lists and other necessary election materials were on hand in most of polling places observed by NDI's delegation. Observers noted the enthusiasm and dedication of poll workers, party agents, and voters alike. Domestic observers were present in virtually every polling center and party representatives from each major political coalition attended the majority of polling places, providing oversight of the process and helping to mitigate potential political clashes.

Lebanese elections have traditionally taken place over four consecutive weekends and 2009 marks the first time they have been held on one day. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) were charged with providing security on election day and with facilitating movement of voters who had to travel to their ancestral villages to vote. Given the magnitude of the task, and the
unprecedented mobilization of security forces, observers noted that the LAF and ISF discharged their responsibilities professionally and efficiently.

Traffic congestion, anticipated as a major election day challenge, was not a significant factor in the election, and voter movements appeared unhindered. While observers praised the effectiveness of the security and logistics planning and the positive role of security forces, it was noted that in future elections the LAF and ISF’s role should be limited to security, with election officials taking full control of polling centers.

There were reports of administrative problems. In many districts, particularly where political competition was greatest, observers reported long lines and voting delays as long as four hours. Some voters left polling stations without voting; in other areas frustration with slow procedures caused tensions leading to minor disruptions of the process.

There were a few reports of irregularities in voter identification and some problems with inaccurate voters lists. There were numerous reports of campaigning in and around polling stations and reports of party agents distributing campaign materials. The media reported a small number of violent incidents.

Structural flaws noted in the run-up to the election included unequal district sizes, reports of vote buying, and the lack of a pre-printed, standardized, and official ballot. Voters may write their choice of candidates on a blank piece of paper and parties distribute completed ballots to voters using various paper sizes and print fonts. It is possible that party agents could identify the ballots distributed by their faction, compromising the secrecy of the vote - an important standard for fair elections. It should be noted that some improvements were made for 2009, including an envelope for the ballot and transparent ballot boxes that contributed to confidentiality of the vote.

The apparently successful conduct of the 2009 parliamentary polls forms the basis for further institutional strengthening in Lebanon by providing the framework for a genuinely independent election commission and strengthened media and campaign finance regulations. The election could also enhance public confidence in the LAF and ISF, helping develop these important security institutions. Finally the Lebanese people may be inspired to improve the representativeness and accountability of the parliament through the adoption of further election reform following this election.

While the 2009 elections were a very positive step in the development of Lebanon's institutions, every step toward better governance in Lebanon is tentative, and the existence of weapons and armed groups outside the control of the state give rise to a fear that achievements could be quickly overridden or reversed. Lebanon's democratic institutions are vulnerable and would benefit from the continuation of the remarkable international interest demonstrated in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections.
It is still early in the post-election period, and although official results have been announced, election complaints and challenges still must be considered and resolved in accordance with the rule of law. The delegation, therefore, cannot render a complete or definitive assessment of the election process at this time. Indeed, it is the people of Lebanon who will determine the credibility of these elections and their significance for ongoing democratization processes. Further statements may be released and a final report will be completed after the period for filing complaints with the Constitutional Council has concluded.

II. Electoral Context

Lebanon, which has one of the most complex political landscapes in the world, has held periodic elections since it won independence. In 1943, a "National Pact" was agreed upon, establishing what has become known as the confessional system, confirming representation in the parliament among religious "confessions" and reserving certain political posts for specific groups. Under the confessional system, the country's president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the parliament's speaker a Shi'a Muslim.

From 1975-1990, Lebanon experienced a civil war, which left Syrian troops in the country as a "peacekeeping" force. In March 2005, in the wake of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the anti-Syrian popular movement known as the Cedar Revolution that followed, Syria withdrew its army and intelligence services, ending its 15-year dominance over Lebanon. A few months later, Lebanon held its first parliamentary elections free of Syrian influence. A coalition named for the date of a major anti-Syrian demonstration -March 14th- won the 2005 elections, and the group known as the March 14 coalition, named after the date of a popular pro-Syrian rally, became the parliamentary minority.

The current phase of Lebanon's political history began in August 2006, after the end of a 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah. The governing March 14 coalition and the March 8 opposition coalition clashed on two primary issues: the right of Hezbollah to maintain weapons and the formation of an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. On November 11, 2006, the five Shi'a Ministers representing Hezbollah and the Shi'a Amal movement resigned from the Council of Ministers. The opposition launched an open-ended sit-in around the government offices in Beirut and called for the formation of a "national unity cabinet" in which it would hold veto power. Speaker of Parliament, and leader of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri subsequently closed the doors of the parliament, arguing that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's cabinet had lost its legitimacy and was no longer constitutional due to the absence of Shi'a representation.
Despite several international attempts to bring leaders back to the dialogue table, the rival coalitions failed to reconcile and resume the political process. November 2007 marked a new development in the crisis when the mandate of the president came to an end and no successor was elected, as the President of the Republic is elected by parliament under the Lebanese Constitution, and the parliament was paralyzed. The presidential vacuum served to further exacerbate the ongoing crisis.

The standoff escalated in May 2008 when the government was perceived by Hezbollah to have challenged the group’s influence over security of the airport and its surrounding areas and called for the dismantling of its private telecommunications network in Lebanon. Street fighting erupted in Beirut and other regions throughout the country with Hezbollah and its allies establishing dominance in Beirut, prompting the Arab League to invite Lebanese leaders to Doha, Qatar. On May 21, all sides signed the Doha Accord and agreed to end all acts of violence, elect Army Commander General Michel Sleiman as President of the Republic, form a national unity cabinet (in which the opposition holds veto power - the so-called "blocking third"), and organize parliamentary elections in the spring of 2009 based on the districts of the 1960 electoral law. Parliament elected President Sleiman on May 25, who subsequently asked Prime Minister Siniora to form the new government.

As political leaders were convening in Doha, civil society groups that had gathered under the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER) launched a lobbying campaign to include key administrative reforms to the 1960 electoral law. While the law that ultimately passed in the fall of 2008 included some of the reforms recommended by the National Commission for the Electoral Law (Butros Commission) and for which CCER was advocating - campaign finance and media regulations and a single day election - MPs defending elements of the status quo from both the governing and opposition coalitions prevented the adoption of other amendments. Proportional representation, a quota for women, and, most importantly, pre-printed, standardized, official ballots failed to make it into law.

III. PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

The pre-election period witnessed important positive developments.

While control of many of the parliamentary seats is predictable based on confessional distributions and the relative strength of factions in specific areas and some were decided by bargains between political leaders before election day, a significant number of swing districts witnessed vigorous and competitive campaigns, which will determine the composition of the next majority in parliament and therefore the next government.
The newly-formed Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) serves as a potentially important precursor institution. It is charged with monitoring the campaign finance and media regulations included in chapters 5 and 6 of the new electoral law - significant improvements from past practices - albeit diluted by potential loopholes. While the SCEC falls short of an independent electoral commission, it sets an important precedent as an intermediary body that could pave the way for the creation of such a commission as was the case in Mexico in the 1990s.

Though late, and after much political debate, the formation of the Constitutional Council represents a positive development in Lebanon’s electoral process, ensuring that a body exists to receive electoral challenges and to validate the process. Public confidence in the Council will increase if it provides effective enforcement of election regulations.

Additionally, the decision of the Council of Ministers to invite domestic and international observers to monitor the June 7 elections marked the first time in Lebanon’s history in which observers were accredited to observe the electoral process. This initiative brings an added degree of transparency to the process and helps to build confidence in the elections by Lebanese citizens.

At the same time, the pre-election period highlighted significant challenges for the election and post-election period.

Assessing the Lebanese electoral system in relation to international standards and norms presents a challenge for election observation. The Lebanese army is charged with maintaining order around the elections but one of the political contestants maintains an armed force not under control of the state. Other parties also possess arms of various sizes and capabilities.

The lack of pre-printed, standardized, official ballots can compromise the secrecy of the vote and strengthens the power of political elites, creating the opportunity for deal-making and undue political influence. A uniform pre-printed ballot would help ensure voting privacy, expedite counting, and discourage some forms of vote buying.

Furthermore, districting under the current electoral law could lead to justifiable claims of under-representation, as it created significant discrepancies in the number of voters per district, giving unequal weight given to each vote.

Vote buying - a common complaint voiced by representatives of all parties - appears to be a prevalent practice. Whether purchasing airplane tickets, exchanging money or promising local services, buying the promise of a vote has a corrosive effect on democratic institutions and devalues the principle of a free vote cast on the basis of conscience.
The requirement that voters register and vote in their ancestral villages rather than their place of residence, compounded with the generally positive new provision calling for elections to be held on one day, could exacerbate challenges of voter mobility and security. Some voters are required to return to villages they left during the civil war and, in the absence of reconciliation with former enemies, some have been apprehensive about returning to these areas to vote.

In the absence of reforms designed to increase women’s representation in politics and parliament and given the small number of women candidates, it appears likely that the already low number of women in parliament will decrease after the election.

IV. Election Day Observations

1. Conduct of Elections

Among the most striking aspects of election day was the high voter turnout and overall orderly and enthusiastic conduct of the elections. While turnout varied from district to district, overall the turnout was 20 percent higher than in 2005, according to the Ministry of the Interior, and as high as 70 percent in the most contested districts. While there were incidents of friction and campaigning in close proximity to the vast majority of polling stations observed, there was a spirit of general enthusiasm and cooperation. Despite concern about conducting the elections on one day, logistics did not prove to be a challenge and voters were easily able to get to and from polling stations. Overcoming this challenge may have been facilitated by the significant security presence, careful planning, and announcement of national holidays for the day before and after the election.

2. Organization of Polling Centers

In general, polling centers were well managed and administered. Most polling stations opened on time. Ballots, voters lists and other necessary election materials were on hand in most of polling places observed by NDI’s delegation. In some cases, polling centers were taxed by high turnout, which led to long lines, a disorganized environment, and frustrated voters. Some voters left polling stations without voting and the slow procedures caused tensions leading to minor disruptions of the process.

The backlog may have been exacerbated by the fact that often polling stations were operating with two instead of three staff, as required by the electoral law, and a lack of clarity over who held authority over the polling station. In contrast, polling stations were packed with party agents who displayed party paraphernalia and distributed branded lunch boxes. Additionally, the election workers were operating under
a new law and, at times, polling station workers were unable to answer questions posed by voters.

3. **Ballot**

Lack of a pre-preprinted, standardized, official ballot led to the majority of voters voting with ballots printed and distributed by party agents. This practice makes it possible for party agents to identify the ballots distributed by their faction, thus potentially compromising the secrecy of the vote. It should be noted that some improvements were made for 2009, including an envelope for the ballot and transparent ballot boxes that contributed to confidentiality of the vote.

4. **Role and Training of Security Forces**

The LAF and ISF, which were charged with maintaining public order on election day, performed their responsibilities professionally and efficiently. While their overall performance boosted public confidence in the security forces and made voters comfortable in turning out to the polls, in some cases their role was unclear. Observers noted instances in which security forces played a more active role than mandated by law inside polling stations, and other instances in which they were passive in crowd control.

5. **Vote Buying**

Observers heard numerous allegations of vote buying, and the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections reported 44 incidents of bribes in a number of districts, particularly in Zahle, Tripoli, Chouf, Kserwan, and Saida (Sidon).

6. **Accessibility**

Despite the provision in the electoral law requiring all polling centers to be accessible to people with disabilities, many polling centers did not meet these requirements.

7. **Role of Domestic Observers and International Election Observers**

These elections were the first in which Lebanon accepted and accredited significant numbers of domestic and international observers. Lebanese civil society organizations, led by the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) within the Coalition Libanaise pour l'Observation d'Elections (CLOE), organized Lebanon's largest domestic observer mission. LADE deployed a total of 2,500 observers throughout the country, which represented a combination of stationary and mobile observers. LADE and CLOE developed an SMS (text message) reporting system, which was used for the first time in Lebanon.
In addition to NDI, the European Union and the Carter Center also organized international observer missions.

V. Recommendations

- While the 2009 elections were generally well run, there were administrative challenges resulting in part from the high voter turnout and because officials were administrating a new electoral law. Among improvements that might be considered are clarifying authority over administration of polling centers by appointing a single civilian official, ensuring that there are an adequate number of officials in polling stations, and enforcing the prohibition on campaigning by party agents in polling stations. NDI's final report will contain more detailed recommendations.

- Elections are a vehicle to address and resolve political differences through peaceful means. In Lebanon, strengthening the mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes is of the highest priority. In that spirit, we urge that any controversies about election outcomes be referred to the Constitutional Council for orderly resolution and that all the political contestants allow the expressed will of the people to form the basis for governance. We urge the Council to act quickly and vigorously to investigate and resolve electoral challenges.

- NDI's delegation recommends the adoption of a pre-printed, standardized, and uniform ballot.

- While it had limited authority, the Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) established an important precedent in this election. Consideration should be given to strengthening the role of the SCEC for the next elections by converting it to an independent election commission.

- The confessional system has evolved in Lebanon as a mechanism to protect the rights of sectarian groups. Increasingly, however, political actors in Lebanon have expressed an interest in at least supplementing the confessional system with other avenues for representation. The delegation encourages the continued debate of further electoral reform as recommended by the President Sleiman, the Minister of the Interior, SCEC, CCER and others.

- The 2009 elections mark the first time women were engaged as poll workers. Consideration should be given to reforms that would result in increased participation of women in all aspects of Lebanese public life, including political parties, parliament, and government.

- In advance of the next elections, care should be taken to implement the requirement of the law that all polling centers be fully accessible to people with disabilities.
Observers reported a need for greater information for candidates, parties, and the public on the specifics of the new electoral law and noted that there is confusion about the role of officials in the electoral process. NDI recommends that election officials initiate a more extensive voter education campaign in advance of the next elections.

VI. BACKGROUND ON THE DELEGATION AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION

International election observation has become widely accepted by countries all around the globe and it now plays an important role in informing citizens and the international community about the nature of each country's electoral process. International election observation, when done in accordance with accepted principles for impartial assessments, seeks to enhance the integrity of election processes by encouraging best electoral practices and deterring misconduct, as well as by identifying problems and irregularities, which can lead to effective redress. It thus contributes to building public confidence in elections and resulting governments.

International observation does not favor any electoral contestant and election observers are welcomed by long-established democracies, as well as by countries that are in the early stages of democratic development. NDI has organized over 150 delegations to observe pre-election, election-day, and post-election processes around the globe, including in Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Yemen, as well as Lebanon. The Institute conducts its election observation in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which is endorsed by 32 intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Secretariat.

The delegation is grateful for the welcome and cooperation it received from voters, election officials, candidates, political party leaders, domestic election observers, and civil activists. NDI had been officially accredited to conduct an international election observation mission by the Ministry of the Interior and is grateful to the Ministry for welcoming this and other international observation groups. The delegation offers this post-election statement in the spirit of supporting and strengthening democratic institutions in Lebanon.

The Institute's international election observation mission in Lebanon is funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

NDI CONTACT INFORMATION

For further information, please contact: Leslie Campbell, Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa, Les@ndi.org, in Washington, DC +1 202 728 5500, or Joseph Hall, Senior Advisor, jhall@ndi.org, in Beirut +961 1 566 518.
APPENDIX E

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION MISSION TO LEBANON
JUNE 2009

PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT DELEGATIONS

MARCH 2009

Leslie Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute
Canada

Paul Adams
Executive Director of EKOS Research Associates
Canada

Mona Yacoubian
Special Adviser, Muslim World Initiative, United States Institute of Peace
United States

MAY 2009

Madeleine K. Albright
Former Secretary of State
United States

Charles Joseph Clark
Former Prime Minister
Canada

Leslie Campbell
Senior Associate and Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute
Canada

Kenneth Wollack
President, National Democratic Institute
United States

Toni Verstandig
Director of Middle East Programs, Aspen Institute
United States
May 7, 2009

APPENDIX F

STATEMENT OF THE PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT DELEGATION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI) REGARDING LEBANON’S JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

In one month, the Lebanese people will go to the polls to elect a new parliament. They will do so under a new electoral law and administration agreed upon by all political contestants. This represents a significant step toward greater transparency and confidence in the process and the development of Lebanon and its institutions as a sovereign state.

Too often Lebanon has been defined by events and actors outside the country's borders. The National Democratic Institute is part of a growing network of friends of Lebanon who agree that Lebanon’s people alone should determine the country's future.

Lebanon's history and sectarian divisions have given rise to a unique electoral system based on an allocation of seats along confessional lines. It includes elements of competition, and, when conducted peacefully, can lead to outcomes accepted as representative by voters and political competitors.

Over the past several years there has been a growing movement for political reform led by civil society groups. This effort led to the establishment of the Butros Commission which recommended major changes in the electoral system, including proportional representation, that could, over time, lead to strengthened institutions of representative government.

Some reforms were adopted by parliament and a number of improvements were approved for this election cycle which, it is hoped, will pave the way for broader changes after the upcoming polls. This is a process we encourage.

Recent and positive electoral reforms that represent improvements over past elections include the following:

- **Formation of an election supervisory committee.** The Supervisory Committee on the Electoral Campaign (SCEC) falls short of an independent electoral commission but sets an important precedent as an intermediary body that could serve as a precursor to such a commission as was the case in Mexico in the 1990s. It is responsible for ensuring the implementation of Chapters 5 and 6 of the electoral law, which stipulate campaign finance and media regulations.
Impartial Administration. The Minister of the Interior, who is ultimately charged with the administration of the elections, was in our discussions widely viewed as impartial, professional and committed to administering a transparent and credible process.

Campaign finance and media regulations. Newly-enacted campaign finance regulations, although diluted by significant loopholes, set a key precedent by mandating expenditure limits. Meanwhile, media regulations seek to ensure the candidates' fair and equal access to all media outlets. While questions remain regarding enforcement of the new rules, most parties and candidates have welcomed the changes.

Accreditation of domestic and international observers. The June 7 elections will be the first in Lebanon's history in which the Council of Ministers issued a decree allowing the Minister of the Interior to accredit international observers. The electoral law also allows domestic election observation. This initiative brings an added degree of transparency to the process and helps to build confidence in the elections by Lebanese citizens.

At the same time, assessing the Lebanese electoral system in relation to international norms and standards presents a challenge for international observation. The Lebanese army is charged with maintaining order around the elections, but one of the political contestants maintains a major armed force not under the control of the state. Other parties also possess arms of various sizes and capabilities.

Given the allocation of parliamentary seats by district and along confessional lines, and a "winner take all" majoritarian system, the results are all but predetermined in an overwhelming majority of the races.

The lack of pre-printed ballots can compromise secrecy of the vote and strengthens the power of political elites creating the opportunity for deal-making and undue influence of voters. Moreover, the drawing of district lines has led to large discrepancies in the number of voters per district and therefore to unequal weight given to each vote.

Voters register and vote in their ancestral villages rather than their place of residence, requiring them to travel long distances and, in some cases to areas now dominated by another confessional group. Moreover, women are required to vote in the ancestral home of their husbands.

All of the above-mentioned issues have been part of the Lebanese electoral reform debate. While further reforms can be considered following the upcoming polls, there are a number of steps that could be taken between now and June 7 to further enhance the credibility of the elections:
The ability to challenge and adjudicate election results. According to Lebanese law, the Constitutional Council (comprised of ten members—five elected by parliament and five appointed by the Council of Ministers) is charged with accrediting the entire process through resolving voting disputes after the polls. However, the Council has yet to be formed, with many observers concerned that it will not be established by election day. The delegation hopes that a means will be found between now and June 7 to break the existing political deadlock and that the Council will be established and fulfill its mandate.

Logistical and security issues. Holding elections in a single day rather than on consecutive weekends is one of the newly-enacted reforms; however it entails major logistical challenges. The election authorities recognize that given the large scale movement of voters around the elections and closely contested races in certain districts, plans must be put in place to ensure adequate voter mobility and security. Mobilizing an estimated 30,000 security forces (both the army and police) will require significant management and coordination efforts by the Defense and Interior Ministries. The delegation also hopes that the Interior Ministry will take all appropriate measures under its authority against those who may violate electoral law during this critical pre-election period. Voter security and a peaceful election environment can be further enhanced with the adoption by the political parties of a code of conduct—an initiative now being advanced by the Minister of the Interior.

Voter education. NDI's long-term observers report a need for greater information for candidates, parties, and the public on the specifics of the new election law and note that there is confusion about the role of district and local officials in the election process. The delegation hopes that between now and election day, the election authorities could expand the education campaign they launched earlier to better inform election workers and voters about new regulations.

Background

NDI's delegation visited Lebanon from May 5-8 to assess preparations for the June 7, 2009 parliamentary elections. The purpose of the delegation was to demonstrate the interest of the international community in the development of the democratic political process and governance in Lebanon, and to present an accurate and impartial assessment of the political environment leading up to the June 7 polls.

The delegation was composed of Madeleine K. Albright, Chairman of NDI and former U.S. Secretary of State; Joseph Clark, former Prime Minister of Canada; Toni G. Verstandig, Director of Middle East Programs at the Aspen Institute; Kenneth Wollack, President of NDI; and Leslie Campbell, NDI's
Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa. The delegation met with candidates, party leaders, government officials, representatives of the major political alliances and various other leaders from the women's, civil society, and international communities.

International election observation has become widely accepted by countries all around the globe and it now plays an important role in informing citizens and the international community about the nature of each country's electoral process. International election observation, when done in accordance with accepted principles for impartial assessments, has the potential to enhance the integrity of election processes by encouraging best electoral practices and deterring misconduct, as well as by identifying problems and irregularities, which can lead to effective redress. It thus contributes to building the appropriate degree of public confidence in elections and resulting governments.

International observation does not favor any electoral contestant and election observers are welcomed by long-established democracies, as well as by countries that are in the early stages of democratic development. NDI has organized over 150 delegations to observe pre-election, election-day and post-election processes around the globe, including in Algeria, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Yemen, as well as Lebanon. The Institute conducts its election observation in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation which is endorsed by 32 intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Secretariat.

Pre-election assessment visits are an important component of NDI’s election observation mission. Ten weeks in advance of the Lebanese election, NDI sent a team of experienced long-term observers from Paraguay, Portugal, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Yemen, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They are observing the pre-election period in five regions in the country. NDI will deploy an additional international group of 50 observers for the June 7 elections and the post-election period.

NDI had been officially accredited to conduct an international election observation mission by the Ministry of the Interior and is grateful to the Ministry for welcoming this and other international observation groups. The delegation does not seek to interfere in Lebanon’s election process, nor does it intend to, or could it, render a final assessment of the election process. NDI recognizes that it will be the people of Lebanon who will determine the credibility of elections. The delegation offers this pre-election statement in the spirit of supporting and strengthening democratic institutions in Lebanon.

NDI has sponsored democratic development programs in Lebanon since 1995 and has maintained an office in the country since 2001. The Institute’s international election observation mission in Lebanon is funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development.
APPENDIX G
LEBANON 2009 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS
### Appendix H

#### Number of Voters per Seat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of Registered Voters</th>
<th>Number of Registered Voters per Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92,764</td>
<td>18,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>101,787</td>
<td>25,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut III</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>252,301</td>
<td>25,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>223,538</td>
<td>31,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minieh-Dinnieh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97,352</td>
<td>32,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>196,149</td>
<td>24,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zghorta</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71,035</td>
<td>23,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becharre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46,422</td>
<td>23,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57,794</td>
<td>19,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mount Lebanon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58,444</td>
<td>29,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jbeil (Byblos)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75,582</td>
<td>25,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesrwan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89,228</td>
<td>17,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>170,744</td>
<td>21,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>151,590</td>
<td>25,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>116,181</td>
<td>23,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>181,949</td>
<td>22,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida (Sidon)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53,859</td>
<td>26,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahrany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92,995</td>
<td>30,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour (Tyre)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>153,060</td>
<td>38,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54,188</td>
<td>18,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>121,912</td>
<td>40,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>123,396</td>
<td>231,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjayoun-Hasbaya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>138,844</td>
<td>967,72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bekaa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck-Hermel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>255,637</td>
<td>465,52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>158,003</td>
<td>22,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bekaa-Rachaya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>122,487</td>
<td>20,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>3,257,243</td>
<td>26,211 (Average)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Complete List of Winning Candidates per District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Winners</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Parliamentary Bloc</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% of Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serge Tour-Sarkissian</td>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>Hanshak Party - March 14</td>
<td>19,281</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jean Oghassabian</td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>Ramgavar Party - March 14</td>
<td>19,317</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michel Pharaon</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>19,742</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nayla Tueni</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>19,985</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nadim Gemayel</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Kataeb Party - March 14</td>
<td>19,340</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sebouh Kalpakian</td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>Hanshak Party - March 14</td>
<td>Uncontested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arthur Nazarian</td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>Tashnag Party - March 8</td>
<td>Uncontested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hani Kobeissi</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>15,126</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nohad Al-Mashnouk</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>16,583</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saadeddine Hariri</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>78,382</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tamam Salam</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>76,925</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Karrani</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,448</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ammar Houri</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,201</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imad Al-Hout</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Jamaa Islamiya - March 14</td>
<td>75,954</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nabil de Freige</td>
<td>Christian Minorities</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,341</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghazi Al-Aridi</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>76,792</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bassem Al-Shab</td>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,510</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atef Majdalani</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,133</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghazi Youssef</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,410</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Akkar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khaled Daher</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>73,954</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khaled Zahraman</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>72,658</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mouin Al-Meraabi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>71,596</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Riyad Rahal</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>78,685</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nidal Tohme</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>78,437</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khodr Habib</td>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>76,679</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hadi Hobeich</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>78,450</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minieh-Dinnieh</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad Fatfat</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>37,667</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qassem Abdul Aziz</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>National Entente Bloc - March 14</td>
<td>39,491</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashem Alameddine</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>36,159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Al Safadi</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>National Entente Bloc - March 14</td>
<td>66,339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najib Mikati</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Tripoli Solidarity Bloc - Non Affiliated</td>
<td>65,076</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Kabbara</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>55,511</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samir Al-Jisr</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>54,259</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Karami</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Tripoli Solidarity Bloc - Non Affiliated</td>
<td>42,987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badr Wannous</td>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>55,415</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Fadel</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>55,884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samer Saadeh</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Kataeb Party - March 14</td>
<td>49,861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleiman Frangieh</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Marada Movement - March 8</td>
<td>19,227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estephan Douiehi</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Marada Movement - March 8</td>
<td>17,874</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim Karam</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Marada Movement - March 8</td>
<td>17,173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sethrida Tawk Geagea</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>13,066</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elie Keyrouz</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>12,751</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Makary</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>14,952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Habib</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>13,809</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Ghosn</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>13,662</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boutros Harr</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>17,733</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Zahra</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>17,541</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walid Khoury</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>28,852</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Abi Ramia</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>28,598</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbas Hashem</td>
<td>Shii</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>28,332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Aoun</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>31,869</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Elias Al-Khazen</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>31,387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youssef Khalil</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>31,313</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naamatallah Abi Nasr</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>30,989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilberte Zwein</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>30,444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Kanaan</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>49,147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim Salhab</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>48,673</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NDI Final Report on The Lebanese Parliamentary Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>Hikmat Dib</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>43,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alain Aoun</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>45,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naji Gharios</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>44,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Ammar</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>44,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilal Farhat</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Independent - March 8</td>
<td>44,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fadi Al-Awar</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Lebanese Democratic Party - March 8</td>
<td>45,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>Akram Shehayaeb</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>36,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Talal Arslan</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Lebanese Democratic Party - March 8</td>
<td>23,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Henri Helou</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>35,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fouad Al-Saad</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>35,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fadi Al-Habr</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Kataeb Party - March 14</td>
<td>33,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>Dory Chamoun</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>National Liberal Party - March 14</td>
<td>61,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elie Aoun</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>60,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georges Adwan</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>58,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walid Jumblatt</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>62,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marwan Hamade</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>61,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alaedinne Terro</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>62,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Hajjar</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>62,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nehme Tohme</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>62,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Bahia Hariri</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>25,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fouad Siniora</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>23,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahrany</td>
<td>Nabih Berri</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>45,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Osseiran</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>43,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michel Moussa</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>43,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Candidate Name</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>Abdul Majid Saleh</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>69,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Fneish</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>69,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nawaf Al-Mussawi</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>68,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Khreis</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>67,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>Ziad Assouad</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>15,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michel Helou</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>13,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issam Sawaya</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement - March 8</td>
<td>14,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>Mohammad Raad</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>62,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yassine Jaber</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>60,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Latif Al-Zein</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>55,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>Hassan Fadlallah</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>49,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Bazzi</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>49,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ayoub Hmayed</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>48,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjayoun-</td>
<td>Ali Hassan Khalil</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>48,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasbaya</td>
<td>Ali Fayad</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>46,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anwar Khalil</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>50,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assaad Hardan</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party - March 8</td>
<td>46,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qassem Hachem</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Baath Party - March 8</td>
<td>46,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>Ali Al-Moqdad</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>108,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nawwar Al-Sahily</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>108,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hussein Al-Haj Hassan</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>108,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghazi Zeitter</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Amal Movement - March 8</td>
<td>107,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hussein Al-Mussawi</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>104,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assem Kanso</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Baath Party - March 8</td>
<td>102,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamel Rifai</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>108,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walid Sukkarieh</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Hezbollah - March 8</td>
<td>108,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marwan Fares</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party - March 8</td>
<td>107,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emile Rahme</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Solidarity Party - March 8</td>
<td>109,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td>Candidate Name</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zahlé</strong></td>
<td>Tony Abou Khater</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>48,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nicolas Fattoush</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Zahle Bloc - March 14</td>
<td>47,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shant Janjanian</td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>48,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Al-Maalouf</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces - March 14</td>
<td>48,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elie Marouni</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Kataeb Party - March 14</td>
<td>49,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okab Sakr</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Zahle Bloc - March 14</td>
<td>49,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assem Arajf</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Zahle Bloc - March 14</td>
<td>48,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Bekaa- Rachaya</strong></td>
<td>Ziad Al-Kadri</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>34,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamal Jarrah</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Future Movement - March 14</td>
<td>33,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wael Abou Faour</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>35,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antoine Saad</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party - March 14</td>
<td>33,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Ghanem</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Independent - March 14</td>
<td>35,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amine Wehbe</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>Democratic Left Movement - March 14</td>
<td>34,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix J

Election Results by Political Party and Bloc
APPENDIX K

MAPPING LEBANON’S MAIN POLITICAL GROUPS
APPENDIX L

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCER Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform
CLOE Coalition Libanaise pour l'Observation des Elections
CSO Civil Society Organization
EU European Union
FPM Free Patriotic Movement
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems
ISF Internal Security Forces
LADE Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections
LAF Lebanese Armed Forces
LF Lebanese Forces
LPHU Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union
LTA Lebanese Transparency Association
LTO Long-Term Observer
MP Member of Parliament
MOIM Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities
NDI National Democratic Institute
OCU Observation Coordination Unit
PR Proportional Representation
PSP Progressive Socialist Party
SCEC Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns
SMS Short Message Service
SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Party
STO Short-Term Advisor
TOT Training of Trainers
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
USAID United States Agency for International Development
APPENDIX M

Ceilings for Electoral Spending per District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>Varying Ceiling</th>
<th>Fixed Ceiling</th>
<th>Final Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BEIRUT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut I</td>
<td>92,764</td>
<td>371,056,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>521,056,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut II</td>
<td>101,787</td>
<td>407,148,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>557,148,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut III</td>
<td>252,301</td>
<td>1,009,204,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>1,159,204,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MOUNT LEBANON</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>151,590</td>
<td>606,360,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>756,360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metn</td>
<td>170,744</td>
<td>682,976,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>832,976,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>181,949</td>
<td>727,796,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>877,796,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>116,181</td>
<td>464,724,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>614,724,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesrwan</td>
<td>89,227</td>
<td>356,908,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>506,908,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jbeil (Byblos)</td>
<td>75,585</td>
<td>302,340,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>452,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida (Sidon)</td>
<td>53,859</td>
<td>215,436,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>365,436,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahrany</td>
<td>93,005</td>
<td>372,020,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>522,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>121,897</td>
<td>487,588,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>637,588,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour (Tyre)</td>
<td>154,099</td>
<td>616,396,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>766,396,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>123,356</td>
<td>493,424,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>643,424,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjayoun-Hasbaya</td>
<td>138,890</td>
<td>555,560,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>705,560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>54,188</td>
<td>216,752,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>366,752,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BEKAAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>158,005</td>
<td>632,020,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>782,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bekaa-Rachaya</td>
<td>122,485</td>
<td>489,940,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>639,940,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck-Hermel</td>
<td>255,637</td>
<td>1,022,548,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>1,172,548,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>196,149</td>
<td>784,596,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>934,596,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minieh-Dinnieh</td>
<td>97,352</td>
<td>389,408,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>539,408,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>223,538</td>
<td>894,152,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>1,044,152,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zghorta</td>
<td>71,337</td>
<td>285,348,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>435,348,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
<td>57,795</td>
<td>231,180,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>381,180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becharre</td>
<td>46,409</td>
<td>185,636,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>335,636,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td>58,443</td>
<td>233,772,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>383,772,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

and

CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS

Commemorated October 27, 2005, at the United Nations, New York
DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES
FOR INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION OBSERVATION
and
CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION OBSERVERS

Commemorated October 27, 2005,
at the United Nations, New York

Endorsing Organizations as of October 24, 2005:
- African Union
- Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
- The Carter Center
- Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL)
- Commonwealth Secretariat
- Council of Europe European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
- Council of Europe – Parliamentary Assembly
- Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)
- European Commission
- European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO)
- Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS)
- IFES
- International IDEA
- Inter-Parliamentary Union
- International Republican Institute (IRI)
- National Democratic Institute (NDI)
- Organization of American States (OAS)
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
- Pacific Islands, Australia & New Zealand Electoral Administrators’ Association (PIANZEA)
- Pacific Island Forum
- Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF)
- United Nations Secretariat
- United States Association of Former Members of Congress (USAFMC)

This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers remain open for endorsement by other intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations. Endorsements should be recorded with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.
Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine democratic elections are internationally recognized human rights. Genuine democratic elections serve to resolve peacefully the competition for political power within a country and thus are central to the maintenance of peace and stability. Where governments are legitimized through genuine democratic elections, the scope for non-democratic challenges to power is reduced.

Genuine democratic elections are a requisite condition for democratic governance, because they are the vehicle through which the people of a country freely express their will, on a basis established by law, as to who shall have the legitimacy to govern in their name and in their interests. Achieving genuine democratic elections is a part of establishing broader processes and institutions of democratic governance. Therefore, while all election processes should reflect universal principles for genuine democratic elections, no election can be separated from the political, cultural and historical context in which it takes place.

Genuine democratic elections cannot be achieved unless a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised on an ongoing basis without discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, including among others disabilities, and without arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions. They, like other human rights and democracy more broadly, cannot be achieved without the protections of the rule of law. These precepts are recognized by human rights and other international instruments and by the documents of numerous intergovernmental organizations. Achieving genuine democratic elections therefore has become a matter of concern for international organizations, just as it is the concern of national institutions, political competitors, citizens and their civic organizations.

International election observation expresses the interest of the international community in the achievement of democratic elections, as part of democratic development, including respect for human rights and the rule of law. International election observation, which focuses on civil and political rights, is part of international human rights monitoring and must be conducted on the basis of the highest standards for impartiality concerning national political competitors and must be free from any bilateral or multilateral considerations that could conflict with impartiality. It assesses election processes in accordance with international principles for genuine democratic elections and domestic law, while recognizing that it is the people of a country who ultimately determine credibility and legitimacy of an election process.
International election observation has the potential to enhance the integrity of election processes, by deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud and by providing recommendations for improving electoral processes. It can promote public confidence, as warranted, promote electoral participation and mitigate the potential for election-related conflict. It also serves to enhance international understanding through the sharing of experiences and information about democratic development.

International election observation has become widely accepted around the world and plays an important role in providing accurate and impartial assessments about the nature of electoral processes. Accurate and impartial international election observation requires credible methodologies and cooperation with national authorities, the national political competitors (political parties, candidates and supporters of positions on referenda), domestic election monitoring organizations and other credible international election observer organizations, among others.

The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers therefore have joined to declare:

1 Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine democratic elections are internationally recognized human rights. Genuine democratic elections are central for maintaining peace and stability, and they provide the mandate for democratic governance.

2 In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and other international instruments, everyone has the right and must be provided with the opportunity to participate in the government and public affairs of his or her country, without any discrimination prohibited by international human rights principles and without any unreasonable restrictions. This right can be exercised directly, by participating in referenda, standing for elected office and by other means, or can be exercised through freely chosen representatives.

3 The will of the people of a country is the basis for the authority of government, and that will must be determined through genuine periodic elections, which guarantee the right and opportunity to vote freely and to be elected fairly through universal and equal suffrage by secret balloting or equivalent free voting procedures, the results of which are accurately counted, announced and respected. A significant number of rights and freedoms, processes, laws and institutions are therefore involved in achieving genuine democratic elections.

4 International election observation is: the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. International election observation should, when possible, offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral and related processes, while not interfering in and thus hindering such processes. International election observation missions are: organized efforts of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations to conduct international election observation.
International election observation evaluates pre-election, election-day and post-election periods through comprehensive, long-term observation, employing a variety of techniques. As part of these efforts, specialized observation missions may examine limited pre-election or post-election issues and specific processes (such as, delimitation of election districts, voter registration, use of electronic technologies and functioning of electoral complaint mechanisms). Stand-alone, specialized observation missions may also be employed, as long as such missions make clear public statements that their activities and conclusions are limited in scope and that they draw no conclusions about the overall election process based on such limited activities. All observer missions must make concerted efforts to place the election day into its context and not to over-emphasize the importance of election day observations. International election observation examines conditions relating to the right to vote and to be elected, including, among other things, discrimination or other obstacles that hinder participation in electoral processes based on political or other opinion, gender, race, colour, ethnicity, language, religion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, such as physical disabilities. The findings of international election observation missions provide a factual common point of reference for all persons interested in the elections, including the political competitors. This can be particularly valuable in the context of disputed elections, where impartial and accurate findings can help to mitigate the potential for conflicts.

International election observation is conducted for the benefit of the people of the country holding the elections and for the benefit of the international community. It is process oriented, not concerned with any particular electoral result, and is concerned with results only to the degree that they are reported honestly and accurately in a transparent and timely manner. No one should be allowed to be a member of an international election observer mission unless that person is free from any political, economic or other conflicts of interest that would interfere with conducting observations accurately and impartially and/or drawing conclusions about the character of the election process accurately and impartially. These criteria must be met effectively over extended periods by long-term observers, as well as during the more limited periods of election day observation, each of which periods present specific challenges for independent and impartial analysis. International election observation missions should not accept funding or infrastructural support from the government whose elections are being observed, as it may raise a significant conflict of interest and undermine confidence in the integrity of the mission’s findings. International election observation delegations should be prepared to disclose the sources of their funding upon appropriate and reasonable requests.

International election observation missions are expected to issue timely, accurate and impartial statements to the public (including providing copies to electoral authorities and other appropriate national entities), presenting their findings, conclusions and any appropriate recommendations they determine could help improve election related processes. Missions should announce publicly their presence in a country, including the mission’s mandate, composition and duration, make periodic reports as warranted and issue a preliminary post-election statement of findings and a final report upon the conclusion of the election process. International election observation missions may also conduct private meetings with those concerned with organizing genuine democratic elections in a country to discuss the mission’s findings, conclusions and recommendations. International election observation missions may also report to their respective intergovernmental or international non-governmental organizations.
8 The organizations that endorse this Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers pledge to cooperate with each other in conducting international election observation missions. International election observation can be conducted, for example, by: individual international election observer missions; ad hoc joint international election observation missions; or coordinated international election observation missions. In all circumstances, the endorsing organizations pledge to work together to maximize the contribution of their international election observation missions.

9 International election observation must be conducted with respect for the sovereignty of the country holding elections and with respect for the human rights of the people of the country. International election observation missions must respect the laws of the host country, as well as national authorities, including electoral bodies, and act in a manner that is consistent with respecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

10 International election observation missions must actively seek cooperation with host country electoral authorities and must not obstruct the election process.

11 A decision by any organization to organize an international election observation mission or to explore the possibility of organizing an observation mission does not imply that the organization necessarily deems the election process in the country holding the elections to be credible. An organization should not send an international election observation mission to a country under conditions that make it likely that its presence will be interpreted as giving legitimacy to a clearly undemocratic electoral process, and international election observation missions in any such circumstance should make public statements to ensure that their presence does not imply such legitimacy.

12 In order for an international election observation mission to effectively and credibly conduct its work basic conditions must be met. An international election observation mission therefore should not be organized unless the country holding the election takes the following actions:

a) Issues an invitation or otherwise indicates its willingness to accept international election observation missions in accordance with each organization’s requirements sufficiently in advance of elections to allow analysis of all of the processes that are important to organizing genuine democratic elections;

b) Guarantees unimpeded access of the international election observer mission to all stages of the election process and all election technologies, including electronic technologies and the certification processes for electronic voting and other technologies, without requiring election observation missions to enter into confidentiality or other nondisclosure agreements concerning technologies or election processes, and recognizes that international election observation missions may not certify technologies as acceptable;

c) Guarantees unimpeded access to all persons concerned with election processes, including:

i) electoral officials at all levels, upon reasonable requests,

ii) members of legislative bodies and government and security officials whose functions are relevant to organizing genuine democratic elections,

iii) all of the political parties, organizations and persons that have sought to compete in
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

the elections (including those that qualified, those that were disqualified and those that withdrew from participating) and those that abstained from participating;

iv news media personnel, and

v all organizations and persons that are interested in achieving genuine democratic elections in the country;

d Guarantees freedom of movement around the country for all members of the international election observer mission;

e Guarantees the international election observer mission's freedom to issue without interference public statements and reports concerning its findings and recommendations about election related processes and developments;

f Guarantees that no governmental, security or electoral authority will interfere in the selection of individual observers or other members of the international election observation mission or attempt to limit its numbers;

g Guarantees full, country-wide accreditation (that is, the issuing of any identification or document required to conduct election observation) for all persons selected to be observers or other participants by the international election observation mission as long as the mission complies with clearly defined, reasonable and non-discriminatory requirements for accreditation;

h Guarantees that no governmental, security or electoral authority will interfere in the activities of the international election observation mission; and

i Guarantees that no governmental authority will pressure, threaten action against or take any reprisal against any national or foreign citizen who works for, assists or provides information to the international election observation mission in accordance with international principles for election observation.

As a prerequisite to organizing an international election observation mission, intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations may require that such guarantees are set forth in a memorandum of understanding or similar document agreed upon by governmental and/or electoral authorities. Election observation is a civilian activity, and its utility is questionable in circumstances that present severe security risks, limit safe deployments of observers or otherwise would negate employing credible election observation methodologies.

13 International election observation missions should seek and may require acceptance of their presence by all major political competitors.

14 Political contestants (parties, candidates and supporters of positions on referenda) have vested interests in the electoral process through their rights to be elected and to participate directly in government. They therefore should be allowed to monitor all processes related to elections and observe procedures, including among other things the functioning of electronic and other electoral technologies inside polling stations, counting centers and other electoral facilities, as well as the transport of ballots and other sensitive materials.

15 International election observation missions should:

a establish communications with all political competitors in the election process, including representatives of political parties and candidates who may have information concerning the integrity of the election process;

b welcome information provided by them concerning the nature of the process;

c independently and impartially evaluate such information; and

d should evaluate as an important aspect of international election observation whether the political contestants are, on a nondiscriminatory basis, afforded access to verify the integrity of all elements and stages of the election process. International election observation missions should in their recommendations, which may be issued in writing or otherwise be presented at various stages of the election process, advocate for removing any undue restrictions or interference against activities by the political competitors to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes.

16 Citizens have an internationally recognized right to associate and a right to participate in governmental and public affairs in their country. These rights may be exercised through nongovernmental organizations monitoring all processes related to elections and observing procedures, including among other things the functioning of electronic and other electoral technologies inside polling stations, counting centers and other electoral facilities, as well as the transport of ballots and other sensitive materials. International election observation missions should evaluate and report on whether domestic nonpartisan election monitoring and observation organizations are able, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to conduct their activities without undue restrictions or interference. International election observation missions should advocate for the right of citizens to conduct domestic nonpartisan election observation without any undue restrictions or interference and should in their recommendations address removing any such undue restrictions or interference.

17 International election observation missions should identify, establish regular communications with and cooperate as appropriate with credible domestic nonpartisan election monitoring organizations. International election observation missions should welcome information provided by such organizations concerning the nature of the election process. Upon independent evaluation of information provided by such organizations, their findings can provide an important complement to the findings of international election observation missions, although international election observation missions must remain independent. International election observation missions therefore should make every reasonable effort to consult with such organizations before issuing any statements.

18 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that substantial progress has been made in establishing standards, principles and commitments concerning genuine democratic elections and commit themselves to use a statement of such principles in making observations, judgments and conclusions about the character of election processes and pledge to be transparent about the principles and observation methodologies they employ.
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

19 The intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that there are a variety of credible methodologies for observing election processes and commit to sharing approaches and harmonizing methodologies as appropriate. They also recognize that international election observation missions must be of sufficient size to determine independently and impartially the character of election processes in a country and must be of sufficient duration to determine the character of all of the critical elements of the election process in the pre-election, election-day and post-election periods – unless an observation activity is focused on and therefore only comments on one or a limited number of elements of the election process. They further recognize that it is necessary not to isolate or over-emphasize election day observations, and that such observations must be placed into the context of the overall electoral process.

20 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that international election observation missions should include persons of sufficiently diverse political and professional skills, standing and proven integrity to observe and judge processes in light of: expertise in electoral processes and established electoral principles; international human rights; comparative election law and administration practices (including use of computer and other election technology); comparative political processes and country specific considerations. The endorsing organizations also recognize the importance of balanced gender diversity in the composition of participants and leadership of international election observation missions, as well as diversity of citizenship in such missions.

21 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration commit to:

a familiarize all participants in their international election observation missions concerning the principles of accuracy of information and political impartiality in making judgments and conclusions;

b provide a terms of reference or similar document, explaining the purposes of the mission;

c provide information concerning relevant national laws and regulations, the general political environment and other matters, including those that relate to the security and well being of observers;

d instruct all participants in the election observation mission concerning the methodologies to be employed; and

e require all participants in the election observation mission to read and pledge to abide by the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, which accompanies this Declaration and which may be modified without changing its substance slightly to fit requirements of the organization, or pledge to abide by a pre-existing code of conduct of the organization that is substantially the same as the accompanying Code of Conduct.

22 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations endorsing this Declaration commit to use every effort to comply with the terms of the Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. Any time that an endorsing organization deems it necessary to depart from any of terms of the Declaration or the Accompanying Code of Conduct in order to conduct election observation in keeping with
the spirit of the Declaration, the organization will explain in its public statements and will be prepared to answer appropriate questions from other endorsing organizations concerning why it was necessary to do so.

23 The endorsing organizations recognize that governments send observer delegations to elections in other countries and that others also observe elections. The endorsing organizations welcome any such observers agreeing on an ad hoc basis to this declaration and abiding by the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.

24 This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers are intended to be technical documents that do not require action by the political bodies of endorsing organizations (such as assemblies, councils or boards of directors), though such actions are welcome. This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observers remain open for endorsement by other intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations. Endorsements should be recorded with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.
International election observation is widely accepted around the world. It is conducted by intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations in order to provide an impartial and accurate assessment of the nature of election processes for the benefit of the population of the country where the election is held and for the benefit of the international community. Much therefore depends on ensuring the integrity of international election observation, and all who are part of this international election observation mission, including long-term and short-term observers, members of assessment delegations, specialized observation teams and leaders of the mission, must subscribe to and follow this Code of Conduct.

Respect Sovereignty and International Human Rights
Elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuine elections are internationally recognized human rights, and they require the exercise of a number of fundamental rights and freedoms. Election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country, as well as the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.

Respect the Laws of the Country and the Authority of Electoral Bodies
Observers must respect the laws of the host country and the authority of the bodies charged with administering the electoral process. Observers must follow any lawful instruction from the country’s governmental, security and electoral authorities. Observers also must maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral officials and other national authorities. Observers must note if laws, regulations or the actions of state and/or electoral officials unduly burden or obstruct the exercise of election-related rights guaranteed by law, constitution or applicable international instruments.

Respect the Integrity of the International Election Observation Mission
Observers must respect and protect the integrity of the international election observation mission. This includes following this Code of Conduct, any written instructions (such as a terms of reference, directives and guidelines) and any verbal instructions from the observation mission’s leadership. Observers must: attend all of the observation mission’s required briefings, trainings and debriefings; become familiar with the election law, regulations and other relevant laws as directed by the observation mission; and carefully adhere to the methodologies employed by the observation mission. Observers also must report to the leadership of the observation mission any conflicts of interest they may have and any improper behavior they see conducted by other observers that are part of the mission.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS

Maintain Strict Political Impartiality at All Times
Observers must maintain strict political impartiality at all times, including leisure time in the host country. They must not express or exhibit any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process. Observers also must not conduct any activity that could be reasonably perceived as favoring or providing partisan gain for any political competitor in the host country, such as wearing or displaying any partisan symbols, colors, banners or accepting anything of value from political competitors.

Do Not Obstruct Election Processes
Observers must not obstruct any element of the election process, including pre-election processes, voting, counting and tabulation of results and processes transpiring after election day. Observers may bring irregularities, fraud or significant problems to the attention of election officials on the spot, unless this is prohibited by law, and must do so in a non-obstructive manner. Observers may ask questions of election officials, political party representatives and other observers inside polling stations and may answer questions about their own activities, as long as observers do not obstruct the election process. In answering questions observers should not seek to direct the election process. Observers may ask and answer questions of voters but may not ask them to tell for whom or what party or referendum position they voted.

Provide Appropriate Identification
Observers must display identification provided by the election observation mission, as well as identification required by national authorities, and must present it to electoral officials and other interested national authorities when requested.

Maintain Accuracy of Observations and Professionalism in Drawing Conclusions
Observers must ensure that all of their observations are accurate. Observations must be comprehensive, noting positive as well as negative factors, distinguishing between significant and insignificant factors and identifying patterns that could have an important impact on the integrity of the election process. Observers’ judgments must be based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence. Observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not draw conclusions prematurely. Observers also must keep a well documented record of where they observed, the observations made and other relevant information as required by the election observation mission and must turn in such documentation to the mission.

Refrain from Making Comments to the Public or the Media before the Mission Speaks
Observers must refrain from making any personal comments about their observations or conclusions to the news media or members of the public before the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission’s leadership. Observers may explain the nature of the observation mission, its activities and other matters deemed appropriate by the observation mission and should refer the media or other interested persons to the those individuals designated by the observation mission.

Cooperate with Other Election Observers
Observers must be aware of other election observation missions, both international and domestic, and cooperate with them as instructed by the leadership of the election observation mission.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS

Maintain Proper Personal Behavior
Observers must maintain proper personal behavior and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

Violations of This Code of Conduct
In a case of concern about the violation of this Code of Conduct, the election observation mission shall conduct an inquiry into the matter. If a serious violation is found to have occurred, the observer concerned may have their observer accreditation withdrawn or be dismissed from the election observation mission. The authority for such determinations rests solely with the leadership of the election observation mission.

Pledge to Follow This Code of Conduct
Every person who participates in this election observation mission must read and understand this Code of Conduct and must sign a pledge to follow it.
PLEDGE TO ACCOMPANY
THE CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION OBSERVER

I have read and understand the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers that was provided to me by the international election observation mission. I hereby pledge that I will follow the Code of Conduct and that all of my activities as an election observer will be conducted completely in accordance with it. I have no conflicts of interest, political, economic nor other, that will interfere with my ability to be an impartial election observer and to follow the Code of Conduct.

I will maintain strict political impartiality at all times. I will make my judgments based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence, and I will base all of my conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence.

I will not obstruct the election process. I will respect national laws and the authority of election officials and will maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral and other national authorities. I will respect and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of the country. I will maintain proper personal behavior and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

I will protect the integrity of the international election observation mission and will follow the instructions of the observation mission. I will attend all briefings, trainings and debriefings required by the election observation mission and will cooperate in the production of its statements and reports as requested. I will refrain from making personal comments, observations or conclusions to the news media or the public before the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission’s leadership.

Signed ___________________________________________

Print Name ___________________________________________

Date ________________________________________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers were developed through a multi-year process involving more than 20 intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations concerned with election observation around the world.

The process began informally in 2001 at the initiative of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) and included an initial meeting at the UN in New York and a meeting in Washington co-hosted by the OAS and NDI.

Building on that foundation, the UNEAD, The Carter Center, and NDI formed a joint secretariat and launched the formal phase of the process in October 2003 at a meeting held at The Carter Center in Atlanta. This was followed by a September 2004 meeting in Brussels, which was hosted by the European Commission. An ongoing consultative process transpired among the participating organizations, which resulted in a consensus document that was offered for organizational endorsements beginning in July 2005.

The secretariat was comprised of Carina Perelli and Sean Dunne for UNEAD, David Carroll, David Pottie and Avery Davis-Roberts for The Carter Center, and Patrick Merloe and Linda Patterson for NDI. The secretariat members prepared the documents, with Mr. Merloe serving as the lead drafter, drawing on a substantial body of existing documentation from organizations involved in election observation. During the process, the secretariat received critical input and comments from many of the participating organizations.

The process was supported by financial assistance from the United Nations, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission, the Republic of Germany and the Starr Foundation, as well as a number of individual contributors.