



DISICON

DISINFORMATION CONFERENCE

**DECEMBER 10, 2019
PRISTINA, KOSOVO**



INTRODUCTION

Disinformation is increasingly threatening the integrity of democratic discourse worldwide. As public reliance on social media and the Internet for news and information has risen, political discourse rapidly moved online. In a large number of countries, the ability to engage in free and meaningful speech online is now under threat due to disinformation, spread inadvertently or through coordinated campaigns.

To better understand the implications and challenges of disinformation, as well as potential preventative actions to counter the phenomenon, NDI Kosovo is directing efforts to engage influential key stakeholders to study the current state of affairs of the information environment in Kosovo. DISICON will offer a cross-sector platform for a conversation that aims to examine how disinformation is manifested in Kosovo and inspire action to prevent and counter online disinformation.



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

FINDINGS OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE RESEARCH

Following broader social trends, political discourse around the world has moved online. As this transformation has occurred, it can no longer be taken for granted that the information that forms the basis of political discourse is grounded in fact and is unadulterated with malicious intent. Disinformation is a form of harmful speech, defined as false or inaccurate information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the explicit intent purpose to mislead and cause harm, typically with political, financial, psychological, or social motivations. Authoritarian governments and illiberal actors, among others, have moved disinformation into the online arena, developing an array of techniques to produce and distribute disinformation quickly to a wide audience that threatens the ability to conduct political discourse based on facts and accurate information. In the present-day context, any endeavor to foster a healthy and progressive democracy must include a concerted effort to protect the integrity of the information environment.

The threat of disinformation to sustained, healthy political discourse confronts countries around the world, including Kosovo. The Kremlin has supported a proxy disinformation campaign in the region, and its efforts could further extend to Kosovo.¹

¹ Information provided by a congressional testimony, found here: Polyakova, Alina. "US Efforts to Counter Russian Disinformation and Malign Influence." Brookings. Brookings, July 10, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/u-s-efforts-to-counter-russian-disinformation-and-malign-influence/>



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

On the basis of the country's recent history of instability and conflict, given deep partisan divides and long-standing ethnic tensions, Kosovo and its citizens may be acutely susceptible to disinformation.

KOSOVO'S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

A qualitative mapping exercise of Kosovo's information environment conducted by NDI in March 2019 found a robust domestic marketplace for disinformation. Interviews with key stakeholders from political parties, civil society, media, the tech industry, and government revealed that political actors across the spectrum are believed to utilize news portals as disinformation sites and regularly generate disinformation, attempting to achieve near-sighted political gains and sway the electorate. Journalists, who generally face limited opportunities to make their living, oblige parties' calls for inflammatory articles as a means of ensuring a quick income. Kosovo also suffers from a comparatively non-transparent media industry, where journalists and news organizations are not obliged to publish detailed funding reports. This opacity, together with an underfunded regulatory agency and anecdotal evidence suggesting that journalists regularly face harassment and intimidation, establishes a foundation for disinformation, which malign actors could weaponize for more destabilizing ends. Positively, information consumption patterns among the electorate reveal a high level of pluralism of media sources and a reasonable level of media fluency.

The assessment also showed that the quality and quantity of Kosovo-produced, Serbian language news is limited, and creates a disjointed information environment between ethnic Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. This implies that there are



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

two effective disinformation fronts that would need to be considered and contested to fully capture the information environment in Kosovo.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Following the March 2019 assessment, NDI conducted three additional levels of research to frame the disinformation environment in Kosovo. With the announcement of extraordinary parliamentary elections in October 2019, NDI contracted an American firm to analyze data from Twitter, Facebook, and online media sources to track political messaging during the election campaign period. This quantitative research scanned publicly-available content from thousands of social media users and hundreds of online pages to identify any presence of bots or intentionally fabricated news, and track how identified disinformation circulated through monitored public accounts and pages. Complementarily, NDI conducted in-house monitoring of traditional media, including their online portals and social media accounts, particularly tracking proven disinformation stories as they moved from social media to mainstream media. Based on in-country analysis of more than 2,800 social media posts and news articles, NDI evaluated the quality of the information environment during the election period, distilling the role prominent media and parties had, and investigating both the potential origin of the disinformation and consequences on broader political discourse. NDI coupled these efforts with qualitative public opinion research through a series of 12 focus groups with participants in six regions, from both Kosovar Albanian and Serb communities. This research sought to understand the electorate's media usage and literacy, as well as how disinformation affects political intentions.



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

This four-spoke methodology generated an understanding of Kosovo's disinformation environment, including clear instances of disinformation used in the electoral period to sway the electorate, though the nature and frequency of the disinformation varied substantially according to content language.

- **All political parties suffered from disinformation attacks in Albanian-language news during the election period.** Across the wide range of Albanian language sources monitored during the campaign, all instances of disinformation and content manipulation occurred in the context of political jostling between the various parties contesting the election. Albanian-language monitoring was conducted primarily on Facebook and on online portals, as Twitter usage was minimal. The research identified multiple instances of doctored photos, articles, public opinion polls, and videos that sought to either slander the prime ministerial candidates and their parties or promote one party in particular. Defamatory attacks were recorded against virtually all parties and candidates, especially against Kadri Veseli, Vjosa Osmani, and Albin Kurti.
- **Disinformation in the election period was not the result of a well-coordinated campaign or directed at any one target. Some instances may likely have been mis-information - false or inaccurate information not intended to cause harm - deriving from low quality journalism including limited fact-checking.** NDI's in-house monitoring revealed that a handful of either online news portals or Facebook pages were the initial sources of disinformation efforts, despite certain stories



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

being shared widely across other Albanian-language platforms and pages. Many of the pages that were the sources of disinformation were either officially partisan or had a quasi-affiliation to one party in particular. As an example, Horizonti 24 and Ngjarje ditore were pages that published disinformation against particular political parties. Many of these exhibited some of the baseline indications of being disinformation sources, such as having administrators with either no registered addresses or addresses in foreign countries (France, Austria, United States), or changing the page names several times in a short time frame. However, there was little indication of automated disinformation bot usage to produce or share disinformation and also little indication that there was any overt and coordinated disinformation campaign, sponsored by a foreign entity. These findings were consistent with NDI's initial diagnostic research regarding the manifestation of disinformation in Albanian-language media before the election monitoring took place. It demonstrated that disinformation is generally human-driven, and may include journalists who face economic precarity, as well as highlighted the comparatively low domestic costs of entry to the production of disinformation.

- **The assessment of the information landscape across Serbian-language sources revealed concerning cases, including coordinated attempts at disinformation that risk inflaming ethnic tensions.** In line with qualitative research into how Kosovar Serbs consume their news, Twitter features far more prominently in forming the information landscape. Over the course of the campaign period, the research identified several overt attempts to proliferate falsified stories and were wholly partisan. The two overarching themes of the fabricated news stories and photos concentrated on attempts to ignite inter-ethnic animosities, such as “revealing”,



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

without any evidence, that extremist Kosovar Albanian groups were preparing to commit mass violence against Kosovar Serbs in the north following the election, and claiming that members of ethnic-Serb parties other than Srpksa Lista were secretly undermining the interests of Kosovar Serbs for their own personal gain. The attempts were significantly more overt and coordinated, with each instance of disinformation pointing toward a coherent plan executed for a specific purpose. While many Serbia-based online news portals were identified as the key sources of original disinformation content, automated analysis identified an influx of new Twitter accounts, based in Serbia, which were created after Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj's resignation and the dissolution of the Assembly. Research found that hundreds of Twitter accounts posted about the election several times per day and that one-third of these accounts were automated. Expert analysis concluded that this indicated heavy bot usage. Bot usage also implies that resources were dedicated by an entity to specifically increase the visibility of dubious and inflammatory articles amongst Kosovar Serbs and create a sense that a "real" conversation was present around these intentionally fabricated topics.

Given these findings, it was equally important to understand citizens' susceptibility to disinformation and their attitudes towards disinformation.

- **Both Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb participants in NDI's focus groups indicated that the sources typically used to consume information align closely to the channels that received the most disinformation.** Most Kosovar Albanians cited using Facebook and online portals for their news, while Kosovar Serbs were significantly more likely to use Twitter and news sources based in Serbia.



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

- **Despite this connection, focus groups showed that the participants using both language sources had a firm grasp of what disinformation looks like.** Focus group participants associated misleading headlines and clickbait as red flags for disinformation, which is particularly significant as both were features of most instances of disinformation observed during the campaign period. Respondents also demonstrated the ability to question the integrity of the news source when deciphering whether a given article was fake or not. In the focus groups, Kosovar Serbs from the north were comparatively better at identifying disinformation than Kosovar Serbs in Gracanica.
- **Despite these positive findings, exercises conducted in the focus groups also revealed that participants are less resilient to disinformation than they perceive themselves to be.** All participants had greater difficulty identifying more advanced or sophisticated instances of disinformation, such as doctored videos, indicating residual room for improvement to augment public resilience to disinformation. Participants, in particular women who get news mostly online, were not always able to recognize credible sources of information and remain vulnerable to disinformation.
- **The focus group research showed that disinformation in the electoral campaigns was unsuccessful at affecting voting intentions.** Despite Vetevendosje and the Democratic League of Kosovo being on the receiving end of several slandering, doctored stories, often including serious and damning conjectures, these parties performed the best during the elections. However, focus groups revealed that gender-based disinformation is particularly difficult to counter when it



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

reinforces existing gender stereotypes, which may further diminish women's political participation.

- **Kosovars are greatly concerned about disinformation and wish to see their leaders take action to prevent it.** Many focus group participants expressed pessimism for the future as they considered disinformation; participants considered disinformation “damaging” and believe it is used to distract from the concerns of everyday people - corruption, education, employment. Kosovar Serb participants were particularly concerned that disinformation could present real threats to personal security, stemming from the community's vulnerability to inter-ethnic conflict. All participants expressed a clear desire for action to eliminate disinformation, with Kosovar Serbs conveying the greatest urgency. They called on Kosovo's government and media to implement concrete measures to address disinformation to protect its democratic systems and public debates.

UPHOLDING INFORMATION INTEGRITY IN KOSOVO

Given the above, Kosovo is in great need for a concerted effort to prevent against further disinformation and its degrading impact on Kosovo's democratic discourse. The risks associated with inaction on disinformation are substantial. Kosovo's ethnic divisions and segregated media consumption habits imply that a coordinated disinformation campaign could reignite ethnic animosities. Political parties that continue to utilize disinformation while jostling for short-lived political points will likely result in a public that is ever more disillusioned with the ability of its political apparatus to adequately capture frustrations and



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

address concerns. Citizens' vulnerabilities to disinformation, especially from a sophisticated and coordinated disinformation campaign, could jeopardize Kosovo's forward trajectory with respect to its liberal democratic progress and aspirations for membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Steps can be taken now to build resilience of Kosovo's information environment and counter future disinformation efforts. With the foundation of a public with a high level of media literacy and plurality of media sources, the leaders of Kosovo, in civil society, government, political parties, and the media, must come together to prevent the supply and demand of disinformation, while also identifying effective responses to perpetrators. Each has a role in addressing this problem for Kosovo - from political parties, which must make commitments to avoid using disinformation against political opponents; to civil society which must work with the media on fact-checking and ensuring the integrity of news coverage; to the government and Assembly, which can consider institutional and legal mechanisms to support this effort. Working together, they can promote critical analysis among citizens and cross-ethnic reconciliation to build resilience to disinformation that exacerbates ethnic tensions or promotes violence. At this time, it is imperative that a commitment and corresponding strategy to prevent disinformation in Kosovo and reduce the challenges it presents to its democracy must involve all actors that contribute to Kosovo's information environment, including technology and media community, political parties, the legislative and executive branches of power, civil society organizations, and the wider electorate.



DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

This report and the National Democratic Institute's (NDI) research in Kosovo are made possible through the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, or any individual of the aforementioned organizations.

Copyright © National Democratic Institute 2019. All rights reserved. Portions of this work may be reproduced and/or translated for non-commercial purposes provided NDI is acknowledged as the source of the material and is provided copies of any translation.



AGENDA

09:30 - 10:00 Registration of participants

10:00 - 10:20 Opening Remarks

Shari Bryan, Vice President of NDI

Philip S. Kosnett, United States Ambassador to Kosovo

10:20 - 10:30 NDI Research Findings: Is Kosovo immune from disinformation?

Presentation of key findings of NDI efforts to analyze the information environment during the campaign period for Kosovo's General Elections held in October 2019. With the support of a U.S.-based network analysis company, NDI conducted monitoring of a wide variety of public Facebook and Twitter accounts to scan them for early signs of distortion tools and efforts. A manual cross-platform analysis examined how different actors shared misinformation or disinformation messages on 'news portals', Twitter, and Facebook accounts, linking messages from their accounts to other relevant platforms used by the Kosovo electorate. Finally, NDI conducted a series of focus groups to measure the qualitative perceptions and mood of the electorate as well as the impact that the flow of election information and disinformation efforts had on voters.

Valon Kurhasani, Program Director at NDI Kosovo

10:30 - 12:00 Panel discussion I



AGENDA

Democracy and Political Processes under Threat: How Disinformation Threatens the Integrity of Information?

The focus on digital disinformation has grown exponentially as it has been used to interfere in important political processes, threatening democracies worldwide. The increased usage of technology in disseminating information presents challenges for citizens to understand what is factual information or not, and use this to inform their democratic decisions. This introductory panel session will explore vulnerabilities to disinformation, especially in fragile democratic countries which may be at greater risk in detecting and tackling these threats. Panelists will provide a framework on disinformation to examine the ways it affects the integrity of information in political processes.

Opening of the panel and moderator: Agron Bajrami, Chief Editor at Koha Ditore

Panelists: Dorka Takacsy, Analyst at Political Capital Institute

Miroslava Sawaris, Research Fellow at Global Security Policy Institute

Matt Bailey, Senior Adviser for Democratic Innovation and Technology of NDI

12:00 - 12:30 Disi-Story: Disinformation in Serbia, Impact and Consequences

Marko Ivković, Resident Director of NDI Serbia

12:30 - 13:30 Lunch break

13:30 - 14:00 Disi-Story: Lessons Learned from North Macedonia

Filip Chaparoski, Senior Program Manager at NDI North Macedonia



AGENDA

14:00-14:30 The impact of disinformation in Serbian community

This session will give an overview of the Kosovo based media news in Serbian language. Panelists will discuss and illustrate the level of exposure to disinformation and its consequences in Serbian community in Kosovo.

Opening of the panel and moderator: Jovana Radosavljević, Executive Director of New Social Initiative

Panelists:

Goran Avramović, Chief Editor at Radio Television KIM

Darko Dimitrijević, Editor in Chief at Radio Goraždevac

14:30 - 16:00 Panel discussion II

Building Resilience in the Age of Disinformation

This session will explore how to respond to the political and social impacts of disinformation in new democracies. Panelists will discuss the role of institutions in policy making to strengthen democratic resilience. It will examine the role of political parties, media, and civil society to address vulnerabilities in the information environment and build an agenda against disinformation. Examples from Kosovo's recent general elections will be shared to illustrate the types of disinformation present in Kosovo and provoke discussion on the tools needed to prevent and fight this phenomenon.



AGENDA

Opening of the panel and moderator: Fitore Rexhepi, Editor at RTK

Panelists:

Besnik Bislimi, Vice President of Vetevendosje

Lutfi Haziri, Vice President of LDK

Memli Krasniqi, Vice President of PDK

Ardian Gjini, Vice President of AAK

The image features a solid purple background. In the center, the word "SPEAKERS" is written in a bold, yellow, sans-serif font. The text is flanked by abstract, organic shapes in shades of purple, teal, and yellow. A large, light purple shape is positioned in the upper right, and another similar shape is in the lower left. Smaller teal and yellow shapes are scattered around the main purple shapes, adding to the abstract composition.

SPEAKERS



SHARI BRYAN
Vice President of NDI

Shari Bryan is NDI's vice president. Ms. Bryan has been actively involved in law, international development and foreign affairs since 1988. She has conducted assessments or missions to more than 30 countries during her tenure at NDI, and played a key role in promoting democratic assistance programs in Africa; conceptualizing and organizing projects on political party finance; governance and HIV/AIDS; and increasing the role of legislatures in overseeing the extractive industries. Before joining NDI, Ms. Bryan served as an attorney in the former UN Trust Territory of Palau, where she worked on negotiating the Compact of Free Association in 2004. She also worked as an attorney for the United States government and served with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).



PHILIP S. KOSNETT
United States Ambassador to Kosovo

Philip Kosnett is the Ambassador of the United States to the Republic of Kosovo. Ambassador Kosnett's most recent prior assignment was as Deputy Chief of Mission and subsequently Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Ankara, Turkey from 2016-2018. Much of Ambassador Kosnett's career has been focused on international security cooperation and political reconciliation. He has served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Uzbekistan and in Iceland; and in political, political-military, and economic-commercial positions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, The Netherlands, Japan, and

Turkey. Washington assignments include tours in the State Department's European Affairs, Counterterrorism, Political-Military, and Intelligence & Research bureaus as well as State's 24-hour Operations Center. Ambassador Kosnett is a multiple recipient of the State Department Superior Honor and Meritorious Honor Awards, and a recipient of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service and the Department of the Army Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service. A 1982 graduate of Harvard, Ambassador Kosnett worked as a game designer in New York and as a teacher in Japan prior to entering the Foreign Service.

VALON KURHASANI

Program Director at NDI Kosovo

Valon Kurhasani is Program Director at the National Democratic Institute in Kosovo. He has more than 17 years of practical experience in democratic system strengthening and civil society empowering. He is part of NDI Regional Political Party Initiative in designing leadership and democratic strengthening programs for political party leadership from Western Balkans.

Valon is a lecturer of Political Science at the University of London under academic direction of LSE - Riinvest College. He holds an MSc degree in Management and Public Policy from University of London, SOAS and Bachelor Degree in Public Administration and Political Science from the University of Prishtina.





AGRON BAJRAMI

Chief Editor at Koha Ditore

Agron Bajrami became chief editor of Koha Ditore in September 2004, after 10 years of journalistic and editorial work with the Koha Media Company. Mr. Bajrami has also written commentaries for American, German and French newspapers and regional press, as well (Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia).

Since 2003, he is also a member of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy, headed by Erhard Busek and Ellen Mickiewicz. Mr. Bajrami is also a board member of Kosovo Press Council and elected member of the Board of South East European media Organisation (SEEMO). Mr. Agron Bajrami graduated from the Fine Arts Faculty in University of Prishtina, in 1991.



DORKA TAKACSY

Analyst at Political Capital Institute

Dorka holds a BA degree in International Business from the Budapest Business School and the University of Picardy Jules Verne. She obtained her MA in International Relations at the Central European University, and studied in the Pushkin State Language Institute in Moscow and at the George Mason University in Washington DC. She gained professional experience, among others, at the National Defense University in DC and the European Parliament. At Political Capital Institute, she focuses on authoritarian influence in the Central Europe region, and especially on institutional Russian influence-seeking.



MIROSLAVA SAWARIS

Research Fellow at Global Security Policy Institute

Miroslava Sawaris is a Research Fellow within the Strategic Communication team at GLOBSEC Policy Institute.

Her expertise is in the analysis of information operations and disinformation campaigns, with a particular focus on the impact of these malign influences on the electoral processes and democratic institutions in Europe, especially the Visegrad Group.



MATT BAILEY

Senior Advisor for Democratic Innovation and Technology

Matt Bailey serves as a senior advisor for democratic innovation and technology at NDI, where he works on a broad array of issues ranging from disinformation and cybersecurity to civic technology and municipal innovation.

Prior to joining NDI, Matt was a civil servant in the Office of the United States Chief Information Officer under two presidents. While at the White House, Matt was part of the teams that launched the first-ever U.S. government-wide open source and legislative data initiatives, led its participation in the Open Government Partnership, and led the chief information officer's policy team. Matt holds a Master of Arts in English Literature from Georgetown University.



MARKO IVKOVIĆ

Resident Director of NDI Serbia

Marko Ivković is the director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) Serbia. Ivković previously served at NDI in Moscow and NDI in Kyiv and has supported NDI programming for 10 years across the Balkans and Eurasia. Ivković oversees NDI Serbia support to mainstream politicians and civic leaders, citizen election observers, and members of parliament to strengthen political discourse, the legislative process, and election processes. In addition, Ivković also manages regional programs that support the efforts of mainstream political and civil society actors to identify and expose disinformation and propaganda, to combat anti-democratic trends and to reinforce democratic political discourse in the Western Balkans.



FILIP CHAPAROSKI

Senior Program Manager at NDI North Macedonia

Filip Chaparoski is a Senior Program Manager with NDI in North Macedonia, with over 15 years' experience working on democracy and governance programs, including civil society, media, parliament and elections. He was involved in the organization of candidate debates for presidential, parliamentary and local elections, and in managing large-scale public awareness campaigns for free and fair elections. He is a strong advocate for active citizen participation and has provided capacity-building assistance and consultancy to over fifty grassroots initiatives, civic movements and organizations in pursuing change for public good. He holds an MA in European Studies from Sussex University (UK) and a BA in International Relations and Diplomacy from Schiller International University (US).



FITORE REXHEPI

Editor at RTK

Fitore Rexhepi is an editor and presenter for the TV show 'Imazh' at the Radio Television of Kosovo, RTK. Mrs. Rexhepi has worked as a journalist and presenter at RTK since 2004.

She holds an MA in International Relations in Law Faculty, University of Prishtina and a BA in Political Science from the University of Prishtina.



BESNIK BISLIMI

Vice President of Vetevendosje

Besnik Bislimi is the Vice President of Self-Determination Movement (LVV). Bislimi served as a Member of the Parliament of Kosovo for one legislature (2014-2016). He studied Macroeconomic Analysis at the Faculty of Business Administration, University of Zagreb, Croatia, from 1990 to 1994. He received his PhD in Macroeconomics, with specific focus on Public Finance from the University of Freiberg, Germany in February 2005.

In addition, Besnik spent four months as a Fulbright Scholar at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University in Atlanta in 2008.



LUTFI HAZIRI
Vice President of LDK

Lutfi Haziri is the Mayor of the Municipality of Gjilan and Vice President of Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Haziri served as Member of Parliament for one mandate and was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Kosovo for Culture, Youth, Sports and Non-Residential Affairs and Minister of Local Government Administration. He headed the delegation of Kosovo in the talks on the political status of Kosovo with Serbia in Vienna in February 2006. Haziri obtained a management diploma of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, certificates of Georgetown University, University of Colorado, a diploma from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as well as other recognitions from local and international organisations.



MEMLI KRASNIQI
Vice President of PDK

Memli Krasniqi is the Vice President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Krasniqi served as a Member of Parliament for one mandate and was the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development (2014-2017) and Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports (2011-2014). He graduated with a BA in Political Science and Public Administration from the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Prishtina and obtained an MSc degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Krasniqi is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Albanian studies of the Institute of History, Albania.



ARDIAN GJINI
Vice President of AAK

Ardian Gjini is the Mayor of the Municipality of Gjakova and Vice President of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). Gjini served as a Member of Parliament for two legislatures (2007-2014) and as Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning.

He studied International Relations and European Studies at the University of Kent in Canterbury.



GORAN AVRAMOVIĆ
Chief Editor at Radio Television Kim

Goran Avramović was born in Kragujevac. Avramović is the chief editor at Radio Television Kim from Čaglavica since 2013 as well as chief editor at Radio Kim, Čaglavica.

He is a correspondent for several national and local magazines such as Svetlost, Pogledi, Fakk, Glas juga, Politika, and so on. Avramović is a contributor for RTS, TV B92, TV PINK, TV FOX, TV AVALA, FRANCE 24 & TV 5 (FRANCE). Goran holds a BA degree from the Junior College for Organization & Computer Information system.



JOVANA RADOSAVLJEVIĆ

Executive director of New Social Initiative

Jovana Radosavljević is the Executive Director of the New Social Initiative. She has experience in monitoring elections in Kosovo and supporting external peace campaigns in Serbia. Previously, she worked at the NGO 'Building Bridges Shift.' She has also worked as a journalist and presenter at MIR Television.

Radosavljević is a TLP program fellow and has completed her Master's in International Studies at the University of Denver with specialization in Conflict Resolution and International Development.



DARKO DIMITRIJEVIĆ

Chief Editor at Radio Goraždevac

Darko Dimitrijević is chief editor at Radio Television Goraždevac (RTG). Before he became chief editor, he was a reporter in the RTG. Mr. Dimitrijević was also elected as a member of the Executive Board of Directors, of the Kosovo Media Association. Mr. Dimitrijević is multiple media correspondent in Kosovo.

Beside working as a correspondent, he was also working as a media consultant at NGO Center for the Rights of Minority Communities, as well as helping drafting proposals on PR measures for various central and local media. Mr. Dimitrijević holds a BA in Journalism at the Department of Political Sciences, International University of Novi Pazar.

Disicon Glossary

The essentials for understanding information disorder

Information Disorder² consists of three different types of disorders: mis-information, dis-information and mal-information.

Mis-information is sharing false information, but without meaning any harm.³

Misinformation = false information + mistake

Dis-information is intentionally sharing false information to cause harm.⁴

Disinformation = false information + intent to harm

Mal-information is sharing genuine information with the intention to cause harm, often by sharing information that is intended to stay private.⁵

Mal-information = true information + intent to harm

Bots are social media accounts operated by computer programs and designed to create posts, such bots can be used to spread misleading narratives.⁶

Source-Checking vs. Fact-Checking-

Source Checking is assessing the source that initially created the content or first shared it, in order to assess the credibility of information.⁷

Fact Checking is assessing the facts in a piece of writing, a news article, a speech, etc. in order to assess whether those facts are correct.⁸

² Council of Europe. (2017) "Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making".

<https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research/168076277c>

³ Council of Europe. (2017) "Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making".

<https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research/168076277c>

⁴ Council of Europe. (2017) "Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making".

<https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research/168076277c>

⁵ Council of Europe. (2017) "Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making".

<https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research/168076277c>

⁶ Howard, P. N. & K. Bence (2016) Bots, StrongerIn, and Brexit: Computational Propaganda during the UK-EU Referendum, COMPROP Research note, 2016.1,

<http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/06/COMPROP-2016-1.pdf>

⁷ Wardle, C. (2017). Information Disorder. 'Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking'. <https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77>

⁸ Cambridge Dictionary

