With funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI or the Institute) is supporting Kosovar Serb and Albanian political leaders and civic activists in building public awareness and oversight of the implementation of the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement (the Agreement) reached on April 19, 2013, which establishes principles to normalize relations between the two countries. The Institute has operated in Kosovo since 1999, working together with political parties, civil society and elected representatives to institute democratic practices. NDI is a nonprofit organization established in 1983 that works to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide.

NDI engaged Prism Research, a public opinion research firm, to conduct a poll in Kosovo from February 8 to 22, 2014, on perceptions and attitudes of citizens regarding the Agreement. The poll was administered in the context of Agreement implementation delays due to a temporary halt in negotiations during elections in Kosovo and Serbia, and due to political instability in the North during prolonged local elections. The release of the report was postponed owing to early parliamentary elections held in June 2014.

A total of 1,205 interviews were conducted from a representative sample of the general population. Trained interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews with randomly selected residents in randomly selected households. The sample was divided into ethnic and geographic sub-strata. Data is weighted based on official figures for ethnic population statistics. The response rate was 76.9 percent in Albanian-majority municipalities and 74.2 percent in Serb-majority municipalities. The margin of error was +/- 2.8 percent. Remaining percentages in this report are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Respondents were interviewed in the Albanian majority municipalities of Gjilan, Peja, Pristina, Prizren, South Mitrovica, in the Serb-majority northern municipalities of Leposavic, North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvecan, and in Kosovar Serb communities in central and Southern regions—Gracanica, Klokott/Vrbovac, Novo Brdo, Parteš, Ranilug, and Strpce.

Survey results were analyzed by ethnicity, region, gender, and age. Most of the analysis focuses on three primary groups: Kosovar Serbs living in Kosovo’s northern municipalities, Kosovar Serbs in the South, and Kosovar Albanians throughout the country.

The majority of questions address understandings of and attitudes towards the April 2013 Agreement; as noted in the text, some questions refer to the ongoing dialogue process between Serbia and Kosovo, of which the Agreement is one milestone. A copy of the text of the Agreement is included as Annex I.
Executive Summary

Across ethnic groups and regions, respondents express by turns pessimism and ambivalence about the direction of Kosovo. Northern Kosovar Serbs, followed by Kosovar Albanians, are most pessimistic about the direction Kosovo is heading, while a plurality of Kosovar Serbs from the South are ambivalent. Respondents are slightly more optimistic about their personal lives — Kosovar Serbs tend to think their lives will remain the same or perhaps improve this year, and Kosovar Albanians are likely to believe their lives will improve.

Following local elections which saw the arrival of new mayors to many city halls across the country, Kosovar Serbs are most concerned with the quality of municipal services, unemployment, and policing and rule of law as priority local issues. Kosovar Albanians are most concerned with unemployment, economic development, and corruption.

Support for the diplomatic dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia varies significantly by ethnic group and region. Two-thirds of Kosovar Serbs from the North oppose the diplomatic dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, and youth in the North have the highest rate of opposition to the diplomatic dialogue at 72 percent. In stark contrast, Kosovar Serbs in the South are the most supportive of all groups, at 62 percent, along with Pristina residents. Kosovar Albanians are evenly split in their support and opposition to the dialogue.

Knowledge of the Agreement

Most Kosovar Serbs across the country get their information on the dialogue from Belgrade-based media, though around a one-fifth relies on local media. About half of Kosovar Albanians get information on the dialogue from local media and half from Pristina-based media. All groups have high trust in the reliability of information on the dialogue.

A strong majority of all ethnic and regional groups demonstrate knowledge of the issues areas included in the April 2013 Brussels Agreement. Kosovar Serbs in general are more knowledgeable than either Kosovar Albanians or other minority groups, and Kosovar Serbs in the North are most knowledgeable. However, a plurality of all ethnic groups, and nearly 7 in 10 respondents in the North, incorrectly believes that the Agreement establishes special security forces in the North. Groups that believe this are more likely to think that the Agreement will not increase security in the North, and vice versa—the presence of new security forces is not linked with greater security.

All groups show lower levels and less consistent knowledge of the competencies of the Association of Serb Municipalities (the Association), and significant numbers of respondents

1 The survey tested respondents’ knowledge of the Agreement’s measures to establish the Association of Serb Municipalities, reform the judicial authorities and police structures in the North, hold municipal elections, and continue energy and telecommunications negotiations.

2 In exchange for Serbia’s dismantling of its so-called ‘parallel institutions’ in the North, the Agreement creates the framework for a Kosovar Association of Serb Municipalities (the Association) which will oversee economic development, education, health, and urban and rural planning across all 10 of Kosovo’s Serb-majority
display incorrect understandings of its mandate. Kosovar Albanians are more likely to understand that the Association will oversee economic development, while Kosovar Serbs are more likely to know it will oversee education. Urban and rural planning as a competency of the Association is least understood by all respondents.

Among Kosovar Serbs, there are generational, gender, and regional knowledge gaps regarding the competencies of the Association. Kosovar Serbs in the south have higher knowledge than their counterparts in the North that the Association will oversee education and health. Fewer than half of Kosovar Serbs in the North are knowledgeable of the Association’s competencies, and Northern youth are the least knowledgeable among all Kosovar Serbs. Though fewer women than men in the North are aware that the Agreement establishes an Association, those women who are familiar are more knowledgeable than men that the Association will oversee economic development and urban and rural planning.

Attitudes about the Agreement

Kosovar Serbs in the North are extremely pessimistic, Kosovar Serbs in the south are moderately pessimistic, and Kosovar Albanians are mildly optimistic on the expected impact of the Agreement, as concerns security in the North, freedom of movement, economic development, European Union (EU) integration prospects, and interethnic relations. However, all ethnic and regional groups have low confidence that they will personally benefit from the implementation of the Agreement.

More than half of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs in the south believe that successful implementation of the Agreement provides an opportunity for economic development. In contrast, half of Kosovar Serbs from the North disagree, and one-third strongly disagrees. Pessimism in the North likely stems from widespread fear that the Agreement will bring job loss.

Unlike other groups, Kosovar Serbs in the North show gender and age variations in attitude towards the Agreement and the future. Men and youth (18 – 34 years) in the North are the most pessimistic subgroups on a range of questions.

While all groups have low expectations that the establishment of the Kosovar Serb municipal association will improve economic development or security, Kosovar Serbs are most skeptical. They are also less likely than Kosovar Albanians to connect the Association with economic development.

Kosovar Serbs from the South are the most supportive and Kosovar Serbs from the North are least supportive of including Serbs from other regions in the Association (63 percent versus 35 percent, respectively). Youth from both communities are less supportive than older generations. Kosovar Albanians have the greatest opposition to an Association that includes ethnic Serbs from both the North and the South and are evenly split on the issue.

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municipalities. Despite an initial agreement to establish the Association by December 31, 2013, the Association’s formation has been delayed by prolonged local elections in the North and disputes over the legality of statutes that establish governing bodies in the four new northern Serb-majority municipalities.
The North

Kosovar Serbs in the North report the lowest levels of personal security of all groups, followed by Kosovar Serbs in the South. Kosovar Serbs in the North believe insecurity stems from lack of adequate policing; Kosovar Serbs in the South identify unemployment and potential inter-ethnic violence as sources of insecurity. Kosovar Albanians report very high levels of personal security, and focus on unemployment as the main source of insecurity. Both ethnic groups exaggerate the extremism of the other; ethnic Serbs are more concerned about reports of Islamic fundamentalism than are ethnic Albanians, who are more concerned with what they see as Serbian extremism emanating from the North.

To improve the situation in the North, Kosovar Serbs believe dialogue with the citizens living there will help, followed by dialogue with Serbia. Kosovar Albanians, particularly women, are much more likely to believe that installing administrative mechanisms in the North will improve the situation, but are also supportive of dialogue with citizens in the North. Pristina residents believe political dialogue and discussion with Serbia is the most effective way to improve the situation in the North.

Kosovar Serbs in the North are more likely than not to believe the North will be fully, as opposed to partially, integrated into Kosovo as a result of the Agreement. In contrast, Kosovar Serbs from the south and Pristina residents are more likely to believe that the North will be partially integrated, with links to Serbia; Pristina residents overwhelmingly hold this belief. Three-fourths of respondents from the North express fears of falling under Pristina’s jurisdiction, with women expressing more concern than men. One-quarter of respondents express acceptance of being governed by Pristina.

A majority of both Kosovar Serbs from the North and Kosovar Albanians disagrees that two municipal governments in Mitrovica improves city management and brings government closer to citizens. Of those, nearly 4 in 10 ethnic Serb respondents from the North strongly disagree that divided municipalities improves city services.
Key Findings

Pessimism and Ambivalence about Kosovo’s Future...

Across ethnic groups and regions, respondents express pessimism and ambivalence about the direction of Kosovo. Northern Kosovar Serbs, followed by Kosovar Albanians, are most pessimistic about the direction Kosovo is heading, while a plurality of Kosovar Serbs from the South and non-Serb minorities are ambivalent. Only 7 percent of Northern Kosovar Serbs, 18 percent of Kosovar Serbs from the South, and 24 percent of Kosovar Albanians believe the country is headed in the right direction.

...But Ambivalence Paired with Optimism on Immediate Personal Future

Respondents are more optimistic about their personal lives this year. A plurality of Kosovar Serbs from the North and the South think there will be no change in the quality of their lives in 2014. Meanwhile, nearly half of ethnic Albanians and a plurality of non-Serb minorities believe their lives will improve.
**DIVIDED SUPPORT FOR HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE**

**How supportive are you of the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Strongly Supportive</th>
<th>Somewhat Supportive</th>
<th>Somewhat Opposed</th>
<th>Strongly Opposed</th>
<th>Do Not Know</th>
<th>Refused to Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-Serbs</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Serbs</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-Others</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-Albanians</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosovar Serbs from the North are least supportive of the diplomatic dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Two-thirds oppose the dialogue, in stark contrast to Kosovar Serb counterparts in the South, who match Pristina residents in expressing the highest levels of support for the dialogue (62 percent of both strongly or somewhat support it). Kosovar Serb youth in the North have the highest rates of opposition of any subgroup in the country: 72 percent oppose the dialogue. Ethnic Albanians are evenly divided in their support for and opposition to the dialogue.

**STRONG KNOWLEDGE OF AGREEMENT PROVISIONS**

**What topics are included in the text of the Agreement?**

When given a closed list of options, a majority of respondents from all ethnic groups show high levels of basic awareness of the five domestic issue areas in the Agreement – the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities, reform of the judicial authorities in the North, police structure reform in the North, and municipal elections. Kosovar Serbs are more knowledgeable than either Kosovar Albanians or other minority groups.
Across all ethnic groups, more respondents doubt rather than believe that the Agreement will personally benefit them. Northern Kosovar Serbs are least confident, and nearly half of Northern Kosovar youth feel very doubtful. Most confident, at around 45 percent, are Kosovar Albanian men and Kosovar Albanian respondents older than 35, and older Serbs in the South.

More respondents believe the Association will not change the status quo than believe it will help economic development or increase security in the North. The exception is Kosovar Albanians, who are most optimistic about the contribution of the Association in general, and among whom a plurality (32 percent) believes it will help economic development in the North.

Kosovar Serbs are less likely to link the Association with economic development; less than half are aware that the Association’s mandate includes overseeing economic development, and only 16 percent think the Association will help economic development in the North. Fewer than 20 percent of Kosovar Serbs think that the Association will increase security.
GENDER AND GENERATIONAL GAPS IN THE NORTH

Respondents in the North show significant gender and generational gaps in knowledge and attitudes towards the future and the Agreement, as compared to Kosovar Serbs in the South or Kosovar Albanians.

➢ PRONOUNCED MALE AND YOUTH PESSIMISM

Northern Kosovar Serbs are the most pessimistic group across all questions, including the general direction of Kosovo, the future of the North, and expectations of the Agreement’s impact on security in the North, freedom of movement, economic development, European Union (EU) integration prospects, and interethnic relations. They have the highest levels of skepticism that the Association of Serb Municipalities (the Association) will have an impact on economic development or security, and they report the lowest levels of personal security.

Men in the North are consistently more pessimistic than women in their general outlook on the present and the future by about 10 percentage points.

Kosovar Serb youth (18 – 34 years) in the North are the most pessimistic of any subgroup and have the highest rate of opposition to the diplomatic dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, at 72 percent. Youth in the North are the most doubtful across all subgroups that the Agreement will improve the lives of citizens, and 83 percent are dubious of any personal benefit. They are least likely to believe that the Agreement will improve security, freedom of movement, or interethnic relations. They are the most pessimistic on the impact of the Association.
More Northern Kosovar Serbs are opposed to being governed by Pristina than accept it. Sixty-three percent expressed opposition to or fear of Kosovo’s governance. However, about one-quarter of respondents express acceptance of being governed by Pristina. Of those, 15 percent express confidence that their municipality will have sufficient freedom under Pristina’s rule.

**MODERATING PRESENCE OF KOSOVAR SERBS IN THE SOUTH**

Kosovo Serbs from the South (along with Pristina residents) show the most support of all groups for the diplomatic dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, with 62 percent in favor. In their general outlook on the future and their expectations of the benefits of the Agreement, they are more optimistic than Northern Kosovar Serbs but less optimistic than ethnic Albanians. They are similarly situated between Northern Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians in their knowledge levels on the Agreement, with the exception of knowledge of the Association – they are significantly more knowledgeable than Kosovar Serbs in the North that the Association will oversee education and health.

**LOWER AWARENESS, HIGHER OPTIMISM AMONG KOSOVAR ALBANIANS**

Kosovar Albanians have the highest opinion of all groups of the potential benefits of the Agreement. A healthy majority believes that successful implementation of the Agreement will enhance security in the North, provide economic development, increase the chances for Serbia and Kosovo to achieve integration with the EU, and will provide greater freedom of movement. These opinions exist even though two-thirds of Kosovar Albanians reporting not having read or heard about the agreement. While a majority can accurately identify topics included in the Agreement, their level of knowledge is lower than other groups.
GREATEST OPTIMISM AND SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENT IN PRISTINA

Compared with other regional groups, Pristina respondents are most optimistic about the direction Kosovo is heading, with 32 percent reporting that it is going in the right direction. They show the highest level of support for the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue (62 percent), along with Kosovar Serbs in the South.

Pristina respondents also have the lowest rates of reading or hearing about the Agreement – 80 percent have not read the text of the Agreement. However, they are more satisfied with the level of information they have about the dialogue than other groups, and are more trusting of the information on the dialogue that they get from the media. They are more likely to believe that the implementation of the Agreement will result in positive changes.

SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENT DETERMINES SATISFACTION WITH INFORMATION

The scope or accuracy of respondents’ information about the Agreement does not determine their support for the Agreement or the level of satisfaction they have regarding the amount of information about the dialogue. Instead, respondents’ satisfaction with the amount of information about the dialogue directly reflects their level of support for it. Those who support the dialogue are more satisfied with the amount of information they have on the Agreement, while those who oppose the Agreement are less satisfied with the amount of information, regardless of the actual amount of information they have.
General Orientation

Future Outlook

Northern Kosovar Serbs are the most pessimistic of all respondents concerning the general direction of Kosovo—56 percent believe the country is going in the wrong direction. While Kosovar Albanians are comparatively the most optimistic group, with a quarter saying Kosovo is going in the right direction, they are polarized and have the second highest belief that Kosovo is on the wrong track. Kosovar Albanian men are more pessimistic than women, who are more ambivalent on the country’s direction. Similarly, Kosovar Serbs in the South are ambivalent about Kosovo’s direction.

When asked if their own lives will improve in 2014, Kosovar Serbs from the North are again most pessimistic. Kosovar Serbs in the South are more optimistic than their Northern counterparts (33 percent). Ethnic Albanians have a mildly optimistic view of the immediate future: nearly half think that their lives will improve this year; fewer than 20 percent think their lives will worsen.

Kosovar Serb men in the South are more polarized in their opinions about whether life in 2014 will improve or worsen or whether interethnic relations will improve or worsen in five years. Women are more likely to believe the status quo will continue.
When asked whom they trust most, 52 percent of Kosovar Albanians choose the Kosovo government, with women having higher trust in the government than men. Kosovar Serbs first trust the Serbian government; those in the North are more trusting of Belgrade than those in the South (61 versus 50 percent). Non-Serb minorities express nearly equivalent levels of trust towards the Kosovar and Serbian governments, as opposed to Kosovar Serb respondents, among whom virtually none list the Kosovo government as their first- or second-most trusted institution.

Men in the North trust the Serbian government more than women (69 versus 58 percent). Kosovar Serb women across regions are more trusting of religious authorities than men. While young Kosovar Serbs in both regions have equivalent levels of trust in religious authorities, older respondents in the North are less trusting of religious bodies than their generational peers in the South—only 13 percent of older Kosovar Serbs in the North, versus 42 percent of older Kosovar Serbs in the South list, trust religious authorities most. Thirty-five percent of Kosovar Albanian respondents rank religious bodies as their second most trusted institution.

Municipal authorities enjoy strong trust across ethnic groups: 4 in 10 Kosovar Albanians list municipal authorities as their first choice. In the North and South Serb communities, municipal authorities are the most popular answer for the second most trusted institution (59 percent and 51 percent, respectively). Kosovar Serb youth in the South are twice as trusting of municipal authorities as their older counterparts—nearly a third of youth select this option.
Most Kosovar Serbs get their information on the dialogue from Belgrade media; one-fifth rely on local media. In the North, men are significantly more likely than women to get media from Belgrade (60 versus 40 percent). Northern Kosovar Serbs have fairly high trust that the media’s information on the dialogue is trustworthy—65 percent—although one-third regards the media as not trustworthy on the dialogue. Kosovar Serbs in the South have the highest rates of reliance on Belgrade-based media and a strong majority (74 percent) trusts the information they get.

About half of ethnic Albanians get information on the dialogue from local media and half from Pristina-based media. Albanians are about twice as inclined to consider information as very trustworthy (19 percent) as Kosovar Serbs.

**Personal Security**

Kosovar Serb respondents in the North report the lowest levels of personal security in their communities, with fewer than half feeling very or somewhat secure, and nearly one-third feeling very insecure. Two-thirds of ethnic Serbs in the South feel secure, and eight in 10 non-Serb
minorities feel at least somewhat secure. Kosovar Albanians report high levels of personal security – 94 percent feel somewhat or very secure.

Perceived sources of community insecurity vary by ethnic group and region. Kosovar Serbs in the North see a lack of adequate policing as a source of future insecurity. Other groups are more concerned with unemployment, although Kosovar Serbs in the South show the greatest concern about interethnic violence. Ethnic groups tend to fear extremism in other groups: ethnic Serbs are more concerned about Islamic fundamentalism; ethnic Albanians cite Serb extremism.

Kosovar Serbs in the North identify a lack of adequate policing or rule of law as the main source of insecurity in their community (43 percent), followed by unemployment, interethnic violence and Islamic fundamentalism. More men than women identify Islamic fundamentalism as a source of future insecurity (37 versus 27 percent).

Kosovar Serbs in the South report higher levels of personal security than those in the North (68 percent feel somewhat or very secure). Women see unemployment and interethnic violence as the greatest sources of future insecurity in their communities, while a third of men also include Islamic fundamentalism as a community issue. When asked about sources of national insecurity, 43 percent of Kosovar Serb men believe growing Islamic fundamentalism is an issue.
Kosovar Albanians report very high levels of personal security, with 51 percent feeling very secure and 44 percent somewhat secure. Of the security threats they perceive to Kosovo and their own communities, more than half identify unemployment, and one-fifth name Serbian extremism. Men are 10 percentage points more likely than women to perceive unemployment and Serb extremism as security threats in their communities.

**The North**

A majority/plurality of Kosovar Serbs (63 percent in the North and 46 percent in the South) believes that the best way to improve the situation in the North is through dialogue with citizens there. Ethnic Serb respondents in the North choose dialogue with Serbia as the second most preferred intervention.

Southern Serbs support dialogue with citizens in the North, followed by dialogue with Serbia, as the best ways to improve the situation in the North.

Ethnic Albanians, particularly women, are much more likely to believe that installing administrative mechanisms in the North will improve the situation (60 percent of all Kosovar Albanians believe this). However, they are also supportive of dialogue with citizens in the North—42 percent list this as their second-ranked choice. More than half of ethnic Albanians choose dialogue with Serbia as their lowest-ranked preferred option.

Pristina residents are more inclined to opt for political dialogue and discussion with Serbia as the first ranked or second ranked option to improve the situation (23 opt for this as the first ranked option, and 64 percent as the second ranked option).
Mitrovica

A majority of both Kosovar Serbs from the North and Kosovar Albanians disagree that two municipal governments in Mitrovica improves overall city management (more timely and better services) and brings government closer to citizens. Nearly 4 in 10 ethnic Serb respondents from the North strongly disagree that it improves city services.

Kosovar Albanian men are comparably more supportive of split municipal governments, with 43 percent strongly or somewhat believing it improves city management. Kosovar Serbs in the South remain divided, with 46 percent agreeing and disagreeing.

Respondents in North and South Mitrovica were asked about potential cooperation between the two municipalities. Respondents cite unemployment as having most potential for cooperation. Those over 35 years of age see more opportunities for cooperation than do youth, with a majority identifying water supply as one such area. Women identify more areas for cooperation than men, including water supply, waste management, and culture, youth, and sports.

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3 The city of Mitrovica has been divided along ethnic lines since 1999. Municipal elections in November 2013 were conducted in the North for the first time and officially established two Kosovar municipalities in the city, split geographically by the Ibar river: North Mitrovica, a Serb-majority municipality, and South Mitrovica, an Albanian-majority municipality.
**The Agreement: Comparative Knowledge and Attitudes**

Kosovar Serbs in the North are more likely than other groups to have read or heard about the Agreement, and have the highest levels of knowledge about the components of the Agreement. Kosovar Serb respondents in the South are evenly split between those who report having read or heard about the Agreement, and those who have not received information about the Agreement. Despite this, a strong majority (around 70 percent) is familiar with the major components of the Agreement. They are somewhat more knowledgeable than Kosovar Serbs in the North that the Agreement establishes an Association.

Kosovar Albanians and non-Serb minority groups are least likely to have read the Agreement or heard about its provisions from others. A majority (63 percent) of ethnic Albanians have not read the text of the Brussels Agreement or had others explain it to them. Compared with minority groups, they have lower rates of identification of the topics included in the Agreement (police structure, judicial authorities, Association, municipal elections, energy and telecommunications). Additionally, around 20 percent of Kosovar Albanians and non-Serb minorities do not know or do not respond to questions testing knowledge of the Agreement’s provisions. Kosovar Albanian women and youth are more likely not to know the areas found in the Agreement.

### Expectations of the Agreement’s Overall Impact

Kosovar Serbs in the North are more likely than Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs in the South to think the Agreement will change the status quo, but they are more pessimistic about its impact on individual lives. Seventy-seven (77) percent doubt it will improve the lives of average citizens, and 80 percent of respondents doubt that it is in their personal benefit.

They have lower confidence than Kosovar Albanians or Serbs in the South that the Agreement will enhance security and economic development, improve interethnic relations, increase chances for Serbia or Kosovo for EU integration, or increase freedom of movement. Notably, one-third of respondents from the North, a larger percentage than other groups, did not know or did not answer a question about the impact of the Agreement on EU integration.
Youth in the North have more pronounced pessimism about the impact of the Agreement than older respondents. They are more likely to disagree that the Agreement will improve security, improve freedom of movement, and improve interethnic relations. Around one-quarter of youth doubt the Agreement will change the status quo.

Kosovar Serbs in the South are divided in their expectations of the benefits of the Agreement. Around half believe the Agreement’s successful implementation will increase security in the North, improve economic development, help parties in EU integration, and improve freedom of movement. Four in 10 think the Agreement will improve interethnic relations.

Southern Kosovar Serbs show slightly greater pessimism about the benefits of the Agreement at a daily level—57 percent lack confidence that the Agreement will provide conditions to improve the lives of average citizens, and four in 10 think the Agreement is in their or their families’ benefit. Kosovar Serbs from the South are also more likely than other groups to believe that the Agreement will not have an impact on the current situation.

Kosovar Albanians are divided too about whether the Agreement will impact the current situation—47 percent believes it will. When asked if the Agreement will improve the lives of citizens, Kosovar Albanian men are more optimistic than women (51 versus 41 percent).

However, on specifics, ethnic Albanians have the highest opinion of all groups of the potential of the Agreement. A healthy majority believes that successful implementation of the Agreement will enhance security in the North (63 percent), spur the economy (57 percent), increase chances for EU membership for Serbia or Kosovo (61 percent), and provide greater freedom of movement (72 percent).
Integration of North

Northern Kosovar Serbs, Kosovar Albanians, and non-Serb minorities are more likely to believe North will be fully, as opposed to partially, integrated into Kosovo. Kosovar Serbs from the South and Pristina residents are more likely to believe that the North will be partially integrated, with links to Serbia; Pristina residents overwhelmingly (77 percent) hold this belief.

Northern Kosovar Serbs by gender and age:
The North will be fully integrated into Kosovo

Kosovar Serb men and respondents over 35 across the country are more likely to believe the North will be fully integrated; in the North, a majority of male respondents and respondents over 35 believe this—the highest of any groups. A significant number of youth (one quarter) believes the North will be only partially integrated. Three-fourths of respondents from the North express fears of adapting to Kosovo jurisdiction, with women expressing more concern than men.
Minorities are pessimistic that the Agreement will improve ethnic relations between ethnic Albanian and Serb communities. Kosovar Serbs in the North are most pessimistic—77 percent think the Agreement will not improve relations much or at all. Women in the North are more skeptical than men—half doubt that it will improve relations at all. Kosovar Serbs in the South are second most pessimistic (35 percent believe relations will improve), followed by non-Serb minority groups (45 percent). Kosovar Albanians are most optimistic about the future of interethnic relations, with half believing the Agreement will significantly or somewhat improve interethnic relations between ethnic Serbs and Albanians.

Similar attitudes characterize expectations of interethnic relations in the next five years. Northern Kosovar Serbs are least optimistic that they will improve—only 21 percent believe so, and only 16 percent of Kosovar Serb youth in the North believe they will improve—the lowest of any group or subgroup. Significantly more men in the North think interethnic relations will worsen in the next five years (44 versus 23 percent of women).

The Association of Serb Municipalities

While more than two-thirds of all groups are knowledgeable that the Agreement establishes an Association, there is weaker understanding of the Association’s envisaged competencies in economic development, education, health, and urban and rural planning. No groups have strong majorities that are knowledgeable of all areas that the Association will oversee.

More ethnic Albanians (63 percent) than ethnic Serbs (43 percent) understand that the Association will oversee economic development. Approximately half of both ethnic communities know that healthcare will be overseen by the Association, although Kosovo Serbs from the South show significantly higher understanding in this area (68 percent). Kosovar Serbs are more aware than Kosovar Albanians that the Association will oversee education (58 percent versus 46 percent).

Urban and rural planning as a competency of the Association is least understood by all
respondents. Around 40 percent of respondents from all communities correctly identified it as an area that will be overseen by the Association; nearly one-third did not respond to the question.

Significant numbers of respondents display incorrect understanding of the mandate of the Association. More than half of Kosovar Serbs and Albanians believe that the Association will oversee security matters, which it will not. Between 25 and 35 percent do not believe that education, health, and urban/rural planning will be overseen by the Association, and nearly one-third of Kosovar Serbs does not believe that economic development will be overseen.

Among Kosovar Serbs, there are generational, gender, and regional knowledge gaps regarding the competencies of the Association. Northern Kosovar Serbs are less knowledgeable then those in the South—less than half are knowledgeable of the Association’s competencies—and Northern youth are the least knowledgeable among Kosovar Serbs. Kosovar Serb youth from the North are least likely to know that the Association will oversee economic development—only 37 say it will, versus 49 percent of Northern respondents over 35.

In the North, though fewer women than men are aware that the Agreement establishes an Association (69 versus 81 percent), women are more knowledgeable than men that the Association will oversee economic development (48 percent versus 31 percent) and urban and rural planning (43 versus 34 percent).

Youth in Southern Serb-majority municipalities have divided awareness of the competencies of the Association—they are the most knowledgeable of Kosovar Serbs that education and health will be overseen by the Association, but have comparably lower awareness that the Association will oversee economic development and urban and rural planning. Men and youth in the South are most aware of health, while women are more aware of urban and rural planning.
There is widespread skepticism that the Association will have a political, security, or economic impact. Approximately a third of Kosovar Serbs and Albanians believe that the Association will not change the status quo. Kosovar Albanians are twice as likely as Kosovar Serbs to believe that the Association will help economic development in the North, but only one third believes so. A majority of Kosovar Serbs are doubtful that the Association will advance economic development and youth are most pessimistic: 86 percent of youth in the North and 91 percent in other Serb-majority municipalities doubt it will help economic development.

Northern youth are the most pessimistic concerning the impact of the Association: fewer than 20 percent believe the establishment of an Association will improve security or economic development. Women in the North have higher expectations of the Association—two-thirds versus half of men expect it will change the status quo.

Kosovar Albanians have comparatively higher (though still low) expectations for the Association, although a one-fifth of respondents (along with other ethnic minorities) report lacking enough information about its role. About a one-quarter of Kosovar Albanians think it will increase security in the North.

Kosovar Albanians and Southern Kosovar Serbs (19 percent) are twice as likely as Kosovar Serbs in the North (10 percent) to think the Association will establish a separate entity.
Kosovar Serbs from the South are the most supportive and Kosovar Serbs from the North are least supportive of including Serb-majority municipalities from other parts of Kosovo in the Association (63 percent versus 35 percent support it, respectively). Youth from both communities are about 10 percentage points less supportive than older generations. Kosovar Serbs in the North, along with non-Serb minorities, are also more likely to respond that they do not know whether the Association should be inclusive.

Kosovar Albanians have the greatest opposition to including Serb-majority municipalities from other parts of Kosovo in the Association and are evenly split between those who support and those who oppose it. Forty-three percent of Kosovar Albanians oppose a more inclusive Association and, of that, 36 percent strongly oppose it.

**Judicial Affairs**

Awareness of judicial provisions in the Agreement is very low (around or below 10 percent), when respondents are asked an open-ended question about Agreement topics, suggesting that judicial reform in the North is not automatically associated with the Agreement. However, when given a closed-list of options, nearly 80 percent of Kosovar Serbs from the North, 70 percent from the South, and 60 percent of Kosovar Albanians correctly identify that judicial provisions are included in the Agreement.
While approximately 60 percent of Kosovar Serbs and 70 percent of Albanians demonstrate understanding that all judicial authorities will be integrated and operate within Kosovo’s legal framework, only around half of that number knows about the mechanisms of integration. Kosovar Serbs in the South have a higher awareness and understanding of the mechanisms for judicial integration of the North than Northern Serbs, and higher or comparable levels as ethnic Albanians.

Youth in the North are comparatively less knowledgeable than older respondents that judicial provisions are included in the Agreement, and less knowledgeable of the specific mechanisms by which the judiciary will be integrated. Nearly one-third reports ‘no answer’ when asked whether the judicial authorities will be integrated.

**Police**

Northern Kosovar Serbs are the most highly aware group (80 percent) that the Agreement reforms the police structure in the North. More than two-thirds of Kosovar Serbs in the South and half of Kosovar Albanians are knowledgeable.

However, respondents from all groups show some confusion about the police structure as described in the Agreement, which stipulates that the existing ethnic Serb police force in the North be integrated into Kosovo’s police structure, reflect the ethnic composition of the region, and be led by a Kosovar Serb commander answering to Kosovar authorities.
A majority of all respondents understands that Serb police structures in the North will be integrated into the Kosovo police force. Northern Kosovar Serbs and ethnic Albanians have the highest awareness—seven out of 10 respondents. One-quarter of all Kosovar Serbs, and one-third of Kosovar Serbs in the South wrongly think that the police force in the North will be all ethnic Serbs. Nearly one-third of all respondents, and nearly 80 percent of Pristina residents, incorrectly think that the Agreement establishes two police forces, one for the North led by Kosovar Serbs and the other for the rest of the country, led by the Kosovo Police. Men in the North are more likely to wrongly think that the Agreement establishes two police forces.

Youth in the North are more knowledgeable than older respondents on questions regarding police reforms, including that the Agreement includes police structure reforms and that the ethnic Serb police in the North will be integrated into the Kosovo police. Compared with older respondents, they are also less likely to believe incorrectly that the police force in the North will be all Serb, or that there will be two police forces in the country. In contrast, ethnic Serb youth in the South have the lowest understanding of all Kosovar Serbs that an ethnic Serb will lead the Kosovar police force in the North. Kosovar Albanians are least aware that police in the northern municipalities will be led by a Serb commander.
Regional Security

Successful implementation of the Agreement will increase the level of security in the North.

<table>
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<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-Albanians</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only one-third of Kosovar Serbs in the North are somewhat or very confident that the Agreement will increase the level of security in the North. Following trends on other questions, Kosovar Albanians are most optimistic—two-thirds believe the Agreement will increase security in the North. Half of Kosovar Serbs believe the same.

Although Kosovar Albanians are least aware that police in the northern municipalities will be led by a Serb commander, when told the specific provisions of the Agreement, half of Kosovar Albanian men and 37 percent of Kosovar Albanian women believe the arrangement will improve security and rule of law. A plurality of 41 percent of Kosovar Serbs in the North demonstrates confidence in the arrangement, with women more confident than men.

The Agreement entails special security forces in the North. (incorrect answer)

Kosovar Serbs in the North are 20 percentage points more likely than southern counterparts to believe—incorrectly—that the Agreement entails special security forces for the North. Sixty-nine percent think so, as opposed to 49 percent of Kosovar Serbs in the South or 40 percent of ethnic Albanians. Groups who believe the Agreement entails special security forces in the North are more likely to believe the Agreement will not increase security in the North, and vice versa.
Economic development

More than one-half of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs in the South believe that successful implementation of the Agreement provides an opportunity for economic development. In contrast, half of Kosovar Serbs from the North disagree, and one-third strongly disagrees.

Pessimism in the North is likely a factor of widespread fear of job loss. Eighty percent of Kosovo Serbs in the North anticipates change from implementation of the Agreement will bring job loss.
A significant majority of ethnic Albanians (72 percent) and non-Serb minorities (60 percent) anticipate significantly or somewhat improved freedom of movement as a result of successful implementation of the Agreement. Kosovar Albanian men anticipate greater freedom of movement than ethnic Albanian women do—76 percent versus 66 percent. Kosovar Serbs in the South are about evenly split in their expectations that freedom of movement will be improved. Only 27 percent of Kosovar Serbs in the North, and 22 percent of youth in the North expect an improvement in freedom of movement.

**Pristina Residents**

Compared with other groups, Pristina respondents are more optimistic about the direction Kosovo is heading, with 32 percent reporting that it is going in the right direction. They are the most supportive of the ongoing dialogue, along with Kosovar Serbs in South, and are more satisfied with the level of information provided about the dialogue. Pristina respondents see the information transmitted by the media about the dialogue as significantly more trustworthy (40 percent opted for very trustworthy), than respondents coming from other regions (16 percent). Pristina respondents also have a greater belief that there will be some change with the implementation of the Agreement.

Pristina residents demonstrate striking differences in understanding and expectations of the Agreement than other groups. A strong majority (77 percent) believe that there will be partial integration of the North with certain links to Serbia. Significantly fewer Pristina residents understand that the Association of Serb Municipalities will oversee education and urban planning (15 percent versus 50 percent among those in other regions, and 21 percent versus 38 percent, respectively). Significantly more Pristina residents (77 percent) believe a partitioned Mitrovica improves city services, versus 30 percent of respondents from all other regions.
Annex I

*First Agreement of Principles*

*Governing the Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia*

April 19, 2013

1. There will be an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. Membership will be open to any other municipality provided the members are in agreement.

2. The Community/Association will be created by statute. Its dissolution shall only take place by a decision of the participating municipalities. Legal guarantees will be provided by applicable law and constitutional law (including the 2/3 majority rule).

3. The structures of the Association/Community will be established on the same basis as the existing statute of the Association of Kosovo municipalities e.g. President, vice President, Assembly, Council.

4. In accordance with the competences given by the European Charter of Local Self Government and Kosovo law the participating municipalities shall be entitled to cooperate in exercising their powers through the Community/Association collectively. The Association/Community will have full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.

5. The Association/Community will exercise other additional competences as may be delegated by the central authorities.

6. The Community/Association shall have a representative role to the central authorities and will have a seat in the communities' consultative council for this purpose. In the pursuit of this role a monitoring function is envisaged.

7. There shall be one police force in Kosovo called the Kosovo Police. All police in northern Kosovo shall be integrated in the Kosovo Police framework. Salaries will be only from the KP.

8. Members of other Serbian security structures will be offered a place in equivalent Kosovo structures.

9. There shall be a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic). The Commander of this region shall be a Kosovo Serb nominated by the Ministry of Interior from a list provided by the four mayors on behalf of the Community/Association. The composition of the KP in the north will reflect the ethnic composition of the population of the four municipalities. (There will be another Regional Commander for the municipalities of Mitrovica South, Skenderaj and Vushtrri). The regional commander of
the four northern municipalities will cooperate with other regional commanders.

10. The judicial authorities will be integrated and operate within the Kosovo legal framework. The Appellate Court in Pristina will establish a panel composed of a majority of K/S judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.

11. A division of this Appellate Court, composed both by administrative staff and judges will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica (Mitrovica District Court). Each panel of the above division will be composed by a majority of K/S judges. Appropriate judges will sit dependent on the nature of the case involved.

12. Municipal elections shall be organized in the northern municipalities in 2013 with the facilitation of the OSCE in accordance with Kosovo law and international standards.

13. Discussions on Energy and Telecoms will be intensified by the two sides and completed by June 15.

14. It is agreed that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side's progress in their respective EU path.

15. An implementation committee will be established by the two sides, with the facilitation of the EU.