

EL SALVADOR 2009 BENCHMARK DEMOCRACY SURVEY: Initial Findings

Neil Nevitte



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“This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Cooperative Agreement No. 519-A-00-08-00023-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.”

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Acknowledgements

NDI is grateful for the support of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) of the Royal Embassy of Denmark for the El Salvador 2009 Benchmark Democracy Survey. DANIDA's regional leadership and support has helped NDI to conduct similar studies with national partner organizations in Nicaragua and Guatemala with the support of other international donors including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The El Salvador study is the result of a joint partnership between NDI and the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (*Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo*, FUNDAUNGO) under the guidance of Executive Director, Dr. Ricardo Cordova. Many thanks to FUNDAUNGO and Dr. Cordova for working with NDI on this project, and for the experience and national perspective contributed to this collaboration.

The principal researcher of the project, Professor Neil Nevitte, would like to thank Senior Elections Consultant, Melissa Estok, for directing the focus groups and Wayne Chu, Ph.D. student at the University of Toronto, for their assistance.

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Introduction

With local civic partners NDI has conducted a number of benchmark democracy surveys in Central America since 2005. These surveys provide reliable data about citizens' orientations to democracy, and about how citizens evaluate different aspects of their political environment. These results are not just useful diagnostic and policy tools but they also allow us to identify quite precisely the location and scope of democratic deficits and surpluses. And with cross-time data, it becomes possible to identify where changes have taken place, where progress has been made and where it has not been made.

This report is based on the survey findings from the first El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey. The core questions on the El Salvador Survey are the same as those asked in other benchmark surveys undertaken in the region. The data come from a stratified random sample of Salvadoran citizens 18 years and older. The total sample (N=1,530) contains a boosted youth sample (18-25 years of age, N=680) and the margin of error is $\pm 2.5\%$ ¹. The field work for the study was carried out by UNIMER under the direction of NDI's project partner, FUNDUANGO, and the surveys were conducted between April 16 and May 10, 2009, shortly after the March 15, 2009 Presidential election². These data are complemented by data from focus groups.

Data are sometimes difficult to interpret in isolation. Where useful, the El Salvador findings are placed in a broader regional context. The primary focus of the following analysis, however, is on how citizens' values, evaluations and outlooks are distributed across different segments of the Salvadoran public. The results of the survey are presented in five parts. The first is concerned with orientations towards democracy. Successful transitions to democracy are unlikely to be consolidated unless significant segments of the public support key democratic principles and values. Two key findings emerge from that analysis. First, support for democratic procedural norms does not run very deep. About one in four Salvadorans support democratic principles compared to about 40% of Nicaraguans. Second, support for these principles is greatest among the young and among those with the highest levels of education. Even so, a substantial majority (62%) of Salvadorans with the highest level of formal education do not support these principles.

The second part of the report focuses on public confidence in governmental and non-governmental institutions. The central finding here is somewhat troublesome: Public confidence in El Salvador's representative institutions, particularly political parties and congress, is very low, lower than for any of the other institutions considered. Moreover, Salvadorans with higher levels of education, and who know more about politics, have the least confidence in these institutions.

¹ The refusal rate was an acceptable 12.5%.

² The complete technical documentation regarding the generation of these data are available in the Appendices of this report.

Civic engagement, which is the breeding ground for electoral participation, is the focus of the investigation in part three. On balance, Salvadorans are more engaged than their Nicaraguan counterparts. They are more interested in, and knowledgeable about politics. They are more trusting and they are more involved in their communities. But they are also more cynical and less inclined to engage in direct political action. There are two striking differences within the Salvadoran population. First, there is a profound gender gap: Along every dimension considered, women are significantly less engaged than men. Second, there is also an age gap. Young Salvadorans are more interested, more active in their communities, and more inclined to engage in direct political action, than their older counterparts. But they are also significantly less trusting and more cynical. The breadth and depth of these gender and age differences are substantial.

We would expect the significant differences between men and women in their patterns of civic involvement to have an impact on electoral engagement, which is the focus of part four. The evidence clearly indicates that is the case. The gender gap in turnout is wide and consistent. But contrary to expectations age variations in civic engagement have no such corresponding effect on young and older Salvadorans. In fact, the evidence contradicts those expectations: Young people turn out to vote at significantly *lower* levels than their older counterparts. The reason for these differences, the evidence shows, is that young Salvadorans face substantial institutional barriers to participation. They lack proper documentation—Unique Identification Documents (known as DUIs) as well as birth certificates—and they face significant obstacles to obtaining these documents. The institutional exclusion of young citizens has substantial implications for representation. These findings raise serious questions about meaningful access to the right to vote, as well as questions about the adequacy of the voter lists.

The investigation concludes with an analysis of how citizens are connected to their political parties, the representative institutions that hold leaders accountable but which, this report shows, lack public confidence. First, a significant proportion of Salvadorans do not identify with any political party. For those who do identify with political parties there is evidence of significant asymmetries in partisan sympathies. The sympathetic support base of the FMLN is substantially larger than that of ARENA. The pool of “very strong” and “strong” supporters for the FMLN is more than twice the size of that of ARENA. The issue priorities of supporters of these two major parties, and those who identify with no party whatsoever are quite similar. Sharp differences do emerge, however, in how these partisans, and the public more broadly, evaluate the party leaders.


Part 1. Views About Democracy

A. Support for Democratic Procedural Norms

The benchmark surveys ask a battery of three questions designed to probe preferences about how the country should be governed. The battery presents respondents with statements about non-democratic governance options: having a “strong leader without elections”; “having the army rule”; and allowing “experts to do what they think is best”. Respondents who *disagree* with these alternatives are classified as supporting democratic procedural norms.

The evidence summarized in Figure 1A-1 place the El Salvador results in regional context. They compare data from matching benchmark democracy surveys undertaken in Guatemala in 2007 and Nicaragua in 2009. Those surveys also asked random samples of Guatemalans and Nicaraguans exactly the same questions. By these measures, there is more support for democratic procedural norms in Nicaragua (40.9%) than in the other two countries. And support for these norms is somewhat higher in El Salvador (23.6%) than in Guatemala (16.4%).

Figure 1A-1. Support for Procedural Democratic Norms



Questions included in the support for democratic norms scale:

I'd Like to know your opinion about what the best system to rule our country is:

1. *Having a strong leader who rules with no elections or congress*
(Strongly disagree/disagree=1, democrat; Strongly Agree/Agree=0, non-democrat)
2. *Having expert decision making who act following what they think is best*

(Strongly disagree/disagree=1, democrat; Strongly Agree/Agree=0, non-democrat)

3. *Having the army ruling the country*

(Strongly disagree/disagree=1, democrat; Strongly Agree/Agree=0, non-democrat)

4. *Having a democratic political system*

(Strongly disagree/disagree=0, non-democrat; Strongly Agree/Agree=1, democrat)

The additive index has a range from 4 (democrats) to 0 (non-democrats). Non-democrats = those who score 0-3 on the scale.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2007 Guatemala Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2009 Nicaragua Democracy Survey. The Guatemala data are weighted to take the Indigenous/Ladino distributions into account.

In which sectors of Salvadoran society is support for these democratic norms highest? And where is the lowest? A background analysis of a variety of socio-demographic variables shows that the most important factors are levels of education and age. People with the highest levels of formal education are more than twice as likely (38.2%) as those with low levels of education (16.8%) to support democratic principles³. Age also matters: people under 26 years of age are more likely (28.1%) to support democratic procedural norms than are their older counterparts (22.5%). These age differences are statistically significant⁴.

Table 1A-1. Support for Procedural Democracy Norms by Socio-Demographics

	Democrats	Non-Democrats	N
Education			
Low	16.8%	83.2	375
Medium	25.7%	74.3	470
High	38.2%	61.8	110
Age			
16-25	28.1%	71.9	192
26+	22.5%	77.5	764

Note: Low Education – Primary school or less; Medium Education – Secondary through technical school; High Education – University or higher.


Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

³ A striking portion of those with the highest levels of education (61.8%) do not support democratic values.

⁴ The distinction between “the young” and “older” Salvadorans might be characterized as corresponding to the “post-conflict” and “conflict” generations. The Peace Accords were signed in 1992. Those in the post-conflict group would have been 8 years or younger in 1992.

The extent to which particular socio-demographic characteristics predict support for democratic procedural norms, and which do not, is summarized in Figure 1A-2. Here, the data are centered around the average level of support for democratic procedural norms (23.6%) and the bars, both above and below the line, signify how much each factor contributes to (above the line), or detracts from (below the line), support for democratic procedural norms⁵. The key interpretive point to note is that these bars indicate net effects, the impact of particular socio-demographic variables *after* other socio-demographic variables are controlled.

Figure 1A-2. Support for Procedural Democracy



Note: These results stylize the multivariate analysis findings. The data are centred around the average level of support for procedural democratic norms, and they identify the demographic location of surpluses (in black) and deficits (in grey) in democratic values.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Clearly, education is by far the most powerful driver of support for democratic norms. Significantly, age also matters. The young have higher levels of formal education than their older counterparts but the young tend to be stronger supporters of democratic procedural norms even after these educational differences are taken into account. Gender and place of residence, by contrast, hardly matter at all.

⁵ The results are computed by OLS analysis.

B. Support for Democratic Values

Support for democratic procedural norms is an important pre-condition for achieving successful democratic transitions, but that support also has to be complemented by democratic values that provide guidance to the day to day actions of citizens. Indeed, support for democratic principles is abstract in the absence of such supporting values as the belief in equality, freedom of expression and association, equality before the law, tolerance towards outgroups.

As in Nicaragua, the El Salvador Benchmark Survey probed levels of public support for three particular democratic values: individual responsibility; equality; and tolerance to outgroups. Respondents were presented with three statements and they were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement. Individual responsibility is measured by citizen response to the statement: *“People who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not society”*. Equality is measured by responses to a statement about gender relations: *“Men make better leaders than women”*. And tolerance to outgroups is measured by a challenging statement about homosexuality: *“Homosexuals should not hold public office.”*

The basic aggregate results, which compare El Salvador and Nicaragua, are summarized in Table 1B-1.

Table 1B-1. Support for Democratic Values

	El Salvador (2009)	Nicaragua (2009)
Individual Responsibility		
Support	63.2%	64.9%
Does Not Support	36.8	35.1
N	(1,003)	(1,125)
Equality		
Support	75.4	77.6
Does Not Support	24.6	22.4
N	(994)	(1,148)
Tolerance		
Support	50.5	60.0
Does Not Support	49.5	40.0
N	(982)	(1,011)

Question: I am going to read to you some of the things people say about politicians, the government, or about other people. For each statement, I would like you to tell me if you very much agree, just agree, disagree, or totally disagree.

1. Individual Responsibility: Percentage of respondents that “very much agree” or “agree” that “*People who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not society.*”
2. Equality: Percentage of respondents that “totally disagree” or “disagree” that “*Men make better leaders than women.*”
3. Tolerance: Percentage of respondents that “totally disagree” or “disagree” that “*Homosexuals should not hold public office.*”

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2009 Nicaragua Democracy Survey

Clearly, Salvadorans are quite similar to their Nicaraguan counterparts when it comes to the first two values. Almost two thirds of Salvadorans (63.2%) and Nicaraguans (64.9%) agree that the blame for “*not getting ahead*” lies with the individual and not society. And about three out of four in each country support gender equality⁶. But significant cross-national differences emerge when it comes to support for the idea that homosexuals should “*not hold public office*”. On that question, Salvadorans are evenly divided whereas a modest majority of Nicaraguans (60%) reject the idea that homosexuals should “*not hold public office*”. Tolerance towards this outgroup is somewhat higher in Nicaragua.

There are at least two relevant questions to probe when unpacking these aggregate findings. First, are there significant variations within different segments of society on these dimensions? And, second, to what extent, if at all, are these responses related to support for democratic principles?

As the evidence summarized in Table 1B-2 shows, there are some significant between group variations. First, there are no substantial differences between democrats (those who support democratic principles) and non-democrats when it comes to either orientations towards individual responsibility or tolerance. But there are substantial and statistically significant differences when it comes to equality. Democrats are significantly more likely (83.4%) than non-democrats (73.3%) to support the principle of gender equality.

⁶ The differences between these two national distributions are not statistically significant.

Table 1B-2. Support for Democratic Values by Procedural Democratic Norms, Gender, Age and Education

	Procedural Democratic Norms		Gender		Age			Education		
	Democrat	Non-Democrat	Men	Women	18-25	26+	Low	Medium	High	
Individual Responsibility										
Support	63.8%	62.9%	61.1%	64.7%	54.9%	65.2%	66.8%	61.0%	59.5%	
Does Not Support	36.2	37.1	38.9	35.3	45.1	34.8	33.2	39.0	40.5	
N	(221)	(707)	(419)	(584)	(193)	(810)	(404)	(487)	(111)	
Equality										
Support	83.4%	73.3%	71.4%	78.1%	79.1%	74.5%	73.0%	74.8%	86.6%	
Does Not Support	16.6	26.7	28.6	21.9	20.9	25.5	27.0	25.2	13.4	
N	(223)	(700)	(413)	(581)	(191)	(803)	(396)	(485)	(112)	
Tolerance										
Support	51.1%	52.1%	50.7%	50.4%	55.0%	49.4%	43.3%	54.6%	59.1%	
Does Not Support	48.9	47.9	49.3	49.6	45.0	50.6	56.7	45.4	40.9	
N	(219)	(695)	(416)	(566)	(191)	(791)	(395)	(476)	(110)	

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Gender, age and level of formal education also matter. Women are more inclined than men to support the principle of individual responsibility (64.7% versus 61.1%). Predictably, women are also stronger supporters of gender equality than men (78.1% versus 71.4%). But men and women are both evenly divided when it comes to tolerance.

Young Salvadorans are both more tolerant and more committed to the principle of gender equality than are their older counterparts. Predictably too, those with higher levels of formal education are more tolerant and they are stronger supporters of gender equality than those with less education (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1994). But they are not more committed to the idea of individual responsibility. Support for individual responsibility is slightly higher among those with lower levels of education and among women.

Are these outlooks related to support for procedural democratic principles? Part of the answer emerges from the results of the multivariate analysis reported in Table 1B-3. Here, the first set of findings address the question: Which socio-demographic factors, net the effects of all others, are the strongest predictors of support for democratic procedural norms? The second stage introduces indicators of the three democratic values into the set-up; it shows which indicators are the strongest predictors of support for democratic principles after all other variables are controlled.

Two findings are absolutely clear. First, education remains the most powerful predictor of support for democratic principles after all other variables are controlled. And second, it is support for equality (gender quality) that turns out to be the second most powerful predictor of support for democratic principles. That finding holds after all socio-demographic indicators and other values are taken into account.

Table 1B-3. Predictors of Support for Procedural Democratic Norms

	Stage 1			Stage 2		
	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Socio-Demographics						
Female	-.099	.074	-.051	-.126	.073	-.064
Employed	-.030	.072	-.016	-.040	.072	-.021
Income	.203	.106	.076	.190	.105	.072
Education	.492***	.132	.163	.478***	.130	.159
Urban	-.074	.081	-.036	-.075	.080	-.037
Age	-.095	.163	-.023	-.095	.161	-.023
Democratic Values						
Indiv. Responsibility				.014	.072	.007
Equality				.373***	.081	.165
Tolerance				-.108	.070	-.056
Constant	2.658***			2.454***	.136	
Adjusted R Square	.038			.063		
N	749			749		

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Dependent Variable: Support for Procedural Norms of Democracy (Scale from 0 to 4)

Coefficients from ordinary least squares regression reported. Independent variables are assigned values ranging from 0 to 1.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

C. Perceptions of “How Democracy Works”

Democracy is an essentially contested concept; people pour different meanings into the idea and there is no consensus about the boundaries of the concept (Macpherson 1968). So it comes as no surprise to discover that when Salvadorans were asked what democracy means to them (open ended question), responses varied widely. Some associate democracy primarily with freedom of speech. For others, democracy brings to mind equal treatment, free elections, national unity, peace and solidarity (see Appendix I). Clearly, different people associate the “workings of democracy” with quite different outcomes. The El Salvador Benchmark Survey presented people with a common set of statements about how “democracy works” and respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement.

There is no necessary or logical link between democracy and stability, order, or even how the economic system performs although in mature democracies economies generally work well, regimes tend to be stable, and public order is routine. The interpretive question probed here is: What kind of outcomes Salvadorans themselves associate with “democracy”.

The basic findings, once again, can be placed in a broader cross-national context. Like Guatemalans (65%), Salvadorans (60.8%) are significantly more likely than Nicaraguans (43.9%) to think that “*the economic system works poorly in a democracy*”. And they are significantly more inclined (48%) than their Nicaraguan counterparts (39%) to believe that democracies are “*not good at maintaining order*”. On all of these indicators, it is Guatemalans who harbor the most negative assessments of “democracy”.

Table 1C-1. Perspectives about “How Democracy Works”

	El Salvador (2009)	Guatemala (2007)	Nicaragua (2009)
In a Democracy, Economic System Works Poorly			
Agree	60.8%	65.0%	43.9%
Disagree	39.2	35.0	56.1
N	(959)	(1,090)	(1,051)
Democracies are Unstable			
Agree	67.9%	73.8%	64.7%
Disagree	32.1	26.2	35.3
N	(966)	(1,056)	(1,076)
Democracies are not Good at Maintaining Order			
Agree	48.0%	57.7%	39.0%

	El Salvador (2009)	Guatemala (2007)	Nicaragua (2009)
Disagree	52.0	42.3	61.0
N	(970)	(1,036)	(1,054)

Questions: *I'm going to read you a few things people say about democracy. For each assertion, I would appreciate if you would tell me if you totally agree, agree, disagree or completely disagree:*

- A. *In a democracy, the economic system works poorly.*
- B. *Democracies are unstable and there is too much discussion.*
- C. *Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.*

Data for Guatemala are weighted by ethnicity.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2007 Guatemala Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2009 Nicaragua Democracy Survey

Are these perspectives about democracy in any way related to support for democratic principles? Or other factors? People who support democratic procedural norms might be expected to be less inclined than others to think that democracies are necessarily unstable, cannot maintain order or have economies that perform poorly. The evidence supports that expectation: “Democrats” and “non-democrats” differ significantly in their reactions to all three statements.

There also reasons to believe that those with higher levels of education will be less inclined to think that democracies entail instability, chaos or economic underperformance. The data also support that expectation (see Table 1C-2), at least when it comes to economic performance and order.

There is no particular reason to suppose that such other demographic factors as age or gender will have any impact on any of these outlooks. To be sure, women are somewhat more likely than men, in aggregate, to think that economies perform poorly in democracies. And younger respondents are marginally more inclined to think that democracies are “not good at maintaining order”. But these variations are attributable to other factors⁷. Three are systematically related to support for democratic principles. As before, it is education that matters most. Also as before, views about equality are strong predictors of support for democratic procedural norms. But one “perspective about democracy” also matters. Net all other variables, people who *disagree* with the statement that democracies are “not good at maintaining order” are significantly more likely to support democratic procedural norms.

⁷ The multivariate results indicating the most significant predictors of support for democratic principles are presented in Appendix II.

Table 1C-2. Perspectives about “How Democracy Works” by Democratic Values, Gender, Age and Education

	Democratic Norms		Gender		Age			Education		
	Democrat	Non-Democrat	Men	Women	18-25	26+	Low	Medium	High	
Economic System Works Poorly										
Agree	50.9%	63.6%	58.1%	62.7%	60.5%	60.9%	64.1%	60.7%	50.0%	
Disagree	49.1	36.4	41.9	37.3	39.5	39.1	35.9	39.3	50.0	
N	(212)	(679)	(406)	(553)	(190)	(769)	(376)	(468)	(114)	
Democracies are Unstable										
Agree	64.5%	69.1%	67.1%	68.5%	69.8%	67.4%	63.9%	71.8%	64.9%	
Disagree	35.5	30.9	32.9	31.5	30.2%	32.6%	36.1	28.2	35.1	
N	(214)	(683)	(410)	(556)	(192)	(774)	(380)	(471)	(114)	
Not Good at Maintaining Order										
Agree	38.9%	50.1%	47.9%	48.1%	52.3%	47.0%	50.1%	49.8%	33.0%	
Disagree	61.1%	49.9%	52.1	51.9	47.7	53.0	49.9	50.2	67.0	
N	(216)	(686)	(409)	(561)	(193)	(777)	(383)	(474)	(112)	

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Part 2. Confidence in Institutions


Institutions perform critical functions: they are the bridges that link citizens to the state, society and the economy (Klingemann, 1995). To accomplish these tasks effectively, institutions must enjoy at least a modicum of public support. Like other benchmark surveys, the El Salvador 2009 Democracy Survey asked respondents a standard set of questions probing levels of citizen confidence in a variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions.

As in Nicaragua, the El Salvador Survey was conducted shortly after an election⁸. The place to begin, then, is with the question: How did citizens evaluate those institutions that qualify as significant electoral actors?

Figure 2-1 summarizes some basic comparative data. In every case, Salvadorans express greater confidence in their electoral institutions than their Nicaraguan counterparts. And with one exception, the case of the office of the president, Guatemalans have more confidence in their electoral institutions than Salvadorans.

There is another common theme that emerges from these findings: Each of the three publics places more confidence in “the media” than they do in the other institutions considered here. And notice that all three publics express the least confidence in political parties and legislatures.

Figure 2-1. Public Confidence in Political Institutions



Question: *Now, I am going to mention a number of organizations. I'd like to know how much confidence you have in the work they do: Total, a lot, some, none* (Percentages are those with “total” or “a lot” of confidence)

⁸ The 2008 Nicaraguan election was particularly contentious. There was a sharp drop in public confidence in these institutions in Nicaragua between 2007 and 2009.

Data for Guatemala are weighted by ethnicity.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2007 Guatemala Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2009 Nicaragua Democracy Survey

A much more complete summary of El Salvador places these results in the broader context of about a dozen institutions, is summarized in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1. Public Confidence in Institutions

	Total Confidence	A lot of Confidence	Some Confidence	No Confidence
Congress	3.0%	5.7%	42.7%	48.6%
Parties	2.9	8.1	42.5	46.4
Big Business	4.4	10.9	40.4	44.3
Judges	5.2	9.8	49.6	35.4
OAS	8.1	20.9	46.4	24.6
President	9.1	20.4	46.3	24.1
Tribunal	11.3	19.7	44.0	24.9
UN	9.0	22.7	46.0	22.3
Police	10.1	20.7	46.1	23.2
NGOs	11.4	21.5	44.6	22.5
Media	11.8	25.7	43.5	19.0
National Army	14.8	26.2	41.3	17.7
Churches	48.7	26.2	21.0	4.1

Question: *Now, I am going to mention a number of organizations. I'd like to know how much confidence you have in the work they do: Total, a lot, some, none.*

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

In this case, the “some confidence” category serves as a midpoint on the scale, a fulcrum. Responses tend to cluster around this midpoint. The interpretive focus, however, is on the balance of the distributions on either side of that midpoint and on the ratio of “total” and “a lot” responses to the “no confidence” responses. These outlier categories are less ambiguous.

Clearly, “Congress” elicits the least confidence of any of the thirteen institutions considered. In that case, the ratio of “no confidence” to “total/ a lot of confidence” is about 6:1. Political parties hardly fare any better. Those two institutions, along with “big business” and “judges”, clearly suffer from a confidence deficit.

“Churches” stand at the opposite end of the public confidence scale. They have a confidence surplus ratio of about 18:1. The national army comes in a very distant second. In rank order, the media, NGOs, the police, the election commission and the UN, all enjoy a confidence surplus, albeit a modest one.

What explains the low levels of confidence in El Salvador’s representative institutions? A closer inspection of these data indicates a striking finding: There is a basic consensus among Salvadorans about these confidence ratings. There is very little variation across different age groups, for example.

Table 2-2 explores which factors predict public confidence in Congress, political parties and the office of the President, and it shows that the only demographic that predicts confidence in these institutions is education. Those who are *more* educated have *less* confidence in these institutions. It also shows that those who are more knowledgeable about politics, and those who are more cynical, are significantly less confident in these institutions. By contrast, those who are interested and engaged in politics have greater confidence in these institutions.

Table 2-2. Predictors of Confidence in Institutions

	Congress		Parties		President	
	β	SE	β	SE	B	SE
Socio-Demographics						
Female	-.021	.051	-.018	.052	.054	.066
Employed	-.029	.050	.001	.050	-.011	.064
Income	.014	.073	-.007	.074	.051	.094
Education	-.127**	.090	-.049	.092	-.132**	.116
Urban	-.059	.055	-.017	.056	-.081*	.071
Age	-.030	.112	.044	.114	.001	.143
Interest in Politics	.279***	.089	.354***	.091	.059	.114
Political Knowledge	-.077*	.100	-.046	.099	-.040	.127
Cynicism	-.083*	.089	-.062	.090	-.104**	.114
Adjusted R Square	.096		.122		.035	
N	825		828		830	

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Standardized beta coefficients from ordinary least squares regression reported. Independent variables are assigned values ranging from 0 to 1.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

That Salvadorans have so little confidence in these key representative institutions is problematical. It is particularly problematical that the educated elite, and those who objectively know more, have the lowest levels of confidence in these institutions.

Part 3. Patterns of Engagement

Support for democratic principles and values are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democratic consolidation. Healthy democracies also require at least minimal levels of citizen engagement and some dimensions of engagement are particularly critical. Interest in politics, for example, is a form of psychological engagement and it provides citizens with the motivation to become informed about their political community (Gabriel and Van Deth, 1995). Mutual trust is also important; trust lubricates social relations lowering interpersonal transaction costs. Local level community involvement is a breeding ground for involvement in the wider political community. Thus rich social networks promote broader political participation (Verba et al 1995; Dalton 1996; Klesner 2007; McClung, 2003). Together, interpersonal trust and associational involvement are the pillars of social capital (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993). Countries with high levels of social capital are all prosperous and stable democracies whereas countries with low stocks of social capital are nearly all impoverished autocracies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Cynicism, the belief that people in government don't care about ordinary citizens, is corrosive to democracy while being politically knowledgeable is a form of cognitive engagement that contributes to the quality of public debate and so to democratic life. Partial democracies containing more interested, trusting, active and knowledgeable citizens have better chances of achieving sustainable democracy, and resisting democratic rollbacks, than do countries with disinterested, mistrustful, disengaged and cynical publics (Diamond 2008; Epstein et al. 2006).

There are powerful reasons, then, to examine closely these dimensions of civic engagement and to ask: Who is engaged? To what extent? And in what ways?

The place to begin is with the aggregate picture and the Nicaraguan data, once again, provide a useful scale for interpreting the Salvadoran findings.

Table 3-1. Engagement, Cross-national Comparisons

Interest in Politics	El Salvador (2009)	Nicaragua (2009)
Interested	51.2%	39.9%
Disinterested	48.8	60.1
N	(1,017)	(1,179)
Interpersonal Trust		
Trust	31.6%	20.3%
Distrust	68.4	79.7
N	(1,031)	(1,175)

Association Membership	El Salvador (2009)	Nicaragua (2009)
High	30.4%	22.4%
Medium	24.9	24.1
Low	44.8	53.5
N	(1,034)	(1,145)
Political Action*		
Active	13.9%	36.1%
Inactive	86.1	63.9
N	(987)	(930)
Cynicism		
Cynical	66.2%	59.4%
Not Cynical	33.8	40.6
N	(1,000)	(1,128)
Political Knowledge		
High	56.5%	44.6%
Medium	28.3	37.8
Low	15.2	17.6
N	(1,050)	(1,200)

Questions:

- (Interest in Politics): *How interested are you in politics?*
 “Very interested” and “somewhat interested”=1, “Not interested” or “reject politics”=0.
- (Interpersonal Trust):
Do you think you can trust most people (in your community) or do you have to be careful when dealing with people?
 You have to be careful, distrust=0;
 Most people are reliable, trust=1
- (Associational Membership):
I'd like you to tell me if you have always, often, sometimes or never participated in the following types of meetings or activities over the past year:
 - Church or religious groups (Always, often, sometimes=1; Never=0)
 - Cultural groups
 - Sports groups
 - Unions or workers associations
 - Community development groups

An additive index with a range of values 0-5: 0 through 1=low membership (0), 2=moderate membership levels (1), 3 through 5=high levels of membership (2)
- (Political Action):
Please tell me if you have ever participated, are willing to do so, or if you would never participate under the circumstance:

1. Request the government's authority to assist with a community problem (Done/willing=1; Never do/not willing=0)
2. Participate in a legally authorized demonstration
3. Participate in a strike at your workplace
4. Support a public protest

This additive index takes on values that range from 0 (inactive) to 4 (active). The most active (4) are compared to those who are less so (0-3).

5. (Cynicism Index):
I'd like you to tell me if you very much agree, just agree, disagree, or totally disagree with these opinions:
 1. I think that the government does not care much about ordinary people (Agree=0; Disagree=1)
 2. Politicians are ready to lie to get elected

The index: 0 (Cynical) – 2 (Not Cynical). Those cynical (0) are compared to those who are not (1-2).

6. (KNOWLEDGE INDEX):
Can you tell me the name of:
 1. The mayor of your municipality
 2. The President of El Salvador
 3. The President of the United States

The additive index scores individuals according to how many correct answers are given. High knowledge (=3 correct answers) are compared to those with two correct answers (medium) and low (one or no correct answers).

*NOTE: The reason for the distinct differences in political action scores between the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan political action scores are largely attributable to variations the "willingness" of individuals to perform a political act. In Nicaragua, respondents are much more willing. Below is the distributional breakdown:

Request Government help to Solve Community Problem	El Salvador	Nicaragua
Have done	14.8%	14.2%
Willing to do	64.2	63.2
Never will do	20.9	22.6
N	1032	1142
Participate in a Demonstration		
Have done	5.8	12.3
Willing to do	23.9	41.1
Never will do	70.3	46.6
N	1021	1133
Participate in Workplace Strike		
Have done	3.6	6.1
Willing to do	21.0	39.1
Never will do	75.4	54.8

N	1019	1132
Support a Public Protest		
Have done	4.3	8.0
Willing to do	22.7	41.9
Never will do	73.0	50.1
N	1018	1126

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey; 2009 Nicaraguan Democracy Survey

As Table 3-1 shows, Salvadorans are significantly more interested, trusting and involved in their communities than are their Nicaraguans counterparts. And they are also more knowledgeable about politics⁹. But when it comes to politics more narrowly construed, Salvadorans also turn out to be more cynical; they are more inclined than their Nicaraguan counterparts to believe that “*the government does not care much about ordinary people*”. They are also substantially less inclined than Nicaraguans to engage in various types of political action—to sign petitions, to participate in demonstrations or strikes.

Table 3-2 summarizes a great deal of data and it reveals substantial variations across some socio-demographic groups within El Salvador. As expected, those who support democratic procedural norms tend to be systematically more engaged than those who do not support those principles. Democrats are more interested in politics; they are more trusting, more engaged in the life of their communities, and more inclined to engage in different forms of direct political action. They also tend to be more knowledgeable but less cynical about politics.

⁹ The knowledge questions used in both countries are directly comparable.

Table 3-2. Engagement by Procedural Democratic Norms, Gender, Age and Education

	Procedural Democratic Norms		Gender		Age			Education		
	Democrat	Non-Democrat	Men	Women	18-25	26+	Low	Medium	High	
Interest in Politics										
Interested	57.7%	52.1%	55.5%	48.2%	61.8%	48.7%	44.7%	53.0%	68.1%	
Disinterested	42.3	47.9	44.5	51.8	38.2	51.3	55.3	47.0	31.9	
N	(222)	(712)	(422)	(595)	(199)	(818)	(414)	(489)	(113)	
Interpersonal Trust										
Trust	36.2%	29.6%	39.8%	25.9%	27.3%	32.7%	31.8%	30.9%	34.5%	
Distrust	63.8	70.4	60.2	74.1	72.7	67.3	68.2	69.1	65.5	
N	(224)	(717)	(422)	(609)	(198)	(833)	(425)	(492)	(113)	
Association Membership										
High	36.7%	30.6%	39.8%	23.7%	38.8%	28.4%	19.9%	33.7%	55.4%	
Medium	22.6	24.8	24.4	25.2	24.5	24.9	26.1	25.7	17.0	
Low	40.7	44.6	35.8	51.2	36.7	46.7	54.0	40.7	27.7	
N	(226)	(719)	(430)	(604)	(196)	(838)	(422)	(499)	(112)	
Political Action										
Active	17.7%	13.9%	22.1%	7.9%	17.4%	13.0%	10.8%	13.4%	27.8%	
Inactive	82.3	86.1	77.9	92.1	82.6	87.0	89.2	86.6	72.2	
N	(215)	(689)	(417)	(570)	(195)	(792)	(400)	(478)	(108)	
Cynicism										
Cynical	64.8%	67.2%	65.0%	67.1%	70.1%	65.3%	63.1%	69.7%	61.8%	
Not Cynical	35.2	32.8	35.0	32.9	29.9	34.7	36.9	30.3	38.2	
N	(219)	(708)	(417)	(583)	(194)	(806)	(401)	(488)	(110)	
Political Knowledge										
High	62.4%	57.3%	65.7%	50.0%	56.5%	56.5%	42.9%	63.3%	78.1%	
Medium	27.9	27.4	25.5	30.3	28.0	28.4	33.4	25.9	19.3	
Low	9.7	15.3	8.8	19.7	15.5	15.2	23.7	10.8	2.6	
N	(226)	(730)	(432)	(618)	(200)	(850)	(434)	(501)	(114)	

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Gender and age effects turn out to be particularly striking. Politics is something of a male sport (Norris 1999) and so it comes as little surprise to discover that Salvadoran men are more interested in, and more knowledgeable about, politics than women. Far more surprising, perhaps, are the very substantial gender gaps in levels of interpersonal trust and civic involvement. Women exhibit much lower levels of interpersonal trust than men, and they are much less involved in their communities. Furthermore, men are about three times more likely than women to engage in political action. These gender gaps are very substantial indeed. There is, in effect, a systematic fault line that separates women from men across every dimension of engagement considered.

Age also matters. It is the young, those under 26 years of age, who tend to be the most engaged in El Salvador. They are more interested in politics (61.8%) than their older counterparts (48.7%)¹⁰. More of the young (38.8% versus 28.4%) are active in their communities. The young are somewhat more inclined to be politically active (17.4% versus 13.0%). At the same time, the young are less trusting and more cynical about politics than their older counterparts.

Formal education is a foundational resource that primes interest, knowledge and participation. And the impact of education corresponds to expectations. The most striking differences concern interest in politics, associational membership, political action and knowledge. Those with the highest levels of formal education are substantially more interested and more knowledgeable than those with medium or low levels of formal education¹¹. The effects are similar for associational membership. Notice that those with the highest levels of education are more than twice as likely as those with the lowest levels of formal education to be involved in their communities (54% versus 19.9%). And they are two-and-a-half times more likely to engage different types of political action.

Significantly, perhaps, education level has hardly any impact upon levels of interpersonal trust. Nor does education have much impact on how Salvadorans evaluate their political classes or on their evaluations of how responsive those in government are to citizens. Levels of cynicism and trust are not entirely uniform but they are essentially similar across all educational groups.

A much more detailed investigation of precisely which factors drive the variations in each of these different dimensions of engagement both underscore and illuminate the findings summarized in Table 3-2. The full results are reported in Appendix III-A. But there are two key findings that emerge from this more rigorous analytic approach¹².

First, and most significant, these results confirm the breadth and depth of the gender gap. Across every dimension of engagement, with the single exception of cynicism, gender is a powerful predictor

¹⁰ This is an unusual finding. Cross-national research typically shows that interest in politics increases with age.

¹¹ There is an education gradient. In effect, those with medium levels of education are more likely than those with less to be interested and knowledgeable. And those with high levels of education are more interested and knowledgeable than those with medium levels of education.

¹² Recall that in multivariate analyses, the focus is on the net effects of each predictor *after* all other factors are controlled. Secondly, in these tests, support for democratic procedural norms and the democratic values indicators are also included in the analyses.

of disengagement. In most cases, gender is the most powerful predictor¹³. Put slightly differently, the gender differences in levels of psychological, cognitive, social and political engagement are not attributable to educational or income differences. Nor are they attributable to variations, for example, in support for equality or democratic norms. The relative disengagement of women, then, raises deeper questions about what lies at the source of this gender gap. Furthermore, exactly the same gender gap holds up among the young. Young women are significantly less interested, trusting, involved in their community, less knowledgeable and less politically active than young men. (See Appendix III-B).

Secondly, education and age effects emerge exactly where one would expect: Education is positively associated with membership in community associations as well as political knowledge. Younger people, net other factors, are significantly more interested in politics and more inclined to engage in political action. Urban dwellers score higher on the political knowledge scale than their rural counterparts. But those living in rural areas (and those with higher income and who support procedural democratic norms) exhibit higher levels of trust.

Follow-up focus groups, conducted between August 26 and August 28 with selected groups of women to investigate in greater detail why the levels of engagement were so much lower among women.

Some spoke as mothers wanting to “protect” their girls more than their sons, or as daughters who worried that activism outside the home might expose them to unsafe situations: As one housewife, and mother of five children put it:

“Girls are taught to be submissive. This is our culture starting in the home, which ends with women not participating.”

But the most common explanation was a cultural one: Many women claimed that it was *machismo* that stood in the way of women’s broader engagement:

“Our men are machista, and they think they should be the leaders.”
(Unmarried, unemployed secretary, age 53)

“The men are too protective to allow ‘their’ women to go out into the street.”
(Young female education student)

“This is due to machismo, in the sense that girls are educated to serve men.”
(Mother of special needs child, unemployed)

¹³ Further analysis also shows that gender is the most powerful predictor of every dimension of political inaction.

*“Men are guilty of machismo, and women are guilty of allowing it.”
(Mother of 4 children, part-time clerk)*

Some participants pointed out that the marginalization of girls and women begins at home. It is at home that girls are taught to defer to male family members and where boys are taught to lead and to protect girls. That asymmetrical dynamic, many said, led to abuses of power:

*“My bother did not want me to join a youth network because he was jealous.”
(Female member of political party youth group)*

*“I have to make deals with my brother. He lets me go out if I wash his clothes...”
(Student and female member of political party youth group)*

*“We are in a youth network of 3 women and 15 men. There were others, but they don’t participate because their fathers won’t permit it.”
(Student and female member of political party youth group)*

Then there were a number of women who argued that it was not *machismo* that was to blame. Rather it was the unequal burdens place on women that also explained why females were less engaged. They were just too busy:

*“We are busy with our kids and we also work, so we have no free time.”
(Responsible for caring for extended family, part-time vendor)*

*“We wake up early, we take care of everybody... then we make and sell things for extra money.”
(Widowed mother of 2 children, works part time as vendor)*

Some participants placed the problem in a broader societal context. They saw the engagement gap as reflecting broader gender biases in El Salvador’s formal institutions. They commented:

*“The organized groups do not reach out to women...with the exception of the churches.”
(Mother of 4 children, former seamstress)*


*“There is no process for renewal in organized groups, particularly political parties, where we have seen the same leaders for as long as we can remember.”
(Female member of a political party youth network)*

*“Men who run [civic and political] organizations are opposed to female participation because women are more responsible and reliable, and so the men are insecure.”
(Female student, member of local Municipal Council)*

Part 4. Voting and Non-Voting

Voting is not only a fundamental democratic right of citizens but it is also the key mechanism by which citizens hold their elected leaders accountable. Most citizens vote out of a sense of duty (Blais 2000). A large body of cross-national research shows that levels of voter turnout vary substantially from one country to the next and from election to election (Franklin 2004). In most countries, in stable and transitional democracies alike, voter turnout tends to be lower in local/ municipal elections than in a national presidential election. El Salvador is no exception to that pattern. Reported levels of voter turnout in the 2006 and 2009 Legislative/ Municipal elections were somewhat lower (around 75%) than in the 2009 Presidential election (80%).

Figure 4-1. Voting Turnout



Question: *Did you vote in the Legislative and Municipal elections of January 2006? Did you vote in the past Legislative and Municipal elections of January 2009? Did you vote in the past Presidential election of March 2009?*

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

One of the most striking findings emerging from the evidence presented in Part 3 concerned a significant gender gap in levels of civic engagement. Recall that along every single dimension of engagement, women were significantly less engaged than men. Given that civic engagement tends to promote electoral turnout there are reasons to expect comparable gender variations in electoral behavior. Specifically, there are reasons to expect lower levels of voter turnout among women than men. The evidence supports that expectation. In the 2009 Legislative/ Municipal elections women’s level of voter turnout was 71.2%, significantly lower than men’s (80.3%). Voter turnout among women was somewhat higher in the 2009 Presidential election (77.2%). But then it was higher also for men (83.1%). Regardless of the type of election in question, the findings are consistent: There is a sustained gender gap in electoral participation.

The evidence summarized in Table 4-1 also indicates a significant age gap. Recall the evidence indicating that young people are more interested in, and more knowledgeable about it, politics than their older counterparts. People with greater interest in, and more knowledge about, politics are significantly more likely to vote than those with lower levels of interest and knowledge (Nevitte et al. 2009). Consequently, there are strong reasons to expect correspondingly higher levels of voter turnout among the young.

Table 4-1. Voting Turnout by Procedural Democratic Norms, Gender, Age, Education and Income

	Legislative/Municipal (2009)			Presidential (2009)		
	Voter	Non-Voter	N	Voter	Non-Voter	N
Democratic Norms						
Democrat	75.2%	24.8	226	81.0%	19.0	226
Non-Democrat	77.0%	23.0	730	80.8%	19.2	730
Gender						
Men	80.3%	19.7	432	83.1%	16.9	432
Women	71.2%	28.8	618	77.2%	22.8	618
Age						
18-25	66.5%	33.5	200	71.0%	29.0	200
26+	76.9%	23.1	850	81.6%	18.4	850
Education						
Low	72.8%	27.2	434	77.0%	23.0	434
Medium	75.4%	24.6	501	80.0%	20.0	501
High	81.6%	18.4	114	79.7%	20.3	1,049
Income						
Low	75.0%	25.0	440	77.8%	22.2	486
Medium	74.1%	25.9	262	80.9%	19.2	282
High	80.0%	20.0	120	85.4%	14.6	130

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

In this case, the surprising finding is that the evidence does *not* support that expectation. There is a significant age gap but it works in opposite direction. Older Salvadorans are consistently, and significantly, more likely than their younger counterparts to vote. This age gap is not minor, nor is it attributable to some statistical artifact. It is a substantial 10 percentage points and once again that same age gap holds across both the Presidential and Legislative/ Municipal elections.

These findings raise an important question: what explains these variations? Why is it that younger Salvadorans, who are more interested in and more knowledgeable about politics than their older counterparts are less inclined to vote? The 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Survey asked non-voters a number of open-ended follow-up questions and the responses shed significant light on the question. Non-voting respondents were asked: *And what was the main reason that you decided not to vote?*

People typically supply two kinds of reasons for not voting – motivational reasons or institutional reasons. Motivational reasons include such responses as: *“I’m not interested in politics,” “I don’t like politicians,” “the political parties are all the same,”* and so on. The common theme uniting these reasons is that it is the citizens themselves who make the decision not to vote. They have a choice, they evaluate the costs and the alternatives, and they choose not to vote. Institutional reasons, by contrast, usually refer to some kind of obstacle or barrier that prevents people from voting. They are what might be called “soft” barriers. Citizens might live some distance away from the polling station and distance, or perhaps they lack of bus fare, or the time, and these factors discourage people from voting¹⁴. But there are also “hard” barriers; people do not vote because, perhaps, they do not have the proper identification or because they are not on the voters’ list. The significant point is that non-voting because of an institutional barrier is not a matter of choice; eligible citizens are prevented from voting by external factors.

Table 4-2. Reasons for Non-Voting in Election

	Legislative/ Municipal Elections (2009)	Presidential Election (2009)
Lack of Identification/DUI	16.7%	22.0%
Lack of Interest	25.5	26.2
Lack of Transportation	8.0	6.1
Out of Municipality	4.6	4.2
Sick	18.6	15.4
Not on Voters’ List	4.6	6.5
Other	22.1	19.6
N	263	214

¹⁴ These soft barriers, or “resource” explanations, are relevant in some national settings (Nevitte et al 2009). But a separate analysis of this explanation for non-voting in El Salvador indicates that resources have only a very modest impact on non-voting in both Legislative/ Municipal and Presidential elections.

Question: *Was there a particular reason why you didn't vote?*

Coding categories for reasons for not voting (responses to the open-ended question):

Lack of Identification: Did not have a DUI; DUI in deteriorated condition

Lack of Interest: Have never voted; Do not have a political preference; Do not have confidence in politicians; not interested; voting is useless; Do not like the candidate's proposal; Their vote was not important because they knew who was going to win; Because everything will go on the same; Candidates' proposals did not catch their attention; Do not like any political party; Political parties never fulfill their promises

Lack of Transportation: Voting centre is far away; Lack of transport to their voting centre

Out of Municipality: Changed municipality of residence; Was out of the country

Sick: Because of illness

Not on Voters' List: Did not appear in the voter registry; Their information did not appear in the voter registry

Other: Did not get permission to leave work; Because of religious reasons; Has not turned 18 yet; Had to take care of the children; Arrived late to the voting centre; Lack of information; Lack of security at the voting centre; Afraid of electoral violence; Too old; Personal issues; Lack of time

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Table 4-2 summarizes the main reasons citizens volunteered for “not voting” in the preceding Legislative/ Municipal and Presidential elections. The findings are clear. The most frequently mentioned reason for not voting in the last Legislative/ Municipal elections was “lack of interest” (motivational reason). About one in four (25.5%) offered that reason in both the Legislative/ Municipal elections and the Presidential election (26.2%). Institutional reasons for not voting, however, were almost as prominent. When “lack of identification” (16.7%) and “not on the voters list” (4.6%) (both are institutional reasons) are considered together, some one in five (21.3%) reported that they did not vote in the last Legislative/ Municipal elections because they faced an institutional barriers. About the same proportion 28.5% (“lack of identification”=22%, plus “not on voters list”=6.5%) supplied institutional reasons for not voting in the last Presidential election. Institutional barriers to voting are typically very low in long standing stable democracies and election commissions go to great lengths to reduce such barriers as do exist. By international standards these institutional barriers are very high indeed.

Given the substantial size of those institutional barriers, a critical question to explore is whether these institutional and motivational barriers are randomly distributed throughout the population, or whether some groups are more electorally disadvantaged than others. A more detailed analysis of these data reveals a striking finding: There is a very substantial age fault line. Table 4-3 unpacks the results by both gender and age.

Table 4-3. Reasons for Non-Voting in Election by Age and Gender

	Legislative/ Municipal Elections (2009)		Presidential Election (2009)	
	18-25	26+	18-25	26+
Age				
Lack of Identification/DUI	28.6%	14.3%	33.2%	18.5%
Lack of Interest	16.1	28.6	18.7	29.9
Lack of Transportation	4.9	8.7	7.3	5.7
Out of Municipality	7.1	3.1	4.1	3.8
Sick	6.7	22.4	6.7	18.5
Not on Voters' List	8.9	2.6	11.4	3.8
Other	27.7	20.4	18.7	19.7
N	224	196	193	157
Gender				
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Lack of Identification/DUI	23.6%	21.0%	28.5%	25.5%
Lack of Interest	20.1	22.8	20.0	25.9
Lack of Transportation	3.5	8.3	4.6	7.7
Out of Municipality	6.2	4.7	6.2	2.7
Sick	9.7	16.3	10.0	13.2
Not on Voters' List	8.3	4.7	9.2	7.3
Other	28.5	22.1	21.5	17.7
N	144	276	130	220

Question: *Was there a particular reason why you didn't vote?*

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Consider age first. Notice that older Salvadorans are much more likely than their younger counterparts to say that they did not vote for motivational reasons. In the Legislative/ Municipal elections, for example, some 28.6% of those over 25 years of age cited “lack of interest” for not voting compared to 16.1% of those under 26 years of age. The age group distributions for the 2009 Presidential election were 29.9% and 18.7% respectively. The pattern is consistent: The most prominent reason older citizens supply for not voting has to do with motivation.

A second and far more striking finding concerns the age discrepancy in the distribution of institutional barriers. Young people (28.6%) were more than twice as likely as older people (14.3%) to say that they did not vote in 2009 Legislative/ Municipal elections because of a “lack of identification/ DUI”. That figure was even higher (33.2%) in the Presidential election. When those respondents saying they lacked proper identification are added to the group that said they did not vote because they were “not on the voters’ list” (another institutional barrier), the age bias in institutional barriers becomes even starker.

In effect, in the Presidential election, a very substantial 44.9% of eligible Salvadorans under 26 years of age report that they did not vote because they faced an institutional barrier. 22.3% of those over 26 years old confronted that problem. Young citizens are twice as likely as their older counterparts to face institutional barriers to voting¹⁵. Significantly, there is no evidence of equivalent biases when it comes to gender or other socio-demographic divisions.

The survey included a variety of other follow-up questions that shed additional light on the problem. Quite aside from the matter of why citizens did not vote, all citizens were asked a straightforward question: “*Do you have a National Identification Card (DUI)?*” Just over 4% of respondents said that they did not have a DUI. But young people were almost twice as likely (7%) than their older counterparts (4%) to report that they did not have a DUI. And when asked if they had tried to get a DUI younger citizens were significantly more likely (50%) than their older counterparts (42%) to say “yes” they had requested a DUI. Moreover, young people who requested a DUI were about twice as likely (8%) as older citizens (4%) to say that they “had problems obtaining a DUI”. Those who lacked DUI’s and who had *not* requested a national identification card were then asked another follow-up question: “*Is there any reason why you have not requested a DUI?*” About half of all respondents – young and old alike – indicated that they had not requested a DUI for motivational reasons (no time/ interest). But a very substantial proportion (44%) said that they had not requested a DUI because “it is too expensive” or “I do not have the money”. There is, then, a significant resource barrier. And about 17% of young people, and 10% of older citizens, indicated that they did not have a birth certificate. (See Appendix IV).

The cumulative effects of those problems are that a significant segment of the public is excluded from the electoral process. Arguably, the impact of institutional barriers facing young people might be less consequential if political leaders are responsive to that group when crafting public policy. The benchmark survey did not ask questions that allow a direct test of that proposition. But implications of that line of reasoning can be explored indirectly in two ways.

First, the benchmark surveys ask all respondents, voters and non-voters alike, the very same open ended question: “*What in your view is the most important problem facing the country?*” If voters and non-voters have the same priorities and preferences than the expectation might be that they would agree about what are the “most important problems facing the country”.

¹⁵ These findings raise profound questions about, first, how young people get access to DUIs. Second, these data raise questions also about the adequacy of the voter registration list.

Nearly all respondents view “unemployment/poverty, the economic crisis and gangs/violence/drugs” as the most important issues facing the country. But voters and non-voters differ when it comes to how much emphasis they place on these issues. As Table 4-4 shows, non-voters who face institutional barriers are significantly more likely than voters to emphasize “unemployment/poverty”. That group also places less emphasis on the “economic crisis”. Those with electoral voice, then, have different priorities than those without an electoral voice.

Table 4-4. Most Urgent Problem in Country Today By Voters and Non-Voters

	Legislative/ Municipal Elections (2009)		Presidential Election (2009)	
	Voter	Non-Voter (Institutional Barriers)*	Voter	Non-Voter (Institutional Barriers)
Unemployment/Poverty	35.3%	47.9%	36.6%	49.6%
Political Issues	.9	1.7	.9	1.7
Gangs/Violence/Drugs	24.3	21.5	23.7	20.0
Health	1.1	.8	1.1	1.7
Economic Crisis	29.6	22.3	29.2	21.7
Corruption	.5	0	.5	0
Social Problems	.5	0	.5	0
Transport/Energy	0	0	0	0
Education	.3	0	.4	0
Water/Food	7.0	5.8	6.7	5.2
None	0	0	0	0
Other	.5	0	.5	0
N	1,174	121	1,107	115

*Institutional Barriers include not having a DUI and not being on the voters list

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Second, the benchmark surveys asked all respondents about their party identification: “*With which political party do you sympathize?*” (open-ended). If political parties attract people who are like-minded, if people with the same priorities and interests gravitate towards the same political parties, then the expectation is that the partisan profile of voters should be about the same as the partisan profile of non-voters facing institutional barriers. The evidence, summarized in Table 4-5, however, does not support that expectation.

Table 4-5. Party Identification by Presidential Voting

	Non-Voter (Institutional Barriers)	Non-Voter (Other Reasons)	Voter
Presidential Election			
ARENA	50.7%	52.5%	39.4%
FMLN	48.0	42.8	57.4
Other	1.3	3.8	3.3
N	75	80	820
Legislative / Municipal Elections			
ARENA	52.9%	51.1%	38.6%
FMLN	45.7	47.5	57.8
Other	1.4	1.4	3.7
N	70	139	767

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Both of these indirect tests point to the same general conclusion. Those who do not vote because they face institutional barriers do not have priorities that are the same as those who do vote. Consequently, it is hard to argue that the exclusion of their segment of the population from the voting process is inconsequential.

The paradox of participation—that young people are significantly more interested and active in their community but significantly less likely to vote—was presented to follow-up focus groups of young people. They were invited to “explain” this paradox.

Most participants were not at all surprised about the evidence indicating that young people were very active in their communities. Some suggested it would be even greater were it not for the “environment of insecurity”:

*“Being involved in political activity can be harmful...dangerous.”
(Member of youth group at the Catholic University – UCA)*

But in trying to explain the paradox, most pointed fingers at the political parties:

*“Young people voted for a candidate, not a political party, hoping for change.”
(Male youth, public relations college student)*

“Not voting is a way of punishing these parties that generate such indifference in the youth population.”

(Male youth, computer specialist)

*“The political parties are interested in our vote but not in addressing our interests.”
(Catholic Church youth group member in San Salvador)*

“We see the same corruption in all of the political parties, and that takes away our interest.”

(Female, high school graduate, unemployed)

“Partisan politics has been harmful to the country.”

(Male law student at the Catholic University – UCA)

“Political parties have lost credibility. They do not guarantee our rights; they do not consult with us. They impose themselves on us.”

(Young female law student from the Technological University - UTEC)

Nor were participants in the youth focus groups surprised to learn that nearly one half of young people not voting faced institutional barriers. Many expressed first hand experience with these barriers and they were quick to point out the problems with DUIs and the voter registry:

*“I have not gotten my DUI because the process is ridiculous. Some go with their documents and are told to come back, only to be told to come back again.”
(Young mechanics student in San Salvador)*

“There are problems with getting a DUI for the first time because the parents are not available to go.”

(Female youth, political party activist)

“It is a big obstacle. Some people work in a different department and don’t have time to go to their department of residency.”

(Young female, call center worker)

“Some youth lack information about where to go. They go, but without the proper documents and family members.”

(Young female college student)

“Information is lacking. If you do not have your parents, you can show an identification card for minors...but youth do not know this.”

(Female youth, NGO worker)

“Citizens in rural areas have problems of access to the DUI centers, which are only in departmental capitals.”

(Young single mother and student)

“They have stolen my DUI twice. It is hard to replace because of the cost – almost \$10! I don’t know what I’ll do if it happens again.”

(Female college student)

“The officials at the DUI centers make it difficult, for example rejecting forms that have tiny errors, giving us the impression that the process is political.” (Young engineering student)

“Sometimes it is risky to go to the DUI centers. They are in areas where it is unsafe to wait in a long line.”

(Female youth volunteer election observer)

“As an election observer, I saw many young people who couldn’t find their names on the voter list.”

(Male youth volunteer election observer)

“The time period given to verify information was short, and time ran out, which violates our constitutional rights.”

(Male law student at the Catholic University – UCA)

“It seems the TSE did not have the capacity to update the voter list to include those that applied for DUIs just before elections.”

(Male computer science student at the Technological University – UTEC)

“I could not vote because I arrived and my name was not on the list. I had spent five and a half hours waiting in line to get my DUI. It was not lack of interest on my part. It was that they did not let me. You get really angry.”

(Young female education student)

Part 5. Citizens and Political Parties

A. Party Identification

One clear finding emerging from these analyses is that citizens express little confidence in their political parties. But understanding how citizens are connected to political parties is important not least of all because parties are key representative institutions that connect citizens to the state. The El Salvador Benchmark Survey asked all respondents two standard questions that tap the strength of citizens' affective ties to political parties. The first was: “*With which party do you sympathize?*” And those indicating that they did identify with one party or another were asked a follow-up question: “*Would you say that your sympathy for the party is very weak, weak, neither weak nor strong, strong, or very strong?*”

Three clear findings emerge from the basic results summarized in Table 5-1. First, the FMLN has a significantly bigger support base than ARENA. 35% of all respondents said that they “sympathized” with the FMLN compared to just 25.6% sympathizing with ARENA.

Second, FMLN supporters are significantly more strongly attached to their party than their ARENA counterparts. Of those who say they sympathize with the FMLN, 63% view themselves as “strong” or “very strong” supporters. By comparison, just 34.5% of ARENA supporters say that they are “strong” or “very strong” party supporters. In effect, the FMLN’s “strong” support base (20%) is more than twice the size of ARENA’s “strong” support base (8%).

Table 5-1. Party Identification

Party ID	Percentage	
	<i>All Respondents</i>	<i>Strong Partisans</i>
ARENA	25.6	34.5
FMLN	35.4	63.0
Other	2.1	2.5
No Party Sympathy	31.0	-
No Response	5.9	-
N	1,050	403


Questions:

Party Identification – *With which party do you sympathize?* Available responses are: ARENA, FMLN, PCN, PDC, CD, FDR, none or Don't Know/Not Answered.

Strong Partisans – Defined as those who selected “strong” or “very strong” to the question: “Would you say that your sympathy for the party is very weak, weak, neither weak nor strong, strong or very strong?”

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Figure 5-1. Distribution of Partisanship by Party



Question: “Would you say that your sympathy for the party is very weak, weak, neither weak nor strong, strong or very strong?”

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Third, 30% of all respondents said that they did not sympathize with any political party at all¹⁶. Significantly, very few respondents declined to respond to that question (5.9%) and just a handful (2.1%) expressed sympathy for other, minor, political parties. For reasons of small sample sizes, then, the focus is on three groups: ARENA sympathizers, FMLN sympathizers, and respondents who said that they did not sympathize with any political party at all¹⁷.

¹⁶ These data have to be interpreted cautiously. In post election environments survey results often overestimate support for “the winner” of the last election. There is a winner bias to the data. Obversely, self-identified non-partisans usually are biased towards the losing party.

¹⁷ Not surprisingly, there is a high correlation between party sympathy and vote choice: 83.6% of ARENA sympathizers voted compared to 89% of FMLN supporters. 65% of those with no sympathy for any party reported that they voted. Curiously, 82.9% of “strong” ARENA supporters voted compared to 91.3% of FMLN supporters.

B. Differentiating Partisans

The conventional strategy for examining the differences between supporters of competing political parties is to explore socio-demographics, values and issues. The report summarizes the key findings only.

(i) Socio-demographics:

The age profiles of ARENA and FMLN supporters are similar. FMLN supporters are marginally younger than their ARENA counterparts (22% versus 20% under 26 years of age respectively). But gender and education are clearly more important factors to consider. In the support base of ARENA, women sympathizers outnumber their male counterparts by a very substantial margin: 63.9% to 36.1%. FMLN supporters, by contrast, are evenly split along gender lines: 50.5% are male and 49.5% are female. And when it comes to education, a significantly higher proportion of FMLN supporters (17%) come from the high education strata compared to (7.1%) of ARENA supporters. Conversely, 48.3% of ARENA (versus 31.8% of FMLN's) supporters are in the lowest education category. The income differences mirror education differences. 54.4% of ARENA supporters are in the "low" income group compared to 49.2% of FMLN supporters. And 18.1% of FMLN supporters, compared to 15.8% of ARENA's supporters.

Table 5-2. Socioeconomic Status by Party Identification

	Party Identification		
	ARENA	FMLN	No Party
Gender			
Men	36.1%	50.5%	36.0%
Women	63.9	49.5	64.0
N	269	372	325
Age			
16-25	20.1%	22.0%	17.5%
26+	79.9	78.0	82.5
N	269	372	325
Education			
Low	48.3%	31.8%	42.8%
Medium	44.6	51.2	50.8

	Party Identification		
	ARENA	FMLN	No Party
High	7.1	17.0	6.4
N	269	371	325
Income			
Low (0-206)	54.4%	49.2%	58.6%
Medium (207-432)	29.9	32.6	31.6
High (433+)	15.8	18.1	9.9
N	241	331	263
Residence			
Rural	42.4%	27.2%	42.2%
Urban	57.6	72.8	57.9
N	269	372	325

Party Identification – *With which party do you sympathize?* Available responses are: ARENA, FMLN, PCN, PDC, CD, FDR, none or Don't Know/Not Answered.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

The sharpest differences concern place of residence. FMLN sympathizers are more concentrated in urban El Salvador (72%) than are ARENA's (57%).

Significantly, the socio-demographic profile of respondents reporting “no” party sympathies track, almost precisely, the profile of ARENA sympathizers¹⁸.

(ii) Values and Issues


When it comes to values and issues, the differences between ARENA and FMLN supporters are more nuanced. FMLN supporters (24.4%) are slightly more inclined than ARENA supporters (21.5%) to support democratic procedural norms. And 25.6% of respondents without any sympathy for any party support these democratic norms. As Figure 5-2a shows, partisans of all stripes (and non-partisans) exhibit about the same level of commitment to equality. The only differences, and

¹⁸ That finding reinforces the interpretation that there are “halo” effects captured in these data.

they are small, appear to be that self-identified ARENA supporters are somewhat more likely than FMLN supporters (65.3% versus 61.2%) to subscribe to individual responsibility. And self-identified FMLN partisans reported slightly higher levels of tolerance than ARENA supporters (52.8% versus 48.2%)¹⁹.


Figure 5-2. Democratic Values and Issue Profiles by Party Identification

(a) Democratic Values



Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

(b) Issues



Question: *What, to you, is the most pressing problem that El Salvador faces today?*

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

¹⁹ The differences are statistically significant, but small.

Figure 5-2b summarizes the issue profile of these three groups and once again, the similarities are more striking than the differences. For all respondents, partisans or not, similar proportions agree that “unemployment/poverty” is the most important issue facing the country. ARENA supporters are marginally more likely than FMLN supporters to say that “gangs, violence, drugs” are the most important issues (26% versus 24.2% respectively). And FMLN supporters are somewhat more likely than ARENA followers to volunteer that the “economic crisis” is the key issue (30.1% versus 24.9%).

As with values, these issue differences are quite marginal. In effect, the data indicate a near consensus among Salvadorans about what are the challenges facing the country.

If these partisans, and non-partisans, do not differ significantly on fundamental values or on issue priorities, then the question that arises is: On what basis do citizens make vote choices? The most obvious candidate answer is: Leaders²⁰.

(iii) Leaders

One longstanding tradition common to countries in the region is a history of “strong leaders”. The corollary conventional wisdom is that leaders matter a lot to vote choice and there is the associated belief that political parties are simply vehicles for ensuring the election and re-election of strong leaders. That said, systematic empirical evidence demonstrating the precise extent to which leaders matter more than political parties, however, is surprisingly rare.

The El Salvador Benchmark Survey included some questionnaire items that provide an opportunity to explore that issue. All respondents were asked standardized thermometer questions that probed their feelings about both political parties and leaders. These “feeling thermometers” provide calibrated metrics, like a thermometer, with a range of 0-100. Respondents were told that a 0 signifies “very cold” feelings towards the political object, 50 means that “you feel very neutral” and 100 means that “you like it very much.” Respondents were then asked to use any point on that scale to indicate “*how you feel towards the ARENA party*”, then *Rodrigo Ávila*; and *the FMLN party*, and then *Mauricio Funes*.

The basic thermometer scores for the parties and leaders are summarized in Table 5-3. The aggregate results are summarized (left-most column) as are the scores assigned by ARENA party supporters, FMLN party supporters, and those who said that they did not support any party. The right most column contains the thermometer scores of those who said that they did not vote.

²⁰ When it comes to engagement, partisan differences are modest but FMLN supporters are somewhat more knowledgeable (65.6%) and interested (68%) than ARENA supporters (53% and 53% respectively). And they are more cynical (72.8%) than ARENA supporters (57%). As one would expect of a party with a larger “strong” support base FMLN supporters exhibit substantially higher levels of political action (26.6% are active) than ARENA supporters (7.3% active). In short, the FMLN is more “mobilized” than ARENA. (See Appendix V—Figure 5-3).

Table 5-3. Mean Thermometer Scores for Parties and Leaders

	Aggregate	ARENA Supporters		FMLN Supporters		No Party Sympathy	Non-Voter
		Strong Partisans	All	Strong Partisans	All		
ARENA	41.2	79.8	75.0	15.9	18.8	37.5	43.8
Ávila	39.1	72.3	67.0	14.2	17.5	38.9	42.9
+/-	-1.1	-7.5	-8.0	-1.7	-1.3	+1.4	-0.1
FMLN	53.4	26.0	28.5	88.6	83.0	39.6	44.4
Funes	61.0	37.7	40.2	90.3	86.0	49.8	54.1
+/-	+7.6	+11.7	+11.7	+1.7	+3	+10.2	+9.7

Question: *Now we are going to use a thermometer scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you feel very cold towards something, which is to say you don't like it at all; 100 means that you like it very much; and 50 means that you feel very neutral towards something. Using this scale, please tell me how you feel about the following things. You can choose whatever number between 0 and 100. How do you feel towards: The ARENA party; the ex-presidential candidate Rodrigo Ávila; the FMLN party; the President-Elect Mauricio Funes.*

Results are the mean thermometer score for all respondents, those who sympathize with ARENA, those who sympathize with FMLN, those who do not sympathize with any party, and those who did not vote in the presidential election.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

There are several noteworthy findings. First, the aggregate scores from all respondents assign ARENA a score of 41.2 on the “cool” side of 50, and the FMLN achieved a score of 53.4 that is just on the warm side of the mid-point.

Now consider the scores assigned to the leaders. Avila, the leader of ARENA, is assigned a score of 39 degrees; significantly lower than his party's score. Funes, by contrast, is assigned a score of 61.0, higher than the score the general public assigns his party. All of these differences are statistically significant. Clearly, Funes provides the FMLN with a “leadership dividend”; his personal popularity helps the party. Avila, by contrast, provides no such leadership dividend.

Third, it is reasonable to expect party sympathizers to rate their own party higher than do other members of the general public. Indeed, it would be remarkable if they did not. The findings confirm that expectation. On average ARENA sympathizers rate their party a 75 on the thermometer scale, some 34 points higher than the general public. FMLN sympathizers rate their own party even higher, 83 points on the 100 point scale. This is some 30 points higher than the general public. And in both cases strong partisans rate their party even higher than other sympathizers. But there is another intriguing finding: ARENA partisans consistently rate the party higher than they rate their leader, and

by a significant amount. Notice also that even ARENA supporters give Funes a leadership dividend for the FMLN, by some 11 points. Conversely, FMLN supporters rate Avila below ARENA.

The fourth noteworthy finding concerns the evaluations of those who sympathize with no party and those who did not vote. These non-partisans are consistent in the sense that their party and leader ratings all fall below the national average. Non-voters similarly mirror the average ratings for the ARENA party and leader, but they score the FMLN, and Funes, significantly below the national average. Intriguingly, both non-voters and those with no party sympathies rate Funes higher than his party. From nearly all quarters, Funes provides the FMLN with a leadership dividend. Avila, by contrast, is at best a neutral force among those without party sympathy and among non-voters.

Finally, there is evidence of significant cross party asymmetries when it comes to how partisans evaluate “the other” party. There is evidence that citizens do not always make vote choices based on positive preferences; vote choices are sometimes driven by how much voters dislike the alternatives. What matters, in effect, is the choice set that voters face. Consider the thermometer scores that FMLN supporters (and strong supporters) assign to ARENA and Avila. Then compare those to the scores that ARENA supporters (and strong supporters) assign to the FMLN and Funes. FMLN supporters assign ARENA (and Avila) scores that are substantially lower than the scores ARENA supporters assign to the FMLN (and Funes). The FMLN dislike for ARENA (and Avila) is substantially deeper than ARENA dislike of the FMLN and Funes. And even ARENA supporters give Funes a “leadership dividend”.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the benchmark democracy surveys is to provide an assessment of the quality of democracy at a particular moment. And to provide analysts a reliable foundation for evaluating the scope, location and scale of democratic deficits and surpluses.

The El Salvador 2009 Benchmark Survey yields a number of insights, some counterintuitive, that draw attention to significant challenges for those aiming to promote democratic consolidation in the country.

The first two major challenges that forcefully emerge from the evidence assembled here concern participation. More particularly, they concern inequalities of participation. Quite aside from the reality that political participation is an intrinsically valuable feature of life in any democracy (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970) unequal participation has at least two pragmatic consequences: inequality of democratic responsiveness and inequalities of influence (Verba 1956; Lijphart 1997). Political equality and engagement are complementary democratic ideals. A commitment to political equality, equality of voice, is empty when there are systematic biases against the full participation of particular segments of any society. Two such biases are plainly evident from these data. The first concerns women. In a nutshell, women are disengaged. The corresponding challenge is to devise ways to answer the question: How to engage women in El Salvador? It seems plausible, on the face of it, that this challenge can simply be resolved with the passage of time: “As women become increasingly exposed to higher levels of education, the conventional expectation is that more women become engaged in the community and electoral life of the country”. That optimism seems to be misplaced. The evidence is that young *and* educated women in El Salvador are significantly less engaged than their young, educated, male counterparts. The clear implication is that “the passage of time” will not be enough.

The challenges are on two fronts: First, how to engage women in their community? And second, how to engage women, particularly young women, in the electoral life of the country?

The second challenge concerns those Salvadorans who are lodged in the post-conflict generation. Quite remarkably, and entirely contrary to the substantial body of cross-national research (Dalton 1996; Wolfinger et al. 1990; Topf 1995; Powell 1986; Creve 1981; Nevitte 2009) young Salvadorans are more interested in and knowledgeable about politics than their older counterparts. That finding is heartening and a source of optimism. Young people, clearly, have the will to engage. But that optimism has to be tempered with the reality that civic engagement, for them, does not become transformed into electoral engagement. And the reason is a disturbing one: Young people face systematic institutional obstacles that prevent them from being electorally engaged as their older counterparts. They lack voice.

That finding raises other serious questions: Why do young people disproportionately face such barriers? Why do they face obstacles getting birth certificates and DUIs? And in the light of these

problems, how adequate are El Salvador's voter registration lists? The challenge, clearly, is to find systematic answers to these questions and solutions that will lower these barriers.

The third challenge is of a different caliber. Salvadorans have the least confidence in two institutions whose primary responsibilities are to represent the interests of the public: Political parties and Congress. More to the point, those evaluations have the quality of a vicious circle, not a virtuous one: The more knowledgeable people are about the political life of the country the less confidence they have in those institutions. Regardless of whether those evaluations are warranted, the locus of the challenge lies at the feet of the political parties and Congress themselves, namely, how to restore public confidence in their institutions?

The fourth challenge is deeper, broader, and less amenable to short term solutions. By comparative standards, support for democratic principles and values in El Salvador is thin and partial. How, then, to widen and deepen support for these principles and values? Part of the answer, arguably, is that support for those principles and values will grow once women and young people are included in the participatory mainstream, and once representative institutions adjust so that citizens have greater public confidence in them. Perhaps so, and the conventional wisdom is that support for democratic principles and values is broadened and deepened by the spread of post-secondary education to larger segments of the public. Whether the salutary effects of "more education" will automatically produce these democratic orientations in the El Salvador case, however, is more problematical. The evidence clearly shows that a substantial majority of Salvadorans who have the highest levels of formal education do *not* subscribe to democratic principles. The unresolved question is: Why is this so? What is it about higher education in El Salvador that limits enthusiasm for democracy among those who receive higher education?

The response to the first challenge is to promote a culture of inclusion for women in El Salvador. The gender gap in civic and electoral participation is wide. It needs to be narrowed. The response to the second challenge is to remove the obstacles to electoral participation among the young; to help them acquire the basic documentation that is essential to full citizenship, and to evaluate systematically the adequacy of voter registration lists. The response to the third challenge is to invite political parties and Congress to re-evaluate their performance as essential representative institutions and to investigate the question: Why do citizens have so little confidence in their institutions? And an initial response to the fourth challenge is to invite education institutions to ask themselves: What role do they see themselves playing in the task of achieving democratic consolidation in the country?

Appendix I

Meaning of Democracy (Open-Ended)

Meaning of Democracy	%	Meaning of Democracy	%
The freedom to do what I want	2.0	The government's political situation	.1
That we are all treated equally	6.2	The power of the people	.8
Freedom	5.2	Rights, duties and obligations of people	.3
Freedom of speech	30.1	When the majority makes decisions	.1
Freedom to freely elect a government	7.4	The national anthem	.1
Make our rights, values and obligations matter	.8	Politics	.5
That everything is okay	.2	Communicate and get along well with people	.3
Participation in politics	.4	A country in crisis	.1
Living in freedom	2.9	A form of government	.7
Good governance by our leaders	.3	Moral values	.1
Be united	3.5	Something important for humanity	.1
Be honest	.3	Everything bad that is happening in the country	.1
Be humanitarian/solidarity	1.8	A person who is disconnected from everyone	.1
Live in peace	3.3	Elections/political campaigns	.3
Search for well-being	.7	Something that allows for peace, freedom and work	.1
Be happy	.2	The right to health, education, etc.	.1
Have economic comfort	.1	Laws that create policies in the country	.1
Democracy is everyone	.3	Waiting for the opinion of everyone and taking it into account	.2
Freedom of participation	1.1	The government	.1
Be tolerant	.1	Living and getting along well with others	.4
It's what ensures the country's future	.1	Everything that does not exist in the country	.1
Political parties/how they work	.3	Relationships with people who have a good sense of style	.1
It's something good/fair	.4	The fundamental base of society	.1
Respecting everyone	1.3	Freedom of religion and culture	.1
Freedom of thought	1.5	Being democratic	.1
That the country is free	.5	Didn't respond	24.2

Question: *How do you understand democracy?*

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Table 1C-3. Predictors of Support for Procedural Democratic Norms

	Stage 1			Stage 2			Stage 3		
	B	SE	β	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Socio-Demographics									
Female	-.112	.077	-.057	-.142	.076	-.073	-.133	.076	-.068
Employed	-.001	.076	-.000	-.016	.075	-.008	-.011	.075	-.006
Income	.174	.109	.066	.164	.108	.062	.163	.108	.062
Education	.489***	.136	.163	.481***	.134	.161	.429***	.134	.143
Urban	-.053	.085	-.026	-.064	.084	-.031	-.054	.083	-.026
Age	-.109	.169	-.027	-.109	.167	-.027	-.152	.166	-.037
Democratic Values									
Indiv. Responsibility				.027	.075	.014	.033	.074	.017
Equality				.361***	.085	.159	.317***	.086	.139
Tolerance				-.112	.073	-.058	-.111	.072	-.057
Perspectives about Democracy									
Economic System Works Poorly							-.108	.077	-.054
Democracies are Unstable							-.083	.079	-.041
Not Good at Maintaining Order							-.186**	.074	-.096
Constant	2.652***	.118		2.457***	.142		2.711***	.159	
Adjusted R Square	.038			.060			.074		
N	689			689			689		

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Dependent Variable: Support for Procedural Norms of Democracy (Scale from 0 to 4) Coefficients from ordinary least squares regression reported. Independent variables are assigned values ranging from 0 to 1.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Appendix III-A

Table 3-3. Predictors of Engagement (Beta Weights)

	Dependent Variable											
	Interest		Trust		Membership		Political Action		Cynicism		Knowledge	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Socio-Demographics												
Female	-.095*	.065	-.091*	.036	-.138***	.093	-.233***	.099	-.051	.042	-.158***	.057
Employed	-.055	.063	.017	.035	.021	.091	-.086*	.097	.046	.041	.012	.056
Income	.039	.093	.113**	.052	.004	.134	.060	.143	-.097*	.060	.095*	.082
Education	.076	.115	-.011	.065	.165***	.166	.033	.177	.050	.075	.092*	.102
Urban	-.020	.070	-.096*	.039	-.009	.101	.000	.108	-.008	.045	.103**	.062
Age	-.087*	.144	.033	.080	-.036	.204	-.109**	.217	.056	.092	-.041	.126
Democratic Norms												
	.049	.129	.084*	.073	.012	.186	.040	.200	.040	.084	.038	.056
Democratic Values												
Indiv. Responsibility	-.039	.063	.026	.035	-.063	.091	-.029	.097	-.020	.041	-.014	.056
Equality	-.017	.072	-.006	.041	.021	.104	-.010	.111	.021	.047	.060	.064
Tolerance	.016	.062	-.002	.035	.061	.088	.031	.094	.052	.040	.000	.054
Constant	1.679***	.144	.236**	.081	1.950***	.207	2.028***	.224	.253**	.094	2.225***	.127
Adjusted R Square	.027		.024		.061		.069		.006		.083	
N	732		738		743		719		739		749	

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Dependent Variable: Support for Procedural Norms of Democracy (Scale from 0 to 4)

Standardized coefficients from ordinary least squares regression reported. Independent variables are assigned values ranging from 0 to 1.

Dependent Variables: Political Interest – 4 point scale; Interpersonal Trust – 2 point scale; Association Membership – 6 point scale; Political Action – 5 point scale; Cynicism – 3 point scale; Political Knowledge – 4 point scale.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Appendix III-B

Table 3-4. Predictors of Youth (18-25) Engagement

	Interest		Trust		Membership		Political Action		Cynicism		Knowledge	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Socio-Demographics												
Female	-.109*	.068	-.083	.040	-.127**	.107	-.136**	.111	-.138**	.050	-.142***	.064
Employed	-.016	.071	.082	.042	.092*	.113	.046	.117	-.001	.052	-.037	.068
Income	.039	.094	.041	.055	.026	.150	.036	.154	-.024	.069	.067	.090
Education	.048	.139	.048	.081	.137**	.222	.106*	.223	-.082	.102	.144**	.132
Urban	.011	.072	-.096*	.042	.027	.114	-.044	.118	.056	.053	.093*	.068
Age	.022	1.029	.119**	.596	-.072	1.624	-.010	1.678	-.039	.757	.089*	.975
Democratic Norms	.038	.139	.042	.081	.090*	.220	.008	.227	.046	.103	.108*	.133
Democratic Values												
Indiv. Responsibility	.017	.066	.080	.039	-.059	.105	-.077	.108	-.014	.049	-.023	.063
Equality	-.018	.085	.053	.049	-.007	.134	.065	.139	-.060	.062	.050	.081
Tolerance	.068	.065	-.016	.038	.094*	.103	-.006	.106	.084	.048	.031	.061
Inst. Confidence												
CSE	.027	.088	.016	.052	-.034	.139	-.022	.143	.096**	.064	.064	.084
Parties	.309***	.084	.096	.050	.111*	.134	.199***	.139	.027	.063	.116*	.081
Congress	.083	.087	-.008	.052	.115*	.139	.085	.143	.038	.065	-.110*	.084
President	-.104*	.082	.004	.048	-.015	.130	-.176***	.134	.063	.061	.011	.078
Adjusted R Square	.129		.037		.094		.104		.049		.096	
N	512		515		512		509		515		521	

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Standardized beta coefficients from ordinary least squares regression reported. Independent variables are assigned values ranging from 0 to 1. Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Appendix IV

Table 4-6. Requested a DUI

	Aggregate	Young (18-25)	Old (26+)
Yes	41.9%	50.0%	42.4%
No	58.1	50.0	57.6
N	43	46	33

Question: *But have you requested a DUI?*

Results are for those who do not have a DUI. Those in the 18-25 year old subsample include the boosted youth sample.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Table 4-7. Reason for Not Requesting DUI

	Aggregate	Young (18-25)	Old (26+)
No Time/ Interest	48.0%	50.0%	42.1%
Could Not Find Office		4.6	
Not Enough Money/ Too Expensive	44.0	27.3	47.4
No Birth Certificate	8.0	16.6	10.5
Sick		4.6	
N	25	22	19

Question: *Is there any reason why you have not requested one?*

Results are for those who do not have and have not requested a DUI. Those in the 18-25 year old subsample include the boosted youth sample.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Table 4-8. Problems Obtaining DUI

	Aggregate	Young (18-25)	Old (26+)
Yes	4.7%	7.6%	4.4%
No	95.3	92.4	95.6
N	1,003	632	814

Question: *Did you have any problems obtaining the DUI?*

Results are for those who do have a DUI. Those in the 18-25 year old subsample include the boosted youth sample.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey

Table 4-9. Type of Problems Obtaining DUI

	Aggregate	Young (18-25)	Old (26+)
Gave Incomplete Information	4.3	8.4	
Lack of Documentation/ Problems with Birth Certificate	34.1	39.6	30.5
Delays and Long Lines	21.3	8.3	25.0
Unfriendly/ Untrained Staff	8.5	6.3	11.1
They were mistaken in my name	4.3	6.3	5.6
Problems with Surname	2.1	8.3	
Could Not Find Office	21.3	14.6	25.0
Because I had to lead someone		4.2	
Postponed the date		2.1	
Not Enough Money	4.3	2.1	2.8
N	47	48	36

Question: *What type of problem did you have?*


Results are for those who do have a DUI and had problems obtaining it. Those in the 18-25 year old subsample include the boosted youth sample.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey


Appendix V

Figure 5-3. Engagement by Party Identification

(a) All Respondents



(b) Strong Partisans



Questions:

With which party do you sympathize? Available responses are: ARENA, FMLN, PCN, PDC, CD, FDR, none or Don't Know/ Not Answered. (Party identification)

“Would you say that your sympathy for the party is very weak, weak, neither weak nor strong, strong or very strong?” Strong Partisans = respondents who answered “strong” or “very strong”.

Source: 2009 El Salvador Benchmark Democracy Survey.

Appendix VI

Questionnaire No. | | | | |

INTRODUCTION: GOOD MORNING/AFTERNOON. MI NAME IS _____ AND I WORK FOR UNIMER, AN ORGANIZATION DEDICATED TO PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES AND WE ARE DOING RESEARCH FOR THE DR. GUILLERMO MANUEL UNGO FOUNDATION. WE ARE DOING A SURVEY TO GATHER THE OPINION OF SALVADORANS ON SEVERAL ISSUES OF OUR COUNTRY. ALL THE INFORMATION IS COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. WOULD YOU BE SO KIND AS TO ALLOW ME TO SPEAK WITH SOMEONE (**VERIFY THE DATE OF THEIR NEXT BIRTHDAY**) WHO LIVES IN THIS HOUSE? THIS WILL ONLY TAKE A FEW MINUTES. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR RESPONSES ARE CONFIDENTIAL. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS. WE ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN GETTING TO KNOW PEOPLE'S OPINIONS ABOUT THESE TOPICS. IF YOU DON'T KNOW HOW TO ANSWER A QUESTION OR IF YOU DON'T WISH TO ANSWER ONE, THERE'S NO PROBLEM.

1. AGE (YEARS OLD)		2. Sex (1) Male (2) Female	
3. DEPARTMENT:		4. SEGMENT: CORRELATING NUMBER	
5. Municipality			
6. Residential Area: (1) Urban (2) Rural		7. Sample type: (1) Sample (2) Over-sample (youth)	
8. Date of survey	Day	Month	Start time

DEMOCRATIC AND PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES

Q9. For each one of the following concepts, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say that **[READ CONCEPT]** is **[READ OPTIONS]**

CONCEPTS	VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT UNIMPORTANT	UNIMPORTANT	DON'T KNOW/ NA
9.1 Family	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
9.2 Friends	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
9.3 Free time	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
9.4 Politics	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
9.5 Work	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
9.6 Religion	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q10. Taking into account all aspects of your life, do you personally feel...?

1. Very happy 2. Somewhat happy 3. A little happy 4. Very unhappy 8. DON'T KNOW/NA

Q11. How proud do you feel to be Salvadoran?

1. Very proud 2. Quite proud 3. Somewhat proud? 4. Not proud 8. DON'T KNOW/NA

Q12.1 How do you understand democracy?

Q12.2 If we talk about the way in which democracy works in our country, how satisfied are you?

1. Very satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. Unsatisfied 4. Very unsatisfied 5. I believe there is no democracy **[DO NOT READ]** 8. DON'T KNOW/NA

Q13. What, to you, is the most pressing problem that El Salvador faces today?

Q14. With regard to the people in your community (neighborhood or district), do you think that one can trust in the majority of them, or that one must be very careful dealing with others?

1. The majority is trustworthy 2. One must be very careful 8. DON'T KNOW/NA

Q15. I'm going to read you a few things people say about **democracy**. For each assertion, I would appreciate if you would tell me if you: **[READ OPTIONS]**

	TOTALLY AGREE	AGREE	DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW/ NA
15.1 In a democracy, the economic system works poorly	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
15.2 Democracies are unstable and there is too much discussion	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
15.3 Democracies aren't good at maintaining order	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
15.4 Democracy may have problems, but it's the best form of government	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q16. How interested are you in politics? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, not interested, or do you reject them?

(1) VERY INTERESTED (2) SOMEWHAT INTERESTED (3) NOT INTERESTED (4) I REJECT THEM
(8) DON'T KNOW/NA

Q17. I'm going to list for you some groups and organizations, and I would appreciate if you would tell me **if you have participated** in the following types of meetings or activities during the last year.

	Always	Frequently	Sometimes	Never	DON'T KNOW/ NA
17.1 Churches or religious groups	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
17.2 Cultural groups	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
17.3 Athletic groups	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
17.4 Unions or professional associations	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
17.5 Political parties	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
17.6 Community development groups	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q18. Now I'm going to list a series of organizations. I would like to know **how much confidence** you have in the work that they do.

	Complete confidence	Quite a bit of confidence	Some confidence	No confidence	Don't know/NA
18.1 Churches	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.2 Armed Forces	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.3 Supreme Electoral Tribunal	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.4 The media	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.5 Non-governmental organizations, NGOs	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.6 National Civil Police	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.7 Judges	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.8 Political parties	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

18.9 Congressmen/women	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.10 President of the Republic	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.11 Big business leaders	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.12 United Nations	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
18.13 Organization of American States	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q19. I'm going to read you some of the things people say about politicians, the government, or other people. I would like to know if you [**READ OPTIONS**] with these assertions.

	Completely agree	Agree	Disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know/NA
19.1 I believe that the government does not care about people like me	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
19.2 Politicians are willing to lie to win elections.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
19.3 People that don't do well in society should blame themselves, not society	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
19.4 In the end, men are better leaders than women	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
19.5 Homosexuals should not be allowed to be elected to public office	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q20. With regard to **citizen participation**, people get involved in different ways. I'm going to mention a few of them and I ask that you please tell me if you have ever participated, would be willing to participate, or would never participate under any circumstance. [**INTERVIEWER: IF THEY HAVEN'T DONE IT, ASK IF THEY WOULD**]

	I've already done it	I would do it	I would never do it	Don't know/NA
20.1 Request that a government authority help resolve a community problem	[1]	[2]	[3]	[8]
20.2 Participate in a legally authorized demonstration	[1]	[2]	[3]	[8]
20.3 Participate in a strike in the workplace	[1]	[2]	[3]	[8]
20.4 Support a public protest	[1]	[2]	[3]	[8]

Q21. I'd like to know your opinion about which you consider to be the **best form of government** for our country

	Completely agree	Agree	Disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know/NA
21.1 Having a strong leader that governs without elections or the Legislative Assembly	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
21.2 Having experts/technocrats that act according to what they think is best for the country.	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
21.3 Having the army govern	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
21.4 Having a democratic political system	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q22. In relation to the **confidence in other groups of people**, I would like to ask you, how much confidence do you have in...?

	Complete confidence	Quite a bit of confidence	Some confidence	No confidence	Don't know/ NA
22.1 Your family	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.2 Salvadorans	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.4 Americans (from U.S.)	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.5 Cubans	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.5 Guatemalans	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.6 Hondurans	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.7 Nicaraguans	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
22.8 Costa Ricans	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

Q23. I'm going to read you some things people sometimes say about the **political process** in El Salvador. I would like you to tell me if you **[READ OPTIONS]** with the assertions.

	Completely agree	Agree	Disagree	Completely disagree	Don't know/NA
23.1 Constitutional reform is necessary	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
23.2 Violence is sometimes necessary as a response to injustice	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
23.3 It's better to go to another country to ensure a better life	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
23.4 Political power is concentrated in very few hands	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
23.5 The best way to resolve the country's problems is through dialogue	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]

INFORMATION

Q24. Could you tell me the name of...? **[DO NOT READ NAMES]**

		CORRECT	INCORRECT	DON'T KNOW/ NA
24.1 The mayor of your municipality	<i>[Verify name of mayor with supervisor]</i>	[1]	[2]	[8]
24.2 The president of El Salvador	<i>[Antonio Saca]</i>	[1]	[2]	[8]
24.3 The president of the United States	<i>[Barack Obama]</i>	[1]	[2]	[8]

Q25. When you want to get information about what's happening in El Salvador, where do you find the most reliable source of information: **[READ OPTIONS]** ? **[JUST ONE OPTION]**

- (1) RADIO (2) TELEVISION (3) NEWSPAPER (4) INTERNET
 (5) friends or relatives (88) Don't know/NA ➔ go to Q27 (99) Not applicable/Do not seek information ➔ go to Q27
 (98) Another source: _____

Q26. How often do you make use of this medium to get the news? *[ONLY ONE OPTION]*

Means of communication	Every day	3-4 times per week	Once per week	Once per month	Don't know/NA	Not applicable
26.1 Radio	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]	[9]
26.2 Television	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]	[9]
26.3 Newspaper	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]	[9]
26.4 Internet	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]	[9]
26.5 Friends or relatives	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]	[9]
26.6 Another source	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]	[9]

Q27. How often do you talk about politics with other people? *[READ OPTIONS]*

(1) DAILY	(2) A FEW TIMES PER WEEK	(3) A FEW TIMES PER MONTH	(4) RARELY	(5) NEVER	(8) DON'T KNOW/NA
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Q28. Where do you get information that helps you make a decision about who to vote for: the radio, the television, the newspapers, friends or relatives, the Internet or another source? *[JUST ONE OPTION]*

(1) RADIO	(2) TELEVISION	(3) NEWSPAPER	(4) INTERNET	(98) ANOTHER SOURCE:	(9) NOT APPLICABLE
(5) Friends or relatives	(6) fliers, billboards, political rallies	(7) candidate forums	(88) Don't know/NA	_____	

POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Q29. With which party do you sympathize? *[DON'T READ LIST]*

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD 6. FDR 8. Don't know/NA ➔ go to Q32 0. None ➔ go to Q32

Q30. Would you say that your sympathy for the party *[INSERT ANSWER FOR Q29]* is... *[READ OPTIONS]*?

1. Very weak 2. Weak 3. Neither weak nor strong 4. Strong 5. Very strong 8. Don't know/NA ➔ go to Q32
9. Not applicable

Q31. How much do you believe your interests are represented en that political party?

1. A lot 2. Somewhat 3. Little 4. Not at all 5. Don't know/NA 9. Not applicable

Q32. When you talk about politics, do you think of yourself as someone on the left or right?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know/NA

Q33. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is the position most to the left and 10 is the position most to the right, where would you place yourself? (Show card Q33)

Left		Center						Right	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)

Q34. Only for youth 18-25 years: In your house, which party does your father vote for?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD
6. FDR 7. Secret Vote 8. Doesn't know/NA 10. Didn't vote
11. Doesn't have a father (not applicable)

Q35 Only for youth 18-25 years: Which party does your mother vote for?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD
 6. FDR 7. Secret Vote 8. Doesn't know/Would not respond 10. Didn't vote
 11. Doesn't have a mother (not applicable)

Q36. Do you think that the vote can have an impact on how things will be in the future or do you believe that no matter how you vote, things will never improve?

1. A vote can change things. 2. It doesn't matter how you vote. 3. Doesn't know/NA.

Q37. Now we are going to use a thermometer scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you feel very cold towards something, which is to say you don't like it at all; 100 means that you like it very much; and 50 means that you feel very neutral towards something. Using this scale, please tell me how you feel about the following things. You can choose whatever number between 0 and 100. How do you feel towards...**[read options]**? *[Doesn't know/NA 888]*

	Scale	Doesn't Know/NA
37.1 The Archbishop of San Salvador, Mons. José Luis Escobar Alas		[888]
37.2 The Coach of the National Soccer Team, Carlos de los Cobos		[888]
37.3 The ex-presidential candidate Rodrigo Ávila		[888]
37.4 The President-Elect Mauricio Funes		[888]
37.5 The ARENA party		[888]
37.6 The FMLN party		[888]
37.7 The PCN party		[888]
37.8 The PDC party		[888]
37.9 The CD party		[888]

ELECTORAL REGISTRY

Q38. Do you have a National Identity Card (DUI)?

1. Yes (go to Q42) 2. No (continue) 3. It is being processed (go to Q40) 8. Doesn't Know/NA (go to Q44)

Q39. But have you requested a DUI?

1. Yes (continue) 2. No (go to Q41) 8. Doesn't know/NA (go to Q41) 9. Not applicable (go to Q41)

Q40. When did you request it? _____ (Go to Q44)

Q41. Is there any reason why you have not requested one?

_____ (Go to Q44)

Q42. Did you have any problems obtaining the DUI?

1. Yes (continue) 2. No (go to Q44) 9. Not applicable (go to Q44)

Q43. What type of problem did you have?

1. They didn't give complete information. 2. Lack of documentation 3. Slow process and long lines
 4. Unfriendly officials 88. Doesn't Know/NA 98. Other: _____

ELECTORAL PROCESS 2006

Q44. Did you vote in the Legislative and Municipal Council elections of January 2006?

1. Yes (continue) 2. No (go to Q47) 3. Was not of voting age (go to Q47)

Q45. For which party did you vote for Mayor in the elections of 2006?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD
6. Other 7. Null vote/Blank vote 10. Vote is secret 9. Not applicable

Q46. For which party did you vote for Representatives in the elections of 2006?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD
6. Other 7. Null vote/Blank vote 10. Vote is secret 9. Not applicable

Electoral Process 2009

Q47. Did you vote in the past Legislative and Municipal Council elections of January 2009?

1. Yes (Go to Q49) 2. No (continue)

Q48. Why didn't you vote in the past elections of January 2009? [in any case, go to Q51]

_____ [go to Q51]

88. Doesn't know/NA (go to Q51)

Q49. For which party did you vote for Mayor in the past elections of January 2009?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD
6. FDR 7. Null vote/Blank vote 10. Vote is secret 9. N/A

Q50. For which party did you vote for Representatives in the past elections of January 2009?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 3. PCN 4. PDC 5. CD
6. FDR 7. Null vote/Blank vote 10. Vote is secret 9. N/A

Q51. As you know, a significant number of people did not vote in the past Legislative and Municipal Council elections of January 2009. Why do you think they didn't vote?

Q52. For the Legislative and Municipal Council elections of January 2009, did you have... [read options] in the electoral results?

1. A lot of confidence 2. Some confidence 3. Little confidence 4. No confidence 8. Doesn't know/NA

Now we would like to ask you some questions related to the past presidential elections of the month of March.

Q53. Did you vote in the past Presidential Elections of March 2009?

1. Yes (go to Q55) 2. No (go to Q54)

Q54. Why didn't you vote in the past elections of March 2009?

_____ (go to Q57)

88. Doesn't know/ NA (go to Q57)

Q55. For which party did you vote for President in the past elections of March 15, 2009?

1. ARENA 2. FMLN 7. Null vote/Blank vote 10. Vote is secret

Q56. What was the principal reason why you voted for this party? _____

Q57. Thinking about the last Presidential Elections of March 2009, how confident were you in how the following were performed?

	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Little confidence	No confidence	Doesn't know/ NA
57.1 The Electoral Registry	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
57.2 The performance of the election campaign	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
57.3 The performance of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
57.4 The election results	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
57.5 The international election observers	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[8]
57.6 The national election observers					

Q58. During elections, some people tried to convince others to vote for a particular party or candidate. Thinking about the elections of 2009, including both the Legislative and Municipal elections in January and the Presidential elections in March, with what frequency have you tried to convince someone to vote for a party or candidate?

1. Frequently 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never 8. Doesn't know/NA

SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY

Q59. Talking about the economy, how would you describe the economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is...[read options]

1. Very good 2. Good 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Bad 5. Very bad 8. Doesn't know/ NA

Q60. In general, how would you classify your personal economic situation? Would you say that it is...[read options]

1. Very good 2. Good 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Bad 5. Very bad 8. Doesn't know/ NA

Q61. In general, how would you evaluate President Antonio Saca's management in the government?

1. Very good 2. Good 3. Regular 4. Bad 5. Very bad 8. Doesn't know/ NA

Q62. Have you been the victim of any crime in the last 12 months?

1. Yes (go to Q63) 2. No (go to Q64) 8. Doesn't know/ NA (go to Q64)

Q63. Of which type of crime were you the victim? _____

Q64. Do you have any close family (parents, siblings, spouse, children) that have gone to live **outside of the country** in the last 5 years?

1. Yes 2. No 8. Doesn't know/NA

Q65. Could you tell me if you have received any remittances?

1. Yes 2. No 8. Doesn't know/ NA

Finally, I would like to ask you for some personal information that will help us ensure that this survey is representative.

Q66. At present, are you working?	1. Si (go to Q67) 2. No (go to Q68)
Q67. What is your work?	
Q68. What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?	1. No formal education 2. Primary school 3. Secondary school 4. High School 5. Technical 6. University 7. Post-graduate 8. Doesn't Know/NA
Q69. What is your marital status?	1. Single 2. Divorced/separated 3. Married 4. Widowed 5. Cohabitation 8 Doesn't know/ NA
Q70. What is your religion?	1. Catholic 2. Evangelical 3. No religion 4. Other _____ 8. Doesn't know/ NA
Q71. I am going to show you a card with different income levels; could you give me an estimate of the monthly family income of this household? That is to say, the sum of what is earned by all those who work, plus the remittances that are received from abroad (if there are any). At what level would you put your family, approximately? [Show income card]	1. From \$0 to \$206 2. From \$207 to \$288 3. From \$289 to \$432 4. From \$433 to \$576 5. from \$577 to 1142.86 6. From 1142.87 up 7. Doesn't know/ NA

These are all of the questions. Thank you very much for your participation.

I CERTIFY THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS FORM CORRESPOND FULLY WITH THE ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE PERSON INTERVIEWED AND I RECOGNIZE THAT ANY ALTERATION ON MY PART IN REGARDS TO THE FORM OF THE INTERVIEW OR SELECTION OF THE RESPONDENT WILL RESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE CONTRACTED COMPANY AND WILL BE SUFFICIENT MOTIVE TO DISCONTINUE MY EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT ENTITLEMENT TO ANY PAYMENT.

Interviewer:	Code __ __	Signature:
Supervisor:	Signature:	
Time of completion:	Comments:	
Encoder:	Signature:	Typist: Signature:

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