LOSING HOPE
Citizen Perceptions of Peace and Reconciliation in the Three Areas

Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile

Conducted April 1 - August 7, 2008

By Traci D. Cook

March 31, 2009

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
This report and the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) focus group research in Sudan are made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (under associate cooperative agreement no. 623-A-00-04-0009). The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

Questions about the content of the document should be directed to Kathy Gest, NDI Director of Public Affairs, (202) 728-5535, kgest@ndi.org.

Copyright © National Democratic Institute 2009. All rights reserved. Portions of this work may be reproduced and/or translated for noncommercial purposes provided NDI is acknowledged as the source of the material and is provided copies of any translation.
LOSING HOPE
Citizen Perceptions of Peace and Reconciliation in the Three Areas

Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile

Conducted April 1-August, 7, 2008

By Traci D. Cook

March 31, 2009

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Contents

National Democratic Institute......................................................................................................................... 1
Preface.............................................................................................................................................................. 2
The Voice of the People.................................................................................................................................. 5
Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................... 6
   Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile................................................................................................................. 6
   Abyei (Ngok Dinka only)............................................................................................................................... 8
Principal Findings - Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile ................................................................................. 11
   1. Ethnicity defines personal identity for Nuba and Funj; Arabs highlight nationality and religion ............ 11
   2. Southern Kordofan pessimistic; Blue Nile more hopeful ........................................................................ 12
   3. Dissatisfaction with the CPA driven by insecurity and lack of development ........................................ 13
   4. Development priorities are education, health, roads and water ............................................................. 16
   5. Quality of education said to be poor ......................................................................................................... 18
   6. States' natural resources do not benefit citizens ...................................................................................... 19
   7. Conflict causes have not been resolved; only Blue Nile indicates progress ........................................ 20
   8. Nuba-Arab relationship threat to peace; good inter-ethnic relations reported in Blue Nile .................. 21
   9. Lack of freedom of movement problematic for Arabs in Southern Kordofan ........................................ 24
  10. JIU seen as ineffective in Southern Kordofan, better in Blue Nile ......................................................... 24
  11. Conflicts in Darfur and Abyei threaten peace in Southern Kordofan ...................................................... 27
  12. NCP-SPLM government a failure in Southern Kordofan, success in Blue Nile ....................................... 29
   13. Malik Agar well-liked as governor of Blue Nile ..................................................................................... 30
   14. Decision to rotate seat of government popular in Blue Nile .................................................................. 31
  15. NCP and SPLM most influential parties, but little party activity reported ............................................. 31
  16. Party support falls along ethnic lines ..................................................................................................... 32
  17. Many say they will reject election results if winning governor not of their ethnicity ............................. 34
  18. Party affiliation, individual character and experience will guide voting choices .................................. 36
  19. Ethnicity-based patterns evident in expressed voting intentions ......................................................... 36
  20. Widespread support for 25 percent quota for women in government .................................................. 37
  21. Unity preferred by all; Nuba and Funj mistakenly believe CPA provides them with referendum option .... 37
  22. Popular consultation remains mystery for many .................................................................................... 39
Principal Findings - Abyei (Ngok Dinka only)......................................................................................... 41
   1. May 13 crisis believed pre-planned ......................................................................................................... 41
  2. NCP and SAF identified as conflict perpetrators ....................................................................................... 42
  3. Tighter security, troop removal and protocol implementation could have prevented crisis .................. 43
  4. Police and SPLA viewed as heroes of conflict ......................................................................................... 44
  5. Humanitarian response excellent but more political support desired ................................................... 45
  6. UNMIS seen as biased during crisis; 'New' UNMIS would be valued .................................................... 46
  7. SPLM maintains strong support but some citizens disappointed ............................................................ 47
This map is illustrative only and its inclusion does not imply endorsement of specific geographical boundaries.
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations safeguard elections and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

**Build Political and Civic Organizations:** NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well-organized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions—the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

**Safeguard Elections:** NDI promotes open and democratic elections. Political parties and governments have asked NDI to study electoral codes and to recommend improvements. The Institute also provides technical assistance for political parties and civic groups to conduct voter education campaigns and to organize election monitoring programs. NDI is a world leader in election monitoring, having organized international delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries, helping to ensure that polling results reflect the will of the people.

**Promote Openness and Accountability:** NDI responds to requests from leaders of government, parliament, political parties and civic groups seeking advice on matters from legislative procedures to constituent service to the balance of civil/military relations in a democracy. NDI works to build legislatures and local governments that are professional, accountable, open and responsive to their citizens.

International cooperation is key to promoting democracy effectively and efficiently. It also conveys a deeper message to new and emerging democracies that while autocracies are inherently isolated and fearful of the outside world, democracies can count on international allies and an active support system. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., with field offices in every region of the world, NDI complements the skills of its staff by enlisting volunteer experts from around the world, many of whom are veterans of democratic struggles in their own countries and share valuable perspectives on democratic development.
When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005, it contained separate protocols for the resolution of conflict in the Three Areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. With their ethnic diversity, resource wealth and border disputes, the Three Areas represent a microcosm of Sudan: their problems are those that have plagued the country for decades and contributed to its seemingly endless internal conflict. Indeed, the CPA faces its toughest test in the Three Areas. Provisions that succeed in promoting peace at the intersection between North and South will likely succeed elsewhere. Conversely, where the CPA fails to address the root causes of conflict, or where implementation of the agreement is inadequate, the consequences are likely to be felt first and most acutely in the Three Areas. In a 2006 NDI study, participants in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile highlighted the fragility of peace and warned that, despite the signing of the CPA, many issues remained unresolved. This second in-depth look at the Three Areas, based on 62 focus group discussions conducted from April-August 2008 with 731 participants, seeks to determine to what extent the CPA is providing viable and lasting solutions for the inhabitants of this critical region of Sudan.

Focus Group Results and Usage. Focus groups are semi-structured group discussions directed by a moderator and following a pre-set guideline. Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions presented here represent views commonly and repeatedly cited during the groups. The interaction between participants in a focus group setting provides insight into how citizens think and feel and is an even more powerful means of understanding why those attitudes exist. Information gathered in this way takes into consideration citizen values and needs and is critical to helping decision-makers test their assumptions and incorporate the will of the people into policy-making.

A Snapshot of Public Opinion. Any public opinion research, including focus groups, is only a snapshot of opinion at the moment the research is undertaken. Public opinion is dynamic and evolves as people experience and react to major events, particularly in post-conflict environments such as the Three Areas. Therefore, the conclusions reached in this report can only be said to represent opinions when the research was undertaken. NDI conducts focus groups in Southern Sudan and/or the Three Areas approximately once every six months, and is thus able to capture any change in attitudes and measure that change against baseline information from previous research.

A Qualitative Research Tool. Focus groups are a qualitative, not a quantitative, research instrument. Although focus groups are a superior research method in teasing out the meanings behind commonly-held attitudes, the total number of participants in focus group research is always relatively small and thus is not statistically representative of the larger population. This report reflects the opinions of the citizens of the Three Areas who participated in this study. General terms, such as ‘people’ and ‘citizens’ may be used on occasion in this report as a convenience to represent the attitudes of those participants; however, the Focus Group Participant Demographics chart as well as the Methodology Notes appearing at the end of the report should be consulted by all readers to understand the sub-set of individuals interviewed for this study.

Participant Perceptions vs. Political Realities. The perceptions of participants in these focus groups (and indeed in any research) do not necessarily reflect reality. In the context of the Three Areas, for example, the perception of participants regarding progress in the implementation of the CPA may differ from the reality at the political level. The reasons for this are many. Communication is difficult in Sudan, and so current information is not always available. Also,
ordinary citizens often judge progress based on the change in their own lives. Larger political gains or improvements in areas outside their immediate interests (although important in the greater context) are not always viewed as progress by the average person. Participants in this study sometimes get their facts wrong and often form their opinions based on inaccurate or semi-accurate readings of the world around them. This study does not purport to provide any true picture of what is happening in the Three Areas. Even if they do not represent reality, however, there is power in people’s perceptions. Citizens make decisions based on what they believe. Without knowledge of these perceptions, policy-makers and other stakeholders will not be able to address them. Thus, the goal of this research is to report the perceptions and opinions of participants, regardless of their accuracy, to Sudanese political and civil society leaders so they may better understand and respond to the concerns of the general populace.

**Ethnic Designations.** A number of ethnic designations are used in this report, including “Nuba,” “Ngok Dinka,” “Misseriya,” “Arab” and “Funj.” While most of these terms refer to established and identifiable groups, the latter two—“Arab” and “Funj”—are used as general terms to describe sometimes amorphous populations, and their limitations should be noted. NDI uses the term “Arab” to describe focus group participants who self-identify as Arabs, even if their ethnic origins are unclear. NDI uses the term Funj to describe principally “Black African” participants in Blue Nile, which include members of more than a dozen tribes. However, participants often use these terms differently from NDI, and it is important to distinguish between participants’ characterizations of others (which are generally accompanied in this report by quotation marks or presented in italics as direct quotes) and NDI’s own descriptions of focus group participants. NDI’s research reveals broad differences of opinion between those who identify themselves as Arabs and those who identify themselves as Funj, differences which exist at least in part because the two groups have experienced discrimination, marginalization and war in dissimilar ways. There is thus value in presenting the two points of view as such despite the imperfect nature of these group labels.

**Limitations of Abyei Research.** The portion of this study that concerns Abyei is limited in its analysis because the field work was conducted only among Ngok Dinka communities. NDI’s preference was to collect data from both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya participants in order to present a comprehensive look at the Abyei conflict. The Institute attempted several times to deploy moderators to Misseriya areas north of Abyei but was unable to do so due to security concerns. Therefore, this report is deficient in its representation of Misseriya views on Abyei. NDI believes strongly that it is important to capture the opinions of Misseriya so that they can become part of the public debate. Efforts to undertake research with Misseriya communities in or near Abyei are continuing, and NDI hopes to provide a fuller analysis of citizen opinions on Abyei in future reports.

---

1 The definition of “Arab” in Blue Nile is particularly complicated due to migration and inter-ethnic integration and marriage. Many citizens of Blue Nile use the term “Arab” to describe groups that migrated to the state from the North in recent decades, as opposed to tribes indigenous to Blue Nile that may identify themselves as Arabs. Others view anyone with a light-skinned appearance as an “Arab.” The term can have political connotations as well, and some individuals’ self-descriptions and characterizations of others may depend on who is asking the question and in what context. Neither is there a single common use of the word “Funj.” For some, the term refers to all indigenous tribes of the Funj Kingdom that existed in Blue Nile in pre-colonial times. For others, it refers only to the “Black African” tribes in the state.

NDI’s ongoing citizen participation program in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through a multi-year grant. The inclusion of regular focus group research in NDI’s wider Sudan initiative is intended to help policy-makers better understand the views of citizens, as they make important decisions that will shape the future of the region. This is the ninth in a series of bi-annual studies NDI has conducted in Sudan since late 2004. The Institute plans to continue this research on a regular basis through 2011 and the end of the CPA interim period. NDI would like to acknowledge USAID officials in Juba and Khartoum, who provided guidance on topics of interest and shared their knowledge of the Three Areas.

The 2006 Three Areas study revealed that participants had an overwhelming feeling of being ‘lost in the middle of peace’ and were questioning whether the CPA addressed their needs. That feeling persists, but the urgency is now much greater. Abyei is struggling to find a way forward after widespread violence and destruction, and Southern Kordofan is experiencing growing tension between Arabs and Nuba. The glimmer of hope is in Blue Nile, where the government has made strides in security and political integration. Even there, though, lack of development threatens to undermine what gains have been made. Local mechanisms for achieving peace have been insufficient on their own, and the CPA, as it has been implemented thus far, has proved inadequate to address the root causes of the conflict. The comments of participants in this study should be heard as a call for everyone – from the national government to the CPA signatories to the international community – to fully engage in the Three Areas before it is too late. NDI is pleased to have the opportunity to help give voice to the citizens of the Three Areas as they search for a path to peace.
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

Negotiators of the CPA understood the complex challenges in the Three Areas and hoped that by forging protocols specific to them a peaceful solution could be found. These quotations from Three Areas citizens illustrate that more work must be done to achieve that goal.

SOUTHERN KORDOFAN (SK) AND BLUE NILE (BN)

The peace is now three years, and there is supposed to be tangible things. The government should have expressed its presence, but for us here there is no government. (Nuba Man, Heban, SK)

CPA was good in the beginning. We can’t stay like we are now for there will be a war. (Arab Woman, Al Hamra, SK)

With the current stability, we expect things will get better. (Arab Man, Dondoro, BN)

In Blue Nile if the CPA will be fully implemented, the future will be good. (Funj Woman, Khorbodi, BN)

We will return to conflict because now there is no development. (Funj Man, Chali, BN)

The conflict can only be solved by the big powers, NCP and SPLM. (Arab Man, Abu Safifa, SK)

The CPA gives three choices to the people of Blue Nile state - we are going to remain in the North, be independent or go to the South. (Funj Man, Geissan, BN)

We will go back to war if an Arab governor won the position. (Nuba Woman, Latmor, SK)

If a Nuba won [governor], war will break out immediately. There will be no peace because he just won’t be for the Arabs. (Arab Man, Lagawa, SK)

ABYEI (NGOK DINKA ONLY)

If this problem would have been between Dinka and Misseriya, it would have not reached beyond control like this. So this is a political issue. (Male IDP, Wau)

It [the Ngok-Misseriya relationship] will never return to normal because we have seen their struggle to bring us down so you cannot sleep in one house with your enemies. It is for one to be shown the door, and that is why we want Misseriya out of Abyei. (Male IDP, Wau)

We will never be the same with the Misseriya. They repaid our kindness with evils. We gave them almost everything, yet they didn’t appreciate our deeds. Instead, they killed our people and burned our houses. (Female IDP, Agok)

[The Misseriya] have the right to graze with their animals in Abyei and everywhere in Sudan because they are Sudanese, but they cannot come with guns. (Male IDP, Agok)

Land is the important thing, and we cannot leave Abyei even though it means death. We can fight to the last man. (Male IDP, Agok)
Executive Summary

This is NDI’s second in-depth study of the Three Areas, which is composed of the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and the territory of Abyei. CPA implementation is most difficult and peace most precarious in the Three Areas, in part because they lie along the resource-rich North-South border. This research was designed to examine citizen perceptions about progress toward permanent peace since the signing of the CPA. In Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, two different pictures emerge – one of a relatively stable, slowly progressing Blue Nile and another of a dysfunctional, conflict-prone Southern Kordofan. Among the Ngok Dinka community in Abyei, feelings have hardened toward the Misseriya and against any compromise on boundaries. Across all the Three Areas, serious questions are raised by the reactions of citizens to elections and the Southern Sudan and Abyei referendums. These and other findings from 62 focus group discussions with 731 participants in the Three Areas are summarized below. Additional data for each finding, including quotations from participants, can be found in the Principal Findings section of this report.

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile

Although Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile faced many of the same challenges when the CPA was signed, they are now on different paths in almost every respect.

- Participants in Southern Kordofan have a bleak view of their current situation and the future. The picture painted by participants in Blue Nile is more hopeful. The vast majority of participants in Southern Kordofan believe the situation in the state is deteriorating. Some even suggest that things were better before the CPA. Rising insecurity and inaction on development have most predicting a grim future. Blue Nile participants are happier with their situation, with most saying the state is moving in the right direction. However, some Funj² participants are pessimistic about the future because they see no progress on development.

- Southern Kordofan participants report numerous continuing conflicts and a poor relationship between Nuba and Arabs. Blue Nile is largely free of conflict and inter-ethnic relations are mostly good, participants in that state say. Nuba and Arab participants report that there is persistent, and potentially explosive, conflict in Southern Kordofan. Each group blames the other for instigating the conflict and describes it as a fight over land and grazing rights. Regardless of who is at fault, most agree the current state of the Arab-Nuba relationship is a threat to peace. Many believe a solution can be achieved only with outside help from the international community or the CPA signatories. Nuba participants suggest tensions could be eased by establishing guidelines governing nomadic movement and grazing rights, while Arabs focus on the need for free and safe movement throughout the state. According to participants in Blue Nile, their state is virtually conflict free and inter-ethnic relations are good. However, Funj participants note some tensions with nomadic Arabs over land and grazing rights.

² See the Preface of this report for a discussion of ethnic designations.
Participants judge the integrated NCP-SPLM state government a failure in Southern Kordofan, but mostly a success in Blue Nile. The attempt to form an integrated NCP-SPLM government in Southern Kordofan is not working, according to participants. Most Nuba participants believe the NCP is dominating government and that the SPLM has been excluded from top positions. Most Arab participants attribute the failure of the integrated government to the hidden agendas of each party. Blue Nile participants say the two parties are getting along well and working together without partisan rancor.

The root causes of conflict in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan remain unresolved, according to most. Lack of development and, in Southern Kordofan, insecurity has led to widespread dissatisfaction with CPA implementation, though most maintain faith in the CPA to bring peace. Discrimination, marginalization and lack of development are at the root of the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, according to participants. Most participants in the two states believe that none of these has been fully resolved by the CPA thus far. Only Blue Nile Arabs say that good progress has been made. Most participants express strong dissatisfaction with how the CPA has been implemented. It has done little, they say, to bring development or, in the case of Southern Kordofan, improve security. Despite this, all but Southern Kordofan Arab participants maintain faith in the CPA to bring peace.

Elections are embraced by all, but many say they will reject the results if the elected governor is not of their ethnicity. Ethnicity-based patterns are evident in expressed voting intentions - Funj and Nuba lean toward the SPLM, Arabs toward the NCP - though Arabs in Blue Nile indicate some support for the SPLM. Party-based voting tendencies are strongest in Southern Kordofan. Almost all participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile believe that elections are a good method for choosing their state leaders. Despite this, many say they could not accept a result in which a person of an ethnicity other than their own won the governorship. Nuba in Southern Kordofan and Funj participants in Blue Nile feel most strongly that they would reject a winner that is not one of their own. Arabs in Southern Kordofan have mixed views on the idea of a Nuba governor. Some say they will accept a Nuba if the person is fair; but others are strongly opposed, saying that a Nuba governor would not be “for the Arabs.” Arab participants in Blue Nile are the exception; most say they will have no problem accepting any election outcome deemed free and fair. When asked to declare their party choice for state governor and Sudan president, most Funj and Nuba participants indicate they will vote for SPLM and most Arabs say NCP. In considering the choice for governor, however, Arabs in Blue Nile demonstrate significant, though not majority, support for the SPLM. SPLM is not favored by as many Blue Nile Arab participants in the presidential race. Most participants say they will cast their vote according to an individual’s character and accomplishments, as well as his or her party affiliation. Party affiliation is a more important factor in voting considerations in Southern Kordofan than in Blue Nile.

Almost all Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile participants say they support the unity of Sudan. Nuba and Funj participants continue to believe that they will have a referendum option; popular consultation is a process that remains a mystery for many. There is a strong desire for unity among participants in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Nuba and Funj participants believe that the South’s separation would leave them in a precarious situation, and all participants feel that the likelihood of renewed conflict is much greater if the South secedes. Although they are not sure of its form, many Nuba and Funj believe they will have an opportunity to determine their fate through some type of referendum. The prospect that there may be no referendum for them is troubling to many, and some predict conflict without one.
Most participants in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan remain largely unfamiliar with the process of popular consultation. When the term is explained, however, they respond favorably to the idea of having representatives who will convey their views to the national government.

Abyei (Ngok Dinka only)\(^4\)

Ngok Dinka participants believe the violence that began on May 13, 2008, in Abyei was a pre-planned effort by NCP and SAF to destroy Abyei. They say implementation of the Abyei protocol and tighter security could have prevented the crisis. Ngok Dinka participants are convinced that the conflict was a deliberate, pre-planned action aimed at establishing control of Abyei through total destruction of the Ngok and their property. They point to an influx of soldiers and armed traders prior to May 13 as proof that NCP was preparing for war. Most believe the Abyei crisis could have been prevented if the party had implemented the Abyei protocol and removed all SAF troops from the town. In addition, some say that a stronger Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) or UNMIS could have quelled the violence before it spread so widely.

The humanitarian crisis response is praised, but Ngok Dinka participants want the international community to focus on a political resolution for Abyei. Participants view UNMIS\(^5\) as a biased actor in Abyei but also see the value of its continued presence, if it can reform itself. Ngok Dinka participants credit the work of the international community for saving many lives during the Abyei crisis but say their political efforts fell short. They are disappointed that the international community did not push harder for the implementation of the Abyei protocol so that the crisis could have been averted. In the estimation of some, the international community is Abyei’s best hope, and so they urge that all possible leverage be used to force NCP into compliance. UNMIS actions in Abyei are perceived as biased because many participants believe that its soldiers and commanders are “Arabs” and thus support NCP. This support, they say, prompted UNMIS to provide material assistance to Brigade 31 during the fighting in Abyei. Nevertheless, Ngok Dinka participants accept the necessity of a continued UNMIS presence and would welcome a ‘new’ UNMIS that is neutral, monitors all sides and is empowered to protect civilians.

Participants applaud the SPLM and Salva Kiir for their work on Abyei, though there is some disappointment about inadequate protection of civilians during the crisis and insufficient efforts to implement the Abyei protocol prior to it. Most maintain their faith in the SPLM to resolve the conflict. Opinion of the SPLM and Salva Kiir following the Abyei crisis is mostly positive. The party is recognized for having given priority to the Abyei issue, and Salva Kiir is seen as personally committed to finding a resolution. Criticisms of the SPLM are based on the participants’ belief that the party did not do enough to protect civilians and did not push hard enough to implement the Abyei protocol. In addition, the participants’ view of local SPLM leaders is that they were weak, ineffective and lacking in authority prior to and during the crisis. Some feel that Salva Kiir and other top SPLM leaders let them down by choosing such leaders. These disappointments are not enough to make the Ngok Dinka abandon the SPLM, but participants feel strongly that the party must remain focused on the Abyei problem. They are pleased that the SPLM appears rededicated to Abyei following the crisis, and fully support its

---

\(^4\) See the Preface of this report for a discussion of why Misseriya communities were not included in this research. For information about Misseriya communities compiled by other researchers, see Pantuliano, S., et. al. Put Out to Pasture, Humanitarian Policy Group, op. cit.

\(^5\) It appears that when making comments about UNMIS, participants are primarily referring to the military sections.
effort to pursue a resolution through negotiation rather than war. They believe the SPLM will be successful in bringing peace to Abyei, as long as it stands up to the NCP.

Participants are highly skeptical that the Road Map agreement will be implemented. The agreement’s security arrangements are widely supported, but its interim boundaries are not well-received. Only a few participants have faith that what has been agreed to in the Road Map will be implemented. The painful lesson of past agreements with the NCP, participants say, is that the party does not implement them in good faith. The key security provisions of the Road Map agreement are embraced by participants as measures critical to re-establishing security in Abyei. Almost all support the removal of SAF and SPLA troops from Abyei and the formation of a new JIU. In the case of the JIU, however, participants want to be assured that no commanders from the previous JIU are allowed to remain. Some believe that the NCP has already reneged on this part of the agreement by not reassigning all of the old JIU elements. A newly deployed police force is also appealing to participants, who credit the police with saving lives during the conflict. They are happy for police to be the only armed group in Abyei town but will only be comfortable if they are chosen exclusively from the Ngok community. Ngok who are NCP can serve as policemen but any non-Ngok officers will lead to serious problems, participants say. The new interim boundaries for the administration of Abyei that were agreed to in the Road Map represent an unacceptable capitulation for most Ngok Dinka participants. They oppose the boundaries as a ‘give away’ of their land and oil and reject any territorial compromises beyond those set out in the Abyei Boundaries Commission report. An international tribunal is an appropriate venue for a boundary settlement, participants say, but few believe the NCP will abide by its ruling.

Participants say that soldiers and armed civilians are the biggest threat to security and that progress in Abyei can be made only when political issues such as boundaries and the composition of the administration are settled. The presence of any Brigade 31 or other SAF soldiers would be destabilizing and risk the security of Abyei, according to participants. Some worry that these soldiers have already found a way to remain in Abyei by joining the new JIU or posing as civilians. Misseriya or other Arab traders who are heavily armed despite their civilian status and any Arabs who may serve in the newly deployed police force are also viewed by participants as threats to Abyei’s peace. In addition to the re-deployment of troops out of Abyei, participants believe that significant progress can be made only by demarcating the territory’s boundaries and establishing a functioning administration. However, participants say that, in general, keeping pressure on the NCP to implement the Abyei protocol will be the single best way to guarantee peace and stability.

The Abyei conflict has irreparably damaged the Ngok-Misseriya relationship, according to participants. Many oppose any Misseriya participation in the Abyei administration and believe Misseriya grazing privileges should be revoked. The sense of betrayal among the participants is strong. They believe they allowed the Misseriya access to their water and grass only to be met with destruction carried out by the very people they helped. The conflict, participants say, has transformed the Misseriya from neighbor to enemy. This explains why almost all are opposed to any participation of Misseriya in the Abyei administration. Participants are suspicious that Misseriya involvement in the administration would only be a ploy to claim

---

7 Since this research took place, the boundary issue has been referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.
Abyei’s land. As one participant said, “Hyenas cannot be in charge of goats.” Most predict conflict if a Misseriya Deputy Administrator is chosen. The Abyei crisis has hardened the Ngok Dinka’s feelings about grazing rights as well. Most participants in this study view the Misseriya’s grazing activities in Abyei as something they have allowed as a privilege rather than a right. They say that after a vote to join Warrap state in Southern Sudan, the Misseriya will need passports to enter Abyei. Despite voicing the belief that the relationship with the Misseriya could not be repaired, when pressed, Ngok Dinka participants identified four changes the Misseriya could make to promote reconciliation: recognize Ngok land rights, disarm, accept inter-tribal marriage and disassociate themselves from the NCP.

There are both ethnic and political dimensions to the Abyei dispute, Ngok Dinka participants say. Land is the primary concern of the Ngok, who say that Abyei’s borders are non-negotiable. When pushed to consider concessions, most reveal a willingness to forgo a greater share of oil revenue or give it up altogether. Ngok Dinka participants are convinced that oil is the only reason there is conflict in Abyei. They believe that, with oil as their motive, the NCP has pushed the Misseriya to claim Abyei as their own. This result is an escalation of ethnic tensions to an uncontrollable level and the creation of a conflict in which the ethnic and the political are inextricably linked. Ngok Dinka participants say that no sacrifice, even death, is too great to protect what they view as their land. Any peace agreement involving permanent changes to Abyei’s borders other than what is set out in the ABC report will be rejected by the Ngok community, according to participants. Many Ngok Dinka participants are loath to consider additional compromises of any kind on Abyei. But when pushed to consider what concessions might be acceptable in exchange for peace, a slim majority of participants indicate they would consider sharing more of, or even relinquishing, their oil rights. Participants’ opinions are informed by the simple calculation that oil will run out one day but the land will remain and by the fact that Abyei already shares much of its oil revenue. However, there is a strong minority who continue to oppose any compromise on either land or oil.

All Ngok Dinka participants say they will vote to join Warrap state in the Abyei referendum. Ngok Dinka participants are unanimous in their desire to be part of the South. Shared ethnicity is the reason cited by most.
**Principal Findings – Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile**

NDI’s first study of the Three Areas, in 2006, revealed a number of similarities between Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Study participants in the two states cited the same conflict causes, shared a view of the future and agreed on what was needed to achieve peace. As a follow-up to the 2006 study, NDI organized 51 focus group discussions, with about half conducted in Southern Kordofan and half in Blue Nile. Overall, the research suggests the two states are now on different paths, with Blue Nile experiencing some improvement and Southern Kordofan facing a deteriorating situation. A total of 636 citizens participated in the discussions. The findings below are drawn from their comments.

1. The Nuba and Funj\(^\text{10}\) populations of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile emphasize ethnicity and race in defining their personal identity, while Arab populations are more likely to highlight nationality and religion. Nationality is also a significant identifier among Funj, but is only a weak one among Nuba.

When asked to describe their personal identity, Nuba participants in Southern Kordofan speak primarily of being Nuba and of a particular tribe. Nationality and religion appear to be weak initial indicators of identity for this population, with participants in only one-third of the groups choosing the terms ‘Sudanese,’ ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ to describe themselves.\(^\text{11}\) However, when prompted with a list of suggested identifiers,\(^\text{12}\) the Nuba participants are more likely to list nationality as a central component of personal identity, though it remains less important than race and ethnicity. Though nationality is a relatively weak identifier, the vast majority of Nuba participants define their nationality as ‘Sudanese,’ instead of opting for a regional description such as ‘Northern Sudanese’ or ‘Southern Sudanese.’ For Arab participants in Southern Kordofan, the inverse is true: religion and nationality are the defining characteristics of identity, with ethnicity and tribe ranked a distant third. (Among Misseriya groups, tribe is somewhat more likely to be a key identifier.)

Like the Nuba, the first instinct of Funj participants in Blue Nile is to define their identity based on ethnicity and tribe. In contrast to the Nuba, though, they feel strongly that nationality is also a key part of their identity. ‘Sudanese’ is often the second term Funj participants choose to describe who they are, and when given the list of suggested identifiers, it is often the first term chosen to describe personal identity. Religion also assumes more importance as a defining characteristic when the list is used, ranking as the third most popular choice after nationality and ethnicity. Funj participants reject any regional description of nationality, such as Northern or Southern Sudanese. They are also the only group in Blue Nile or Southern Kordofan among whom a significant number see party affiliation (in this case with the SPLM) as a critical component of personal identity. Arab participants in Blue Nile believe personal identity is defined by the same characteristics as their counterparts in Southern Kordofan: nationality and religion are the most important factors, with tribe playing a smaller role.

\(^{10}\) See the Preface of this report for a discussion of ethnic designations.

\(^{11}\) In this exercise, participants were asked to list three words, other than their name, that they would use to describe themselves to a stranger. No prompts were given.

\(^{12}\) In the second part of the question, participants were asked to choose three terms from a list provided and rank them according to how well they expressed their identity. Nationality, race, ethnicity, religion and political party were among the categories tested.
2. **Participants in Southern Kordofan have a bleak view of their current situation and the future. The picture painted by participants in Blue Nile is more hopeful.**

The vast majority of participants in Southern Kordofan believe the situation in the state is deteriorating. This contrasts with the findings of NDI’s 2006 study, in which Nuba participants said they had seen some gains in security – though not in development - since the signing of the CPA, and Arab participants were generally positive about the direction in which the state was heading. Many participants in the current study say things were better before the CPA and have little hope for the future. They believe the key challenge for the state and national governments is to find a permanent solution to pervasive insecurity. Nuba and Arab participants have opposite views on the cause of insecurity, with each side blaming the other. For Nuba, lack of development is also a serious problem. The prospect of the 2009 elections, with the possibility of an SPLM victory, provides a glimmer of hope for some Nuba participants. Just as many, though, are skeptical, expressing a fatalistic view that “Arabs” and/or “Khartoum” will continue destructive practices in the state, regardless of the election outcome. Arabs, meanwhile, tend to speak only of insecurity as the cause of the state’s problems; development, while important, is not a root cause of their dissatisfaction. There are mixed views about the 2009 elections among Arab participants, some of whom say the elections will have a positive impact and others who fear the consequences of an SPLM victory.

The peace is now three years, and there is supposed to be tangible things. The government should have expressed its presence, but for us here there is no government. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

Really, life is very hard in Lagawa. This is only due to insecurity. The Nuba people cannot do anything out of the town because they will be killed or robbed. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Lagawa)

Things are completely going in the wrong direction... The situation was good during the war time. (SK Arab Older Woman, Al Bajaaya)

The situation in Southern Kordofan is not bright... Things are going in the wrong direction because security here in South Kordofan is not permanent. (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

I can see completely it is going to be worse [in the future] because there are policies for war by Arab people. Guns are still with Arabs, but the Nuba have no guns. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Latmor)

Things will not be alright [in the future] for there are some problems near Kadugli and in Sunut and some other areas, and the Nuba are the people behind those problems. (SK Arab Older Woman, Keliak)

If SPLM won the elections, then things will be good. Otherwise, there will be nothing. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

If NCP wins the election, Sudan will remain united because it has power. If not, an unknown future is waiting for us. (SK Arab Older Man, Lagawa)

Funj participants in Blue Nile have mixed views on the situation in their state - some feel everything is going well and others say the situation is worsening. Most of those with a positive view base

---


14 In 2006, Funj participants expressed extreme disappointment over what they described as a lack of change (and in some cases, worsening) in their lives since the signing of the peace agreement. See Traci Cook, *Lost in the Middle of Peace*, pp.10-11, op. cit.
their optimism on recent progress and events, such as Malik Agar’s ascendency to the governorship. Thus, they talk about the state being “in the process” of moving in the right direction, rather than something that has been achieved fully. Those with a negative view are primarily dissatisfied with the pace of development. Arab participants in Blue Nile are more uniformly positive about the state’s direction than Funj. Peace and security are sufficient proof for most that the situation is improving, though a number agree with their Funj counterparts that the slow pace of development is troubling. Nomadic groups are the exception among Arab participants. They are more likely to express frustration with the current situation because of insecurity experienced along their migration routes. Participants in Blue Nile are more hopeful about the future than are those in Southern Kordofan. Arab participants are confident the state’s future is bright, though a few say a better future can only be guaranteed if stability is maintained and the pace of development is increased. Funj participants express less certainty about the future. While most are not pessimistic, they believe the future is highly dependent upon the implementation of the CPA, and many couch their predictions in conditional terms, saying “if” the CPA is implemented they will have hope for the future. Two other issues some Funj participants mention as critical to their future are the 2009 elections and the lack of political and social integration of Blue Nile’s population. These participants are fearful that disunity among the state’s different ethnic groups will boil over into conflict, and they see the elections as a possible trigger if there is not “good cooperation.”

Things are in the process of reaching the right direction. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

Things nowadays are not arriving in the right way. It is because no road has been maintained and nothing has been improved. (BN Funj Older Man, Rosaries)

The situation is stable and improving. (BN Arab Older Woman, Talia town)

With the current stability, we expect things will be better [in the future]. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Dondoro Town)

In Blue Nile if the CPA will be fully implemented, the future will be good. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

In Blue Nile there are two state governments, and we say the future is going to be bad because we the citizens of Blue Nile are not united. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

In 2009 life in Blue Nile is going to be worse because we are not sure indeed about the coming election. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

3. Knowledge about the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan protocol of the CPA remains low among all participants. Widespread dissatisfaction with its implementation is rooted in disappointment with lack of development and, in Southern Kordofan, continuing insecurity. Despite this disappointment, all but Southern Kordofan Arab participants maintain faith in the CPA to bring peace.

In discussing the CPA’s relevance to Southern Kordofan, Nuba participants refer to several provisions relating to the state, including those dealing with power-sharing and bringing development to war-affected areas. For some Nuba participants, the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan protocol is mostly about wealth-sharing, while others believe it is about the right of self-

---

15 Phrase is from a younger woman in Dondoro.
government (with some linking this to the right of popular consultation). The varied answers suggest an incomplete and vague understanding of the peace agreement and, indeed, many participants indicate a strong desire for more information about it. Most are satisfied with what they believe the CPA says about their state, but there is strong dissatisfaction with how the agreement is being implemented. Nuba participants say that persistent insecurity and a lack of development are proof that CPA implementation is not going well in the state. Dissatisfaction with implementation has not caused a loss of faith in the CPA itself, though, as the majority of Nuba participants believe that the CPA remains the state’s best chance for peace. The smaller number of Nuba participants who have lost faith in the CPA usually refer to a lack of clarity in the agreement about where they belong (North or South) or a belief that the CPA shortchanges the state in comparison to the North and South.

No one came here to tell us what the CPA says... People are not aware of the CPA because people are not enlightened. (Two SK Nuba Younger Women, Kadugli)

It is the implementation of the agreement which is not good, not the agreement itself. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

It [the CPA] is not implemented well because we have not seen anything in the CPA being implemented... there is no development in our area. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

[CPA implementation] is not going well because we still fight with Arabs who are our neighbors. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Lagawa)

The CPA has both bad and good parts, but since we have suffered enough, let us keep it. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

The CPA is bad because it does not provide anything good to Nuba Mountains compared to North or South Sudan. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

Arab participants in Southern Kordofan demonstrate little knowledge of the CPA, saying, as one participant did, “no one explained to us what the CPA said about Southern Kordofan state.” Of the few participants who expressed views on the agreement, most identify it with either power-sharing or simply as a ceasefire. Likewise, some participants refuse to evaluate the progress of CPA implementation because of their lack of knowledge, but others say that, even without such knowledge, they are sure the agreement is not working. Arab participant complaints are the same as those of their Nuba counterparts: the CPA has done little to resolve the security situation and development is virtually non-existent. This leads most to conclude that the agreement is flawed and will lead the state back to conflict. Some also see the CPA as one-sided in favor of the Nuba. Few have faith in the CPA to resolve the conflict in Southern Kordofan.

We have heard about the CPA, but the South Kordofan part, we didn’t hear about it. (SK Arab Younger Man, Keliak)

It [the CPA] says that the government is shared by the NCP and SPLM and after some time an election will be done. (SK Arab Older Man, Abu Safifa)

---

16 Further discussion of participants’ views on popular consultation can be found in section 22.
17 Quotation is from an older woman in Al Hamra.
No [CPA] implementation. There is no peace, no development. Nothing.
(SK Arab Middle Aged Woman, Lagawa)

The implementation is zero now. There is no security. You can't move freely in Nuba areas.
(SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

CPA was good in the beginning and before it. We can't stay like we are now for there will be a war.
(SK Arab Older Woman, Al Hamra)

It is a bad agreement. It is supporting only the Nuba. (SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

The CPA is a bad agreement because we didn't benefit from that agreement.
(SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

Funj participants in Blue Nile most closely associate the CPA with self-government and popular consultation. Most of these participants believe either the CPA will provide them with self-rule outright or that they will be given the right to vote for self-rule through popular consultation and/or a referendum. As a result of this belief, they express broad satisfaction with the agreement's provisions relating to Blue Nile. Participants also appreciate the improvement in security in Blue Nile since the signing of the CPA, which has allowed relatives and friends to return home. Implementation of the agreement is a different issue, and most Funj participants say it is not going well. The measure that virtually all use is development. Without development, they say, implementation of the CPA cannot be viewed favorably. Faith in the ability of the CPA to bring lasting peace is uneven among Funj participants. The majority agree that it is the state's best chance for peace, but they also see the agreement as fragile, as evidenced by their tendency to make their predictions about the CPA in conditional terms. For example, one participant says leaders must act well for the CPA to bring lasting peace. The few who believe the CPA is a bad agreement complain that it is not well-implemented outside the South.

[The CPA is] popular consultation, whether Sudan will remain united or separated.
(BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

The CPA gives three choices to the people of Blue Nile state -- we are going to remain in the North, be independent or go to the South. (BN Funj Older Man, Geissan)

The CPA is not enough for Blue Nile state... It is not well implemented. It is just by words not in action.
(BN Two Funj Older Men, Deren)

There is no sign of development we have seen since the signing of the peace agreement.
(BN Funj Younger Woman, Dondoro)

It [the CPA] is good because the CPA can lead to lasting peace.
(BN Funj Younger Woman, Geissan)

The CPA is both bad and good. If the leaders are not well-controlled, people will go back to conflict.
(BN Funj Younger Man, Rosaries)

18 Further discussion of participants' views on popular consultation can be found in section 22.
That’s bad to us in Blue Nile state because the CPA agreement deals only with the South, but excludes us the people of Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

Many Blue Nile Arab participants, like those in Southern Kordofan, say they know little about the CPA. Those who indicate some knowledge of the CPA speak mostly of its provisions regarding the state’s political and administrative status. Some believe the CPA definitively states that Blue Nile is part of the North, while others say it provides several options for the ultimate status of Blue Nile. A few participants also mention that the agreement calls for development of the state. Opinions about CPA implementation split mostly along urban-rural lines. In the more populous towns of Damazin, Rosaries and Kurmuk, Arab participants are generally satisfied with implementation and see signs of progress not only in tangible improvements such as roads, but also in cooperation between and integration of the two parties in government. In contrast, rural Arab participants cite lack of development and persistent insecurity as evidence of poor implementation. Although not viewed as perfect, most have faith the CPA can bring permanent peace to the state. The exception is one focus group comprised of nomads where some participants cite continuing insecurity as proof the CPA is not a good agreement and will lead to conflict.

We heard only about it [the CPA] over the media, but we did not get specifically the issues related to Blue Nile. (BN Arab Older Woman, Talia)

It [the CPA] says Blue Nile belongs to the North. (BN Arab Older Man, Geissan)

It gave Blue Nile a self-determination referendum either to join the South or the North. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

It [CPA implementation] is not bad. According to the CPA, the NCP should rule the state for one term then SPLM rules in the following term, and it is going well as written. The Kurmuk–Geissan road is now been constructed and that is implementation. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

No [CPA implementation is not going well] because the developmental projects are not implemented... Civilians are not yet rendered sufficient services. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Wad El Mahi)

It is not going well, because there is still insecurity in some places. (BN Arab Younger Man, Deren)

It [the CPA] is a good agreement and can lead us to peace. (BN Arab Younger Woman, Damazin)

The CPA is having both good and bad parts, but we have to maintain it. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Disa)

4. Education, health, roads and water resources, in that order, are the development priorities of participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Most cite very few improvements in these areas, though Blue Nile participants identify more progress. All agree war-affected areas have not been developed as envisioned in the CPA.

Education and health are top development priorities for Nuba participants in Southern Kordofan, although investment in roads and water resources is also seen as critically important. The Nuba say

---

19 In three groups, participants also speak of the “invasion of Omdurman by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim” as a sign that implementation is not going well and the CPA is failing.
the CPA has brought little or no improvement in these areas, and the parties' commitment to direct funds to war-affected communities has not been fulfilled. When pressed, some participants acknowledge minor improvements in water resources and schools, though most credit these to international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Arab participants in Southern Kordofan have many of the same development priorities - education, health, roads and water - as the Nuba, though they add security to the top of the list. Also like the Nuba, they say little or no development has occurred in their communities, and they have seen no benefit from the provisions in the CPA that require funds be dedicated to war-affected areas.20 Nuba participants feel that the whole state is underdeveloped, but Arab participants believe that Nuba areas, including Kauda, have benefited from more development. One reason some cite for this is that the "English people" are helping them. Most Arab participants unable to identify signs of development even when pressed, but a few mention improvements in schools and health facilities. Where there are tangible signs of development, most give credit to some level of government.

We have seen very little [improvement in development post-CPA] because they should have done many schools and hospitals that would have been enough for us. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Latmor)

Development here is very little indeed [after the CPA]. (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

Of course there are a few schools built here, but only primary schools, no secondary schools. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Koalib)

Nuba Mountains has developed more than us... English people and the organizations are supporting in Nuba development. (SK Arab Older Woman, Kadugli)

The NGOs are the ones who provided a little development. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

There are some efforts like mobilization of funds for Nuba, but these are not reaching the state. For example, the percentage of funds for Southern Kordofan from the GOSS was there, but the Nuba didn't know that. But those efforts are not equivalent to the contribution of Nuba to the war. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

Education, roads and health are top development priorities for Funj participants in Blue Nile. Most participants indicate there has been “a little” improvement in development since the signing of the CPA, and most are able to name at least one sign of development, usually related to schools. Credit for these improvements goes to state government, the SPLM and to a lesser extent, international organizations. However, it is clear that participants do not see these as sufficient, and they expect the government to engage in large-scale development activities. The CPA provision to develop war-affected areas has not been fulfilled, participants say, and a few believe that development has actually gone in the reverse direction, i.e., it has occurred in non-war affected areas first.

The development priorities of Arab participants in Blue Nile are much the same as the Funj citizens in the state. Education, health and roads are all top priorities, but Arab participants say that additional water resources are also necessary for them to thrive. A large number of Arab participants

20 The exception to this finding is among two groups conducted in Keliak, whose participants feel that there has been significant development. Keliak appears to be a special case, which may be due to its location near oil fields and on a major trading route.
can point to recent signs of development, such as schools and roads, but they have mixed opinions on whether the scale of activities is satisfactory. Rural participants say their development expectations have not been met, while urban participants are more likely to applaud development progress. Both groups generally credit state government with the improvements they have seen. Despite expressing more satisfaction with development than any other group in the study, most Blue Nile Arab participants agree with their Funj counterparts that the CPA commitment to develop war-affected areas has not, or has only partly, been fulfilled. They complain that only Blue Nile’s large towns are benefiting from the agreement.

There is no sign of development since the signing of the CPA. (BN Funj Younger Woman, Geissan)

The only improvement that we have seen since the signing of the CPA is the construction of a school and clinic. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

Development has been excellent [after the CPA]. (BN Arab Younger Woman, Damazin)

Development is just a little because they have concentrated in one place [only]. (BN Arab Younger Man, Deren)

Instead of starting the development from the area affected by war they started from Damazin. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Rosaries)

We have not seen anything to indicate the fulfillment of the commitment [to develop war-affected areas]. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Disa)

5. **Dissatisfaction with the quality of education in Southern Kordofan is high, with many saying even the basics are not in place.** Blue Nile participants are also unhappy with the state of their schools, but cite somewhat less fundamental problems. Arab participants want Arabic to be the language of instruction in their states, but Funj and Nuba insist that their children should be taught in both English and Arabic.

Participants in Southern Kordofan agree that the state of education is poor and has not improved since the CPA. The quantity and quality of teachers is a problem, participants say, and most schools lack basic materials, such as books. Arab participants are also concerned about schools that mix boys and girls. The major complaints about education from participants in Blue Nile are poor academic standards and crumbling infrastructure. Unlike in Southern Kordofan, however, there are a few participants in Blue Nile who indicate education has improved since the CPA.

The language of instruction in classrooms is a potentially volatile issue in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Arab participants in both states report that their children are taught in Arabic, and they believe this is appropriate. Those in Blue Nile add that another language should be taught as well, and most suggest English, though this is generally proposed as a subject and not as a language of instruction. In Southern Kordofan, there does not appear to be one language of instruction in Nuba areas as participants indicate that it is Arabic in some areas, English in others and a mix in still others. Whatever the current instructional language, most Nuba participants believe that it is critical their children understand and be taught in both Arabic and English. In Funj areas of Blue Nile, most participants report that both English and Arabic are taught, and they are happy with that. However, in a few groups, participants say that either English is not offered or that ‘Arab’ teachers refuse to use it. These participants are adamant that English must also be adopted as a language of instruction.
There are no teachers, no books, no conducive school atmosphere. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Dilling)

Education is very weak here... We have only two schools, and it is mixed boys and girls. (Two SK Arab Younger Men, Al Bajaaya)

Most of the construction collapsed. Now the students are taught under trees. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Disa)

The schools are having very weak academic standards... There are no skilled or capable teachers. (BN Arab Older Woman, Deren)

[Children are taught in] Arabic. I am not happy because we need students to be taught in both Arabic and English. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

[Children are taught] in the Arabic language. We don't like that because if someone is taken from here to Kauda they will not get a job since people there are doing things in English language. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

Our children are taught in Arabic... We are happy with it... Arabic is the language of Islam. (Three SK Arab Younger Men, Al Bajaaya)

Languages taught in school are Arabic and English... We are happy for that. (Two BN Funj Middle Aged Women, Rosaries)

Arabic language is good, but English should be added. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Geissan)

6. **Natural resources in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are not being used to the states' or the populations' benefit, participants say.** Almost all agree that oil in Southern Kordofan and hydroelectricity in Blue Nile are exported from these states without compensation.

The utilization of natural resources has fueled past discontent and conflict among the population in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Participants in both states say the issue remains problematic. The states and their people, they contend, do not receive any benefits from the natural resources within their borders because many are removed without compensation to the local population and the proceeds from the sale of those resources are not re-invested in the state. Participants in Southern Kordofan say they have not seen any of the state's CPA-mandated two percent share of revenues from local oil production, and some suspect corruption is to blame. In addition, the Nuba complain that this two percent share is far too little. Participants in Blue Nile also believe the state is not benefiting from its natural resources. Oil is not being extracted in Blue Nile, but equally controversial is Rosaries Dam and the electricity it produces. Most participants in Blue Nile say they are not benefiting from the dam because electricity is exported to northern Sudan. The only positive comments regarding natural resources come from Arab participants - principally in Southern Kordofan but some also in Blue Nile - who say that they do benefit from local agricultural production.

We do not benefit [from the state's natural resources] because people whose lands are affected by petrol pipeline are not compensated and people have not benefited from the forests. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Dilling)
This two percent is too little. It is not even seen in the state. In fact, it is not there. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Lagawa)

Petroleum is just running under our feet, but we didn’t see anything from it. Its money is not for development. It goes to specific pockets. (SK Arab Younger Man, Keliak)

Things [natural resources] are there but the northern government is the one benefiting from these resources. (BN Funj Younger Man, Rosaries)

No benefit [from Rosaries Dam]. The electricity is exported to Khartoum. (BN Arab Older Man, Geissan)

The state has benefited a lot from agricultural resources. (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Bajaaya)

Yes, the state is benefiting [from its natural resources], for example water, wood and milk. (BN Arab Middle Aged Arab Nomad, Damazin)

7. Participants generally agree that discrimination and marginalization, and to a lesser degree, insecurity and underdevelopment, are at the root of the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Lasting resolution of these issues has not been achieved, according to most. Only Blue Nile Arabs say that good progress has been made.

Discrimination and marginalization are cited by participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile as the primary causes of the conflict in those states. A number of Nuba and Funj participants say that lack of development and insecurity caused by “Arabs” also played an important role in igniting conflict, while Arab participants in both states say their feeling of marginalization stemmed from underdevelopment and lack of meaningful representation in the central government. In judging the progress made since the CPA in resolving these issues, Funj and Nuba participants acknowledge some gains, particularly in rights and freedoms, but none believe they have been adequately addressed. In addition, rural participants, and especially those who focus on insecurity and lack of development as conflict causes, are much more likely than town dwellers to say the CPA has failed to resolve these issues. Blue Nile Arab participants report more satisfaction than any other group with progress in resolving the causes of the conflict, with most saying they have been resolved partly and some saying they have been resolved fully. Arab participants in Southern Kordofan, however, believe a weak and divided state government is to blame for failing to address the problems at the root of the conflict in the state.

Discrimination, injustice and the lack of power-sharing [were the reasons for the conflict]. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

There was marginalization against the people of Blue Nile. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

No development in the area like good schools, good hospitals and no good roads [was the cause of the conflict]. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

The war broke out because of racial discrimination. (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

Some [resolution of the conflict causes] because now there is freedom. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Julud)
We think it [discrimination by Arabs] is now better because there is power-sharing in the government. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

There is not any improvement [in security]. Instead the situation is getting worse. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Lagawa)

The government is not around, and it has no power to overcome these problems. (SK Arab Older Woman, Keliak)

Some of the problems have been solved. (BN Arab Younger Man, Rosaries)

8. The relationship between Nuba and Arabs in Southern Kordofan is a significant threat to peace, participants say. Participants in Blue Nile report mostly good inter-ethnic relations, but relations with nomads are a cause for concern. Government intervention and guidelines governing nomads’ movement and grazing rights are said to be necessary for improved relations.

Participants report that there is persistent, and potentially explosive, conflict in Southern Kordofan. They describe the conflict as a fight over land and grazing rights. The Nuba argue that Arabs are armed (while the Nuba are not), that Arab traditional leaders are not neutral and that the central government is behind much of the violence. Arab participants say that it is the Nuba who are the instigators, and that they are responsible for the violence and theft in the region. Few believe this conflict can be solved by traditional or local means, and so both Nuba and Arabs say outside intervention from the international community or the CPA partners (NCP and SPLM) is required. The scale of the current conflict in Southern Kordofan is such that many participants believe the state is close to a return to general, statewide war.

There is conflict between nomads and farmers and between tribes, and this leads us to conflict between the Nuba and Arabs in land. This is a dangerous thing. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

We are still fighting with the Nuba over grass and water... the conflict in Southern Kordofan is still going on. (SK Arab, Younger Man, Al Hamra)

[The current conflict] cannot be solved by the local authorities... This is because those engaged in the conflict are armed, and they are not ready to listen. (SK Nuba Older Man, Kurchi)

It is the very government who are arming those Arabs. It means the government is encouraging that. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

It [the current conflict] can only be solved by JIU and UNMIS because they can pressure the government to disarm the militias. (SK Nuba Older Man, Kauda)

The conflict can only be solved by the big powers, NCP and SPLM. (SK Arab Older Man, Abu Safifa)

The state is nearer to a return to war than peace. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

The current situation is very serious indeed because of insecurity. (SK Arab Older Woman, Al Hamra)
Some Nuba participants declare that they have a poor relationship with all Arab tribes, but others say there are some Arab tribes with whom relations are good. Of this group, most say they have better relations with the Fallata and Ambororo. Almost all agree that Nuba have the worst relationship with Arab nomads, and specifically Misseriya. According to Arab participants, some Nuba tribes are better than others, but which ones are ‘good’ depends on local relationships (rather than one being viewed as ‘good’ by all) and the religion of the tribe. The relationship with Muslim Nuba tribes is better than with non-Muslim ones, Arab participants say. Regardless of who is at fault, both Arabs and Nuba believe the current state of their relationship is a significant threat to peace. Arabs see government negotiations as the key to improving relations, while Nuba focus on disarmament and the separation of Nuba from Arab nomads through borders and fixed grazing areas.

A rab nomads have a bad relationship with N uba because they attack our farms and graze their cattle on them. (SK Nuba Younger Woman, Kadugli)

The A mbororo are the best. They only cross our land without doing any harm. We are on good terms with them. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Lagawa)

It [relationship between N uba-A rab] is poor because they kill and steal and deprive our cattle from grazing the open land. (SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

In A l H amra, we have a good relationship with the N uba living near us. They are N uba M oro... but the rest of the N uba who are living in the mountains behind the M oro have a bad relationship with us. (SK Arab, Older Woman, Al Hamra)

N uba in the western mountains are called M eri and all of them are M uslims... Their relationship with us is good because they are M uslims. (Two SK Arab, Younger Men, Keliak)

The bad relationship that other tribes have with the N uba will affect the long term peace in South Kordofan. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Kauda)

The N uba themselves [threaten peace]. They block roads and collect revenues. The N uba in town are good, but the N uba are not good with the nomads. (SK Arab Older Man, Abu Safifa)

[T o make relations better] they [A rab nomads] must be disarmed, and they must have a fixed place. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

The government must come and sit down with the two sides... that is the only solution [to make Arab-N uba relations better]. (SK Arab, Younger Man, Al Bajaaya)

In Blue Nile, participants have somewhat different views of the state of inter-ethnic relations. Almost all Arab participants describe the relationship with Funj as one that is strong and built on a foundation of significant integration and inter-marriage. While acknowledging mostly positive relations with Arabs, Funj also express significant concerns about their interactions with Arab nomads. This group, they say, crosses farmland without permission and poses a threat to the local population because they are often armed. Unlike in Southern Kordofan, however, participants in Blue Nile are confident in local and traditional authorities to resolve any disputes. A few participants say that, in addition to traditional means, the government should work to identify paths and rules for nomadic grazing.
Our relationship is good... We are mixed because they have married from us, and we have married from them. (Two BN Arab Middle Aged Women, Disa)

All the tribes within Blue Nile are having an excellent relationship because they co-existed for a long time, and they do not discriminate against each other. (BN Arab Younger Man, Deren)

Yes, we have problems with them [Arab nomads]... If a civilian that owns a farm talked to a nomad regarding grazing, he [the nomad] will just prepare his weapon. (Two BN Funj Middle Aged Women, Khorbodi)

The nomads just cross the area and enter into farm land with their cattle without asking permission from the owner of the farm. (BN Funj Younger Woman, Dondoro)

The [problems with Arab nomads] can be solved through traditional means because they are our brothers. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Rosaries)

The normal conflict between nomads and farmers is there, but it is easily overcome and settled. (BN Arab Older Man, Geissan).

We want the state governor to call for discussion and set the rules for those nomads. (BN Funj Younger Woman, Geissan)

The old routes for the nomads have to be re-opened and improved. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Dondoro)

Blue Nile is largely free of conflict, according to participants. The only conflict participants reference is one specific to the Geissan-Ethiopia border, as well as political ‘conflict’ characterized by disagreement but not violence. Funj participants, though, are more pessimistic than Arabs about the possibility of permanent peace due to perceived underdevelopment in their areas.

No [conflict in Blue Nile]. There is stability. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

The cause of conflict is between the leaders of the state. They have different opinions in their work, and the NCP are still recruiting the military force. (BN Funj Older Man, Deren)

Yes, [there is conflict in Blue Nile], but it is very small conflicts between MPs or politicians competing for power. (BN Arab Older Man, Geissan)

The conflict [in Geissan] needs to be settled by the state government because it is in between the border of two countries. (BN Funj Younger Man, Rosaries)

We will return to conflict because now there is no development. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

I see much of the things we want are now provided. I do not want to see war again. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Dondoro)
9. Arab participants say they experience significant restrictions on their freedom of movement in Nuba areas of Southern Kordofan. Nuba participants express uneasiness with Arab travel to their communities, though a majority are open to peaceful and temporary travel. There are no freedom of movement issues in Blue Nile.

Almost all Arab participants in this study declare they have no freedom of movement to Nuba areas within Southern Kordofan. Many recount how they are questioned, threatened, physically stopped or simply scared to visit areas dominated by the Nuba. The opposite, they say, is not true: Nuba are free and even welcomed in Arab areas of the state. Nuba participants acknowledge their discomfort with Arabs traveling to or through their areas. A significant minority, in fact, say they do not want to see Arabs in their communities at all. The majority, though, indicate they are willing to accept Arab travel on two conditions – the Arabs come in peace, and they return back to their own areas. Participants in Blue Nile report no problems with freedom of movement.

If they only come with their animals and go right back, we have no problem.
(SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

If they come peacefully I have no objection [to Arabs moving in Nuba areas], but if they are still doing what they have done, I don’t think they will have a room in Kauda.
(SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

I do not accept them to come here... Since Arabs are the ones that killed Nuba during the war, we do not accept them. (Two SK Nuba Younger Women, Julud)

We as Arabs welcome all with open hearts, while we can’t go to the Nuba areas.
(SK Arab, Younger Woman, Kadugli)

The Nuba move freely anywhere while we can’t pass that mountain of theirs... there is freedom for Nuba only, not for the Arabs... they are welcomed in all Arab areas, while we have no similar right. Their land is a forbidden land. (SK Arab, Older Man, Lagawa)

It [freedom of movement] is good because we move freely to Damazin to visit our parents in the North.
(BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

There is freedom of movement. It is good. There are no problems... One can go into any community regardless of race or religion. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

10. Security in Southern Kordofan has not improved with the presence of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU), which many say is ineffective and does not foster SAF-SPLA cooperation within its ranks. The JIU is seen in a more positive light in Blue Nile. A continued SAF presence in both states makes Nuba and Funj participants uneasy.

As noted earlier, Arab and Nuba participants disagree on the cause of insecurity in Southern Kordofan. Nuba participants point to a number of other armed groups, including members of the Popular Defense Force (PDF), other Arab militias and armed nomadic tribes, such as the Shanabla and Misseriya. Nuba believe they are the target of these groups because of their desire to ethnically cleanse Nuba areas. Arab participants say there is only one other armed group in Southern

21 "Other armed groups" is a phrase used to describe military-like groups who are not regular army.
Kordofan: the SPLM. They, too, say the goal is ethnic cleansing and accuse the SPLM of trying to rid Nuba areas of Arabs.

We have no security in Southern Kordofan as the Nuba people. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Koalib)

It [security] is not good. Every day a new conflict comes out. (SK Arab Younger Woman, Kadugli)

[Other armed groups] are trying to stop development in the state and to control the land of other people [the Nuba]. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

[Other armed groups are trying to] enslave the Nuba. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Dilling)

There is no armed group except the SPLM... the Nuba are well-armed to stand against Arabs and Islam... SPLM is only there to destroy. (SK Arab, Younger Man, Keliak)

Their [the SPLM] aim is to chase away the Arabs from the mountains... they don't like Arabization and Islam. (SK Arab, Older woman, Al Bajaaya)

Almost all participants in Blue Nile indicate they are pleased with the security situation. They say the only armed groups in the state are some nomads who have retained their weapons and some members of the PDF. Neither of these is seen as a significant threat to peace, though a few Funj participants remain suspicious of these groups’ motives.

We have an excellent security situation here in Blue Nile state. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

We are well-secured. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

There is a Public Defense Force militia in the area called Jabal Ingessana. (BN Funj Older Man, Deren)

There is none completely, except the Popular Defense Forces. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) presence in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile makes Funj and Nuba participants uncomfortable. In Southern Kordofan, Nuba participants say that Nuba soldiers in SAF have been removed from the state, making the force mostly “Arab”. In Blue Nile, Funj participants do not think it is fair that the SPLA has left or been integrated into JIUs while SAF remains. Both groups say they want SAF removed from their states. Arab participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are appreciative of the SAF’s presence. Those in Blue Nile say that SAF contributes to peace and security. Some Southern Kordofan participants echo this but also express frustration that SAF is not powerful enough to protect them fully.

The SAF is now politicized, and they are now mainly from Arab ethnic groups. So for these reasons, it is now not neutral. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Julud)

---

22 It is unclear whether Arab participants are speaking of supporters of the SPLM/A or of an SPLM-affiliated militia.
23 Participants were not always clear about whether they were speaking of stand alone units of SAF or of SAF units within JIUs. Also, some participants indicate that SAF and SPLA forces act as independent armies even though they may fall under the JIU umbrella.
We want [SAF] to leave Southern Kordofan because they are not solving any problems. (SK Nuba Older Man, Kurchi)

We in Blue Nile state are not feeling good for SAF to remain there while SPLA has left. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

We need SAF to take off from Blue Nile state. (BN Funj Older Woman, Kurmuk)

They [SAF] provide for us security. (BN Arab Younger Man, Deren)

SAF is the strongest power here in Lagawa... Security was in the hands of the police and attacks happened. When the power moved to the soldiers, everything stopped. (SK Arab Middle Aged Woman, Lagawa)

Their [SAF] role is very weak and problems are increasing. They are not able to solve them. (SK Arab Younger Man, Keliak)

Most Nuba and Funj participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile say that SPLA troops have abided by the provisions of the CPA and left the state, joined integrated units or are now “staying with us as civilians.” This is widely accepted as appropriate because it is part of CPA implementation and offers proof that the SPLM is living up to its commitments. A few participants, however, remain uneasy about living without the protection of the SPLA. As noted above, Arab participants in Southern Kordofan attribute attacks on them to SPLM/A groups and do not distinguish between regular army, SPLA units within JIUs or independent supporters. Therefore, they talk about attacks by the SPLA without acknowledging the redeployment of the SPLA regular army. In Blue Nile, Arab participants understand the SPLA has moved south of the January 1, 1956, border and see it as a step in the process of CPA implementation.

We think that [SPLA leaving the state] is good because it gives a chance for development, and it can also show that the SPLA has implemented the CPA. (BN Funj, Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

[By leaving the state] they [the SPLA] are just obeying the ceasefire protocol. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Lagawa)

We think that it is not good for the SPLA to leave Blue Nile state while there are SAF troops still trying to be increased in the area, especially Damazin. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

Ordinary people are killed and shot by gangs of SPLA. (SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

This [redeployment of the SPLA] is implementation of the CPA. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

The creation of Joint Integrated Units composed of SAF and SPLA is one of the primary security provisions of the CPA. Participants in Southern Kordofan have a poor opinion$^{25}$ of the JIU’s performance in the state thus far. They say it has achieved nothing and are disappointed with its lack of response to persistent insecurity. They also express skepticism that the JIU is acting “jointly.” Most participants say the SPLA and SAF units in the JIU do not cooperate, but rather stay in their

---

$^{24}$ Phrase is from a younger Nuba woman in Julud.

$^{25}$ A few Nuba female participants held positive views of the JIU, saying they “helped people.”
own camps and act independently. A few Arab participants claim the JIU is biased toward the Nuba.\(^{26}\)

> The JIU doesn’t help us. It’s just there staying idle. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

> They [JIU] are doing nothing... they are not doing a good job; there is only more disputes. (SK Arab Older Man, Abu Safifa)

> The JIU is meaningless because they are supposed to disarm the other armed groups, but they are doing nothing. Even when there is a gun shooting they don’t respond. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

> There is no benefit to these united forces... one of my boys was killed in front of the integrated units, and they did nothing. (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

> They [JIU] stay together in one barracks but each in one side, and they never mix. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

> They [JIU] are not good... not good because they aren’t agreeing among themselves. (SK Arab Older Woman, Al Hamra)

> If any Arabs complained to them, they [the JIU] don’t listen or respond. The opposite [occurs] when a Nuba does, you find they are moving up and down. (SK Arab Older Man, Lagawa)

Opinions about the JIU in Blue Nile are more favorable. Most participants either rate its job as good or say that it has no interaction with them. The results are more mixed when participants are asked whether the SAF and SPLA are working well together within the JIU. Some participants say yes, but some say no.

> They [JIU] are doing well, without any problems. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

> Our opinion [of the JIU] is good because they are peacekeeping troops in the area. (BN Funj Younger Man, Rosaries)

> They [the SAF and SPLA in the JIU] are working together since the signing of the CPA. (BN Funj Younger Woman, Dondoro)

> They [the SAF and SPLA in the JIU] are not actually integrated. Each force is aside from the other. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Dondoro)

11. The conflicts in Darfur and Abyei threaten peace in Southern Kordofan, according to participants. Most predict that conflict in Abyei will lead to a broader Southern Kordofan war.

The situation in Darfur is troubling on many levels for participants in Southern Kordofan. Participants express concern about soldiers from their communities taking part in the conflict, and many feel a connection to the region based on ethnic identity. Nuba participants speak of the

\(^{26}\) All of the comments relating to bias were in the Lagawa area.
Darfur people “who are black like us.” 27 Arab participants say Darfur affects them because “they are Arabs and Muslims.” 28 Participants are also worried about a possible spillover effect. Some Nuba fear a connection between Arab combatants in Darfur and Arabs in Southern Kordofan, while some Arab participants think that security in Southern Kordofan will be difficult to achieve without a resolution in Darfur.

The soldiers that die [in Darfur], they are mostly from Nuba.  (SK Nuba Younger Woman, Julud)

The war in Darfur will affect us because our young fellows could be taken by the government to participate in the Darfur war and be killed.  (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

The Darfur problems have an effect on Southern Kordofan because they are our people.  (SK Nuba Older Woman, Koalib)

It [Darfur] has great importance. If you hear your Arab Muslim brother has been attacked and assaulted, you feel unhappy.  (SK Arab Older Man, Abu Safifa)

This issue [the Darfur crisis] is just from the government because they are targeting us the Africans. If they are defeated there, the Misseriya here will also fight us.  (SK Nuba Younger Man, Lagawa)

Since there is instability, both areas [Darfur and Kordofan] will not find the peace we want.  (SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

Land and oil are said by Southern Kordofan participants to be at the heart of the conflict in Abyei, although Arab participants are somewhat more likely to view the conflict solely in terms of land. None of the participants are happy with the central government’s response to the Abyei crisis. Nuba believe that the central government is part of the problem in Abyei, instigating fighting and subverting the CPA. Some Arab participants say the central government has been weak on Abyei and has not provided enough support to the Misseriya there. Many consider Abyei within Southern Kordofan’s borders, 29 and the impact on the state of any conflict in Abyei seems obvious to participants. The resolution of the conflict is thus very important to Southern Kordofan participants, but few believe peace is on the horizon. Most believe war will break out in Abyei 30 and eventually engulf the whole state.

It [the Abyei crisis] is just because of the oil.  (SK Nuba Younger Man, Lagawa)

It [the Abyei crisis] is a fight for land ownership. The Arabs are trying to take it from the original owners.  (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

I think people are fighting in Abyei because of the land because Arabs say Abyei is their land and Dinkas say that also.  (SK Arab Older Woman, Al Hamra)

It [the central government] is trying to ignite the fight.  (SK Nuba Younger Man, Heban)

---

27 Phrase is from a middle aged Nuba woman in Kauda.
28 Phrase is from a young Arab man in Keliak.
30 These groups were conducted prior to the May 13, 2008 fighting in Abyei.
The government’s role is very weak... the SPLM has caused a lot of problems and they are helping the Dinkas fight back.  (SK Arab Older Woman, Keliak)

If there is any problem in Abyei, it will affect South Kordofan.  (SK Nuba Older Man, Kauda)

It [the Abyei crisis] will not only affect Southern Kordofan; it will affect the CPA as well.  (SK Arab Older Women, Al Bajaaya)

A war will erupt which will affect Southern Kordofan.  (SK Nuba Older Man, Kurchi)

There will be great destruction in the whole area if the Dinka don’t go to the borders of 1956.  (SK Arab Younger Woman, Kadugli)

12. Participants judge the integrated NCP-SPLM state government a failure in Southern Kordofan, but mostly a success in Blue Nile.

The attempt to form an integrated NCP-SPLM government in Southern Kordofan is not working according to participants. Most Nuba participants believe the 55% NCP and 45% SPLM formula prescribed in the CPA has not been fulfilled. They contend that despite the agreement the NCP continues to dominate the state government by occupying top positions, limiting the SPLM to only a few positions or simply refusing to fill designated SPLM slots. Arab participants give a slightly different reason for the failure of the NCP-SPLM state government, focusing instead on the “bad blood” between the parties and saying each party “has its own agenda.”\(^{31}\) As one participant said, “NCP says this; SPLM says the opposite.”\(^{32}\) Both Nuba and Arab participants are skeptical that state government can be improved under the current formula. Participants who have not given up hope for a solution focus on the need for good faith efforts by both parties. In addition, Nuba participants stress the need for true power-sharing, and Arab participants the need for security.

The NCP have occupied the top positions.  (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

Practically, the 45% given to us is not fulfilled.  It’s only the commissioner who is SPLM.  (SK Nuba Younger Man, Lagawa)

They [NCP and SPLM] claim to be in participation, but their hearts are dirty.  (SK Arab Older Woman, Al Hamra)

I don’t think the two parties will rule in a good way... they claim they have agreed but they are still cheating each other... they are not faithful to one another.  That is why they can’t work successfully.  (SK Arab Younger Men, Al Bajaaya)

The security comes first, and all people should sit together and clear their hearts.  (SK Arab Younger Woman, Kadugli)

This can only be solved if both parties understand what is needed from each in regards to their partnership.  (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

\(^{31}\) Phrase is from an older Arab man in Lagawa.

\(^{32}\) Quotation is from a middle-aged Arab woman in Kadugli.
The 55% NCP-45% SPLM formula has had more success in Blue Nile. Most participants in the state report that the two parties are getting along well and working jointly on issues without partisan rancor. Unlike the Nuba, Funj participants in Blue Nile do not express dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 55%-45% formula. A few do, however, talk about some disputes between the parties.

Our people from the SPLM are given good positions in the state government.  
(BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

The mixed government is working in a nice way.  
(BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

There is no one in the government who talks about his or her political affiliations... They are doing a good job.  
(BN Arab Traditional Authority, Disa)

It [NCP-SPLM integrated government] is working well.  
(BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

13. Malik Agar is the only post-CPA governor or deputy governor in Southern Kordofan or Blue Nile whose support crosses ethnic lines.

Current Governor Malik Agar enjoys strong support among participants in Blue Nile, Funj and Arab alike. In his inauguration speech, the Governor, who represents the SPLM, had promised an aggressive approach to development, and most believe he is fulfilling that promise. Infrastructure improvements, and particularly road construction, are cited as among his achievements. Some participants also appreciate Agar’s travel throughout the state to discuss problems with different communities. The exception to this view is among participants in two localities of Blue Nile – Geissan and Dondoro. In those areas, there is significant dissatisfaction with Agar’s administration. Participants say they feel Agar has ignored them by not coming to speak with them and by not devoting resources to developing their war-affected communities. Other post-CPA governors and deputy governors in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan are criticized for not visiting communities or failing to produce concrete results.

Absolutely our opinion about Malik Agar is that he is a good Governor because recently Malik Agar has brought some change in the state.  
(BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

His [Malik Agar’s] work is excellent... Since signing the peace agreement, he implemented most of his promises.  
(BN Funj Younger Man, Rosaries)

Yes, he [Malik Agar] has delivered that promise.  We have seen the roads being constructed.  
(BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

He is a simple man who can talk to anyone.  This is the best thing in him.  He has provided services to the state.  
(BN Arab Traditional Authority, Disa)

We thank him very much.  He has provided enough assistance to us... I want to thank him because he made operations in the hospital free of charge.  
(BN Arab Older Woman, Deren)

[Malik Agar’s work] is poor because some areas affected by war were not maintained, and therefore there is no change.  
(BN Funj Younger Woman, Geissan)
He has not done anything... He has never visited us; he said the war did not affect Geissan.
(BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Geissan)

He usually bypasses us. He has never visited us to find out what our needs are.
(BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Dondoro)

14. Malik Agar's announcement that state government operations will rotate between Damazin and Kurmuk is popular among Blue Nile participants.

Participants in Blue Nile agree that Governor Malik Agar's announcement that the operations of government will rotate between Damazin and Kurmuk is beneficial. They say rotating government can expand the scope of development and bring greater interaction and unity among the state's different ethnic groups. Participants in only two groups objected to the idea of a rotating government. This was due to concern about the added cost of operating two government centers.

That is a good move made by government to visit the two areas. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

It is a good announcement that he made to rotate the state government from Damazin to Kurmuk and that will bring cooperation among the communities. (BN Funj Younger Woman, Dondoro)

It is good because it will balance development between Kurmuk and Damazin... It will give a chance for solving the community problems, because the government will be closer to all the communities.
(BN Two Arab Middle Aged Men, Damazin)

It is excellent [to rotate the state government] because it will give a chance to the government to know the situation of the other regions. (BN Arab Younger Woman, Damazin)

It is not good because it will cost the government too much money. (BN Arab Younger Man, Rosaries)

15. The NCP and SPLM are the most recognized political parties in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, but there are few reports of political party activity, except among Arab participants in Blue Nile.

The NCP and SPLM are the two main political parties that participants in Southern Kordofan can identify unprompted. Participants also have some familiarity with the Umma party and a few individuals mentioned the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Sudan Communist Party (SCP). Participants are not aware of any major degree of political party activity in their communities, though Nuba participants in Kadugli say they have heard political rhetoric from both SPLM and NCP, and Arab participants in Abu Safifa say they have heard the NCP discuss some issues. In Blue Nile, Funj participants report little political party activity, but many Arab participants indicate they hear political parties speak of development and their political programs.

This [political parties talking about their programs] doesn't happen.
(SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

No party ever came to tell us about its programs. (SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

The SPLM said it is better than NCP and vice versa. (SK Nuba Younger Woman, Kadugli)
NCP is the only party that came and looked out for our interests... Only the NCP talks about issues.
(SK Arab, Older Man, Abu Safifa)

They [political parties] are not speaking about any policies or the other party.
(BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

They [political parties] give promises all the time, for example, provision of good services.
(BN Arab Older Traditional Authority Man, Disa)

16. Party support falls along ethnic lines in both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile: Nuba and Funj support the SPLM and Arabs support the NCP. However, participants in Blue Nile cite performance, rather than ethnicity, as the basis for their opinions of political parties.

The SPLM has strong support among Nuba participants in this study. The party is appreciated for its ability to bring peace to Southern Kordofan and freedom to the Nuba people, and it is clear that Nuba will continue to be loyal to the SPLM for some time to come. However, this does not prevent participants from expressing some criticism of the party. Nuba in this study have mixed feelings about the performance of the SPLM, with an aggregate view in the “fair” range. The reasons given for this rating are varied. Some participants cite general weakness of the party, a lack of full commitment to the Nuba issue and the inability of the party to deliver development, but there is no common theme to their dissatisfaction. Funj in Blue Nile declare an allegiance to the SPLM that is similar to the Nuba. This bond is based on years of SPLM solidarity throughout the conflict and the party’s success in negotiating the CPA. Arab participants in Blue Nile hold mixed opinions about the party – some support the SPLM, some see the party as a potentially positive force but are cautious and others reject the SPLM as either unqualified or discriminatory.

It [SPLM] is the party which brought us peace and freedom. We are proud of it.
(SK Nuba Older Man, Kurchi)

From the security point of view, it [the SPLM’s performance] is very good, but from the development point, it is poor. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Julud)

Our opinion about the SPLM is good, because without the SPLM the people of Blue Nile would already have been destroyed by the Sudan government. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

SPLM is our government, and we feel proud of it. (BN Funj Older Man, Geissan)

SPLM is 100% good. If we forward them any problem, they solve it immediately.
(BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Disa)

It is too early for me to evaluate the SPLM. They are still infants, but good enough, they brought peace.
(BN Arab Two Traditional Authorities, Disa)

33 Due to security concerns of NDI’s Arab moderators, participants in the Southern Kordofan Arab groups were not asked their opinion of the SPLM.
34 Participants were asked to rate the party’s performance on the following scale: excellent, good, fair or poor.
We joined the SPLM because they were addressing our real needs, but in the end, they did not achieve even one of those needs. They are just unable to do it. They are not qualified.
(BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Dondoro)

SPLM is very rude to us, especially we the Arabs. They are not good.
(BN Arab Two Middle Aged Nomads, Damazin)

Opinions about the NCP divide along ethnic lines in Southern Kordofan – Nuba participants have an almost universally low opinion of the party while Arab participants are almost unanimously positive about it. The strong negative feelings among the Nuba are driven by their wartime experience. Peace has not convinced them that the NCP has changed or that it has anything to offer them. In contrast, Arab participants often speak of the NCP as “our party,” and strong support for it is expressed in all the groups. An ethnic divide in Blue Nile is clear as well, but the strength of feelings about the NCP, whether positive or negative, is weaker. Funj participants are not happy with the NCP, but they mostly cite the party’s failure to achieve anything for the state recently, rather than focus on past sins or ethnicity. A majority of Arab participants are supportive of the NCP, but they are more likely to justify their support on the basis of party performance rather than in religious or ethnic terms. Moreover, unlike in Southern Kordofan, some Arab participants indicate a dislike for the NCP.

NCP is the one marginalizing our people... We cannot befriend a snake.
(SK Two Nuba Older Men, Kauda)

NCP doesn’t give anything to Southern Kordofan. NCP are not good.
(SK Two Nuba Middle Aged Women, Latmor)

Even if you join them [NCP], they will just marginalize you. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

NCP is doing well... NCP is our party. (SK Arab Younger Men, Al Bajaaya)

NCP is the only one helping us because the other parties are not present in Al Hamra.
(SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

NCP did nothing for Blue Nile. Like the former NCP governor in Blue Nile state, he said there is no development, let people cultivate. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

Our opinion of the NCP is it is not going well here in Blue Nile state.
(BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

All of its [NCP’s] work is going well... NCP is doing a good job.
(BN Arab Two Middle Aged Nomads, Damazin)

NCP has provided for us what we need. They are not bad. (BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Dondoro)

NCP does not solve our problems. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Disa)
17. Elections are embraced by virtually all participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, but many say they will reject the results if the elected governor is not of their ethnicity. The exception is among Arab participants in Blue Nile, who will accept election outcomes deemed free and fair.

Almost all participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile believe that elections are a good method to choose their leaders. Most also say that state elections, if conducted fairly, will resolve the root causes of the conflicts there. A number of participants in both states and of all ethnicities, however, are concerned about what will happen if the party they oppose wins, or if it refuses to accept the victory of their preferred party. This makes them skeptical about the ability of elections to act as a conflict cure-all.

It is a good thing to vote for our own government. (BN Funj Older Man, Deren)

If the election will be free and fair, this will solve the problems of Blue Nile state. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Rosaries)

Yes, the conflicts will get resolved [by state elections]. (BN Arab Middle Aged Nomad, Damazin)

Elections will not solve the problems because the SPLM and Nuba have other objectives against Islam and Arabs. (SK Arab Younger Man, Keliak)

Despite support for elections and faith in their ability to resolve the states’ problems, many participants say they could not accept a result in which a person of an ethnicity other than their own won the governorship. Nuba participants in Southern Kordofan and Funj participants in Blue Nile express this most strongly, as they did during NDI’s 2006 study. They are concerned about continuing discrimination and argue that past Arab rule in the states has brought no change. Furthermore, many say that even if Arabs are found to make up a majority of the state population, they have earned the right - through years of marginalization - to be led by someone from their own communities. Absent this, some participants contend that conflict will ensue. There are a few Nuba and Funj participants, however, who say they could accept an Arab as governor if that person treats all citizens equally.

35 A very broad definition of ethnicity is being used here, as throughout the report. It refers in general to a “Funj” or “Nuba” versus “Arab” divide.
36 See Traci Cook, Lost in the Middle of Peace, pp.24-25, op. cit.
37 As mentioned in the Preface, the definition of “Arab” in Blue Nile is not straightforward. In answering questions about a win by an Arab governor, one individual said he could accept an Arab if the candidate came from a southern Blue Nile tribe and another said that at least any Arab governor in Blue Nile would be a “black Arab.” Thus, the
We shall not accept for an Arab to become governor in this state. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Koalib)

We will go back to war if an Arab won the position of governor. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Latmor)

I cannot accept [an Arab as governor] because there will be discrimination. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Lagawa)

Even if the Arabs are the majority, this area must be ruled by its real natives. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

If an Arab receives the most votes and wins the government, we will fight and separate. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

We are not going to accept that again for an Arab governor will neglect this state again. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

If he [an Arab governor] can provide what we need [we will accept it]. There must be justice and equality. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

There are majority and minority rights. The rights of the majority will be accepted as well as the rights of the majority. (BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

Among Arab participants, those in Southern Kordofan voice mixed views on the idea of a Nuba governor. Some are accepting of the idea as long as the person does not discriminate, but others are as opposed to it as their Nuba counterparts are to an Arab governor. Religion appears to play a role in the feelings of some, who say they cannot be ruled by a non-Muslim. In contrast, the vast majority of Arab participants in Blue Nile express no reservations about living under a Funj governor. As long as the election is free and fair they see no grounds to challenge the winner.

It will be fine if the Nuba won the election but the one that has been elected must be in the rank of justice. (SK Arab Younger Man, Al Hamra)

If a Nuba won, war will break out immediately. There will be no peace because he just won't be for the Arabs. (SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

We will never accept [a Nuba governor]. I am a Muslim. How can a non-Muslim rule me, and he is against me? (SK Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

If the election is free and fair, of course, we will accept the result. (BN Arab Younger Man, Rosaries)

different definitions of “Arab” in Blue Nile may have influenced answers to this question, in particular if Funj participants interpreted the term to mean an Arab from Northern Sudan. Nevertheless, the responses of Funj participants in aggregate suggest these participants would have difficulty accepting anyone they did not view as from their own ethnic background, including “Arabs” from Blue Nile.
18. Most participants say they will vote according to an individual’s character and accomplishments and the candidate’s party affiliation. Party-based voting tendencies are strongest in Southern Kordofan.

In describing how they will select a candidate in the upcoming elections, most participants focus on two factors: party affiliation and character/experience. The importance of party affiliation is strongest in Southern Kordofan. Many Nuba participants say that party, and specifically an SPLM affiliation, will be their only criterion, and most Arab participants concur, though they are looking for NCP candidates and are somewhat more likely to talk about an individual’s accomplishments as well. In Blue Nile, Arab participants talk about party but place equal importance on experience. Funj participants are more likely to focus on a person’s character than party affiliation.

I will vote for my party, and the person who represents my party.  
(SK Nuba Middle Aged Woman, Kauda)

We will vote for NCP only.  
(SK Arab Younger Man, Keliak)

We will vote for the one who has the better CV of serving his community.  
(SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

We want an experienced and hardworking person.  
(BN Arab Older Woman, Deren)

[I will vote for someone] based on his party.  
(BN Arab Older Man, Geissan)

Our vote will be based on the person’s behavior and how good the person is to the people.  
(BN Funj Middle Aged Man, Kurmuk)

19. Voting intentions for the 2009 elections follow the same ethnicity-based patterns as does support for the NCP and SPLM. The only variation is among Blue Nile Arab participants, who indicate significant — though not majority — support for the SPLM, particularly in the gubernatorial election.

Participants were asked which party they would vote for in the state gubernatorial election and which party they would choose in the national presidential election, assuming those elections were held that day. All Nuba participants in Southern Kordofan indicate their votes for governor and president will be cast for candidates representing the SPLM. Most Arab participants in that state refused to answer questions about voting preferences. Those that did indicate they will vote for the NCP candidates. In Blue Nile, the vast majority of Funj participants say they will support the SPLM’s candidates, though a few voice intentions to vote for the NCP. Blue Nile Arab participants demonstrate different tendencies. In the race for governor, five out of twelve Arab groups were solidly behind the NCP, three were split between the NCP and SPLM, two were staunchly SPLM, one was for the Umma party and the results from one group did not produce a majority for any party. When casting their mock votes for president, however, support among Blue Nile Arab participants for the NCP was somewhat stronger — eight groups were solidly NCP, two were for the SPLM, and two were split between the SPLM and NCP.
20. There is widespread support among both male and female participants for the election law provision reserving 25 percent of National Assembly and state legislative assembly seats for women.

Participants do not have any misgivings about the national electoral law requirement setting aside a portion of seats for women. All say that it is important for women to participate in the political process and see this mechanism as a legitimate tool for ensuring that.38

We think that [legislative seats reserved for women] is good because we want to take part in the National Assembly and the state legislative assembly as well. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

We want women to participate more in politics... It also shows that Sudan wants to give and express women's rights. (BN Funj Older Man, Geissan)

It is good and suitable for them. There is importance in female representation. (SK Nuba Older Man, Kurchi)

We know that 25% of seats are given to women during the election time and that's a good thing. We even wish a woman could win the presidency. (SK Arab Older Woman, Kadugli)

It is a fair percentage for women. (BN Arab Traditional Authority, Disa)

21. Almost all Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile participants say they support the unity of Sudan. Nuba and Funj participants in both states continue to believe that they will have a referendum option. Most speak of separation or conflict if the South votes to secede from Sudan and their states are denied a referendum of their own.

There is a strong desire for unity among participants in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Nuba and Funj participants believe the break-up of the country would leave them perched precariously between different regions, not knowing to which they would belong. They are also concerned, along with Arab participants, about the potential for instability if the country divides. The risk of conflict, they say, is much higher if separation is the future.

We want it [Sudan] to be one because if it divides, we will not know who to join. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Dilling)

[Sudan should be] united, so that there will be no problems. (SK Nuba Younger Woman, Julud)

We don't want separation, for unity is power. (SK Arab Younger Man, Keliak)

Yes, we want Sudan to remain united as one country... If Sudan is separated, we the people of Blue Nile and the Nuba will face more difficulties. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

If Sudan is united, it will remain stable. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Disa)

Sudan should remain as one country... because [if not] there will be war between the South and the North. (BN Arab Middle Aged Woman, Geissan)

38 Most Arab groups in Southern Kordofan refused to answer political questions, including this one.
In 2006, many Funj and Nuba participants mistakenly believed they would be given an opportunity to vote in a self-determination referendum along with residents of Abyei and Southern Sudan. Although they are not sure of its form, most Nuba and Funj participants remain confident they will have such an opportunity. Many say they will vote in the South’s referendum, while others believe they will be given a separate vote. Some, and particularly younger participants, say that popular consultation (see section 24) is equivalent to a referendum.

It is we who determine whether to join North or South not only that or also to become independent as a country. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Koalib)

If the North separates from the South, then the people of Blue Nile will have a chance to choose the South. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Rosaries)

Southern Blue Nile will vote in the same referendum [as the South]. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

Because we do have our popular consultation, we will have our own referendum if the South separates. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

The popular consultation will give us the opportunity to join the South. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

The prospect that there may be no self-determination referendum in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile is troubling to many Nuba and Funj participants. These participants have a grim view of their future without a referendum option. If that happens, most say they will join the South, declare ‘independence’ immediately or go back to war. Arab participants agree that separation by the South will trigger a desire among Nuba and Funj populations for separation, thus also raising the chance of conflict.

[If there is no referendum] we will be lost... we will suffer more. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

[If there is no referendum] it will mean the people of Blue Nile got lost in the middle of Sudan. They were not given their rights in the peace agreement. (BN Funj Younger Man, Chali)

[If there is no referendum] it will bring conflict. (SK Nuba Older Man, Kurchi)

[If there is no referendum] people will return to conflict immediately. (BN Funj Younger Woman, Dondoro)

[If the South separates] it would be the greatest fear for Uduk and Funj, we the people of Blue Nile, to remain in the middle. (BN Funj Older Woman, Damazin)

[If the South separates] we will claim for an independent country for the Nuba. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Julud)

If Southerners will inform us, we will join them. If they will not, we can also separate from the North and rule our own affairs. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khordobi)

---

39 See Traci Cook, Lost in the Middle of Peace, pp.26-27, op. cit.
We the people of Blue Nile state will respond [to the South’s separation] with fighting to the national government and be separated immediately. (BN Funj Older Woman, Kurmuk)

[If the South separates] they [Nuba] will claim separation like Southerners.
(SK Arab Middle Aged Man, Lagawa)

The Funj are SPLM as are the Southerners. If the Southerners separate, the Funj will separate also.
(BN Arab Middle Aged Man, Damazin)

A lot of chaos will erupt [if the South separates]... it will cause war and conflicts between the Funj.
(BN Arab Younger Man, Deren)

22. Popular consultation is a process that remains a mystery for many, though the idea of having representatives who will convey people’s views to the national government is attractive.

Popular consultation is the CPA-mandated process by which the peace agreement will become the final resolution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Four years after the signing of the CPA, the term is still largely unfamiliar to the general population of those two states.40 Most participants41 say either that they have not heard of popular consultation or they do not understand what it means. Younger participants generally and Funj participants in Blue Nile are slightly more familiar with the term, but some interpret it incorrectly, believing that it provides for a self-determination referendum. Only a few Nuba participants in Southern Kordofan indicate they have heard political leaders speak about the topic;42 all others say they know of no attempts at educating the public. When participants are read a description of the popular consultation process, most respond favorably, primarily because they like the idea of elected leaders representing their views. Because the popular consultation process is not well-understood, many participants have only vague ideas of what they would request of these representatives with regard to the CPA. Many talk of the need for peace and development. Some Nuba participants are more specific, however, and say they will instruct their representatives to amend the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile protocol to provide for greater power- and wealth-sharing and a self-determination referendum. A few Arab participants in Blue Nile say they will urge their representatives to endorse the CPA “as it is”43 and to avoid separation.

We heard about it, but nobody came to clarify it to us. (SK Nuba Younger Man, Kauda-Kumbur)

It [popular consultation] says Blue Nile will be given three choices - either to go with the South, remain with the North or rule and form its own country. (BN Funj Middle Aged Woman, Khorbodi)

It [popular consultation] is good because there will be people who will represent us and bring us good things. (SK Nuba Older Woman, Koalib)

The elected representatives will talk on behalf of their communities.
(BN Funj Younger Woman, Geissan)

40 The term was also found to be unfamiliar in 2006, when participants in only one of 28 focus groups conducted in the two states had heard of it. See Traci Cook, Lost in the Middle of Peace, pp.26-27, op. cit.
41 The data on this question was insufficient to analyze the perceptions of Arabs in Southern Kordofan.
42 These participants say that Abdel Aziz, presently SPLM Deputy Secretary General, came to Southern Kordofan to educate the public on the implementation of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile protocol.
43 Phrase is from an Arab traditional authority in Disa.
It [the Southern Kordofan/Blue Nile protocol] should be converted to self-determination. (SK Nuba Middle Aged Man, Kadugli)

We will tell them that we do not want separation. (BN Middle Aged Nomad, Damazin)
PrincipaL Findings - Abyei (Ngok Dinka Only)44

Serious fighting erupted in Abyei on May 13, 2008 and resulted in the displacement of thousands of people. The SPLM and NCP subsequently signed a Road Map agreement outlining a strategy for moving forward. But many questions remained. How would a traumatized population react to the provisions of the agreement? Would the agreement further the prospects for long-term peace? What additional steps would be needed to achieve a final resolution in Abyei? To explore these issues, NDI conducted nine focus groups discussions, four in Wau and five in Agok, with Ngok Dinka communities displaced by the May 13 crisis. Ninety-five (95) participants joined in the discussions. The following are the major findings from their contributions.

1. Though random fighting between soldiers and police may have sparked the May 13 Abyei crisis, Ngok Dinka participants believe the conflict was a long-planned event designed to destroy Abyei.

Virtually all Ngok Dinka participants have the same perception of the immediate cause of the conflict that began on May 13, 2008 in Abyei. The fighting, they say, started in Dokura when Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Brigade 31 members shot at police, who then returned fire. They are also convinced that, though Dokura may have been the trigger, the conflict was a deliberate, pre-planned action aimed at establishing control of Abyei through total destruction. Participants cite several signs that they believe foretold events to come. Among these were a substantial increase in the number of Brigade 31 soldiers entering Abyei, declarations by these soldiers that they would leave Abyei in ashes, and an influx of Arab traders into Abyei town (who would later allegedly fight along militias) at the same time as Arab families were leaving the area. According to some, the increase in soldiers was prompted by the arrival of the SPLM-appointed administrator, Edward Lino, in Abyei town.

There are many things to show that this incident was planned - the number of soldiers and traders increased, and new troops entered [A byei town] when the A byei administrator arrived.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

In fact, we knew there was going to be fighting in A byei because there were new army groups entering A byei that claimed to be part of Brigade 31. They said they were on leave and returning now.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

Arab businessmen were taking away their families back to Northern Kordofan. From that, we knew that something was going to happen. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

From the time Edward Lino came in, Brigade 31 began bringing in their soldiers... This showed that there was something going to happen, but we didn’t know when this would happen.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

44 See the Preface of this report for a discussion of why Misseriya communities were not included in this research. For information about Misseriya communities compiled by other researchers, see Pantuliano, S., et. al. Put Out to Pasture, Humanitarian Policy Group, op. cit.
45 NDI cannot independently verify any of these occurrences or observations. They are reported by Ngok Dinka focus group participants.
2. The planners and perpetrators of the Abyei conflict are easily identified, Ngok Dinka participants say. In their view, the responsibility lies with the NCP, SAF, and specifically, SAF's Brigade 31, who acted with the complicity of Misseriya traditional leaders.

According to Ngok Dinka participants, the National Congress Party (NCP) was the mastermind behind the May 13 conflict, while SAF commanders controlled all armed elements, including militias, and Brigade 31 carried out the violence. Participants say the NCP's first offense was a refusal to implement the CPA by removing all Brigade 31 and other SAF troops, with the exception of those in JIUs, from Abyei. Since then, the party has armed both regular troops and militias and has manipulated the Misseriya into believing they can have Abyei's land and oil, participants say. They declare that the NCP's desire to control Abyei's resources "is why they brutalize civilians so that they give up on Abyei." Participants believe that SAF is the primary implementer of the NCP's designs in Abyei. SAF commanders initially insisted on remaining in Abyei following the signing of the CPA and thereafter funded and encouraged Brigade 31 and militia activities. SAF's failure to remove Brigade 31 from Abyei town and prevent it from attacking civilians in the May 13 incident is viewed as one of the key reasons the conflict spread. The main perpetrators of violence during the Abyei crisis were members of Brigade 31, say Ngok Dinka participants. They are blamed for most attacks on civilians, the looting of private property, and the destruction of homes and businesses. Participants say Brigade 31 is composed primarily of Misseriya.

NCP is the cause of this entire crisis in Abyei. They know that there are supposed to be two armies in Abyei, i.e. SPLA and SAF, made up of JIUs. They should take away Brigade 31 and the Misseriya militia. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

They [NCP] are actually the ones who have a hand in the May 13 crisis because they were the ones sending troops to Abyei. They hired guotsum and also Brigade 31 to destroy Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

NCP gave guns and ammunition to the Misseriya and told them that they will be given land and the oil will be theirs. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

These people [SAF forces] are the heart of the crisis because they were supposed to leave immediately after the CPA, but they insisted on staying. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

SAF pays guotsum salaries and encourages their brutality toward civilians. SAF gave reinforcements to guotsum during this incident. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

They [Brigade 31] were the ones who started shooting civilians in town on the 14th of May and burned entire houses as they looted our property. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

In the eyes of Ngok Dinka participants, the CPA removed much of the power of traditional leaders, including among the Misseriya, to resolve disputes in Abyei. However, this does not absolve the Misseriya of blame in the crisis, they say. Ngok Dinka participants believe Misseriya traditional leaders allowed themselves to be manipulated and used by the NCP, and they failed to counsel their men not to attack their neighbors at the bidding of others. Ngok Dinka participants see their own traditional leaders as having tried to make peace with the Misseriya many times, only to be met with

---

46 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka IDP elder in Agok.

47 "Guotsum" is a term referring to armed militia aligned with Brigade 31.
one broken agreement after another. Thus, Ngok leaders are not blamed for the Abyei crisis, but they are viewed as having been powerless to prevent it.

They [Misseriya traditional leaders] are easily cheated and driven by the NCP, but all could have been okay had the leaders said no to any negative influence. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

They [Misseriya traditional leaders] had a hand in the Abyei crisis. They know that we live together. Why did they tell their sons not to involve themselves in the Abyei problem? They know very well that Brigade 31 is full of their sons. They should stop them from backing SAF soldiers. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

Our [Ngok traditional] leaders always love peace to prevail between us and our neighbors, but what do they get in return? Violence, raiding of cattle and loss of human life. They have made more than one agreement with the Misseriya, and none of those agreements have lasted. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

Since the signing of the CPA, they [Ngok traditional leaders] became powerless. Everything was given to SPLM and NCP. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

3. The Abyei crisis could have been prevented, Ngok Dinka participants say, if there had been tighter security in the area, if all troops had been removed from Abyei town and, most importantly, if the CPA’s Abyei protocol had been implemented.

There are a number of actions participants suggest could have prevented, or at least lessened the possibility of, the May 2008 Abyei crisis. Two of the most commonly mentioned are security measures. First, participants point out that there had been many isolated conflicts leading up to May 13. This, combined with the influx of new troops, they say, should have been investigated and security tightened as a result. Second, participants believe that removal of all troops from Abyei town, except members of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) and police, could also have prevented the crisis. A lesser number also say that a stronger JIU and/or a stronger UNMIS would have quelled any violence before it spread so widely. Most participants believe, however, that the prevention of the Abyei crisis would have required something more than just better security arrangements. These participants say the commitment by both parties to the full implementation of the Abyei protocol would have been necessary for the violence to have been avoided.

Having seen the fighting in Warguet and Biemnhom and the entrance of new troops, what could have been done [to prevent the Abyei conflict] was tighten security and call a meeting to investigate the reason why NCP increased troops in Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

The tightening of the security could have been the best [to prevent the Abyei conflict] because when the two hundred army men entered, nothing was done to interrogate their entrance. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

If they would have removed Brigade 31 and SAF soldiers who are not under JIU s [from Abyei town], it would have been good to prevent the crisis. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

If we were having a strong JIU like the JIU in Port Sudan, then it would have been good to prevent the crisis, and Abyei would not have been burned down. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

48 For more on the role of UNMIS in the Abyei crisis, see section 6.
I think if UNMIS were to do their duties according to what they have been told from the Security Council - to defend the civilians and their property and stop both parties from fighting - and then called them for a meeting on that day, then something like May 13 could not have happened.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

The only way this crisis would have been prevented is by both parties implementing the Abyei protocol.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

4. **Ngok Dinka participants say the police and the SPLA are the heroes of the Abyei conflict because of their efforts to help civilians escape. Police are not blamed for their part in the conflict, but some question the SPLA's strategy.**

Many Ngok Dinka participants attribute their survival during the crisis to quick thinking and action by the police and the SPLA. Both forces provided a shield for civilians and helped move the young and infirm. Although the police were part of the initial trigger for the conflict, participants do not blame them for what happened subsequently, saying the police were only defending themselves. Feelings about the SPLA’s overall conduct are more mixed. Participants are deeply grateful for the help the SPLA gave to civilians escaping the fighting, but some question the SPLA’s decisions both before and during the crisis. One point of concern is the SPLA’s deployment south of Abyei town. Some participants argue that the SPLA should have deployed north of town, so that SAF movements could have been monitored and the SPLA could have acted as a buffer between SAF and civilians. This strategic mistake, they say, meant the SPLA was not in a position to help civilians. Opinion is split, however, on whether the SPLA should have engaged in full-scale fighting during the crisis. Some believe strongly that it is the duty of the SPLA to protect its civilians and not stand by while its people are killed. Others credit the SPLA’s restraint, saying it was smart not to take the NCP’s bait and re-ignite an all-out war.

If there were no police in Abyei, you would not be talking to anyone now.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

The SPLA intervened and helped us escape while police fought with guotsum, Brigade 31 and other SAF units to find a way of taking the unable from huts and also to give room to others who were inside the huts.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

The SPLA did one small mistake. They were supposed to go and stay in the northern part of Abyei and not south of the area. That is why they could not help us during crisis because they were far from us.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

The SPLA should know that they are the security point for the people of Abyei. They need to protect the civilians under any situation.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

The SPLA [performed poorly] because it gave orders to their soldiers not to fight, while your people are being killed... while your mothers and fathers are being killed and your homeland burned.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

SPLA has a lot of respect because NCP wanted to create a problem, and if SPLA had responded, then NCP would say it is the SPLA who has not respected peace. So the SPLA is patient, and I think they are within their powers and are playing on the safe side of CPA.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)
5. The humanitarian response of the international community and the UN is widely praised, but Ngok Dinka participants want more emphasis placed on finding a political resolution to the Abyei crisis.

Ngok Dinka participants applaud the work of the international community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the crisis and give them credit for saving many lives. Help of almost every kind—food, water, medicine, shelter and education—is described and appreciated by the participants. Many organizations that participated in the relief effort are mentioned by name with USAID, WFP and UNICEF noted repeatedly. The United States, Britain and Norway are the countries perceived to have provided the most assistance. When asked about the response of the United Nations (UN), participants are equally complimentary. The UN is thanked for being among the first that responded and for providing basic necessities such as shelter and water:

Their [the international community] work is good, and they are helping us in almost everything, politically and humanitarian-wise. Their response is immediate. They gave us drugs during the crisis and without their help, many lives could have been lost due to bad weather. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

The NGOs also helped during the crisis. They received people who ran away from Abyei and gave something like food, water or anything. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

All organizations in Abyei have helped and each was assigned a role to play. They divided the work among themselves...the few we can remember are WFP, UNICEF, USAID, ACAD, Save the Children, MSF, Goal, PACT and many others. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

We have been hearing America [provided relief] and most of the things we received are said to come from the American people. We have heard of Britain [helping]. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

It [the UN response] was good for me because they responded by sending humanitarian assistance for the people. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

Despite their broad approval of the international response to the Abyei crisis, participants are not completely uncritical. The humanitarian response appears above reproach; it is the political response that some participants say falls short. These participants are disappointed that the international community did not use its powers to prevent the crisis or protect those within Abyei. They urge the UN and other international agencies to focus on implementation of the Abyei protocol and to use the leverage they have to force the NCP into compliance. Some echo the words of one participant, who said, “that is the only hope we have now.”

There is no need for the international community to wait for NCP to do what they want to do. They are more powerful than NCP. They should force them to implement the Abyei protocol. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

Their work of humanitarian [relief] is good, but we wish them to do more on political grounds because the need that generates humanitarian assistance is caused by imbalance on political grounds. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

49 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka IDP middle aged woman in Wau.
6. Participants believe UNMIS\textsuperscript{50} was biased in its actions before, and especially during, the May 13 crisis. They see the value in a continued UNMIS presence, but it must be a ‘new’ UNMIS that they feel is demonstrably neutral and empowered to prevent a repeat of May 13.

Ngok Dinka participants feel that UNMIS was unequal in its treatment of the ‘southern’ and ‘northern’ sides in Abyei before the May 13 crisis. They complain that Ngok were passed over by UNMIS for local employment in favor of ‘Arabs,’ that UNMIS blocked SPLA access to Abyei and that UNMIS monitored only the SPLA and not the SAF.\textsuperscript{51} There is also a widespread conviction among participants that UNMIS supports the NCP, in part due to a perception that UNMIS soldiers, and particularly its commanders, are ‘Arabs’ or ‘from Islamic countries.’\textsuperscript{52}

Once the crisis began, many Abyei IDP participants contend UNMIS support turned into material assistance to Brigade 31. They accuse UNMIS of numerous one-sided actions, including the provision of fuel and water to ‘Arab’ fighters and the digging of trenches for Brigade 31 to serve as cover. In addition to the allegations of bias, participants express disappointment and dismay at the failure of UNMIS to protect civilians, something which they assumed was UNMIS’s raison d’être in Abyei. They feel that inaction cost lives and that a quick response could have prevented the violence. Participants also question how UNMIS could have allowed property to be looted and burned in its presence.

\begin{quote}
They [UNMIS] are concentrated on southern Abyei rather than northern Abyei. They denied the SPLA entrance to help civilians and on the northern side they allowed reinforcements, and they gave water to Brigade 31 during the crisis. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
The problem of UNMIS in Abyei comes from their commanders because all commanders came from Arab countries that support NCP. So how do you expect them to work effectively without favoring their friend? The evidence is that UNMIS made a heap of sacks filled with soil for themselves and Brigade 31 for their protection. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
These people [UNMIS] became an army, not peacekeepers as we know them. They helped Brigade 31 during the crisis, which isn’t their duty. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
UNMIS supported Brigade 31 by digging holes as their hiding places. UNMIS also allowed the burning and looting of our properties in their presence and UNMIS gave their tanks to Brigade 31 to use during the fighting. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
If UNMIS are really to protect civilians, why did they allow Abyei to be set on fire by Brigade 31? These are not really UN, they are part of Arabs. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Suppose on the first day, on May 12, if UNMIS would have intervened on the same day, the incident would have been stopped. If they had also removed Brigade 31 from Abyei earlier, it would have helped to prevent the incident. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{50}It appears that when making comments about UNMIS, participants are primarily referring to the military sections.

\textsuperscript{51}Past research in Abyei indicates that some Ngok residents blame the NCP, not UNMIS, for its inability to travel north of Abyei town, although others are unaware of this restriction and blame UNMIS.

\textsuperscript{52}In making reference to ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’ UNMIS commanders, it appears participants are mostly speaking of military observers and not the Zambian contingent of soldiers stationed in Abyei, although one participant did list Zambia as an ‘Islamic’ country.
The strong belief that UNMIS was biased leads many to insist that if it is to maintain its presence in Abyei its military section must be re-constituted. Participants have no faith that the soldiers and commanders who were present on May 13 will act responsibly in the future. Ethnicity is the main concern. Abyei IDP participants are convinced that UNMIS military staff are composed of Arabs and Muslims who have an allegiance to the NCP. Thus, they say a ‘new’ UNMIS must be installed in Abyei with non-Arab commanders and soldiers, preferably those from IGAD or Western countries - otherwise they will feel uncomfortable with a continued UNMIS presence. Some participants say that no UNMIS in Abyei would be better than the UNMIS that existed on May 13. At the same time, however, most participants accept the necessity of some type of UNMIS presence and clearly value its role as buffer between themselves and the NCP and SAF. Participants indicate they would welcome an UNMIS in Abyei that is neutral, monitors all sides and, above all, is fully empowered to protect citizens and prevent a repeat of May 13. There are mixed views about where a ‘new’ UNMIS should be stationed – some participants prefer it be deployed both south and north of the agreed administrative boundaries, some say it should go to the north of Abyei only and others simply want UNMIS to be ‘in the middle’ to control interactions between SAF and SPLA.

Let us hope that the United Nations will listen to our crying and implement this part on UNMIS troops and commanders by changing these Arabs and replacing them with new ones from non-Arab countries. In fact, the UNMIS commanders should come from those countries which helped in signing the CPA like Norway, America, Kenya, and other IGAD countries. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

Unless they change the UNMIS in Abyei and commanders of the old UNMIS if they still continue staying there, then it is good to stay without UNMIS in Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

UNMIS has an international mandate, and we hope they will adjust to doing the right thing. They have seen their mistakes, and I hope they have learned from the Abyei crisis. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

We think UNMIS should be given powers to stop whoever will start anything like May 13, and they should not support one side and leave another side while they come to protect the citizens of Abyei and not Arabs. Otherwise, we have a right to tell them to go from our area. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

They should be deployed in the centre between north and south of administrative boundaries to control SAF and SPLA who come across to south. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

7. The SPLM and Salva Kiir are viewed favorably by most Ngok Dinka participants, although there is lingering disappointment among some about the level of protection offered civilians during the crisis and the failure to implement the Abyei protocol. Participants believe the party has now re-dedicated itself to Abyei, and most maintain their faith in the SPLM to resolve the conflict.

Opinion of the SPLM and Salva Kiir following the Abyei crisis is mostly positive. The party is recognized as having given priority to the Abyei issue from the time of the original peace negotiations, and Salva Kiir is seen as personally committed to finding a resolution. The immediate response to the crisis by the SPLM is also judged as good by Ngok Dinka participants. They commend the party’s efforts to evacuate civilians from Abyei and appreciate its unwavering commitment to peace. The one concern some mention is the SPLM’s track record in seeing agreements through to implementation. Participants want the SPLM to keep a closer watch on the NCP and to do everything possible to hold them to their end of the bargain. Otherwise, they say, there is little point in negotiating and signing agreements.
SPLM did their work well. During the crisis, both the police and SPLA defended the civilians and also sent them vehicles to transport their children and all men and women. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

Salva is a good leader. He speaks for the equality of all Sudanese, and he has been speaking about the Abyei protocol and its implementation. Salva is standing with us in the same track going to the same destination with the people of Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

In my view, SPLM has been with us since the signing of peace in Naivasha. Their effort to settle the Abyei protocol has been trying at moments. Even during this crisis, they are at our back. They have not failed us, though they have some petty problems which they shall overcome. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

The effort of Salva and the SPLM is good. They are committed to the negotiations, but we are afraid because implementation is the biggest test of the agreement. SPLM is a little reluctant on follow-up with NCP to implement the agreement. It would be better for SPLM to negotiate the agreement and work extra hard to implement it because their effort will be nothing without implementation. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

Although opinion of the SPLM is generally good, it is not uniform. Those that have criticisms focus on two themes - the SPLM/A should have done more to protect civilians during the Abyei crisis and the party should have pushed harder to implement the Abyei protocol prior to the crisis. As noted above, there are mixed feelings about how extensively the SPLA should have engaged in the fighting. However, for some participants, the SPLA’s failure to provide protection for civilians during the crisis is tantamount to betrayal by a party they had trusted. Some participants also believe that if the party had pressured the NCP to implement the Abyei protocol, there would have been no crisis. These disappointments are not enough to make most, or perhaps any, abandon the SPLM, but Ngok Dinka participants feel strongly that the party must maintain a high level of dedication to resolving the Abyei problem. This feeling is represented by the comment of one participant, who said "We still support the SPLM as our party, but we ask the SPLM leaders to put the Abyei crisis on top of the agenda because we have suffered a lot, and we do not want to suffer again in the future.”

The SPLM was not responding to Abyei civilians because your people are being killed and you are still calling for peace. What peace? We want SPLM to fight for our rights like what NCP does for Misseriya. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

If the SPLM would have given pressure to the NCP to implement the CPA and Abyei protocol, then something like May 13 could not have happened. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

Since the crisis, participants say they see an SPLM that is reinvigorated on the issue of Abyei. As evidence, they point to talks over the Road Map agreement (see section 10), the decision to move forward with an Abyei Administration and some progress on troop movement. Now, they only ask that the level of intensity be maintained until Abyei is peaceful again.

53 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka younger man in Wau.
54 The focus groups were conducted relatively soon after the announcement of the Road Map agreement, which likely influenced participants’ perceptions about the SPLM’s level of effort on the Abyei issue.
Before the crisis, SPLM was sleeping a lot, doing nothing on Abyei issues for almost three years... It [SPLM] has changed in so many ways, so they now awoke from sleeping.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

Before the crisis, SPLM was doing nothing. We usually heard that the Abyei administration will be formed and nothing happened up to now. So it is good for SPLM to be active in giving pressure to NCP to implement the Abyei protocol.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

I think now he [Salva Kiir] became more serious about the problem of Abyei than before because he wants to act and deal with NCP properly on the Abyei issue.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

I can tell SPLM to keep it up. That is the spirit we want from them to give NCP pressure to implement the Abyei protocol and CPA, so I can say SPLM has totally changed.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

Most Ngok Dinka retain their faith in the SPLM to find a resolution to the problem of Abyei. They believe the party is dedicated to peace and has proven itself as a defender of the people. However, a number qualify their faith by saying that the SPLM will only find a solution for Abyei if it takes a stronger stand in dealing with the NCP or if it focuses on the problem more intently.

SPLM can definitely solve the problem of Abyei and bring peace. It has the credibility to put the effort in and ultimately to deal with NCP to amicably solve the Abyei problem.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

Definitely, we believe that the SPLM can resolve the Abyei problem because it is a party of the people that defends the rights of citizens. We as chiefs gave the issue of Abyei to the SPLM to take full responsibility. As a ruling party in the Government of Southern Sudan and one that also liberated marginalized people, we strongly believe in the SPLM and support them to do so.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

I believe that SPLM can resolve the problem if they become very serious with NCP, engage in talks with them. They can do that.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

I think they [SPLM] will solve it if they take it upon themselves as their own problem and not that of Abyei.  
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

8. **There is heavy criticism of local SPLM leaders’ actions before and during the May 13 crisis, which many say cost lives.**

Participants make a sharp distinction between top SPLM leaders and those that were the party’s representatives in Abyei before and during the crisis. The widespread view of local SPLM leaders is that they were weak, ineffective and lacking in authority, and that these flaws came to the forefront during the crisis itself. The leaders are blamed for failing to recognize the threat of new SAF troops moving into Abyei and for downplaying the conflict once fighting started. Many participants recount a story of an Abyei SPLM security officer calling Juba and reporting that the fighting was isolated and would be over soon. They also identify the officer as the person who prevented SPLA troops from intervening to a greater degree. Most of the anger of participants is directed at the security officer and other local SPLM leaders, but there is also a sense that the top SPLM leaders let them down by choosing such weak leaders. Their hope is that these leaders are dismissed and stronger ones are chosen to replace them.  
[Note that this research took place prior to the naming of new SPLM representatives in Abyei.]
The SPLM officers in Abyei are weak and are not bold enough to act independently on a situation that demands their authority like this Abyei crisis. It got out of hand because of lack of leadership and misinformation between SPLM in Abyei and its headquarters. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

We have no direct point to blame on Salva, but we can blame him for the weak presentation of SPLM leaders who lead us in Abyei. So we need Salva to give us freedom to choose leaders who can lead people of Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

I still stand with SPLM but beg the leadership of SPLM to change the SPLM leaders in Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

9. Ngok Dinka participants say the SPLM and Salva Kiir have their full support in pursuing a resolution to the Abyei issue through negotiations rather than war.

The trauma of the May 13 crisis has not lessened the desire of the vast majority of Ngok Dinka participants for a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the Abyei issue. They believe Salva Kiir and the SPLM are pursuing the right course in negotiating with the NCP and fully support their efforts. Participants say that the SPLM’s commitment to negotiation will demonstrate to the rest of the world that the Abyei people are peacemakers, not warmongers.

The effort of Salva Kiir and the SPLM [on Abyei negotiations] is excellent because they want to resolve the Abyei crisis in a peaceful way and this will show the world that we the people of new Sudan are peacemakers. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

Even after many of us have died, it is good for him [Salva Kiir] to solve our problems through negotiation and to show the rest of the world that we are fighting for our rights, and we are not warmongers. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

We the people of new Sudan are calling for peace in Sudan, not war. That is why we want them to do what they want, and we will still negotiate with them and to show the international community that we are for peace. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

10. The Road Map agreement is viewed as a welcome development, but participants are highly skeptical that it will be implemented.

On June 8, 2008, the SPLM and NCP announced they had reached what they called a “Road Map agreement” to resolve the Abyei crisis. Ngok Dinka participants welcome the agreement and are pleased with its provisions, but many are anxious about its prospects for success. Their intense distrust of the NCP is the reason most question whether implementation will occur. The painful lesson of past agreements, participants say, is that much which is agreed to will never come to be. This reduces confidence that the May 13 violence will not recur. In fact, some participants say they have already heard the NCP has dishonest intentions with respect to certain provisions of the agreement, especially those relating to armed groups. Only the prospect of sustained pressure by the international community and the SPLM gives some hope that the NCP will honor the agreement.

From what I know [about the Road Map agreement] we are going to have our own administration and be free from all brutalities of Brigade 31, which is good. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)
I think this agreement is a waste of time because NCP has dishonored so many agreements, and the Abyei agreement would not be an exception. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

No, I don't believe this agreement will be implemented because the same people who signed the CPA are the ones who signed this agreement again, so there is no guarantee for them to implement it. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

Like other agreements dishonored, this Abyei agreement is not an exception. The NCP doesn't work well without pressure. They are like a donkey which only walks when beaten, so it will be implemented if the international community and SPLM pressure the NCP. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

We cannot tell [if the events of May 13 will be repeated], but from the look of things, the implementation is not like they have written and this shows that the events of 13 May might be repeated. It is not that we are sure, but what NCP is doing right now is the opposite of what they have signed, and the SPLM reaction and the reaction of the people of Abyei might result in other conflict. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

11. The Road Map's security arrangements are widely supported, though some believe the JIU provision has already been violated by the NCP and most say that any new police force must consist only of Ngok Dinka.

The key security provisions of the Road Map agreement – formation of a new JIU, deployment of a police force to Abyei town and the removal of SAF and SPLA from Abyei – are all embraced by participants as measures critical to reestablishing security. Participants are nearly unanimous in their approval of the redeployment of SAF and SPLA troops. The presence of soldiers in Abyei town, many believe, is the reason the violence took so many lives and destroyed so much property. They see deployment of troops north and south of the Abyei administrative boundaries as a way to keep any future conflict isolated from civilians.

This [moving SAF and SPLA troops outside of Abyei] will free us from the brutalities of soldiers, and we will be free to move. That is exactly what we want. We hope and pray that this is implemented. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

That agreement is good because it will make us feel secure if all troops from SAF and SPLA are taken to the north and south of administrative boundaries. And if they want to do any thing, they can do it far away from civilians. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

If they take soldiers to the north and south of the agreed boundaries, I will build my house confidently. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

The formation of a new JIU for Abyei also receives the support of participants, but they want to ensure that “new” really means new. The JIU, they say, must be changed from top to bottom and no commanders from the previous JIU should be allowed to remain. Some believe that the NCP has already reneged on this part of the agreement by not purging all of the old JIU elements, particularly the commanders. Some also say the agreement has been violated because the NCP has not re-deployed the JIU to agreed upon locations.55

55 These focus groups were conducted approximately one to two months after the adoption of the Road Map agreement. Therefore, perceptions of the make-up of the new JIU and deployment locations may have been developed when there was little or rapidly changing information.
It [a new JIU] is good as long as everything is new, including their commanders. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

Taking the old faces and bringing in new faces was a good idea to me but now the NCP has refused to do as agreed and instead maintained their JIUs commanders. This threatens security in Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

This part has already been implemented, but they [NCP] messed up with the location of JIUs. They have not been placed in the area we have said in the agreement. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

The idea of a newly deployed police force in Abyei is appealing to many participants, who credit the police with saving lives during the conflict. This approval, however, comes with one major caveat. Participants are happy for police to be the only armed group in Abyei town, but only if they are chosen from “local people.” It is ethnicity, and not party affiliation, that participants view as the most important criteria for the police. Any NCP or SPLM member is welcome, and the NCP is free to have a role in choosing members of the police force, as long as those chosen are Ngok Dinka. Any non-Ngok in the police force, participants believe, will lead to problems that could re-ignite the conflict.

I think it is a good idea for the police to be in the area alone without any soldiers from SA F, SPLA and Brigade 31. If it was not for the police during the crisis, you would not even get one person to give this information. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

We have no problem in joining police in Abyei as long as police are selected from the people of Abyei. We don’t care whether they are supporters of NCP or SPLM, our main concern is bringing police from other tribes who are not Ngok and doing so can threaten security and peace in Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

Bringing of police that is comprised of only Abyei people is not bad, but the problem comes when they bring non-Ngok. Such people are the ones who come and cause problems that lead to war. Our children from NCP or SPLM cannot do anything that might risk or destroy us. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

12. Ngok Dinka participants are adamantly opposed to a mixed Ngok-Misseriya Abyei Administration and predict conflict if a Misseriya Deputy Administrator is chosen. An SPLM-NCP administration composed only of Ngok is acceptable.

The Road Map agreement details a process for establishing an Abyei administration through the nomination of a Chief Administrator by the SPLM and a Deputy Chief Administrator by the NCP. The only restriction the agreement places on the nominations is that candidates must be residents of Abyei. Ngok Dinka participants in this study have strong objections to the word ‘residents’ because they fear the use of such a broad term will open the door for a Misseriya to become part of the administration. Any Misseriya involvement in the Abyei administration would be patently unfair, they say. Ngok Dinka are not involved in the administration of Misseriya towns, such as Muglad, so why, participants ask, should Misseriya be involved in Abyei’s? The only reason that participants can think of is a malicious one - involvement in the administration of Abyei is a way for Misseriya to claim Abyei’s land. Therefore, the idea of a mixed Ngok-Misseriya administration is absurd to many.

---

56 These focus groups were conducted prior to the appointment of a Chief Administrator and a Deputy Chief Administrator for Abyei. Rahama Abdel Rahman al-Nour, a Misseriya, was appointed to the Deputy position.
As one participant said, “Hyenas cannot be in charge of goats.” This does not exclude the possibility of a joint NCP-SPLM administration. Most participants are very comfortable with the idea of a two-party administration, as long as the top executives are Ngok Dinka. They believe that a Ngok Dinka from the NCP would pose no threat to the community.

Why are they saying both [will be] residents of Abyei? We have Misseriya residents in Abyei and many tribes also, and so do you mean they can be deputy too? We are against that.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

We have never claimed any leadership from Muglad, which is Misseriya headquarters, and I think there is no point for them to claim leadership in Abyei if it is not for the intention of destroying us.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

In my opinion, we cannot accept a person who is not Ngok to participate in the Abyei administration, but we can accept appointment of any Ngok Dinka from NCP to rule in Abyei.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

If they [administrators] would be from Abyei, they can work together for the interest of the citizens of Abyei because they are born in Abyei and belong there. No one can do something bad to his community.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

Participants say the choice of a Misseriya as Deputy Chief Administrator will greatly increase their feelings of insecurity. Many say that conflict is inevitable if a Misseriya is appointed. In their view, the Misseriya Deputy’s only goal will be to gain ownership of their land, possibly through a repeat of the destruction of May 13. Some participants note that they would rather remain without an administration than live under one with Misseriya. Others say they are willing to fight and die to prevent a Misseriya Deputy.

I will feel that Abyei will be insecure [if a Misseriya is appointed Deputy], and there is a likelihood that something like May 13 can happen at anytime. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

We would not like the idea [of a Misseriya Deputy], and that would mean another era of conflict in Abyei because Misseriya were part of the destruction of Abyei and giving them positions in the Abyei administration is an indication of another war. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

We better stay without an administration. We have stayed for three years, so either Ngok people rule themselves or we don’t want that administration. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

If NCP appoints the deputy from Misseriya, then we must die to protect our land.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

13. The agreement on interim boundaries is not well-received by most Ngok Dinka participants, who oppose a ‘give away’ of their land and oil. An international tribunal is an appropriate venue for a boundary settlement, they say, but few believe the NCP will abide by its ruling.

New interim boundaries for the administration of Abyei were agreed to by the SPLM and NCP as part of the Road Map agreement. The interim boundaries made the Abyei area slightly smaller than

---

57 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka elder in Agok.
had been outlined in the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) report\textsuperscript{58} and in particular removed some of the eastern- and western-most territory of the ABC-defined area. To most Ngok Dinka participants, the interim boundaries represent a capitulation they are not ready to accept. Past research\textsuperscript{59} indicated that while Ngok Dinka disagreed with the placement of Abyei's borders as defined by the ABC, they were willing to accept these in the spirit of compromise. Now, participants say they can compromise no more. They suspect that the interim boundaries are an NCP attempt to take Abyei's oil and fear any additional surrender of territory will only encourage the NCP to push for more in the future. The exception to this view is among Ngok Dinka chief participants in Agok. By virtue of their position, they have more access to information and so interpret the interim boundaries agreement differently. The chiefs say the agreement does not represent an abandonment of territory and instead is only a temporary measure to allow for calm in Abyei and for the NCP to withdraw its troops. They fully expect to keep the areas that were removed from the administrative territory of Abyei once a final resolution is reached.

We are not going to accept the new interim boundaries because ABC came up with the boundaries, which is giving us our land and resources. If NCP wants to take it by force, then let them kill us first. Then they will get the land and resources free. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

I think we have given NCP enough land in ABC boundaries report so there is no need to agree with them on these new interim boundaries or else let them kill us all and then take over the land of Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

We totally disagree with whoever came up with this interim map because it cuts away our land and oil, and this explains why NCP accepted to sign the agreement. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

When the [SPLM] committees agreed to accept this part [of Abyei] to be removed, it was because NCP was going to be faithful enough and totally remove their forces from Abyei. Maram and Heglig will still be our geographical areas, and we don't want Maram and Heglig to be given to NCP. It was done to cool down the May 13 incident, and it should not be misunderstood as given away. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

According to the Road Map agreement, an arbitration tribunal selected by the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague will resolve the SPLM-NCP dispute over the Abyei Boundaries Commission report if the two parties cannot agree on borders for the area within a specified timeframe.\textsuperscript{60} Most Ngok Dinka participants approve of this provision. They say an international body is an appropriate venue to decide the issue and are confident that the tribunal will rule in their favor because they believe they have proved Abyei is theirs. That confidence does not extend to the NCP’s actions, however. Participants indicate they have little faith the NCP will abide by the tribunal’s decision, regardless of the weight an international court may have. They say enforcement of the decision, like implementation of the Abyei protocol, is the critical issue.

It will be good if it goes to the international body because they will identify and distinguish between the owners of the land and the bloody grabbers who want to take everything by force.

(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

I am confident that a decision will come out and will be to our benefit.

(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

\textsuperscript{58} Petterson, Donald et. al Abyei Boundaries Commission Report. op.cit.
\textsuperscript{59} See Traci Cook, Lost in the Middle of Peace, pp.28-29, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{60} Since this study was conducted, the case has been referred to the tribunal.
Going to the court is good, but I doubt if NCP will agree with the result in court. Also, since NCP knows that they are guilty, they find a way to dash the rule of law. NCP knows that we have proved that Abyei is our land. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

In reference to the court, NCP will deny the result as usual and nothing will be done to have the decision implemented. Well, what will be done if NCP refuses to implement the final Hague decision? Nothing has been said about this. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

14. The presence of soldiers, especially those from SAF and its Brigade 31, is the biggest threat to the future security of Abyei town, Ngok Dinka participants say. Armed traders, ‘civilian’ soldiers and Arab police are also viewed as a risk.

Most Ngok Dinka participants agree that the biggest threat to the security of Abyei in the future is the presence of soldiers in town. In particular, participants are worried that any Brigade 31 soldiers or other SAF soldiers in the town would immediately destabilize the situation. Some worry that Brigade 31 soldiers already have found a way to remain in Abyei by joining the new JIU or by posing as civilians. Other threats to security, according to participants, are Misseriya or Arab traders who are heavily armed despite their civilian status and the inclusion of any Arabs in the police force.

I think the biggest threat to Abyei security is having SAF and Brigade 31 in Abyei. If they can take away any troops from both sides even UNMIS to north and south of agreed administrative boundaries, then there will be no threat to security in Abyei. (Two Ngok Dinka IDP Older Men, Wau)

There are some Brigade 31 members who have joined JIU s, and they create a tense atmosphere with the new SPLA JIU s by creating problems. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

All troops are removed from Abyei, but SAF and some Brigade 31 soldiers are playing a trick that they are not soldiers and pretend to be civilians by removing their military uniforms. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

Misseriya and Arab traders are another obstacle to be considered because they come as traders but carry weapons in their goods which they later hide in their shops, and this is a big threat to security. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

The presence of Arab police is the biggest threat, if they are going to be included in the deployment of national police in Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man)

15. Troop re-deployment, boundary demarcation and a working administration are the prerequisites for progress in Abyei, participants say, though keeping pressure on the NCP to implement the Abyei protocol will be most important.

Participants’ advice to the SPLM about how to move forward on the Abyei issue consists of three specific suggestions and a general recommendation. Immediate steps that participants see as necessary are demarcation of boundaries, establishment of an Abyei administration and redeployment of troops out of town. While these are important, most participants also say that keeping up the pressure on the NCP to implement the Abyei protocol is the single best way for the SPLM to guarantee that the conflict will be resolved. Part of that pressure, they say, must include strong appeals to the international community to keep the NCP committed to fulfilling its commitments.
If SPLM can demarcate our boundaries with Misseriya then we can take control and establish our autonomous administration with our traditional leaders. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

SPLM should establish an administration which consists of Ngok Dinka patriots and NCP troops should be redeployed northward. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

We want SPLM to be serious in dealing with NCP because NCP signed agreements and refused to implement them. They should use all means to ensure NCP implements the agreements signed. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

SPLM ... can inform the international community that NCP is not willing to implement the Abyei protocol so that the international community can deal with NCP. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

16. Ngok Dinka participants’ strong desire to return to Abyei is driven by an emotional connection to their ‘homeland’ and a fear that Misseriya will settle there. Security and the provision of basic needs are prerequisites for return.

The IDP participants in this study are anxious to return to Abyei. For most, Abyei is their birthplace, and they cannot imagine living anywhere else. Some also fear that staying away from Abyei for very long will encourage Misseriya to take over their property. The Road Map agreement has not prompted an immediate return to Abyei and will not be a major factor in their decision to return, many participants say. Most point to a lack of tangible signs of implementation as the reason the agreement has not yet influenced the timing of their return. The agreement’s success in moving Brigade 31 out of Abyei has swayed a few participants, however, to contemplate returning home soon.

I can go back home as soon as possible. Even now, I am ready to go back. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

If I do not go back now, then Misseriya will come and take my home. I will have nowhere to go. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

Abyei is ours in any condition. It is not this agreement that can make us return, but our love for our land. We cannot talk of agreement now because we did not see any implementation of the agreement. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

I haven’t seen any agreement implemented. Without implementation, it means nothing to me. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

The recent agreement worked. It has made the Brigade 31 leave and that has freed my mind from their brutalities and fear...Now I can return home freely. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

Progress on the two major concerns of participants – security and the meeting of basic needs – will speed the return of Ngok Dinka IDPs to Abyei. If security, in the form of the complete removal of Brigade 31 and any other SAF soldiers from Abyei town, is established, some say they would return immediately. Basic needs and services are more important for others. The destruction of Abyei was complete, they say, and so significant investment will be required to ensure daily survival. Food, water and shelter are all that is necessary for a certain section of the population to return, particularly younger men. Women, and some older participants, believe that reconstruction will have to extend to schools and health centers before Abyei can be attractive to all who want to return.
I will return as soon as they arrange security for us and take away Brigade 31 with SAF soldiers out from the area. Then we will go back. If they do not remove Brigade 31, then we better live here than going back to Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

I will be relaxed in Abyei if I have shelter, food and water because these things are what makes life go around, and it will be very hard to live without shelter or food. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

Right now, we have lost everything and to return is to start a new life in Abyei. The things that are basic for us are essentials, such as health, water, food, education, utensils and shelter. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

The thing that can make us comfortable [to return to Abyei] are shelters, health facilities, water, education, food and assurances of good security. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

17. The Abyei conflict has irreparably damaged the Ngok-Misseriya relationship, according to participants. They desire complete separation of the two tribes.

All Ngok Dinka participants are in agreement that the Abyei conflict has forever changed how they view the Misseriya. The sense of betrayal among the participants is strong. The Ngok graciously allowed Misseriya access to water and grass, they say, only to be met with destruction carried out by the very people they helped. In the minds of many, the violence of May 13 has revealed the ‘true colors’ of the Misseriya and transformed them from neighbor to enemy. This transformation drives an intense desire among the participants for complete separation of the two tribes. The comment of one participant illustrates the divide many now believe exists: “Cats and dogs cannot eat in the same plate.”

The implication is that Misseriya will no longer be tolerated in Abyei. Even when confronted with the fact that some Misseriya have joined the SPLM/A, about half believe their only motive is to spy for the NCP. However, the other half say these Misseriya should be accepted. There is no doubt, however, that Ngok Dinka participants believe the relationship between themselves and the Misseriya is beyond repair.

We will never be the same with the Misseriya. They repaid our kindness with evils. We gave them almost everything, yet they didn’t appreciate our deeds. Instead, they killed our people and burned our houses. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

The recent fighting has shown me who the Misseriya are. We had been in several meetings with their elders and leaders, and we thought that we are neighbors. But now I realize that my perception made me foolish, homeless and lost my people. So now Misseriya are enemies, and living with them or seeing them in Abyei will be a problem because I will not like Misseriya any more. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

It [the Ngok-Misseriya relationship] will never return to normal because we have seen their struggle to bring us down so you cannot sleep in one house with your enemies. It is for one to be shown the door, and that is why we want Misseriya out of Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

They [Misseriya who joined the SPLA] are not SPLM/A members. They are just on a mission of the NCP to find out what the SPLM are doing regarding the election in 2009. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

61 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka older woman in Agok.
People are not the same. Maybe they [the Misseriya who joined SPLM] have realized the bad governance of NCP and decided to join SPLM. In this case, we can not refuse to receive them. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

18. Most Ngok Dinka participants view the Misseriya’s grazing activities in Abyei as something they have allowed as a privilege rather than a right. After a vote to join Warrap state in Southern Sudan, most say the Misseriya will need passports to enter Abyei.

Most Ngok Dinka do not believe that Misseriya have an inalienable right to graze their cattle in Abyei. Instead of a right, many participants view Misseriya grazing in Abyei as something they have allowed based on agreements between the two tribes. Whether or not grazing is defined as a right, the conflict in Abyei causes many to declare that the Misseriya’s time for grazing in Abyei has come to an end. These participants say the Misseriya have proven they are enemies of the Ngok people and only want to graze their cattle by force. This is not a unanimous view, however. A number of Ngok Dinka participants note that they believe in the right of all Sudanese to move freely, including the Misseriya in Abyei. Their one stipulation is that any movement and grazing must be done without arms. Some also indicate their willingness to compromise on grazing rights if that would help achieve peace.

They [Misseriya] don’t have any right to bring their cattle to Abyei. They used to graze their cattle in Abyei and areas around Abyei because of an understanding between us and them, but now that they have not realized our good deeds toward them, the time to build a relationship is over; they have done more harm to us than good. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

I don’t think the Misseriya have the right to graze in Abyei land right now. They have burned houses and looted our properties, so I don’t think there is any right for them to graze in Abyei again. (Ngok Dinka IDP, Younger Woman, Agok)

They have the right to graze with their animals in Abyei and everywhere in Sudan because they are Sudanese, but they cannot come with guns. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

I think we can compromise with Misseriya on grazing rights through negotiations and agreement... that way we will live in peace. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

Ngok Dinka participants believe that a vote by their people to join Warrap state in the Abyei referendum will confine the Misseriya to their own territory and will prevent them from crossing into Abyei except through the usual border processes between two countries. After the referendum, they say, Misseriya will need passports to enter Abyei.

In addition, they believe the issue of grazing rights will no longer be one between Ngok and Misseriya but will be elevated to a diplomatic negotiation between two countries. This appears to provide great comfort that any grazing by the Misseriya in Abyei territory will be refused by the Government of Southern Sudan or, at a minimum, will be tightly controlled. There is little sympathy

---

62 The Abyei protocol of the CPA stipulates that residents of Abyei will vote in a 2011 referendum on whether to join Bahr el Ghazal (Southern Sudan), or retain Abyei's special administrative status in the North. Bahr el Ghazal has since been subdivided into four states: Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes. In 2011, it is understood that Abyei residents will be given the choice to join Warrap state or retain the territory's special administrative status in the North.
among Ngok Dinka participants for what a closing of the border into Abyei may do to the Misseriya. Most feel they no longer deserve consideration because of the destruction they accuse them of having wrought. Some also say that the Misseriya will not be made destitute if their entry to Abyei is blocked. According to this group, the Misseriya have their own land and resources upon which to draw, and it is the duty of the NCP or the Khartoum government to provide for any shortfalls for their people.

They [Misseriya who graze in Abyei] will be affected very much because when we join Bahr el Ghazal, we will be a different country from Misseriya. They will need a passport to enter the South, and without it they cannot be allowed to enter Abyei. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

By that time [when we join Bahr el Ghazal], the coming of Misseriya shall not be between Ngok and Misseriya but would be a diplomatic issue between North and the South. By that time, we will be separated and shall have borders. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

I think we should not be concerned about Misseriya because of what they did to us. We should not even talk about what will affect them. We want them to feel the way we felt last time. (Ngok Dinka Older Man, Wau)

We will be in Bahr el Ghazal and will have no connection to get concerned about their [the Misseriya’s] matters. They have land and forests like we have. Therefore, they should graze their cattle there. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

19. To promote reconciliation, participants say the Misseriya must recognize Ngok land rights, disarm, accept inter-tribal marriage and disassociate themselves from the NCP. There is no agreement on how the Misseriya’s primary concern – grazing rights – should be addressed.

Despite their belief that the relationship with the Misseriya is beyond repair, Ngok Dinka participants were asked to set that aside and envision how reconciliation could be achieved. They argue reconciliation would require the Misseriya to change in four fundamental areas. First, the Misseriya would have to acknowledge the Ngok as the legitimate landowners of Abyei and respect their rights and wishes. Disarmament is also a pre-condition for reconciliation. After the violence of May 13, no one, participants say, will be comfortable with armed Misseriya crossing Ngok land. A third area participants believe would contribute to better relations is greater social interaction between the two groups. In particular, the Misseriya’s acceptance of inter-tribal marriage would signal a respect for the Ngok and would create strong kinship bonds. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Ngok Dinka participants say the Misseriya would have to sever their ties with the NCP for reconciliation to be achieved.

[In order to reconcile with the Ngok] I will tell the Misseriya to respect the Ngok and their rights because the land belongs to them. Disarm all those who have guns, and then they will be allowed to graze freely. They should allow intermarriage to strengthen the relationship. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

They [Misseriya] should not take sides with SAF and carry guns when they come with animals to graze. They should go back peacefully without killing people, and they should avoid NCP in their activities. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

They should allow intermarriages between Ngok and Misseriya so that relationships are bonded and none of other side will attack others for the will of kinship. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)
They should not support NCP activities towards the Abyei people.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

Most Ngok Dinka participants think that the Misseriya’s primary concern in relation to Abyei is grazing rights. Misseriya, they say, worry that they will not have a place to graze their cattle if Ngok are in control and/or if Abyei votes to join the South in 2011. Some participants add that the NCP has also made oil a concern of the Misseriya by tricking them into believing it can be theirs. Setting oil aside, participants have a number of reactions to how Misseriya concerns over grazing could be addressed. Some say it is not the job of the Ngok to be concerned with the Misseriya’s grazing problems. In their view, the Misseriya must solve their own grazing issues in their own territory. Others offer solutions that would permit Misseriya grazing in Abyei, such as allowing them to move freely as long as they are unarmed, or demarcating special grazing areas within the territory. A final group says addressing the Misseriya’s concern over grazing should be the job of the NCP or the central government. Suggestions for the government include digging a canal so that Misseriya have their own water or designating grazing lands north of Abyei.

What Misseriya want from Abyei is grazing land and nothing else.
(Ngok Dinka Younger Woman, Agok)

I think Misseriya are afraid if Abyei joins Southern Sudan, then they will have no right for their animals to graze. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

It [the Misseriya’s main concern] is pasture and also because oil is in Abyei and NCP fooled them by telling them to claim Abyei as their land so that oil can flow northward. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)

We are not concerned about Misseriya. Why are we concerned with their problems while they are not concerned about us and our problems? (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)

They can come with their animals [to Abyei] for grazing without guns.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

The way to address this issue is to demarcate the border with Misseriya, so that they should know their areas of grazing.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

NCP should make a canal that takes water to Misseriya land, so they may have green pastures for their cattle throughout the years.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

20. Oil drives the conflict in Abyei, but the NCP’s association with the Misseriya adds ethnic and political dimensions to the dispute, Ngok Dinka participants say.

Ngok Dinka participants are convinced there is only one reason for conflict in Abyei: oil. The NCP only became interested in Abyei after oil was discovered, they say. Participants offer as proof of this a story about a conversation between President Omar Bashir and the late SPLM leader Dr. John Garang in which Bashir allegedly told Garang he could have the people of Abyei as long the oil remained in the North. Thus, many believe if the Ngok relinquished all rights to the oil, they would be left in peace.

There is nothing which NCP wants apart from oil, which was discovered in Abyei. Otherwise, there is nothing.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Agok)
I think NCP is just after the resources which are in Abyei. The late leader Dr. John told us that Bashir said if you want the people of Abyei, then take them and leave their resources. That was a clear statement. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

It’s the oil. NCP has an idea that if they own Abyei they will not [have to] share with the South because Abyei would be a northern territory. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

While oil is the root cause of the problem, participants also note the NCP’s success in exploiting existing tensions between Ngok and Misseriya. As a result, most view the conflict as two-sided, with both ethnic and political dimensions. Ngok and Misseriya have engaged in low-level conflict over grazing and cattle raiding for decades. Over time, the conflict has grown more political. Participants place the blame for that on the NCP. With oil as their motive, the party has deliberately pushed the Misseriya to claim Abyei as their own, they say. The result is an escalation of ethnic tensions to an uncontrollable level, and the creation of a conflict within which the ethnic and the political are inextricably linked.

Our problem with Misseriya was based on cattle raiding and grazing, but when oil was discovered in Abyei, NCP employed their tricks to increase problems between us and Misseriya so that the Misseriya can have land for grazing and NCP with oil. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

It [the conflict] is the combination of both [political and ethnic] because Misseriya are pushed by NCP to claim Abyei as their land, and this is creating problems between Ngok and Misseriya. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

It [the conflict] is a combination of both [political and ethnic] because before the First World War it was between Misseriya and Ngok, but after some time it became between NCP and SPLM. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

If this problem would have been between Dinka and Misseriya, it would have not reached beyond control like this. So this is a political issue. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

21. Ngok Dinka participants declare that no sacrifice is too great to protect their land and that Abyei’s borders are non-negotiable.\(^63\)

Despite the sacrifices many have already made, Ngok Dinka participants declare they will continue to fight for their land. Participants see Abyei as their birthright, and abandonment of the land of their ancestors would be an indignity they could not bear. No price, including death, is too high to pay to retain their land, they say.

Land is the important thing, and we cannot leave Abyei even though it means death. We can fight to the last man. (Ngok Dinka IDP Elder, Agok)

It’s our land and it’s our pride. Our great grandfathers lived here, and we cannot give it away at whatever cost. God blessed us with resources and that’s why these greedy animals want to destroy us and take our land. But they will never succeed in their destructive plans for land; we will fight until they kill all of us. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Agok)

\(^63\) Participants are defining Abyei’s borders as those prescribed in the ABC report.

- 61 -
Losing Hope

My father died because of this land. Now, how can I run away and leave my father’s legacy and vision? There is no way. They better kill us all and take over the land. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

This unyielding commitment to their land is the main reason most Ngok Dinka participants are opposed to the interim boundaries in the Road Map agreement, as discussed above. Moreover, any peace agreement involving permanent changes to the Abyei borders as defined by the ABC will be strongly rejected. Other compromises can be discussed, participants say, but the final resolution for Abyei must not contain any further surrender of land beyond what has been agreed to in the ABC report.

We will not have any compromise with Arabs to give them any part of our land, or we will all die. What compromise we did, we gave them in ABC report. (Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

We will not allow any part of Abyei to be given to anyone. It is better they take away our land after we have all died, so that our ancestors blame no one. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

We will never allow our land to be taken away from us. Our fathers have fought for it, and we too are ready to die for this land. Oil is different from land, and they need to know that we are ready to die for our land. (Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Man, Wau)

22. When pushed to consider concessions, most Ngok Dinka participants reveal a willingness to share greater oil revenue or to relinquish oil rights altogether in return for peace. However, there is a strong minority who continue to oppose any compromise on either land or oil.

Ngok Dinka participants are loath to consider any additional compromises on Abyei. Most see no reason they should have to re-negotiate the Abyei protocol - a deal signed by both sides - or reconsider the boundaries set by the ABC report, which they view as already involving a sacrifice of their land. When pushed to consider what concessions might be acceptable in exchange for peace, however, a slim majority of participants indicate they would consider sharing or even relinquishing their oil rights. If peace required a choice between giving up part of Abyei’s land or Abyei’s oil, participants make it clear they would choose to give up oil. Their rationale is based on two ideas. The first is that oil is a national, not local, resource, and the second is that oil is a finite resource. The fact that Abyei’s oil is already being shared with all Sudanese, which most view as proper, appears to make sharing more of it or giving it up altogether more palatable. Participants’ opinions are also informed by the simple calculation that oil will run out one day but the land will remain. For this group, SPLM policy will decide their reaction to any change in the wealth-sharing provision of the Abyei protocol. Since the South gets a bigger share of Abyei’s oil than Abyei itself, participants trust the SPLM’s decision-making regarding Abyei’s oil, even if it means they may not reap its benefits. This faith comes with one major condition, however: any compromise on oil cannot include the land under which it lies.

If we can choose one [land or oil] to be given peace forever, then we choose land and give oil out. (Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

It is oil [to be given up] because oil is for all the nation, and we have shared it through percentages already among all Sudanese. (Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)
I think we can give up oil, because oil can get finished but land cannot get finished.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

SPLM should know that Abyei oil belongs to them and they are the one getting more, as the CPA said. So if they agreed [to give up Abyei's oil], then we will have no word. We can just welcome our peace.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Younger Woman, Agok)

Oil can be drained out from the land, but land cannot be taken away. If SPLM agrees to give away oil, then we will not give up our land.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

A significant minority of Ngok Dinka participants disagree that oil is negotiable. Most of them believe that Abyei's land cannot be separated from its resources and see any compromise on oil rights as illogical. The comment of one participant illustrates the feelings of this group: “Why should anyone try to separate what is inseparable?”
Participants with this view are less likely to be influenced by the position of the SPLM on oil negotiations. The people of Abyei were fighting for their land and oil before the SPLM existed, they say, and so it is up to them to decide their fate.

We can fight Arabs until the last minute rather than giving them our land or oil.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Woman, Wau)

I think we are not going to choose either [land or oil] because God gave everyone his rightful place and land and oil go together. So there is no right for us to give one and remain with another.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Woman, Wau)

We cannot choose anything [to give up] because the land was given to us by God and oil is also in our land and not Abyei's land.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

Land belongs to people of Abyei and oil is in this same land therefore SPLM have no voice to give anything, but it is for the people of Abyei to decide.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Middle Aged Man, Wau)

23. All Ngok Dinka participants say they will vote to join Warrap state in the Abyei referendum.

Ngok Dinka participants are unanimous in their desire to be part of the South. They declare without hesitation that their vote in the Abyei referendum will be to join Warrap state. Shared ethnicity is the reason cited by most. The common language, culture and skin color they share with those in Warrap and greater Bahr el Ghazal is a much stronger link, participants say, than the administrative one they have with Southern Kordofan and Khartoum. This shared experience gives participants comfort that their life will be better in Warrap/ Bahr el Ghazal than the North. As one participant noted, “We are equal in all things, and we can live together happily.”

I will join Bahr el Ghazal because we are all Dinka. We speak one language, our culture is one, our color is black, so I better join them rather than joining those who have their own language and culture and different beliefs.
(Ngok Dinka IDP Older Man, Wau)

---

64 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka middle aged man in Wau.
65 Although it was not mentioned as a choice by the moderator, participants in two of the female groups noted they would prefer to join Upper Nile rather than Bahr el Ghazal/ Warrap.
66 Quotation is from a Ngok Dinka younger man in Wau.
We are originated from Bahr el Ghazal, so we will vote to join Bahr el Ghazal immediately. We are Dinka, and we have the same culture. What took us to Kordofan was just administrative and not cultural or traditional, so if the Arabs want it or not, we will vote for Bahr el Ghazal.

(Ngok Dinka IDP Chief, Agok)
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The situation in two of the Three Areas has reached a critical stage. Abyei has experienced a major episode of violence, and there are signs that Southern Kordofan is on the verge of a broadened conflict of its own. While Blue Nile appears more stable, tensions, especially relating to development, remain. Four years under the CPA have done little to resolve the root causes of the conflicts in the Three Areas, and slow or ineffective implementation of its provisions has created a pervasive atmosphere of discontent. It is questionable if the relative peace that exists today can be maintained without further intervention. Opinion is divided on who should be providing this support. Arab participants tend to suggest more central government involvement is needed, while Funj and Nuba participants appeal to the international community or SPLM for assistance. But all agree that permanent peace will only be achievable with greater engagement by outside forces. Elections, even if conducted in a free and fair manner, should not be viewed as a panacea. In the Three Areas, they have as much potential for destabilization as they do for conflict resolution. The findings of this research study among Nuba, Funj and Arab participants point to steps that actors within and outside the Three Areas can take to build a stronger foundation for peace.

SOUTHERN KORDOFAN AND BLUE NILE

Preventing Conflict in Southern Kordofan

Participants in this study offer many warning signs that Southern Kordofan is close to a return to conflict. These include ongoing insecurity, restricted movement, dysfunctional government, and the presence of numerous armed civilians. The underlying problems in the state are diverse and therefore different approaches will be needed to maintain peace.

Recommendations:

- Stem insecurity by:
  - Strengthening Southern Kordofan’s Joint Integrated Unit (JIU), which participants say has been ineffective. Key steps include improving cooperation between its SAF and SPLA units, a more demonstrably neutral approach to security issues and an aggressive stance toward preventing and investigating violence in the state.
  - Disarming civilians. The proliferation of guns in civilian hands causes daily clashes, any of which could touch off a broader war. A comprehensive disarmament campaign that is viewed as fair to both sides will substantially lower the chance of an isolated incident spreading.

- Support reconciliation efforts between Nuba and Arabs—both see the poor state of their relations as a significant threat to peace. Efforts should focus on reaching agreement on fixed grazing routes and ensuring safe and free movement of all citizens throughout the state.

- Improve cooperation within the state government and accelerate civil service integration. Conflict seems inevitable to many because of the lack of cooperation between the NCP and SPLM. To counter this, the parties must demonstrate they can rule together amicably and effectively in an integrated government.
Boosting Development

While there is no single cure-all for the problems in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, increasing the pace of development could come very close. Much of the dissatisfaction registered by participants in this study is rooted in their disappointment with the lack of development in their communities. This is interpreted as a sign that the CPA is not being implemented and calls into question the value of a peace that delivers no tangible benefits.

Recommendations:

• Urgently plan, fund and implement large-scale, high visibility projects that can demonstrate to the population the benefits of the CPA. While immediate infrastructure improvements may not be possible, what is most important is to engender a feeling that development has begun in earnest. Thus, large money transfers from the development fund for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile or from donors should be secured and announced.
  o Development strategies should be shared and planning conducted transparently in order to build public confidence that development is benefiting all citizens.
  o State and local government should increase communication aimed at building citizens’ awareness about their government’s role in development.

Investing in Civic Education

The election scheduled for 2009 will be a turning point for Sudan and even more so for Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. It will be the first election in which many citizens will feel they have the opportunity to choose their state government. That, in addition to a lack of experience with open competition and campaigning, is why elections could also be a flashpoint for conflict in the two states. Some participants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile expect the victory of a governor from their own ethnic group and indicate a reluctance to accept elections as free and fair if they produce a different result. Moreover, a mistaken belief persists among many Nuba in Southern Kordofan and Funj in Blue Nile that they will be granted some type of self-determination referendum, such as those that will be conducted in Southern Sudan and Abyei. Civic education will need to be comprehensive and far-reaching to prevent elections from becoming a conflict trigger.

Recommendations:

• Sensitize citizens as to what is acceptable behavior during elections (speaking freely on issues) and what is unacceptable (physically attacking opponents, bribery, fraud).

• Initiate a broad civic education program to build confidence in the process of elections and manage expectations as to their results.
  o If census results are available and helpful to explaining how demographics may impact voting patterns, these should be widely shared with the public.

• Provide citizens in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan with more information about the CPA’s provision for “popular consultation.” It is critical that relevant government bodies clarify what the process of popular consultation will entail, and that the parties begin to speak to citizens about the process. The support of NGOs will likely be necessary in disseminating information about popular consultation.
ABYEI

Supporting the Road Map Agreement

Faith in the ability of the NCP and SPLM to implement agreements they sign was one of the casualties of the Abyei conflict. Citizens saw the May 13 fighting as a direct result of the parties’ failure to implement the Abyei protocol. The parties must not only be committed to achieving the provisions outlined in the Road Map, they must also make every effort to convince a skeptical public that the agreement is working. Promoting Road Map achievements will also likely increase the return of displaced civilians to Abyei, since skepticism about implementation contributes to fear among Ngok Dinka that security can be maintained.

Recommendation:

• Announce, demonstrate, and discuss publicly progress in implementing the Road Map agreement.

Securing Abyei

The May 13 conflict proved that the security arrangements in Abyei were insufficient to prevent violence from spreading quickly and harming civilians. Going forward, the key principle that Ngok Dinka participants want the government, the parties and the international community to honor is the complete separation of civilians and soldiers. The Road Map agreement did much to address that by moving SAF and SPLA troops to the north and south of the administrative boundaries. After the trauma of the conflict, however, civilians will need reassurance that Abyei can be made safe again. That will require not only the removal of troops from town, but also the positioning of buffers that instill confidence those soldiers will not return. The police are one such buffer. Many Ngok Dinka credit their survival during the May 13 conflict to the police, and thus are predisposed to see them as legitimate protectors of the community. UNMIS is another buffer. While its reputation as a neutral player was damaged during the conflict, many Ngok Dinka still feel that an UNMIS presence is critical to security in Abyei.

Recommendations:

• Help train and equip Abyei police to safeguard civilians.
• Rehabilitate the reputation of UNMIS as a neutral player in Abyei, including by:
  o Opening new lines of communication between UNMIS military units and the Ngok Dinka community.
  o Explaining to the community UNMIS’s mandate and the limitations of that mandate, including with regard to protecting civilians.
  o Outlining in detail to Ngok leaders what steps UNMIS is taking to avoid a repeat of May 13.

67 As noted in the body of this report, accusations of bias are aimed primarily at the military sections of UNMIS.
Defining Misseriya Grazing Rights

Grazing rights, most participants agree, are not the primary cause of the Abyei conflict. However, clashes between Misseriya nomads and the SPLA in early 2008 contributed greatly to an atmosphere of increased tensions that presaged the May 13 events. Ngok Dinka say that the clashes will be repeated again in 2009 and each year thereafter unless an agreement on grazing rights is reached.

Recommendations:

- All parties should support efforts to produce a grazing rights agreement in Abyei. The agreement must:
  - Delineate grazing routes and areas.
  - Set timeframes for movement.
  - Address disarmament of Misseriya during their passage through areas in which Ngok Dinka are resident.
  - Establish dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms.

Exploring a Wealth-Sharing Compromise

This study identifies a possible avenue of compromise in Abyei. Some in the Ngok Dinka community indicate an openness to further negotiation on sharing oil revenue with the North and/or Misseriya if this can bring peace. An acceptable compromise for this group would involve a final agreement on Abyei’s boundaries as prescribed in the ABC report, in exchange for sharing greater revenues from the oil produced within Abyei or even forgoing all oil revenue. This is not an easy choice even for those willing to consider it, however, and getting support from the general Ngok population for further compromises will be difficult.

Recommendations:

- Support further study and discussion of opinions among both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya about possible wealth-sharing compromises. This could include focus group research, as well as inter- and intra-community workshops and conferences.

- The SPLM and NCP should take the lead in consulting with and educating the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya populations about potential compromises. This is particularly important because the political parties are viewed by their supporters as trusted sources of information and guidance.
### Appendix A: Focus Group Participant Demographics

#### THREE AREAS FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>GROUP SIZE</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/01/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kadugli</td>
<td>Nuba 70</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/04/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kauda-Kumbur</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Mixed 71</td>
<td>Middle 72</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/05/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kurchi</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Latmor</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/07/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kauda</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Mixed 73</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/08/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Al Hamra Hawazma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/08/08</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Al Hamra Hawazma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>Primary - Secondary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/08/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kadugli town</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Younger 74</td>
<td>Primary - Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/09/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kadugli Hawazma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Younger 75</td>
<td>Primary - Secondary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

68 Names of ethnic groups and/or tribes are listed as recorded by the Sudanese moderators, but the spellings may be incorrect or alternate spellings may exist.
69 Younger refers to participants up to age 25; middle refers to participants age 26-40; older refers to participants more than 40 years old.
70 Nuba is an umbrella ethnic designation for a group of tribes e.g. Damba, Korongo.
71 Four participants are Muslim and eight are Christian.
72 Six participants are younger at age 20, 22, 22, 23, 25.
73 Six participants are Muslim, five are Christian and one traditional believer.
74 Ten participants are older at age 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 38, 39, 40, 40, 45.
75 One participant is older at age 27.
**Losing Hope**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>GROUP SIZE</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/10/08</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Abu Safifa</td>
<td>Hawsma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/11/08</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kauda</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/11/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Dilling town</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/11/08</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Al Bajaa</td>
<td>Hawsma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/12/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Kaudugli</td>
<td>Hawsma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Secondary-University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/12/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Dilling</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/12/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Al Bajaa</td>
<td>Hawsma</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/12/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Heban</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/17/08</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Keliak</td>
<td>Missirya</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/17/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Julud</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/18/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Julud</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/18/08</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Keliak</td>
<td>Missirya</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

76 One participant is younger at age 39.
77 Seven participants are Muslim and six Christian.
78 Nine participants are older at age 26, 27, 28, 29, 29, 29, 30, 31
79 Two participants are older at age 41 and 45 and one younger participant at age 25
80 Seven participants are Christian and five are Muslim.
81 Six participants are at secondary level, four at university level and two at primary level.
82 Missirya is a pastoralist community-nomads in nature and comprises of various tribes.
83 One participant is older at age 26.
84 All participants are older at age 26, 27, 29, 29, 30, 35, 37, 38, 40, 40.
85 Two participants are younger at age 37 and 38.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>GROUP SIZE</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/18/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Koalib</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Lagawa</td>
<td>Misseriya</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary-University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Lagawa</td>
<td>Misseriya</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary-secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/23/08</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Lagawa</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/24/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>Lagawa</td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/7/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Krumuk</td>
<td>Funj-Dawala</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/7/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Krumuk</td>
<td>Uduk</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/9/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Chali</td>
<td>Uduk</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/12/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Khor Bodi</td>
<td>Dawala</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/15/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Damazin</td>
<td>Funj-Uduk</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/15/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Damazin</td>
<td>Funj-Dawala</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/16/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Rosaries</td>
<td>Dawala</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary-Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/16/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Rosaries</td>
<td>Dawala</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Geissan</td>
<td>Dawala</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

86 Eight participants are Christian and three are Muslim.
87 Eight participants are younger at age 30, 31, 32, 35, 35, 39, 40.
88 One participant is older at age 46.
89 Detailed data on the make-up of participants in this group was lost.
90 Seven participants are younger at age 22, 26, 30, 31, 37, 37, 40.
91 Seven participants are younger at age 19, 20, 21, 22, 25.
92 Eight participants are Christian and seven participants are Muslim.
93 Two participants are younger at age 30 and 39.
94 Fourteen participants are older at age 26, 26, 26, 27, 28, 28, 30, 30, 38, 39, 40.
95 Nine participants are younger at age 29, 30, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.
96 Seven participants are Muslim and eight are Christian.
97 Eleven participants are Muslim and four are Christian.
98 Nine participants are younger at age 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.
99 Two participants are older at age 27 and 28.
100 Two participants are older at age 37 and 41.

---
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>GROUP SIZE</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/20/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Geissan Dawala</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/21/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Deren town</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Pri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/24/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Dongdo Funj</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary-Second</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/16/08</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Wademaial Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/17/08</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Rosaries Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary-Second</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/18/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Dassa Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Pri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/19/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Dissa Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/19/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Dissa Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/20/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Damazin Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary-Second</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/21/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Damazin Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>None-early</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/24/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Kormuk Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/25/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Dindoro Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/26/08</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Dindoro Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/27/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Deren Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/27/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Deren Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>None-Pri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/30/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Geissan Arab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/30/08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>Geissan town</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101 Nine participants are younger at age 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 33, 36, 37.
102 Five participants are younger at age 30, 30, 36, 38, 38.
103 Two participants with no educational background.
104 Four participants are older at age 26, 26, 29, 35.
105 Three participants are younger at age 35, 37, 37.
106 Four participants are at primary level, three are at secondary level and four with no education.
107 Three participants are younger at age 20, 20, 25.
108 Seven participants are younger at age 17, 18, 23, 22, 27, 32, 37.
109 Four participants are younger at age 20, 21, 22, 23.
110 Detailed data on the make-up of participants in this group was lost.
111 Three participants are at secondary level, three with no education, and four are teachers.
112 Three participants are at primary level, eight at secondary level and one on intermediate level.
113 Two participants are younger at age 25, 25.
114 Five participants are at primary level, two at secondary level and one at intermediate level.
115 Nine participants are younger at age 30, 31, 32, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40.
116 Five participants are at primary level, two at secondary level, four at intermediate level and one with a diploma.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>GROUP SIZE</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07/08/08</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Western BEG</td>
<td>Wau town</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary - Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/09/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Western BEG</td>
<td>Wau town</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/11/08</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Western BEG</td>
<td>Wau town</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Secondary - University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/12/08</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Western BEG</td>
<td>Wau town</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>Primary - Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/06/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Agok</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Secondary - University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/07/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Agok</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Secondary - University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/05/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Agok</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>Secondary - University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/06/08</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Agok</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>Secondary - University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/04/08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Agok</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>Dinka Ngok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Primary - Secondary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

117 Five participants are older at age 45, 45, 50, 50, 55.
118 One participant is a traditionalist.
119 One participant is younger at age 39.
APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY NOTES

Focus Group Research: Focus groups are open-ended group interviews directed by a moderator and following a pre-set guideline. The purpose of focus group research is to understand the attitudes, opinions and experiences of participants who are recruited for the exercise. Focus groups are particularly useful in gaining a deeper appreciation for the motivations, feelings and values behind participants’ reactions. In addition, the group format enables respondents to participate in an exchange of ideas – thus revealing a more in-depth understanding of why opinions are held – that may not emerge in individual in-depth interviews or quantitative surveys.

Focus group discussions are comprised of a small number of participants, typically 8-10 per group. However, depending on the situation, groups may be slightly smaller or larger than the ideal. In the Three Areas context, a chiefs’ or sheikhs’ group, for example, may work better with a smaller number because they are generally well-informed and have strongly-held opinions. A women’s group in a more isolated area may benefit from being larger because it is likely that one or more of the participants will refuse to speak at length, even if pressed.

Focus groups are recruited to be homogeneous – so, for example, men’s and women’s groups are conducted separately - to enhance the comfort level of the participants and to clarify the views of a particular sub-group. The number of groups conducted varies widely based on the goals of the research, but the total number of participants is always relatively small and cannot be considered statistically representative of the larger population. It is important to always be aware that focus groups are a qualitative, and not a quantitative, research tool.

Group Composition: The focus groups in this report are stratified by gender, ethnicity, age and education. Single ethnicity groups were conducted among Ngok Dinka, Arabs, and Nuba. In Blue Nile, Funj groups may have included more than one ethnicity, such as Maban and Uduk, but they did not include Arab participants. The Arab groups were composed of participants who identified themselves as Arab, though ethnic identity is particularly complex in Blue Nile. (See the explanation of ethnic designations below and in the Preface.)

Age: Based on past research in Sudan, the age categories used are broadly defined as “younger,” “middle” or “older.” Younger refers to participants up to age 25, middle refers to participants age 26-40 and older refers to participants over age 40. Given the difficulty of gathering participants in largely rural areas and since some people in the Three Areas do not know their ages, the categories are used as a general guideline rather than a strictly enforced criteria.

Religion: The majority of focus groups were conducted among Muslims because that is the dominant religion in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. The Ngok Dinka groups were predominantly Christian. A few mixed Muslim-Christian groups were held in areas where it is common for people of the same ethnicity but different religions to live together. Four mixed religion groups were held among Nuba and two among Funj.

Education: Participants sampled in the groups had widely varying degrees of education, ranging from none through university. As much as possible, the groups were stratified to include participants with relatively similar educational backgrounds. We did not attempt to
stratify by education when we were recruiting special groups, such as chiefs or sheikhs, since in that case the category of participant was the more important criterion.

Leadership Roles: Groups are conducted separately with area leaders and ordinary citizens to prevent undue influence. In addition, traditional authorities and government officials are not allowed to sit in on discussions with ordinary citizens, even as observers. On the rare occasion when an area leader demands to be part of a group in which they were not meant to participate, that data is either excluded from the analysis or compared to the data from other groups with ordinary citizens to see if it is at variance.

Ethnic Locations and Designations: All groups with Nuba were conducted in Southern Kordofan, and groups with Funj were conducted in Blue Nile. Arab groups in Southern Kordofan consisted of participants from two Arab ethnic groups, Hawazma and Misseriya. Groups designated as Arab in Blue Nile were composed of participants who identified themselves as Arab. Ethnic identity is particularly complicated in Blue Nile due to migration and inter-ethnic integration and marriage, and this may have resulted in some non-ethnic Arabs participating in what NDI denotes as “Arab” groups for the purposes of this report. (For more information on ethnic designations and their limitations, see the Preface.)

Logistics: The logistical challenges of conducting research in the Three Areas are immense. Travel outside of the major towns is difficult and sometimes impossible due to poor road networks and insecurity. Pre-planning for the groups requires labor-intensive coordination to organize transport and accommodation in each location. These difficulties occasionally impact the number and type of groups that can be conducted.

Staffing: It is a challenge to find moderators in the Three Areas who are fluent in English because of poor or non-existent education facilities and the dominance of Arabic in certain locations. As a result, some of the women’s groups were conducted by male moderators, but the data for those groups did not differ from the ones in which female moderators conducted the groups.

Group Locations: The 62 focus groups outlined in this report were conducted in 26 locations throughout Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, Abyei and Western Bahr el Ghazal (the latter for Abyei IDPs). (See Appendix A for a list of focus group locations.)

Facilities: In more rural areas, there are few structures appropriate for focus group research. As a result, groups were sometimes conducted in open-air settings, although this reduces the privacy of the group.

Remote Areas: Groups were primarily conducted in locations that are accessible by vehicle. There were several attempts to penetrate deeper into rural areas, but due to poor road networks, some remote peoples were not reached.

Outside Influence: In some cases, local authorities are informed of the research activities before they begin. However, every effort is made to ensure there is no undue influence exerted on the participants in the groups. The focus group guideline is not shared with local authorities prior to the group, unless disclosure is required to proceed with the research, and in the majority of instances, the participants are gathered in some random fashion. In this study, there was no case in which the findings from one or more groups differed radically from findings in the groups overall, which suggests that any local influence that may have occurred did not impact the research.
APPENDIX C: MODERATOR’S GUIDELINE

Three Areas Focus Groups - Southern Kordofan-Nuba

I. INTRODUCTION

Hello, my name is ____________, and I am trying to learn more about what citizens of Southern Kordofan State think about the important issues in this area. I am neutral and do not represent any political party or government office. I work for a non-governmental organization (NGO), and I am just here to collect information so that others can understand your situation here better. I am the facilitator for today’s discussion.

I want everyone to know that:

- There are no right or wrong answers.
- Everyone’s opinion is equally important. We want everyone to speak.
- If you disagree with someone, that is okay.
- This discussion is only between those of us here.
- I have this recorder to help me when I write the report. Your name will not be used in the report. The report will only say a [woman/man] from [location] said this or that.
- The person here is taking notes to help with the report.
- Please speak loudly so the recorder can pick up your voice.

Thank you. Any questions before we begin? Now let us begin.

II. IDENTITY

1. If you could use only three words to identify who you are, what besides your name would those words be?

2. I am going to give you a list of words in no particular order, and I want you to pick the three, in order of importance, that you would use to describe yourself.

   - African
   - Sudanese
   - Muslim
   - Northern Sudanese
   - Nuba
   - Christian
   - Name of Your Specific Tribe
   - Southern Sudanese
   - SPLM
   - NCP
   - Other Political Party


---

120A slightly different version of the guideline was used in the Arab groups in Southern Kordofan.
III. STATE DIRECTION

1. How are things going in Southern Kordofan these days? Are they going in the right direction or wrong direction?

2. It has been over three years since the CPA was signed. Since that time how has the situation in Southern Kordofan changed?

3. Now let’s think back to last year, 2007, at this time. Have things in Southern Kordofan gotten better, worse or stayed the same since that time? What is the reason for your answer? [IF THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN ANSWERED IN THE PREVIOUS ONE, SKIP IT]

4. Looking to the future, will things in Nuba Mountains in 2009 be better OR worse? List the reasons you think this.

IV. COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

1. What does the CPA say specifically about Southern Kordofan?
   a. Do you like OR dislike what the CPA says about Southern Kordofan?

2. Is the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) going well OR not going well? What is the reason for your answer?

3. I am going to read you three statements. Please tell me which one best reflects how you feel about the CPA. [REPEAT THE STATEMENTS SEVERAL TIMES AND SAY THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE VOTING FOR EACH STATEMENT OUT LOUD]

   - The CPA is a good agreement that will lead to a lasting peace in Southern Kordofan.
   - The CPA is a bad agreement that will eventually fall apart and lead back to conflict in Southern Kordofan.
   - The CPA is an agreement that has both good and bad parts but is our best chance to maintain the peace in Southern Kordofan.

   [FOR EACH STATEMENT VOTED FOR ASK] What is the reason for your vote?

   [FOR THOSE THAT CHOOSE THE ‘BAD AGREEMENT’ STATEMENT ASK] What are the parts that you think are bad?

V. DEVELOPMENT

1. What are the top three problems facing this area?

2. Name any signs of development you have seen since the signing of the CPA.
   a. How much improvement has there been in development in this area since the signing of the CPA – A Lot, Some, A Little, None at All? What is the reason for your answer?

   [IF ‘A Little’ OR ‘None at All’ ASK] Why do you think this has not happened?
3. Who is responsible for these improvements in development?
   
   a. Specifically, which one of the following would you give the most credit for these improvements? Also, tell me the reason for your answer

   - National Government
   - State Government
   - Local Government
   - NCP
   - SPLM
   - Another Political Group
   - International Organizations

4. How has development here [this area] compared to development in other parts of Southern Kordofan state since the signing of the CPA? Please provide examples.

VI. CONFLICT & PEACE

1. When the conflict started in Southern Kordofan in the mid-1980s, what were the main reasons for this conflict?

   a. Let’s narrow it down to three main causes. What were the top three causes of the conflict?

2. Taking these causes one-by-one, tell me how much improvement you have seen in resolving these issues since the signing of the CPA.

   a. __________ [ISSUE ONE] Has this improved -
      A Lot, Some, A Little or None at All? Why do you say that?

   b. __________ [ISSUE TWO] Has this improved -
      A Lot, Some, A Little or None at All? Why do you say that?

   c. __________ [ISSUE THREE] Has this improved -
      A Lot, Some, A Little or None at All? Why do you say that?

3. Is there conflict in Southern Kordofan today? [IF YES] Please describe the conflict(s) and tell me the cause (for each). [IF NO, SKIP TO QUESTION #4]

   a. Is this conflict that can be settled by local authorities OR not? [IF NO] Why not?

4. Do you think peace will last in Southern Kordofan? Why or why not?

5. Please place a mark on this graph that indicates how close or far away you feel Southern Kordofan is to achieving a permanent peace. After placing your mark, explain why you made the mark you did. [SHOW GRAPH AND PROVIDE MARKERS]
VII. RELATIONS WITH NOMADIC & OTHER ETHNIC POPULATIONS

1. There are several different ethnic groups in Southern Kordofan. With which of these groups do the Nuba have the best relationship and which the worst? Why did you name these groups? [IF ANSWER IS A GENERIC ‘ARABS’, PROBE PARTICIPANTS TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHICH ‘ARABS’ THEY MEAN]

2. Now let’s speak of the nomads that cross Nuba areas for grazing. Which of these groups do the Nuba have the best relationship and which the worst? Why did you name these groups?

3. Are the relationships with the groups whom the Nuba have the worst relations with a threat to long-term peace in Southern Kordofan? Why or why not?
   a. How can the problems with these groups be solved?

4. [ASK THIS ONLY IN NORTH NUBA AND WESTERN KORDOFAN] How is the relationship between the Maalyia and the Nuba?
   a. What are the problems and how can these be solved?

5. [IF NOT ALREADY COVERED] How is the relationship between the Dinka and the Nuba?
   a. What are the problems and how can these be solved?

VIII. ABYEI & DARFUR

1. Do the problems in Darfur have any impact on Southern Kordofan? What is the reason for your answer?

2. Now let’s talk about Abyei. Tell me what you think of the problems Abyei is experiencing.
   a. Will the problems in Abyei affect peace in Southern Kordofan OR will it only affect Abyei?
   b. What is your prediction for what will happen in Abyei?

IX. SPLM, NCP, OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS & LEADERS

1. Name all the political groups that operate in Southern Kordofan.
   a. [IF THEY ONLY SAY NCP OR SPLM] Are there political groups who are not related to SPLM or NCP? [IF YES] Tell me about those - who are they; who supports them?
   b. Is there any political group that is just made of Nuba? [IF YES] Tell me about them. Do a lot of people support them? Why or why not?

2. Are political parties talking about how they are different and better than other parties? [IF YES] Tell me what they say. Do they ever speak about specific issue or policies?

3. What is your opinion of the SPLM?
4. How would you rate the efforts of Salva Kiir and the SPLM on behalf of the Nuba people – excellent, good, fair or poor? What is the reason for your rating?

5. What is your opinion of the NCP?

6. Who do you think has more support in the Nuba area – the SPLM or the NCP?

7. What about in the whole state of Southern Kordofan – which party has more support, the SPLM or the NCP?

8. I am going to read you a list of Nuba political leaders. I want you to say the first word that comes to your mind that describes what type of leader they are. Please do not just say their title or job. I am looking for something that describes them as a leader. [ASK EACH PERSON ONE AT A TIME]

   ° Telefon Kuku
   ° Neroun Philip
   ° Daniel Kodi
   ° Abdel Aziz
   ° Maki Ali Bliel
   ° Mohammed Markuzo

   Why did you use that word?

9. Daniel Kodi was sworn in as Deputy Governor of Southern Kordofan in September 2007. What do you think of this?

   a. Do you think that he will be able to bring more help and development to the Nuba people in his new position? [IF YES] What are your expectations?

10. Abdel Aziz returned to Sudan in January of this year and is now residing in Juba. What do you think of this?

    a. What would you like for him to do now that he is back in Sudan?

X. STATE GOVERNMENT

1. According to the CPA, the NCP is supposed to have 55% of the positions in the Southern Kordofan government and the SPLM 45%. How has this mixed government worked thus far?

   a. What are the problems in the state government and how can they be solved?

2. Rate the job that Ismail Khamis Jalab did during his time as Governor – excellent, good, fair or poor? What is the reason for your rating?

   a. [IF ANSWER IS ‘Fair’ OR ‘Poor’ AND NOT ALREADY ANSWERED] Were the problems when the SPLM held the Governor’s office the result of NCP tactics to block the SPLM OR the fault of the Ismail Khamis OR both? What is the reason for your answer?

3. What is your opinion of the new Governor, Omer Suleiman Adam, who is representing the NCP?
a. Do you think he is treating the Nuba people fairly OR not? [IF NO] Why?

XI. ARMIES & ARMED GROUPS

1. Tell me about the security situation in Southern Kordofan.

2. Name for me all the armed groups [militia] in the state.
   a. What are these groups trying to achieve?
   b. Are they a threat to lasting peace in Southern Kordofan? [IF YES] How?

3. What is your opinion of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Southern Kordofan?
   a. What is role of the SPLA, if any, in Southern Kordofan?

4. What is your opinion of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) that are comprised of soldiers from both the SPLA and the SAF?
   a. Are they doing a good job OR not a good job in Southern Kordofan? What is the reason for your answer?

XII. 2009 ELECTIONS

1. In 2009, the whole of Southern Kordofan will vote for a governor and for people to represent them in the state legislature [state parliament]. Is this a good thing OR not a good thing?

2. Do you think if the elections are free and fair and the Nuba people get to vote for whomever they wish, this will resolve the problems that caused the conflict in Southern Kordofan?

3. Let’s say the election is free and fair and the Nuba vote for who they want, but an ‘Arab’ receives the most votes and wins the position of governor? Will you accept this result OR not? [IF NO] Why not?
   a. [IF NOT ALREADY ANSWERED] Let’s say the Arabs have the most people living in Southern Kordofan state and those people vote for an Arab governor. Would you accept an Arab as governor in Southern Kordofan as the winner in the election if more Arabs live in Southern Kordofan than Nuba and fairly voted for their choice?

4. For the 2009 elections, how will choose who you will vote in most of the elections –will your vote be based on who the person is OR what the person’s tribe is OR which party the person represents?

5. If the 2009 elections were held today, for which political party would you vote for the office of President of Sudan?

6. Of the following people, which would you prefer be the SPLM candidate in 2009 for the office of President of all of Sudan:
LOSING HOPE

- Salva Kiir
- Yassir Arman
- Malik Agar
- Abdel Aziz

What is the reason for your answer?

7. Now, not talking about the person you favor for president, but instead thinking about who among the SPLM candidates has the best chance to win the election for president of Sudan. Please remember that anyone who wins the president’s office will have to get votes from many different groups throughout Sudan. Of these SPLM people – Salva Kiir, Yassir Arman, Malik Agar and Abdel Aziz – which has the best chance to win the election for president in all of Sudan?

8. Among possible other candidates, who do you like the best in the presidential election of the following:

- Omar Bashir
- Ali Osman Mohammed Taha
- Saddiq Al Madhi
- Hassan al-Turabi
- Ali Mohammed Al-Murghani
- Mustafa Ismael

XIII. REFERENDUM

1. Do you want Sudan to remain united as one country OR do you think it would be better for the country to separate into different regions? What is the reason for your answer?

2. The CPA says that southerners will vote in a referendum where they will choose whether or not to stay united with the North. Which of the following is what the CPA says about the Nuba Mountains area? Please note that your answer should be based on what you believe the CPA says, not what you wish or hope to happen.

   i. The people of Nuba Mountains will vote in the same referendum as southerners and will choose along with southerners whether to stay with the North or to separate.
   
   ii. The people of Nuba Mountains will vote in a separate referendum from that of southerners where they will choose whether to stay with the North, go with the South or become independent of both North and South.
   
   iii. The people of Nuba Mountains will not be voting in a referendum and will become part of the North if the South votes for separation.

   a. [ASK ONLY OF THOSE WHO CHOOSE i OR ii] What will happen if there is not a vote that allows the people of Nuba Mountains to choose whether to go with North, go with the South or be independent?

3. [IF THERE IS DISCUSSION OF CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT NUBA] Are you talking of being a separate country OR do you only mean that Nuba Mountains would govern its own affairs but still remain part of Sudan?
4. Currently, there is no provision in the CPA that allows the Nuba Mountains to vote on whether they want to go to the South, remain in the North or be independent. What would it mean for the Nuba Mountains if the South votes to separate from the North and create its own country?

   a. What would be your greatest fear if this happens?

   b. How do you think the Nuba people would respond if this happens?

5. Have you heard of the term ‘popular consultation’? [IF YES:] What does it mean and how does it apply to Southern Kordofan? [IF NO GO TO QUESTION #6]

6. Popular consultation is a process that will begin after the 2009 elections. Representatives elected to the state legislature [state parliament] will either accept the CPA as it is OR enter into negotiations with the national government to change the way the CPA is implemented in Southern Kordofan. Once the CPA is accepted by the legislature, it becomes the final solution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan. What do you think of this?

   a. What will you tell your elected representatives you want to do about the CPA?

7. Have you heard any political groups speak about popular consultation? [IF YES] What have they said?

XIV. LAND ISSUES

1. Do you think there will be any problems in demarcating the border between the North and South, particularly between Southern Kordofan and all the states to the south?

XV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1. What are the countries that give development aid and assistance to Southern Kordofan state?

2. What are the areas [sectors] in which ______________________ [NAME OF COUNTRIES, TAKEN ONE AT A TIME, MENTIONED IN QUESTION #1] gives development aid and assistance to Southern Kordofan?

   a. Of the following, tell me the areas in which ____________________ [NAME OF COUNTRIES] has given development assistance to Southern Kordofan:

      ☑ Health
      ☑ Agriculture
      ☑ Education/Schools
      ☑ Democracy & Governance
      ☑ Roads
      ☑ Food Aid
      ☑ Other Areas?

3. What is your opinion of the development assistance ____________________ [NAME OF COUNTRIES] has given to Blue Nile state thus far? [PROBE FOR FAVORABILITY (GOOD/NOT GOOD) AND EFFECTIVENESS (HELPED/NOT HELPED)]
4. What are the countries that have given development assistance to other parts of Sudan but not this state? What is your opinion of that assistance [ASK FOR EACH COUNTRY]?
Three Areas Focus Groups - Blue Nile-Arab

I. INTRODUCTION

Hello, my name is ____________, and I am trying to learn more about what citizens of Blue Nile state think about the important issues in this area. I am neutral and do not represent any political party or government office. I work for a non-governmental organization (NGO), and I am just here to collect information so that others can understand your situation here in ____________ better. I am the facilitator for today’s discussion.

I want everyone to know that:

○ There are no right or wrong answers.
○ Everyone’s opinion is equally important. We want everyone to speak.
○ If you disagree with someone, that is okay.
○ This discussion is only between those of us here.
○ I have this recorder to help me when I write the report. Your name will not be used in the report. The report will only say a [woman/ man] from [location] said this or that.
○ The person here is taking notes to help with the report.
○ Please speak loudly so the recorder can pick up your voice.

Thank you. Any questions before we begin? Now let us begin.

II. IDENTITY

1. If you could use only three words to identify who you are, what besides your name would those words be?

2. I am going to give you a list of words in no particular order, and I want you to pick the three, in order of importance, that you would use to describe yourself.

   ○ African
   ○ Sudanese
   ○ Muslim
   ○ Northern Sudanese
   ○ Arab
   ○ Name of Sect
   ○ Name of Your Specific Tribe
   ○ Name of Political Party You Support

III. STATE DIRECTION

1. How are things going in Blue Nile state these days? Are they going in the right direction or wrong direction?

---

A slightly different version of the guideline was used among Funj groups in Blue Nile.
2. It has been over three years since the CPA was signed. Since that time how has the situation in Blue Nile changed?

3. Looking to the future, will things in Blue Nile in 2009 be better OR worse? List the reasons you think this.

IV. COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

1. What does the CPA say specifically about Blue Nile state?
   a. Do you like OR dislike what the CPA says about Blue Nile state?

2. Is the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) going well OR not going well? What is the reason for your answer?

3. I am going to read you three statements. Please tell me which one best reflects how you feel about the CPA. [REPEAT THE STATEMENTS SEVERAL TIMES AND SAY THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE VOTING FOR EACH STATEMENT OUT LOUD]
   - The CPA is a good agreement that will lead to a lasting peace in Blue Nile state.
   - The CPA is a bad agreement that will eventually fall apart and lead back to conflict in Blue Nile state.
   - The CPA is an agreement that has both good and bad parts but is our best chance to maintain the peace in Blue Nile state.

   [FOR EACH STATEMENT VOTED FOR ASK] What is the reason for your vote?

   [FOR THOSE THAT CHOOSE THE 'BAD AGREEMENT' STATEMENT ASK] What are the parts that you think are bad?

V. DEVELOPMENT

1. What are the top three problems facing this area?

2. Name any signs of development you have seen since the signing of the CPA.
   a. How much improvement has there been in development in this area since the signing of the CPA – A Lot, Some, A Little, None at All? What is the reason for your answer?

   [IF ‘A Little’ OR ‘None at All’ ASK] Why do you think this has not happened?

3. Who is responsible for these improvements in development?
   a. Specifically, which one of the following would you say is the reason these improvements happened? Also, tell me the reason for your answer

      - National Government
      - State Government
      - Local Government
4. How has development here [in this area] compared to development in other parts of Blue Nile state since the signing of the CPA? Please provide examples.

5. There was a commitment in the CPA to have a significant amount of funds directed to this state from the national budget to develop war-affected areas. Do you feel this commitment has been fulfilled?

6. How are the schools in your area?
   a. In what language are the children being taught? Are you happy with this or not?

VI. NATURAL RESOURCES

1. This state has several different types of natural resources. Does the state benefit from these resources? Please explain your answer.

2. There are some large mechanized farming schemes in this state. What is your opinion of these?

3. Rosaries Dam produces much of the electricity for the country. Do the people in Blue Nile state benefit as well from Rosaries Dam?

VII. CONFLICT & PEACE

1. When the conflict started in Blue Nile state in the mid-1980s, what were the main reasons for this conflict?
   a. Do you think these problems have been solved fully now so that they will not cause any conflict in the future in Blue Nile state?

2. Is there conflict in Blue Nile state today? [IF YES] Please describe the conflict(s) and tell me the cause (for each). [IF NO, SKIP TO QUESTION #3]
   a. Is this conflict that can be settled by local authorities OR not? [IF NO] Why not?

3. Please place a mark on this graph that indicates how close or far away you feel Blue Nile state is to achieving a permanent peace. After placing your mark, explain why you made the mark you did. [SHOW GRAPH AND PROVIDE MARKERS]

VIII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHNIC POPULATIONS

1. Now, about the relationship between the Arab populations and the Funj or Ingessana, how would you rate the relations between the two – Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor? What is the reason for your answer?
   a. What needs to be done to solve the problems between the two groups?
2. [FOR NON-NOMADIC POPULATIONS] Now let’s speak of the nomads that cross Funj or Ingessana areas for grazing. How do you think the relationship is between these nomadic populations and the Funj – Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor? Why did you name these groups?
   a. What needs to be done to solve the problems between the two groups?

3. [FOR NOMADIC POPULATIONS] How would you rate your relationship with the Funj or Ingessana – Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor? What is the reason for your answer?
   a. What needs to be done to solve the problems between the two groups?

4. What role do tribal leaders play in resolving conflict?
   a. Are they effective in solving conflict between Arab groups and Funj groups in Blue Nile state? [IF NO] Why not?

5. How do you feel about freedom of movement in relation to people from other ethnic groups – like the Funj – coming to a predominantly Arab area?

6. What is the biggest threat to long-term peace in Blue Nile State?

**IX. SPLM, NCP AND OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS**

1. Are political parties talking about how they are different and better than other parties? [IF YES] Tell me what they say.
   a. Do they ever speak about specific issue or policies?

2. What is your opinion of the NCP here in Blue Nile state?

3. What is your opinion of the SPLM here in Blue Nile state?

4. Who do you think has more support among Arab populations in Blue Nile state – the SPLM, NCP or another party? What is the reason for your answer?

5. What about in the whole state of Blue Nile – which party has more support, the SPLM, the NCP or another party?

**X. STATE GOVERNMENT**

1. According to the CPA, the NCP is supposed to have 55% of the positions in the Southern Kordofan government and the SPLM 45%. How has this mixed government worked thus far?
   a. Are the two sides – NCP and SPLM – working well together OR not? Explain.
   b. What are the problems in the state government and how can they be solved?

2. Rate the job that Abdarman Abu Medium did during his time as governor – Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor? What is the reason for your rating?
3. What is your opinion of the new Deputy Governor, Ahmed Kermno Ahmed?

4. What is your opinion of the new Governor, Malik Agar?
   a. How would you rate the job he is doing thus far as governor – Excellent, Good, Fair or Poor? What is the reason for your rating?
   b. Governor Malik Agar said his first priority would be development and improving infrastructure. Has he delivered on that promise?

5. Do people from different ethnic groups in Blue Nile state have an equal opportunity to be employed by the state government? [IF NO] Why not?

6. When Malik Agar was named governor, he also announced that the government would rotate between Damazin and Kurmuk. What do you think of this?

XI. ARMIES & ARMED GROUPS

1. Tell me about the security situation in Blue Nile state.

2. Name for me all the militia [armed groups that are not official armies] in the state. [IF NONE, SKIP TO QUESTION #3]
   a. What are these groups trying to achieve?
   b. Are they a threat to lasting peace in Blue Nile state? [IF YES] How?

3. What is your opinion of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Southern Kordofan?

4. The SPLA has left Blue Nile state. What do you think about this?

5. What is your opinion of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) that are comprised of soldiers from both the SPLA and the SAF?
   a. Are the SPLA and SAF working well together in the JIU OR not?
   b. Is the JIU doing a good job for the people of this state OR not a good job in Blue Nile? What is the reason for your answer?

6. Governor Malik Agar said under his leadership that police and popular defense force militias would not terrorize people as in the past. Has he delivered on that promise?

XII. 2009 ELECTIONS

1. In 2009, the whole of Blue Nile state will vote for a Governor and for people to represent them in the state legislative assembly [state parliament]. Is this a good thing OR not a good thing?

2. Do you think if the elections are free and fair and everyone gets to vote for whomever they wish, this will solve the problems that caused the conflict in Blue Nile state?
3. Let’s say the election is free and fair and the Arab populations vote for whom they want, but a Funj or Ingessana receives the most votes and wins the position of governor. Will you accept this result or not? [IF NO] Why not?
   a. [IF NOT ALREADY ANSWERED] Let’s say the Funj or Ingessana have the most people living in Blue Nile state and those people vote for a Funj or Ingessana governor. Would you accept a Funj or Ingessana as Governor in Blue Nile state as the winner in the election if more Funj or Ingessana live in Blue Nile than Arabs and fairly voted for their choice?

4. For the 2009 elections, how will you choose who you will vote for in most of the elections - will your vote be based on who the person is or what the person’s tribe is or which party the person represents or something else? Why did you say that?

5. Now I am going to give you a list of possible SPLM candidates for the office of president. Of the following people, which would you prefer be the SPLM candidate in 2009 for the office of president of all of Sudan. I am not saying that you will vote for SPLM but am just asking you which of the following do you think would be best to represent the SPLM in the presidential election:
   - Salva Kiir
   - Yassir Arman
   - Malik Agar
   - Abdel Aziz Al-Hillo
   - Any Other SPLM Person [NAME THEM]
   What is the reason for your answer?

6. Among possible other candidates, who do you like the best in the presidential election of the following:
   - Omar Al-Bashir
   - Ali Osman Mohammed Taha
   - Saddiq Al-Mahdi
   - Hassan al-Turabi
   - Mohammed Osman al-Murghani
   - Mustafa Osman Ismael
   - Arkow Minnawi
   - Any Other Person [NAME THEM]

7. If the 2009 elections were held today, for which political party would you vote for in the election for governor of Blue Nile state?
   a. Which political party would you vote for in the election for president of Sudan?

8. The draft election law, which the NCP and the SPLM have agreed to, states that 25% of seats in the National Assembly and in each state legislative assembly will be reserved for women. What do you think of this?
XIII. REFERENDUM

1. Do you want Sudan to remain united as one country OR do you think it would be better for the country to separate into different regions? What is the reason for your answer?

2. The CPA says that southerners will vote in a referendum where they will choose whether or not to stay united with the North. What would you want the South to do – stay with the North or separate?
   a. Which way do you think Southerners will choose – to stay united or separate?
   b. If the South votes to separate, would you accept that?
   c. What will it mean for the Funj or Ingessana population if the South votes to separate?

3. What does the CPA say about Blue Nile state in relation to a self-determination referendum?

4. Have you heard of the term ‘popular consultation’? [IF YES:] What does it mean and how does it apply to Blue Nile state? [IF NO GO TO QUESTION #5]

5. Popular consultation is a process that will begin after the 2009 elections. Representatives elected to the state legislature [state parliament] will either accept the CPA as it is OR enter into negotiations with the national government to change the way the CPA is implemented in Blue Nile state. Once the CPA is accepted by the legislature, it becomes the final solution to the conflict in Blue Nile state. What do you think of this?
   a. What will you tell your elected representatives you want to do about the CPA?

6. Have you heard any political groups speak about popular consultation? [IF YES] What have they said?

7. In a speech in Kurmuk, Blue Nile Governor Malik Agar said that everyone should look for possible options for unity and that the SPLM would be committed to unity if it is assured of its usefulness. What do you think of this statement?

8. Governor Malik Agar has also said he supports a federal system in Sudan whereby different regions rule their own affairs but are still part of Sudan. What do you think of this statement?

XIV. LAND ISSUES

1. What are the issues relating to land in this area?
   a. How is land allocated in Blue Nile state? Is this a good process OR not?

2. Who has the power to draw land boundaries in Blue Nile state?
   a. What do you think of the job they are doing?
   b. What is the role of traditional authorities?
3. Do you think there will be any problems in demarcating the border between the North and South, particularly between Blue Nile state and all the states to the south?

**XV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

1. What are the countries that give development aid and assistance to Blue Nile state?

2. What are the areas [sectors] in which ___________________ [NAME OF COUNTRIES, TAKEN ONE AT A TIME, MENTIONED IN QUESTION #1] gives development aid and assistance to Blue Nile state?

   b. Of the following, tell me the areas in which ___________________ [NAME OF COUNTRIES] has given development assistance to Blue Nile state:

      - Health
      - Agriculture
      - Education/Schools
      - Democracy & Governance
      - Roads
      - Food Aid
      - Other Areas?

3. What is your opinion of the development assistance ___________________ [NAME OF COUNTRIES] has given to Blue Nile state thus far? [PROBE FOR FAVORABILITY (GOOD/NOT GOOD) AND EFFECTIVENESS (HELPED/NOT HELPED)]

4. What are the countries that have given development assistance to other parts of Sudan but not this state? What is your opinion of that assistance [ASK FOR EACH COUNTRY]?
Three Areas Focus Groups – Abyei - Ngok Dinka

I. INTRODUCTION

Hello, my name is ____________, and I am trying to learn more about what citizens of Abyei think about the important issues in this area. I am neutral and do not represent any political party or government office. I work for a non-governmental organization (NGO), and I am only here to collect information so that others can understand your situation here in Abyei better. I am the facilitator for today’s discussion.

I want everyone to know that:

- There are no right or wrong answers.
- Everyone’s opinion is equally important. We want everyone to speak.
- If you disagree with someone, that is okay.
- This discussion is only between those of us here.
- I have this recorder to help me when I write the report. Your name will not be used in the report. The report will only say a [woman/man] from [location] said this or that.
- The person here is taking notes to help with the report.
- Please speak loudly so the recorder can pick up your voice.

Thank you. Any questions before we begin? Okay, now let us begin.

II. ABYEI CRISIS

1. Describe the events of May 13 and the days following in Abyei.
   a. [IF NOT ANSWERED ABOVE] What were the immediate causes of the events of May 13?

2. Now thinking back before May 13 what were the things that helped set the conditions in Abyei so that something like May 13 could happen?

3. I am going to name a group and I want you to tell me the role that group played in relation to May 13 and the events leading up to it.
   ° NCP
   ° SPLM
   ° Misseriya Traditional Leaders
   ° Ngok Traditional Leaders
   ° SPLA
   ° SAF
   ° Brigade 31
   ° The Police
   ° UNMIS

4. What could have been done to prevent the events of May 13 and the following days?
III. CRISIS RESPONSE

1. In response to the events of May 13, what groups have performed their jobs well?
   a. Which groups have not performed their jobs well?

2. How would you rate the response of the GOSS to the events of May 13 - excellent, good, fair or poor? What is the reason for your answer?
   a. [IF NOT ANSWERED ABOVE] What is your opinion of the response of the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) to the crisis in Abyei?

3. How would you rate the response of the international community to the events of May 13 - excellent, good, fair or poor? What is the reason for your answer?
   a. What organizations have been most helpful?
   b. What countries have been most helpful?
   [IF USA IS MENTIONED, SKIP TO QUESTION C]

   1. Is the United States of America (USA) one of the countries that is giving assistance to Abyei during this time?
   [IF NO, GO TO QUESTION F]
   [IF YES, GO TO QUESTION C]
   c. [IF NOT ANSWERED IN A] Have you heard of the United States Agency for International Development or U-S-A-I-D or US-AID?
   d. How has the USA and USAID helped during this crisis?
   e. What is your opinion of the assistance the USA and USAID have given to the people of Abyei in this crisis? [PROBE FOR FAVORABILITY (GOOD/ NOT GOOD) AND EFFECTIVENESS (HELPED/ NOT HELPED)]
   f. Before May 13, did the USA and USAID provide any assistance to the Abyei area? [IF YES] What type of assistance? What is your opinion of this assistance?

4. What is your opinion of the United Nations (UN) response to the crisis in Abyei?

5. How could the response of the international community to the crisis be improved? [PROBE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL ASSISTANCE]

IV. SPLM & THE ABYEI CRISIS

1. Tell me your opinion of the SPLM before the Abyei crisis.
a. Now tell me about your opinion of the SPLM after the Abyei crisis. Has it changed OR stayed the same?

2. Tell me your opinion of Salva Kiir before the Abyei crisis.

   a. Now tell me about your opinion of Salva Kiir after the Abyei crisis. Has it changed OR stayed the same?

3. How would you rate the efforts of Salva Kiir and the SPLM to resolve the Abyei crisis through negotiations with the NCP – excellent, good, fair or poor? What is the reason for your rating?

4. Before May 13, the SPLM rejected an offer by the NCP to have a joint administration in Abyei. Do you think this was the right decision OR not the right decision? Why?

5. What could the SPLM do better regarding the Abyei issue?

6. What is your opinion of Edward Lino’s leadership during the Abyei crisis?

7. What is your opinion of Deng Alor’s leadership during the Abyei crisis?

8. Do you believe the SPLM can ultimately resolve the problems in Abyei?

V. ROAD MAP AGREEMENT

1. Tell me what you know about the agreement between the SPLM and the NCP reached on June 8 to resolve the Abyei crisis.

2. What is your opinion of the agreement?

3. Do you believe that the agreement will be implemented?

VI. ABYEI SECURITY

1. The Abyei agreement lists several measures intended to restore and improve security in Abyei. I am going to read each one-by-one and I would like for you to tell me what you think of it.

   a. A new Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) of SAF and SPLA soldiers will be deployed to Abyei. The JIU will not include elements in the former Abyei JIUs. Training and integration are to be stressed so that this unit is more effective than previous ones deployed in Abyei. What is your opinion of this?

      1. What would make you feel more comfortable with this part of the agreement?
      2. Do you believe this part of the agreement will be implemented?

   b. Police will be deployed in Abyei after consultation between the National Minister of the Interior and the Government of Southern Sudan Minister of Internal Affairs. What is your opinion of this?

      1. What would make you feel more comfortable with this part of the agreement?
      2. Do you believe this part of the agreement will be implemented?
c. SAF and SPLA troops will be redeployed to the north and south of the agreed Abyei administrative boundaries. What is your opinion of this?

   1. What would make you feel more comfortable with this part of the agreement?
   2. Do you believe this part of the agreement will be implemented?

2. You have spoken previously of the role of UNMIS during the Abyei crisis. What do you think the role of UNMIS should be in Abyei going forward?

   a. The Abyei agreement says that UNMIS will have free movement north and south of the Abyei area. What is your opinion of this?

      1. Do you believe this part of the agreement will be implemented?

3. With this new agreement, how confident are you that the events of May 13 will not be repeated - very confident, somewhat confident, not at all confident or not sure? What is the reason for your answer?

   a. What could be done to make you more confident that the events of May 13 will not be repeated?

4. Going forward under this new agreement, what is the biggest threat to security in Abyei?

VII. ADMINISTRATION, BORDERS AND THE ABC

1. The Abyei agreement says that an Abyei Area administration will be established. The Chief Administrator will be nominated by the SPLM and the Deputy Chief Administrator will be nominated by the NCP and both will be residents of Abyei. What is your opinion of this?

   a. How will the two work together?

   b. What would make you feel more comfortable with this part of the agreement?

   c. What if the NCP appoints a Misseriya as Deputy Chief Administrator – how would you feel about that?

2. New interim boundaries for the administration of the Abyei area were agreed to by the SPLM and NCP. The SPLM has agreed that, for example, in the west Al-Merriam will not be part of the Abyei area under the interim administration nor will in the East, the part nearest Southern Kordofan. Also, the shared rights area as defined by the ABC will not be included in the interim administration area. What is your opinion of this?

3. The Abyei agreement also calls for an arbitration tribunal selected by the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague to settle the dispute over the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission. Both parties agree to implement the decision of the tribunal. What is your opinion of this?

   a. Do you believe this part of the agreement will be implemented?
VIII. RETURN OF IDPS

1. Do you intend to return to the Abyei area? [IF YES] How soon? [IF NO] Why not?

2. Does the recent Abyei agreement make you feel any better about returning to Abyei? Why or why not?

3. What are your biggest concerns about returning to the Abyei area?

4. What would make you feel more comfortable about returning to Abyei? [PROBE SPECIFIC THINGS IDPS NEED TO RETURN]

IX. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOK AND MISSERIYA

1. Has the recent fighting changed how you feel about the Misseriya?

2. Before the war, the Ngok and Misseriya lived together and, although there were occasional clashes, for the most part they lived together peacefully. Can the relationship between the Ngok and Misseriya ever return to what it was before the war? Why or why not?

3. What are the reasons that some Misseriya have joined the SPLM/ A and why are they different from other Misseriya?

4. Let’s say you were in charge of a reconciliation committee between Ngok and Misseriya traditional leaders. Tell me the three things you would do to resolve the conflict between the two groups.

5. What do you think is the one thing that the Misseriya are most concerned about in relation to Abyei?
   
   a. Is there any way to address their concerns? [IF YES] How can this best be done? [IF NO] Why?

6. What grazing rights do the Misseriya have in Abyei currently?

7. Before May 13, there were clashes between the SPLA and Misseriya migrating to grazing areas in Abyei and just outside of Abyei. What are the causes of these clashes?
   
   a. Will these clashes be repeated during the next dry season OR can they be resolved? What is the reason for your answer?

8. If Abeyi voted to join Bahr el Ghazal and Southern Sudan voted to become independent in the 2011 referendums, how would that affect the grazing rights of the Misseriya?
   
   a. What would you do to address Misseriya concerns about this?
X. CONFLICT & RESOLUTION

1. There have been tensions in Abyei for years - even before the recent fighting. Using just one word, tell me what this long-running conflict is about? Why did you use that word?

2. At its root, is the problem in Abyei between the Ngok and the Misseriya OR is it between the NCP and the SPLM OR is the problem a combination of both? What is the reason for your answer?

3. War brings a lot of pain and suffering to everyone. In relation to Abyei, what do you think are the things that would be worth the pain and suffering to fight for?

4. What are the things that would not be worth the pain and suffering to fight for - in other words, what compromises are you willing to make in a negotiation with the Misseriya and/ or the NCP in order to avoid war and have peace in Abyei?

5. What would you think about a compromise that brought peace to Abyei in exchange for the redrawing of its boundaries so that some or all of its oil resources remain in the North?
   a. What if the SPLM told you that giving up some of Abyei’s oil resources is the only way to achieve peace - would you support their decision to redraw boundaries that excluded some of the oil fields in Abyei OR not?

6. If you had to give up a part of Abyei’s oil OR a part of Abyei’s land to achieve peace, which would you choose? [FORCE A CHOICE OF ONE]

7. We’ve talked about all the problems with Abyei. Now, I want to know what do you think is the solution?

8. I am going to say the names of some groups and I want you to tell me what each should do to bring permanent peace.
   - NCP
   - SPLM
   - SPLA
   - SAF
   - Misseriya Leaders
   - Ngok Leaders
   - United Nations/ UNMIS

9. What impact does the Abyei conflict have on the CPA overall?

XI. REFERENDUM

1. How will you vote in the 2011 Abyei referendum - to join with Bahr el Ghazal or to join with Southern Kordofan? Why?
APPENDIX D: ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Traci D. Cook is a Senior Advisor for the National Democratic Institute’s Sudan program. An experienced opinion researcher who has done similar work elsewhere in Africa and the Caribbean, she previously served as the senior director for strategic and corporate communications at the Women’s National Basketball Association and as vice president of marketing communications at Shepardson Stern + Kaminsky in New York, where she supervised and analyzed focus groups research for Fortune 500 companies. As country program director for NDI in Malawi between 1993 and 1996, she also designed and conducted a series of focus groups on democracy and governance. Complementing her work in the field of international development and in the private sector is her experience as the political director for the Mississippi Democratic Party, legislative work on Capitol Hill and research work for various U.S. House and Senate races. This is Ms. Cook’s tenth study of citizen opinions and attitudes in Sudan.