
**THE 1990 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS IN GUATEMALA**

Foreword by Bruce Babbitt

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION
TO THE GUATEMALAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS**

November 11, 1990

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NDI has conducted democratic development programs in more than 35 countries. Programs focus on six major areas:

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


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is the report by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) on the 1990-91 Guatemalan election process. The report is based on the observations of four NDI-sponsored missions that visited Guatemala in August, September and November of 1990 and January 1991 to monitor the electoral process.

The report was prepared by NDI staff. While the conclusions reached in this report reflect a consensus based on consultations with members of the delegation, NDI assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained herein.

The report was drafted by Mark Feierstein, NDI program officer for Latin America; attorney Deborah Hauger, who represented NDI in Guatemala for the three months preceding the first round of elections; and Steven Griner, an NDI special assistant. Much of the material in this report is taken from an earlier report written by Feierstein, Hauger, Griner and Curtis Vredenburg, who was in Guatemala on a separate assignment. This report was edited by NDI Executive Vice President Kenneth Wollack, Senior Consultant Larry Garber and Public Information Director Sue Grabowski.

NDI extends its thanks to the delegation members and is particularly grateful to Bruce Babbitt for leading two delegations to Guatemala. His knowledge of Latin America and democratic development combined with his unorthodox but fluent Spanish helped establish NDI's credibility in Guatemala.

A grant to NDI from the U.S. Agency for International Development to support electoral processes in Latin America made the extensive monitoring effort possible.

Finally, and most important, NDI thanks the many Guatemalans who took the time to share their views about their diverse and beautiful country.

FOREWORD

I was honored to be part of the National Democratic Institute's international observer delegation to the November 11, 1990, national elections in Guatemala and would like to thank all those, Guatemalans and others, who made this effort possible. Leading this delegation was particularly satisfying as I was able to build upon my experiences in Guatemala, experiences that began some 20 years ago as I hitchhiked across the country with my young wife. Since then, I have taken a personal interest in this country's often tragic history and its transition to democracy, which began with the historic 1985 elections.

Five years ago, Guatemala planted the seed of democracy despite overwhelming obstacles. With the successful presidential election of 1990, the roots of this democracy are growing deeper. For the first time in nearly 40 years, this country has witnessed a transition from one civilian administration to another.

I was particularly impressed with the integrity of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal headed by the highly respected Arturo Herbruger. Nearly all of those involved, despite party affiliation or political ideology, demonstrated unwavering confidence in this man's honesty and objectivity. Mr. Herbruger and the electoral tribunal were instrumental in ensuring a fair and transparent process.

Participants in any democratic system, however, should never feel satisfied. It is my hope that Guatemalans, having perfected the technicalities of a free election, will address the more profound problems facing their nascent democracy.

Of particular concern to the delegation was the pervasive threat of violence that often inhibited political debate during the campaign. Additionally, we were struck by the indigenous community's lack of participation, due, in part, to this fear of violence.

I congratulate the Guatemalan people for the significant accomplishments in building democracy. This report emphasizes the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the present system. Its intent is to contribute to this continuing democratization effort.

Bruce Babbitt
June 1991

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A 27-member delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), observed the November 11, 1990, Guatemalan elections for president, congress, municipal positions and the Central American Parliament. These elections and the presidential runoff on January 6, 1991, won by Jorge Serrano led to Guatemala's first transfer of power from one civilian government to another in more than 35 years.

NDI collected information on all aspects of the electoral process. Two monitoring teams visited Guatemala during the campaign period, and an NDI representative was based in Guatemala for the three months preceding the November 11 elections. An NDI representative also observed the January 6, 1991, runoff. The following are the delegations' summary conclusions regarding the election process:

- 1) The balloting and counting procedures on both election days were particularly efficient. The process was peaceful, orderly and free of overt intimidation. The highly regarded Supreme Electoral Tribunal and its president deserve credit for overseeing the nearly flawless process.

- 2) The police provided security for the voting and were generally helpful. The military, which has a large presence in some areas of conflict, remained in the background.

- 3) Voter turnout declined significantly compared with the 1985 presidential elections, from 69 percent of registered voters to 57 percent. This decline may be the result of a number of factors, including a new law making voting voluntary and perceived failures of the Cerezo government.

4) Indigenous groups, by virtue of their exclusion from the economy and institutions of Guatemalan society, lack the opportunity and incentives to organize or participate in national political life. Turnout in indigenous areas, especially among women, was particularly low.

5) The threat of political violence had deleterious effects on the election campaign. A vigorous and nationwide campaign by the leading candidates and ubiquitous political advertising were marred by killings of and threats against candidates and others involved in the electoral process. The campaign environment did not allow for unfettered debate. Freedom of expression was liberally permitted under the law, but violence constricted the political spectrum by discouraging participation in the political process and suppressing countervailing points of view.

6) Social and political violence, combined with unprecedented high inflation, has led many Guatemalans to question the efficacy and desirability of democracy. According to one public opinion poll, respondents divided evenly between a preference for democracy and military rule.

7) The Supreme Electoral Tribunal's decision to prohibit a former president, Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, from contesting the election because of his participation in a coup was consistent with the Guatemalan Constitution. Ríos Montt was provided sufficient legal channels to challenge the prohibition of his candidacy. Still, he has widespread support; a significant number of ballots were invalidated to express support for his candidacy.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

On November 11, 1990, Guatemalans went to the polls to elect a civilian president for the second time in five years. Voters also elected members of Congress and the Central American Parliament and most of the country's municipal officials. The presidential run-off, held on January 6, 1991, resulted in the election of Jorge Serrano, originally a dark horse candidate, who had come to prominence as a consequence of his participation in negotiations with the Guatemalan guerrillas.

The election of another civilian president in a technically efficient and fair process and the transfer of power between two parties were tainted by a widespread view that democratic advances made early in President Vinicio Cerezo's term had been reversed. [See Appendix I for post-election statement of NDI delegation.] When Vinicio Cerezo won a landslide victory five years ago, civilian rule returned to Guatemala after more than 30 years of direct or indirect military rule. Observers praised the conduct of the 1985 elections and expressed hope that the Cerezo administration would utilize its mandate to institutionalize the nascent democracy by curtailing human rights abuses, strengthening the judicial system and expanding freedom to organize politically. For two years, significant progress was made. Freedom of speech flourished and political organizations were resurrected or founded.

But two coup attempts, in May 1988 and May 1989, led the government to retreat. During the second half of Cerezo's term, killings, politically and non-politically motivated, increased. Human

rights groups charge that the military and police are responsible, and they fault the government for not investigating or prosecuting those accused.

The violence had deleterious effects on the election campaign, as it discouraged some from actively participating in the process and restricted political debate. The violence and the troubled economy led many Guatemalans to question whether democracy was superior to military rule. One beneficiary of this discontent was Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, who ruled the country for 16 months in 1982-83 and received the opprobrium of human rights groups. Although Ríos Montt was constitutionally prohibited from running, he led most public opinion polls before the elections.

NDI based a representative in Guatemala for the three months preceding the first round to gather information on the process, particularly the effects of the violence on the campaign. The results of that research are documented in this report, which focuses on the less technical aspects of the electoral process.

A. NDI's Activities in Guatemala

1. Pre-election advance teams

NDI sponsored two pre-election delegations to Guatemala. A three-member NDI team visited Guatemala from August 15-20 to gather information on the political situation in the country, acquire information on the electoral process and develop a program in anticipation of the elections.

The pre-election team concluded that the elections were expected to be technically fair, but the country's poor human rights situation was impeding an unrestricted campaign. NDI decided, therefore, to place an attorney in Guatemala to monitor the election campaign and to better understand the extent to which the democratic process was being affected by the government's inability to stem human rights abuses. Many of those affected by such abuses believe that NDI, as a foreign institute, can publicly report information and adopt positions that cannot be publicized by the victims.

NDI also sponsored a seven-member international team, led by former Arizona governor and Democratic Party presidential aspirant Bruce Babbitt, that visited Guatemala from September 20-24. [See Appendix II for delegation's terms of reference.] The other members of the delegation in September were retired Brigadier Gen. Nehemia Dagan from Israel; Senator Francisco Guerra García from Peru; Congressman Juan Torres from Bolivia; Juan Manuel García Passalacqua, a political scientist and journalist from Puerto Rico; Mark Feierstein, NDI program officer and director of NDI's Guatemala program; and Deborah Hauger, NDI's adviser based in Guatemala.

Both delegations met with the leading presidential candidates, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, government officials, senior military officers, human rights activists, representatives of the private sector and unions, academics, journalists and members of think tanks and civic education groups. [See Appendices III and IV for schedules of the August and September delegations.] The delegations were in Guatemala during periods of heightened uncertainty over the candidacy of retired Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt and increased concern over the rise in election-related violence. Both delegations were well-received, and many Guatemalans expressed gratitude for this pre-election presence. Press coverage of the September delegation was extensive. [See Appendix V.]

A preliminary report based on the two delegations' findings and assessment of Guatemala's pre-election environment was released by NDI in October 1990. That report was distributed to Latin American experts throughout Washington, as well as to NDI's observers and to observers from other organizations. Based on the information gathered for the report, NDI sponsored a World Affairs Briefing in Washington where Bruce Babbitt discussed the Guatemalan elections and democracy.

2. *NDI forum*

At the conclusion of the pre-election mission in September, NDI organized a forum on comparative democratic experiences. The international delegation members were joined by Guatemalan

participants, including the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, presidential candidates, government and church officials, human rights activists, members of the private sector and unions, academics and military officers. The forum provided a unique opportunity for the members of the NDI delegation to relate experiences from their respective countries' histories.

Several Guatemalan participants noted that it was the first time leading political figures, military officers and human rights activists were present in the same forum. Many said it was a significant step in the promotion of dialogue among different sectors of Guatemalan society. The consensus among the international and Guatemalan participants was that elections are a means to establish the conditions under which democracy can flourish. [See Appendix VI for list of forum participants.]

3. International observer delegation

NDI organized a 27-member international delegation to observe the first round of the elections on November 11. The observer group, which was led by Bruce Babbitt, included members of the September pre-election delegation, as well as other election experts and political figures from 14 countries. The members of the delegation collectively represented a wide spectrum of democratic tendencies.

The delegation arrived in Guatemala on Thursday, November 8. On Friday, the delegation was briefed by NDI staff, presidential candidates, members of the electoral tribunal, human rights activists, military officers, union officials and private sector representatives. On Saturday, the delegation divided into seven teams and dispersed throughout the country by automobile and airplane. The teams deployed outside of Guatemala City met with local politicians and electoral officials on Saturday, while the team situated in Guatemala City met with, among others, Gen. Rfos Montt. The teams reassembled in Guatemala City late Sunday night and Monday morning. Following a debriefing session, the delegation released a statement on Monday afternoon and held a press conference for Guatemalan and foreign press.

Because the second round was expected to be as free of irregularities as the first round, NDI decided not to send a delegation for the presidential run-off on January 6, 1991. An NDI staff member was present, however, to gather final figures on registration, turnout and results and to interview political and electoral officials.

Chapter 2

COUNTRY BACKGROUND

A. Geography, Demography and the Economy

Guatemala, situated between Mexico to the north and El Salvador and Honduras to the south, is the northernmost country on the Central American isthmus. Guatemala has a population of approximately 10 million people on a land mass of 108,780 square kilometers. It is organized into 22 departments and 330 municipalities.

Almost 60 percent of the population is Mayan — 22 languages are spoken among them — with the remaining 40 percent of mixed Spanish and indigenous descent (*ladino*). Most of the indigenous population lives in the highlands to the west, while most of the Spanish-speaking *ladino* population lives in the east. About 70 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, a comparatively low percentage in Latin America; the Protestant evangelical movement in Guatemala is one of the fastest growing in the world.

The country's land distribution is one of the most uneven in Latin America. Most peasants migrate during the planting or harvesting seasons to work on the large export farms on the coast.

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, accounting for about 30 percent of the country's production and providing a living to more than two-thirds of all Guatemalans, including the vast majority of the poorest. The largest agricultural exports are, in order of importance, coffee, cotton and sugar. In the 1960s and 1970s,

Guatemala developed a robust industrial sector, which today accounts for 15 percent of the economy.

B. Historical Background

1. Pre-colonial era

Before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1523, nearly the entire Central American isthmus and present-day Chiapas in Mexico were inhabited by the Mayans. The seat of Mayan civilization, Tikal, was located in the rain forests of northern Guatemala. People throughout Mayan society journeyed to Tikal to study in its schools, worship in its temples, or, like today, marvel at the superior architecture of its buildings and temples. The Mayans made revolutionary advances in architecture, mathematics and astronomy. Mayan society was theocratic, empowering priests with the spiritual and secular mandates of its populace. Sacrifice was often used as an expression of worship. Even today a mixture of Catholicism and Mayan worship is reflected in the sacrifice of small animals in reverence to saints of the Catholic Church.

2. Colonial period

After Hernan Cortéz conquered the Aztecs in Mexico, he sent his first lieutenant, Pedro Alvarado, south to search for gold and other riches. According to legend, Alvarado encountered fierce resistance from the Mayan warriors led by Tecun Uman, today the national hero of Guatemala. Tecun Uman, believing that horse and man were one, killed Alvarado's mount and stood to revel in his victory at which time Alvarado pierced Uman's heart with his sword. As Tecun Uman lay dying, a green bird with large tail feathers — a *quetzal* — landed on his wounded chest and stained its feathers with the blood of the Mayan warrior. Today, the green *quetzal* with its red chest is Guatemala's national symbol.

Pedro Alvarado ruled Central America from the town of Ciudad Vieja. He later moved the capital to neighboring Antigua, where it remained until a series of earthquakes prompted a relocation of the capital to Guatemala City in the late 1700s. When Alvarado's hopes of finding gold and silver went unfulfilled, the Spanish began to

exploit the land and its indigenous population for economic gain. The mercantilist system — the exploitation of raw materials and agricultural products by the mother country — restricted those who were not part of the small aristocratic class from upward mobility. Huge tobacco and cotton plantations replaced the small subsistence farms of the Indians and established the economic system that solidified the hierarchy of Guatemalan society and laid the groundwork for the present-day land distribution. A vagrancy law required "unemployed" Indians to work 40 days a year on public works projects. Peonage-for-debt, a system in which Indians worked for minuscule wages to repay debts, insured an abundance of cheap labor.

3. *Independence*

The Central American countries obtained independence from Spain in 1821 as a federation. This relationship lasted 17 years before fighting between Conservatives and Liberals led to the breakup of the federation and the establishment of five autonomous Central American countries. Guatemala's first president was an illiterate *mestizo* leader of extraordinary political acumen, José Rafael Carrera. Fanatically religious, Carrera believed he was divinely chosen to rule Guatemala. He remained president-for-life until his death in 1865, setting the precedent of strong-man rule that would remain until the latter part of the 20th century.

Long-term reigns of strongmen in the 19th and 20th centuries provided a form of political stability that allowed for economic development and increased social programs. During this time, the government constructed roads, telegraphs and a railroad that contributed to the economic growth of the nation. Health care and education also improved as hospitals and schools were built in the countryside and all children, regardless of sex or race, were granted the right to an education.

Political opposition, however, was brutally repressed, and the small aristocratic class held power zealously. The wealth created through economic development was unevenly distributed, widening the gap between rich and poor. Many far-reaching proposals in

health and education went unfulfilled due to lack of public funds, while the Guatemalan tax rate remained the lowest in the region. This combination of economic inequality and political despotism climaxed during the repressive regime of President Jorge Ubico, helping to trigger the 1944 Revolution.

4. Revolution of 1944 and the 1954 coup

On October 22, 1944, Major Francisco Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz led a coup that ousted Ubico's hand-picked successor. Soon thereafter, Juan José Arévalo Bermejo, an exiled school teacher, was elected president with 85 percent of the vote in the first free elections in Guatemala in more than 50 years. Inspired by the social programs of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, Arévalo embarked on a program of economic redistribution and social justice. He quickly established a social security system and founded an economic development institute to aid the poor. Government spending was reallocated, and more than a third of the budget was devoted to education and health programs. A new constitution abolished the vagrancy law and assured civil rights for all citizens regardless of race.

Jacobo Arbenz, the minister of defense under Arévalo, won the subsequent elections in 1950 with 63 percent of the vote. He implemented sweeping reforms directed at the large multinational corporations. These reforms included breaking up monopolies, collecting back taxes and distributing land more equitably. Arbenz's most far-reaching objective was land reform. Uncultivated land was expropriated and the owners compensated at the value declared for tax purposes. Since this value was much lower than the actual market value, large landowners, particularly the United Fruit Company, objected vehemently.

Destiny placed Arbenz and his innovative economic reforms in the midst of the most tense period of the Cold War, and his government was viewed as a communist threat by the United States. Other circumstantial evidence strengthened the suspicion that Arbenz was part of a larger international conspiracy: communist sympathizers in his government were identified, and a secret arms shipment from

Czechoslovakia was discovered. As a consequence, United Fruit and other big businesses persuaded the Eisenhower Administration to aid Carlos Castillo Armas, an exiled colonel with allegiance to the right, in ousting Arbenz in 1954.

5. Militarization: 1954-1982

Guatemalan politics during the next 25 years was dominated by a series of military dictatorships and a revival of the pre-1944 repression. The constitution written during the Arévalo administration was annulled and many of the newly obtained civil rights rescinded. Land reform was reversed. In 1958, Mario Sandoval Alarcón founded the National Liberation Movement (MLN), a right-wing political party. The more zealous members of the MLN established the Mano Blanca (White Hand), a precursor to the right-wing death squads that exist in Latin America today.

In 1960, when General Miguel Ydígoras allowed the CIA to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation, a group of young officers, who believed that Guatemalan sovereignty was being violated, revolted. The revolt failed, and the officers fled to form the nucleus of the modern-day guerrilla insurgency, with support from Fidel Castro. Although this movement was brutally repressed, its few survivors continued the cause, recruiting among the indigenous population where the guerrillas expanded and their successes grew.

The lone civilian president between 1954 and 1985 was Julio César Méndez Montenegro. He was elected in 1966, but was permitted to take office only after agreeing not to interfere in the army's internal affairs or its counterinsurgency activities. Human rights during his term deteriorated.

In 1982, the three primary armies of the insurgency formed the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Its goal, as stated in the communiqué announcing its formation, was "the end of the economic and political domination of the repressive wealthy, both national and foreign, who rule Guatemala." By then, the guerrillas, espousing a rigid revolutionary ideology and utilizing ruthless methods, were militarily active in more than half the country.

During the regime of Romeo Lucas García, from 1974 to 1978, violence, so prevalent in Guatemalan society, took an even more perverse turn. Every morning, decapitated and tortured bodies were discovered in the streets of the capital and the countryside. Torture and assassination touched the lives of *ladinos* as well as indigenous, the urban as well as the rural. The relatively strong Guatemalan economy plunged, and corruption within the government raged unchecked.

6. *Ríos Montt and Mejía Victores*

The emergence of the charismatic evangelical Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, who became president in 1982 after a coup that overthrew Lucas García, was welcomed by many Guatemalans. Ríos Montt represented a progressive group of young middle-ranking officers who sought to depoliticize the army and return the nation to civilian rule. He had been the Christian Democrats' presidential candidate in 1974, but his apparent victory was denied by the military.

Ríos Montt put an abrupt end to the right-wing death squad activities, and daily life in the cities returned to relative normality. Human rights conditions improved in the cities. The sinking Guatemalan economy was buoyed by the reinstated aid from the industrialized countries. Ríos Montt dealt with corruption harshly and preached the importance of honesty, sobriety, and marital fidelity in sermons he gave every week on national television.

When Ríos Montt assumed power, the guerrillas occupied territory just a few miles outside of the capital. Ríos Montt initiated a "beans and bullets" counterinsurgency that sought to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population. Food and shelter were provided to those not yet under guerrilla occupation, while civilian patrols were armed to combat the insurgency. Often, however, this meant uprooting the indigenous from land that had been their home for generations and placing them in highly regulated model villages. The inhabitants were not allowed to leave these villages without special permission and were forbidden to move back to their previous homes. Men were obligated to serve in civilian patrols 24 hours a week.

Those who refused to participate were labeled subversive and dealt with accordingly.

Villages in guerrilla strongholds met a much worse fate. The army destroyed entire villages, killing men, women and children. Life there during the 18 months of Ríos Montt did not change measurably from the years of Lucas García. In a year and a half, the guerrilla armies were decimated; the few survivors, cut off from their primary base of support, were left to roam the mountains relegating military strategy to hit-and-run attacks and random acts of sabotage.

Having assumed power promising free and fair elections, Ríos Montt later decided that the future of the nation depended on strong-arm rule and declared himself president-for-life. This proclamation led to another coup in 1983.

General Oscar Mejía Victores, Ríos Montt's successor, confronted a declining economy, an impatient society and the country's highly negative international image. Consequently, he had little choice but to follow through with Ríos Montt's promise in 1982 of a new constitution and free and fair elections.

7. Constitution of 1985

Constituent Assembly elections were held on July 1, 1984. More than 1,110 candidates competed for the 88 seats in the Assembly, which would write the new constitution. Many Guatemalans expected fraud, but were surprised by the professionalism of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the credibility of the results. Moderate parties fared best, led by the Christian Democrats, which won 20 seats, and the newly formed National Centrist Union (UCN), which garnered 21 seats. A coalition of three right-wing parties won 23 seats.

The 1985 Constitution was most noteworthy with respect to its inclusion of human rights provisions. The document established the precedence of international law over Guatemalan law and created a human rights commission and a human rights ombudsman to streamline investigations and give a sense of permanence to their missions. Other reforms included an increase in congressional

powers and the establishment of a permanent court of constitutionality with independent jurisdiction.

8. 1985 elections

Vinicio Cerezo, a Christian Democrat who had spent several years in exile, won the 1985 presidential election. In the run-off, Cerezo garnered two-thirds of the vote against Jorge Carpio of the UCN. Eight presidential candidates competed, with philosophies ranging from center-left to far-right; seven parties and coalitions won seats in the legislature.

The elections were procedurally fair and marked a first step in the transition toward democracy. Although such issues as human rights and land reform were avoided early in the campaign, by the last week almost no subject was taboo. The elections, nevertheless, were marred by violence and fear. Human rights violations, including murder and kidnapping, continued throughout the campaign.¹

9. Civilian rule under Cerezo

Cerezo, as only the second freely elected civilian president in Guatemala in 30 years, tried to dampen expectations upon taking office by explaining the limitations of newly established civilian rule. He said his primary goal was to remain in office through 1990 and peacefully transfer the presidency to another freely elected civilian.

The first half of Cerezo's five-year term was notable for its successes. Inflation slowed, politically motivated violence declined, freedom of speech flourished and new political groups formed. In 1987, Cerezo played a key role in initiating the Central American Peace Plan negotiations.

The second half of Cerezo's term, however, saw a sharp turn for the worse. Crime and political violence increased, and the economy slowed. The business federation, CACIF, led a one-day

¹ International Human Rights Law Group and Washington Office on Latin America, *The 1985 Guatemalan Elections: Will the Military Relinquish Power?* (1985).

work shutdown in 1987 to protest higher taxes and alleged government corruption. In 1988, public servants went on strike demanding higher wages.

Two coup attempts in May 1988 and May 1989 were defeated by military officers loyal to Cerezo, but the president was forced to make important concessions to the army, such as ceding control of the police to the military and suspending government talks with the guerrillas. Human rights groups charged that the military and police were murdering political dissidents, with total impunity; no military officer has ever been punished for human rights abuses. The only case in which members of the police force had even been prosecuted for human rights abuses was overturned in August 1990. In this case, four police officers from Guatemala's second largest city, Quetzaltenango, had been found guilty of murdering two university students and had each been sentenced to 30 years in jail.

Chapter 3

PRE-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

Since the return to civilian rule, political space in Guatemala has increased, providing greater opportunities for participation by many groups that had been excluded from the political process since at least 1970. In the past five years, several labor, cooperative, student and peasant groups that were active before 1970 have reemerged. New associations have also formed. Legal mechanisms have been established to permit broad registration of political parties and candidates. However, although popular organizing has dramatically increased, groups traditionally repressed still suffer reprisals, albeit not orchestrated by the government, that limit further organizing.

While the Cerezo administration made significant advances toward reestablishing civilian rule in Guatemala, continuing politically motivated violence has seriously hindered the establishment of a pluralist democracy, particularly in the interior of the country. Democracy in Guatemala has not yet been institutionalized to a degree that guarantees a safe arena for all potential participants in a peaceful political process.

Though not as polarized as in the past, Guatemala's political spectrum is still tilted toward the right. This was particularly evident in the period before the November general elections. Despite a field of 12 presidential candidates, few contenders presented left-of-center platforms. Human rights activists maintain that political activism on behalf of what are perceived to be left-of-center causes — such as land reform, tax reform and human rights — is risky.

A. Discrediting Democracy

When Vinicio Cerezo assumed the presidency, Guatemalans had high expectations for significant and rapid change. Supporters of Cerezo maintain that he deserves credit for having maintained civilian democratic rule for five years and ceding power not only to another civilian, but to someone from another party. They note that the transition to democracy is a slow and difficult process but that Guatemala has made progress.

Critics of Cerezo reply that in the past two years, roughly since the first coup attempt in 1988, the Cerezo government has backed off from challenging the power of the military and the most powerful economic sectors. During this period, assassinations and disappearances of politicians, academics, labor leaders, human rights workers and peasant organizers increased sharply, and prosecutions of politically related crimes virtually ceased. Opponents of the Cerezo administration argue that his 1985 campaign promises of tax and land reform and efforts to hold the army accountable for human rights abuses were practically abandoned by the time he left office.

The Cerezo administration and the Christian Democrats were also accused of large-scale corruption. Party members, government officials and Cerezo faced allegations of using state funds for such personal purchases as expensive homes. Accusations of malfeasance extended into the 1990 campaign. The government was repeatedly accused of using official funds, personnel and equipment to aid Christian Democratic candidates. Set against the backdrop of a troubled economic situation — inflation approached 65 percent in the first nine months of 1990, the highest ever recorded in Guatemala — and an increasing crime rate, tales of government corruption and the personal enrichment of Cerezo and members of his administration apparently contributed to the erosion of Cerezo's popular support.

The perceived shortcomings and failures of the Cerezo administration led many Guatemalans to become disillusioned with democracy, a concept that some people are said to equate with the Christian Democrats. In a country where more than 60 percent of eligible voters are under the age of 30, the Cerezo administration was the first experience of democratic rule for most voters. These first-

time voters, particularly those in urban areas, have heard of the "stable," relatively crime-free administration of Ríos Montt. Civilian rule, as they have experienced it, does not necessarily hold particular appeal for this and other segments of the population.

The effects of this disillusionment with democracy on the election process were twofold. Many potential voters appeared either apathetic or sought to elect a charismatic leader who would stem corruption and crime. This resulted in low voter turnout and continued support for Ríos Montt in the first round, despite his disqualification as a candidate.² In a public opinion poll conducted before the first round, respondents were almost equally divided between a preference for a military government and a democratic one.³

B. Indigenous Participation in Guatemala's Political Process

The Guatemalan indigenous community, which comprises more than half of the population, is marginalized from the political process. Almost all leading political positions are occupied by *ladinos*. In Congress, for example, only about 5 percent of the members are Indian. Since the return of civilian rule in 1985, there have been no indigenous Cabinet ministers. There are no Mayan parties, and most local municipal candidates for the November general elections, even in districts overwhelmingly Indian, were *ladinos*.

Language differences, coupled with the lack of cooperation and organization among different indigenous groups, hinder indigenous participation in the political process. There are 22 Mayan languages,

² Ríos Montt continued to lead many pre-November polls even after the Supreme Court's decision to disqualify his candidacy, and many voters cast write-in ballots for him.

³ "El elector guatemalteco, desorientado," *Panorama*, August 20, 1990, p. 20. In the poll, conducted by the Chamber of Free Enterprise, 25 percent of the respondents chose a military dictatorship as the best form of government. Twenty-three percent selected democracy. Forty-four percent did not respond.

and many Indians do not speak Spanish. To be sure, differences among indigenous communities make it difficult to generalize about the role of the indigenous population in the political process. In particular, the extent to which some communities have been (or desire to be) integrated into the political process varies. In some cases, Mayans have chosen not to participate in what is perceived as a *ladino* process, preferring instead to maintain their own forms of local governance.

C. Violence and Intimidation

The electoral environment preceding the 1990 and 1991 elections was marred by violence and intimidation. During the months leading up to the November general elections, there were threats against the lives of several candidates for national and local offices. Death threats, which may be common in many countries, are taken more seriously in a setting such as Guatemala, where political assassinations have occurred with alarming frequency.

Before the November general elections, at least five presidential candidates and two vice presidential candidates received threats against their lives and, in some cases, the lives of their families. Alfonso Cabrera, the Christian Democrats' presidential candidate, claimed to have survived four attempts on his life. On the eve of the elections, Raúl Horacio Montenegro, vice presidential candidate for the United Revolutionary Front (FUR), a small leftist party, was beaten and left naked by four men in downtown Guatemala City. Political figures, however, also invented threats and violent incidents to garner publicity, according to a U.S. lawyer working with the Catholic Church human rights office.

On September 28, 1990, two weeks after the Supreme Court granted Ríos Montt a temporary right to register as a candidate, Félix Castillo Milla, director of the Citizens Registry, received a death threat by phone. The caller stated that if Ríos Montt were not permitted to permanently register within three days, Castillo Milla would be assassinated. The three days passed without incident, but Castillo Milla continued to receive threats.

The Electoral Tribunal was also the target of threats. On October 3, 1990, the Electoral Tribunal received a bomb threat, and, on October 8, 1990, a caller threatened to blow up the presses used to print the ballots.

Daily newspaper articles in the months preceding the elections chronicled a widening circle of political violence. The following incidents reflect the dangerous political environment.

- On July 1, 1990, labor leader Petronil Hernández Vasilo, secretary of a union affiliated with the Guatemalan Confederation of Labor Unity (CUSG), was assassinated in Jutiapa.
- On August 28, 1990, Celso Milagro Girón y Girón, UCN candidate for mayor in San Pedro Jocopilas, Quiché, was assassinated.
- On September 7, 1990, Solidarity Action Movement (MAS) vice presidential candidate Gustavo Espina's business was attacked by gunmen who fired bullets into the windows of his office and adjoining buildings. A few hours later, in the middle of the night, unidentified individuals called the candidate's home, threatening that the armed attack was only a "demonstration" of what could happen, and advised him to quit the electoral campaign. Minister of the Interior Carlos Morales Villatoro said the attack on Espina was not politically motivated.
- During the first two weeks of September, bullets were fired at the homes and businesses of several political candidates and participants in the political process, including UCN Congressman Juan Carlos Simons.
- On September 16, 1990, Sebastian Morales, Christian Democratic regional director for San Pedro Jocopilas, was assassinated.
- On October 5, 1990, a mayoral candidate of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in the city of Mixco, Francisco Arnoldo Pensamiento, and his assistant survived an armed attack in Guatemala City. The MLN also denounced the disappearance

on September 27 of Marcos Osorio Chivalan, the party's secretary in Santa Maria Chiquimula.

- Also on October 5, Juan José Rodil Peralta, UCN congressional candidate and former minister of the interior under Cerezo, and Oliverio Garcia Rodas, a UCN Congressman, claimed they were attacked by machine gun fire as they rode through Guatemala City in Rodil's bullet-proof car. No one was hurt. The next day Rodil denied accusations by some Guatemalan Congressmen and other political parties that the incident was a fabricated publicity stunt. A few hours later, Rodil's car was machine-gunned a second time as he traveled from Esquintla to the capital. Again no one was hurt.
- On November, 10, 1990, a UCN political party leader, Mañuel Toj, was killed by a group of unidentified men who broke into his house in Quiché province. On November 29, 1990, a UCN political party leader from San Jose Acatempa, Israel García Escobar, was shot to death while driving to Jutiapa.
- On December 6, 1990, Oscar Augusto Miranda, a leader of the human rights organization, Mutual Support Group (GAM), was kidnapped by several unidentified people who burst into his home. Two days later, his body, showing signs of torture, was found in a village outside Guatemala City.

The increase in political violence before the elections continued a trend in which the human rights situation had been steadily deteriorating during the past two-and-a-half years. In September, the United Nations sent a human rights expert to Guatemala in response to the deteriorating situation. Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, America's Watch and the Washington Office on Latin America also sent delegations in the latter months of the campaign to investigate claims of escalating political violence and specific cases, such as the murder of Myrna Mack, a Guatemalan anthropologist, and the abduction and torture of a U.S. Maryknoll sister, Diana Ortiz.

The U.S. State Department said in its 1990 annual human rights report that "security forces and civil patrols committed, with almost total impunity, a majority of the major human rights abuses."⁴

The government's ombudsman for human rights reported 559 killings and 140 disappearances in 1990. Nongovernmental groups put the number of killings at 1,500. Statistics compiled by the GAM for the five years of Cerezo's administration show a total of almost 4,000 political assassinations, 1,300 kidnapping or disappearances and 600 wounded in assassination or kidnapping attempts. [See Appendix VII for examples of ads denouncing human rights violations.]

Threats and assassinations were not limited to political candidates. Journalists, academics, human rights activists, and industrialists also fell victim to violence. Once the November general elections limited the political field to two candidates, violence against parties and candidates decreased, but the overall level of violence did not.

D. The Role of Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt

The uncertain legal status of Ríos Montt's candidacy was considered by many to be the greatest destabilizing factor in the electoral process. Ríos Montt, who became president following the 1982 military coup and ruled for 18 months, continued to run for president even after his candidacy was legally barred by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Court of Constitutionality. Ríos Montt's popularity was demonstrated in several polls, which showed that even after his candidacy was declared illegal, he maintained the support of between 20 and 30 percent of the electorate. This popularity was attributed to the growing unrest and dissatisfaction with increasing levels of street crime, political violence, and alleged government corruption while private citizens

⁴ "Guatemala," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990*, U.S. Department of State, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 631.

struggled with mounting inflation. These factors contributed to the popularity of a candidate perceived to be iron-fisted, honest and uncompromising.

This positive characterization contrasts with Ríos Montt's international image. His presidency is most remembered internationally for his creation of Guatemala's armed civilian patrols, his "scorched earth" policies in combatting left-wing insurgents and for extrajudicial executions of criminals following secret trials in Courts of Special Jurisdiction.

In the early months of the 1990 presidential campaign, most legal experts and politicians believed that Article 186 of the Guatemalan Constitution, which prohibits any individual who became president as the result of a *coup d'etat* from holding that office again, would prevent Ríos Montt from formally registering as a candidate. Ríos Montt's lawyers, anticipating that the courts would enforce this prohibition, developed several legal arguments based on the Guatemalan Constitution and international human rights covenants. They argued that the provisions prohibiting Ríos Montt's candidacy were not retroactive, that the judicial value of the present constitution began on January 14, 1986 (two years after Ríos Montt was ousted from power by the military), that provisions of international human rights accords prevail over provisions of the Guatemalan Constitution, and that under these accords all citizens have the right to run for office.

In early September, after Ríos Montt's arguments were rejected by the Citizens Registry, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and his official registration as a candidate was denied by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, his lawyers tried a new strategy. With his application for registration pending final appeal before the Supreme Court, he applied for, and was granted, political amnesty by the Supreme Court (an amnesty created in anticipation of the reintegration of guerrillas into Guatemalan society). Ríos Montt's lawyers argued that the amnesty absolved him of all past acts and enabled him to exercise his full rights of participation in the presidential race. [See Appendix VIII for exchange of corres-

pondence between Ríos Montt's campaign manager and Bruce Babbitt.]

As Ríos Montt's lawyers continued to advance an assortment of legal strategies to keep alive his potential candidacy, the September 12 deadline for formal registration of candidates arrived. In a move that surprised many in the legal community and outraged the Citizen's Registry and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court, at midnight on September 12, granted Ríos Montt the right to register, pending a final decision on the constitutionality of his candidacy. This move muddied the pre-election playing field — with Ríos Montt claiming that his candidacy was guaranteed and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal forced to suspend printing of the presidential ballots until a definitive ruling could be made.

After several postponements, on October 12, the Supreme Court, with the support of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, ruled that Ríos Montt was definitively barred from participating in the presidential elections. Ríos Montt appealed to the Court of Constitutionality — his final right of appeal — but that court also ruled against him.

Despite the rejection of his candidacy, Ríos Montt continued to campaign, publicly asserting his right to run for office. [See Appendix IX for ad run by Ríos Montt after being barred from running.] In September, Ríos Montt told the NDI pre-election delegation that he would respect the courts' decisions, but that his supporters might not. "I respect the law, but I cannot control the passion of the people," he said. As the general election approached, his tone became more militant, calling for his supporters to nullify their ballots by writing in his name. "We'll go into the streets and block traffic," he said. "They'll have to run over us. How pretty the blood flowing to protect liberty will be."⁵

However, in the last few days before the general election, Ríos Montt moderated his tone, stating to reporters that he was not

⁵ "Dictatorship Threats Raised by Ríos Montt," *The Miami Herald*, October 27, 1990, p. 3.

sponsoring the "abolishment of the ballot...only informing people that they must select and not elect."⁶ "They have assassinated me politically" he said, referring to the decision rejecting his candidacy. Although he asserted that the people's will was not respected because the Guatemalans prefer him, Ríos Montt also said he would respect the results.⁷ Election-day disturbances (or even a possible coup attempt), expected by some to be instigated by Ríos Montt supporters, did not materialize.

After being barred from running, Ríos Montt did not support another candidate. Only after the field was narrowed to two candidates did the parties backing Ríos Montt support Serrano. Ríos Montt never endorsed anyone because he believed it would have implied recognizing the electoral process and the prohibition of his candidacy.

⁶ "Ríos Montt: Results to be 'respected,'" Notimex, November 11, 1990 in FBIS-LAT-90-219, November 13, 1991, p. 31.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Chapter 4

PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

A. Political Parties

Most political parties in Guatemala are relatively new, personalist electoral vehicles without extensive and permanent organizational structures. Unlike the pre-1985 regime, which required 50,000 signatures to establish and register a political party, forming a party is now relatively easy, requiring only 4,000 signatures. Party allegiance is so weak that before the November elections, many members of Congress had switched parties since their election five years earlier. Few parties possess strong ideological identities or programmatic agendas.

Mass participation in politics was first made possible in 1944, but the coup 10 years later and the three decades of direct and indirect military rule that followed, curtailed opportunities for peaceful political activity. Parties on the left were decimated, and many leftist exiles still do not feel safe enough to return. Some of those who have returned continue to face persecution despite the presence of a civilian government.

Twenty parties participated in the 1990 elections. [See Appendix X for a list of the parties.] Of these, seven lost their status as political parties following the elections for failure to receive the requisite 4 percent of the votes. Not every party participated in municipal elections in all departments. In some departments, for example, as few as four parties ran candidates on the local list.

The presidential ballot contained 12 candidates backed by a total of 13 parties. The major parties and coalitions, and their presidential candidates, are briefly described below:

Christian Democratic Party of Guatemala (DCG)

Presidential Candidate: Alfonso Cabrera

Vice Presidential Candidate: Marco Antonio Villamar

The Christian Democratic Party, a member of the Christian Democratic International, was founded in 1955. In the 1970s, the party formed alliances with more liberal parties and with various labor and women's groups and moderated its originally conservative platform. These alliances helped add labor's urban strength to the Christian Democrats' rural base. The Christian Democratic Party was the leading opposition party during military rule, and its members suffered brutal repression, losing hundreds of candidates and leaders. In 1974, the party won the presidential elections with Rfos Montt as its standard bearer but was denied the presidency by the military. Today the Christian Democratic Party is arguably the best organized party, particularly in rural areas and among the indigenous population.

Alfonso Cabrera, who has been actively involved in politics since his college days, became secretary general of the Christian Democratic Party in 1985. He was the first president of the Constituent Assembly and the Congress. Upon completion of his one-year term as president of the Congress, Cabrera was appointed by Cerezo as minister of special affairs and then as foreign minister. Cabrera was Cerezo's hand-picked choice to succeed him.

Cabrera's presidential campaign was hindered by widespread dissatisfaction with the Cerezo administration and the candidate's alleged ties to drug traffickers. Cabrera's already faltering campaign experienced a further setback when, three weeks before the November 11 general elections, he suffered an attack of acute pancreatitis and was flown to Houston, Texas, for medical care. Top Christian Democratic officials carried on the campaign, but Cabrera's

fragile health forced him to remain outside the country until after the elections.

In an attempt to recapture the support of the left, the Christian Democrats chose Marco Antonio Villamar, a leading figure in the 1944 Revolution, as its vice presidential candidate. The party also attracted leading defectors from the Democratic Socialist Party.

National Centrist Union (UCN)

Presidential Candidate: Jorge Carpio

Vice Presidential Candidate: Manuel Ayau Cordon

The UCN's presidential candidate, Jorge Carpio, is a publishing magnate who finished second to Cerezo in the 1985 elections. The UCN, a member of the Liberal International, also finished second to the Christian Democrats in the 1984 Constituent Assembly elections and the 1988 municipal elections. Carpio owns *El Gráfico*, the second leading daily newspaper in Guatemala, which functions almost exclusively as a party organ.

In 1985, the then two-year-old party had the best-financed campaign and used the most advanced U.S.-style mass media techniques. Carpio's selection of a member of the MLN [below] as his vice presidential candidate contributed to the impression of a rightward shift in the party. The party, however, still defines itself as centrist and seeks to attract the democratic left and the progressive right. The party strongly supports free enterprise and receives heavy financial backing from the business community.

Solidarity Action Movement (MAS)

Presidential Candidate: Jorge Serrano Elías

Vice Presidential Candidate: Gustavo Espina

Jorge Serrano founded MAS after the 1985 elections, in which he finished third as the candidate of the Democratic Party of National Cooperation. From 1987-1990, Serrano was the political party representative to the National Reconciliation Commission and participated in the dialogue with the guerrillas. During the regime of Ríos Montt, Serrano served as head of the Council of State, a

legislative body hand-picked by Ríos Montt. The MAS is a member of the International Democrat Union, the international organization of conservative parties.

Serrano fared poorly in the early public opinion polls, but he apparently benefitted from a strong performance in a televised debate with President Cerezo. A Protestant fundamentalist, Serrano withdrew from leadership in his Protestant church when he decided to enter politics. During the campaign, he downplayed religion as an issue, promising to lead a secular government.

National Advancement Party (PAN)

Presidential Candidate: Alvaro Arzú

Vice Presidential Candidate: Fraternal Vila

Alvaro Arzú was elected mayor of Guatemala City in 1985 and resigned in January 1990 to run for president. The PAN began as a committee to promote Arzú's mayoral candidacy in 1985 and became a party in mid-1989. The party is run by conservative professionals and friends of Arzú. Most of Arzú's support was centered in the capital.

Plataforma No-Venta

Would-be Presidential Candidate: Efraín Ríos Montt

Would-be Vice Presidential Candidate: Harris Whitbeck

The Plataforma No-Venta was a coalition of three parties: the Democratic Institutional Party (PID), a military party; the National Unity Front (FUN); and the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), created in 1990 by Protestant fundamentalist supporters of Ríos Montt. The disqualification of Ríos Montt's candidacy also disqualified the entire national slate of candidates of the Plataforma No-Venta, although district and municipal candidates were permitted to participate in the general elections.

In 1974, Ríos Montt was the Christian Democrat's presidential candidate, but his apparent victory in that election was disallowed by the military, who sent him to Spain as military attaché. Ríos Montt

became president of Guatemala after a coup in 1982 and was overthrown by the military 16 months later.

National Opposition Front (FNO; also identified as PSD/AP5)

Presidential Candidate: René de León Schlotter

Vice Presidential Candidate: Aracely Conde de Paiz

The FNO is an alliance of the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), which is a member of the Socialist International, and the Popular Alliance 5 (AP-5), a splinter of the Christian Democrats. De León Schlotter, a founder of the Christian Democratic Party, left the party after losing the presidential primary to Cabrera.

In the 1970s, many of the PSD's leaders were killed, including the party's founder Alberto Fuentes Mohr, and some remain in exile. The party is strongest in the capital. Of the leading parties, the PSD is probably in the weakest financial position. The party was the first in Guatemalan history to run a woman on the presidential ticket.

National Liberation Movement (MLN)

Presidential Candidate: Col. Luís Ernesto Sosa Avila

Vice Presidential Candidate: David Eskanasy

The MLN was founded by Mario Sandoval Alarcón, patriarch of Guatemalan conservatives, and other supporters of the 1954 "liberation." The party is vehemently anti-communist and promotes conservative socio-economic values. In the late 1960s, it created the "White Hand" death squads. In 1984, Sandoval described himself as a fascist.

The party may have moderated since the last election. Sandoval participated in talks in 1990 between the parties and the guerrillas in Oslo, Norway, where he physically embraced a guerrilla leader.

Presidential candidate Col. Sosa Avila is the brother-in-law of Ríos Montt.

B. The Military and the Civil Defense Patrols

About 65,000 Guatemalans serve in the military. An estimated 95 percent of the soldiers are Mayans. Members of the armed forces cannot vote. The military did not directly impede or interfere in the electoral process, possibly because no candidate with a good chance of winning was perceived to threaten its authority. The military leadership, however, was believed to have been most wary of a strong Ríos Montt candidacy, who as president disrupted the military hierarchy.

Since the return to civilian rule, the military has in theory abandoned the doctrine of national security, which maintained that internal subversion was the primary threat to national security, in favor of what it calls the thesis of national stability. This thesis is based on the belief that in a polarized, less-developed society, the attempt of one sector to impose itself on the rest of society is destabilizing. Military officials also maintain that the armed forces are professionalizing their ranks, seeking to minimize military politicization.

The military is not a monolithic force. During the Cerezo administration, younger officers attempted two coups. The instigators of the first coup attempt denounced the government and the military high command for drug trafficking and corruption. The target of the second coup was then-Defense Minister General Hector Alejandro Gramajo, who was perceived as too close to the Christian Democrats and allegedly corrupt.

As a result of the coup attempts, Cerezo was forced to make important concessions to the military. Gen. Gramajo resigned as minister of defense to study at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Many political analysts speculate that Gramajo is being groomed, or is grooming himself, to enter the presidential race in 1995.

Guatemalan and international human rights groups believe the military and security forces are responsible for political killings and disappearances, but to date no member of the military or the police has been punished for human rights abuses. Guatemalan human

rights groups and many academics and politicians believe that political freedom cannot be expanded until the military's impunity and influence in politics is ended. They say the military has to accept differing political views and not associate dissident views with communism or subversion.

Civil defense patrols are one example of this widespread military influence. The civil patrols were first established in 1981 and officially sanctioned shortly after the 1982 coup that brought Rfos Montt to power. At their peak in 1984, nearly 1 million men served in the patrols, many of them involuntarily recruited through fear of being accused of sympathizing with the guerrillas or of facing violent reprisals if they refused to join. As armed civilians under the control of the army, the civil patrols were a crucial element in the army's counterinsurgency war. Except for some areas in the east and south of the country, most rural communities at one time or another formed civil patrols. By 1985, the rigidity of the patrol system was disbanded or relaxed in many areas, but today an estimated 500,000 people still serve.⁸

Human rights leaders cite incidents of torture, disappearance, harassment and death carried out by civil patrols, particularly patrol commanders. The civilian commanders of local patrols are often characterized as the community "bad seeds" who use their power and connections to the local military bases to control and terrorize fellow villagers. The civil patrol commanders are given a special "quasi-military" status, which protects them from prosecution in civilian courts.

The 1985 Constitution abolished compulsory civil patrol duty, but the army is accused by human rights and indigenous advocacy groups of compelling participation through intimidation and violence. The government says the majority of civil patrol members serve voluntarily. On December 17, 1990, during the period between the two election rounds, the Guatemalan Congress passed legislation that

⁸ "Above the Law? Civil Patrols in Guatemala," *Central America Report*, May 18, 1990.

terminated military control of the patrols and placed them under civilian government authority. How the law will be implemented in practice remains to be seen.

Opposition parties said they expected the military to try to influence the elections through the civil defense patrols. Before the elections, the civil patrols were coordinated by the army's Department of Civilian Affairs, which could theoretically have tried to pressure the patrols into voting for a particular candidate. Other observers, however, noted that the military was probably too divided and the civil defense patrols too independent from central control for the military to organize a campaign in favor of a particular candidate. For example, even though the military leadership was believed to be wary of Ríos Montt, some mid-level officials were more sympathetic to his candidacy. No evidence of a national or local coordinated military attempt to affect the outcome of the vote through pressure on the patrols ever materialized.

C. URNG Guerrillas and the Peace Process

Estimates of the number of armed rebels range from the Defense Ministry's 950 to the guerrillas' claims of 3,500 to 4,000. The rebels were subdued by an army campaign in the early 1980s, but resumed guerrilla activities in 1989 with a series of attacks on bridges and electrical towers. The guerrillas do not represent a serious threat to the government.

The URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit), the coalition of guerrilla groups, advocates the elimination of the civil defense patrols, subordination of the military and police to the civilian judiciary, land reform and adequate political representation of the country's ethnic groups.

The Cerezo government and the military had maintained that the URNG must lay down its weapons before negotiations could take place with the government, but the URNG responded that it would not disarm until progress is made on its demands. In order to improve the atmosphere for negotiations between the government and the guerrillas, Guatemala's National Reconciliation Commission convened meetings between the URNG and leaders of various sectors

of Guatemalan society. In a meeting in Spain in May 1990, the political parties and the URNG recognized the need for judicial reform, agreed to include the URNG in a national constituent assembly in 1991 and promised to hold future meetings. The guerrillas agreed not to disrupt the elections.

Three months later, the URNG met in Canada with leading Guatemalan business leaders. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the meeting. The URNG accepted the premise that "business sectors and foreign investment can play a positive, dynamic and responsible role." Following the meeting, the private sector announced its support for the formation of a legal Communist Party in Guatemala. In September, the URNG met with religious leaders in Ecuador, where they committed themselves to pursuing a peaceful and political solution to the armed conflict.

In late October, the insurgent movement met with trade union and lower-income sectors. The meeting ended with appeals to the Guatemalan government and the army to engage in direct dialogue with the URNG. This fourth round of peace talks produced a document that called for a national constituent assembly to "discuss constitutional reforms that would effectively allow for an improvement in democracy and guarantee that it would be real and participatory in nature."⁹

Although the URNG apparently kept its promise not to disrupt the elections on November 11, sabotage of bridges and local communications channels resumed almost at the stroke of midnight on November 12. In addition to running newspaper and radio ads before the elections advising Guatemalans to register their dissatisfaction with the government by boycotting the ballot box, insurgents are reported to have held local town meetings and stopped traffic on election day, admonishing people not to vote. [See Appendix XI for URNG ad published after first round of elections.]

⁹ "CNR, URNG call for Constitutional Assembly, *La Jornada*, October 26, 1990 in FBIS-LAT-90-224, November 20, 1990, p. 11.

D. The Media

The media in Guatemala consists of six television stations (one government, one evangelical and four private), four major newspapers, one major weekly news magazine and more than 200 radio stations broadcast in Spanish and a number of indigenous languages. Print media is considered to be the most objective and sophisticated source of information. But due to the high level of illiteracy in Guatemala (estimates range as high as 50 percent nationwide and 70 percent for the indigenous population), few people read newspapers or magazines. In the rural areas, where televisions are scarce, radio is the primary source of information.

Guatemalans enjoy legal guarantees of press freedom. Although there is more coverage of such sensitive topics as the military, drug trafficking and human rights abuses than in the early 1980s, journalists say they routinely censor themselves. In 1989, journalists suffered a series of attacks. A bomb exploded at a privately owned television station, a shareholder of a weekly newspaper was assassinated, and a number of reporters received death threats.

In 1988, *La Época*, a progressive weekly founded by journalist Byron Barrera, became a forum for discussing controversial topics. The publication closed after just four months when its offices were destroyed. The first reported attack against a journalist during the 1990 election campaign occurred on October 15, when Víctor Humberto Gonzalez Gamarra, the owner of two major radio stations and the general secretary of the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Union (URD), was assassinated. Less than two weeks later, Barrera was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt, and his wife was killed in the attack. Barrera has since left the country.

1. *Print media*

Most newspapers and magazines maintain a conservative editorial line, which is also reflected in their reporting. Major publications are owned by individuals who are moderate to conservative politically. The exceptions are the underground newspapers of limited circulation printed by students at the University of San Carlos.

The only newspapers circulated nationally are *Prensa Libre* and *El Gráfico*. *El Gráfico*, owned by UCN presidential candidate Jorge Carpio, was relentless in its criticism of Cerezo, his administration and the Christian Democrats. Highly sensational, it serves for all intents and purposes as the UCN's official organ. *Prensa Libre* was almost, if not equally, as critical of the Cerezo administration, though it is less inflammatory than *El Gráfico* and its reporting is considered more objective.

Other newspapers, considered less influential but generally offering more solid journalism, are *La Hora* and *Siglo XXI*, both of which have limited circulation outside Guatemala City. *Siglo XXI* is said to be strongly influenced by the private sector. *La Hora* owner Oscar Clemente Marroquín, who unsuccessfully ran for the office of mayor of Guatemala City, used his paper for campaign purposes.

The most professional and objective source of information is the weekly news magazine *Crónica*. *Crónica* refuses to run political ads (a policy the magazine's managing editor says enhances its credibility but has left it financially strapped) and is comprehensive in its coverage of all parties and candidates. However, *Crónica's* price is prohibitive for much of the general population. One copy costs roughly the equivalent of a day's wages for a skilled laborer.

Reporters and editors of major national publications note that self-censorship of the press is maintained through fear of reprisals. They, therefore, are discouraged from publishing stories that cover more than the most superficial details of issues and incidents involving paramilitary groups and security forces. Some political leaders accuse the management of some publications of being more concerned with maintaining good personal relationships with their friends in the government and military than with their publication's coverage of controversial issues involving the armed forces. Journalists acknowledge the virtual absence of investigative reporting. Murders, disappearances and assaults are most often reported with a minimum of details, devoid of investigatory interviews or an analysis of the case.

To the Cerezo administration's credit, it fully tolerated, if not encouraged, abundant criticism of the government in the press. This climate of tolerance helped to strengthen Guatemala's National Press Association. Although the national press is still highly constrained by self-censorship, the press association has been increasingly independent and is seen by many as a vehicle for change in Guatemala. The press responded strongly to the attempted assassination of Barrera and the murder of Gonzalez Gamarra.

2. *Television and Radio*

By law, state television and radio were required during the campaign period to provide 30 minutes per week of air time to each registered party or coalition of parties. Some parties complained they were not given their share of time and, more important, that the time afforded the government for official programming was often used for partisan purposes by the Christian Democrats. For example, the Christian Democratic party symbol was shown on television screens following presidential talks. Critics complained that "Conversemos," a weekly hour-long government program on which Cerezo had "conversations" with the Guatemalan public, was used to bolster the Christian Democrats and Cabrera.

Laws regulating rates for political ads were unevenly enforced, if enforced at all. According to the election law, private press and media are prohibited from charging in excess of commercial rates for political advertising. Nevertheless, political parties and organizations say they were routinely charged double for political ads. They were hesitant to file charges, however, for fear of losing media access.

Although foreign ownership of Guatemalan television and radio stations is legally prohibited, at least four of the six private television stations are effectively foreign-owned. One official of the Democratic Socialist Party alleged that Angel Gonzalez, a Mexican who owns two channels, feathered his relationships with potential future administrations by giving to a chosen few large amounts of free air time for campaign ads. He also allotted some free time to all of the other candidates. Because candidates receiving minimal air time (e.g., one hour as opposed to 40 hours per week) needed any

time they could get, they were reluctant to lodge formal complaints and risk loss of the little time they had been granted.

E. The Private Sector

Guatemala's economic elite is a diverse group, led by the traditional *ladino* elite, whose wealth has historically been based on coffee, but which has moved in the last three decades into industry and new agro-exports, and into companies acting as junior partners to U.S. banks and transnational companies. Most recently, an increasingly powerful entrepreneurial group has been emerging in the private sector.

The economic interests of the groups constituting the economic elite do not always overlap. While the traditional agro-exporters have less interest in fostering domestic consumption and benefit from currency devaluations, the newer entrepreneurs who provide goods and services to the Guatemalan public seek to bolster the internal market and oppose currency devaluations.

Two organizations dominate the Guatemalan private sector: UNAGRO, representing traditional agricultural interests, and CACIF, the main voice of trade, industry and finance. Piramide, the influential money-raising and strategy arm of CACIF, represents some of the most powerful non-traditional elements of the private sector.

Historically, Guatemala's economic elite has been (along with the military) one of the two most powerful actors influencing the government from behind the scenes. In the last few years, however, important ideological divisions have emerged within the economic elite. A younger group of CACIF and Piramide reformist leaders has advocated that business leaders seek elected public office and actively participate in politics, while an older group consisting primarily of traditional agro-exporters wishes to maintain behind-the-scenes influence.

Among the reformists are 20 members of CACIF who ran for public office in the 1990 elections. Included in this group is CACIF member and Piramide founder Guillermo Gonzalez, who was elected to the Central American Parliament as a MAS member. "I remember

when I was a boy, sitting at the dining room table listening to my father and his friends talk about who should be the minister of economy," Gonzalez told an NDI delegate before the elections. "In those days, the private sector could decide such things behind closed doors — and the decisions were implemented."

Gonzalez said the behind-the-scenes power of the economic elite must continue to diminish in order for Guatemala to develop a strong democracy. "The stability and peace we desire as a country can only be brought about through legitimate, sanctioned participation in the political process," he said. Many members of the private sector say the traditional oligarchical structure of the past is being dismantled not by the efforts of the guerrillas or the government, but by many of the economic elite's own members.

Some more critical outside observers attribute the private sector's political diversification as necessary to build a broader "legitimate" base of support in view of an increasingly autonomous military. The relationship between CACIF and the military, though close, has never been comfortable. Although united in their fight against "subversion" and the protection of private property, they diverge on other issues. CACIF advocates decreased government spending, an end to military corruption and privatization of various public companies (in which the military is said to have a stake) as a solution to the country's fiscal problems. The military has argued for increased taxation of the private sector.

Since its founding in 1956, CACIF has distrusted reformist attitudes within the Christian Democratic Party, equating reform with socialism. At the beginning of his term, Cerezo embarked on a cautious land reform program, which met with resistance from the agro-industrial members of the private sector, resulting in little distribution of land.

The private sector divided its support among Carpio, Arzú, Serrano and, before he was disqualified, Ríos Montt. Party leaders and prominent businessmen told NDI that Carpio initially received the most support among members of the private sector, with select members of Piramide reportedly donating more than \$1.5 million to his campaign. By early November, significant private sector backing

was also given to Arzú and to some extent Serrano. By November 11, Arzú was a close second favorite to Carpio among the economic elite. In the second round, private sector support reportedly shifted dramatically from Carpio to Serrano.

Surprisingly, once the field narrowed to two candidates, it became evident that powerful members of the private sector had been giving Serrano moral, if not financial, support for quite some time. By the time the general election ended, Carpio had managed to alienate many members of the economic elite. For the most part, those who had been backing Arzú gave Serrano considerable support in the second round.

F. Catholic and Protestant Churches

1. Catholic Church

Due to its large following and considerable financial resources, the Catholic Church plays an important unofficial role in the Guatemalan political process. Representatives of the Church met with the guerrillas in September in Ecuador as part of the peace process sponsored by the National Reconciliation Commission, which is presided by Bishop Monseñor Quesada Toruño. The Church also has established a human rights office.

The Church has been careful to present itself as fully supportive of the democratic process and not partial to a particular party or candidate. The Church hierarchy occasionally offers its views on specific politically charged topics (such as land reform, the civil patrols and human rights) via widely publicized pastoral letters, and some clergy delve more directly into politics. The Church institutionally, however, avoids directly linking its views to any political platform.

This position of political neutrality was officially maintained by the leadership of the Catholic Church throughout the run-off, despite Serrano's strong links to the evangelical movement. Carpio's repeated attempts to draw the Church into his fight against Serrano, though largely rebuffed by the Catholic leaders, found more success with local priests, many of whom admonished their parishioners to

prevent the spread of evangelism in Guatemala by voting against Serrano. Despite these often impassioned sermons, massive polarization of the Catholic voting constituency against Serrano did not occur.

2. *Protestant churches*

Guatemala has one of the highest percentages of Protestants in Latin America. An estimated 20 to 30 percent of Guatemalans are Protestant, and demographers expect Guatemala to become, sometime in the next few decades, the first country in Latin America with a Protestant majority.

As with the case of the Catholic Church, the majority of Protestant churches in Guatemala did not officially choose sides in any political contest. In the early 1980s, a Protestant commission, The Commission of Social Responsibilities of the Church, laid down what it termed a "golden rule:" while Christians should meet their civic responsibilities, they should do so as individuals, and that the church as an institution should categorically refrain from participating in politics.¹⁰

Protestant churches possess the capability to influence politics in Guatemala. There are seven evangelical radio stations (some of them in native Mayan languages), one television station, a magazine and one newspaper of wide distribution. Due to their emphasis on a literal reading of the Bible, most Protestants are literate. While accurate statistics are not available, it is estimated that more than 80 percent of Protestants can read, compared with 45 percent of the total Guatemalan population.

Nevertheless, the Protestant churches do not represent a unified political force. Their membership is found mostly in rural areas. Since transportation and communication in rural areas are difficult, any mass movement based there tends to be politically marginalized.

¹⁰ David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth* (Oxford: The University of California Press, 1990), p. 209.

Moreover, there are more than 200 different independent evangelical sects in the country. The only evangelical presidential candidate was Serrano, and there is no evidence that evangelicals voted overwhelmingly for him.

Chapter 5

ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

Guatemalans went to the polls on November 11, 1990, to elect a president and vice president, 116 members of Congress, 20 members to the Central American Parliament and local officials in 300 of the country's 330 municipalities. Since no presidential candidate obtained more than 50 percent of the votes, a run-off election was held on January 6, 1991, between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes.

Presidents serve five-year terms and cannot be re-elected. Twenty-nine members of the 116-member Congress, who also serve five-year terms, were chosen from a national list and 87 were chosen by district.

Elections in Guatemala are governed by a law considered by the political parties to be comprehensive and unambiguous. The current election law was drafted in 1987 and revised as recently as 1990.

A. Electoral Tribunal

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) was widely respected by virtually all participants in the political process as an impartial body of competent and committed professionals. The method of selecting the five magistrates on the tribunal enhances its standing as a nonpartisan body. A nominating committee made up of representatives from universities and professional schools submits to the Supreme Court a list of 20 candidates chosen from a pool of practicing attorneys who meet the legal requirements for appointment to the tribunal. From these candidates, the Supreme Court, by a two-

thirds majority vote of its members, selects five magistrates and five alternates to serve five-year terms.

Although the tribunal is dependent upon other branches of government for its financing, the selection method and the seemingly universal respect for the tribunal president, Arturo Herbruger, and his colleagues has afforded the tribunal a degree of autonomy and independence otherwise unknown in Guatemalan politics. Since its formation seven years ago, the tribunal has strengthened and jealously guarded its autonomy. Although some parties claimed before the November elections that irregularities might affect the outcome of the elections, they also credited the tribunal for its efforts to minimize any attempts at fraud. Ultimately, no allegations of significant fraud were raised by any of the parties following the elections.

B. Local Electoral Boards

The elections are administered in each department by a three-member board (*junta electoral departmental*, or JED), made up of a president, secretary and member (*vocal*) in each of the 22 departments. There is also a three-member board (*junta electoral municipal*, or JEM) in each of the 330 municipalities. The members of the departmental boards are chosen by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; the departmental boards select the members of the municipal boards. The municipal boards in turn select the three officials that staff each of the voting sites (*juntas receptoras de votación*, or JRV).

The municipal boards are responsible for selecting the voting sites, which are principally located in local schools, municipal buildings and town courtyards. The municipal boards also supply the JRVs with the necessary materials and send the election results to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal after receiving them from the JRVs.

C. Voter Registration

All Guatemalan citizens at least 18 years old who are not in the military or an armed police force are eligible to vote. More than 3.2 million people, approximately 70 percent of the potential electorate, registered to vote in the 1990 elections, an increase of about 450,000

since 1985. Thanks to braille ballots, the blind were able to vote for the first time.

Unlike in 1985, voting was not obligatory, although one cannot obtain a passport or drivers license without registering to vote. Citizens registered to vote by obtaining a registration document issued by the Citizens Registry or an annotation on their *cédula de vecindad*, the national identification card. The *cédula* is issued by the mayor of each municipality. Voter registration for the 1990 elections closed on August 11, 90 days before election day. Only those citizens registered for the 1990 November election were eligible to vote in the January runoff.

The TSE acknowledged that the electoral registries contained inaccuracies and that some people possessed false national identification cards. The tribunal is seeking funding to overhaul the national citizens registry and replace the traditional paper *cédulas* with tamper-resistant plastic cards for future elections. Despite imperfections in the registry, no parties charged that the outcome of this year's elections were affected by registration problems or duplicate voting.

Before the November elections, opposition political parties charged that Christian Democratic officials in small towns falsified *cédulas* to facilitate multiple voting for the ruling party. The tribunal acknowledged that some *cédulas* may have been duplicated but is confident that multiple voting was held to a minimum.

D. Voter Education Campaigns

Voter education campaigns were carried out around the country by the TSE and private organizations. Among those participating in civic education programs about the electoral process were the nonpartisan think tank CEDEP (Center for Political Studies) and Jovenes de Guatemala (Guatemalan Youth), a youth organization. CEDEP initiated a voter education program in mid-October, funded in part by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which included television spots, newspaper ads and radio notices in Spanish and several indigenous languages. Hampered by limited funds, CEDEP was unable to obtain as much advertising space as originally

planned and had to shorten its overall education campaign. Despite the financial constraints, CEDEP's efforts were highly visible and commended by the TSE.

Jovenes de Guatemala obtained much of its financial support from individual businesses. In addition to erecting numerous nonpartisan billboards around the country and circulating flyers and bumper stickers encouraging Guatemalans to vote, Jovenes hosted a civic forum in September for the presidential candidates.

Like CEDEP, the TSE conducted its voter education campaign through multilingual radio ads, television spots and extensive newspaper coverage. The advertisements encouraged people to vote, provided details on how to vote and described how to ensure that one's documentation was in proper order to vote. [See Appendix XII for examples of voter education material.] Much of the TSE's budget for voter education was supplied by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Critics complained that the TSE voter education campaign began too late (newspaper ads appeared beginning in late October) and that little was done to encourage citizens to register. TSE officials conceded that more could have been accomplished with greater funding.

Chapter 6

NOVEMBER 11, 1990, GENERAL ELECTION

On the morning of November 10, the NDI delegation divided into seven teams and deployed to cities throughout the country. [See Appendices XIII and XIV for delegation's terms of reference and arrival statement.] The delegation's coverage was extensive, reaching Huehuetenango in the west, Esquintla in the south, Esquipulas in the east and Nebaj in the north. The delegates visited some of the more remote regions of the country and watched the voting and counting in areas that had never been visited by foreign observers. Each team met with local election and municipal officials, political party members and candidates, human rights workers and local clergy. [See Appendix XV for delegation's schedule.] On election day, the delegation collectively visited more than 400 polling stations in more than 45 municipalities. [See Appendix XVI for press coverage of delegation.]

A. The Balloting Process

On election day, most of the country's 5,630 voting precincts opened as scheduled at 7 a.m. By 6 a.m., some polling sites had lines of several hundred people. Some people had arrived hours earlier after having walked from one to four hours from their homes. Voters waited patiently for the polls to open, in most places forming separate (and dramatically shorter) lines for women. By noon, most precincts had short lines, if any at all.

As stated previously, each JRV was administered by three officials chosen by the municipal electoral board to represent the

electoral tribunal. The JRV consisted of a president, secretary and a third member called a *vocal*. Also present at each table were accredited party pollwatchers and an official TSE "instructor" who verified voters' documentation and gave instructions to voters unfamiliar with the voting process. The NDI delegation observed that even in the most remote areas, almost every JRV had a pollwatcher from each of the major parties running a presidential candidate.

Some of the larger parties had arranged to accredit several pollwatchers for each JRV so that a pollwatcher could be relieved every few hours. Smaller parties, however, often had only one representative to monitor the entire process, including the vote count. Some pollwatchers interviewed in the morning did not expect their parties to be able to provide substitute monitors or food.

The JRV officials sat at a table with three slots cut into it (one slot for each of the three ballots: presidential, congressional and municipal). Taped underneath each of the slots was a large transparent plastic bag, used to collect the ballots. Transparent bags were used to prevent ballot box stuffing.

A maximum of 600 voters was assigned to each JRV. Voting procedures in Guatemala are similar to the methods utilized elsewhere in Latin America. Upon arriving at the JRV, a voter presented a registration card or *cédula* to the precinct officials, who verified the name against the voter registry, checked off the name and asked the voter to sign the registry. Illiterate voters signed with an inked thumb print.

The voter was then given a black crayon and three ballots, each of which had been folded in half and signed on the back by the president of the JRV. There were three ballots: a presidential ballot that also contained the national list of congressional candidates and candidates for the Central American Parliament, a district ballot containing the district congressional candidates and a municipal ballot listing the candidates for municipal posts. In selecting a presidential candidate, the voter simultaneously cast a vote for the party's national list of congressional candidates and deputies to the Central American

Parliament. The national list ballot contained the name, photograph and party symbol of the presidential candidate.

Having received the ballots, the voter went behind a voting cubicle and marked his or her preferences. He or she then folded each ballot and deposited it into the corresponding clear plastic bag. Once the voter had finished voting, the president of the JRV stamped the voter's *cédula* or registration card. The voter's finger was then dipped in indelible ink as a safeguard against multiple voting.

The voting precincts closed at 6 p.m. Anyone in line when the balloting ended was permitted to vote. In many JRVs, no voter arrived after 2 or 3 p.m. Some polling sites in isolated regions without electricity closed between 4 and 5 p.m. so that the ballots could be counted before dark. Electoral officials also feared interference by the guerrillas in some areas of the country if they transported the results to the municipal capitals at night.

B. Military and Police Participation

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) initially sought to have the military play as minimal a role as possible in the elections, asserting to one of NDI's pre-electoral delegations that it would require the police and the army to remain outside of the voting areas. Emphasizing their expectations of a peaceful election day, the magistrates of the TSE expressed their intentions to provide adequate security, but to minimize high-profile security measures. One of the TSE's magistrates told NDI: "We don't want the voters to feel intimidated, pressured or harassed in any way by the presence of security forces at the polls or to be afraid to go to the polls because they have heard a lot about security risks. The police and the army are cooperating fully to keep the process safe and complying with our wishes that they keep their distance."

As November 11, 1990, approached and the level of political violence increased, the TSE was forced to reverse its original plan. Instead of downplaying the presence of security forces on election day, the TSE launched a publicity campaign to inform voters that full-scale security precautions were underway to guarantee security on election day. Rumors of possible attempts by Ríos Montt

supporters or the URNG to disrupt the elections had created an atmosphere of apprehension, which the TSE sought to minimize. Security surrounding access to TSE headquarters tightened, and the minister of the interior and the chief of police publicly detailed security plans for election day.

By all reports, the conduct of the army and the police on election day was exemplary. At polling sites visited by NDI delegates, police officers were visible but inconspicuous, often keeping an unobtrusive distance of at least 20 meters from the polling site.

Early on the morning of election day, NDI observers sighted heavily armored personnel carriers and several military vehicles on the highway north of Huehuetenango — yet no military personnel were seen near the polling sites. When asked about the absence of the army, a national policeman in the town of San Sebastián said the army was in the hills behind the town on full alert to assist if needed. "They send a runner down every half hour or so and we give them a report as to how things are going. They also have some plain-clothes men watching to let them know if anything looks unusual." The same policeman stated that the national police and the treasury police had been given special instructions to stay "a short distance" from the polls but to be close enough to intervene in case of any disturbance.

C. Transportation

Since polling precincts are often located several hours from remote villages, the ability to transport voters and influence undecided or indifferent passengers is believed to give certain parties an advantage at the polls. Before the elections, opposition parties asserted that the Christian Democrats would have a significant advantage on election day because of its access to government vehicles. The government was said to have used numerous state vehicles and even state boats to transport voters in the 1988 municipal elections. Such allegations prompted suggestions that the TSE control government resources on election day to transport voters in a nonpartisan fashion, but the TSE took no such action.

Members of the delegation also heard several allegations that the UCN and PAN, the two parties with the most financial resources, had monopolized transportation in several towns by paying transport owners not to operate on election day in order to reduce available transportation for other parties. Some voters said that they had merely ridden in with "everyone else."

The lack of transportation and few voting precincts in rural areas) may be partially responsible for the abstention rate, particularly among women. Many men who had made the long walk from their homes to the polling sites said their wives had stayed home with the children or had gone to the market rather than vote.

D. The Counting Process

When the voting was completed, the JRV president opened the bags containing the ballots, unfolded and counted them. This process was followed one bag at a time, presidential ballots first, followed by the district and then municipal ballots. The number of ballots was compared with the number of people who had voted, according to the electoral list of the precinct. The votes were then counted one by one and read out loud by the JRV president who, in most cases, held each ballot up to be viewed by the other two precinct officials and the party pollwatchers. If everyone agreed on who received the vote cast on that ballot, the vote was recorded on a tally sheet (*acta*). If someone did not agree, a vote was taken among the JRV officials and pollwatchers. The electoral law states that if the vote results in a tie, the ballot is nullified. When a pollwatcher disputed a decision, the pollwatcher registered a formal complaint to the municipal electoral board and the TSE.

Once the counting was complete, the *vocal* announced the results to those present. If one of the pollwatchers did not agree, the president conducted a recount until the results were accepted by a majority of the JRV officials and pollwatchers. At those voting precincts observed by NDI delegates, the counting process was conducted with great care and professionalism. Party pollwatchers were fully involved in the process, carefully verifying each of the results recorded on the *actas*.

Each of the *actas* contained the complete election results, including the number of null and blank votes, as well as a list of challenges filed by the party pollwatchers. Each *acta* was signed by the three JRV officials and the pollwatchers; the pollwatchers received an official copy. The *actas* were then transported and the results telephoned to the municipal electoral boards, which, in turn, sent the results by fax to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, headquartered in the El Dorado Hotel in Guatemala City. The seals and signatures of local election officials were verified by the TSE upon receipt in Guatemala City.

The system of transmitting local vote tallies by fax was originally developed in Guatemala and has subsequently been adopted by other Central American countries to help ensure the accuracy and authenticity of transmitted local results. The counting process at the municipal, district and national levels ran smoothly. Within four hours of the closing of the polls, the TSE began announcing preliminary results in the presidential race.

Before the elections, members of various political parties, particularly the UCN, had voiced concern that the government's control of the telephone lines would facilitate government tampering with transmission of the results. No allegations of tampering were raised, however.

E. Results

Carpio finished first in the first round with 25.72 percent, followed closely by Serrano who garnered 24.14 percent. Cabrera came in third with 17.5 percent followed by Arzú with 17.29 percent. The UCN won the most congressional seats (41), followed by the Christian Democrats (27), MAS (18), PAN (12) and the three-party coalition backing Ríos Montt (12). [See Appendix XVII for presidential and congressional results.]

F. Voter Turnout and Nullified Votes

As noted earlier, an estimated 65-70 percent of Guatemala's eligible voters registered to vote. Fifty-seven percent of registered voters cast ballots on November 11. Ten percent of the ballots cast

were nullified or blank. This means that only about 35 percent of eligible voters cast valid ballots.

Turnout was lower than in 1985 when 69 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Citizens were not required to vote in 1990 and 1991 as they were in 1985, nor were the elections considered as historically significant as the elections in 1985 that led to the transition from military to civilian rule. Some speculate that the low turnout in November was partially due to the lack of profound debate over issues and the difficulty of distinguishing between the leading candidates. As Alvaro Arzú, the presidential candidate of the Party of National Advancement (PAN), reportedly said before the general elections, "There's no real difference between any of us."¹¹ Arzú publicly denied having made this comment.

Turnout in indigenous regions was particularly low, especially among women. In the department of Quiché, only 47 percent of registered voters cast ballots in the first round. That figure declined to 31 percent in the second round. In the department of Huehuetenango, the corresponding percentages were 49 and 35. This contrasts with turnouts of 61 percent and 54 percent in the department of Guatemala, a largely *ladino* department that comprises Guatemala City. Figures are not available by sex. Nevertheless, in some areas the delegation observed, up to 95 percent of the voters were men.

Ríos Montt's insistence in the weeks before the general election that he was still a candidate despite the ruling against him, and his subsequent call to voters to nullify their ballots by writing in his name (there is no provision for write-in votes), undoubtedly increased the number of invalid votes. The percentage of null and blank votes was 10 percent in 1990, 2 percentage points higher than in 1985 when voters were less experienced with voting procedures.

It is impossible to know how many people voted for Ríos Montt because ballots bearing his name were not counted separately from other nullified ballots. Nevertheless, when the ballots were being

¹¹ Lindsey Gruson, "In Guatemala, a Taste for Strongmen Lingers," *The New York Times*, October 11, 1990, p. 11.

counted at the JRVs, NDI delegates saw many votes for Ríos Montt. Of the nullified and blank ballots that a regional team watched being counted at one precinct, for example, about one-third had Ríos Montt's name, the initials RM or a large X (as Ríos Montt had instructed) marked on them. Another one-third were nullified because they were marked incorrectly in some way (e.g., more than one X marked on the ballot) and about one-third percent were blank.

Ríos Montt's call to write-in his name reached the most remote areas of the country. In Nebaj, an isolated town in a war zone in Quiché province, voters told NDI delegates that they had "received their order from the general." Many of those interviewed believed Ríos Montt could be elected with write-in votes. At the least, many supported Ríos Montt's view that his receiving a majority of the votes would demonstrate he should have been elected.

Ríos Montt's instructions to his constituents may have cost the parties of the Plataforma No-Venta municipal and congressional votes. Some of his supporters nullified all three ballots instead of just nullifying the presidential ballot and voting for the party on the other two ballots.

The URNG guerrillas urged Guatemalans not to vote. The URNG bought full page ads in the country's major newspapers, distributed leaflets and advertised on radio stations reaching remote areas of the interior to urge Guatemalans to abstain. In a communiqué published on November 8, titled "These Elections are not the Solution," the URNG stated:

In a society in which the civilian government and state are under military control, these elections and their results can neither be an expression of the people's free will nor a democratic means to solve the serious and pressing problems of the people in general....It is not through this electoral process that the people will ensure that they will become direct participants in solving the crisis; these

elections are not a guarantee of the free expression of the people's will.¹²

¹² "URNG People Not to Vote in Elections," *El Grafico*, November 8, 1990, p. 72 in FBIS-LAT-90-218, November 9, 1990, p. 10.

Chapter 7

THE RUN-OFF ELECTION: CARPIO vs. SERRANO

Following Serrano's surprisingly strong showing, when he came within percentage points of finishing first, Serrano, to whom few people had paid much attention early in the campaign, quickly became the heavy second-round favorite. Carpio, who won the first round, was not expected to be able to expand his base of support after having spent millions of dollars and years on his campaign. That turned out to be the case as Serrano won 65 percent to Carpio's 30 percent. Serrano benefitted from the support of the Christian Democrats and the PAN.

Personal attacks characterized the campaign between Serrano and Carpio. The UCN initiated the mudslinging via José Rodil, former Christian Democrat and interior minister under Cerezo, who accused Serrano of defaulting on his many personal loans. Serrano filed a law suit in retaliation claiming defamation of character. Carpio used not-so-subtle tactics to make religion a campaign issue to appeal to the country's majority Catholic population to keep the Protestant Serrano out of the presidential palace. The negative campaigning apparently backfired, disturbing even some members of Carpio's own party.

Serrano was also perceived as the candidate most likely to succeed in negotiating a peace agreement with the guerrillas. A day after the first round, he said, he would not demand that the guerrillas surrender their weapons as a precondition to negotiations. Participants in the meetings between the guerrillas and leaders of various sectors of Guatemalan society say that Serrano's previous

involvement in the peace negotiations improves his chances for achieving a lasting resolution to Guatemala's internal conflict.

The elections again were well-administered; no irregularities were reported. As expected, turnout was lower in the second round than in the first; about 45 percent of registered voters cast ballots.

The most noteworthy and tragic event between the first and second rounds of voting was the December 2 killing by the military of 16 people in the town of Santiago Atitlán. Both candidates condemned military personnel for the deaths that resulted when soldiers fired on a crowd gathered at a military base to demand that the base be relocated. Serrano and Carpio said the guilty military personnel should be punished, and both promised to fully investigate the crimes if elected to the presidency.

The brutality of the attack generated unprecedented condemnation of the army by the government, the Church, public and private organizations, academics, the media, the presidential candidates and the international community. Markedly lacking in the national public response was the customary evasion of direct criticism of the country's security forces. Instead, the killings led to a flood of newspaper articles and radio and television commentaries directly criticizing the military not only for its authorship of the massacre but also for what one editorial referred to as "the 'holocaust' that Guatemala has suffered under authoritarian governments from 1978 through 1982."¹³ On December 8, for the first time in the country's history, an official report (authored by Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de Leon Carpio) directly accused the army as an institution of human rights violations.

The army responded to the public outcry by removing several local military officers from their post at the Santiago Atitlán base and, under a presidential order, closing the base soon thereafter. Four days after the attack, Defense Minister General Juan Leonel Bolaños held a press conference at which he named two officers the army was holding responsible for the crimes. Bolaños stated that the

¹³ *La Hora*, December 12, 1990, p. 4.

officers would be tried by military courts, an approach that has been criticized by skeptical human rights advocates who cite past failures of military tribunals to prosecute, convict or punish their own.

Chapter 8

REFLECTIONS

It is customary to observe elections in authoritarian countries where the balloting and counting processes are often fair, but in which legal restrictions and abuses exist during the campaign period. In such circumstances, questions are raised regarding the overall efficacy of the process. Observers then seek to identify the problems during the campaign and attempt to evaluate their significance. Recommendations can be made regarding changes in the constitution and electoral law.

Observing the Guatemalan process provides a different challenge. Guatemala has many characteristics of a democracy. Since 1985, its leaders have been duly elected at the national and local levels in competitive and well-administered elections. The constitution provides for freedom of the press and association. Numerous political parties and civic organizations exist independent of the state. Nevertheless, Guatemala, as its leaders acknowledge, cannot yet guarantee many of the freedoms that its laws promise.

During the second half of President Cerezo's term, killings, politically and non-politically motivated, increased significantly. Human rights organizations charge that the military and police are responsible. The organizations fault the civilian government for not prosecuting the accused, although they emphasize that the government is not ordering the crimes, as was the case in the past.

The violence had deleterious effects on the 1990-91 election campaign. A vigorous and nationwide campaign by the leading can-

didates and ubiquitous political advertising was marred by killings of and threats against candidates and others involved in the electoral process. The campaign environment did not allow for unfettered debate. Freedom of expression was liberally permitted under the law, but the violence constricted the political spectrum by discouraging participation in the political process and suppressing countervailing points of view. Advocating land reform or prosecution of military and police officers for human rights abuses could have placed one's life in danger.

This is not to say that the election results would have been significantly different if there had been a totally free campaign environment. Although some believe that the mass of poor, rural indigenous voters represents a potential reservoir of support for left-of-center candidates, the electoral history of other Latin American countries suggests otherwise. Rural voters, especially women, have usually been among the most conservative. If participation among indigenous citizens, particularly women, increased, the more conservative parties might be strengthened.

The nature of the Guatemalan elections, nevertheless, raises important questions about the role of elections in the democratic process. How should an international delegation assess a technically flawless balloting process with legally guaranteed political and civil rights in which participants in the process face threats to their personal security? Moreover, what is the significance for democracy of the cultural isolation and the lack of participation in political society of the indigenous communities? Is the low turnout of indigenous women a debility of the democratic system that requires immediate official attention or a product of a culture that is beyond the influence of the state?

From a political standpoint, the 1990 elections contributed to the democratic process by providing for the first peaceful transfer of power between civilian governments in more than 35 years. More important, the transfer took place between different parties. But is the consolidation of democracy necessarily consistent with the expansion of democracy? Is Guatemala consolidating an exclusionary

democracy that does not allow for the participation of significant sectors of the population?

These issues are partially anthropological in nature. International observers, regardless of their experience, can only begin to comprehend a society as complex as Guatemala's after a brief visit. Democratization is a dynamic and long-term process. Guatemala has established the foundations for democracy by holding free and fair elections that allow for alternation in power and by legally providing political and civil liberties. But the system has failed to safeguard the citizenry from human rights abuses. The most important contribution the Serrano administration could make would be to end the military's impunity, thereby enabling citizens to participate in politics with greater security. This would require strengthening the judicial system, an area in which Guatemala has been unable to make progress since the resumption of civilian rule.

As one of a handful of countries in Latin America with large indigenous populations, Guatemala is confronted with the challenge of creating a political system that meets the needs of historically isolated indigenous communities. The extent to which some communities have been (or desire to be) integrated into the political process varies. In some cases, Mayans have selected not to participate in what is perceived to be a *ladino* process, preferring instead to maintain their own forms of local governance.

The role of indigenous communities in Latin America will receive greater attention as the 500th anniversary of the Old World's discovery of the New World is commemorated in 1992. Full integration is not a matter of amending the constitution or creating civic organizations. It is a process that could take decades, if not centuries.

APPENDICES

POST-ELECTION STATEMENT**INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION
TO THE GUATEMALAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS****November 17, 1991**

The international delegation sponsored by the National Democratic Institute has completed its preliminary assessment of the Guatemalan electoral process. This statement is the consensus view of a 27-member delegation that includes individuals from 14 nations representative of the full spectrum of democratic tendencies.

We came to Guatemala as representatives of the international community of democracies to demonstrate support for free and fair elections. The election we witnessed yesterday is historic in that it will facilitate the first transition of power from one civilian government to another in more than 30 years.

We congratulate the Guatemalan people and the institutions that participated in the electoral process, particularly the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, for the peaceful and orderly election we observed at locations throughout the country. If, as we expect, the second round of the presidential election is as fair and transparent as the first, Guatemala will have successfully completed this historic process and a new and legitimate civilian government will take office.

The NDI observer mission was present in Guatemala to collect information on all phases of the electoral process. Two monitoring teams visited the country during the campaign period. A 40-page report was prepared for the delegation reflecting the work of these groups. All members of these earlier teams are also members of this delegation.

Particular concern was expressed in the pre-election report about the violence perpetrated against candidates for public office, political activists and others involved in the electoral process, as well as the underlying causes of this violence. These violent acts, which included the deaths by assassination of six political leaders, clearly

were designed to inhibit political activity and to constrain debate. Guatemala's democracy cannot be fully consolidated until this effort to subvert the process by violent means is ended.

The campaign period permitted the major candidates and parties to bring their messages to the people despite the violence. The major parties had ample access to the media outlets of the country and used a number of other standard campaign techniques to make the voters aware of their positions. Smaller parties, which did not have special relationships with media outlets and lacked resources, were less successful in exposing the voters to their views.

The delegation arrived in Guatemala on Thursday, November 8. During its stay, the delegates met with President Cerezo, the leading presidential candidates, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, human rights groups, labor unions, representatives of the private sector and security officials. On election day, the delegation collectively visited more than 400 voting sites in 45 municipalities.

The delegation's coverage was extensive, reaching Huehuetenango in the west, Nebaj the north, Esquipulas in the east and Escuintla in the south. The teams visited some of the more remote indigenous communities in the interior of the country, observing the process in towns that had never been visited by foreign observers.

The balloting procedures on election day were particularly efficient. Indeed, delegation members who had witnessed several elections indicated that this was one of the most technically proficient they had seen. The process was peaceful, orderly and free of any overt intimidation. The police provided security for the voting and were generally helpful. The military, which has a heavy presence in some of the areas of conflict, stayed in the background. They were ready to assist in case of any incidents but were unobtrusive.

The tabulation of votes, which is still underway, has been systematic and without any suspicion of fraud. Our delegation observed the counting process in the first phase at several voting sites throughout the country and found the process open and fair.

Decisions to declare ballots null and void were taken in the presence of party observers in a fair manner.

Our delegation observed that a number of ballots were invalidated because of apparent inadvertent mistakes by the voter. A meaningful percentage of the null votes seemed to be a result of the desire of voters to express support for the candidacy of Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, although it is impossible to quantify this support through a simple examination of the ballots. Ríos Montt's candidacy was ruled invalid by the judicial system because of a constitutional prohibition against those who had taken part in *coups d'etats*.

Members of our delegation met with Gen. Ríos Montt and listened to his political and legal case. We noted his stated desire to control his supporters and to prevent violence.

Our delegation received several reports of voters who possessed national identification cards (*cedulas*) whose names were not on the registration rolls. We had other reports of individuals who had been issued more than one *cedula* and who were confused as to their proper identification number. These matters and others were taken up by registration officials at local tribunal offices and in nearly all cases were resolved in favor of permitting the individual to vote.

Many Guatemalans with whom we spoke expressed concern about the turnout, which according to available figures is about 55 percent of the registered voters. Several factors may have contributed to this decline in turnout from the 69 percent turnout in 1985. A change in the law, which made voting voluntary in 1990, a right rather than a duty, may be one factor. There were other, more troublesome possibilities as well. These include: the remote location of voting places, especially in the rural areas; the lack of transportation in these areas; the assignment of voting sites some distance from the voters' neighborhoods in urban areas; the concentration of sites in relatively few locations (a system which may have facilitated security arrangements but not voting); the fear of violence on election day; and the general alienation of a large segment of the population from the political process.

The most difficult problem underlying the formal success of the electoral process is the exclusion of large sectors from effective participation in Guatemalan society. The climate of violence and the assassination of political leaders has discouraged the discussion and debate of many issues such as land reform and human rights.

Indigenous groups, by virtue of their exclusion from the economy and institutions of Guatemalan society, lack both the opportunity and the incentives to organize or participate in national political life. Of the 70 percent of the population that was registered to vote, many of these were in this alienated, indigenous group and did not vote. Participation among women was particularly low in some areas. We observed regions where an estimated 95 percent of the indigenous voters were men.

Our delegation wishes to state that, as successful as the electoral process was, it occurred within an excessively narrow frame of reference. Most of those who did not either register or vote are indigenous peoples. We hope that the newly elected government will address this serious problem in all its dimensions. All democracies must both seek to broaden participation in the political process and to preserve the fundamental human rights of all its citizens. We note that this is one of the principal tenets of the Central American peace accords.

These serious problems underscore that elections do not automatically translate into successful, even viable, democracies. Guatemala has demonstrated that it remains on the democratic path by its conduct of a fair and transparent election. We hope and expect that the government that takes office as a result of this electoral process will commit the entire nation to the process of strengthening and expanding Guatemala's democracy.

TERMS OF REFERENCE**ADVANCE SURVEY DELEGATION**

**TO: MEMBERS OF SURVEY DELEGATION TO
GUATEMALA**

FROM: NDI

RE: TERMS OF REFERENCE

DATE: SEPTEMBER 7, 1990

We are very pleased you will be participating in our program in Guatemala. The objective of this delegation is to gather information on the electoral process to prepare a report on the pre-election day electoral environment and identify issues that the election delegations in November and January should focus on. A briefing report has been prepared for you that outlines some of the pertinent issues. Below is a list of questions that may help guide this delegation. We welcome any suggestions you may have.

I. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

- A. Are there any restrictions, *de facto* or *de jure*, that prevent the political parties from conducting their respective campaigns in any region of the country?
- B. Are there arrests, detentions or killings of party leaders or other individuals during the campaign that appear politically motivated?
- C. Are citizens free to organize and become politically involved, whatever their political views?
- D. Are voters intimidated into voting for (or not voting for) a particular coalition, party or candidate by the armed forces, political parties or government officials?

E. Is there any evidence of illegal campaign practices by any of the participants? How did the authorities respond to these charges?

F. Is there evidence of government or military support for any of the coalitions, parties or candidates participating in the elections?

G. Do political parties represent the spectrum of political views of the populace?

H. Do candidates feel free enough to advocate any position?

I. Is information on the candidates, the political parties and the electoral process readily available in the languages of the many indigenous communities?

J. Are ethnic groups adequately represented in the electoral process as candidates, campaign workers or electoral officials?

II. ROLE OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA

A. Do the competing parties obtain adequate and relatively equal access to the press and media?

B. Does the government-controlled media provide adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?

C. Do journalists feel free to cover controversial topics? Are certain subjects considered taboo?

III. ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS

A. Do the electoral tribunal and the local electoral officials act, and are they perceived to act, in a nonpartisan manner?

B. Are there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process? Are voters able to cast a secret ballot?

C. Is there evidence that prospective voters have been or will be arbitrarily removed from the electoral registry or be assigned to polling sites far from their homes? Are there measures to prevent multiple voting?

D. Have people been registered that are not eligible to vote, such as under-age Guatemalans and foreigners?

IV. RESULTS

A. Will political parties have access to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's counting center?

V. THE ELECTIONS GENERALLY

A. Do citizens view the elections as a useful mechanism to express their political views?

B. How is the electoral process contributing to the strengthening of the democratic process in Guatemala?

**DELEGATION MEETING SCHEDULE
SURVEY MISSION
August 14-20, 1990**

TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1990

- 6:30 p.m. Arrive in Guatemala City/Check into Sheraton.
8 p.m. Dinner meeting with Juan Jose Rodil, former interior minister under Vinicio Cerezo

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1990

- 8:30 a.m. Working breakfast
11 a.m. Meeting with René de Leon Schlotter, presidential candidate for coalition formed by the Popular Alliance and the PSD
1:30 p.m. Working lunch
3 p.m. Meeting with Efraín Ríos Montt. Also meet with his vice presidential candidate Harris Whitback and campaign manager Juan Callejas
5:30 p.m. Meeting with foreign correspondent
7:30 p.m. Working dinner

THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1990

- 7:30 a.m. Breakfast meeting with Amilcar Méndez, head of the CERJ
9 a.m. Meeting with Jorge Serrano Elias, presidential candidate for MAS (Movimiento de Acción Solidaria)
10:45 a.m. Embassy briefing with DCM Arnold Sierra (political officer dealing with elections), Jim Dickmier (press attache) and an AID representative

- 12:30 p.m. Meeting with Jorge Carpio, presidential candidate for the UCN (Union del Centro Nacional) and Claudio Riedel, director of international relations for the UCN
- 5:30 p.m. Meeting with journalist Colum Lynch, freelance writer for *Newsweek* and *NYT*
- 7 p.m. Dinner with Dr. Gustavo Berganza, national editor, *Cronica*

FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, 1990

- 8 a.m. Meeting with Arzú, presidential candidate for the PAN (Partido de Advance Nacional)
- 9:30 a.m. Meeting with Lic. Arturo Herbruger, president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
- 1:30 p.m. Working lunch
- 3 p.m. Meeting with Gonzalo Marroquín, director of *La Hora*
- 4:30 p.m. Meeting at CEDEP (Centro de Estudios Politicos) with Rolando Cabrera, executive secretary
- 6 p.m. Meeting with Bob Murphy, Center for Democracy representative in Guatemala
- 7 p.m. Working dinner with members of AVANSCO, a nonpartisan think tank in Guatemala City

SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1990

- 8:30 a.m. Breakfast meeting with Dr. Alejandro Giammattei, national coordinator for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
- 9 a.m. Meeting with Factor Méndez, director of the human rights organization CIEPRODH
- 11 a.m. Meeting with Mario Solorzano, secretary general of the PSD and Lic. Antonio Hernandez Valencia, Diputado for Alianza Popular 5

- 3 p.m. Meeting with Factor Méndez, director of CIEPRODH
- 5 p.m. Meeting with human rights prosecutor Ramiro de Leon Carpio
- 7 p.m. Dinner meeting with Guatemala City municipal employees

SUNDAY, AUGUST 19, 1990

Day trip to the interior: Chichicastinango, Santa Cruz del Quiché, Sololá, and Panajachel. Meetings with local Army Commander Gen. Morales at base outside Chichicastinango, chief of police for Santa Cruz del Quiché, and local government officials.

MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1990

- 9 a.m. Meeting with Diputado Diego Velasco Britto, Indian member of Congress from Quiché district who serves on the Indian Communities Committee in Congress

TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1990

- 9 a.m. - noon Meetings with labor union representatives
- 2 p.m. Meeting with Interior Minister Lic. Morales Villatoro, head of the national police and non-military security issues
- 4 p.m. Meeting with DC presidential candidate Lic. Cabrera and his campaign manager
- 6 - 10 p.m. Attend university human rights forum with Factor Méndez

**DELEGATION MEETING SCHEDULE
SURVEY MISSION
September 20-25, 1990**

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1990

- 6:30 p.m. Arrive Guatemala City/Check into Camino Real
8:30 p.m. Dinner and NDI briefing

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1990

- 7:45 a.m. Breakfast at Camino Real with presidential candidate René de Leon Schlotter (AP5), Aracely Conde de Paiz (PSD) and other party reps
- 9:45 a.m. Meeting at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal with Lic. Herbruger and other Tribunal members
- 11:45 a.m. TEAM 1:
Meeting with presidential candidate Jorge Serrano Elias and vice presidential candidate Gustavo Espina
- 11:45 a.m. TEAM 2:
Meeting with presidential candidate Alvaro Arzú and vice presidential candidate Fraterno Vila (PAN)
- 1:30 p.m. Working lunch with presidential candidate Jorge Carpio (UCN) and other UCN reps
- 3:30 p.m. Meeting with Archbishop Mons. Rodolfo Quesada Toruño and other members of the National Reconciliation Commission
- 5 p.m. Meeting with presidential candidate General Efraín Ríos Montt, vice presidential candidate Harris Whitbeck and other representatives from the Plataforma No-Venta

- 7 p.m. Briefing from Profesor Factor Méndez, director of CIEPRODH (Centro de Investigación, Estudio y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos)
- 7:30 p.m. Dinner meeting with academic and peace organizations (CIEPRODH, the National University, FLACSO and IRIPAZ)

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1990

- 8:30 a.m. Working breakfast with representatives from the private sector (CACIF, PYRAMIDE, FUNDESA, etc.)
- 10:30 a.m. Meeting with the human rights prosecutor Lic. Ramiro de Leon Carpio
- 12:30 p.m. Working lunch with Guatemalan think tanks and nonpartisan organizations (ASIES, AVANCSO, CEDEP, etc.)
- 2:30 p.m. Meeting with human rights groups (GAM, CONAVIGUA, CONDEG, CERJ, CONFRUEGUA)
- 4:15 p.m. Meeting with labor groups (UNSI TRAGUA)
- 7 p.m. Working dinner with representatives of the media
- 8:30 p.m. NDI briefing on trips to the interior (both teams)

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1990

- 7:30 a.m. ROAD TRIPS ALL DAY - DEPART CAMINO REAL

TEAM 1: DISTRICT OF QUICHE

- 10:30 a.m. Arrival in Santa Cruz del Quiché. Meeting with Police Chief Alberto Alacan Girón
- 11 a.m. Meeting with Amilcar Méndez, Director of CERJ - Human Rights/political environment testimony from Quiché indigenous residents

- 12:30 p.m. Stop at the bridge of "Sepela" to talk to the Civilian Defense Patrols (PAC's)
- 1 p.m. Stop at Army base #20 on return from Santa Cruz del Quiché to Chichicastenango. Meeting with base commanders, Gen. Morales, and Col. Santizo Franco
- 2 p.m. Working lunch in Chichicastenango at the Hotel Santo Tomas with Oscar Vinicio Villar Anleu (ex-governor of Quiché and current DC candidate for Diputado), Padre Axel Mencos, Mayor Oscar Mota, and the current governor of Quiché province
- 4 p.m. Meeting in Panahachel with the local bishop, Monseñor Eduardo Fuentes and an American priest who is active in Sololá
- 5 p.m. Meeting in Sololá with military personnel
- 6:30 p.m. Return to Guatemala City
- 8:30 p.m. Working dinner, debriefing and sharing of info from road trips

TEAM 2: ZACAPA

- 10:30 a.m. Meetings with candidates Albino Lamuño and Mynor Cifuentes from Frente Nacional de Oposicion who have been threatened, Roberto Vasquez and his wife Gladys (friends of Monseñor Ramazzini), Oscar Pineda (DC candidate for Diputado) and Luis Eduardo Argueta Chang (DC candidate for Mayor), and the Bishop of Esquipulas
- 1:30 p.m. Working lunch
- 2:30 p.m. Meetings with representative of AP5-PSD Caril Alonso and candidates from local mayoral race
- 3:30 p.m. Travel to Chiquimula for meetings with local municipal candidates
- 5:30 p.m. Return to Guatemala City

8:30 p.m. Working dinner, debriefing and sharing of info from road trips

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1990

8 a.m. Breakfast with presidential candidate Alfonso Cabrera (DCG)

10 a.m. Meeting with Minister of the Interior Gen. Carlos Augusto Morales Villatoro

10:45 a.m. Meeting with Naval Captain Jorge A. Mazariegos A. Director of the Centro de Estudios Militares, representing the Minister of Defense, Gen. Juan Leonel Bolaños

11:30 a.m. Meeting with Chief of Staff General Roberto Mata

12-2 p.m. FREE (time to prepare for forum)

2-6 p.m. FORUM: "Experiencias en la Vida Democratica"

8 p.m. Working dinner, debriefing and exchange of ideas

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1990

5:30 a.m. Depart for airport

PRESS COVERAGE OF SEPTEMBER DELEGATION

6 24 de septiembre de 1990

EL GRAFICO

SUCESOS

Demócratas en área conflictiva

□ Buscan información del comportamiento de habitantes frente a las elecciones generales.

SANTA CRUZ del Guiché, septiembre 24. Por Rony Iván Véliz, Enviado Especial de "El Gráfico". La delegación del Instituto Nacional Democrático -IND- para Asuntos Internacionales, del Partido Demócrata de los Estados Unidos, se reunió ayer en horas de la mañana en esta localidad con los representantes indígenas de los Consejos de Comunidades Étnicas «Runujel Junam» (CERJ), para recolectar información sobre el comportamiento de la población ante las elecciones generales del próximo 11 de noviembre en nuestro país.

El ex-gobernador del Estado de Arizona Bruce Babby, dijo que el objetivo primordial de su viaje a Guatemala, es observar el trabajo efectuado por los candidatos presidenciales de los diferentes partidos políticos, que jugarán en esta contienda electoral, y que planean los sectores populares del proceso de democratización y el futuro de este país.

«No somos una comisión oficial; pero, daremos a conocer un informe especial a la Comisión de Observadores oficiales del Instituto, que será un grupo de 30 personas que viajarán en noviembre, siguiendo de cerca el proceso electoral», indicó.

«Nos reunimos ya con el presidente del Tribunal Supremo Electoral, un sector de la prensa nacional, con los dirigentes del CACIF, con los dirigentes del «Grupo de Apoyo Muttu» con los diferentes candidatos presidencia-

les y con funcionarios gubernamentales. Las pláticas fueron muy amigables y de gran importancia para nuestra comisión».

Esta comisión de observadores estuvo en el reciente proceso de elecciones celebrado en Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, los países europeos orientales, África y ahora Guatemala, agregó.

Toda la información sobre el proceso electoral será para evaluar de qué manera puede ayudar a propiamente el «IND» a Guatemala en sus esfuerzos de promover el proceso electoral libre y justo y a consolidar el gobierno democrático, manifestó el ex-gobernador Babby en



La sede de los Consejos de Comunidades Étnicas «Runujel Junam».

La Comisión que llegó a

□ Los observadores norteamericanos conformados por el ex-gobernador del Estado de Arizona Bruce Babby, el diputado Juan Torres de Bolivia, Mark Felerstein, oficial del programa para el Instituto Nacional Democrático y el general de brigada retirado, Nehemia Dagan de Israel, escuchaban los planteamientos del dirigente Amítcar Méndez del CERJ sobre el proceso electoral, del próximo 11 de noviembre. (Fotos de Rony Iván Véliz).

este lugar está formada por el general retirado Nehemia Dagan de Israel, su traductora oficial, Mark Felerstein, oficial de programas para la IND; y el ex-embajador del Estado de Arizona Bruce Babby.

□ **Experto de derechos humanos de la ONU viajó a Nebel**

El experto de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Organización de Naciones Unidas, profesor Christian Tomuschat, viajó ayer al municipio de Nebel, de este departamento, para verificar las denuncias efectuadas so-

bre la detención ilegal de 86 personas en su mayoría mujeres indígenas de la aldea Amacchel, ejecutada por supuestos miembros de la institución armada a principios de la semana pasada.

Tomuschat se iba a constituir en el destacamento militar del lugar, para indagar con el comandante castrense sobre la detención ilegal, la cual violaría los derechos humanos de la población, informó un oficial de las Naciones Unidas al ser consultado. El experto de la ONU también se puso en contacto con los denunciantes.



□ EL EXCANDIDATO presidencial de los Estados Unidos Bruce Babby del Estado de Arizona, manifestaba a los indígenas de los Consejos de Comunidades Étnicas «Runujel Junam» que en su calidad de observador internacional el propósito de su visita al departamento de El Guiché y a este país, para la consolidación de un gobierno democrático.

EL GRAFICO

PORTES
AÑO RE

DEMOCRATAS DE EUA EN AREA CONFLICTIVA

INFORMACION EN LA PAGINA 6.

Guatemala, lunes 24 de septiembre de 1,990

Año XXVIII - No. 9335.



La delegación de observadores del Partido Democrata de los Estados Unidos, que se encuentra en Guatemala para recibir información sobre el pensamiento de los indígenas y los campesinos, en torno a las próximas elecciones previstas para el 11 de noviembre, viajó ayer a la zona de conflicto, visitando directamente la ciudad de Santa Cruz del Quiché. Los miembros de la misión se entrevistaron con dirigentes de las Comunas de Comunidades Indígenas "Runujé" durante el grupo esta formado por Bruce Babitt, ex-gobernador del estado de Arizona, el congresista Juan Torres, de la República de Nueva York y Marco Ferrerán, oficial de Programas del estado de Indiana. INSERTA la foto del General Efraín Ríos Montt, cuando aver en compañía de los principales dirigentes de los partidos políticos que apoyan su plataforma política, se dirige a varios miles de simpatizantes durante una concentración en la Plaza Mayor de la capital. (Grabador de Piny Veliz y Florento Sacchoneki).



Delegados del Instituto Nacional Demócrata:

Observadores de EU con magistrados del T.S.E.

Seguirán de cerca el proceso electoral

Una delegación del Instituto Nacional Demócrata para Asuntos Internacionales, afiliado al Partido Demócrata, de Estados Unidos, se reunió esta mañana con los magistrados del Tribunal Supremo Electoral.

Los delegados preparan la llegada al país de observadores del IND a las elecciones del 11 de noviembre, como parte de un programa de observación del proceso de democratización de América Latina.

En opinión del presidente del TSE, Arturo Herbruger Asturias, la presencia de observadores internacionales en las elecciones es bienvenida y el Tribunal no la objeta, por cuanto es importante para consolidar el desarrollo del proceso electoral como un acontecimiento de trascendencia nacional e internacional.

Los magistrados del TSE y la delegación del IND cambiaron impresiones sobre la relevancia del proceso



Los delegados del Instituto Nacional Demócrata que han llegado al país, visitaron hoy el TSE y saludaron a los magistrados.

electoral guatemalteco, que se encuentra prácticamente en la recta final, a menos de dos meses de las elecciones. El Instituto Nacional Demócrata para Asuntos Internacionales ha participado como observador en procesos electorales en varios países latinoamericanos, incluido Guatemala en 1985.

El ex presidente de Estados Unidos, Jimmy Carter, ha participado como observador-miembro de las dele-

gaciones.

El IND realiza análisis de los procesos electorarios y una vez cumplidos los mismos, hace estudios sobre su desarrollo e implicaciones, para luego aportar conclusiones y recomendaciones en el marco de la democratización del continente de habla hispana.

La delegación visitará este día partidos políticos y otros organismos estatales y privados relacionados con

el proceso electoral, con la finalidad de reunir elementos de juicio que le permitan la integración de la delegación de observadores para noviembre próximo.

Según el presidente del TSE, Arturo Herbruger Asturias, las puertas de ese organismo están abiertas a todas las instituciones internacionales que pretendan enviar observadores a las elecciones del 11 de noviembre.

"Interés en el actual proceso"

El Instituto Nacional Demócrata para Asuntos Internacionales, afiliado al Partido Demócrata de Estados Unidos, está verdaderamente interesado en el proceso electoral guatemalteco, luego de la experiencia por la observación del proceso de 1985.

En tales términos se expresó esta mañana un miembro del IND, Bruce Babbitt, quien hace cinco años formó parte de la delegación de observadores del instituto a las elecciones generales guatemaltecas.

Babbitt, ex gobernador de Arizona y pre candidato presidencial del Partido Demócrata en 1988, calificó las elecciones de 1985 en Guatemala como una imprecionante etapa de transición a la democracia.

Posee experiencia como observador electoral durante el plebiscito en Chile y la elección del actual presidente de ese país, Patricio Aylwin, así como en las elecciones de Nicaragua, Pakistán y otros países.



Bruce Babbitt

Guatemala, viernes 21 de septiembre de 1990

La Hora

DECANO DE LA PRENSA INDEPENDIENTE



OBSERVADORES.- Un grupo de observadores demócratas de los Estados Unidos llegó al país para iniciar la observación del proceso electoral y esta mañana visitaron a las autoridades del Tribunal Supremo Electoral (foto), para conocer cómo se desarrolla la campaña política. Más adelante llegarán importantes personalidades estadounidenses para supervisar las elecciones. **COPRONIHUAC.-** La nueva Junta Directiva de COPRONIHUAC fue presentada ayer por el periodista Alvaro Contreras.

Proceso electoral será observado por demócratas de USA

Página 5

GUATEMALAN PARTICIPANTS
"Experiencias en la Vida Democrática"
September 24, 1990

SR. JOSE MARIA ARGUETA
 Director Ejecutivo, Fundación
 DIG

LIC. JOSE LUIS CRUZ
 SALAZAR
 ASIES

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 Candidato Presidencial, Partido
 Democracia Cristiana de
 Guatemala

LIC. RENE DE LEON
 SHLOTTER
 Candidato Presidencial, Partido
 Socialista Democrático (PSD)

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LICDA. CARMEN
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ING. JORGE ANTONIO
 FUENTES SERRANO
 Partido Movimiento de Acción
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DRA. ARACELY CONDE DE
 PAIZ
 Candidata Vice Presidencial,
 Partido Socialista Democrático
 (PSD)

MONSEÑOR FERNANDO
 AMALERO
 Obispo de Escuintla

SRA. NINETH
 MONTENEGRO DE GARCIA
 Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo

GAMMONSENOR JUAN
GERARDI CONEDERA
Obispo Auxiliar de la
Arquidiócesis de Guatemala

DR. ALEJANDRO
EDUARDO GIAMMATTEI
Jefe del Departamento de
Coordinación de Programas del
Tribunal Supremo Electoral

ING. GUILLERMO
GONZALEZ
CACIF

LIC. ARTURO HERBRUGER
Presidente, Tribunal Supremo
Electoral

CAPITAN DE NAVIO
Jorge A. Mazariegos Aguirre
Director, Centro de Estudios
Militares

SR. AMILCAR MENDEZ
Director, CERJ

LIC. FACTOR MENDEZ
Director, CIEPRODH

SR. BYRON MORALES
UNSI TRAGUA

GENERAL Y LIC. CARLOS
AUGUSTO MORALES
VILLATORO
Ministro de Gobernación

DR. LUIS ALBERTO
PADILLA
Instituto de Relaciones
Internacionales para la Paz

SR. MARIO POLANCO
Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, GAM

SRA. ROSA PU
Comité de Unidad Campesina,
CUC

TENIENTE CORONEL
CARLOS RADFORD
Centro de Estudios Militares

LIC. JOSE RECINOS
Movimiento Solidarista
Guatemalteco

LIC. CLAUDIO RIEDEL
Secretario Rels. Internac.,
UCN, (representing Jorge
Carpio)

GENERAL JOSE EFRAIN
RIOS MONTT
Candidato Presidencial,
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SALAZAR
Diputada al Congreso
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SRA. NOHEMI SANDOVAL
DE MORAN
Diputada al Congreso
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PSD-AP5

LICDA. CATALINA
SOBERANIS
Diputada al Congreso
Nacional, Partido Democracia
Cristiana

SR. MARIO TRIAY
Director, FUNDESA

ING. HARRIS WHITBECK
Candidato Vice Presidencial,
Plataforma No-Venta

SAMPLE ADS DENOUNCING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

GRANFIDO

13 de diciembre de 1990 48

GAM

GRUPO DE APOYO MUTUO

5a. Av. 9-11, Zona 12-Teléfono: 719735
Guatemala, C.A.

Guatemala, 10 de Diciembre de 1,990.

EL GRUPO DE APOYO MUTUO. -GAM-

En el día de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (10 de diciembre), saluda al pueblo de Guatemala, especialmente aquellos a quienes sus derechos elementales como la vida, la libertad, el empleo, la vivienda y la salud, le siguen siendo negados. En este día recordemos hermanos guatemaltecos que hace ya 47 años, surge la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos a iniciativa de los pueblos que vivieron los horrores de las 2 guerras mundiales, las cuales dejaron un costo humano y social que con nada se pudo reparar: muertos, desaparecidos, y pueblos divididos.

Hoy sin embargo en nuestra querida Guatemala día a día se mata, y se secuestra, y con ello se sume en el duelo a las familias guatemaltecas, aquí no hay derecho que valga, aquí las autoridades encargadas de velar por la seguridad de la ciudadanía, son las que nos mantienen sumidos en el terror y la miseria, desintegran hogares y crean más huérfanos, matan con toda impunidad a la población civil indefensa; el año pasado el ejército masacró en Cobán a 9 Keckchies y nunca se les castigó por este genocidio, recientemente masacraron 13 personas en la Aldea «Panabaj» y aún no se sabe si esta vez se romperá con el «muro de la desigualdad legal», porque el caso de la Aldea El Aguacate parece archivado, la familia de Humberto González Gamarra, aún espera resultados de las investigaciones en relación a sus asesinos, los hijos de Mirna Mack se han quedado sin progenitora... y aquí en Guatemala, nada pasa, todo sigue su ritmo, nos preparamos para celebrar la Navidad con un índice inflacionario de casi el 100%, sin transporte extraurbano; el 12 de diciembre se exhuma el cadáver de Sebastián Velásquez Mejía, entregarán los huesos a su familia... pero aquí nada pasó, nos piden olvido y perdón.

Salud pueblo en el día de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos.

¡POR LA VIDA, LA LIBERTAD Y LA PAZ!
GAM PRESENTE
GRUPO DE APOYO MUTUO.



ASOCIACION DE INVESTIGACION Y ESTUDIOS SOCIALES

Profundamente conmovida por los sangrientos sucesos acaecidos el pasado fin de semana en Santiago Atitlán, los cuales dejaron como cauda numerosas personas muertas y heridas, y la evidencia de una flagrante transgresión al Estado de Derecho;

ANTE LA OPINION PUBLICA:

- PRIMERO:** Expresa su más enérgica condena y exige que se proceda de inmediato, de conformidad con la ley, a castigar a quienes resulten responsables.
- SEGUNDO:** Afirma que el proceso de democratización sólo puede desarrollarse en un régimen de pleno respeto y garantía a los Derechos Humanos.
- TERCERO:** Demanda de los poderes del Estado, todos los esfuerzos que sean necesarios para evitar que la impunidad de los hechos debilite la confianza en el régimen de derecho.
- CUARTO:** Extiende su completo y solidario apoyo al Procurador de los Derechos Humanos, instancia constitucional competente para investigar hechos como el aludido, y confía en que el Ministerio Público y los tribunales de justicia cumplirán fielmente sus cometidos.
- QUINTO:** Considera que en defensa de los principios en que descansa la vida institucional del país, corresponde al Ejército Nacional tomar las previsiones pertinentes para impedir que en el futuro, elementos de esa institución pongan en entredicho la misión constitucional de las fuerzas armadas.
- SEXTO:** Advierte que, no obstante que los hechos se dieron en circunstancias en las que aún prevalece una confrontación armada carente de sentido en el contexto del actual proceso de apertura política, los actos de todos los elementos del Ejército Nacional deben ajustarse siempre a la Constitución y leyes vigentes en el país.
- SEPTIMO:** Llama a los sectores políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales, a promover una conciencia nacional que condene públicamente tan execrable hecho, y a que nos comprometamos todos en la preservación de los derechos humanos, y en la construcción de la democracia y la paz en nuestra patria.

**CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JUAN CALLEJAS
AND BRUCE BABBITT**

Guatemala, 16 de Octubre de 1990.

Señor
Bruce Babbitt
National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs
Hotel Camino Real
Presente

Atención: Licenciada Deborah Hauger

Respetado Señor Babbitt:

Acepte usted mis personales muestras de respeto y estima para su persona y por supuesto, para la labor que realiza en este bello país, rogándole recibir los comentarios que a continuación expongo, no sólo en forma positiva, sino con la mejor intención de ayudarles en la tarea que intuyo, desean realizar en el país.

Quiero introducir mis comentarios, dándoles soporte en algunos antecedentes que considero de gran importancia para los pensamientos que expondré a continuación:

1. El primero y muy importante, es la convicción que creo compartimos de apoyar un sistema de gobiernos que fundados en los ideales democráticos, permitan darle la oportunidad al individuo, y en este caso, al guatemalteco, a realizar su propia y auténtica democracia, fundamentada en su propia realidad cultural histórica y con sus propios anhelos al futuro.
2. Lo anterior quiere destacar el principio de que, cualquier participación extranjera, que con muy buenas intenciones, desee imponer sus propios conceptos o interpretaciones, los cuales por supuesto, no tendrían las bases culturales, históricas y de expectativas al futuro de la sociedad en que pretenden instalarse, serían tarde o temprano abortadas por esa sociedad, tal cual ya ha sido demostrado en los casos de Panamá y Nicaragua.
3. Las experiencias de Panamá y Nicaragua y en esta última, opino como ciudadano nacido en ese país, han demostrado la triste realidad del fracaso de su gobierno por un lado y de su agrupación por otro, participando en algunos casos como observadores (últimas elecciones en Nicaragua) y en otro, como actores y protagonistas. (Derrocamiento del gobierno del General Anastasio Somoza y del General Noriega en Panamá).
4. El fracaso al cual aludo en forma terminante, ha sido demostrado por la realidad de gobiernos que como los del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, resultaron ser un fracaso, después de haber sido apoyados por el Gobierno Demó-

crata de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica bajo la dirección del respetable Señor Carter y luego de haber sido aislados "democráticamente" por el gobierno Republicano del Señor Reagan.

5. El hasta hoy fracaso del gobierno de la Unión Nacional Opositora también de Nicaragua, el cual bajo el espejismo de las generosas promesas del gobierno Republicano del Señor Bush, ofreció soluciones regaladas y limosneras a un pueblo perezoso que hoy se encuentra desesperado por no haber recibido el apoyo de éste último; apoyo que parece estar entregándose por cuantagotas.

6. El hasta hoy también fracasado gobierno panameño, que después de sufrir una invasión a la usanza de los años '30, se encuentra indignamente con la mano extendida, esperando las gotas de ayuda económica que su gobierno quisiera darle como parte del juego democrático al estilo norteamericano; mientras la población, en ese juego democrático, se muere de hambre.

Finalmente, y como parte importante de estos antecedentes, no quisiera que usted o alguno de sus colegas creyera que tengo espíritu anti-norteamericano; pero sí puedo afirmarle que tengo un espíritu de solidaridad y hermandad; un espíritu de libertad en el que con humildad y dignidad creo que cada hombre y cada pueblo en un juego democrático serio, debe tener el gobierno que merece, y nadie, bajo sus particulares interpretaciones y/o particulares intereses políticos o geo-políticos tiene derecho a desvalorizar la dignidad, calidad y libertad de su elección.

Entrando en materia, quiero externarle, considerando sus palabras de apertura a la reunión a la que se sirviera invitarme y para la cual me honré en acompañar al General Ríos Montt, que después de meditarlo seriamente, me encuentro confundido porque sinceramente no encuentro cómo, una representación tan seria y con la calidad de personalidades que la conforman, pudieron haber sido tan especialmente inocentes o quizás muy inteligentes, como para externar opiniones tan concretas y positivas de un proceso electoral que como el actual en Guatemala, tiene tan serias dudas de ser democrático, que hasta el más ingenuo ciudadano que es entrevistado en las encuestas de opinión pública ha externado su falta de credibilidad en el sistema democrático.

¿Ignora usted Señor Babbitt, que en julio de 1989, un 63% de la población creía en el sistema democrático como el mejor sistema de gobierno para esta sociedad, mientras que en julio de 1990 (un año después) apenas el 23% lo considera de esta manera?

¿Ignora usted Señor Babbitt, que desde hace 20 meses en Guatemala y con una grave violación a nuestro orden legal, en abuso de poder, así como la violación del pueblo soberano, los poderes del Estado han venido atacando la candidatura de un ciudadano que como el General Efraín Ríos Montt goza del primer lugar en las encuestas de opinión pública, con cerca de 1,000,000 de votos?

¿Ignora usted Señor Babbitt, que el Tribunal Supremo Electoral y el Registro de Ciudadanos se han convertido en los únicos defensores de la no-participación del General Ríos, aún contraviniendo lo dispuesto por la Honorable Corte Suprema de Justicia?

¿Cómo explica usted, Señor Babbitt, la postura del Tribunal Supremo Electoral, cuando ni siquiera los partidos políticos opositores, y extrañamente el poder Ejecutivo, han externado opinión en contra?

¿Cree usted Señor Babbitt, que en un foro como en el que participamos, podía usted afirmar que el proceso electoral y que las autoridades del Tribunal Supremo Electoral estaban maravillosamente bien?

Por supuesto, he de suponer que como observador, lo cual aprecio y valoro, ustedes tienen ante todo que actuar con sabiduría, meditación y total conocimiento de causa, antes de hacer afirmaciones que puedan contribuir a lo que ya sucedió en otras naciones hermanas. Su responsabilidad es muy grande Señor Babbitt y es a este espíritu de sensatez, serenidad y buen juicio que apelo; no para que cambie sus pensamientos, pero sí para que los medite y se dé cuenta que si se quiere contribuir a las democracias del mundo, se hace necesario algo más que buenas intenciones y conversaciones.

Permitame finalizar, y antes de despedirme, afirmarle que como ciudadano, como miembro de esta comunidad mundial que busca lo mejor para nuestros pueblos, como cristiano convencido de la necesidad de soportarnos los unos a los otros, así como de amarnos los unos a los otros; estoy también convencido de hablar verdad, porque sólo conociendo la verdad, podemos ser verdaderamente libres; y es en esta convicción, que le exhorto a usted y a sus colegas, a buscar bien en este nuestro proceso electoral y emitir sus juicios positivos o negativos, sólo y únicamente cuando estén claros de que lo expuesto, puede ser absolutamente verdad.

Ovidémonos por este rato de querer ser complacientes y buenos políticos al estilo tradicional, las naciones demandan hoy más que nunca el veredicto de la verdad; de esa verdad que hace justicia.

Muchas gracias.



Juan Francisco Callejas Vargas



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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October 25, 1990

Mr. Juan Francisco Callejas Vargas
11 Calle 5-12, Zona 10
Guatemala City
GUATEMALA

Dear Mr. Callejas:

Thank you for your letter of October 16. I appreciate your taking the time to comment on the work of our delegation and to offer constructive criticism.

The objective of the NDI observer delegations is to demonstrate international support for free and fair elections and the democratic process. NDI has acquired an international reputation for its expertise and impartiality in observing elections. As in other elections we have observed, our delegation in Guatemala will not take sides in the elections. Only the Guatemalan people can pass judgement on the fairness of the process. Our work is very much like that of journalists -- reporting information that we gather as a result of interviews and personal observations. We hope that our final report reflects accurately the views of the Guatemalan people.

My comments during the forum reflected the delegation's impressions after having spoken with a broad spectrum of individuals involved in the electoral process. I appreciate your concerns regarding the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, but remain impressed with the near universal confidence that exists in the TSE and particularly in its chairman.

Again, thank you for your letter. I hope to see you again in November.

Sincerely,

Bruce Babbitt
Leader
NDI Observer Delegation
to Guatemalan Elections

**NEWSPAPER AD RUN BY RÍOS MONTT
AFTER BEING BARRED FROM
PRESIDENTIAL RACE**

La Hora, viernes 2 de noviembre de 1990

El Gral. Efraín Ríos Montt al Pueblo de Guatemala.

CONCIUDADANO:

El Movimiento Ríosmonttista es la expresión de la necesidad de vivir en un Estado de Derecho.

Dos años hemos trabajado y hemos llegado a la culminación de nuestra lucha, con el más grande éxito que ciudadano alguno podría esperar. Hemos desenmascarado a un puño de ídolos de barro, que simplemente se han prestado a manejar la ley, de acuerdo con los intereses sectarios, partidarios y de grupos de presión especial, olvidándose que, como jueces y magistrados, sobre todo interés, debe prevalecer la justicia.

El Estado de Derecho, no va a ser instaurado por el sistema y su gobierno. El Estado de Derecho, es la capacidad individual de reclamar sus propios derechos de acuerdo con la ley; el Estado de Derecho, es tener una conciencia ciudadana que nos permita involucramos en la administración de la justicia, para que Guatemala como nación, tenga fundamentalmente una expresión personal, una actitud social y un carácter propio.

Conciudadano: Yo conozco la ley, obedezco la ley, cumplo con la ley y hago que la ley se cumpla, hemos derrotado al sistema y a sus secuaces, y continuaremos en nuestra batalla, no por un puesto, el cual no nos interesa, sino por el imperio de la ley, por el cual estamos dispuestos a morir. Los que están de acuerdo con las disposiciones partidistas o del grupo de presión del sistema gubernamental, hoy nos consideran "FUERZAS ENEMIGAS".

Guatemala, no es el Presidente, el Diputado, el Magistrado, el Alcalde o el Soldado; Guatemala toma vida en su vida, Guatemala es usted que trabaja, usted que paga sus impuestos, usted que mantiene al gobierno; enséñele al gobierno a respetar sus derechos, y no porque usted sea rebelde, ni porque usted sea docto, sino porque el Artículo 45 de la Constitución de la República lo autoriza. Usted tiene la autoridad moral de hacerlo, por ello el 11 de noviembre en la papeleta blanca póngame RÍOS MONTT; en la papeleta celeste que es para Diputados, vote por la mazorca, la antorcha y la mano, quienes serán nuestras puntas de lanza para establecer el Estado de Derecho, y para Alcalde en la papeleta amarilla, vote por la mazorca, la antorcha y la mano. para trabajar en beneficio de los municipios y no de chantajistas y usureros.

No estamos promocionando una persona, ni estamos ungiendo a nadie para que ocupe el "trono regio"; sino que estamos creando conciencia para que Guatemala obtenga carácter a través del carácter suyo, el movimiento Ríosmonttista es la expresión suya en beneficio de la vida, la libertad y la propiedad, además el movimiento Ríosmonttista es un RECHAZO y expresión de Resistencia Pacífica (Art. 45 de la Constitución) a la descarada imposición del concertado sistema que hoy impera.

El Estado de Derecho es una CONQUISTA del pueblo y nunca una ocurrencia del sistema.

HASTA QUE LA MUERTE NOS SEPARE.




GUATEMALAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Guatemala

ELECTIONS '90

No. 8

Glossary

PARTY	TENDENCY	CANDIDATES
AP-5/PSD Alianza Popular 5/Partido Social Demócrata (Popular Alliance 5/Social Democrat Party)	Left	René de León Aracely Conde de Paiz
DCG Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (Christian Democratic Party)	Center-left	Alfonso Cabrera Marco Antonio Villamar
FUR Frente Unido de la Revolución (Revolution's Union Front)	Left	Leonel Hernández Raúl Montenegro
MAS Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (Solidarity Action Movement)	Center-right	Jorge Serrano Gustavo Espina
MEC Movimiento Emergente de Concordia (Emerging Movement for Harmony)	Right	Benedicto Lucas Héctor Guerra
MLN Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Movement)	Right	Luis Ernesto Sosa David Eskenassy
PAN Partido de Avanzada Nacional (National Advancement Party)	Center-right	Alvaro Arzú Fraterno Vila
PD Partido Demócrata (Democrat Party)	Center-left	Jorge Reyna Carlos Torres
PDCN Partido Democrático de Cooperación Nacional (Democratic Party of National Cooperation)	Center-right	José Fernández Adolfo Putzeys
PNR Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renewal Party)	Center-right	Fernando Leal Kurt Meyer
PR Partido Revolucionario (Revolutionary Party)	Left	José Angel Lee Carlos Gallardo
UCN Unión del Centro Nacional (National Center Union)	Center	Jorge Carpio Manuel Ayau
A-90 Alianza No-Venta (No Sale Alliance)	Coalition of	
PID Partido Institucional Democrático (Institutional Democratic Party)	Right	
FUN Frente de Unidad Nacional (National Unity Front)	Right	
FRG Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (Guatemalan Republican Front)	Right	

NEWSPAPER AD RUN BY THE URNG

URNG

LOS GRANDES RIESGOS DEL MOMENTO POLITICO

PRONUNCIAMIENTO DE LA COMANDANCIA GENERAL DE LA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA -URNG-

La culminación de la primera fase del proceso electoral pone en evidencia las grandes limitaciones del sistema político del país, y presenta, pese a su manipulación y propaganda, indicadores muy precisos que, a su vez, abren una etapa compleja y peligrosa.

La Comandancia General de la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca -URNG- considera de urgente interés a la opinión pública nacional e internacional, con el objeto de precisar y medir los alcances de la situación que actualmente vive el país.

El proceso electoral hace pasar tres hechos fundamentales:

- 1.- El ejercicio de una mal llamada democracia, que utiliza solamente mecanismos formales para su presentación y legitimidad, ha estado su finalidad representativa y participativa durante estos comicios. Estamos todavía muy lejos de lo que es una democracia real, funcional y participativa. Esto puede apreciarse claramente al constatar la ausencia de opciones verdaderamente democráticas, el predominio de meros sectores representativos de poderosos intereses contrarios a los derechos de las grandes mayorías, y la falta total de programas que busquen la solución de los grandes problemas del país.
- 2.- Todo ello se da en un marco de recesión generizada por parte del ejército y otros sectores del Estado, que, al margen de la política gubernamental, mantiene en medida creciente un régimen de terror y cruda violación de los derechos humanos.
- 3.- La apatía y el rechazo electoral son cuantificables a juzgar por el alto índice de ciudadanos que no se empadronaron, y por el gran porcentaje de los que, estando empadronados, se abstuvieron de ir a las urnas; y son manifestación de un repudio y descontento ante la falta de una verdadera democracia en Guatemala.

El resultado de estas elecciones confirma la necesidad de cambios profundos y la búsqueda de nuevos caminos: insistir en las formalidades y tratar de esconder con ellas la realidad, agrava aun más la ya deteriorada situación del país, imponiendo su desarrollo por sendos autarcismos.

Cada día son más amplios los sectores que resienten y comprenden nuestra crítica realidad nacional, y son conscientes del apuro de estos cambios. Por eso es muy importante entender y asimilar ahora la gran lección histórica que dejan las recientes elecciones.

El tránsito electoral se caracteriza por un mal ajeno a los intereses populares, y genera para el país un incierto futuro, en lugar de prometedora estabilidad y esperanza. Crea obviamente en toda la sociedad una sensación de inseguridad y muestra la carencia de opciones democráticas, representativas y participativas.

Existen graves peligros para la construcción democrática. Son muy objetivos, concretos, en la medida que el proceso electoral sirve de elemento distractor para encauce presiones y exigencias de los sectores en pugna en el ejército; enmascarar planes operativos y represivos encaminados a entorpecer toda expresión popular y la búsqueda de una solución política justa y democrática; y mantener un régimen que nacional e internacionalmente concita a rebuía general.

Por los anteriores razones la Comandancia General de la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca -URNG-

ALERTA

Sobre planes militares de gran envergadura que el Alto Mando del Ejército ha preparado y puesto en marcha para lanzar una escalada represiva contra la población civil en las áreas de conflicto e intensas operaciones contra los frentes de la URNG. Para ello, desde octubre ha realizado cuidadosos preparativos tendientes a garantizar una concentración de fuerzas y de

medios bélicos de todo tipo.

El lanzamiento de esta ofensiva, por parte del Alto Mando del Ejército, ampliará y profundizará la guerra. Las fuerzas de la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca -URNG- se preparan con seriedad para afrontar y derrotarla.

PREVE

Que en tanto la transición gubernamental no introduzca cambios esenciales en el régimen de militarización, represión y violación de los derechos humanos, con el que los posees establecidos tratan de frenar las justas luchas y aspiraciones de la población guatemalteca, la situación tenderá a agravarse aun más.

RECHAZA

Las pretensiones belicistas que ha reiterado recientemente el Alto Mando del Ejército, para eludir el camino del diálogo con vistas a una solución política.

Desconfianza de hecho los Acuerdos de Oslo y agenciar a maniobras electivas, cuestiona una voluntad política y plantea la necesidad de ser una revisión de la posición del Alto Mando, que no expresa, además, las aspiraciones de sectores del Ejército, en contra de la voluntad de amplios sectores de la sociedad guatemalteca y las opiniones internacionales que se han pronunciado en favor del proceso.

ACLARA

Que no ha realizado ninguna acción militar de tipo a las elecciones, y que, por lo mismo, cumplió cabalmente su ofrecimiento formulado en el Acuerdo de El Escorial, de no oponerse a ellas. Nuestra manifestación y llamado a no votar es una posición política, que expresa el sentimiento de los sectores mayoritarios de nuestra población, y está enmarcada en el contexto del ejercicio democrático.

REITERA

Que las operaciones destinadas a afectar la infraestructura de vías de comunicación y fuentes de conducción energética, corresponden a una necesidad de contener y dispersar a numerosas fuerzas represivas, obligándolas a custodiar estos medios, evitando así su despliegue contra la población civil en las áreas de conflicto.

El momento de la represión y la falta de una condena efectiva, que lleve a la suspensión de la represión generizada, nos hace recurrir a estas operaciones como un medio defensivo. Así lo manifestamos oportunamente antes de iniciarse. Exhortamos a la población a no confundirse con la propaganda que el Gobierno y el Ejército hacen alrededor de estas.

EXHORTA

A los más amplios sectores del país, que han manifestado su voluntad y decisión en favor de la búsqueda de una solución política, a sumar esfuerzos y estar vigilantes para no permitir retrocesos en el proceso ya avanzado de consenso nacional, que constituya la democracia y la paz en Guatemala.

REAFIRMA

Su voluntad de buscar, a través del diálogo, el camino de una solución política al conflicto armado interno que vive nuestra Patria.


COMANDANCIA GENERAL DE LA URNG.

UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA


VOTER EDUCATION MATERIALS

GRAFICO

29 de octubre de 1999



Tu tienes un compromiso



EXXII

piensa...
vota,
gana.

i ejerce *bien*
tu derecho al voto !



Resorte y papeles en lugar vacíos



Este asocio puede ser determinado por usted

El 11 de noviembre
tienes una cita
con tu destino.

¡VOTA!

TU VOTO ES SECRETO



Elecciones 90
Tribunal Supremo Electoral
GUATEMALA

gana.

Con tu voto,



pienso...
voto,
gana

i ejerce *bien*
tu derecho al voto !



Recorda y pague en tu lugar votar



Este espacio puede ser patrocinado por Usted

TERMS OF REFERENCE**INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION
TO THE GUATEMALAN ELECTIONS**

**TO: MEMBERS OF OBSERVER DELEGATION TO
GUATEMALA**

FROM: NDI

RE: TERMS OF REFERENCE

DATE: OCTOBER 29, 1990

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is organizing a 27-member international delegation to observe the November 11, 1990, national and local elections in Guatemala. The delegation includes legislators, political party leaders and election experts from 14 countries who collectively represent the democratic political spectrum.

In organizing this delegation, NDI does not presume to supervise the elections or to interfere in Guatemalan affairs. The delegates recognize that the ultimate judgement about the process will be made by the Guatemalan people. This delegation's modest role is to reflect the consensus of the Guatemalan people as they assess the elections. The delegation report will try to reflect that consensus and will inform the international community about the nature of the electoral process and political developments in Guatemala. The delegation, therefore, must attempt to document observations and try to distinguish among the factual and subjective judgements it will hear from Guatemalans.

After briefings in Guatemala City on Friday, November 9, with electoral and government officials, candidates and others involved in the electoral process, the delegation will divide into teams that will visit different regions of the country. Based on the findings of the

teams, the delegation will attempt to offer a national perspective in a statement it intends to issue Monday afternoon, November 12, in Guatemala City. NDI would like each team to prepare a short report based on their observations to be included in the report NDI will publish after the second round of the presidential elections in January 1991.

To avoid misunderstandings by Guatemalans and by the media, NDI requests that delegates make no comments to the media regarding their personal observations of the elections until after the delegation statement has been presented.

Based on the findings of the two advance NDI delegations, the following are among the issues that appear most relevant for consideration by the delegation. These issues are discussed in more depth in the attached pre-election report prepared by NDI.

I. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

- A. Were there any restrictions, *de facto* or *de jure*, that prevented the political parties from conducting their respective campaigns in any region of the country?
- B. Were there arrests, detentions or killings of party leaders or other individuals during the campaign that appeared politically motivated?
- C. Were citizens free to organize and become politically involved, whatever their political views?
- D. Were voters intimidated into voting for (or not voting for) a particular coalition, party or candidate by the armed forces, political parties or government officials?
- E. Was there any evidence of illegal campaign practices by any of the participants? How did the authorities respond to these charges?
- F. Was there evidence of government or military support for any of the coalitions, parties or candidates participating in the elections?
- G. Do political parties represent the spectrum of political views of the populace?
- H. Did candidates feel free enough to advocate any position?

I. Was information on the candidates, the political parties and the electoral process readily available in the languages of the many indigenous communities?

J. Were ethnic groups adequately represented in the electoral process as candidates, campaign workers or electoral officials?

II. ROLE OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA

A. Did the competing parties obtain adequate and relatively equal access to the press and media?

B. Did the government-controlled media provide adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?

C. Did journalists feel free to cover controversial topics? Were certain subjects considered taboo?

III. ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS

A. Do the electoral tribunal and the local electoral officials act, and are they perceived to act, in a non-partisan manner?

B. Are there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process? Are voters able to cast a secret ballot?

C. Is there evidence that prospective voters have been or will be arbitrarily removed from the electoral registry or assigned to polling sites far from their homes? Are there measures to prevent multiple voting?

D. Have people been registered that are not eligible to vote, such as under-age Guatemalans and foreigners?

IV. RESULTS

A. Did the political parties have access to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's counting center?

B. Were the official results reported in accordance with electoral law? Were the official results disseminated expeditiously?

C. Did the various Panamanian institutions recognize the results? If not, were challenges filed in accordance with the electoral law?

D. How did the political parties' unofficial results compare with the official results?

V. THE ELECTIONS GENERALLY

A. Do citizens view the elections as a useful mechanism to express their political views?

B. How did the electoral process strengthen the democratic process in Guatemala?

ARRIVAL STATEMENT**INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION
TO THE GUATEMALAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS****November 8, 1990**

I am Bruce Babbitt, a former governor of the state of Arizona and a candidate for president of the United States in 1988. It is my privilege to introduce the international delegation organized by the National Democratic Institute to observe the Guatemalan elections. The National Democratic Institute is a democratic development institute in Washington, DC, that conducts nonpartisan programs around the world. The institute is represented here by its president, J. Brian Atwood.

The 27 delegates — who are legislators, leaders of political parties, election experts, public security officials, businessmen and civic activists — come from 14 countries in Latin America, the United States, Europe and Africa. The Latin American delegates represent Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico and Venezuela. Many of the delegation members have experience observing elections in other countries as members of NDI delegations or other organizations.

NDI has organized election observer delegations in a dozen countries in Europe, Asia and throughout Latin America. It has gained a worldwide reputation for its expertise and neutrality in electoral matters.

It is with considerable humility that any delegation undertakes to observe an election in another country. We are not here to arbitrate or interfere in the internal affairs of Guatemala. We do not presume to judge the election process; Guatemala is a sovereign and proud nation. We are here to demonstrate international support for the democratic process and to report our impressions to the international community on the elections.

As observers, we have taken no position regarding the outcome of the elections. The members of our delegation are representative of the democratic spectrum and are here because they have demonstrated in their careers a strong commitment to democracy. We are all interested in learning from the Guatemalans regarding the nature of the electoral process and its implications for Guatemala's consolidation of democracy. We plan to learn a great deal that we can take home to our own countries.

This approach is consistent with the practice of international observers for elections in other countries, a practice that is now widely accepted within the democratic community of nations, particularly here in Latin America. The current government's attitude toward this delegation reflects this trend.

The government has encouraged our presence, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has provided us with credentials that will enable our delegates to enter the polling sites and observe the proceedings. The government has not placed any restrictions on where or when we may visit polling sites.

During the past three months, we have made a great effort to understand the Guatemalan electoral process. Since September NDI has had a representative here gathering information on the process. An NDI delegation visited the country in August, and about six weeks ago, I led a seven-person team to Guatemala. During that visit, we had an opportunity to meet with the leading actors in the electoral process as well as some of the most keen observers of Guatemalan political life. We visited regions outside the capital to acquire a more complete perspective of the political process.

We were particularly impressed with the efforts the Guatemalan people are making to strengthen and consolidate their new democracy. The increase in political violence that has been reported has not been a deterrent to the thousands of participants in the process. Special mention should be made of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and its president, Arturo Herbruger. In our experience as observers, we have never encountered such esteem for an electoral body and its president.

To fulfill the objectives set for the delegation by NDI, we met today with a broad spectrum of political leaders as well as military and police officials and representatives of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the private sector and human rights groups. Tomorrow the delegation will divide into seven teams of about five people each to meet with people throughout the country. On Sunday, these teams will traverse the country to observe the balloting and counting. The delegates are particularly interested in canvassing the opinions of Guatemalans, as they assess the campaign, the procedures on election day and the results.

The delegation will regroup in Guatemala City on Monday to exchange impressions. We expect to report our views to the international community at a press conference on Monday at 4 p.m. Our appraisal of the process, we expect, will reflect that of the Guatemalan people.

The determination of Guatemala's next government rests, as it should, in the hands of persons freely elected by the people of Guatemala. We share their hopes for peaceful elections and for the continued development of its democracy.

Thank you.

SCHEDULE

**INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION
TO THE GUATEMALA NATIONAL ELECTIONS**

November 8-13, 1990

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

Arrival: Registration in Lobby Garden

Lunch: El Cafetal for early arrivals

8 - 10 p.m.

Welcome Remarks

La Ronda

NDI President Brian Atwood

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1990

8:30 - 9:30 a.m.

Working Breakfast/Briefing

Salón Izabal

Brian Atwood/Bruce Babbitt/Mark
Feierstein/Deborah Hauger

9:35 - 10:30 a.m.

Meeting with Dr. Alejandro Giammatei,
chief coordinator, Supreme Electoral
Tribunal and Hugo Maul, magistrate,
Supreme Electoral Tribunal

Salón Izabal

10:35 - 11:30 a.m.

Meeting with human rights groups and
labor

Salón Izabal

11:35 - 12 p.m.

Meeting with Alvaro Arzú, presidential
candidate, Party of National Advancement
(PAN)

Salón Izabal

12:05 - 12:30 p.m.

Meeting with Jorge Serrano Elfas,
presidential candidate, Solidarity Action
Movement (MAS)

Salón Izabal

12:45 - 2 p.m.

Lunch with private sector

El Cafetal I and II

- 2:05 - 2:30 p.m. Meeting with Marco Villamar, vice
Salón Izabal presidential candidate, Christian
Democratic Party (DC)
- 2:45 - 3:15 p.m. Meeting with Jorge Carpio, presidential
Salón Izabal candidate, National Centrist Union (UCN)
- 3:30 - 4:30 p.m. Meeting with military/security officials:
Salón Izabal Carlos Augusto Morales Villatoro,
Minister of Interior; General Roberto
Mata, Army Chief of Staff; and Colonel
Julio Caballeros, Chief of Police
- 4:35 - 5 p.m. Press Conference
Salón Izabal
- 5:30 - 6:30 p.m. Meeting with President Vinicio
La Ronda Cerezo
- 6:35 - 7:45 p.m. Working dinner with deployment teams to
Salón Izabal discuss weekend activities

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1990

- 7 - 8 a.m. Breakfast
- 8:05 a.m. Teams deploying to the interior leave for
their regions (car/plane departures)
- 8:15 a.m. Guatemala Team - Departure from main
lobby for Supreme Electoral Tribunal
(TSE)

REST OF DAY: Teams have individual schedules

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1990

Teams observe elections, closing of polls and ballot count

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1990

Morning	Teams return to Guatemala City for
Salón Izabal	debriefing
11 a.m. - ON	Lunch buffet
Salón Amatitlán	Press statement
Farewell dinner at El Pedregal	

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1990

Departure of all delegation members

PRESS COVERAGE OF NOVEMBER DELEGATION



10 de noviembre de 1990 5

Observadores de EUA irán al área de conflicto

● Los delegados pertenecientes al Instituto Nacional Demócrata dijeron que no ven peligro de fraude.

Por Rony Iván Véliz, de la Redacción de "EL GRAFICO". La delegación de observadores internacionales del Instituto Nacional Demócrata de los Estados Unidos, viajará al interior de la república para verificar los comicios electorales en las denominadas áreas de conflicto, donde el aumento de la violencia política que se ha reportado, es un obstáculo para la participación electoral de miles de personas, dijo Bruce Babbitt, ex-gobernador de Arizona, en conferencia de prensa.

Nuestra consultora, Deborah Hauger, reunió durante seis semanas información sobre el proceso del 11 de noviembre y nosotros formamos 7 grupos que viajarán a los departamentos de Alta Verapaz, Huehuetenango, San Marcos, Quetzaltenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Zacapa, Baja Verapaz, Escuintla, Jalapa, Chiquimula, El Progreso, y esta capital, agregó dijo Bruce Babbitt.

Los 30 representantes que son legisladores, líderes de partidos políticos, expertos en elecciones, oficiales de seguridad pública, hombres de negocios, y activistas públicos, proceden de 15 países y



● Los observadores internacionales del Instituto Nacional Demócrata de los Estados Unidos, ofrecieron ayer una conferencia de prensa, donde dieron a conocer sus impresiones

tendrán una tarea muy dura. El día lunes daremos a conocer nuestro primer informe, explicó Babbitt.

"No estamos aquí para arbitrar o interferir en los asuntos internos de Guatemala; no pretendemos juzgar el proceso electoral, y daremos nuestro apoyo para la consolidación de la democracia en nuestro

sobre las elecciones generales del 11 de noviembre y sobre la reunión con las organizaciones populares y los candidatos presidenciales (Foto de Rony Iván Véliz).

país", destacó Brian Atwood, presidente del NDI.

"No creemos que haya fraude en estas elecciones, pero si vemos algo anormal, lo vamos a denunciar a nivel internacional", subrayó el visitante. Dijo que los representantes han estado en docenas de elecciones en Europa, Asia, y en Latinoamérica y ad-

quiriendo reputación mundial por su experiencia y neutralidad en materia electoral.

Por último, destacó que este proceso va a ser electoral y el pueblo es el que va a decidir quién será el futuro mandatario de la Nación.

4 10 de noviembre de 1990

GRAFICO

Observadores internacionales se reunieron con grupos populares

□ También conversaron con candidatos a la presidencia de la república.

La delegación de observadores internacionales del Instituto Nacional Democrata se reunieron ayer durante todo el día con los representantes de las organizaciones sindicales y populares entre ellas el Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo-GAM- La Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala-UNSTRAGUA-, la Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala-CONAVIGUA; el Centro de Investigación, Estudio y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos-CIEPRODH-y la Central General de Traba-



● El ex-gobernador de Arizona Bruce Babbitt, y Deborah Hauger consultora del Instituto Nacional Democrata reunidos con la profesora Nineth Montenegro de García del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo-GAM- y otras organizaciones populares y sindicales (Fotos de Rony Iván Véliz).



● El candidato presidencial de UCN Jorge Carpio Nicolle y dirigentes de la misma organización se reunieron ayer con el grupo de observadores internacionales del Instituto Nacional Democrata.

jadores de Guatemala -CGTG-, y el padre Miguel Palacios representantes de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación -CNR- y otras organizaciones afines.

Las distintas organizaciones populares informaron a los observadores internacionales que la violencia política pre-eleitoral se incrementó considerablemente y que les solicitaban a ellos

viajaran al interior del país, para que verificaran los próximos comicios en las áreas de conflicto.

Los derechos humanos es algo muy importante que se ha tomado en cuenta por los diferentes candidatos presidenciales, ya que son miles de damnificados por la violencia en nuestro país que ha dejado cerca de 100 mil muertos, 40 mil desaparecidos y miles de viudas y huérfanos dijo Nineth de

García presidente del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo-GAM-.

El ex-gobernador de Arizona, Bruce Babbitt, dio a conocer a la prensa nacional y extranjera que ellos tomarán en cuenta los informes aportados por las organizaciones sindicales y los grupos de derechos humanos de Guatemala, para su informe final.

También indicó el ex-gobernador de Arizona que se reunieron con los representantes del Tribunal Supremo Electoral, el sector privado, CACIF, UNAGRO, La Cámara de Industria, la Asociación de Azucareros, La Cámara de Finanzas del sector privado, los candidatos presidenciales Jorge Carpio Nicolle de UCN; Jorge Serrano Elias, del MAS; Alvaro Arzú, del PAN, y el Lic. Marco Antonio

Villamar Contreras, vicepresidente de la DC, así como con el ministro de Gobernación Lic. Carlos Morales Villatoro, el director de la Policía Nacional, coronel Julio Caballeros Seigné, y el General Roberto Matta Gálvez.

"Estamos particularmente impresionados con los esfuerzos que el pueblo guatemalteco está haciendo para fortalecer y consolidar la democracia, pero debemos mencionar especialmente al Tribunal Supremo Electoral y a su presidente, Licenciado Arturo Herbruger", informó Bruce Babbitt.

"En nuestra experiencia como observadores, nunca hemos encontrado un cuerpo electoral ni un presidente de tal organización que sea tan respetado como en Guatemala", finalizó diciendo.

PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRACY

The Los Angeles Times
November 18, 1990

Is Squeaky Clean Squeaky Fair?



International election monitors fathomed the contradictions of Guatemala. Will they do as much in Mexico?

By **JOBBE G. CASTAÑEDA**

GUATEMALA CITY—Last Sunday's first round of the Guatemalan presidential elections is an excellent example of two fundamental trends in Latin American life and society today.

The hemisphere, with the exceptions of Cuba and Mexico, is living through a significant but circumscribed process of democratization. Second, the opening up of the majority of the region's economies, often beyond what prudence and sound policy would indicate, is being accompanied by a parallel "internationalization" of its politics.

More than 100 international observers officially monitored the Guatemalan vote; this is a new phenomenon that should be viewed in a broader context. Increasingly, Latin American elections, human-rights issues and environmental policies are becoming the object of foreign scrutiny, sometimes supervision and occasionally censure. These twin trends—limited democratization and political internationalization—were strongly present during Guatemala's voting last Sunday. The elections were technically clean and fair by any standards, yet not very relevant to the majority of the nation's inhabitants.

To begin with, voter participation is a major problem. Only about 70% of the population registered to vote, and only half of those went to the polls. A tenth of these voided their ballots or left their ballots blank, so the four major candidates split barely 30% of the eligible voters. The leading candidate received about 25%, representing less than 10% of the eligible voting population. Regionally, the situation is far worse, because the national average disguises very low voter registration and participation in most rural areas.

But disfranchisement is not just a function of abatement, electoral rolls and percentages. Those who vote least also make up the majority of Guatemala's population: the rural, indigenous peoples, whose beauty and dignity are surpassed only by their sadness and misery. Moreover, the significance of these elections for those millions of Guatemalans is further diminished by the fact that the main issues that affect them—land reform, human-rights vio-

lations, a negotiated conclusion to the civil war, tax reform and their own marginalization—were not addressed by candidates who freely confessed, in private, that the tacit condition established by the military for allowing a "peaceful transfer of power was that none of the contestants make too many waves."

Thus, there seems to be a trade-off between the cleanliness of the electoral process and its real meaning. While this "democracy under surveillance" is not a feature of every nation in Latin America, there are analogous aspects in many countries: Chile, Argentina, perhaps even Brazil, Colombia and Peru. Consequently, there seems to be a growing awareness among observers of recent elections throughout Latin America that

history and political situation of the country and simply don't have the time to imbue themselves with the necessary information and sensitivity. Furthermore, despite reiterated commitments to nonintervention and respect for sovereignty, it is evident that international observation—along with international enforcement of human rights and environmental standards—does imply a degree of foreign interference in domestic affairs. Acknowledging this intrinsic characteristic of international monitoring should not lead to its rejection or dismissal, but it does introduce a note of caution and this caveat: There is a right way of doing this and also a wrong way.


The National Democratic Institute delegation in Guatemala is an example of doing it the right way. It is a pluralistic, multinational group, including Latin Americans, Europeans, Americans, one

Israeli, one Australian and a South African envoy of the African National Congress. The group not only looked at the electoral process but also at the context. It talked—and more important, it listened to the various groups. Most of its internal discussions reflected the ambiguity of the situation: A clean and fair election, yet so meaningless to the country's real problem that it has been described by others as "electoral apartheid."

International observers have contributed significantly to democratic transitions in many countries. It is mostly done with the enthusiasm of sitting governments, but of course, not always. Gen. Augusto Pinochet in Chile never invited foreign observers; they came anyway. Despite the risks, it is increasingly perceived as the best—or least unattractive—solution to a difficult problem: holding elections where traditions or interests do not work in their favor. Even in Mexico, the Salinas administration is increasingly isolated in its rejection of international observers. The right-of-center

PAN, left-of-center leader Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the Critical Current faction of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party all accept the principle in one way or another as electoral fraud intensifies and acquires new dimensions and features, such as last Sunday's municipal elections in the state of Mexico. It remains to be seen whether U.S. advocates of international observance in general will be as committed to the idea with regard to Mexico or whether the double standard will continue to apply to the United States' southern neighbor.

Jobbe G. Castañeda, a professor of political science at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, was a member of the NDI election observer delegation to Guatemala.



although the formal process is an indispensable ingredient to any solution of the region's problems, it is no more than that.

This is also largely true of the internationalization of the region's politics. It is not a panacea and is fraught with contradictions, inconsistencies and very real dangers. A delegation such as the one sent to Guatemala by the National Democratic Institute and led by former Arizona Gov. Bruce Babbitt can easily mistake the trees for the forest, confusing procedure with substance and technical details with political process. It can wrongly conclude that the four or five days spent by a delegation in any given country are typical of everyday life.

In many cases, the observers are unfamiliar with the language, customs,

firmas

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A QUEMARROPA

Mon-312

La democracia observada

Por Carlos Alberto Montaner

En opinión del autor, la participación de observadores internacionales en las elecciones presidenciales latinoamericanas es un ejemplo de madurez política.

(FIRMAS PRESS. Madrid) El expresidente Carter se va a Haití a observar las elecciones. Desembarcará en el destartalado país con unas cuantas docenas de colaboradores pertenecientes a la fundación que lleva su nombre y al *National Democratic Institute* de Washington.

El propósito de la expedición es clarísimo: impedir los fraudes electorales y legitimar con su aval al gobernador. Si tiene alguna preferencia seguramente la mantendrá en secreto. En política --al contrario de lo que ocurre en las competencias deportivas-- lo importante no es que gane el mejor, sino el que obtenga más votos, porque mejor y peor son siempre discutibles juicios de valor, mientras que la mayoría aritmética constituye una categoría inapelable. Por más vueltas que se le dé 3 son inevitablemente más que 2.

No hay duda: La vacilante democracia latinoamericana necesita de la presencia de los observadores. Sin ellos es probable que los partidarios de Pinochet habrían sentido la tentación de rellenar las urnas durante el plebiscito que liquidó al general por un escaso margen. Sin su presencia Daniel Ortega difícilmente hubiera admitido la derrota en Nicaragua, y Manuel Noriega acaso estaría gobernando a los panameños frente a unos Estados Unidos impotentes ante la legitimidad del dictador. Sin esos benditos observadores, Juan Bosch no habría vacilado en convocar a los dominicanos a la insurrección reclamando un triunfo que en realidad no obtuvo en las urnas: perdió por 20,000 votos rigurosamente contados.

La admisión de observadores internacionales en las elecciones de América Latina es una sabia muestra de madurez política. No tiene sentido invocar escrúpulos nacionalistas para cerrarle el paso a la presencia de este silencioso puñado de testigos de la democracia. Es a la inversa: se trataba de garantizar de la genuina expresión de la voluntad popular. Son avalistas y no enemigos de la soberanía electoral. Hasta ahora sólo México se niega a admitir su presencia en los comicios nacionales, lo que explica --entre otras razones-- la mínima credibilidad con que hoy cuenta la muy cuestionable democracia mexicana.

Hace pocas fechas acudí en calidad de observador internacional a las elecciones de Guatemala. Fui invitado por el *National Democratic Institute* como parte de

una heterogénea delegación que incluía búlgaros, sudafricanos, panameños, españoles, puertorriqueños, nicaraguenses y --naturalmente-- norteamericanos. Pero si variopinto era el origen étnico, racial y nacional de los componentes, igualmente plural era la filiación ideológica: los había liberales y conservadores, demócratas y republicanos, sandinistas y antisandinistas. Sólo existía un elemento unificador que nos cohesionaba: la firme creencia en que la democracia sólo es posible si se fundamenta en procesos electorales transparentes. Nuestra misión, pues, consistía en observar atenta y discretamente las elecciones, repartidos por todo el territorio nacional, con el objeto de verificar que las reglas se cumplieran.

Para mi fortuna me tocó recorrer los pueblos indígenas asentados en la proximidad del lago de Atitlán, uno de los parajes más bellos del planeta. Primero en lancha, y luego a pie, en compañía en Harriet Babbitt, esposa del exgobernador de Arizona, de Luis Sánchez --vicepresidente del Congreso nicaraguense-- y de Mark Feierstein oficial del NDI; hablamos con electores y con candidatos, con funcionarios electorales y con los militares que --en la distancia-- mantenían el orden. Presenciamos la votación y el recuento. En general fueron unas elecciones impecables. El procedimiento electoral guatemalteco hacía muy difícil el fraude, aunque eso no garantizaba la expresión de la verdadera voluntad de toda la población. Lamentablemente es bajísima la participación de las mujeres indígenas. Menos de un 15 por ciento se atrevió a depositar su voto. Y esta inhibición más parece ser un problema cultural que político: entre los indígenas la mujer apenas cuenta en las actividades cívicas del grupo. Ese terreno está tradicionalmente reservado a los hombres.

Sólo una vez creímos percibir una fuerte presencia femenina. Penosamente subíamos por la ladera de una loma cuando divisamos una larga fila de electores frente a la mesa de votación. Casi todas llevaban falda. "Menos mal: en este pueblo votan las mujeres", afirmé entusiasmado. "No --me aclaró Hattie Babbitt-- en este pueblo los hombres utilizan faldas". Tenía razón. A veces a los observadores nos pasan gato por liebre. [6]

ELECTION NEWS

GUATEMALA - AN HISTORIC TRANSITION

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by Susan Johnson, Director LI

On November 11th 1990 for the first time in more than 30 years a transition of power from one civilian government to another took place as a result of fair elections in Guatemala. But apart from the presence of a number of international observers, including LI President Adolfo Suárez and a 30-member NDI delegation, the elections received scant attention from the international community.



*Stephen Schlesinger and M Fiallos,
President of the Nicaraguan
Supreme Electoral Council*

The NDI witnessed an election which was conspicuous for its efficiency and fairness, and a vindication of the high esteem in which the Guatemalan Supreme Electoral Tribunal is held. The tribunal's attention to detail was remarkable, even down to the provision of toilet paper to the local election tribunals for the removal of excess ink from voters' fingers! On election day officials and voters alike in all regions of the country appeared to understand the procedures. Party poll watchers were present and lines were, despite their sometimes inordinate length early in the day, orderly. Military and police presence was unobtrusive even in areas of insurgency.

As the final results of the first round of the Guatemalan Presidential elections came in, Jorge Carpio, leader of the Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN) and Vice President of the LI, was confirmed as the winner with 25.7% of the vote. He now faces a run-off on January 6 against Jorge Serrano, leader of the centre-right Solidarity Action Movement (MAS), who



Adolfo Suárez and Jorge Carpio

Indeed since the 1954 CIA-backed coup which brutally diverted Guatemala from its uncertain path to democracy, this small and beautiful Central American country has received minimal media attention. The military presided undisturbed for 30 years over a country with an on-going civil war and where shocking human rights abuses were perpetrated with impunity. Only since the election of a civilian government in 1985 are books documenting the 1954 coup such as *Bitter Fruit* by Stephen Schlesinger, member of the NDI delegation, finally available to the Guatemalan public.



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won 24.2% of the vote. In the 116-seat Congress UCN was confirmed as the largest party. The superior campaign organisation of the UCN in rural areas, witnessed by the countrywide coverage of the NDI delegation, which reported finding UCN slogans in the remotest places, was confirmed by the vote which saw the party winning strongly outside the capital.

But the issue in Guatemala was not the secrecy of the vote or the fear of fraud. The military in Guatemala has historically not concerned itself with such subtle tactics. Presidents who incur the displeasure of the military are simply removed by a coup.

In 1985 the military, faced with a declining economy and a negative international image, permitted democratic elections to be held under a new constitution. Vinicio Cerezo, Leader of the Christian Democratic party, was elected to the presidency.

For the first part of his five-year term inflation fell, as did human rights abuses. But then violence reasserted itself and the economy sank into recession. Two coup attempts in 1988 and 1989 were defeated by those sections of the military loyal, for their own reasons, to Cerezo, but they exacted their price. Control of the police was ceded to the military and the murder of political dissidents rose sharply.

Ramiro de Leon Carpio, elected government ombudsman for Human Rights by Congress at the beginning of 1990, stressed to the delegation the endemic corruption of the military, political and intellectual elite which rules the country. This elite comprises the 40% Spanish-speaking 'ladinos', whilst the 60% indigenous Indian population is excluded from the political process both by illiteracy and the exclusive use of Spanish, rather than their own languages. But this issue of virtual disenfranchisement

is not a subject that is discussed or even apparently recognised in Guatemala.

The excellent officials of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal bubbled with enthusiasm in explaining to the NDI delegation that for the first time arrangements had been made so that ballots would be available in Braille, enabling some 3,000 blind people to exercise their vote. They apparently saw no anomaly in the effort expended to allow such a tiny minority to vote whilst the majority of the population remains politically alienated. The NDI delegation member from the ANC, South Africa, could not escape the feeling that he was politically less far from home than he was geographically.

The sense of unreality continued throughout our meetings with human rights groups including the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) which represents Guatemalan widows - 40,000 persons have disappeared over the last 20 years, 90% of them men. Meanwhile the political process carries on regardless. In Guatemala political candidates who publicly address issues such as land reform, human rights abuses and social justice are unlikely to live long enough to take office.

On election day, leaving the sophisticated lines of predominantly young people voting in Guatemala City, we drove to a small Indian village near the old capital city of Antigua. A fifteen-minute car ride up what passed for a road brought us from the first world to the third and face to face with the other Guatemala.

Indian women dressed in colourful shawls which contrasted sharply with the drab dwellings and invariably carrying babies on their backs, came in to vote, preferring a fingerprint rather than a signature. Young barefooted children ran about in the cold. The men sat around the desolate main square against a spectacular

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backdrop of mountains. In the absence of any real employment possibilities the main occupation of the male villagers is consuming large quantities of home-made liquor. From time to time the village is visited by the military to remind them of the possibility that they could 'disappear'.

The political will to bring those who perpetrate human rights abuses to justice simply does not exist. The post of ombudsman for human rights, created in 1985 under the newly elected Cerezo government, has only investigatory powers. The single case where members of the police force were brought to trial was overturned in August of this year. Meanwhile extra-judicial killings continue at a level of 25-30 per month.

Violence during the election campaign resulted in the assassination of six political leaders; a few hours before the polls opened the Secretary-General of the UCN in the Quiche region was murdered. The delegation in its final statement noted that although the campaign itself was technically fair in the sense of adequate access to the media and other facilities for the major parties, the violence was clearly 'designed to inhibit political activity and constrain debate', especially on the left of the political spectrum.

The delegation also noted with concern the low turnout of 53% compared to 69% in 1985. Given that only 70% of the population had registered to vote, participation in the election was a minority activity. Although the low turnout may partly be explained by a change in law since 1985 which made voting voluntary, it seems likely that this absenteeism was the concrete manifestation of all the underlying causes for concern in this election - fear of violence, alienation from the political process of large segments of the population and the concentration of voting tables in relatively few locations.



Susan Johnson observes election

This latter arrangement meant that some rural voters had to travel up to 22 hours to vote, and in urban areas people were not registered according to their place of residence but their time of registering. As a result many people had to travel right across the city to vote. Clearly the issue of security rather than facilitating the vote was paramount.

Despite these serious concerns there is no doubt that Guatemala has held, by its own terms of reference, a successful and historic election. The resumption of its interrupted journey to democracy now depends upon the will of the newly-elected government to involve the entire Guatemalan population in the process of consolidation of democracy. The international community bears a great responsibility to ensure that Guatemala receives the outside support and attention it needs for the cultivation of its still fragile democracy. The Liberal International has good reason to hope that one of its members will have the opportunity as President to take the lead in the crucial process of national reconciliation.

**PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTION RESULTS**

November 11, 1990 Presidential Breakdown

President and Vice President Political Party	Valid Votes	Percentage of Valid Votes
Jorge Carpio Nicolle Manuel Ayau Cordón <i>Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN)</i>	399,775	25.72
Jorge Serrano Elias Gustavo Adolfo Espina S. <i>Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS)</i>	375,165	24.14
Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo Marco Antonio Villamar C. <i>Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)</i>	271,933	17.50
Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen Fraterno Vila Betoret <i>Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)</i>	268,796	17.29
Luis Alberto Sosa Avila David Eskenassy <i>Coalición Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, Frente de Avanzada Nacional (MLN-FAN)</i>	73,809	4.77
René de Leon Schlotter Aracely Conde de Paiz <i>Coalición Partido Socialista Democrático, Alianza Popular Cinco (PSD-AP-5)</i>	55,675	3.60

José Angel Lee Duarte Carlos Gallardo Flores <i>Partido Revolucionario (PR)</i>	33,251	2.15
José Fernandez Adolfo Putzeys <i>Partido Democrático de Cooperación Nacional (PDCN)</i>	32,217	2.08
Benedicto Lucas Garcia Hector Antonio Guerra <i>Movimiento Emergente de Concordia (MEC)</i>	16,561	1.07
Fernando Leal Estevez Kurt Martin Meyer Rodas <i>Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)</i>	11,015	0.71
Leonel Hernandez Cardona Raul Montenegro <i>Frente Unido de la Revolución (FUR)</i>	7,903	0.51
Jorge Reyna Carlos Torres <i>Partido Demócrata (PD)</i>	6,269	0.41
<hr/>		
VALID BALLOTS CAST/PERCENTAGE	1,552,369	85.91%
NULL BALLOTS/PERCENTAGE	164,267	9.09%
BLANK BALLOTS/PERCENTAGE	90,221	4.99%
TOTAL	1,806,857	

November 11, 1990 Congressional Breakdown

Party	Deputies
Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN)	41
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)	27
Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS)	18
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)	12
Coalición Partido Institucional Democrático, Frente de Unidad Nacional, Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (PID-FUN-FRG)	12
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN)	3
Coalición Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, Frente de Avance Nacional (MLN-FAN)	1
Coalición Partido Socialista Democrático, Alianza Popular Cinco (PSD-AP5)	1
Partido Revolucionario (PR)	1
	<hr/>
Total	116

**Presidential Breakdown
January 6, 1991**

President and Vice President Political Party	Valid Votes	Percentage of Valid Votes
Jorge Serrano Elias Gustavo Adolfo Espina S. <i>Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS)</i>	936,389	68.08
Jorge Carpio Nicolle Manuel Ayau Cordón <i>Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN)</i>	438,990	31.92
VALID VOTES CAST/PERCENTAGE	1,375,379	94.88%
NULL VOTES/PERCENTAGE	69,179	4.77%
BLANK BALLOTS/PERCENTAGE	5,116	.35%
TOTAL	1,449,674	

