

**COORDINATING
OBSERVERS TO THE
1993
ELECTIONS IN
NIGER**

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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
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NDI Description, Board and Publications



Acknowledgments

This report on the 1993 legislative and presidential elections in Niger was prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). NDI established a secretariat in Niger in early January 1993 to examine the pre-election environment and organize, with representatives of the United Nations (UN), the training and coordination of election observers from more than 18 countries. NDI also sponsored small observer teams for the legislative elections that took place on February 14, the first round of the presidential election on February 27 and the second round on March 27.

Steven Dinkin, special consultant to NDI for the Niger project, performed the lion's share of the secretariat's duties. He brought invaluable service to the project through his Peace Corps experience in Niger, his ability to speak Hausa and other local languages, and his tireless work. Dinkin wrote most of the pre-election briefing report, much of which reappears here in the chapters on the country background, the election system, and the pre-election environment. Dinkin also drafted most of the sections on election-day activities, and an assessment of election day and its aftermath.

NDI Assistant Counsel for Election Processes Michael Stoddard co-authored the report and edited the first-draft. NDI President

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Kenneth Wollack, Senior Associate for Election Processes Larry Garber, Senior Program Officer Edward McMahon, Director of Program Coordination Eric Bjornlund and Public Information Director Sue Grabowski edited the report.

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Executive Summary

As part of a continuing effort to assist Niger's transition, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) supported an ambitious and innovative program to coordinate¹ election observers, both domestic and international, to the 1993 legislative and presidential elections.

NDI helped organize the coordination of election observers to Niger's February 14, 1993 legislative elections, the February 27 first-round presidential election and the March 27 run-off election. NDI joined the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in this effort — the Coordinated Observer Mission (the Coordinated Mission) — to organize, brief, train and deploy Nigerien and foreign election observers and to facilitate information sharing among them. Over the course of the three elections, NDI helped provide this service to 15, 18 and 16 delegations totalling 136, 162 and 132 observers respectively.

¹ NDI uses the term "coordinate" throughout this document to signify a consensual process of consultation, cooperation and sharing information. The term, as used here, is *not* intended to convey the sense that NDI or the UNDP had the authority to direct, manage or supervise the activities of other groups.

The 1993 Elections in Niger

On March 27, the people of Niger elected as president Mahamane Ousmane, the leader of the Alliance of Forces for Change (AFC). Ousmane obtained approximately 54 percent of the vote, defeating Tandja Mamadou, candidate of the former ruling party, who garnered the remaining 46 percent. This run-off election, the fourth voting exercise in three months, represented the culmination of Niger's electoral exercises for a transition to a multiparty political system.

Niger's interim government conducted the March 27 election, as it had the previous voting exercises, in a professional manner. The elections were characterized by strict compliance with the election laws and maximum emphasis on transparency. These factors guaranteed the elections a degree of credibility not enjoyed in other recent African electoral exercises.

NDI was particularly impressed with the following aspects of the process:

- The electoral system and administrative framework provided adequate opportunity for all political parties to participate in managing the elections;
- The access given to monitors from political parties, domestic organizations and international delegations was encouraged and facilitated;
- The process of crafting, modifying and administering the election system employed a consultative, open approach and was further supervised and checked by the advent of an official, nonpartisan, autonomous "watchdog" operation;
- Political parties, government officials, military personnel and citizens alike were relatively well informed, understood the objectives and rules of the process, and demonstrated exemplary good faith in performing their respective roles.
- The decision of the prior incumbent authorities to dissolve the former government, to conduct a national conference and to institute an interim government, coupled with former President Ali Saibou's resolution not to compete, reduced tensions throughout the transition and evidenced an unusual commitment to ensuring a free and fair election environment.

However, as might be expected in a country holding its first multiparty elections, some aspects of the process were not ideal. Chief among the observed problems were:

- Minor administrative irregularities;
- Isolated attempts to manipulate the process;
- A low level of participation among eligible voters stemming from a combination of factors including cultural barriers to voting by women, long distances to polling stations and an ambitious election schedule, during which three of the four election exercises were held in a six-week period that coincided with both Ramadan and the country's warmest season;
- Inefficiencies in administering the process — such as requiring complex procedures for nominating candidates, verifying voter identification, balloting and tabulating results — caused unnecessary confusion and delays; and
- Questionable adherence to principles of due process by the government in addressing the ongoing Tuareg rebellion, combined with inconsistent processing of Tuareg candidate nominations, led to confusion and added tension surrounding that ethnic unrest.

Nonetheless, NDI and others determined that these concerns were isolated cases and did not materially alter the outcome of the elections. Indeed, observers and participants alike concluded that this series of elections demonstrates a resounding affirmation of Niger's commitment to pluralistic democracy. Moreover, the problems that existed were addressed by the administrative authorities, the candidates and the voters with such general goodwill and commitment to a fair, open process that the Niger experience serves as a model for other African nations.

Coordinated Observer Mission

The effort to coordinate the activities of election observers in Niger enhanced the overall quality of the international monitoring exercise. The benefits were achieved through several activities organized by NDI and the UN, including providing comprehensive reports on the pre- and post-election periods, familiarizing observers with election monitoring techniques, briefing observers on specifics of Niger's election system and political situation and organizing a systematic sharing of information.

The Coordinated Mission also maximized the efficiency of the overall monitoring process in Niger. It designed a strategic election-day deployment plan to enlarge the quantity and broaden the demographic diversity of polling sites observed. As a result, the members of the Coordinated Mission avoided duplication of effort and observed a larger sample of polling sites than would have been possible had each delegation acted independently. And by combining human, financial and information resources, individual observer delegations achieved the benefits associated with a large monitoring operation while sharing a fraction of the significant costs typically associated with such an undertaking.

Ultimately, the Coordinated Mission achieved a high level of credibility in the eyes of Niger's government, the political parties and the international community. However, several factors inherent in Niger's pre-election environment significantly shaped the flexibility and freedom with which the Coordinated Mission pursued its objectives. NDI recognizes that every election situation is unique, and as such, the factors that made coordination a success in Niger may not exist elsewhere.

Chapter 1

Introduction

On March 27, 1993, the people of Niger elected the leader of the Alliance of Forces for Change (*Alliance des forces du changement* – AFC), Mahamane Ousmane, president of the republic. Ousmane received approximately 54 percent of the vote, defeating Tandja Mamadou, candidate of the former ruling party, who garnered the remaining 46 percent.

This election constituted the final vote in a series of four elections that began with a December 28, 1992 constitutional referendum and proceeded through the February 14, 1993 legislative and February 27 first-round presidential elections. These elections marked the culmination of a movement that started at the 1991 National Conference on political reform and resulted in Niger's transition from a single-party state to a multiparty political system.

Niger's transitional government conducted the elections in a professional manner characterized by strict compliance with the election laws and maximum emphasis on transparency. An integral element in the successful conduct of the elections was the independent and nonpartisan election supervision commission (*Commission*

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nationale de contrôle et de supervision des élections — COSUPEL) that worked closely with the National Election Commission. Together they steered the elections through many difficult challenges.

Niger's political leaders, who pushed for change with a spirit of cooperation and a unity of purpose, also must be commended for their vision, perseverance and respect for the ultimate outcome. It was a significant indication of their dedication to the democratic process that all of the competing parties acknowledged and accepted the results of the elections.

In conceding defeat, Tandja Mamadou, presidential candidate for the National Development Movement (*Mouvement national pour la société de développement* — MNSD), stressed the importance of respecting the results and the democratic process to his followers. He said,

You should (be) proud and dignified. You must maintain unity and solidarity, and continue to seek peace, security, justice and prosperity. You must be steadfast in your support of national unity and your loyalty to the nation of Niger. (See Appendix I.)

Similarly deserving credit are the political party pollwatchers and the mixed domestic and international observer teams from the Coordinated Mission, whose efforts helped assure a legitimate and credible process. Above all, it is the people of Niger who merit congratulations for peacefully and patiently demonstrating their commitment to the principles of freedom and democracy.

The election of a new government in Niger can trace its roots to 1990, when protests for economic and political reform forced the single-party government to hold a national conference in 1991. Attended by more than 1,200 representatives from all sectors of Nigerien society, the conference called for constitutional reform and multiparty elections.

Recognizing that the elections, Niger's first attempt at multiparty voting since independence in 1960, would be the keystone of the transition process, COSUPEL invited delegations from various countries and nongovernment organizations, including NDI, as impartial observers. As part of a continuing effort to assist Niger's transition, NDI supported an ambitious and innovative program to coordinate election observers to the legislative and presidential elections.

NDI's activities in Niger began in November 1991, when the Institute invited several Nigerien activists from political parties and civic organizations to a regional seminar on election monitoring in Cotonou, Benin. In March 1992, NDI conducted a three-day election observation seminar in Niamey that focused exclusively on Niger's upcoming elections. These programs provided civic and political party leaders detailed information about the techniques of observing elections and played an important role in enhancing the capabilities of domestic monitors.

In addition to these programs, NDI organized two three-day political party training seminars in Niamey and Zinder. These seminars, held in October 1992, trained political party representatives in grassroots organizing, candidate selection and constituency mobilization with the objective of improving their capacity to compete in elections and to offer meaningful choices for the voters. Finally, NDI invited COSUPEL President Adamou Kombo to join NDI's international observer delegation to Romania's national elections in September, where he observed first-hand the mechanisms for administering and monitoring multiparty elections. According to Kombo, his experience in Romania prompted COSUPEL to initiate new procedures that enhanced confidence in Niger's electoral process.

Upon receiving an invitation to observe the Nigerien elections, NDI contacted the United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit in New York, representatives of countries with development programs in Niger and members of other interested nongovernmental organizations to discuss election monitoring plans. Subsequent discussions led to a program in which NDI joined with the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to coordinate the activities of election observers.

Local human rights organizations, regional civic groups, national delegations from Africa, Canada and Europe, as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT) francophone mission and NDI composed the constituent members of the Coordinated Observer Mission (the Coordinated Mission). At its peak capacity, the Coordinated Mission comprised 18 separate delegations, and 162 observers, for the run-off presidential election.

On behalf of the Coordinated Mission, NDI established a secretariat in Niamey that ultimately conducted and published a pre-

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election assessment of the electoral process, briefed and trained election observers, organized a strategic deployment of observers, and coordinated the collection and sharing of information for the observers. The success of the Coordinated Mission, characterized by improvements in the efficiency, quality and credibility of election monitoring capacity, is an important development in ongoing efforts to assist democratization and electoral processes throughout the world.

Chapter 2 of this report briefly summarizes the cultural, political and historical setting for the elections. Chapters 3 through 6 discuss Niger's election framework, the events of the legislative and presidential elections and NDI's assessments of these exercises. Chapter 7 explains the background, organization and activities of the Coordinated Mission. In Chapter 8, NDI offers some reflections on Niger's elections and the Coordinated Mission, and evaluates the benefits and limitations of coordination efforts.

Chapter 2

Country Background

A. Geography and Demographics

Niger, a geographically vast country, lies in the heart of Sahelian Africa on the southern edge of the Sahara desert. More than two-thirds of the country is characterized as desert. "Desertification," the continuing advance of the desert southward due to climate changes and land misuse, is an issue of growing concern. The climate is hot and dry most of the year, particularly in March, April and May. The rainy season normally lasts from June to September.

Most of Niger's 8 million inhabitants live on the only land suitable for raising crops and livestock, an area in the southern savanna region bordering Nigeria. The Niger River flows for 480 kilometers along the southwest border, providing enough water for farming. However, recurring cycles of drought have caused severe problems for the agricultural sector.

The dominant ethnic groups comprise the Hausa, who are concentrated in the south, and the Djerma-Songhai, who live primarily in the southwest and west. Both communities derive their

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livelihood primarily from agriculture. Beyond farming, the Hausa have, historically, concentrated on commercial activities while the Djerma have dominated government. Most of the remainder of Niger's population are nomadic and semi-nomadic Tuareg and Fulani, whose herds of livestock constitute their economic mainstay. The majority of people reside in small villages. Niamey, the capital, has a population of about 500,000. Zinder, the second largest city, has approximately 80,000 inhabitants.

Niger's official language is French, which is spoken by about 15 percent of the population. Although the 1991 National Conference identified 10 "national" languages, including Arabic, at least 50 percent of Nigeriens speak Hausa. Other languages spoken are Djerma, Tuareg, Fulani and Beri Beri (Kanouri). More than 85 percent of the population are followers of Islam. Most of the remainder practice traditional religions or belong to a tiny Christian minority.

Although education is free and compulsory until age 15, UNESCO figures classify as literate only about 20 to 25 percent of the population; among women, the illiteracy rate is estimated at 83 percent. With few newspapers or television sets, most of Niger's citizens rely on radio and word of mouth for information.

B. Historical Overview of Niger's Culture and Politics

Before the arrival of the French in the late 19th century, the territory that is today the Republic of Niger comprised a succession of small kingdoms and sultanates that depended economically on the trade caravans that plied their way across the vast Saharan desert of north central Africa. In 1890, France and Great Britain divided between themselves the regions of Central Sudan and the Sahara. The French pursued military conquest of the territory in order to check British expansion, stabilize the Lake Chad area and create an empire stretching from North Africa to the Red Sea.

Once their control over the entire territory to the east was assured, the French moved Niger's capital from Zinder to Niamey in 1922. Unlike the British, the French utilized traditional rulers for the day-to-day administration of local affairs. This arrangement was easily achieved in Hausa communities where strong local authorities already existed. The Djerma society in the west lacked such

authorities and here the French simply appointed new "canton chiefs."

Nationalist politics began to emerge in Niger following World War II. At a conference held in Bamako, Mali in 1946, members of west Africa's educated elite formed a pan-African organization called the African Democratic Rally (*Le rassemblement démocratique africain* – RDA). Nigerien participants returned home to establish an RDA affiliate called the Niger Progressive Party (*Parti progressiste nigérien* – PPN), one of Niger's first political parties. Most of PPN's members were modernized Djerma from Niamey and west Niger who exhibited hostility not only toward French colonial authority, but also toward traditional power held by the tribal chiefs. By the late 1950s, however, the PPN modified its position to espouse a modest reform program, demonstrated increased tolerance toward traditional authority and embraced the principle of internal self-rule for Niger, with limited autonomy as a member of the French community. In the 1958 constitutional referendum creating the Fifth French Republic, Niger's voters approved continued association with France.

Other major parties that emerged after World War II as offshoots of the PPN included the Nigerien Progressive Union (*Union progressiste nigérienne* – UPN) and the Nigerien Union of Independents and Supporters (*Union nigérienne des indépendants et sympathisants* – UNIS). UNIS came to dominate politics after winning the 1958 legislative elections. The more radical Sawaba (Freedom) Party, led by Djibo Bakary, supported independence from France and opposed the constitutional referendum that continued Niger's French dependence.

Before the 1958 vote, French authorities succeeded in outmaneuvering the Sawaba Party, which lost control over the legislative assembly. During the next two years, Sawaba was systematically suppressed, and the PPN regained political power in the legislature. The PPN extended its control over the unions and the media to such a degree that Niger became a *de facto* one-party state. By the time full independence was granted to Niger on August 3, 1960, the ruling PPN had eliminated all opposition.

Since independence, Niger has been governed by three regimes. The first, headed by Hamani Diori and administered by the PPN, began at independence in 1960 and ended in 1974, when a group of

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military officers staged a coup and toppled the regime. Growing economic problems, the failure of rural development programs, severe drought, and student and labor unrest contributed to the regime's demise. Opponents of Diori's government objected to the appearance of dependence on French advisors and government corruption. A defense pact with Libya, negotiated without consulting the military, also contributed to Diori's downfall.

The Supreme Military Council (*Conseil militaire suprême* – CMS), an arrangement created following the April 15, 1974 coup, administered the second government. The 12-officer council was headed by Lt. Colonel Seyni Kountche, chief of staff of the armed forces. The CMS suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and banned all political parties. A body named the National Development Council (*Conseil national de développement* – CND) replaced the legislature. Although heavily dominated by Djerma officers, including Kountche, the CMS also included Tuareg officers and some Hausa cabinet members.

A highly personalized regime evolved during the next two years, and Kountche succeeded in holding power by balancing military and civilian interests. He managed to keep students and organized labor at bay through a strategy of co-optation and repression. In 1978, the government released political prisoners from the previous regime, including Diori and Bakary.

C. The National Conference and the Transition Toward Democracy

Largely as a result of economic strains in the mid-1980s, Kountche called for the adoption of a national charter, which Niger's educated elite hoped would represent the first step toward constitutional government and greater democracy. The June 17, 1987 referendum on the National Charter was the first time Nigeriens had voted in 17 years. They ratified the Charter, but the democratization process did not immediately follow.

After a long period of ill-health, Kountche died in a French hospital in November 1987. The CMS immediately designated army chief of staff Colonel Ali Saibou as head of state and chairman of the CMS. By August 1988, Saibou announced the formation of the MNSD political party, which he intended to be "the final step in normalizing Niger's politics." However, Saibou was not yet prepared

to permit establishment of a multiparty system. Saibou intended the MNSD to serve as the single forum within which differing opinions and ideological views could be expressed.

The MNSD's first party congress elected Saibou as party president. The congress also chose 67 military and civilian figures as members of the new Superior Council of National Direction (*Conseil supérieur d'orientation nationale* – CSON), which replaced the CMS. Nigeriens approved a new constitution in 1989 and in December voted in Niger's first direct, albeit single-party, elections since independence.

Throughout the following year, growing student unrest led to violent clashes with the police. The trade unions organized strikes against government-imposed austerity measures such as restrictions on wage increases introduced in May 1990. In November 1990, a general strike calling for a relaxation of the harsh economic policies and a transition to multiparty politics halted uranium production, closed public offices and disrupted transportation.

Bowing to pressure, Saibou agreed to open the political system to multiparty competition. Interim procedures were established to allow the registration of political parties, and the constitution was amended accordingly. A national conference on political reform was planned for mid-1991, with municipal and legislative elections proposed for later in the year.

In July 1991, the National Conference convened in Niamey. More than 1,200 delegates represented 24 newly registered political parties, as well as professional, women's and student organizations. At the outset, the National Conference declared itself sovereign, and subsequently voted to suspend the constitution and disband the CND. Saibou was allowed to remain interim president under the supervision of the National Conference, which also assumed control over the police and the armed forces. The latter had come under particular criticism for their violent suppression of a Tuareg rebellion in 1990. Finally, the Conference established a special committee to investigate abuses of political and economic power alleged to have occurred since independence.

The Conference designated Amadou Cheifou, formerly a regional official of the International Civil Aviation Organization, to lead a transitional administration, which would relinquish the reins of government in early 1993 to democratically elected officials. André

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Salifou, who had presided over the Conference since August, was selected to chair the interim legislative body, the High Council of the Republic (*Haut conseil de la république* – HCR). The HCR was tasked with implementing resolutions adopted by the Conference, supervising the president and drafting a new constitution. After passing a charter governing the activities of the newly formed political parties, the Conference disbanded in November 1991.

The transitional government introduced austerity measures to alleviate the huge debt burden inherited from the previous regime. These policies delayed the payment of salaries to civil servants and armed services personnel, which in turn generated periodic protest demonstrations and threats of mutiny by the military. The transitional government also faced continuing problems with unrest among the Tuareg population in the north, which led to violent clashes between rebels and security forces.

The HCR completed work on the draft constitution by late September 1992. In a December 26 referendum, Nigeriens approved the constitution by an overwhelming margin. After several delays and postponements, the remainder of the electoral calendar was fixed.

Chapter 3

Electoral Framework

On February 14, 1993, approximately 1.3 million Nigeriens voted to fill 83 seats in the first democratically elected, multiparty legislative assembly in Niger's history. Twelve of Niger's 18 registered political parties competed in the elections, presenting lists that comprised 569 accredited candidates.

On February 27, 13 days after the legislative elections, Nigeriens voted in similar numbers during the presidential election in which eight candidates competed. Since no candidate won an absolute majority of the votes cast, on March 27 a run-off election was conducted in which a simple majority of the votes determined the winner. Approximately 1.4 million Nigeriens voted in the run-off election.

A. Administrative Structure

The minister of interior, appointed by the prime minister of the transitional government, presided over the National Election Commission, which supervised the implementation and administration of the election process. Representatives of all registered political

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parties sat on the Commission's national board of directors. In addition to providing financial, technical and material resources, the Commission was responsible for organizing and training election officials.

The National Election Commission, headquartered in Niamey, established regional offices in the capital city of each of the seven administrative divisions (departments) in Niger. The chief executives of the departments (*préfets*) presided over these regional offices and were responsible for distributing election materials and overseeing the vote counting processes at the department level.

Each department in Niger is further divided into administrative units called *arrondissements*. Within the respective *arrondissements*, a chief executive (*sous-préfet*) conducted election activities similar to the *préfet*. The *sous-préfets*' electoral duties included collecting tally sheets from the polling stations within their *arrondissements* and forwarding the information to the department level.

There were approximately 4,600 polling stations in Niger during each of the three elections. Each polling station was administered by a president, a secretary, and five assistants. These officials were nominated by the *sous-préfets* and political parties, but were ultimately designated by the *préfets*.

The COSUPEL, a subcommittee of the HCR, supervised the National Election Commission and was granted a broad mandate in electoral matters. The COSUPEL was designed to be autonomous and impartial in its work. Members included representatives of indigenous human rights and civic organizations, academics, members of the judiciary and other impartial individuals.

The COSUPEL divided its work among three subcommittees. The public information subcommittee educated the voting population about the electoral code. The financial, technical and logistical subcommittee reviewed, with the National Election Commission, the necessary costs of pre-election, election-day and post-election operations. The legislative subcommittee ensured that the National Election Commission followed the rules set forth in the electoral code. In addition to the work of its three subcommittees, the COSUPEL conducted an independent vote count from the department level through the national level, and announced the preliminary, unofficial results.

The Supreme Court served as the ultimate arbiter of disputes raised during the balloting process. The Supreme Court also examined the completed tally sheets and the provisional results, and announced the final, official results of the elections.

B. Election System

For the legislative elections, seats were distributed according to a proportional representation system. To compete in a given constituency, a political party was required to present a slate of candidates equal to the total number of seats available in the constituency. The constituencies were drawn along administrative lines (the seven departments and Niamey). In addition, eight special, single-seat constituencies were added to improve the chances of certain groups to secure ethnically localized representation. The range of seats in the regular constituencies was determined by the relative size of the population and the number of administrative units in each. The seats were divided in the departments as follows: Agadez — four seats; Diffa — four; Dosso — 10; Maradi — 13; Tahoua — 13; Tillabéry — 13; Zinder — 14. The city (*commune urbaine*) of Niamey was allotted four seats, and the special constituencies of Banibangou, Bankilare, Bermou, Bilma, N’Gourti, Tassara, Tesker and Torodi represented one each.

Each party received the proportion of seats in a constituency equal to the proportion of total votes cast for the party in the constituency. The largest remainder system was used to allocate “leftover” seats within a constituency. For each constituency, a political party ranked in advance the candidates on its party list and selected candidates starting from the top of the list who would fill the number of seats ultimately won.

In the presidential election, a candidate was required to obtain an absolute majority (50 percent plus one) in order to win on the first round. If the threshold was not achieved, the two candidates receiving the most votes competed in a second round of balloting. In the second round, the candidate who gathered the most votes was declared the president.

As a general rule, all voters maintained the right to contest the results of their particular polling stations. Also, a candidate could contest the overall election administration by making a request to the chief justice of the Supreme Court not later than 15 days from the

announcement of the definitive results. The Supreme Court had 48 hours from the day a complaint was filed to render its decision. The Supreme Court had the authority to declare null and void the results obtained as a consequence of fraud.

C. The Electoral Register

All Nigeriens 18 years or older were eligible to vote, unless they lost their franchise due to conviction for certain kinds of crimes. Prospective voters were listed on an electoral register, which was revised between October 1 and December 31, 1992.

All eligible citizens who registered, but found their names omitted from the electoral lists, were allowed to present their complaint to the regional office of the National Election Commission. The Commission had up to five days to render a decision and notify the interested party in writing. The citizen subsequently had the right to appeal the decision to a court of justice.

Registration on an electoral list authorized citizens to receive voting cards, which were used principally as identification on election day. The printing and distribution of voting cards was the responsibility of the National Election Commission.

D. Major Political Parties

By October 1992, 17 political parties were officially registered in Niger. Many of these parties formed in early 1991, in time to participate in the National Conference that convened in July of that year. In fact, 24 parties took part in the Conference, but a number subsequently dissolved or were absorbed by other political groups.

Before adjourning, the National Conference approved a charter for political parties that established the institutional framework for a pluralistic system. Among other points, this charter called upon the parties to proscribe "intolerance, regionalism, ethnocentrism, fanaticism, racism, xenophobia, inciting and or recourse to violence in all forms." In fact, however, certain parties were closely associated with ethnic or tribal groups, as noted below.

National Development Movement (*Mouvement national pour la société de développement* – MNSD-Nassara)

MNSD is the largest party in Niger. Created in 1989, MNSD represents a broad cross-section of the Nigerien populace. An

invention of the military-civilian government in 1989, MNSD was the ruling party until the National Conference mandated a transition period and approved the political parties charter. During the elections, MNSD benefitted from its previous access to state funding and its extensive, national network of party offices. No other party enjoyed a comparable level of organizational and financial strength, including a following among all the ethnic groups.

Democratic and Social Convention (*Convention sociale et démocratique* – CDS-Rahama)

CDS is a centrist party advocating social democratic principles as the basis for development in Niger. CDS is led by the new president, Mahamane Ousmane. It is particularly popular in the south and east, and in Zinder. CDS has a predominately Hausa following. Many of its members are associated with private business interests seeking an end to excessive government intervention in the economy.

Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (*Parti nigérien pour la démocratie et le socialisme* – PNDS-Tarraya)

This non-Marxist, socialist party attracts teachers, economists, engineers and other “intellectuals.” Although it has not formulated a focused political philosophy, the PNDS is the largest of the political parties to draw a following among intellectuals on the left of the ideological spectrum and enjoys some support throughout the country. However, except for the department of Tahoua, the party lacks a strong following in any one city or region outside of Niamey. Some of its leaders held positions in the transition government, the labor movement and the mineral industry.

Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress (*Alliance nigérienne pour la démocratie et le progrès* – ANDP-Zaman Lahiya)

ANDP-Zaman Lahiya was founded by Moumouni Adamou Djermakoye, a former ambassador to the United States, who broke away from the MNSD. He was a presidential candidate in the first round. The party relies on support from the Djerma people, who are concentrated in the western region around Niamey and who held the majority of government positions for many years.

16 Elections in Niger

The following five political parties do not enjoy the same degree of nationwide support as those listed above, but nonetheless won seats in the National Assembly.

- Niger Progressive Party/African Democratic Rally (*Parti progressiste nigérien, section du rassemblement démocratique africain* — PPN-RDA) The PPN was Niger's first political party, founded in 1946.
- Union of Democratic and Progressive Patriots (*Union des patriotes démocrates et progressistes* — UDPD-Chamoua) Party leader and former history professor André Salifou was president of the HCR, an office to which he was elected after presiding over the National Conference. Salifou's party represents another group of intellectuals.
- Union of Popular Forces for Democracy and Progress (*Union des forces populaires pour la démocratie et le progrès* — UDFP-Sawaba) This Marxist-oriented party was founded at the same time as the PPN-RDA, but was banned in 1959 when Niger became a one-party state under the PPN.
- Niger Social Democratic Party (*Parti social démocrate nigérien* — PSDN-Alheri) Philosophically, this party is close to the social democratic views espoused by the CDS-Rahama.
- Union for Democracy and Social Progress (*Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social* — UDPS-Amana) This centrist party draws its membership almost exclusively from the Tuareg people, a traditionally nomadic tribe that constitutes about 8 percent of the population and is concentrated in the north and west.

E. Nonpartisan Domestic Groups

Niger's civic groups are relatively limited in number and in depth of organization. There are three major Nigerien human rights groups with membership ranging from between 200 and 750 each. Although based in Niamey, these organizations are represented in all of the major urban areas throughout the country. In recent years, their principal activities have included securing democratic rights and denouncing violations of due process related to the Tuareg uprising. Representatives of these organizations were key participants in the COSUPEL's activities. Other members formed a domestic monitor delegation that joined the efforts of the Coordinated Mission.

Chapter 4

Pre-election Environment

Given Niger's limited experience with multiparty elections, only moderate campaign activity occurred during the pre-election period. In areas where the elections were better organized, candidates and party members displayed posters bearing party slogans and symbols, held rallies, or campaigned out of vehicles, spreading their message through loudspeakers. Support for political parties, in general, depended more on geographic location and ethnic affinity than on political platforms.

A. Security Concerns

Although the campaign period was generally peaceful, isolated instances of violence, harassment and intimidation were directed against candidates and party members. During the pre-election period for the legislative elections, for example, Tuareg rebels attempted to assassinate MNSD candidate Tandja Mamadou while he was campaigning in the northern department of Agadez. Several local

journalists alleged that Moumouni Djermakoye, the ANDP-Zaman Lahiya presidential candidate, was behind the attempt, but the accusations were never substantiated. As a result of the assassination attempt and the ethnic tensions in the north, the MNSD discontinued campaigning in the region.

In addition to tensions in the north, student and trade union strikes occurred throughout the country. For the most part, these strikes arose in response to government-imposed austerity measures, including school closures, the elimination of student stipends and the delinquent payment of salaries for civil servants. The students and unionists protested in the streets, blocking key urban areas throughout the country. During the protests, individuals marched, set tires on fire, and damaged government and private property.

B. Media Coverage of the Campaign

Nigeriens receive news through radio, television and newspapers. However, with a literacy rate of less than 20 percent and limited access to television, Nigerians overwhelmingly listen to radio as the principal medium of mass communication. Despite controlling the electronic media and the major newspaper, the government ensured that all political parties were accorded equal access and equal time for campaign spots.

Electronic Media

The government controls the only television and radio station in the country. It provides brief and sporadic programming that often lasts less than a few hours each day.

Throughout the campaign periods of all three elections, the government made a concerted effort to allow each political party equal access to the electronic media. Political parties were accorded free public campaign time as well as the opportunity to purchase private advertisements. In the period preceding the legislative elections, for example, each party received a total of 24 minutes of public time, and the right to purchase up to 20 minutes of private time on both television and radio. Because most parties lacked sufficient resources to purchase advertisements, only CDS-Rahama actually used all of its allotted time for privately purchased television and radio advertising. By contrast, MNSD-Nassara purchased only 60 percent of its allotted private television and radio advertising time.

During the first round of the presidential election, each party was accorded the same amount of public and private time as was available during the legislative elections, except private radio time was increased to 30 minutes. No political party used all of its allotted time for paid advertising.

The scheduling for public and private time changed during the second round of the presidential election. Both CDS-Rahama and MNSD-Nassara received seven 10-minute slots of public time and the opportunity to purchase additional private time for radio and television advertising. Only CDS-Rahama used all of its private radio advertising allocation, while neither party used all of its allotted privately paid television advertising time.

Before each election, political parties asked the government to authorize electronic media coverage of their campaign activities. However, claiming insufficient funds, the government declined. This impediment was overcome in the first round by using financial assistance provided by Canada; the government broadcast two presidential debates during the first round of the presidential election.

Print Media

Before the National Conference, only one daily newspaper existed in Niger. *Le Sahel*, owned and controlled by the government, typically provided extensive and uncritical coverage of the government. However, when several new private newspapers emerged after the National Conference, the print media provided increasingly balanced coverage of the leading parties' electoral campaigns. While several newspapers were published directly by the political parties, most were run by nonpartisan editors who encouraged objective reporting.

C. Administrative Issues

Several concerns relating to the administration of the elections emerged during the three campaign periods. One significant problem arose before the legislative elections. Authorities rejected four Tuareg nominees from the UDPS who were preparing to run for office in the department of Agadez. The nominees, arrested for their alleged roles in the Tuareg rebellion, complained they had been detained without probable cause. This detention, they argued, prevented them from completing the required applications for candidacy in a timely

manner, for which their nominations were initially rejected. (See Appendix II.)

Two days before the elections, officials sought to reverse the ruling and allow the four nominees to participate as candidates in an effort to appease the UDPS and calm tensions in the north. On February 12, the minister of interior forwarded the applications of the four Tuareg nominees to the Supreme Court, asking that the Court make an exception to the deadline. The minister of interior and the National Election Commission moved quickly to assemble the necessary UDPS ballots and to transport and distribute them throughout Agadez. However, on February 13, the day before the elections, the Supreme Court issued a decree stating that, in accordance with Ordinance 93-004, the list of eligible candidates, without exception, must be completed and publicized by the minister of interior no later than January 29, 1993. (See Appendix III.) At midnight, the *préfet* of Agadez was advised to remove the UDPS ballots from the polling stations before they opened in the morning.

Confusion regarding voter identification procedures created another administrative problem before and during the legislative elections. Before the legislative elections, the electoral code was amended to allow otherwise ineligible citizens to vote in two special instances. First, if the voter's name was on the electoral list and the voter was in possession of his or her voting card, but did not have another form of identification, he or she would be allowed to vote if two witnesses could verify the voter's identity. Second, if the voter's name appeared on the electoral list, but the voter was not in possession of his or her voting card, he or she could vote if he or she could produce another form of identification, such as a family identification card, plus verification by two witnesses. As a result of these new amendments, which were designed to enhance participation, uninformed polling station members and pollwatchers experienced difficulty identifying registered voters and determining eligibility.

Several important issues also surfaced during the pre-election period of the first round of the presidential election. First, the MNSD and CDS parties claimed that 18,000 voting cards were not distributed by the responsible *sous-préfets* in the *arrondissements* of Terra, Ouallum and Tchintabarden. Leaders of these two parties maintained that the *sous-préfets* of the affected regions were purposely not distributing voting cards to rival political party supporters.

Second, two weeks before the election, the minister of interior discovered that 1 million ballots of the PNDS-Tarraya candidate were printed on white paper as opposed to the official dark pink paper. The ballots were subsequently reprinted, yet 450,000 of the newly printed ballots were again discolored. Leaders of PNDS convened a meeting at the minister of interior's office one day before the election charging negligence against the print shop and the minister of interior.

PNDS argued that the discolored ballots posed two significant problems. PNDS had trained its supporters to choose the ballot with the official dark pink color. Without the proper color ballots, the PNDS argued that its supporters might not know how to cast a PNDS vote. In addition, the PNDS feared that the presidents of polling stations would nullify the PNDS ballots for failing to meet official specifications. Upon hearing the PNDS complaints, the minister of interior ordered 450,000 ballots reprinted again so they could be distributed the night before the election. The problem was rectified at the last moment, but the incident created considerable uneasiness and confusion in the final hours before the opening of the polls.

Third, several days before the election, governing authorities apprehended a member of the CDS-Rahama party with more than 40,000 counterfeit ballots. Nigerien election officials charged the CDS party with attempting to distribute these ballots to potential followers as a means of persuading them to vote for CDS-Rahama. CDS responded by claiming that these "sample" ballots were intended only for campaign purposes. The individual found in possession of the ballots was eventually arrested and imprisoned, and the ballots were confiscated.

Finally, stamps used to validate *procuration* (power of attorney) documents were stolen from a *sous-préfet's* office in the department of Maradi, from the *préfet's* office in Niamey and from the mayor's office in Commune II of Niamey. Election officials attempted to resolve this problem by disallowing all power of attorney documents validated by these stamps.

During the weeks before the final round of the presidential election, electoral officials faced several serious issues. Many of these issues revolved around the Alliance of Forces for Change (*Alliance des forces du changement* – AFC), a coalition of parties that formed in support of CDS presidential candidate Mahamane

Ousmane. The AFC comprised CDS, PNDS, ANDP and six other parties, which joined in opposition to the MNSD candidate, Tandja Mamadou.

In response to the growing popularity of the AFC, the MNSD raised legal questions about the validity of the coalition. They charged, for example, that Ousmane had promised the PNDS and the ANDP the offices of prime minister and president of the National Assembly, respectively, in order to attract votes from these two parties and consolidate their voting bloc in the legislature. MNSD maintained that this political move violated Article 138 of the electoral code, which states that a political party may not attempt to attract voters by offering money or promising political positions or positions of public employment. CDS, on the other hand, argued that the arrangement derived from a mutual decision made by the AFC membership, and consequently did not result from a CDS promise of political favors. Ultimately, the MNSD and others determined that the alleged breach of the code would not materially alter the final results of the election.

In a related matter, MNSD complained that ANDP, PNDS and other smaller parties affiliated with the AFC were campaigning under their respective banners as opposed to that of CDS. Article 64 of the electoral code states that only political parties presenting candidates are allowed to organize political rallies. Subsequent to MNSD's complaint, the COSUPEL broadcasted a radio announcement that reiterated the code's proscription against losing party members campaigning under their own colors. MNSD did not raise the issue again after the COSUPEL's announcement.

Before the second presidential round, MNSD petitioned the Supreme Court to rule that all members of polling stations, (*i.e.*, the president, secretary and five assistants) throughout the country must represent exclusively MNSD or CDS. MNSD did not want, for example, ANDP or PNDS representatives in the AFC to serve as polling-station officials. MNSD made a similar demand regarding pollwatchers. Articles 43 and 46 of the electoral code state that a political candidate and his/her political party are allowed to select a pollwatcher to observe the proceedings and to sign the tally sheets upon the closure of a polling station.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of MNSD. (See Appendix IV.) However, the minister of interior interpreted the response of the

Supreme Court as an advisory opinion rather than a binding order and thus allowed the *préfet* of each department to determine the manner in which he would implement the Supreme Court's determination. As a result of the minister of interior's decision, the composition of the polling stations differed from department to department. Observers minimized this controversy, arguing that, regardless of the composition of polling-place officials, the party pollwatchers present in each polling station could sufficiently monitor their actions and deter or detect potential fraud.

Chapter 5

The Elections

A. Balloting Process

Before the polls officially opened on each election day, Nigeriens began forming long lines in front of polling stations located in schools, community centers and makeshift, traditional millet-thatched shelters. The number of registered voters for each polling station generally ranged between 750 and 1,200.

The polling stations opened at 8 a.m., as stipulated in the electoral code, during the legislative elections. During the first round of the presidential election, the minister of interior moved the opening time ahead one hour in order to finish voting an hour earlier during Ramadan, the month-long Islamic holiday that prohibits food and water consumption during daylight. Although Ramadan had ended by the second round of the presidential election, the minister of interior again altered the opening time to 7:30 a.m., to help voters avoid the oppressive afternoon heat that is most severe in March.

Before a polling station opened, the president demonstrated to the voters, party pollwatchers, international observers, and other polling-

station officials that the ballot box was empty. The president then closed and sealed the box. Upon entering the polling station, a voter presented a voter identification card and a supplemental form of identification to the officials stationed at the voting table. When a voter was properly identified, a notation to this effect was made on the register.

After establishing proof of identification, a voter took an envelope and one ballot for each party (or presidential candidate) competing in the election and entered the privacy of the voting booth. The voter selected the ballot that represented his or her choice, placed it in the envelope, and discarded the unused ballots. The voter then exited the voting booth, showed the president that he or she had only one envelope and placed the envelope in the ballot box. After voting, the voter's card was stamped with the date of the vote and the voter's left thumb was dipped in indelible ink.

When balloting ended, all official members of the polling station signed the *proces verbal* (tally sheet). This tally sheet was kept at the mayor's office during the eight days following the announcement of results and was at the disposal of all registered voters.

B. Problems Observed

For all three elections, observers and participants concluded that the electoral process was transparent and generally well administered. However in a number of cases, administrative shortcomings, procedural inconsistencies and other more serious irregularities hindered the actual voting process. As noted above, both the election officials and the observers believed that the problems did not materially affect the results of the elections.

Throughout all three elections, the administrative problems included: late opening and early closing of polling stations; the acceptance of improper or inadequate forms of identification, (e.g., medical cards); ballots found on the ground in ballot booths; transparent (as opposed to opaque) containers for discarded ballots; failure of polling-station officials to dip the left thumb of voters in indelible ink; insufficient lighting during the counting process; party pollwatchers administering the electoral process; and undistributed electoral cards at polling stations.

In addition to these administrative issues, observers also noted problems of greater significance. One major problem, linked to

political and cultural issues, was low voter participation. Of the approximately 4 million registered voters, an estimated 1.3 million to 1.4 million people voted during each of the three elections, which amounts to less than 33 percent participation. Inaccurate registration lists are suspected of contributing to the low percentage figure. The low turnout partially stemmed from the UDPS-Amana led boycott of the legislative elections in the north and from the effect of Ramadan during the first round of the presidential election. These explanations do not fully illustrate the poor voter turnout, however, since a lack of voter participation was apparent in the second-round presidential election as well.

One problem, which remained unresolved for several days following the legislative elections, originated in the special constituency of Tesker, located in the department of Zinder. A conflict arose between the Toubou people, a tribe ethnically related to the Beri-Beri (Kanouri) in the eastern part of the country, and a significant Arab population located in the same constituency. Both ethnic groups, the Toubou associated with MNSD-Nassara and the Arab population associated with PNDP-Tarraya, accused the other of attempting to manipulate the voting process. Although the results in this constituency were initially nullified, the Supreme Court eventually ruled in favor of PNDP.

Several irregularities were unique to the first round of the presidential election. As a result of stolen and discolored ballots, the Nigerien election authorities required that all ballots be signed and stamped by an official in each polling station. With no systematic certification method in place, the process turned out to be extremely time consuming and confusing. The resulting delays discouraged some voters, who abandoned the long lines rather than wait to vote. This problem did not develop during the second round of the presidential election since officials had only to stamp and sign two stacks of ballots, one each for the CDS and MNSD candidates.

To maintain security in the ethnically troubled northern department of Agadez, the Nigerien government closed some polling stations and moved others from the countryside to the city. This action caused long delays in the voting process as officials struggled to locate prospective voters on one combined electoral list that contained an inordinately large number of names. These delays,

coupled with the great distances voters were required to walk, contributed to low voter participation in the region.

Moreover, at two separate polling stations in the region of Torodi, observers witnessed voting by individuals whose names were not on the electoral list. After investigating the matter further, the observers discovered the names of more than 250 people who had voted without appearing on the electoral list. Polling-station officials and party pollwatchers seemed to agree that these names represented eligible voters who had simply been omitted from the list. Observers were concerned, however, that the identification procedure used to verify these voters was informal and arbitrary.

Finally, ballots cast at several polling stations in Nigerien diplomatic missions in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia were annulled due to reported destruction of election materials and other forms of disruption. The COSUPEL determined that these problems would not materially change the election's outcome.

Several isolated issues also arose during the second round of the presidential election. For example, during the first round, more than 50 polling stations in the department of Agadez were closed for security reasons. During the second-round election, the minister of interior ordered the *préfet* of Agadez to reopen the stations. MNSD officials argued against the move. They claimed that security concerns prohibited them from campaigning in the area or from safely fielding pollwatchers at the voting stations. The *sous-préfet* of Agadez ultimately determined he only could ensure safe voting in 18 of the previously closed polling stations.

In a related matter, three designated polling stations in Agadez were assigned 16,000 of the displaced registered voters for election day. Many of the nomadic voters waited in lines throughout the entire day and had not voted at the scheduled closing time. Fortunately, representatives of the COSUPEL were on hand to convince election officials that, according to the electoral code, individuals waiting in line at the scheduled closing time must be allowed to vote. Nonetheless, it proved impossible to determine how many voters were discouraged from voting by the last-minute change in polling station locations, by the long distances required to walk to the new locations, by the long lines in the sun, or by the mistaken belief that they would not be allowed to vote after the polls closed, regardless of their place in line.

Similarly, in northern Benin, where three polling stations were supposed to be created for expatriated Nigeriens, only one polling station was actually established. Observers were told that the chaotic scene and the long lines at the one station effectively discouraged or prohibited many voters from exercising their franchise.

Chapter 6

The Counting Process

A. The Official Counting Process

Vote counting began under the supervision of the polling-station president immediately after the polls closed. As a first step, the ballot box was opened and the envelopes contained therein were counted in front of the polling-station officials, party pollwatchers, and domestic and international observers. Any discrepancy with regard to the number of envelopes presented in the box was noted on the tally sheet.

Vote counters were chosen at random from among the voters still present at the polling site. The vote counters removed the ballots from the envelopes and placed the ballots into two piles, valid and potentially invalid. The choice on each ballot was announced to the president who in turn announced it publicly, which was noted on a list by a secretary. Representatives of candidates or parties had the opportunity to verify every ballot counted.

The president or secretary filled out the tally sheet, which was copied and subsequently signed by all members of the polling station.

The nullified and blank ballots were attached to the original tally sheet, which was then sent to the minister of interior and subsequently to the Supreme Court. The copy of the tally sheet was kept in the mayor's office in the region in which the polling station was located. Every candidate, or his or her representative, maintained the right to receive a copy of the tally sheet upon request.

Results of the tally were transmitted through the departments to the National Election Commission and the minister of the interior. During each counting process, COSUPEL conducted a comprehensive parallel tabulation in order to verify the results reported by the National Election Commission. Specifically, during the legislative elections, COSUPEL representatives examined each tally sheet arriving at the department headquarters for the official count. They compared the results reported from each *arrondissement* with the few they had independently monitored. The regional representatives then prepared a separate tally for COSUPEL's use and sent it by telefax to headquarters in Niamey, where the results were compared with those officially transmitted for each department. If there was no discrepancy, COSUPEL "verified" or approved the official results in that department. If the results did not match, or if COSUPEL's tallies were delayed, then the official results, albeit provisional, were also delayed until the discrepancy was corrected or the official tally was otherwise verified.

This process, although an effective means of verification, was extremely time consuming and ultimately caused a delay of several days in reporting the provisional results. During the subsequent presidential elections, the COSUPEL remedied the problem by verifying and signing the actual tally sheet used by the National Election Commission. This modification increased the efficiency of the counting process and demonstrated the COSUPEL's growing confidence in the government's administration of the elections.

At the conclusion of the counting process, the minister of the interior and the COSUPEL published the preliminary, unofficial results and sent them to the Supreme Court. The Court, in turn, validated the tally sheets and subsequently announced the definitive, official results.

B. Election Results

The preliminary results of the legislative elections were not announced by the COSUPEL president until three days after the polls closed. Despite the fact that, for most of the country's departments, the results were already received and verified at the national counting center, the announcement of all results was withheld until outstanding tally sheets from two polling stations in Zinder could be located and confirmed. The resulting delay in the process initially created skepticism and uneasiness among the voters.

The official results were as follows: National Development Movement (MNSD) — 29 seats; Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) — 22; Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS)— 13; Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP) — 11; Union of Popular Forces for Democracy and Progress — two; Union of Democratic and Progressive Patriots — two; Niger Progressive Party/African Democratic Rally — two; Niger Social Democratic Party — one; and Union for Democracy and Social Progress — one. (See Appendix V.)

Observers noted that tribal or regional affiliations appeared to be the principal indicator of political party support. For example, ANDP-Zaman Lahiya won eight of its 11 seats in the departments of Dosso and Tillabéry. Both of these departments are located in the extreme western portion of Niger and both are centers of Djerma population. The ANDP, on the other hand, failed to win a single seat in Zinder, a department populated mostly by the Hausa. By comparison, the CDS-Rahama, a party associated with the Hausa ethnic group, won nine out of the 14 seats in Zinder, but only three out of 23 seats in the departments of Dosso and Tillabéry.

The official results from the February 27 presidential election showed MNSD presidential candidate Tandja Mamadou falling well short of the 50 percent plus one needed to win the presidency outright, but comfortably claiming one of the two run-off positions. Mahamane Ousmane, the CDS-Rahama candidate, won the second spot in the run-off by finishing 8 percentage points behind Mamadou.

The results (total votes received and percentage of the total vote) of the first presidential election were as follows: Tandja Mamadou (MNSD) — 439,429 (34.57 percent); Mahamane Ousmane (CDS) — 339,113 (26.68 percent); Mahamadou Issoufou (PNDS) — 197,395 (15.53 percent); Moumouni Djermakoye (ANDP) — 191,551 (15.07

percent); Illa Kané (UPDP) — 32,866 (2.59 percent); Oumarou Youssouf (PPN) — 25,661 (2.02 percent); Omar Katzelma Taya (PSDN) — 23,414 (1.84 percent); Djibo Bakary (UDFP) — 21,613 (.70 percent). (See Appendix VI.)

In the run-off, the official results established Ousmane as the first president chosen through a democratic, multiparty election since Nigerien independence. Ousmane won the election with a total of 763,476 votes (54.42 percent), while Tandja Mamadou gained 639,418 votes (45.58 percent). (See Appendix VII.)

Among the political parties and the electorate, there was broad acceptance of the announced election results. Since the legislative election results provided an indication of each party's relative strength in the country, voters did not appear to be surprised by the allocation of votes in the later presidential elections. Also, the various complaints by political parties regarding pre-election irregularities were addressed through the timely rulings of the COSUPEL and the Supreme Court. Other disputes that lingered after the elections were quickly and quietly forgotten as the petitioners realized, given the sizeable margin of victory, that the substance of the complaints would not have materially altered the final outcome.

Chapter 7

The Coordinated Observer Mission

This chapter describes the circumstances particular to Niger that allowed international election observers to coordinate their efforts so closely. It also explains in detail the activities and innovations of the Coordinated Mission.

On October 8, 1992, NDI received a request from the government of Niger to observe the transition elections. NDI faced several program alternatives. One option was to organize a large-scale, autonomous, international observer delegation. NDI has organized such missions for 25 elections since 1986, including three in African countries. Another course was to decline the invitation, as is NDI practice when the possibility of credibly evaluating an election appears remote. However, in the Niger context, several factors shaped NDI's decision to choose a third option – to help coordinate election observers.

First, political observers and NDI expected that Niger's elections could occur in a peaceful, non-contentious environment. The scheduled elections represented a consensus decision of a national conference and were to be administered by a multiparty, interim government. These factors suggested a relatively secure, constructive election climate. Also, despite the existence of diverse and competitive ethnic groups in Niger, these groups have a long history of peaceful coexistence. The Tuareg rebellion represents the major exception to otherwise benign relations, but it remained relatively isolated in the north and did not pose a serious security threat to the overall election process.

Second, NDI determined that Niger's elections would be difficult and costly to monitor. Niger is a vast, sparsely populated country linked by minimal transportation and communication infrastructure. The expense of bringing in and deploying sizeable international delegations for three separate elections also weighed against conducting a large-scale, autonomous observation approach for NDI.

Third, NDI's desire and ability to support Niger's transition was influenced by issues of priority, resource allocation and previous investment. NDI wished to sustain its participation in the Niger transition, which began with a conference on election observing in November 1991 and included two series of seminars in March and October 1992. At the same time, NDI was already committed to observing the presidential election in Senegal, which occurred on February 21, 1993.

Fourth, the importance of the transition to Nigeriens and the potential significance of the Nigerien model for other countries weighed heavily in favor of an NDI role in the election process. Niger, an Islamic country, with a long history of single-party rule, posed inviting challenges for democratic development. Also, Niger's effort to organize its transition by employing a national conference and a multiparty interim government was an initiative NDI hoped to examine further.

Finally, NDI's decision to help coordinate and facilitate election observers was influenced by the requests for assistance from, and the excellent relations among, the United Nations and the Niger-based diplomatic corps. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) hosted weekly planning meetings with members of the donor community (countries supporting development assistance programs)

throughout the two-year transition and the period before the elections. This level of cooperation was further evidenced in the preliminary meetings NDI held with prospective delegation sponsors during the early development of the program.

Soon after receiving the invitation to observe the elections, NDI contacted the United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit in New York, representatives of the donor countries in Niger and other interested nongovernmental organizations to determine each group's plans for monitoring. At the time, donor countries were contemplating several small international delegations. No local organizations were planning to conduct an independent, nonpartisan monitoring operation. Both donors and local groups, however, expressed interest in training, leadership and general coordination.

Subsequent discussions yielded a program in which NDI joined with the United Nations and the UNDP to coordinate the activities of election observers. (See Appendix VIII.) The United Nations, which reflects principles of non-intervention, multinationalism, and neutrality, eventually mobilized the myriad individual delegations. The UN's leadership role provided added legitimacy to the Coordinated Mission concept, and facilitated access to government and political party officials for the observers.

Operating within the UN mantle, NDI advised the UNDP resident representative on the development and implementation of an election-monitoring operation. NDI's election monitoring plan comprised four major facets: establishing a secretariat in Niger to coordinate activities and monitor the pre-election period; conducting full-day election observer training seminars; developing and implementing election-day deployment plans for observers; and sharing information at post-election debriefings.

A. Secretariat

In January 1993, five weeks before the first election, the Coordinated Mission established a full-time secretariat (the Secretariat) in Niamey, Niger. The Secretariat was staffed principally by NDI Project Officer Steven Dinkin, NDI Assistant Counsel for Election Processes Michael Stoddard, Louise Kantrow representing the UN Electoral Assistance Unit and Dr. Ahmed Rhazaoui, the UNDP's acting resident representative in Niger. Based in the UNDP building, the Secretariat initially pursued two important pre-election

objectives: to complete a pre-election assessment and to prepare for the Coordinated Mission activities.

Pre-Election Assessment

Upon arrival in Niger, Secretariat personnel met with the president and executive committee of the COSUPEL, the minister of the interior, members of the National Election Commission, leaders of the major political parties, journalists, and representatives of human rights and other civic organizations to obtain information necessary for the preparation of a pre-election assessment report. The Secretariat also conducted a week-long trip across the country to interview local government and election officials and political party representatives.

As a result of these efforts, the Secretariat produced a detailed analysis of the election system and the campaign environment, focusing on such matters as media access, security concerns, political party programs and the preparedness of election officials. This pre-election assessment, together with information summarizing the historical, social and cultural context of the elections, was distributed as a pre-election report in English and French to Nigeriens and all observer delegations. The assessment allowed participants in the Coordinated Mission to evaluate the overall context of the election process, rather than simply focus on the election-day activities.

Preparations for Coordinated Mission Activities

While conducting the pre-election assessment, the Secretariat simultaneously initiated preparations for implementing the coordinated election observer program. Rhazaoui used his UNDP offices to host weekly meetings with the sponsors of observer delegations in order to develop the terms of reference and to plan the organizational and logistical preparations for the Coordinated Mission. (The particulars of planning and implementing the deployment plan are described in Section C., below.) The Secretariat also acted as the liaison between individual observer delegations and Nigerien election officials to secure accreditation and advise the authorities of election-related concerns.

The terms of reference described for participants the dual, underlying objectives of the Coordinated Mission: to provide a well-informed, credible assessment of the Niger elections and to profit

from the efficiencies of a division of labor. More specifically, the objectives of the program were to:

- follow and report, comprehensively, on the election process from pre-election preparations to the resolution of post-election investigations;
- minimize duplicating efforts and expending resources among observer delegations;
- encourage the best possible quality of observation and, by sharing information and monitoring techniques, to minimize potential disparities among evaluations;
- assure that information was gathered based on a solid understanding of the political context and the electoral laws;
- maximize the number of polling sites observed and the amount of information that could be collected on election day; and,
- respect the institutional autonomy of each delegation, including each delegation's independence to issue individual post-election assessments of the process.

Meeting this last objective in the context of coordination proved to be a major challenge. Most Coordinated Mission observers represented delegations sponsored by foreign governments. Because statements issued by election observers can directly affect relations between the host state and a foreign government, the potential for delegations to issue conflicting, divergent evaluations was evident.

The resulting dynamic led to adoption of guidelines for operation of the Coordinated Mission. First, participants in the Coordinated Mission would be bound by common terms of reference and a common code of conduct only to the extent they freely consented. Second, all major decisions that affected the Coordinated Mission would be made by consensus; where consensus could not be achieved, each delegation was free to pursue its objectives independently. Third, the Secretariat would inform participating delegations of all developments and seek advice regarding all major decisions. Fourth, no statement made in the course of sharing information during the post-election debriefing could be attributed by others to the delegation responsible for the statement.

As a last step in the preparation phase, the Secretariat had to determine the composition of the Coordinated Mission. In the process, NDI initiated efforts to expand and broaden the mission's

composition. Specifically, NDI sought the participation of three Nigerien human rights groups, the African-based Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development (a political development institute known by its French acronym GERDDDES) as well as representatives from most diplomatic missions in Niamey in the Coordinated Mission. Resident foreign nationals (*e.g.*, employees of the French government or of the United Nations living in Niger) also were added to the list of potential participants by their respective delegation leaders.

B. Election Observer Training

Two days before each election, the UNDP and NDI arranged a full-day briefing and training for all accredited election observers. The Secretariat provided each observer with a letter of accreditation and an official identification badge from the COSUPEL, plus a packet of reference materials on the political environment and the election system in Niger. Included in these materials were copies of the Niger constitution and the electoral code, the NDI pre-election assessment report, a manual on the role of observers and monitoring techniques (See Appendix IX), checklists on which to record election-day observations (See Appendix X), maps, economic data, training materials used by local election officials and sample ballots.

The agenda for the briefing was ambitious. Sessions covered a general review of Niger's political history, a discussion of the role of election observers, and an in-depth analysis of the electoral system and the electoral code. Experts from the COSUPEL and the National Election Commission fielded questions regarding the interpretation of election laws and possible problems in the process. Political party representatives were available to convey their impressions of the process and to answer questions.

During the training portion of the briefing, the Secretariat emphasized the importance of impartial election observing and the methods by which it might best be accomplished. Among the many points it discussed, the Secretariat placed special emphasis on objectivity, on keeping a broad perspective as to the relative impact of irregularities on the final outcome of the election, and on techniques for recording information. As noted above, public statements, including post-election assessments, were subject to varying terms of reference among Coordinated Mission delegations.

The Canadian delegation, for example, informed the Coordinated Mission that the terms of reference from their government precluded its making public statements regarding the election process at any time. Other delegations were not subject to such restrictions. All observers were reminded repeatedly that the credibility of each delegation and the Coordinated Observer Mission as a whole was best served by impartial conduct.

C. Strategic Deployment

The deployment of observers represented the third major facet of the Coordinated Observer Mission. During the week before each election, the Secretariat met with the available representatives of all participating delegations in order to record an inventory of personnel and resources.

Each delegation provided the Secretariat with a list of the names of its observers. The complete list was then sent to the COSUPEL for accreditation. This list also included the names of resident foreign nationals living in Niger under the auspices of the organizations sponsoring observer delegations. For those observers unable to attend the training seminar, the Secretariat arranged to deliver accreditation, badges, observer training manuals and election-day checklists. In all, the three elections comprised 15, 18, and 16 participating delegations, totaling 136, 162, and 132 observers respectively. (See Appendix XI.)

At the pre-election meeting with the Secretariat, the delegation representatives also discussed transportation and communication resources to be made available to the mission. Due to threats of rebel violence and hostage-taking along the road between Niamey and Agadez, the Coordinated Mission chartered a small plane, enabling teams to observe each round of the elections in the city of Agadez. For all other regions, vehicles were rented or were provided by diplomatic missions in Niamey.

Once the number of vehicles and drivers was determined, the delegation representatives worked out a plan to deploy observers. This process required identifying the population centers and potential problem areas (*e.g.*, Agadez, Tahoua and Zinder) based on the pre-election studies of the Secretariat. Once an adequate number of teams was designated to cover these critical areas, the remaining teams were assigned to regionally and politically diverse locations in an effort to

achieve a more representative cross-section of sites observed. The resulting deployment plan detailed teams to the remote, rural areas of Diffa in the far east of the country, to Torodi along the border with Burkina Faso in the south, to the towns of Ouallum and Tillabéry near Mali in the north, as well as to the urban centers of Zinder and Niamey.

Implementing the deployment plan constituted the next step of the mission. The day after the training seminar, teams traveled to their assigned regions. Upon arrival in the town that would serve as their base for election day, teams met with local officials and political party representatives to introduce the mission and to evaluate new developments.

On election day, the teams observed the opening of the polls, voting, ballot counting and the transmission of results. Observers also noted on their checklists the location, the identification, the name of presiding officials, the number of registered voters, and the nature and time of their observations for each polling place.

The checklists served as a guideline for the observers to record information indicating whether or not the polling station officials were following proper procedures. Spaces were provided on the checklist to identify potential irregularities, including: the availability of electoral supplies (*e.g.*, ballots, indelible ink and electoral lists); the presence of polling-station officials; acts of undue influence and intimidation; and the amount of time it took for a voter to wait in line, to be identified and to vote. Before leaving the area, observers graded the quality of the voting process on the checklist. Observer teams remained for approximately 20 minutes at each polling station, covering a total of 10 to 15 polling stations in the course of a day.

At the end of the election day, observers watched the reopening of the ballot boxes and the counting of envelopes, and noted whether the total number of envelopes recorded correlated with the number of registered voters checked off on the list. They then recorded on their checklists the total number of votes cast, null votes, disputed votes, votes for each party and total number of registered voters. Observers also were asked to record verbal complaints and complaints noted on the tally sheets.

During the evening, observers visited regional headquarters where official election results were collected. Many of the observers based in Niamey followed the tabulation process to the national

election headquarters. Resident foreign national observers, who stayed at their posts after the election, were instructed to send their observation forms back to their delegation leaders by phone, facsimile machine or other returning teams.

D. Debriefing

On the second day after each election, most of the observers reassembled in Niamey for a debriefing session. A spokesperson for each delegation offered a general assessment of the election and a synopsis of the delegation's observations. After each report, other delegates were afforded an opportunity to ask questions. In several instances, delegations were called on to clarify a specific point made in the synopsis or to recount a relevant illustration.

The Secretariat adopted two rules for the debriefings to encourage an uninhibited evaluation of election procedures. First, the media was excluded until such time as the delegations were prepared to present their respective findings at a press conference. Second, as noted above, comments or observations expressed by a delegation member in the debriefing were not to be attributed in any public statement.

After each election, as the preliminary results appeared to be uncontested and the evaluations of the constituent members of the Coordinated Mission were relatively consistent, press conferences were organized in the afternoon following the debriefing. Usually, the leaders of the largest delegations made brief statements and answered questions from the assembled media. By gathering reports from diverse and remote regions in each of the country's departments and by sharing and cross-checking these observations in an open forum, the delegations of the Coordinated Observer Mission were able to present a comprehensive, objective assessment of the elections less than 48 hours after the close of the polls.

Chapter 8

Reflections

This section of the report reflects on several notable aspects of Niger's elections and of the Coordinated Observer Mission and considers how these attributes affected the successful outcome of the elections and monitoring effort.

Since 1989, when multiparty democracy began to sweep across Africa, transitional elections have had mixed results. Some elections, such as those in Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire, were administered by incumbent governments before nascent political institutions and civic organizations had time to develop. These governments thus faced limited competition and were able to retain control of the executive branch and the legislature. In other countries, such as Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Togo, opposition movements were better evolved. However, due to inadequate voter education, intimidation, fraud, abuse of the prerogatives of incumbency or irregular administration, these elections proved less than ideal, and losing parties refused to accept the results. By contrast, the recent transition in Niger continues a quiet pattern of

successful democratic African elections that have been conducted in Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Mali, Namibia and Zambia.

A. Niger's 1993 Elections

The origins of Niger's transition set the tone for its successful development and completion. The initial steps toward multiparty elections in Niger were taken by representatives of Niger's diverse society who conducted fruitful and peaceful political negotiations. At the July 1991 National Conference, Niger formed a workable and coherent pluralistic interim governing structure. This government played an instrumental role in organizing and administering credible elections, and in enhancing confidence of competing parties in the overall process. The withdrawal of the incumbent president as a candidate for president also contributed to an electoral environment free of many impediments that have hampered other recent transitions. This atmosphere was enhanced at every stage of the process by the multiparty composition of administrative authorities and by the transparency of government activities.

The independent, nonpartisan verification role played by the COSUPEL was another major factor in assuring a successful election process. Staffed by representatives of the judiciary, academia and human rights organizations, this quasi-governmental entity maintained credibility with all sides. In addition, the COSUPEL also provided an informal system of checks and balances that built confidence in the process for competitors and monitors alike.

In selecting an electoral system, the interim government also diffused tensions that tend to create a contentious environment. The scheduling of legislative elections, which used a proportional system, before the two-round presidential contest resulted in several parties obtaining significant representation in the legislature before the "winner take all" presidential election. The 83 legislative seats were divided among nine political parties, spreading the sense of institutional commitment to the process among a diverse range of ideologies, ethnicities and other interests. A less polarized atmosphere existed in the period preceding the presidential election, particularly for parties such as the MNSD, which won 29 seats in the legislative elections.

Finally, an underlying, but influential, factor in the Nigerien elections is the peaceful tradition within which competing interests

and ethnicities interrelate. The Djerma-dominated ruling party and military, and the Hausa majority in the interim government and the opposition parties, resolved disputes through dialogue and negotiation. Similarly, Ousmane's ability to form the AFC coalition, spanning several ideologies and ethnicities, highlights the pragmatic orientation of Niger's ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the issue of the Tuareg's rebellion has not benefitted from the same good relations.

Several additional issues deserve mention. First, the interim government's ability to conduct four elections, including the constitutional referendum, in four months demonstrates enormous energy and dedication. The process, however, was both logistically and financially taxing. Multiple elections may also have decreased voter participation in some regions.

Second, in each election, the participation of registered voters was approximately 35 percent. This low number does not call into question the new government's mandate or suggest that a large percentage of eligible voters was disenfranchised. Indeed, the level of participation may have increased had elections not coincided with Ramadan and the height of the summer season. Nigerien officials have indicated that they would try to avoid this scheduling conflict in the future.

Perhaps a more significant decrease in participation stemmed from outdated and potentially bloated election lists. Deficient registration lists could be remedied in the future by conducting a thorough registration process that, for administrative reasons, was not undertaken for the transition elections. Another factor contributing to the low turnout may have been the tens of thousands of electoral (identification) cards that were never distributed to voters. Those who did not receive their cards may have been ignorant of provisions of the election law permitting the use of alternative identification to vote. Greater administrative diligence and voter education could remedy this situation in the future.

Despite these drawbacks, observers and participants alike concluded that this series of elections demonstrated a resounding affirmation of Niger's commitment to pluralistic democracy. Moreover, the problems that existed were addressed by the administrative authorities, the candidates and the voters with such general goodwill and a commitment to a fair, open process that the

Nigerien experience should serve as a model for other African nations.

B. The Coordinated Observer Mission

The coordination of election observers in Niger led to significant improvements in efficiency, quality and credibility of the overall monitoring effort. Several key factors made this possible. As noted in Chapter 7, a relatively non-polarized political atmosphere and the high level of cooperation among individual observer delegations provided an ideal environment in which to coordinate activities.

In the case of Niger, close coordination — including using common recording forms, conducting joint briefing and training sessions, and sharing information throughout — improved the quality and uniformity of observers' assessments. At a minimum, it helped prevent uninformed and contradictory evaluations. Had the elections been more controversial, the likelihood of divergent assessments undoubtedly would have increased. Such a possibility, however, should not diminish the utility of coordinating observer activities and sharing information in other countries.

Close coordination was also made possible by the unique role played by the UN. The principles of nonintervention, multinationalism and neutrality espoused by the UN gave the Coordinated Mission added legitimacy with Nigerien officials. It also was instrumental in encouraging delegations to cooperate.

At the outset of the accreditation process, the COSUPEL questioned whether certain prospective observer groups were committed to nonpartisan, objective observing. It was finally determined that these groups were in fact impartial. Their inclusion as monitors greatly expanded the observer effort. The inclusion of Nigeriens on the Coordinated Mission also helped break language and cultural barriers, and enriched the Coordinated Mission's overall understanding of Nigerien society and politics. More significantly, expansion was encouraged to improve the observers' appearance of nonpartisanship and impartiality and to help empower regional and local indigenous organizations.

At the same time, there are risks involved in expanding the number of delegations in a coordinated effort. For one thing, the neutrality of lesser known entities is difficult to determine. For another, there is a considerable degree to which each delegation in a

coordinated effort is perceived to be associated with the others. Thus, if one delegation were to act or speak out in a strong, independent manner, the other delegations might be perceived as condoning those actions and statements, all attempts to distance themselves notwithstanding.

The participation of resident foreign nationals on observer delegations was another innovation of the Coordinated Mission. It enabled the mission to reach remote regions and to profit from a higher level of knowledge about local issues and conditions. As with the inclusion of additional observer delegations, however, the benefits of using resident foreign nationals were tempered by concerns that they could appear biased or interventionist.

The experience in Niger highlights the extent to which cooperation and coordination of election observers improves the overall monitoring effort. Providing comprehensive reporting on the pre- and post-election periods, increasing familiarity with election monitoring techniques, conducting briefings on the specifics of a country's election system and political situation, and sharing information among observers can enhance similar observer efforts in other countries. Also, by coordinating the deployment of personnel on election day, observer groups will avoid duplication of effort and maximize the number of polling sites observed. In sum, by combining human, financial and information resources, individual delegations can achieve the benefits associated with a large monitoring operation while sharing the significant costs typically associated with an undertaking of that size.

The successful completion of these elections has laid a solid foundation for building democracy in Niger. However, many challenges lie ahead as the country begins to consolidate its democratic system. We hope that Niger's newly elected leaders will continue their important work through a spirit of dialogue, tolerance and compromise. NDI and the international community stand ready to support their efforts.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

**Concession Speech by Tandja Mamadou
President of MNSD-Nassara**

(Unofficial Translation)

National Movement for the Developing Society
(MNSD-Nassara)
Central Committee
Political Bureau
Niamey

People of Niger!

Today, on the 27 of March 1993, you have elected the President of the Third Republic by choosing one of two candidates, one representing the MNSD-Nassara and the other an alliance of nine political parties.

May I from the outset congratulate our brother MAHAMANE OUSMANE, and call on him to conduct a clear-headed and responsible analysis of the political situation following the second round of the presidential election. A victory such as this one requires that he, as supreme arbiter, act in a way that promotes unity and leaves no room for hatred, sectarianism and provocation. Scattered attacks against our supporters have been reported and this must stop immediately. Confrontational attitude must by all means be avoided. Therefore appropriate steps should be taken throughout the country.

Activists and supporters of the MNSD-Nassara

You have just confirmed for the whole world that the MNSD-Nassara is and continues to be the party with the strongest following on our political scene. You have just proven that no decisions involving the people of Niger can be taken without heeding the voice of the 45 percent that you represent.

You deserve warm thanks and congratulations, but you should also be proud and dignified. You must maintain unity and solidarity, and continue to seek peace, security, justice and prosperity. You must be steadfast in your support of national unity and your loyalty

to the nation of Niger. Whatever your own professional or social position, I call on you to continue to serve Niger and to put the higher interest of our nation above all else. I would like to pay a special tribute to the women and young people of Niger, as well as to the leaders of the MNSD-Nassara whose fighting spirit and energy are at the source of the strength of our great national party.

Last, may I warmly thank all the political parties that supported me. May they rest assured of our party's determination to work with them to make possible the smooth functioning of democracy in a spirit of harmony and serenity, and the certain triumph of truth and responsibility!

God bless Niger!

"Long live the MNSD-Nassara"

Thank you.

Appendix II

**UDPS Petition to the Minister of the Interior
Regarding Rejection of Candidates for the
Legislative Elections**

(Unofficial Translation)

Union for Democracy and Social Progress — UDPS-Amana

From: The Secretary-General of the UDPS-Amana

To: The Minister of the Interior, Niamey, NIGER

Date: February 10, 1993

Re: UDPS-Amana candidates in the legislative elections

Mr. Minister:

Allow me to inform you of the steps taken by the UDPS-Amana and the obstacles my party has met with regarding the eligibility of its candidates.

Mr. Minister, early on in the period leading up to the elections, we dutifully sought information from the appropriate authorities and various jurisdictions, including your Ministry, on the subject of the eligibility of our party's numerous activists, who are currently imprisoned, to run as candidates in the legislative elections. We received an affirmative answer from all sides. All persons illegally detained (in violation of several statutes, including Decree 74-27 of November 8, 1974 which instituted a State Security Court and set out its structure and procedures) are fully entitled to their rights as citizens, including their electoral rights.

Having obtained these clarifications, we looked into how this right could actually be exercised in light of the fact that:

- many of the activists being illegally detained had no visitation rights — I personally raised this issue during a hearing with the prime minister, held in the presence of the minister of the interior and nine other parties; unfortunately I was denied access after several attempts, in spite of the agreement in principle given by the minister, on the grounds that no instructions to that effect had been issued;

- most of these citizens have had their homes searched and have themselves been “searched,” not always in accordance with the law, and therefore have no documents proving their identity available to them, or, in the best of cases, if they have any, these documents are in such a state of disarray that they were not able to assemble them in order to register as candidates;
- many of these activists, in illegal detention, have not received wages and have no financial resources whatsoever, and are therefore unable to provide for their basic needs, let alone pay the deposit required of candidates;
- the party itself is terribly weakened organizationally and financially because of the serious blow sustained as a result of the massive arrests in its ranks, especially the systematic sweep in the leadership of some local chapters. Given this state of affairs it is easy to understand why the UDPS is not able to put up the money for the deposit candidates are required to pay;
- finally, the electoral code contains some regulatory constraints, particularly the requirement that all candidates on the party list must have submitted a complete set of documentation required to register (I personally contacted the DAPJ when some of our activists who were not detained and who were running on the Maradi district list tried unsuccessfully to register, having themselves assembled all the required documents. The DAPJ confirmed that documentation for all candidates on the party list had to be submitted in completed form for any candidate on the list to be registered.)

Mr. Minister, in light of these very real problems, because we want to contribute to the building of the democratic process in our country and to fully exercise our rights and duties as citizens, we sent an official letter to the minister of the interior immediately, in fact on December 6, 1992, a full month and 20 days before the official deadline for candidates to register. This letter, numbered 187/92/CEN/UDPS, stresses the fact that our militants are being illegally detained on government orders, that they are entitled to run as candidates in the elections, that they are faced with objective obstacles which prevent them from gathering the required documents to register, let alone paying the deposit or running a campaign. In this letter we therefore request that, in the name of fairness, these citizens who have undeniably been illegally detained for several

months without being charged, be permitted to run as candidates provided that they pay the deposit and submit the required documents at a later date.

Concerned with making our undertaking as official as possible and convinced as we are that our request is legitimate, we have widely circulated it to various groups and other keen observers we felt should be informed of intent. These are: the minister of justice; the Supreme Court; the public prosecutor; COSUPEL; the National Election Commission; all political parties; all human rights organizations; USIN; all diplomatic missions.

Mr. Minister, in spite of these precautions and the good will we have shown, we were met only with indifference, indeed complete indifference, we have not yet received any response at all from your ministerial department. Thus, faced with such a lack of response, when the deadline came for the registration of candidates, wanting to prove that we continue to be committed to contributing to the democratic process, we filed with the Ministry of the Interior, within the required deadline, a list of one hundred and 18 candidates for the UDPS (candidates and alternates). We were dismayed to discover that only one list, for the district of Bermo, was approved, before the ruling issued by the Supreme Court. This, in our view, is clear evidence that the government has decided to keep our party out of the legislative elections. Could this be because our party has chosen the path of federalism, acting on its sovereign rights? Or is it because the UDPS dares to utter out loud some truths that remain taboo in our country?

Thus the latest step taken in this matter by the government, namely delaying carrying out the judicial decision to release 81 of our activists who were detained in Agadez, and who were kept in detention for an additional three weeks, only to be released by some extraordinary coincidence on January 26, 1993, at 8:30 p.m., on the very last day of the registration period for candidates and... right after closing time. This action in and of itself sums up the intent of the government of transition:

1. To exclude the UPDS from the legislative elections; and
2. To provoke party supporters in order to cause reactions or other forms of disapproval that would serve as grounds to conduct large-scale arrests in our ranks, if not worse; this is clear to us. This is precisely why the National Executive Committee of the

UDPS-Amana was quick to give standing orders throughout the party ranks to avoid reactions, urging supporters not to give in to such provocation. One thing is certain: the UDPS will not take this sitting down, and will use all available means of legal recourse.

Mr. Minister, the supervisory advisory committee censured our first broadcast statement during the campaign merely on the grounds that we have no right to explain our motives, to tell our supporters and domestic and international public opinion what has taken place, and how it is that the UDPS is only able to run in one district whereas others have in the course of this campaign been more violent and critical in their attacks on the government. In this we also intend to avail ourselves of our rights in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

Mr. Minister, we know that some *préfectures*, including Agadez, look upon our request favorably and have even asked you to intercede on our behalf in the name of social justice. We would therefore greatly appreciate your kind consideration of our last and indeed legitimate request.

Sincerely,
MAMANE-MOUSSA

Appendix IV

**Decision #93-8 of the Supreme Court
Constitutional Division
Regarding MNSD Petition — Nomination of
Polling-Place Officials**

(Unofficial Translation)

March 13, 1993

The Supreme Court, Constitutional Division, following a request for ruling, deliberated on March 13, 1993, in its chambers, and ruled as follows:

The Court

On the basis of the report submitted by Mr. AMADOU HAMA ALGINY, Advisor, and of the findings of the Public Prosecutor, having deliberated in accordance with the law;

Ruling on the petition filed according to standard procedure by the Prime Minister, under cover of letter #00056/SGG of March 11, 1993, filed with the Clerk's Office of the Court on the same day as document #157, requesting that the Court provide an interpretation of Article 46 of Decree #92-43 of August 22, 1992, on the electoral code, regarding the nomination of the members of the polling places by political parties;

...

Finds

Whereas the petition to the Court requests an interpretation of Article 46 of Decree 92-43 of August 22, 1992, which stipulates that: "The President and the members of the polling place are appointed by the *préfet* with jurisdiction over that district, nominations are made by the *sous-préfets*, mayors and political parties;"

Whereas the petition is submitted with the following question: "Can all legally recognized parties take part in the nomination of polling place officials, or is this prerogative reserved for parties with candidates running in said elections;"

Whereas, this question notwithstanding, the wording of Article 46 does not call for major comment, insofar as it states that the Administration shall appoint polling place officials, on the basis of nominations made by the *sous-préfets*, mayors and the political parties;

Whereas however no distinction is made between legally recognized parties and parties with candidates running in the election;

Whereas the answer to the question posed must come from the spirit of the electoral law and the status it grants to political parties;

Whereas political parties as political groups that play an essential role in political life, legally competing for power, must exist legally and demonstrate at each stage of the electoral law that they are acting in accordance with the law, as Articles 31, 43 and 64 of the electoral code specifically set forth;

Whereas any political group wishing to participate in the nomination of polling place officials, can only do so insofar as it remains in the electoral process, as parties enter into or are eliminated from said process;

Whereas each stage in the electoral process brings with it new rights and the consolidation of interests, that are endorsed by law; that the losers who no longer have an interest protected under the law in the competition must withdraw;

Whereas a political party, while it is legally recognized, that no longer has a candidate in the race cannot take part in the nomination of polling place officials;

Whereas this prerogative that belongs at first to legally recognized parties with candidates running in the election, then devolves to only those political groups whose candidates have won in the first round of balloting under the two round, majority vote system;

Whereas it should be said that losing in the competition gradually diminishes or eliminates legal prerogatives, and that this is the logical outcome of the selection process;

Whereas consequently polling-place officials should be appointed in the aforementioned manner;

Hereby

Agrees to hear this case on its merits;

Rules

That the polling places set out in Article 43 as amended and Article 46 can only include members of political parties with candidates remaining in the second round, under the provisions governing the participation of political parties in polling-place teams;

...

In witness whereof this decision was signed by the President and the Chief Clerk of the Court.

Appendix V

Results of the Legislative Elections

Basic Election Data

Total Constituencies	4,590
Registered Voters	3,878,178
Total Voting	1,282,473
Spoiled Ballots	53,847
Valid Votes	1,228,626
Voter Participation	33.07%

Composition of the National Assembly

Political Party	Seats Won [*] by Departmental Constituency								Seats Won [*] by Special Constituency								Total Seats Won
	AZ	DA	DO	MI	TY	TA	ZR	NY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
ANDP	0	0	4	1	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0			11
CDS	1	0	2	5	1	3	9	1			0	0					22
MNSD	2	2	2	3	6	5	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	29
PNDS	1	1	1	2	1	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	13
PNN	0	0	1	0	1		0	0									2
PSDN		1		0			0	0			0	0					1
UDFP		0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0		0			0			2
UPDP			0	1			1	0									2
PMT			0	0	0		0	0									0
PUND	0																0
UDPS										1							1
MDP			0					0									0
Total Seats	4	4	10	13	13	13	14	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	83

* A "0" indicates that the party submitted a full list of candidates in the constituency but did not win any seats. A blank space signifies that the party did not compete in that constituency.

Appendix VI

**Results of the Presidential Election
(First Round)**

Basic Election Data

Constituencies Reporting	4,765
Registered Voters	4,018,494
Total Voting	1,306,412
Spoiled Ballots	35,370
Valid Votes	1,271,042
Voter Participation	32.51%

Number of Votes and Percentages of Total Votes Won

Candidate	Party	Votes Won	% of Total Votes
Tandja Mamadou	MNSD	439,429	34.57
Mahamane Ousmane	CDS	339,113	26.68
Mahamadou Issoufou	PND	197,395	15.53
Adamou M. Djermakoye	AND	191,551	15.07
Illa Kané	UPD	32,866	2.59
Oumarou Youssouf	PPN	25,661	2.02
Omar Katzelma Taya	PSD	23,414	1.84
Djibo Bakary	UDF	21,613	1.70
Total		127,1042	100

Appendix VII

Results of Presidential Election (Second Round)**Basic Election Data**

Constituencies Reporting	4,828
Registered Voters	4,069,333
Total Voting	1,433,393
Spoiled Ballots	30,499
Valid Votes	1,402,894
Voter Participation	35.22%

Number of Votes and Percentage of Total Votes Won

Administrative Region	Mahamane Ousmane		Tandja Mamadou	
	Votes Won	% of Total Votes	Votes Won	% of Total Votes
Agadez	22,095	60.45	11,456	39.55
Diffa	15,760	38.88	24,797	61.14
Dosso	107,077	64.75	58,288	35.25
Maradi	143,194	54.06	121,676	45.94
Tahoua	142,749	55.45	114,695	44.55
Tillabéry	84,772	32.61	175,180	67.39
Zinder	178,091	75.01	59,332	24.99
City of Niamey	48,589	43.93	62,010	56.07
Embassies Abroad	21,149	70.19	8,984	29.81
Totals	763,476	54.42	639,418	45.58

Appendix VIII

**Text of Letter on Coordination from the UN
Electoral Assistance Unit to NDI**

11 December 1992

Dear Mr. Stoddard,

Thank you for your letter of 8 December in which a proposed strategy with respect to the upcoming series of elections in Niger is outlined. We fully endorse the proposal for the United Nations and NDI to work together and assume the role of coordinator for the various groups intending to observe the 1993 legislative and presidential elections. This kind of collaboration is welcomed by the United Nations and we anticipate it will significantly further the democratization process in Niger.

For our part, Mr. James Jonah, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs has informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, by letter of 9 December that the United Nations is prepared, through the office of the Resident Coordinator, to monitor the election process and help coordinate the assistance of international organizations.

As you are aware, from Headquarters we anticipate fielding a mission by Mrs. Louise Kantrow to assist the Resident Coordinator's office in this process. In a coordinated approach, Mrs. Kantrow will be able to provide the liaison between the Resident Coordinator's office, the Government and NDI. In addition she will assist in mobilization of the range of United Nations resources in the field.

...

Again, we look forward to working closely with NDI in coordinating the election process in Niger.

Sincerely yours,

s/

Horacio Boneo, Director
Electoral Assistance Unit
Department of Political Affairs

Appendix IX

**Guidelines for Neutral Election Observing
for the Elections in Niger**

February 1993

(Excerpts from the International Observer Manual)

I. Preface

This manual is designed to prepare those individuals who will monitor the 1993 elections in Niger. The manual highlights the salient aspects of the electoral system and political environment, explains the role of impartial election observers, and suggests the manner in which observers can best carry out their duties.

The manual has been prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a Washington-based, nongovernmental, political development institute that has observed elections in more than 25 countries and has supported domestic monitoring efforts in a similar number of countries. NDI has been active in Niger since March 1992, conducting several programs that have sought to enhance the monitoring capabilities of the political parties. In November 1992, NDI was among several organizations and donor countries invited to observe the Niger elections.

At present, NDI is working with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) coordinate the activities of election observers for the Nigerien elections. An NDI staff person is working in the offices of the UNDP to help organize and coordinate the observer effort and to act as a liaison between international observers and Nigerien election officials.

II. Introduction

In 1991, the Nigerien National Conference, which included over 1,200 delegates representing 24 political parties and civic organizations, created an interim government to oversee Niger's transition to democracy. Amadou Cheifou was named prime minister and André Salifou was chosen to head the Haut conseil de la république (HCR), the interim legislature. Among its several

mandates, the HCR was made responsible for drafting a new constitution and administering multiparty elections.

In furtherance of this mandate, the HCR first enacted an electoral code (*Ordonnance* No. 92-43 du 22 août 1992). The code provides for a National Commission for Elections, which comprises the Minister of the Interior and representatives of all registered political parties, to administer the elections. In Article 149 of the code, the HCR created the *Commission nationale de contrôle et supervision des opérations des élections* (COSUPEL), an independent, nonpartisan, autonomous organization (see also, Deliberation No. 004/HCR, 25 août, 1992). COSUPEL's president, Adamou Kombo, and officers are appointed by the president of the HCR. In addition to its role of assessing the legitimacy of the election process, COSUPEL is responsible for accrediting domestic and international election observers (Article 7).

On December 26, 1992, several donor countries sent small teams to observe the constitutional referendum. Numerous administrative irregularities were evident, but were found not to have materially altered the outcome. The referendum was successfully implemented and approved by an overwhelming margin.

In early January 1993, NDI conducted a pre-election assessment mission in which the election system of Niger and the political conditions in the country were analyzed (a separate describes the findings of the evaluation). Also, NDI and the UN representatives met with foreign diplomats and leaders of nongovernment organizations to determine their interest in participating in a coordinated observer effort.

Given Niger's vast size and limited transportation system, and given that planned observer missions will be relatively small and few in number, a coordinated approach should create an observer capability greater than the sum of its individual parts. In this context, observer groups can maximize their impact if they:

- coordinate pre-election briefing meetings and share information;
- use common or similar terms of reference to guide the observation effort;
- use common or similar reporting forms;
- pool transportation and communication resources;
- coordinate deployment on election day; and

- participate in a joint debriefing after the elections to share observations.

At the same time, the coordinated effort will not oblige individual groups or organizations to present a joint post-election evaluation. Rather, each organization's freedom to issue a separate statement will be respected.

III. The Role of Impartial Election Observers

Traditionally, elections have been monitored by political parties. The parties designate pollwatchers to ensure that the process is not manipulated to their detriment. During the past decade, the role of the neutral and impartial observer has emerged. This development, which includes both domestic monitors and international observers, has been particularly significant in countries undergoing a democratic transition.

Several distinct purposes are served by observing elections from a neutral and impartial perspective:

- public confidence in democracy, in the election system, and in the election results is enhanced;
- the development of fair election laws and practices is encouraged;
- instances of intimidation and violence are diminished;
- election fraud is deterred;
- the occurrence of election fraud is more easily detected and denounced;
- election results, assuming the absence of fraud, are more easily accepted by all parties; and
- the local population and the international community is provided with an objective evaluation of the election process.

IV. What is a Free and Fair Election?

Whether an election is free and fair is a relative determination. It is not an exact science. Rather, the evaluation must be made based on the sum of all reliable evidence and the degree to which any combination of factors may have skewed the true intentions of the voters. The following factors are important:

- An *election atmosphere* free of intimidation, bribery, violence, coercion and anything intended to subvert the true will of the voters;
- *Election procedures* that reasonably guarantee the secrecy of the ballot, the ability to express one's personal choice, the accuracy of the counting, and the announcement of results in a timely fashion;
- Reasonably successful *implementation of election procedures*.

V. Code of Conduct for Observers

In order to promote and preserve the credibility of the overall assessment, you must remain *objective and impartial* in all your activities. You should not express publicly any political party preference. You should work diligently to observe as much of the election process as possible and to research and record your findings in a complete, objective manner.

A. General Comportment

International observers generally do not play the role of supervisor or referee of elections. Elections are an integral event in the self-determination of a country, so observers must be careful to avoid interfering in the host country's internal affairs. At the same time, all observers have an obligation to assess and report on the overall character of the election process. This delicate balance can be successfully maintained if, in all your conduct, you are: *diligent, objective, impartial, and respectful of local customs and laws*.

B. Observing

Your observations and other credible sources of information will form the basis for conclusions about the elections. Therefore, you should document your observations and, in all instances, attempt to distinguish objective from subjective judgments.

C. Relations with the Media

It is useful to tell the media who you are and what you are doing so they can inform the public that observers will be monitoring the elections. However, due to the possibility that any statement you make before or during election day may be taken out of context, it is best not to make any comments regarding your personal observations

on the quality of the election process until after you have presented your summary report to the headquarters of the operation.

D. Reporting

In general, the observer's role can not be complete without a report of what the observer witnessed. This report may be directed to your sponsoring organization, to other observers, to the election officials, to competing political parties, to the media, or to any combination of the above. As with other aspects of an observer's duties, you should base your comments on comprehensive collection of reliable information and the objective, impartial assessment thereof.

As an impartial observer (*i.e.*, not a pollwatcher designated by a competing political party) to these historic elections in Niger, you have accepted an obligation to perform the duties of election observing to the best of your abilities and according to the standards outlined in this manual. It is an obligation that should not be undertaken without serious thought and dedication to the principles of objectively assessing the expression of the Nigerien people.

VI. Niger's Election System

...

VII. Potential Election Irregularities

It is important that you attempt to determine the degree to which any problems affect the quality of the electoral process in your area. Try to observe, research and record the severity, frequency and pattern of any of the following issues and the number of voters influenced.

- Unfair attempts to influence voters or election officials through use of: bribes, employment promises, threats, intimidation, systematic disruption of the election process, unbalanced media access;
- Disenfranchisement of voters through: unreasonably restricting the registration process, unreasonably restricting candidate eligibility, failing to properly list registered voters, failing to distribute voter identification cards, requiring unreasonable supplemental voter identification, systematic complication of the election process, incomplete distribution of election materials;

- Fraud, such as stealing ballots, stuffing ballots, destroying ballots, misreading, miscounting, mistabulating ballots and results, providing misleading reports to the media, voting twice, trying to remove indelible ink;
- Logistical problems, including insufficient number of ballots, ballots missing for certain parties, insufficient number of envelopes, ink that washes off, inadequate secrecy of the vote, missing officials, missing voter registry, no artificial lights; and
- Civic education: voters do not seem to have a reasonable understanding of their right to freely choose a candidate or how to express their choice, and administrators do not have a reasonable understanding of their duties and how to execute them.

VIII. Suggested Activities for Impartial Observers

To effectively observe and report on the election process, you should consider the following suggested activities:

A. *Before Election Day*

- 1) Learn the basic information about the election system and key election laws;
- 2) Become familiar with important election issues, disputes or expected problems;
- 3) Give notice to the public and the authorities of the your objectives and your general program;
- 4) Assess the registration process, the campaign process, the media coverage of the campaign, and the administrative preparations;
- 5) Plan a deployment that will allow maximum quantity and diversity of election observation;
- 6) If possible, identify and contact election officials and candidates in regions you are likely to observe;

B. *Election Day - The Preparations and the Voting*

- 1) Arrive at the first *bureau de vote* (BDV) of your deployment at 7:30 a.m., 30 minutes before the voting is scheduled to start, so you can observe the official opening of the BDV, and stay long enough to detect any missing materials, basic flaws or delays in the commencing of voting;

- 2) Identify yourself as an impartial observer to the appropriate authorities;
- 3) Note on your observer checklist the key data for the BDV (identification, location, name of officers, number of registered voters) and the time of your observations;
- 4) Stand in one place or circulate so that you can observe the important aspects of the voting process, *but do not interfere with the preparations*;
- 5) Observe the identification process and the voting process; observe the atmosphere inside the BDV and outside in the queue;
- 6) Make yourself available to the authorities, the political party delegates, the domestic monitors and the voters if they wish to share their impressions or report problems *but do not pressure them if they appear intimidated*; The code does *not* expressly give international observers the right to record irregularities on the *proces verbal* (P-V), but the officers of the BDV and the political party pollwatchers do have this authority (article 44);
- 7) Research and record on your checklist any observations or reports of irregularities, and try to quantify the effect of the problem;
- 8) Pursue the appeals process as per the election law in cases of serious problems, but remember to avoid disrupting the voting process;
- 9) Stay for a sufficient amount of time to fill out your checklist and to detect possible irregularities, and then move on to the next BDV on your itinerary; and
- 10) *Do no harm*: Above all, do not create or encourage a situation of increased tension if it appears it will harm the objectivity and credibility of the observer mission or if it will significantly increase the threat of violence.

C. Election Day - The Closing of the Polls and Tabulation Process

- 1) If possible, return to the same BDV where you started the day before the voting ends;
- 2) Observe the opening of the urn and the counting of envelopes and note whether the total of envelopes and recorded voters is equal;

- 3) Record on your checklist the total number of votes cast, null votes, disputed votes, votes for each party and total number of registered voters;
- 4) Record any complaints noted on the P-V, verbal complains and other observations;
- 5) Follow (or in some cases pursue) the appeals process for any significant problems or disputes, record the action of the appellate authority and the outcome;
- 6) If you are near the regional headquarters where official election results are gathered, go there to observe and record the tabulation of the regional results; and
- 7) As soon as possible, communicate your observations to the observer mission headquarters.

D. Reporting

- 1) Be sure you have completed all necessary information on the checklist;
- 2) Research and record important complaints and the response from the appellate process;
- 3) Plan to return from your deployment to meet with other election observers and debrief them on your observations; and
- 4) Determine your preliminary assessment of the election process, as a whole; nominate one member of your deployment team to prepare and present the summary of your findings to other observers.

Appendix X

Checklist for Election Day

SUMMARY REPORT
CHECKLIST FOR ELECTION DAY

Name of observer			Date of election				
Polling site: identification (by number and name) Column A	Constituency: village/ region B	Time of arrival/ departure C	Total registered voters D	On average, how long did voters wait in line/ take to check in and vote E	Characterize the problems observed (Index I, #1-9, below) F	Comments (seriousness of problems, quantity of voters effected, names of officials responsible, action taken, etc.) G	Validity of poll, Index II below H
1.		/		/			
2.		/		/			
3.		/		/			
4.		/		/			
5.		/		/			
6.		/		/			
7.		/		/			
8.		/		/			

I. Index of problems (See, Column F, above):

- 1 - problems with election materials (e.g. distribution and use of voting booths, ballot boxes, ink, ballots, etc.)
- 2 - missing polling place officials
- 3 - mistakes by officials in administering the electoral process (e.g. identifying voters, applying ink, etc.)
- 4 - improper permission to vote or manner of voting
- 5 - improper rejection of qualified voters
- 6 - improper refusal to admit accredited observers or pollwatchers

II. Index of validity of the poll (See, Column H, above)

- 7 - undue influence directed at voters (by candidates, parties or authorities)
 - 8 - acts of violence or intimidation (by civilians, by armed forces or police)
 - 9 - other (please explain)
- Characterize the overall quality of voting at each polling station:
 A - Good, little or no problems; B - Acceptable, with minor irregularities;
 C - Serious problems, putting in question validity of results; D - invalid.

Appendix XI

**International and National Observer
Delegations and the Number of
Participating Observers**

Delegation	Legislative Elections	First-Round Presidential Election	Second- Round Presidential Election
<i>International Observers</i>			
Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation		8	
Belgium	2	8	8
Benin	3	3	3
Burkina Faso		1	
Canada	17	16	11
Chad			1
Denmark	9		
Egypt	1	1	1
France	50	54	44
Germany	5	6	5
Italy	1	1	1
Côte D'Ivoire (GERDDES)		1	1
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	4	5	4
Netherlands	5		
Nigeria	1	1	

Delegation	Legislative Elections	First-Round Presidential Election	Second- Round Presidential Election
Organization of African Unity (OAU)		4	4
Switzerland		3	2
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	16	20	20
<i>Nigerien National Observers</i>			
Democratic Association for the Development of Liberty (DLD)	9	10	5
LNDH-GARKUAR DAN-ADAM	9	10	5
Nigerien Association for the Protection of Human Rights (ANDDH)	4	10	11

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was established in 1983. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain, and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. The Institute is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has a staff of 100 with field offices in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

NDI has conducted democratic development programs with more than 50 countries. Programs focus on six major areas:

Political Party Training: NDI conducts multipartisan training seminars in political development with a broad spectrum of democratic parties. NDI draws expert trainers from around the world to forums where members of fledgling parties learn first-hand the techniques of organization, communication and constituent contact.

Election Processes: NDI provides technical assistance for political parties and nonpartisan associations to conduct voter and civic education campaigns, and to organize election monitoring programs. The Institute has also organized more than 35 international observer delegations.

Legislative Training: NDI has organized legislative seminars focusing on legislative procedures, staffing, research information, constituent services and committee structures.

Local Government: Technical assistance on models of city management has been provided to national legislatures and municipal governments.

Civil Military Relations: NDI brings together military and political leaders to promote dialogue and establish mechanisms for improving civil-military relations.

Civic Education: NDI supports and advises nonpartisan groups and political parties engaged in civic and voter education programs.

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